

Black People and Politics in the 1980s

1. MARXIST THEORY

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In the *Iliad* the ruler of men, Agamemnon, appears, not as the supreme king of the Greeks, but as supreme commander of a federal army before a besieged city. And when dissension broke out among the Greeks, it is to this quality of his that Odysseus points in the famous passage; the commanding of many is not a good thing; let us have one commander, etc. (to which the popular verse about the sceptre was added later).^{*} "Odysseus is not here lecturing on the form of government, but is demanding obedience to the supreme commander of the army in the field. For the Greeks, who appear before Troy only as an army, the proceedings in the *agora* are sufficiently democratic. When speaking of gifts, that is, the division of the spoils, Achilles never makes Agamemnon or some other *basileus* the divider, but always the 'sons of the Achaeans,' that is to say, the people. The attributes 'begotten of Zeus,' 'nourished by Zeus,' do not prove anything, because *every gens* is descended from some god, and the gens of the tribal chief from a 'prominent' god, in this case Zeus. Even bondsmen, such as the swineherd Eumeaus and others, are 'divine' (*dioi* or *theioi*), even in the *Odyssey*, and hence in a much later period than the *Iliad*. Likewise in the *Odyssey*, we find the name of *heros* given to the herald Mulios as well as to the blind bard Demodocus. In short, the word *basileia*, which the Greek writers apply to Homer's so-called kingship (because military leadership is its chief distinguishing mark), with the council and popular assembly alongside of it, means merely—military democracy." (Marx.)

Besides military functions, the *basileus* had also sacerdotal and judicial functions; the latter were not clearly specified, but the former he exercised in his capacity of highest representative of the tribe, or of the confederacy of tribes. There is no reference anywhere to civil, administrative functions; but it seems that he was *ex officio* a member of the council. Etymologically, it is quite correct to translate *basileus* as king, because king (*kuning*) is derived from *kuni*, *künne*, and signifies chief of a gens. But the old-Greek *basileus* in no wise corresponds to the modern meaning of the word king. Thucydides expressly refers to the old *basileia* as *patrikē*, that is, derived from the gens, and states that it had specified, hence restricted, functions. And Aristotle says that the *basileia* of the Heroic Age was a leadership over freemen, and that the *basileus* was a military chief, judge and high priest. Hence, the *basileus* had no governmental power in the later sense.^{**}

^{*} Homer, *Iliad*, Ode II.—Ed.

^{**} Like the Grecian *basileus*, the Aztec military chief has been wrongly presented as a prince in the modern sense. Morgan was the first to subject to historical criticism the reports of the Spaniards, who at first misunderstood and exaggerated, and later deliberately misrepresented things; he showed that

Thus, in the Grecian constitution of the Heroic Age, we still find the old gentile system full of vigour; but we also see the beginning of its decay: father right and the inheritance of property by the children, which favoured the accumulation of wealth in the family and gave the latter power as against the gens; differentiation in wealth affecting in turn the social constitution by creating first rudiments of a hereditary nobility and monarchy; slavery, first limited to prisoners of war, but already paving the way to the enslavement of fellow members of the tribe and even of the gens; the degeneration of the old intertribal warfare to systematic raids, on land and sea, for the purpose of capturing cattle, slaves, and treasure as a regular means of gaining a livelihood. In short, wealth is praised and respected as the highest treasure, and the old gentile institutions are perverted in order to justify forcible robbery of wealth. Only one thing was missing: an institution that would not only safeguard the newly-acquired property of private individuals against the communistic traditions of the gentile order, would not only sanctify private property, formerly held in such light esteem, and pronounce this sanctification the highest purpose of human society, but would also stamp the gradually developing new forms of acquiring property, and consequently, of constantly accelerating increase in wealth, with the seal of general public recognition; an institution that would perpetuate, not only the newly-rising class division of society, but also the right of the possessing class to exploit the non-possessing classes and the rule of the former over the latter.

And this institution arrived. The *state* was invented.

V

THE RISE OF THE ATHENIAN STATE

How the state developed, some of the organs of the gentile constitution being transformed, some displaced, by the intrusion of new organs, and, finally, all superseded by real governmental authorities—while the place of the actual "people in arms" defending itself through its gentes, phratries and tribes was taken by an armed "public power" at the service of these authorities and, therefore, also available against the people—all this can nowhere

the Mexicans were in the middle stage of barbarism, but on a higher plane than the New Mexican Pueblo Indians, and that their constitution, so far as the garbled accounts enable us to judge, corresponded to the following: a confederacy of three tribes, which had made a number of others tributary, and which was governed by a Federal Council and a federal military chief, whom the Spaniards had made into an "emperor." [Note by Engels.]

be traced better, at least in its initial stage, than in ancient Athens. The forms of the changes are, in the main, described by Morgan; the economic content which gave rise to them I had largely to add myself.

In the Heroic Age, the four tribes of the Athenians were still installed in separate parts of Attica. Even the twelve phratries comprising them seem still to have had separate seats in the twelve towns of Cecrops. The constitution was that of the Heroic Age: a popular assembly, a popular council, a *basileus*. As far back as written history goes we find the land already divided up and transformed into private property, which corresponds with the relatively developed state of commodity production and a commensurate commodity trade towards the end of the higher stage of barbarism. In addition to cereals, wine and oil were cultivated. Commerce on the Aegean Sea passed more and more from Phoenician into Attic hands. As a result of the purchase and sale of land and the continued division of labour between agriculture and handicrafts, trade and navigation, the members of gentes, phratries and tribes very soon intermingled. The districts of the phratry and the tribe received inhabitants who, although they were fellow countrymen, did not belong to these bodies and, therefore, were strangers in their own places of residence. For in time of peace, every phratry and every tribe administered its own affairs without consulting the popular council or the *basileus* in Athens. But inhabitants of the area of the phratry or tribe not belonging to either naturally could not take part in the administration.

This so disturbed the regulated functioning of the organs of the gentile constitution that a remedy was already needed in the Heroic Age. A constitution, attributed to Theseus, was introduced. The main feature of this change was the institution of a central administration in Athens, that is to say, some of the affairs that hitherto had been conducted independently by the tribes were declared to be common affairs and transferred to a general council sitting in Athens. Thereby, the Athenians went a step further than any ever taken by any indigenous people in America: the simple federation of neighbouring tribes was now supplanted by the coalescence of all the tribes into one single people. This gave rise to a system of general Athenian popular law, which stood above the legal usages of the tribes and gentes. It bestowed on the citizens of Athens, as such, certain rights and additional legal protection even in territory that was not their own tribe's. This, however, was the first step towards undermining the gentile constitution; for it was the first step towards the subsequent admission of citizens who were alien to all the Attic tribes and were and remained entirely

outside the pale of the Athenian gentile constitution. A second institution attributed to Theseus was the division of the entire people, irrespective of gentes, phratries and tribes, into three classes: *eupatrides*, or nobles; *geomoroi*, or tillers of the land; and *demiurgi*, or artisans, and the granting to the nobles of the exclusive right to public office. True, apart from reserving to the nobles the right to hold public office, this division remained inoperative, as it created no other legal distinctions between the classes. It is important, however, because it reveals to us the new social elements that had quietly developed. It shows that the customary holding of office in the gens by certain families had already developed into a privilege of these families that was little contested; that these families, already powerful owing to their wealth, began to unite outside of their gentes into a privileged class; and that the nascent state sanctioned this usurpation. It shows, furthermore, that the division of labour between husbandmen and artisans had become strong enough to contest the superiority, socially, of the old division into gentes and tribes. And finally, it proclaimed the irreconcilable antagonism between gentile society and the state. The first attempt to form a state consisted in breaking up the gentes by dividing the members of each into a privileged and an inferior class, and the latter again into two vocational classes, thus setting one against the other.

The ensuing political history of Athens up to the time of Solon is only incompletely known. The office of *basileus* fell into disuse; *archons*, elected from among the nobility, became the heads of the state. The rule of the nobility steadily increased until, round about 600 B.C., it became unbearable. The principal means for stifling the liberty of the commonalty were—money and usury. The nobility lived mainly in and around Athens, where maritime commerce, with occasional piracy still as a sideline, enriched it and concentrated monetary wealth in its hands. From this point the developing money system penetrated like a corroding acid into the traditional life of the rural communities founded on natural economy. The gentile constitution is absolutely incompatible with the money system. The ruin of the Attic small-holding peasants coincided with the loosening of the old gentile bonds that protected them. Creditor's bills and mortgage bonds—for by then the Athenians had also invented the mortgage—respected neither the gens nor the phratry. But the old gentile constitution knew nothing of money, credit and monetary debt. Hence the constantly expanding money rule of the nobility gave rise to a new law, that of custom, to protect the creditor against the debtor and sanction the exploitation of the small peasant by the money owner. All the rural districts of Attica bristled with mortgage posts

bearing the legend that the lot on which they stood was mortgaged to so and so for so and so much. The fields that were not so designated had for the most part been sold on account of overdue mortgages or non-payment of interest and had become the property of the noble-born usurers; the peasant was glad if he was permitted to remain as a tenant and live on *one-sixth* of the product of his labour while paying *five-sixths* to his new master as rent. More than that: if the sum obtained from the sale of the lot did not cover the debt, or if such a debt was not secured by a pledge, the debtor had to sell his children into slavery abroad in order to satisfy the creditor's claim. The sale of his children by the father—such was the first fruit of father right and monogamy! And if the blood-sucker was still unsatisfied, he could sell the debtor himself into slavery. Such was the pleasant dawn of civilisation among the Athenian people.

Formerly, when the conditions of life of the people were still in keeping with the gentile constitution, such a revolution would have been impossible; but here it had come about nobody knew how. Let us return for a moment to the Iroquois. Among them a state of things like that which had now imposed itself on the Athenians without their own doing, so to say, and certainly against their will, was inconceivable. There the mode of production of the means of subsistence, which, year in and year out, remained unchanged, could never give rise to such conflicts, imposed from without, as it were; to antagonism between rich and poor, between exploiters and exploited. The Iroquois were still far from controlling the forces of nature; but within the limits set for them by nature they were masters of their production. Apart from bad harvests in their little gardens, the exhaustion of the fish supply in their lakes and rivers, or of game in their forests, they knew what the outcome would be of their mode of gaining a livelihood. The outcome would be: means of sustenance, meagre or abundant; but it could never be unpremeditated social upheavals, the severing of gentile bonds, or the splitting of the members of gentes and tribes into antagonistic classes fighting each other. Production was carried on within the most restricted limits, but—the producers exercised control over their own product. This was the immense advantage of barbarian production that was lost with the advent of civilisation; and to win it back on the basis of the enormous control man now exercises over the forces of nature, and of the free association that is now possible, will be the task of the next generations.

Not so among the Greeks. The appearance of private property in herds of cattle and articles of luxury led to exchange between individuals, to the transformation of products into *commodities*.

Here lies the root of the entire revolution that followed. When the producers no longer directly consumed their product, but let it go out of their hands in the course of exchange, they lost control over it. They no longer knew what became of it, and the possibility arose that the product might some day be turned against the producers, used as a means of exploiting and oppressing them. Hence, no society can for any length of time remain master of its own production and continue to control the social effects of its process of production, unless it abolishes exchange between individuals.

The Athenians were soon to learn, however, how quickly after individual exchange is established and products are converted into commodities, the product manifests its rule over the producer. With the production of commodities came the tilling of the soil by individual cultivators for their own account, soon followed by individual ownership of the land. Then came money, that universal commodity for which all others could be exchanged. But when men invented money they little suspected that they were creating a new social power, the one universal power to which the whole of society must bow. It was this new power, suddenly sprung into existence without the will or knowledge of its own creators, that the Athenians felt in all the brutality of its youth.

What was to be done? The old gentile organisation had not only proved impotent against the triumphant march of money; it was also absolutely incapable of providing a place within its framework for such things as money, creditors, debtors and the forcible collection of debts. But the new social power was there, and neither pious wishes nor a longing for the return of the good old times could drive money and usury out of existence. Moreover, a number of other, minor breaches had been made in the gentile constitution. The indiscriminate mingling of the gentiles and phratry throughout the whole of Attica, and especially in the city of Athens, increased from generation to generation, in spite of the fact that an Athenian, while allowed to sell plots of land out of his gens, was still prohibited from thus selling his dwelling house. The division of labour between the different branches of production—agriculture, handicraft, numerous skills within the various crafts, trade, navigation, etc.—had developed more fully with the progress of industry and commerce. The population was now divided according to occupation into rather well-defined groups, each of which had a number of new, common interests that found no place in the gens or phratry and, therefore, necessitated the creation of new offices to attend to them. The number of slaves had increased considerably and

must have far exceeded that of the free Athenians even at this early stage. The gentile constitution originally knew no slavery and was, therefore, ignorant of any means of holding this mass of bondsmen in check. And finally, commerce had attracted a great many strangers who settled in Athens because it was easier to make money there, and according to the old constitution these strangers enjoyed neither rights nor the protection of the law. In spite of traditional toleration, they remained a disturbing and foreign element among the people.

In short, the gentile constitution was coming to an end. Society was daily growing more and more out of it; it was powerless to check or allay even the most distressing evils that were arising under its very eyes. In the meantime, however, the state had quietly developed. The new groups formed by division of labour, first between town and country, then between the various branches of urban industry, had created new organs to protect their interests. Public offices of every description were instituted. And then the young state needed, above all, its own fighting forces, which among the seafaring Athenians could at first be only naval forces, to be used for occasional small wars and to protect merchant vessels. At some uncertain time before Solon, the naucraries were instituted, small territorial districts, twelve in each tribe. Every naucrary had to furnish, equip and man a war vessel and, in addition, detail two horsemen. This arrangement was a twofold attack on the gentile constitution. First, it created a public power which was no longer simply identical with the armed people in its totality; secondly, it for the first time divided the people for public purposes, not according to kinship groups, but territorially, according to *common domicile*. We shall see what this signified.

As the gentile constitution could not come to the assistance of the exploited people, they could look only to the rising state. And the state brought help in the form of the constitution of Solon, while at the same time strengthening itself anew at the expense of the old constitution. Solon—the manner in which his reform of 594 B. C. was brought about does not concern us here—started the series of so-called political revolutions by an encroachment on property. All revolutions until now have been revolutions for the protection of one kind of property against another kind of property. They cannot protect one kind without violating another. In the Great French Revolution feudal property was sacrificed in order to save bourgeois property; in Solon's constitution creditors' property had to suffer for the benefit of debtors' property. The debts were simply annulled. We are not acquainted with the exact details, but Solon boasts in his poems

that he removed the mortgage posts from the encumbered lands and enabled all who had fled or had been sold abroad for debt to return home. This could have been done only by openly violating property rights. And indeed, the object of all so-called political revolutions, from first to last, was to protect *one* kind of property by confiscating—also called stealing—*another* kind of property. It is thus absolutely true that for 2,500 years private property could be protected only by violating property rights.

But now a way had to be found to prevent such re-enslavement of the free Athenians. This was first achieved by general measures; for example, the prohibition of contracts which involved the personal hypothecation of the debtor. Furthermore, a maximum was fixed for the amount of land any one individual could own, in order to put some curb, at least, on the craving of the nobility for the peasants' land. Then followed constitutional amendments, of which the most important for us are the following:

The council was increased to four hundred members, one hundred from each tribe. Here, then, the tribe still served as a basis. But this was the only side of the old constitution that was incorporated in the new body politic. For the rest, Solon divided the citizens into four classes, according to the amount of land owned and its yield. Five hundred, three hundred and one hundred and fifty medimni of grain (1 medimnus equals appr. 41 litres) were the minimum yields for the first three classes; whoever had less land or none at all belonged to the fourth class. Only members of the first three classes could hold office; the highest offices were filled by the first class. The fourth class had only the right to speak and vote in the popular assembly. But here all officials were elected, here they had to give account of their actions, here all the laws were made, and here the fourth class was in the majority. The aristocratic privileges were partly renewed in the form of privileges of wealth, but the people retained the decisive power. The four classes also formed the basis for the reorganisation of the fighting forces. The first two classes furnished the cavalry, the third had to serve as heavy infantry; the fourth served as light infantry, without armour, or in the navy, and probably were paid.

Thus, an entirely new element was introduced into the constitution: private ownership. The rights and duties of the citizens were graduated according to the amount of land they owned; and as the propertied classes gained influence the old consanguine groups were driven into the background. The gentile constitution suffered another defeat.

The gradation of political rights according to property, however,

was not an indispensable institution for the state. Important as it may have been in the constitutional history of states, nevertheless, a good many states, and the most completely developed at that, did without it. Even in Athens it played only a transient role. Since the time of Aristides, all offices were open to all the citizens.

During the next eighty years Athenian society gradually took the course along which it further developed in subsequent centuries. Usurious land operations, rampant in the pre-Solon period, were checked, as was the unlimited concentration of landed property. Commerce and the handicrafts and useful arts conducted on an ever-increasing scale with slave labour became the predominant branches of occupation. Enlightenment made progress. Instead of exploiting their own fellow-citizens in the old brutal manner, the Athenians now exploited mainly the slaves and non-Athenian clients. Movable property, wealth in money, slaves and ships, increased more and more; but instead of being simply a means for purchasing land, as in the first period with its limitations, it became an end in itself. This, on the one hand, gave rise to the successful competition of the new, wealthy industrial and commercial class with the old power of the nobility, but, on the other hand, it deprived the old gentile constitution of its last foothold. The gentes, phratries and tribes, whose members were now scattered all over Attica and lived completely intermingled, thus became entirely useless as political bodies. A large number of Athenian citizens did not belong to any gens; they were immigrants who had been adopted into citizenship, but not into any of the old bodies of *consanguinei*. Besides, there was a steadily increasing number of foreign immigrants who only enjoyed protection.¹⁶⁹

Meanwhile, the struggles of the parties proceeded. The nobility tried to regain its former privileges and for a short time recovered its supremacy, until the revolution of Cleisthenes (509 B.C.) brought about its final downfall; and with them fell the last remnants of the gentile constitution.

In his new constitution, Cleisthenes ignored the four old tribes based on the gentes and phratries. Their place was taken by an entirely new organisation based exclusively on the division of the citizens according to place of domicile, already attempted in the naucreries. Not membership of a body of *consanguinei*, but place of domicile was now the deciding factor. Not people, but territory was now divided; politically, the inhabitants became mere attachments of the territory.

The whole of Attica was divided into one hundred self-governing townships, or demes. The citizens (demots) of a deme elected

their official head (demarch), a treasurer and thirty judges with jurisdiction in minor cases. They also received their own temple and a tutelary deity, or *heros*, whose priests they elected. The supreme power in the deme was the assembly of the demots. This, as Morgan correctly remarks, is the prototype of the self-governing American municipality. The modern state in its highest development ends with the very unit with which the rising state in Athens began.

Ten of these units (demes) formed a tribe, which, however, as distinct from the old gentile tribe (*Geschlechtsstamm*), was now called a local tribe (*Ortsstamm*). The local tribe was not only a self-governing political body, but also a military body. It elected a phylarch or tribal head, who commanded the cavalry, a taxiarch, who commanded the infantry, and a *strategos*, who was in command of the entire contingent raised in the tribal territory. Furthermore, it furnished five war vessels with crews and commander; and it received an Attic *heros*, by whose name it was known, as its guardian saint. Finally, it elected fifty councillors to the council of Athens.

The consummation was the Athenian state, governed by a council of five hundred—elected by the ten tribes—and, in the last instance, by the popular assembly, which every Athenian citizen could attend and vote in. Archons and other officials attended to the different departments of administration and the courts. In Athens there was no official possessing supreme executive authority.

By this new constitution and by the admission of a large number of dependents (*Schutzverwandter*), partly immigrants and partly freed slaves, the organs of the gentile constitution were eliminated from public affairs. They sank to the position of private associations and religious societies. But their moral influence, the traditional conceptions and views of the old gentile period, survived for a long time and expired only gradually. This became evident in a subsequent state institution.

We have seen that an essential feature of the state is a public power distinct from the mass of the people. At that time Athens possessed only a militia and a navy equipped and manned directly by the people. These afforded protection against external enemies and held the slaves in check, who at that time already constituted the great majority of the population. For the citizens, this public power at first existed only in the shape of the police force, which is as old as the state, and that is why the naïve Frenchmen of the eighteenth century spoke, not of civilised, but of policed nations (*nations policées*).* Thus, simultaneously with their state, the

* A play on words: *policé*—civilised, *police*—police.—Ed.

Athenians established a police force, a veritable gendarmerie of foot and mounted bowmen—*Landjäger*, as they say in South Germany and Switzerland. This gendarmerie consisted—of slaves. The free Athenian regarded this police duty as being so degrading that he preferred being arrested by an armed slave rather than perform such ignominious duties himself. This was still an expression of the old gentile mentality. The state could not exist without a police force, but it was still young and did not yet command sufficient moral respect to give prestige to an occupation that necessarily appeared infamous to the old gentiles.

How well this state, now completed in its main outlines, suited the new social condition of the Athenians was apparent from the rapid growth of wealth, commerce and industry. The class antagonism on which the social and political institutions rested was no longer that between the nobles and the common people, but that between slaves and freemen, dependents and citizens. When Athens was at the height of prosperity the total number of free Athenian citizens, women and children included, amounted to about 90,000; the slaves of both sexes numbered 365,000, and the dependents—immigrants and freed slaves—45,000. Thus, for every adult male citizen there were at least eighteen slaves and more than two dependents. The large number of slaves is explained by the fact that many of them worked together in manufactories with large rooms under overseers. With the development of commerce and industry came the accumulation and concentration of wealth in a few hands; the mass of the free citizens was impoverished and had to choose between going into handicrafts and competing with slave labour, which was considered ignoble and base and, moreover, promised little success—and complete pauperisation. Under the prevailing circumstances what happened was the latter, and being in the majority they dragged the whole Athenian state down with them. It was not democracy that caused the downfall of Athens, as the European schoolmasters who cringe before royalty would have us believe, but slavery, which brought the labour of the free citizen into contempt.

The rise of the state among the Athenians presents a very typical example of state building in general; because, on the one hand, it took place in a pure form, without the interference of violence, external or internal (the short period of usurpation by Pisistratus left no trace behind it); because, on the other hand, it represented the rise of a highly-developed form of state, the democratic republic, emerging directly out of gentile society; and lastly, because we are sufficiently acquainted with all the essential details.

VI

THE GENS AND THE STATE IN ROME

According to the legend about the foundation of Rome, the first settlement was undertaken by a number of Latin gentes (one hundred, the legend says) united into one tribe. A Sabellian tribe, also said to consist of one hundred gentes, soon followed, and finally a third tribe of various elements, again numbering one hundred gentes, joined them. The whole story reveals at the very first glance that here hardly anything except the gens was a natural product, and that the gens itself, in many cases, was only an offshoot of a mother gens still existing in the old habitat. The tribes bear the mark of having been artificially constituted; nevertheless, they consisted mostly of kindred elements and were formed on the model of the old, naturally grown, not artificially constituted, tribe; and it is not improbable that a genuine old tribe formed the nucleus of each of these three tribes. The connecting link, the phratry, contained ten gentes and was called the *curia*. Hence, there were thirty of them.

That the Roman gens was an institution identical with the Grecian gens is a recognised fact; if the Grecian gens was a continuation of the social unit the primitive form of which is presented by the American Redskins, then the same, naturally, holds good for the Roman gens. Hence, we can be more brief in its treatment.

At least during the earliest times of the city, the Roman gens had the following constitution:

1. Mutual right of inheritance of the property of deceased gentiles; the property remained in the gens. Since father right was already in force in the Roman gens, as it was in the Grecian gens, the offspring of female lineage were excluded. According to the law of the Twelve Tables, the oldest written law of Rome known to us,¹⁷⁰ the natural children had the first title to the estate; in case no natural children existed, the *agnates* (kin of male lineage) took their place; and in their absence came the gentiles. In all cases the property remained in the gens. Here we observe the gradual infiltration into gentile practice of new legal provisions, caused by increased wealth and monogamy: the originally equal right of inheritance of the gentiles was first limited in practice to the *agnates*, probably at a very remote date as mentioned above, and afterwards to the children and their offspring in the male line. Of course, in the Twelve Tables this appears in reverse order.

2. Possession of a common burial place. The patrician gens

Claudia, on immigrating into Rome from Regilli, received a plot and also a common burial place in the city. Even under Augustus, the head of Varus, who had fallen in the Teutoburg Forest, was brought to Rome and interred in the *gentilitius tumulus**; hence, his gens (Quinctilia) still had its own tomb.

3. Common religious celebrations. These, the *sacra gentilitia*** are well known.

4. Obligation not to marry within the gens. In Rome this does not appear to have ever become a written law, but the custom remained. Of the innumerable names of Roman married couples that have come down to our day there is not a single case where husband and wife have the same gentile name. The law of inheritance also proves this rule. A woman by her marriage forfeited her agnatic rights, left her gens, and neither she nor her children could inherit her father's property, or that of his brothers, for otherwise the father's gens would lose the property. This rule has a meaning only on the assumption that the woman was not permitted to marry a member of her own gens.

5. Possession of land in common. In primeval times this always obtained when the tribal territory was first divided. Among the Latin tribes we find the land partly in the possession of the tribe, partly of the gens, and partly of households that could hardly have represented single families at that time. Romulus is credited with having been the first to assign land to single individuals, about a hectare (two *jugera*) to each. Nevertheless, even later we still find land in the hands of the gentes, not to mention state lands, around which the whole internal history of the republic turned.

6. Reciprocal obligation of members of the gens to assist and help redress injuries. Written history records only paltry remnants of this; from the outset the Roman state manifested such superior power that the duty of redress of injury devolved upon it. When Appius Claudius was arrested, his whole gens, including his personal enemies, put on mourning. At the time of the second Punic War¹⁷¹ the gentes united to ransom their fellow gentiles who were in captivity; they were *forbidden* to do this by the senate.

7. Right to bear the gentile name. This was in force until the time of the emperors. Freed slaves were permitted to assume the gentile names of their former masters, although without gentile rights.

8. Right of adopting strangers into the gens. This was done by adoption into a family (as among the Red Indians), which brought with it adoption into the gens.

* Mound of the gens.—Ed.

** Sacred celebrations of the gens.—Ed.

9. The right to elect and depose chiefs is nowhere mentioned. Inasmuch, however, as during the first period of Rome's existence all offices, from the elective king downward, were filled by election or appointment, and as the *curiae* elected also their own priests, we are justified in assuming that the same existed in regard to the gentile chiefs (*principes*)—no matter how well-established the rule of choosing the candidates from the same family may have been already.

Such were the powers of a Roman gens. With the exception of the complete transition to father right, they are the true image of the rights and duties of an Iroquois gens. Here, too, "the Iroquois is plainly discerned."

The confusion that still reigns even among our most authoritative historians on the question of the Roman gentile order is shown by the following example: In his treatise on Roman proper names of the Republican and Augustinian era (*Roman Researches*, Berlin 1864, Vol. I), Mommsen writes:

"The gentile name is not only borne by all male gentiles, including adopted persons and wards, except, of course, the slaves, but also by the women. . . . The tribe [*Stamm*] (as Mommsen here translates *gens*) is . . . a community derived from a common—actual, assumed or even invented—ancestor and united by common rites, burial places and inheritance. All personally free individuals, hence women also, may and must be registered in them. But determining the gentile name of a married woman offers some difficulty. This indeed did not exist as long as women were prohibited from marrying anyone but members of their own gens; and evidently for a long time the women found it much more difficult to marry outside the gens than in it. This right, the *gentis enuptio**, was still bestowed as a personal privilege and reward during the sixth century. . . . But wherever such outside marriages occurred the woman in primeval times must have been transferred to the tribe of her husband. Nothing is more certain than that by the old religious marriage the woman fully joined the legal and sacramental community of her husband and left her own. Who does not know that the married woman forfeits her active and passive right of inheritance in respect to her gentiles, but enters the inheritance group of her husband, her children and his gentiles? And if her husband adopts her as his child and brings her into his family, how can she remain separated from his gens?" (Pp. 8-11.)

Thus, Mommsen asserts that Roman women belonging to a certain gens were originally free to marry only *within* their gens; according to him, the Roman gens, therefore, was endogamous, not exogamous. This opinion, which contradicts the experience of all other peoples, is principally, if not exclusively, based on a single, disputed passage in Livy (Book xxxix, ch. 19) according to which the senate decreed in the year 568 of the City, that is, 186 B. C.,

* Of marrying outside the gens.—Ed.

ut Feceniae Hispanae datio, deminutio, gentis enuptio, tutoris optio item esset quasi ei vir testamento dedisset; utique ei ingenuo nubere liceret, neu quid ei qui eam duxisset, ob id fraudi ignominiaeve esset—that Fecenia Hispana shall have the right to dispose of her property, to diminish it, to marry outside of the gens, to choose a guardian, just as if her (deceased) husband had conferred this right on her by testament; that she shall be permitted to marry a freeman and that for the man who marries her this shall not constitute a misdemeanour or disgrace.

Undoubtedly, Fecenia, a freed slave, here obtained permission to marry outside of the gens. And it is equally doubtless, according to this, that the husband had the right to confer on his wife by testament the right to marry outside of the gens after his death. But outside of *which* gens?

If a woman had to marry in her gens, as Mommsen assumes, then she remained in this gens after her marriage. In the first place, however, this assertion that the gens was endogamous is the very thing to be proved. In the second place, if the woman had to marry in the gens, then naturally the man had to do the same, otherwise he could never get a wife. Then we arrive at a state where a man could by testament confer on his wife a right which he did not possess himself for his own enjoyment, which brings us to a legal absurdity. Mommsen realises this, and therefore conjectures:

"marriage outside of the gens most probably required in law not only the consent of the person authorised, but of all members of the gens." (P. 10, note.)

First, this is a very bold assumption; and secondly, it contradicts the clear wording of the passage. The senate gives her this right as her *husband's proxy*; it expressly gives her no more and no less than her husband could have given her; but what it does give is an *absolute* right, free from all restriction, so that, if she should make use of it, her new husband shall not suffer in consequence. The senate even instructs the present and future consuls and praetors to see that she suffers no inconvenience from the use of this right. Mommsen's supposition, therefore, appears to be absolutely inadmissible.

Then again: suppose a woman married a man from another gens, but remained in her own gens. According to the passage quoted above, her husband would then have the right to permit his wife to marry outside of her own gens. That is, he would have the right to make provisions in regard to the affairs of a gens to which he did not belong at all. The thing is so utterly unreasonable that we need say no more about it.

Nothing remains but to assume that in her first marriage the

woman wedded a man from another gens and thereby became without more ado a member of her husband's gens, which Mommsen himself admits for such cases. Then the whole matter at once explains itself. The woman, torn from her old gens by her marriage, and adopted into her husband's gentile group, occupies a special position in the new gens. She is now a gentile, but not a kin by blood; the manner in which she was adopted excludes from the outset all prohibition of marrying in the gens into which she has entered by marriage. She has, moreover, been adopted into the marriage group of the gens and on her husband's death inherits some of his property, that is to say, the property of a fellow member of the gens. What is more natural than that this property should remain in the gens and that she should be obliged to marry a member of her first husband's gens and no other? If, however, an exception is to be made, who is more competent to authorise this than the man who bequeathed this property to her, her first husband? At the time he bequeathed a part of his property to her and simultaneously gave her permission to transfer this property to another gens by marriage, or as a result of marriage, he was still the owner of this property; hence he was literally only disposing of his own property. As for the woman and her relation to her husband's gens, it was the husband who, by an act of his own free will—the marriage—introduced her into his gens. Thus, it appears quite natural, too, that he should be the proper person to authorise her to leave this gens by another marriage. In short, the matter appears simple and obvious as soon as we discard the strange conception of an endogamous Roman gens and, with Morgan, regard it as having originally been exogamous.

Finally, there is still another view, which has probably found the largest number of advocates, namely, that the passage in Livy only means

"that freed slave girls (*libertae*) cannot, without special permission, *e gente enubere* (marry outside of the gens) or take any step which, being connected with *capitis deminutio minima*,* would result in the *liberta* leaving the gentile group." (Lange, *Roman Antiquities*, Berlin 1856, Vol. I, p. 195, where the passage we have taken from Livy is commented on in a reference to Huschke.)

If this assumption is correct, the passage proves still less as regards the status of free Roman women, and there is so much less ground for speaking of their obligation to marry in the gens.

The expression *enuptio gentis* occurs only in this single passage

* Slightest loss of family rights.—Ed.

and is not found anywhere else in the entire Roman literature. The word *enubere*, to marry outside, is found only three times, also in Livy, and not in reference to the gens. The fantastic idea that Roman women were permitted to marry only in their gens owes its existence solely to this single passage. But it cannot be sustained in the least; for either the passage refers to special restrictions for freed slave women, in which case it proves nothing for free-born women (*ingenuae*); or it applies also to free-born women, in which case it rather proves that the women as a rule married outside of the gens and were by their marriage transferred to their husbands' gens. Hence it speaks against Mommsen and for Morgan.

Almost three hundred years after the foundation of Rome the gentile bonds were still so strong that a patrician gens, the Fabians, with permission from the senate could undertake by itself an expedition against the neighbouring town of Veii. Three hundred and six Fabians are said to have marched out and to have been killed in an ambush. A single boy, left behind, propagated the gens.

As we have said, ten gentes formed a phratry, which here was called a *curia*, and was endowed with more important functions than the Grecian phratry. Every *curia* had its own religious practices, sacred relics and priests. The latter in a body formed one of the Roman colleges of priests. Ten *curiae* formed a tribe, which probably had originally its own elected chief—leader in war and high priest—like the rest of the Latin tribes. The three tribes together formed the Roman people, the *populus Romanus*.

Thus, only those could belong to the Roman people who were members of a gens, and hence of a *curia* and tribe. The first constitution of this people was as follows. Public affairs were conducted by the senate composed, as Niebuhr was the first to state correctly, of the chiefs of the three hundred gentes; as the elders of the gentes they were called fathers, *patres*, and as a body senate (council of elders, from *senex*, old). Here too the customary choice of men from the same family in each gens brought into being the first hereditary nobility. These families called themselves patricians and claimed the exclusive right to the seats in the senate and to all other offices. The fact that in the course of time the people allowed this claim so that it became an actual right is expressed in the legend that Romulus bestowed the rank of patrician and its privileges on the first senators and their descendants. The senate, like the Athenian *boulê*, had power to decide in many affairs and to undertake the preliminary discussion of more important measures, espe-

cially of new laws. These were decided by the popular assembly, called *comitia curiata* (assembly of *curiae*). The assembled people are grouped by *curiae*, in each *curia* probably by gentes, and in deciding questions each of the thirty *curiae* had one vote. The assembly of *curiae* adopted or rejected laws, elected all higher officials including the *rex* (so-called king), declared war (but the senate concluded peace), and decided as a supreme court, on appeal of the parties, all cases involving capital punishment for Roman citizens. Finally, by the side of the senate and the popular assembly stood the *rex*, corresponding exactly to the Grecian *basileus*, and by no means such an almost absolute monarch as Mommsen represents him to have been.* The *rex* also was military commander, high priest and presiding officer of certain courts. He had no civil functions, or any power over life, liberty and property of the citizens whatever, except such as resulted from his disciplinary power as military commander or from his power to execute sentence as presiding officer of the court. The office of *rex* was not hereditary; on the contrary, he was first elected, probably on the nomination of his predecessor, by the assembly of *curiae* and then solemnly invested by a second assembly. That he could also be deposed is proved by the fate of Tarquinius Superbus.

Like the Greeks in the Heroic Age, the Romans at the time of the so-called kings lived in a military democracy based on gentes, phratries and tribes, from which it developed. Even though the *curiae* and tribes may have been partly artificial formations, they were moulded after the genuine and natural models of the society in which they originated and which still surrounded them on all sides. And though the naturally developed patrician nobility had already gained ground, though the *reges* attempted gradually to enlarge the scope of their powers—this does not change the original and fundamental character of the constitution and this alone matters.

Meanwhile, the population of the city of Rome and of the Roman territory, enlarged by conquest, increased, partly by immigration, partly through the inhabitants of the subjugated,

* The Latin *rex* is equivalent to the Celtic-Irish *righ* (tribal chief) and the Gothic *reiks*. That this, like our *Fürst* (English first and Danish *förste*), originally signified gentile or tribal chief is evident from the fact that the Goths in the fourth century already had a special term for the king of later times, the military chief of a whole people, namely, *thiudans*. In Ulfila's translation of the Bible Artaxerxes and Herod are never called *reiks* but *thiudans*, and the realm of the Emperor Tiberius not *reiki*, but *thiudinassus*. In the name of the Gothic *thiudans*, or king, as we inaccurately translate it, *Thiudareiks*, Theodorich, that is, Dietrich, both names flow together. [Note by Engels.]

mostly Latin, districts. All these new subjects (we leave out the question of the clients for the moment) were outside of the old gentes, *curiae* and tribes, and so were not part of the *populus Romanus*, the Roman people proper. They were personally free, could own land, had to pay taxes and were liable to military service. But they were not eligible for office and could neither participate in the assembly of *curiae* nor in the distribution of conquered state lands. They constituted the plebs, excluded from all public rights. Owing to their continually increasing numbers, their military training and armament, they became a menace to the old *populus* who had now closed their ranks hermetically against all increase. The land, moreover, seems to have been fairly evenly divided between *populus* and plebs, while the mercantile and industrial wealth, though as yet not very considerable, may have been mainly in the hands of the plebs.

In view of the utter darkness that enshrouds the whole legendary origin of Rome's historical beginning—a darkness intensified by the rationalistic-pragmatic attempts at interpretation and reports of later legally trained authors whose works serve us as source material—it is impossible to make any definite statements about the time, the course and the causes of the revolution that put an end to the old gentile constitution. The only thing we are certain of is that its causes lay in the conflicts between the plebs and the *populus*.

The new constitution, attributed to *rex* Servius Tullius and based on the Grecian model, more especially that of Solon, created a new popular assembly including or excluding all, *populus* and plebeians alike, according to whether they rendered military service or not. The whole male population liable to military service was divided into six classes, according to wealth. The minimum property qualifications in the first five classes were, respectively: I, 100,000 asses; II, 75,000 asses; III, 50,000 asses; IV, 25,000 asses; V, 11,000 asses; which, according to Dureau de la Malle, is equal to about 14,000, 10,500, 7,000, 3,600 and 1,570 marks, respectively. The sixth class, the proletarians, consisted of those who possessed less and were exempt from military service and taxation. In the new assembly of *centuriae* (*comitia centuriata*) the citizens formed ranks after the manner of soldiers, in companies of one hundred (*centuria*), and each *centuria* had one vote. The first class placed 80 *centuriae* in the field; the second 22, the third 20, the fourth 22, the fifth 30 and the sixth, for propriety's sake, one. To these were added 18 *centuriae* of horsemen composed of the most wealthy; altogether 193. For a majority 97 votes were required.

But the horsemen and the first class alone had together 98 votes, thus being in the majority; when they were united valid decisions were made without even asking the other classes.

Upon this new assembly of *centuriae* now devolved all the political rights of the former assembly of *curiae* (a few nominal ones excepted); the *curiae* and the gentes composing them were thereby, as was the case in Athens, degraded to the position of mere private and religious associations and as such they still vegetated for a long time, while the assembly of *curiae* soon fell into oblivion. In order to eliminate the three old gentile tribes, too, from the state, four territorial tribes were introduced, each tribe inhabiting one quarter of the city and receiving certain political rights.

Thus, in Rome also, the old social order based on personal ties of blood was destroyed even before the abolition of the so-called kingdom, and a new constitution, based on territorial division and distinction of wealth, a real state constitution, took its place. The public power here consisted of the citizenry liable to military service, and was directed not only against the slaves, but also against the so-called proletarians, who were excluded from military service and the right to carry arms.

The new constitution was merely further developed upon the expulsion of the last *rex*, Tarquinius Superbus, who had usurped real royal power, and the institution, in place of the *rex*, of two military commanders (consuls) with equal powers (as among the Iroquois). Within this constitution moved the whole history of the Roman republic with all its struggles between patricians and plebeians for admission to office and a share in the state lands; and the final dissolution of the patrician nobility in the new class of big land and money owners, who gradually absorbed all the land of the peasants ruined by military service, cultivated with the aid of slaves the enormous new tracts thus created, depopulated Italy, and thus opened the gates not only to imperial rule, but also to its successors, the German barbarians.

VII

THE GENS AMONG THE CELTS AND GERMANS

Space prevents us from going into the gentile institutions still found in a more or less pure form among the most diverse savage and barbarian peoples of the present day; or into the traces of such institutions found in the ancient history of civilised nations in Asia. One or the other is met with everywhere.

A few illustrations may suffice: Even before the gens had been recognised it was pointed out and accurately described in its main outlines by the man who took the greatest pains to misunderstand it, McLennan, who wrote of this institution among the Kalmucks, the Circassians, the Samoyeds* and three Indian peoples: the Waralis, the Magars and the Munniporees. Recently it was described by Maxim Kovalevsky, who discovered it among the Pshavs, Khevsurs, Svanetians and other Caucasian tribes. Here we shall confine ourselves to a few brief notes on the existence of the gens among Celts and Germans.

The oldest Celtic laws that have come down to our day show the gens still in full vitality. In Ireland it is alive, at least instinctively, in the popular mind to this day, after the English forcibly blew it up. It was still in full bloom in Scotland in the middle of the last century, and here, too, it succumbed only to the arms, laws and courts of the English.

The old Welsh laws, written several centuries before the English Conquest,¹⁷² not later than the eleventh century, still show communal field agriculture of whole villages, although only as exceptions and as the survival of a former universal custom. Every family had five acres for its own cultivation; another plot was at the same time cultivated in common and its yield divided. Judging by the Irish and Scotch analogies there cannot be any doubt that these village communities represent gentes or subdivisions of gentes, even though a reinvestigation of the Welsh laws, which I cannot undertake for lack of time (my notes are from 1869¹⁷³), should not directly corroborate this. The thing, however, that the Welsh sources, and the Irish, do prove directly is that among the Celts the pairing family had not yet given way by far to monogamy in the eleventh century. In Wales, marriage did not become indissoluble, or rather did not cease to be subject to notice of dissolution, until after seven years. Even if only three nights were wanting to make up the seven years, a married couple could still separate. Then their property was divided between them: the woman divided, the man made his choice. The furniture was divided according to certain very funny rules. If the marriage was dissolved by the man, he had to return the woman's dowry and a few other articles; if the woman desired a separation, she received less. Of the children the man was given two, the woman one, namely, the middle child. If the woman married again after her divorce, and her first husband fetched her back, she was obliged to follow him, even if she

* Old name for Nentsi.—Ed.

already had *one* foot in her new husband's bed. But if two people had lived together for seven years, they were considered man and wife, even without the preliminaries of a formal marriage. Chastity among girls before marriage was by no means strictly observed, nor was it demanded; the regulations governing this subject are of an extremely frivolous nature and run counter to all bourgeois morals. When a woman committed adultery, her husband had a right to beat her—this was one of three cases when he could do so without incurring a penalty—but after that he could not demand any other redress, for

"the same offence shall either be atoned for or avenged, but not both."¹⁷⁴

The reasons that entitled a woman to a divorce without detriment to her rights at the settlement were of a very diverse nature: the man's foul breath was a sufficient reason. The redemption money to be paid to the tribal chief or king for the right of the first night (*gobr merch*, hence the mediaeval name *marcheta*, French *marquette*) plays a conspicuous part in the legal code. The women had the right to vote at the popular assemblies. Add to this that similar conditions are shown to have existed in Ireland; that time marriages were also quite the custom there, and that the women were assured of liberal and well-defined privileges in case of separation, even to the point of remuneration for domestic services; that a "first wife" existed by the side of others, and in dividing a decedent's property no distinction was made between legitimate and illegitimate children—and we have a picture of the pairing family compared with which the form of marriage valid in North America seems strict; but this is not surprising in the eleventh century for a people which in Caesar's time was still living in group marriage.

The Irish gens (*sept*; the tribe was called *clainne*, clan) is confirmed and described not only by the ancient law-books, but also by the English jurists of the seventeenth century who were sent across for the purpose of transforming the clan lands into domains of the King of England. Up to this time, the land had been the common property of the clan or gens, except where the chiefs had already converted it into their private domain. When a gentile died, and a household was thus dissolved, the gentile chief (called *caput cognationis* by the English jurists) redistributed the whole gentile land among the other households. This distribution must in general have taken place according to rules such as were observed in Germany. We still find a few villages—very numerous forty or fifty years ago—

with fields held in so-called rundale. Each of the peasants, individual tenants on the soil that once was the common property of the gens but had been seized by the English conquerors, pays rent for his particular plot, but all the arable and meadow land is combined and shared out, according to situation and quality, in strips, or "*Gewanne*," as they are called on the Mosel, and each one receives a share of each *Gewann*. Moorland and pastures are used in common. As recently as fifty years ago, redivision was still practised occasionally, sometimes annually. The map of such a rundale village looks exactly like that of a German community of farming households [*Gehöferschaft*] on the Mosel or in the Hochwald. The gens also survives in the "factions." The Irish peasants often form parties that seem to be founded on absolutely absurd and senseless distinctions and are quite incomprehensible to Englishmen. The only purpose of these factions is apparently to rally for the popular sport of solemnly beating the life out of one another. They are artificial reincarnations, later substitutes for the blasted gentes that in their own peculiar way demonstrate the continuation of the inherited gentile instinct. Incidentally, in some localities members of the same gens still live together on what is practically their old territory. During the thirties, for instance, the great majority of the inhabitants of the country of Monaghan had only four family names, that is, were descended from four gentes, or clans.*

The downfall of the gentile order in Scotland dates from the suppression of the rebellion of 1745.¹⁷⁶ Precisely what link in this order the Scotch clan represents remains to be investigated; no doubt it is a link. Walter Scott's novels bring the clan

* During a few days that I spent in Ireland,¹⁷⁵ I again realised to what extent the rural population there is still living in the conceptions of the gentile period. The landlord, whose tenant the peasant is, is still considered by the latter as a sort of clan chief who supervises the cultivation of the soil in the interest of all, is entitled to tribute from the peasant in the form of rent, but also has to assist the peasant in cases of need. Likewise, everyone in comfortable circumstances is considered under obligation to help his poorer neighbours whenever they are in distress.

Such assistance is not charity; it is what the poor clansman is entitled to by right from his rich fellow clansman or clan chief. This explains why political economists and jurists complain of the impossibility of inculcating the modern idea of bourgeois property into the minds of the Irish peasants. Property that has only rights, but no duties, is absolutely beyond the ken of the Irishman. No wonder so many Irishmen with such naïve gentile conceptions, who are suddenly cast into the modern great cities of England and America, among a population with entirely different moral and legal standards, become utterly confused in their views of morals and justice, lose all hold and often are bound to succumb to demoralisation in masses. [Note by Engels to the fourth edition, 1891.]

in the Highlands of Scotland vividly before our eyes. It is, as Morgan says,

"an excellent type of the gens in organisation and in spirit, and an extraordinary illustration of the power of the gentile life over its members. . . . We find in their feuds and blood revenge, in their localisation by gentes, in their use of lands in common, in the fidelity of the clansman to his chief and of the members of the clan to each other, the usual and persistent features of gentile society. . . . Descent was in the male line, the children of the males remaining members of the clan, while the children of its female members belonged to the clans of their respective fathers."¹⁷⁷

The fact that mother right was formerly in force in Scotland is proved by the royal family of the Picts, in which, according to Bede, inheritance in the female line prevailed. We even see evidences of the punaluan family preserved among the Scots as well as the Welsh until the Middle Ages in the right of the first night, which the chief of the clan or the king, the last representative of the former common husbands, could claim with every bride, unless redeemed.

* * *

That the Germans were organised in gentes up to the time of the migration of peoples is an indisputable fact. Evidently they settled in the territory between the Danube, the Rhine, the Vistula and the northern seas only a few centuries before our era; the Cimbri and Teutoni were still in full migration, and the Suevi did not settle down until Caesar's time. Caesar expressly states that they settled down in gentes and kinships (*gentibus cognationibusque*), and in the mouth of a Roman of the Julia gens the word *gentibus* has a definite meaning that cannot possibly be misconstrued. This holds good for all Germans; even the settling of the conquered Roman provinces appears to have proceeded still in gentes. The Alamannian Law confirms the fact that the people settled on the conquered land south of the Danube in gentes (*genealogiae*)¹⁷⁸; *genealogia* is used in exactly the same sense as *Mark* or *Dorfgenossenschaft*¹⁷⁹ was used later. Recently Kovalevsky has expressed the view that these *genealogiae* were large household communities among which the land was divided, and from which the village communities developed later on. The same may be true of the *fara*, the term which the Burgundians and Langobards—a Gothic and a Herminonian, or High German, tribe—applied to nearly,

* Village community.—Ed.

if not exactly, the same thing that in the Alamannian book of laws is called *genealogia*. Whether this really represents the gens or the household community is a matter that must be further investigated.

The language records leave us in doubt as to whether all the Germans had a common term for gens, and if so, what term. Etymologically, the Greek *genos*, the Latin *gens*, corresponds to the Gothic *kuni*, Middle High German *künne*, and is used in the same sense. We are led back to the time of mother right by the fact that the terms for "woman" are derived from the same root: Greek *gynê*, Slav *zena*, Gothic *quino*, Old Norse *kona*, *kuna*. Among Langobards and Burgundians we find, as stated, the term, *fara*, which Grimm derives from the hypothetical root *fisan*, to beget. I should prefer to trace it to the more obvious root *faran*, *fahren*, to wander, a term which designates a certain well-defined section of the nomadic train, composed, it almost goes without saying, of relatives; a term, which, in the course of centuries of wandering, first to the East and then to the West, was gradually applied to the gentile community itself. Further, there is the Gothic *sibja*, Anglo-Saxon *sib*, Old High German *sippia*, *sippa*, *Sippe*.* Old Norse has only the plural *sifjar*, relatives; the singular occurs only as the name of a goddess, *Sif*. Finally, another expression occurs in the Hildebrand Song,¹⁷⁹ where Hildebrand asks Hadubrand

"who is your father among the men of the people ... or what is your kin?" (*eddo huêlihhes cnuostes du sts*).

If there was a common German term for gens, it might well have been the Gothic *kuni*; this is not only indicated by its identity with the corresponding term in kindred languages, but also by the fact that the word *kuning*, *König*, which originally signified chief of gens or tribe, is derived from it. *Sibja*, *Sippe*, does not appear worthy of consideration; in Old Norse, at least, *sifjar* signified not only relatives by blood, but also by marriage; hence it comprises the members of at least *two gentes*; thus the term *sif* cannot have been the term for gens.

Among the Germans, as among the Mexicans and Greeks, the horsemen as well as the wedge-like columns of infantry were grouped in battle array by *gentes*. When Tacitus says: by families and kinships, the indefinite expression he uses is explained by the fact that in his time the gens had long ceased to be a living association in Rome.

* Kinsfolk.—Ed

Of decisive significance is a passage in Tacitus where he says: The mother's brother regards his nephew as his son; some even hold that the blood tie between the maternal uncle and the nephew is more sacred and close than that between father and son, so that when hostages are demanded the sister's son is considered a better pledge than the natural son of the man whom they desire to place under bond. Here we have a living survival of the mother-right, and hence original, gens, and it is described as something which particularly distinguishes the Germans.* If a member of such a gens gave his own son as a pledge for an obligation he had undertaken, and if this son became the victim of his father's breach of faith, that was the concern of the father alone. When the son of a sister was sacrificed, however, then the most sacred gentile law was violated. The next of kin, who was bound above all others to protect the boy or young man, was responsible for his death; he should either have refrained from giving the boy as a pledge, or have kept the contract. If we had no other trace of gentile organisation among the Germans, this one passage would be sufficient proof.

Still more decisive, as it comes about eight hundred years later, is a passage in the Old Norse song about the twilight of the gods and the end of the world, the *Völuspá*. In this "Vision of the Seeress," in which, as Bang and Bugge have now shown, also elements of Christianity are interwoven, the description of the period of universal depravity and corruption preceding the cataclysm contains this passage:

Broedhr munu berjask ok at bönum verdask, munu *systrungar* sifjum spilla.

"Brothers will wage war against one another and become each other's slayers, and *sisters' children* will break the bonds of kinship."

Systrungar means son of the mother's sister, and in the poet's eyes, the repudiation by such of blood relationship caps the

* The Greeks know only in the mythology of the Heroic Age the special intimacy of the bond between the maternal uncle and his nephew, a relic of mother right found among many peoples. According to Diodorus, IV, 34, Meleager kills the sons of Thestius, the brothers of his mother Althaea. The latter regards this deed as such a heinous crime that she curses the murderer, her own son, and prays for his death. It is related that "the gods fulfilled her wish and ended Meleager's life". According to the same author (Diodorus, IV, 43 and 44), the Argonauts under Heracles landed in Thracia and there found that Phineus, at the instigation of his second wife, shamefully maltreats his two sons by his first, deserted wife, Cleopatra, the Boread. But among the Argonauts there are also some Boreads, the brothers of Cleopatra, the maternal uncles, therefore, of the maltreated boys. They at once come to their nephews' aid, set them free and kill their guards. [Note by Engels.]

climax of the crime of fratricide. The climax lies in *systrungar*, which emphasises the kinship on the maternal side. If the term *syskina-börn*, brother's and sister's children, or *syskina-synir*, brother's and sister's sons, had been used, the second line would not have been a crescendo as against the first but a weakening diminuendo. Thus, even in the time of the Vikings, when the *Völuspá* was composed, the memory of mother right was not yet obliterated in Scandinavia.

For the rest, in Tacitus' time, at least among the Germans with whom he was more familiar, mother right had already given way to father right: the children were the heirs of the father; in the absence of children, the brothers and the paternal and maternal uncles were the heirs. The admission of the mother's brother to inheritance is connected with the preservation of the above-mentioned custom, and also proves how recent father right was among the Germans at that time. We find traces of mother right even late in the Middle Ages. In this period fatherhood was still a matter of doubt, especially among serfs, and when a feudal lord demanded the return of a fugitive serf from a city, it was required, for instance, in Augsburg, Basel and Kaiserslautern, that the fact of his serfdom should be established by the oaths of six of his immediate blood relatives, exclusively on his mother's side. (Maurer, *Urban Constitution*, I, p. 381.)

Another relic of mother right, then beginning to fall into decay, was the, from the Roman standpoint almost inexplicable, respect the Germans had for the female sex. Girls of noble family were regarded as the best hostages guaranteeing the keeping of contracts with Germans. In battle, nothing stimulated their courage so much as the horrible thought that their wives and daughters might be captured and carried into slavery. They regarded the woman as being holy and something of a prophetess, and they heeded her advice in the most important matters. Veleda, the Bructerian priestess on the Lippe River, was the moving spirit of the whole Batavian insurrection, in which Civilis, at the head of Germans and Belgians, shook the foundations of Roman rule in Gaul.¹⁸⁰ The women appear to have held undisputed sway in the house. Tacitus says that they, with the old men and children, had, of course, to do all the work, for the men went hunting, drank and loafed; but he does not say who cultivated the fields, and as according to his explicit statement the slaves only paid dues and performed no compulsory labour, it would appear that what little agricultural work was required had to be performed by the bulk of the adult men.

As was stated above, the form of marriage was the pairing family gradually approximating to monogamy. It was not yet strict monogamy, for polygamy was permitted to the nobility. On the whole (unlike the Celts) they insisted on strict chastity among girls. Tacitus speaks with particular warmth of the inviolability of the matrimonial bond among the Germans. He gives adultery on the part of the woman as the sole reason of a divorce. But his report contains many gaps here, and furthermore, it too openly holds up the mirror of virtue to the dissipated Romans. So much is certain: if the Germans in their forests were such exceptional models of virtue, only a slight contact with the outer world was required to bring them down to the level of the other, average, Europeans. In the whirl of Roman life the last trace of strict morality disappeared even faster than the German language. It is enough to read Gregory of Tours. It goes without saying that refined voluptuousness could not exist in the primeval forests of Germany as it did in Rome, and so in this respect also the Germans were superior enough to the Roman world without ascribing to them a continence in carnal matters that has never prevailed among any people as a whole.

From the gentile system arose the obligation to inherit the feuds as well as the friendships of one's father and relatives; and also *wergild*, the fine paid in atonement for murder or injury, in place of blood revenge. A generation ago this *wergild* was regarded as a specifically German institution, but it has since been proved that hundreds of peoples practised this milder form of blood revenge which had its origin in the gentile system. Like the obligation of hospitality, it is found, for instance, among the American Indians. Tacitus' description of the manner in which hospitality was observed (*Germania*, c. 21) is almost identical, even in details, with Morgan's relating to his Indians.

The heated and ceaseless controversy as to whether or not the Germans in Tacitus' time had already finally divided up the cultivated land and how the pertinent passages should be interpreted is now a thing of the past. After it had been established that the cultivated land of nearly all peoples was tilled in common by the gens and later on by communistic family communities, a practice which Caesar still found among the Suevi; that later the land was allotted and periodically re-allotted to the individual families; and that this periodical re-allotment of the cultivated land has been preserved in parts of Germany down to this day, we need not waste any more breath on the subject. If the Germans in one hundred and fifty years

passed from common cultivation, such as Caesar expressly attributes to the Suevi—they have no divided or private tillage whatsoever, he says—to individual cultivation with the annual redistribution of the land in Tacitus' time, it is surely progress enough; a transition from that stage to the complete private ownership of land in such a short period and without any outside intervention was an utter impossibility. Hence I can read in Tacitus only what he states in so many words: They change (or redivide) the cultivated land every year, and enough common land is left in the process. It is the stage of agriculture and appropriation of the soil which exactly tallies with the gentile constitution of the Germans of that time.

I leave the preceding paragraph unchanged, just as it stood in former editions. Meantime the question has assumed another aspect. Since Kovalevsky has demonstrated (see above, p. 44*) that the patriarchal household community was widespread, if not universal, as the connecting link between the mother-right communistic family and the modern isolated family, the question is no longer whether the land was common or private property, as was still discussed between Maurer and Waitz, but what *form* common property assumed. There is no doubt whatever that in Caesar's time the Suevi not only owned their land in common, but also tilled it in common for common account. The questions whether their economic unit was the gens or the household community or an intermediate communistic kinship group, or whether all three of these groups existed as a result of different local land conditions will remain subjects of controversy for a long time yet. Kovalevsky maintains that the conditions described by Tacitus were not based on the Mark or village community, but on the household community, which, much later, developed into the village community, owing to the growth of the population.

Hence, it is claimed, the German settlements on the territory they occupied in the time of the Romans, and on the territory they later took from the Romans, must have been not villages, but large family communities comprising several generations, which cultivated a correspondingly large tract of land and used the surrounding wild land as a common Mark with their neighbours. The passage in Tacitus concerning the changing of the cultivated land would then actually have an agronomic meaning, namely, that the community cultivated a different piece of land every year, and the land cultivated during the previous year was left fallow or entirely abandoned. The sparsity of the

* See p. 234 of this volume.—Ed.

population would have left enough spare wild land to make all disputes about land unnecessary. Only after the lapse of centuries, when the members of the household had increased to such an extent that common cultivation became impossible under prevailing conditions of production, did the household communities allegedly dissolve. The former common fields and meadows were then divided in the well-known manner among the various individual households that had now formed, at first periodically, and later once for all, while forests, pastures and bodies of water remained common property.

As far as Russia is concerned, this process of development appears to have been fully proved historically. As for Germany, and secondarily, for other Germanic countries, it cannot be denied that, in many respects, this view affords a better interpretation of the sources and an easier solution of difficulties than the former idea of tracing the village community down to the time of Tacitus. The oldest documents, for instance, the *Codex Laureshamensis*,¹⁸¹ are on the whole more easily explained by the household community than by the village Mark community. On the other hand, it presents new difficulties and new problems that need solution. Here, only further investigation can decide. I cannot deny, however, that it is highly probable that the household community was also the intermediate stage in Germany, Scandinavia and England.

While in Caesar the Germans had partly just taken up settled abodes, and partly were still seeking such, they had been settled for a full century in Tacitus' time; the resulting progress in the production of means of subsistence is unmistakable. They lived in log houses; their clothing was still of the primitive forest type, consisting of rough woollen cloaks and animal skins, and linen underclothing for the women and the notables. They lived on milk, meat, wild fruit and, as Pliny adds, oatmeal porridge (the Celtic national dish in Ireland and Scotland to this day). Their wealth consisted of cattle, of an inferior breed, however, the animals being small, uncouth and hornless; the horses were small ponies, not fast runners. Money, Roman coin only, was little and rarely used. They made no gold or silver ware, nor did they attach any value to these metals. Iron was scarce and, at least among the tribes on the Rhine and the Danube, was apparently almost wholly imported, not mined by themselves. The runic script (imitations of Greek and Latin letters) was only used as a secret code and exclusively for religious sorcery. Human sacrifices were still in vogue. In short, they were a people just emerged from the middle stage of barbarism into the upper stage. While, however, the tribes whose immediate

contact with the Romans facilitated the import of Roman industrial products were thereby prevented from developing a metal and textile industry of their own, there is not the least doubt that the tribes of the North-East, on the Baltic, developed these industries. The pieces of armour found in the bogs of Schleswig—a long iron sword, a coat of mail, a silver helmet, etc., together with Roman coins from the close of the second century—and the German metal ware spread by the migration of peoples represent a peculiar type of fine workmanship, even such as were modelled after Roman originals. With the exception of England, emigration to the civilised Roman Empire everywhere put an end to this native industry. How uniformly this industry arose and developed is shown, for instance, by the bronze spangles. The specimens found in Burgundy, in Rumania and along the Azov Sea might have been produced in the very same workshop as the British and the Swedish, and are likewise of undoubtedly Germanic origin.

Their constitution was also in keeping with the upper stage of barbarism. According to Tacitus, there was commonly a council of chiefs (*principes*) which decided matters of minor importance and prepared important matters for the decision of the popular assembly. The latter, in the lower stage of barbarism, at least in places where we know it, among the Americans, was held only in the gens, not yet in the tribe or the confederacy of tribes. The council chiefs (*principes*) were still sharply distinguished from the war chiefs (*duces*), just as among the Iroquois. The former were already living, in part, on honorary gifts, such as cattle, grain, etc., from their fellow tribesmen. As in America they were generally elected from the same family. The transition to father right favoured, as in Greece and Rome, the gradual transformation of elective office into hereditary office, thus giving rise to a noble family in each gens. Most of this old, so-called tribal nobility disappeared during the migration of peoples, or shortly after. The military leaders were elected solely on their merits, irrespective of birth. They had little power and had to rely on force of example. As Tacitus explicitly states, actual disciplinary power in the army was held by the priests. The popular assembly was the real power. The king or tribal chief presided; the people decided: a murmur signified "no," acclamation and clanging of weapons meant "aye." The popular assembly was also the court of justice. Complaints were brought up here and decided; and death sentences were pronounced, the latter only in cases of cowardice, treason or unnatural vices. The gentes and other subdivisions also judged in a body, presided over by the chief, who, as in all original

German courts, could be only director of the proceedings and questioner. Among the Germans, always and everywhere, sentence was pronounced by the entire community.

Confederacies of tribes came into existence from Caesar's time. Some of them already had kings. The supreme military commander began to aspire to despotic power, as among the Greeks and Romans, and sometimes succeeded in achieving it. These successful usurpers were by no means absolute rulers; nevertheless, they began to break the fetters of the gentile constitution. While freed slaves generally occupied an inferior position, because they could not be members of any gens, they often gained rank, wealth and honours as favourites of the new kings. The same occurred after the conquest of the Roman Empire in the case of the military leaders who had now become kings of large countries. Among the Franks, the king's slaves and freedmen played a great role first at court and then in the state; a large part of the new aristocracy was descended from them.

There was one institution that especially favoured the rise of royalty: the retinue. We have already seen how among the American Redskins private associations were formed alongside of the gens for the purpose of waging war on their own. Among the Germans, these private associations had developed into standing bodies. The military commander who had acquired fame gathered around his person a host of booty-loving young warriors pledged to loyalty to him personally, as he was to them. He fed them, gave them gifts and organised them on hierarchical principles: a bodyguard and a troop ready for immediate action in short expeditions, a trained corps of officers for larger campaigns. Weak as these retinues must have been, as indeed they proved to be later, for example, under Odoacer in Italy, they, nevertheless, served as the germ of decay of the old popular liberties, and proved to be such during and after the migration of peoples. Because, first, they created favourable soil for the rise of the royal power. Secondly, as Tacitus observed, they could be held together only by continuous warfare and plundering expeditions. Loot became the main object. If the chieftain found nothing to do in his neighbourhood, he marched his troops to other countries, where there was war and the prospect of booty. The German auxiliaries, who under the Roman standard even fought Germans in large numbers, partly consisted of such retinues. They were the first germs of the Landsknecht* system, the shame and curse of the Germans. After the conquest of the Roman Empire, these kings' retainers,

* Mercenary soldiers.—Ed.

together with the bonded and the Roman court attendants, formed the second main constituent part of the nobility of later days.

In general, then, the German tribes, combined into peoples, had the same constitution that had developed among the Greeks of the Heroic Age and among the Romans at the time of the so-called kings: popular assemblies, councils of gentile chiefs and military commanders who were already aspiring to real kingly power. It was the most highly-developed constitution the gentile order could produce; it was the model constitution of the higher stage of barbarism. As soon as society passed beyond the limits for which this constitution sufficed, the gentile order was finished. It burst asunder and the state took its place.

VIII

THE FORMATION OF THE STATE AMONG THE GERMANS

According to Tacitus the Germans were a very numerous people. An approximate idea of the strength of the different German peoples is given by Caesar; he puts the number of Usipetans and Tencterans, who appeared on the left bank of the Rhine, at 180,000, including women and children. Thus, about 100,000 to a single people,* considerably more than, say, the Iroquois numbered in their most flourishing period, when not quite 20,000 became the terror of the whole country, from the Great Lakes to the Ohio and Potomac. If we were to attempt to group on a map the individual peoples of the Rhine country, who are better known to us from reports, we would find that such a people would occupy on the average the area of a Prussian administrative district, about 10,000 square kilometres, or 182 geographical square miles. The *Germania Magna*** of the Romans, reaching to the Vistula, comprised, however, roundly 500,000 square kilometres. Counting an average of 100,000 for any single people, the total population of *Germania Magna* would have amounted to five million—a rather high figure for

* The number taken here is confirmed by a passage in Diodorus on the Celts of Gaul: "In Gaul live numerous peoples of unequal strength. The biggest of them numbers about 200,000, the smallest 50,000." (Diodorus Siculus, V, 25.) That gives an average of 125,000. The individual Gallic peoples, being more highly developed, must certainly have been more numerous than the German. [Note by Engels.]

** *Germania Magna*: Greater Germany.—Ed.

a barbarian group of peoples, although 10 inhabitants to the square kilometre, or 550 to the geographical square mile, is very little when compared with present conditions. But this does not include all the Germans then living. We know that German peoples of Gothic origin, Bastarnians, Peukinians and others, lived along the Carpathian Mountains all the way down to the mouth of the Danube. They were so numerous that Pliny designated them as the fifth main tribe of the Germans; in 180 B.C. they were already serving as mercenaries of the Macedonian King Perseus, and in the first years of the reign of Augustus they were still pushing their way as far as the vicinity of Adrianople. If we assume that they numbered only one million, then, at the beginning of the Christian era, the Germans numbered probably not less than six million.

After settling in Germany [*Germanien*], the population must have grown with increasing rapidity. The industrial progress mentioned above is sufficient to prove it. The objects found in the bogs of Schleswig, to judge by the Roman coins found with them, date from the third century. Hence at that time the metal and textile industry was already well developed on the Baltic, a lively trade was carried on with the Roman Empire, and the wealthier class enjoyed a certain luxury—all evidences of a greater density of population. At this time, however, the Germans started their general assault along the whole line of the Rhine, the Roman frontier rampart and the Danube, a line stretching from the North Sea to the Black Sea—direct proof of the ever-growing population striving outwards. During the three centuries of struggle, the whole main body of the Gothic peoples (with the exception of the Scandinavian Goths and the Burgundians) moved towards the South-East and formed the left wing of the long line of attack; the High Germans (Herminonians) pushed forward in the centre of this line, on the Upper Danube, and the Istaevonians, now called Franks, on the right wing, along the Rhine. The conquest of Britain fell to the lot of the Ingaevonians. At the end of the fifth century the Roman Empire, exhausted, bloodless and helpless, lay open to the invading Germans.

In preceding chapters we stood at the cradle of ancient Greek and Roman civilisation. Now we are standing at its grave. The levelling plane of Roman world power had been passing for centuries over all the Mediterranean countries. Where the Greek language offered no resistance all national languages gave way to a corrupt Latin. There were no longer any distinctions of nationality, no more Gauls, Iberians, Ligurians, Noricans; all had become Romans. Roman administration and

Roman law had everywhere dissolved the old bodies of *con-sanguinei* and thus crushed the last remnants of local and national self-expression. The new-fangled Romanism could not compensate for this loss; it did not express any nationality, but only lack of nationality. The elements for the formation of new nations existed everywhere. The Latin dialects of the different provinces diverged more and more; the natural boundaries that had once made Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa independent territories, still existed and still made themselves felt. Yet nowhere was there a force capable of combining these elements into new nations; nowhere was there the least trace of any capacity for development or any power of resistance, much less of creative power. The immense human mass of that enormous territory was held together by one bond alone—the Roman state; and this, in time, had become their worst enemy and oppressor. The provinces had ruined Rome; Rome itself had become a provincial town like all the others, privileged, but no longer ruling, no longer the centre of the world empire, no longer even the seat of the emperors and vice-emperors, who lived in Constantinople, Trèves and Milan. The Roman state had become an immense complicated machine, designed exclusively for the exploitation of its subjects. Taxes, services for the state and levies of all kinds drove the mass of the people deeper and deeper into poverty. The extortionate practices of the procurators, tax collectors and soldiers caused the pressure to become intolerable. This is what the Roman state with its world domination had brought things to: it had based its right to existence on the preservation of order in the interior and protection against the barbarians outside. But its order was worse than the worst disorder, and the barbarians, against whom the state pretended to protect its citizens, were hailed by them as saviours.

Social conditions were no less desperate. During the last years of the republic, Roman rule was already based on the ruthless exploitation of the conquered provinces. The emperors had not abolished this exploitation; on the contrary, they had regularised it. The more the empire fell into decay, the higher rose the taxes and compulsory services, and the more shamelessly the officials robbed and blackmailed the people. Commerce and industry were never the business of the Romans who lorded it over entire peoples. Only in usury did they excel all others, before and after them. The commerce that existed and managed to maintain itself for a time was reduced to ruin by official extortion; what survived was carried on in the eastern, Grecian, part of the empire, but this is beyond the

scope of our study. Universal impoverishment; decline of commerce, handicrafts, the arts, and of the population; decay of the towns; retrogression of agriculture to a lower stage—this was the final result of Roman world supremacy.

Agriculture, the decisive branch of production throughout antiquity, now became so more than ever. In Italy, the immense aggregations of estates (*latifundia*) which had covered nearly the whole territory since the end of the republic, had been utilised in two ways: either as pastures, on which the population had been replaced by sheep and oxen, the care of which required only a few slaves; or as country estates, on which large-scale horticulture had been carried on with masses of slaves, partly to serve the luxurious needs of the owners and partly for sale in the urban markets. The great pastures had been preserved and probably even enlarged. But the country estates and their horticulture fell into ruin owing to the impoverishment of their owners and the decay of the towns. Latifundian economy based on slave labour was no longer profitable; but at that time it was the only possible form of large-scale agriculture. Small-scale farming again became the only profitable form. Estate after estate was parcelled out and leased in small lots to hereditary tenants, who paid a fixed sum, or to *partiarii*,* farm managers rather than tenants, who received one-sixth or even only one-ninth of the year's product for their work. Mainly, however, these small plots were distributed to *coloni*, who paid a fixed amount annually, were attached to the land and could be sold together with the plots. These were not slaves, but neither were they free; they could not marry free citizens, and intermarriage among themselves was not regarded as valid marriage, but as mere concubinage (*contubernium*), as in the case of the slaves. They were the forerunners of the mediaeval serfs.

The slavery of antiquity became obsolete. Neither in large-scale agriculture in the country, nor in the manufactories of the towns did it any longer bring in a return worth while—the market for its products had disappeared. Small-scale agriculture and small handicrafts, to which the gigantic production of the flourishing times of the empire was now reduced, had no room for numerous slaves. Society found room only for the domestic and luxury slaves of the rich. But moribund slavery was still sufficiently virile to make all productive work appear as slave labour, unworthy of the dignity of free Romans—and everybody was now a free Roman. On this account, on the one hand,

* Sharecroppers.—Ed.

there was an increase in the number of superfluous slaves who, having become a drag, were emancipated; on the other hand, there was an increase in the number of *coloni* and of beggared freemen (similar to the poor whites in the ex-slave states of America). Christianity is perfectly innocent of this gradual dying out of ancient slavery. It had partaken of the fruits of slavery in the Roman Empire for centuries, and later did nothing to prevent the slave trade of Christians, either of the Germans in the North, or of the Venetians on the Mediterranean, or the Negro slave trade of later years.* Slavery no longer paid, and so it died out; but dying slavery left behind its poisonous sting by branding as ignoble the productive work of the free. This was the blind alley in which the Roman world was caught: slavery was economically impossible, while the labour of the free was under a moral ban. The one could no longer, the other could not yet, be the basic form of social production. Only a complete revolution could be of help here.

Things were no better in the provinces. Most of the reports we have concern Gaul. By the side of the *coloni*, free small peasants still existed there. In order to protect themselves against the brutal extortions of the officials, judges and usurers, they frequently placed themselves under the protection, the patronage, of men possessed of power; and they did this not only singly, but in whole communities, so much so that the emperors of the fourth century often issued decrees prohibiting this practice. How did this help those who sought this protection? The patron imposed the condition that they transfer the title of their lands to him, and in return he ensured them the usufruct of their land for life—a trick which the Holy Church remembered and freely imitated during the ninth and tenth centuries, for the greater glory of God and the enlargement of its own landed possessions. At that time, however, about the year 475, Bishop Salvianus of Marseilles still vehemently denounced such robbery and related that the oppression of the Roman officials and great landlords became so intolerable that many “Romans” fled to the districts already occupied by the barbarians, and the Roman citizens who had settled there feared nothing so much as falling under Roman rule again. That poor parents frequently sold their children into slavery in those days is proved by a law forbidding this practice.

* According to Bishop Liutprand of Cremona, the principal industry of Verdun in the tenth century, that is, in the Holy German Empire,¹⁸² was the manufacture of eunuchs, who were exported with great profit to Spain for the harems of the Moors. [Note by Engels.]

In return for liberating the Romans from their own state, the German barbarians appropriated two-thirds of the entire land and divided it among themselves. The division was made in accordance with the gentile system; as the conquerors were relatively small in number, large tracts remained, undivided, partly in the possession of the whole people and partly in that of the tribes or gentes. In each gens fields and pastures were distributed among the individual households in equal shares by lot. We do not know whether repeated redivisions took place at that time; at all events, this practice was soon discarded in the Roman provinces, and the individual allotment became alienable private property, allodium. Forests and pastures remained undivided for common use; this use and the mode of cultivating the divided land were regulated by ancient custom and the will of the entire community. The longer the gens existed in its village, and the more Germans and Romans merged in the course of time, the more the consanguineous character of the ties retreated before territorial ties. The gens disappeared in the Mark community, in which, however, sufficient traces of the original kinship of the members were visible. Thus, the gentile constitution, at least in those countries where Mark communes were preserved—in the North of France, in England, Germany and Scandinavia—was imperceptibly transformed into a territorial constitution, and thus became capable of being fitted into the state. Nevertheless, it retained the natural democratic character which distinguishes the whole gentile order, and thus preserved a piece of the gentile constitution even in its degeneration, forced upon it in later times, thereby leaving a weapon in the hands of the oppressed, ready to be wielded even in modern times.

The rapid disappearance of the blood tie in the gens was due to the fact that its organs in the tribe and the whole people had also degenerated as a result of the conquest. We know that rule over subjugated people is incompatible with the gentile order. Here we see it on a large scale. The German peoples, masters of the Roman provinces, had to organise their conquest; but one could neither absorb the mass of the Romans into the gentile bodies nor rule them with the aid of the latter. A substitute for the Roman state had to be placed at the head of the Roman local administrative bodies, which at first largely continued to function, and this substitute could only be another state. Thus, the organs of the gentile constitution had to be transformed into organs of state, and owing to the pressure of circumstances, this had to be done very quickly. The first representative of the conquering people was, however, the

military commander. The internal and external safety of the conquered territory demanded that his power be increased. The moment had arrived for transforming military leadership into kingship. This was done.

Let us take the kingdom of the Franks. Here, not only the wide dominions of the Roman state, but also all the very large tracts of land that had not been assigned to the large and small *gau* and Mark communities, especially all the large forests, fell into the hands of the victorious Salian people as their unrestricted possession. The first thing the king of the Franks, transformed from an ordinary military commander into a real monarch, did was to convert this property of the people into a royal estate, to steal it from the people and to donate or grant it in fief to his retainers. This retinue, originally composed of his personal military retainers and the rest of the subcommanders of the army, was soon augmented not only by Romans, that is, Romanised Gauls, who quickly became almost indispensable to him owing to their knowledge of writing, their education and familiarity with the Romance vernacular and literary Latin as well as with the laws of the land, but also by slaves, serfs and freedmen, who constituted his Court and from among whom he chose his favourites. All these were granted tracts of public land, first mostly as gifts and later in the form of benefices—originally in most cases for the period of the life of the king¹⁸³—and so the basis was laid for a new nobility at the expense of the people.

But this was not all. The far-flung empire could not be governed by means of the old gentile constitution. The council of chiefs, even if it had not long become obsolete, could not have assembled and was soon replaced by the king's permanent retinue. The old popular assembly was still ostensibly preserved, but more and more as an assembly of the subcommanders of the army and the newly-rising notables. The free landowning peasants, the mass of the Frankish people, were exhausted and reduced to penury by continuous civil war and wars of conquest, the latter particularly under Charlemagne, just as the Roman peasants had been during the last period of the republic. These peasants, who originally had formed the whole army, and after the conquest of the Frankish lands had been its core, were so impoverished at the beginning of the ninth century that scarcely one out of five could provide the accoutrements of war. The former army of free peasants, called up directly by the king, was replaced by an army composed of the servitors of the newly-arisen magnates. Among these servitors were also villeins, the descendants of the peasants who formerly had

acknowledged no master but the king, and a little earlier had acknowledged no master at all, not even a king. Under Charlemagne's successors the ruin of the Frankish peasantry was completed by internal wars, the weakness of the royal power and corresponding usurpations of the magnates, whose ranks were augmented by the *gau* counts,¹⁸⁴ established by Charlemagne and eager to make their office hereditary, and finally by the incursions of the Normans. Fifty years after the death of Charlemagne, the Frankish Empire lay as helpless at the feet of the Normans as four hundred years previously the Roman Empire had lain at the feet of the Franks.

Not only the external impotence, but the internal order, or rather disorder, of society, was almost the same. The free Frankish peasants found themselves in a position similar to that of their predecessors, the Roman *coloni*. Ruined by war and plunder, they had to seek the protection of the new magnates or the Church, for the royal power was too weak to protect them; they had to pay dear for this protection. Like the Gallic peasants before them, they had to transfer the property in their land to their patrons, and received it back from them as tenants in different and varying forms, but always on condition of performing services and paying dues. Once driven into this form of dependence, they gradually lost their personal freedom; after a few generations most of them became serfs. How rapidly the free peasants were degraded is shown by Irminon's land records of the Abbey Saint-Germain-des-Prés, then near, now in, Paris. Even during the life of Charlemagne, on the vast estates of this abbey, stretching into the surrounding country, there were 2,788 households, nearly all Franks with German names; 2,080 of them were *coloni*, 35 *liti*, 220 slaves and only 8 freeholders! The custom by which the patron had the land of the peasants transferred to himself, giving to them only the usufruct of it for life, the custom denounced as ungodly by Salvianus, was now universally practised by the Church in its dealings with the peasants. Feudal servitude, now coming more and more into vogue, was modelled as much on the lines of the Roman *angariae*, compulsory services for the state,¹⁸⁵ as on the services rendered by the members of the German Mark in bridge and road building and other work for common purposes. Thus, it looked as if, after four hundred years, the mass of the population had come back to the point it had started from.

This proved only two things, however: First, that the social stratification and the distribution of property in the declining Roman Empire corresponded entirely to the then prevailing stage of production in agriculture and industry, and hence was

unavoidable; secondly, that this stage of production had not sunk or risen to any material extent in the course of the following four hundred years, and, therefore, had necessarily produced the same distribution of property and the same class division of population. During the last centuries of the Roman Empire, the town lost its supremacy over the country, and did not regain it during the first centuries of German rule. This presupposes a low stage of agriculture, and of industry as well. Such a general condition necessarily gives rise to big ruling landowners and dependent small peasants. How almost impossible it was to graft either the Roman latifundian economy run with slave labour or the newer large-scale farming run with serf labour on to such a society, is proved by Charlemagne's very extensive experiments with his famous imperial estates, which passed away leaving hardly a trace. These experiments were continued only by the monasteries and were fruitful only for them; but the monasteries were abnormal social bodies founded on celibacy. They could do the exceptional, and for that very reason had to remain exceptions.

Nevertheless, progress was made during these four hundred years. Even if in the end we find almost the same main classes as in the beginning, still, the people who constituted these classes had changed. The ancient slavery had disappeared; gone were also the beggared poor freemen, who had despised work as slavish. Between the Roman *colonus* and the new serf there had been the free Frankish peasant. The "useless reminiscences and vain strife" of doomed Romanism were dead and buried. The social classes of the ninth century had taken shape not in the bog of a declining civilisation, but in the travail of a new. The new race, masters as well as servants, was a race of men compared with its Roman predecessors. The relation of powerful landlords and serving peasants, which for the latter had been the hopeless form of the decline of the world of antiquity, was now for the former the starting-point of a new development. Moreover, unproductive as these four hundred years appear to have been, they, nevertheless, left *one* great product behind them: the modern nationalities, the refashioning and regrouping of West-European humanity for impending history. The Germans, in fact, had infused new life into Europe; and that is why the dissolution of the states in the German period ended, not in Norse-Saracen subjugation, but in the development from the royal benefices and patronage (commendation¹⁸⁶) to feudalism, and in such a tremendous increase in the population that the drain of blood caused by the Crusades barely two centuries later could be borne without injury.

What was the mysterious charm with which the Germans infused new vitality into dying Europe? Was it the innate magic power of the German race, as our jingo historians would have it? By no means. Of course, the Germans were a highly gifted Aryan tribe, especially at that time, in full process of vigorous development. It was not their specific national qualities that rejuvenated Europe, however, but simply—their barbarism, their gentile constitution.

Their personal efficiency and bravery, their love of liberty, and their democratic instinct, which regarded all public affairs as its own affairs, in short, all those qualities which the Romans had lost and which were alone capable of forming new states and of raising new nationalities out of the muck of the Roman world—what were they but the characteristic features of barbarians in the upper stage, fruits of their gentile constitution?

If they transformed the ancient form of monogamy, moderated male rule in the family and gave a higher status to women than the classic world had ever known, what enabled them to do so if not their barbarism, their gentile customs, their still living heritage of the time of mother right?

If they were able in at least three of the most important countries—Germany, Northern France and England—to preserve and carry over to the feudal state a piece of the genuine constitution in the form of the Mark communities, and thus give to the oppressed class, the peasants, even under the hardest conditions of mediaeval serfdom, local cohesion and the means of resistance which neither the slaves of antiquity nor the modern proletarians found ready at hand—to what did they owe this if not to their barbarism, their exclusively barbarian mode of settling in gentes?

And lastly, if they were able to develop and universally introduce the milder form of servitude which they had been practising at home, and which more and more displaced slavery also in the Roman Empire—a form which, as Fourier first emphasised, gave to the oppressed the means of gradual emancipation as a class (*fournit aux cultivateurs des moyens d'affranchissement collectif et progressif*)* and is therefore far superior to slavery, which permits only of the immediate manumission of the individual without any transitory stage (antiquity did not know any abolition of slavery by a victorious rebellion), whereas the serfs of the Middle Ages, step by step, achieved their emancipation as a class—to what was this due

* Furnishes for the cultivators means of collective and gradual emancipation.—Ed.

if not their barbarism, thanks to which they had not yet arrived at complete slavery, either in the form of the ancient labour slavery or in that of the Oriental domestic slavery?

All that was vital and life-bringing in what the Germans infused into the Roman world was barbarism. In fact, only barbarians are capable of rejuvenating a world labouring in the throes of a dying civilisation. And the highest stage of barbarism, to which and in which the Germans worked their way up previous to the migration of peoples, was precisely the most favourable one for this process. This explains everything.

IX

BARBARISM AND CIVILISATION

We have traced the dissolution of the gentile order in the three great separate examples: Greek, Roman, and German. We shall investigate, in conclusion, the general economic conditions that had already undermined the gentile organisation of society in the upper stage of barbarism and completely abolished it with the advent of civilisation. For this, Marx's *Capital* will be as necessary as Morgan's book.

Growing out of the middle stage and developing further in the upper stage of savagery, the gens reached its prime, as far as our sources enable us to judge, in the lower stage of barbarism. With this stage, then, we shall begin our investigation.

At this stage, for which the American Indians must serve as our example, we find the gentile system fully developed. A tribe was divided up into several, in most cases two, gentes; with the increase of the population, these original gentes again divided into several daughter gentes, in relation to which the mother gens appeared as the phratry; the tribe itself split up into several tribes, in each of which, in most cases, we again find the old gentes. In some cases, at least, a confederacy united the kindred tribes. This simple organisation was fully adequate for the social conditions from which it sprang. It was nothing more than a peculiar natural grouping, capable of smoothing out all internal conflicts likely to arise in a society organised on these lines. In the realm of the external, conflicts were settled by war, which could end in the annihilation of a tribe, but never in its subjugation. The grandeur and at the same time the limitation of the gentile order was that it found no place for rulers and ruled. In the realm of the internal, there was as yet no distinction between rights and duties; the ques-

tion of whether participation in public affairs, blood revenge or atonement for injuries was a right or a duty never confronted the Indian; it would have appeared as absurd to him as the question of whether eating, sleeping or hunting was a right or a duty. Nor could any tribe or gens split up into different classes. This leads us to the investigation of the economic basis of those conditions.

The population was very sparse. It was dense only in the habitat of the tribe, surrounded by its wide hunting grounds and beyond these the neutral protective forest which separated it from other tribes. Division of labour was a pure and simple outgrowth of nature; it existed only between the two sexes. The men went to war, hunted, fished, provided the raw material for food and the tools necessary for these pursuits. The women cared for the house, and prepared food and clothing; they cooked, weaved and sewed. Each was master in his or her own field of activity: the men in the forest, the women in the house. Each owned the tools he or she made and used: the men, the weapons and the hunting and fishing tackle, the women, the household goods and utensils. The household was communistic, comprising several, and often many, families.* Whatever was produced and used in common was common property: the house, the garden, the long boat. Here, and only here, then, do we find the "earned property" which jurists and economists have falsely attributed to civilised society—the last mendacious legal pretext on which modern capitalist property rests.

But man did not everywhere remain in this stage. In Asia he found animals that could be domesticated and propagated in captivity. The wild buffalo cow had to be hunted down; the domestic cow gave birth to a calf once a year, and also provided milk. A number of the most advanced tribes—Aryans, Semites, perhaps also the Turanians—made the domestication, and later the raising and tending of cattle, their principal occupation. Pastoral tribes separated themselves from the general mass of the barbarians: *the first great social division of labour*. These pastoral tribes not only produced more articles of food, but also a greater variety than the rest of the barbarians. They not only had milk, milk products and meat in greater abundance than the others, but also skins, wool, goat's hair, and the spun and woven fabrics which the increasing quantities of the

* Especially on the North-West coast of America; see Bancroft. Among the Haidas of the Queen Charlotte Islands some households gather as many as seven hundred members under one roof. Among the Nootkas, whole tribes lived under one roof. [Note by Engels.]

raw material brought into commoner use. This, for the first time, made regular exchange possible. At the preceding stages, exchange could only take place occasionally; exceptional ability in the making of weapons and tools may have led to a transient division of labour. Thus, unquestionable remains of workshops for stone implements of the neolithic period have been found in many places. The artificers who developed their ability in those workshops most probably worked for the community, as the permanent handicraftsmen of the Indian gentile communities still do. At any rate, no other exchange than that within the tribe could arise in that stage, and even that was an exception. After the crystallisation of the pastoral tribes, however, we find here all the conditions favourable for exchange between members of different tribes, and for its further development and consolidation as a regular institution. Originally, tribe exchange with tribe through their respective gentile chiefs. When, however, the herds began to be converted into separate property, exchange between individuals predominated more and more, until eventually it became the sole form. The principal article which the pastoral tribes offered their neighbours for exchange was cattle; cattle became the commodity by which all other commodities were appraised, and was everywhere readily taken in exchange for other commodities—in short, cattle assumed the function of money and served as money already at this stage. Such was the necessity and rapidity with which the demand for a money commodity developed at the very beginning of commodity exchange.

Horticulture, probably unknown to the Asiatic barbarians of the lower stage, arose, among them, at the latest, at the middle stage, as the forerunner of field agriculture. The climate of the Turanian Highlands does not admit of a pastoral life without a supply of fodder for the long and severe winter. Hence, the cultivation of meadows and grain was here indispensable. The same is true of the steppes north of the Black Sea. Once grain was grown for cattle, it soon became human food. The cultivated land still remained tribal property and was assigned first to the gens, which, later, in its turn distributed it to the household communities for their use, and finally to individuals; these may have had certain rights of possession, but no more.

Of the industrial achievements of this stage two are particularly important. The first is the weaving loom, the second, the smelting of metal ore and the working up of metals. Copper, tin, and their alloy, bronze, were by far the most important; bronze furnished useful tools and weapons, but could not

displace stone implements. Only iron could do that, but its production was as yet unknown. Gold and silver began to be used for ornament and decoration, and must already have been of far higher value than copper and bronze.

The increase of production in all branches—cattle breeding, agriculture, domestic handicrafts—enabled human labour power to produce more than was necessary for its maintenance. At the same time, it increased the amount of work that daily fell to the lot of every member of the gens or household community or single family. The addition of more labour power became desirable. This was furnished by war; captives were made slaves. Under the given general historical conditions, the first great social division of labour, by increasing the productivity of labour, that is, wealth, and enlarging the field of production, necessarily carried slavery in its wake. Out of the first great social division of labour arose the first great division of society, into two classes: masters and slaves, exploiters and exploited.

How and when the herds and flocks were converted from the common property of the tribe or gens into the property of the individual heads of families we do not know to this day; but it must have occurred, in the main, at this stage. The herds and the other new objects of wealth brought about a revolution in the family. Gaining a livelihood had always been the business of the man; he produced and owned the means therefore. The herds were the new means of gaining a livelihood, and their original domestication and subsequent tending was his work. Hence, he owned the cattle, and the commodities and slaves obtained in exchange for them. All the surplus now resulting from production fell to the man; the woman shared in consuming it, but she had no share in owning it. The "savage" warrior and hunter had been content to occupy second place in the house and give precedence to the woman. The "gentler" shepherd, presuming upon his wealth, pushed forward to first place and forced the woman into second place. And she could not complain. Division of labour in the family had regulated the distribution of property between man and wife. This division of labour remained unchanged, and yet it now put the former domestic relationship topsy-turvy simply because the division of labour outside the family had changed. The very cause that had formerly made the woman supreme in the house, namely, her being confined to domestic work, now assured supremacy in the house for the man; the woman's housework lost its significance compared with the man's work in obtaining a livelihood; the latter was everything, the former an insignificant

contribution. Here we see already that the emancipation of women and their equality with men are impossible and must remain so as long as women are excluded from socially productive work and restricted to housework, which is private. The emancipation of women becomes possible only when women are enabled to take part in production on a large, social scale, and when domestic duties require their attention only to a minor degree. And this has become possible only as a result of modern large-scale industry, which not only permits of the participation of women in production in large numbers, but actually calls for it and, moreover, strives to convert private domestic work also into a public industry.

His achievement of actual supremacy in the house threw down the last barrier to the man's autocracy. This autocracy was confirmed and perpetuated by the overthrow of mother right, the introduction of father right and the gradual transition from the pairing family to monogamy. This made a breach in the old gentile order: the monogamian family became a power and rose threateningly against the gens.

The next step brings us to the upper stage of barbarism, the period in which all civilised peoples passed through their Heroic Age: it is the period of the iron sword, but also of the iron ploughshare and axe. Iron became the servant of man, the last and most important of all raw materials that played a revolutionary role in history, the last—if we except the potato. Iron made possible field agriculture on a larger scale and the clearing of extensive forest tracts for cultivation; it gave the craftsman a tool of such hardness and sharpness that no stone, no other known metal, could withstand it. All this came about gradually; the first iron produced was often softer than bronze. Thus, stone weapons disappeared but slowly; stone axes were still used in battle not only in the Hildebrand Song, but also at the battle of Hastings, in 1066.¹⁸⁷ But progress was now irresistible, less interrupted and more rapid. The town, inclosing houses of stone or brick within its turreted and crenellated stone walls, became the central seat of the tribe or confederacy of tribes. It marked rapid progress in the art of building; but it was also a symptom of increased danger and need for protection. Wealth increased rapidly, but it was the wealth of single individuals. Weaving, metalworking and the other crafts that were becoming more and more specialised displayed increasing variety and artistic finish in their products; agriculture now provided not only cereals, leguminous plants and fruit, but also oil and wine, the preparation of which had now been learned. Such diverse activities could no longer be conducted by any single individual; *the*

second great division of labour took place; handicrafts separated from agriculture. The continued increase of production and with it the increased productivity of labour enhanced the value of human labour power. Slavery, which had been a nascent and sporadic factor in the preceding stage, now became an essential part of the social system. The slaves ceased to be simply assistants, but they were now driven in scores to work in the fields and workshops. The division of production into two great branches, agriculture and handicrafts, gave rise to production for exchange, the production of commodities; and with it came trade, not only in the interior and on the tribal boundaries, but also overseas. All this was still very undeveloped; the precious metals gained preference as the universal money commodity, but it was not yet minted and was exchanged merely by bare weight.

The distinction between rich and poor was added to that between freemen and slaves—with the new division of labour came a new division of society into classes. The differences in the wealth of the various heads of families caused the old communistic household communities to break up wherever they had still been preserved; and this put an end to the common cultivation of the soil for the account of the community. The cultivated land was assigned for use to the several families, first for a limited time and later in perpetuity; the transition to complete private ownership was accomplished gradually and simultaneously with the transition from the pairing family to monogamy. The individual family began to be the economic unit of society.

The increased density of the population necessitated closer union internally and externally. Everywhere the federation of kindred tribes became a necessity, and soon after, their amalgamation; and thence the amalgamation of the separate tribal territories into a single territory of the people. The military commander of the people—*rex, basileus, thiudans*—became an indispensable and permanent official. The popular assembly was instituted wherever it did not yet exist. The military commander, the council and the popular assembly formed the organs of the military democracy into which gentile society had developed. A military democracy—because war and organisation for war were now regular functions of the life of the people. The wealth of their neighbours excited the greed of the peoples who began to regard the acquisition of wealth as one of the main purposes in life. They were barbarians: plunder appeared to them easier and even more honourable than productive work. War, once waged simply to avenge aggression or as a means of enlarging territory that had become inadequate, was now waged

for the sake of plunder alone, and became a regular profession. It was not for nothing that formidable walls were reared around the new fortified towns: their yawning moats were the graves of the gentile constitution, and their turrets already reached up into civilisation. Internal affairs underwent a similar change. The robber wars increased the power of the supreme military commander as well as of the subcommanders. The customary election of successors from one family, especially after the introduction of father right, was gradually transformed into hereditary succession, first tolerated, then claimed and finally usurped; the foundation of hereditary royalty and hereditary nobility was laid. In this manner the organs of the gentile constitution were gradually torn from their roots in the people, in gens, phratry and tribe, and the whole gentile order was transformed into its opposite: from an organisation of tribes for the free administration of their own affairs it became an organisation for plundering and oppressing their neighbours; and correspondingly its organs were transformed from instruments of the will of the people into independent organs for ruling and oppressing their own people. This could not have happened had not the greed for wealth divided the members of the gentes into rich and poor; had not "property differences in a gens changed the community of interest into antagonism between members of a gens" (Marx); and had not the growth of slavery already begun to brand working for a living as slavish and more ignominious than engaging in plunder.

* * *

This brings us to the threshold of civilisation. This stage is inaugurated by further progress in division of labour. In the lowest stage men produced only for their own direct needs; exchange was confined to sporadic cases when a surplus was accidentally obtained. In the middle stage of barbarism we find that the pastoral peoples had in their cattle a form of property which, with sufficiently large herds and flocks, regularly provided a surplus over and above their needs; and we also find a division of labour between the pastoral peoples and backward tribes without herds, so that there were two different stages of production side by side, which created the conditions for regular exchange. The upper stage of barbarism introduced a further division of labour, between agriculture and handicrafts, resulting in the production of a continually increasing portion of commodities especially for exchange, so that exchange between individual producers reached the point where it became a vital necessity for society. Civilisation strengthened and increased all

the established divisions of labour, particularly by intensifying the contrast between town and country (either the town exercising economic supremacy over the country, as in antiquity, or the country over the town, as in the Middle Ages) and added a third division of labour, peculiar to itself and of decisive importance: it created a class that took no part in production, but engaged exclusively in exchanging products—the *merchants*. All previous inchoative formations of classes were exclusively connected with production; they divided those engaged in production into managers and performers, or into producers on a large scale and producers on a small scale. Here a class appears for the first time which, without taking any part in production, captures the management of production as a whole and economically subjugates the producers to its rule; a class that makes itself the indispensable intermediary between any two producers and exploits them both. On the pretext of saving the producers the trouble and risk of exchange, of finding distant markets for their products, and of thus becoming the most useful class in society, a class of parasites arises, genuine social sycophants, who, as a reward for very insignificant real services, skim the cream off production at home and abroad, rapidly amass enormous wealth and corresponding social influence, and for this very reason are destined to reap ever new honours and gain increasing control over production during the period of civilisation, until they at last create a product of their own—periodic commercial crises.

At the stage of development we are discussing, the young merchant class had no inkling as yet of the big things that were in store for it. But it took shape and made itself indispensable, and that was sufficient. With it, however, *metal money*, minted coins, came into use, and with this a new means by which the non-producer could rule the producer and his products. The commodity of commodities, which conceals within itself all other commodities, was discovered; the charm that can transform itself at will into anything desirable and desired. Whoever possessed it ruled the world of production; and who had it above all others? The merchant. In his hands the cult of money was safe. He took care to make it plain that all commodities, and hence all commodity producers, must grovel in the dust before money. He proved in practice that all other forms of wealth were mere semblances compared with this incarnation of wealth as such. Never again has the power of money revealed itself with such primitive crudity and violence as it did in this period of its youth. After the sale of commodities for money came the lending of money, entailing interest and usury. And

no legislation of any later period throws the debtor so pitilessly and helplessly at the feet of the usurious creditor as that of ancient Athens and Rome—both sets of law arose spontaneously, as common law, without other than economic compulsion.

Besides wealth in commodities and slaves, besides money wealth, wealth in the form of land came into being. The titles of individuals to parcels of land originally assigned to them by the gens or tribe were now so well established that these parcels became their hereditary property. The thing they had been striving for most just before that time was liberation from the claim of the gentile community to their parcels of land, a claim which had become a fetter for them. They were freed from this fetter—but soon after also from their new landed property. The full, free ownership of land implied not only possibility of unrestricted and uncurtailed possession, but also possibility of alienating it. As long as the land belonged to the gens there was no such possibility. But when the new landowner shook off the chains of the paramount title of the gens and tribe, he also tore the bond that had so long tied him inseparably to the soil. What that meant was made plain to him by the money invented simultaneously with the advent of private property in land. Land could now become a commodity which could be sold and pledged. Hardly had the private ownership of land been introduced when mortgage was discovered (see Athens). Just as hetæerism and prostitution clung to the heels of monogamy, so from now on mortgage clung to the ownership of land. You clamoured for free, full, alienable ownership of land. Well, here you have it—*tu l'as voulu*,* Georges Dandin!

Commercial expansion, money, usury, landed property and mortgage were thus accompanied by the rapid concentration and centralisation of wealth in the hands of a small class, on the one hand, and by the increasing impoverishment of the masses and a growing mass of paupers, on the other. The new aristocracy of wealth, in so far as it did not from the outset coincide with the old tribal nobility, forced the latter permanently into the background (in Athens, in Rome, among the Germans). And this division of freemen into classes according to their wealth was accompanied, especially in Greece, by an enormous increase in the number of slaves,** whose forced labour formed

* You wanted it. This expression is taken from Molière's comedy *Georges Dandin*.—Ed.

** For the number of slaves in Athens, see above, p. 126. In Corinth, at the city's zenith, it was 460,000, and in Aegina 470,000; in both, ten times the number of free burghers. [Note by Engels.]

Engels gives the page of the fourth German edition. See p. 284 of this volume.—Ed.

the basis on which the superstructure of all society was reared.

Let us now see what became of the gentile constitution as a result of this social revolution. It stood powerless in face of the new elements that had grown up without its aid. It was dependent on the condition that the members of a gens, or, say, of a tribe, should live together in the same territory, be its sole inhabitants. This had long ceased to be the case. Gentes and tribes were everywhere commingled; everywhere slaves, dependents and foreigners lived among the citizens. The sedentary state, which had been acquired only towards the end of the middle stage of barbarism, was time and again interrupted by the mobility and changes of abode upon which commerce, changes of occupation and the transfer of land were conditioned. The members of the gentile organisation could no longer meet for the purpose of attending to their common affairs; only matters of minor importance, such as religious ceremonies, were still observed, indifferently. Beside the wants and interests which the gentile organs were appointed and fitted to take care of, new wants and interests had arisen from the revolution in the conditions of earning one's living and the resulting change in social structure. These new wants and interests were not only alien to the old gentile order, but thwarted it in every way. The interests of the groups of craftsmen created by division of labour, and the special needs of the town as opposed to the country, required new organs; but each of these groups was composed of people from different gentes, phratries and tribes; they even included aliens. Hence, the new organs necessarily had to take form outside the gentile constitution, parallel with it, and that meant against it. And again, in every gentile organisation the conflict of interests made itself felt and reached its apex by combining rich and poor, usurers and debtors, in the same gens and tribe. Then there was the mass of new inhabitants, strangers to the gentile associations, which, as in Rome, could become a power in the land, and was too numerous to be gradually absorbed by the consanguine gentes and tribes. The gentile associations confronted these masses as exclusive, privileged bodies; what had originally been a naturally-grown democracy was transformed into a hateful aristocracy. Lastly, the gentile constitution had grown out of a society that knew no internal antagonisms, and was adapted only for such a society. It had no coercive power except public opinion. But now a society had come into being that by the force of all its economic conditions of existence had to split up into freemen and slaves, into exploiting rich and exploited poor; a society that was not only incapable of reconciling these antagonisms,

but had to drive them more and more to a head. Such a society could only exist either in a state of continuous, open struggle of these classes against one another or under the rule of a third power which, while ostensibly standing above the classes struggling with each other, suppressed their open conflict and permitted a class struggle at most in the economic field, in a so-called legal form. The gentile constitution had outlived its usefulness. It was burst asunder by the division of labour and by its result, the division of society into classes. Its place was taken by the *state*.

* * *

Above we discussed separately each of the three main forms in which the state was built up on the ruins of the gentile constitution. Athens represented the purest, most classical form. Here the state sprang directly and mainly out of the class antagonisms that developed within gentile society. In Rome gentile society became an exclusive aristocracy amidst a numerous plebs, standing outside of it, having no rights but only duties. The victory of the plebs burst the old gentile constitution asunder and erected on its ruins the state, in which both the gentile aristocracy and the plebs were soon wholly absorbed. Finally, among the German vanquishers of the Roman Empire, the state sprang up as a direct result of the conquest of large foreign territories, which the gentile constitution had no means of ruling. As this conquest did not necessitate either a serious struggle with the old population or a more advanced division of labour, and as conquered and conquerors were almost at the same stage of economic development and thus the economic basis of society remained the same as before, therefore, the gentile constitution could continue for many centuries in a changed, territorial form, in the shape of a Mark constitution, and even rejuvenate itself for a time in enfeebled form in the noble and patrician families of later years, and even in peasant families, as in Dithmarschen.*

The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it "the reality of the ethical idea," "the image and reality of reason," as Hegel maintains.¹⁸⁹ Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an in-

* The first historian who had at least an approximate idea of the nature of the gens was Niebuhr, thanks to his knowledge of the Dithmarschen families—to which, however, he also owes the errors he mechanically copied from there.¹⁸⁸ [Note by Engels.]

soluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the conflict, and keep it within the bounds of "order"; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.

As distinct from the old gentile order, the state, first, divides its subjects *according to territory*. As we have seen, the old gentile associations, built upon and held together by ties of blood, became inadequate, largely because they presupposed that the members were bound to a given territory, a bond which had long ceased to exist. The territory remained, but the people had become mobile. Hence, division according to territory was taken as the point of departure, and citizens were allowed to exercise their public rights and duties wherever they settled, irrespective of gens and tribe. This organisation of citizens according to locality is a feature common to all states. That is why it seems natural to us; but we have seen what long and arduous struggles were needed before it could replace, in Athens and Rome, the old organisation according to gentes.

The second distinguishing feature is the establishment of a *public power* which no longer directly coincides with the population organising itself as an armed force. This special public power is necessary because a self-acting armed organisation of the population has become impossible since the split into classes. The slaves also belonged to the population; the 90,000 citizens of Athens formed only a privileged class as against the 365,000 slaves. The people's army of the Athenian democracy was an aristocratic public power against the slaves, whom it kept in check; however, a gendarmerie also became necessary to keep the citizens in check, as we related above. This public power exists in every state; it consists not merely of armed men but also of material adjuncts, prisons and institutions of coercion of all kinds, of which gentile [clan] society knew nothing. It may be very insignificant, almost infinitesimal, in societies where class antagonisms are still undeveloped and in out-of-the-way places as was the case at certain times and in certain regions in the United States of America. It [the public power] grows stronger, however, in proportion as class antagonisms within the state become more acute, and as adjacent states become larger and more populous. We have only to look at our present-day Europe, where class struggle and rivalry in conquest have

tuned up the public power to such a pitch that it threatens to swallow the whole of society and even the state.

In order to maintain this public power, contributions from the citizens become necessary—*taxes*. These were absolutely unknown in gentile society; but we know enough about them today. As civilisation advances, these taxes become inadequate; the state makes drafts on the future, contracts loans, *public debts*. Old Europe can tell a tale about these, too.

Having public power and the right to levy taxes, the officials now stand, as organs of society, *above* society. The free, voluntary respect that was accorded to the organs of the gentile [clan] constitution does not satisfy them, even if they could gain it; being the vehicles of a power that is becoming alien to society, respect for them must be enforced by means of exceptional laws by virtue of which they enjoy special sanctity and inviolability. The shabbiest police servant in the civilised state has more "authority" than all the organs of gentile society put together; but the most powerful prince and the greatest statesman, or general, of civilisation may well envy the humblest gentile chief for the unstrained and undisputed respect that is paid to him. The one stands in the midst of society, the other is forced to attempt to represent something outside and above it.

Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital. By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both. Such was the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which held the balance between the nobility and the class of burghers; such was the Bonapartism of the First, and still more of the Second French Empire, which played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. The latest performance of this kind, in which ruler and ruled appear equally ridiculous, is the new German Empire of the Bismarck nation: here capitalists and

workers are balanced against each other and equally cheated for the benefit of the impoverished Prussian cabbage junkers.

In most of the historical states, the rights of citizens are, besides, apportioned according to their wealth, thus directly expressing the fact that the state is an organisation of the possessing class for its protection against the non-possessing class. It was so already in the Athenian and Roman classification according to property. It was so in the mediaeval feudal state, in which the alignment of political power was in conformity with the amount of land owned. It is seen in the electoral qualifications of the modern representative states. Yet this political recognition of property distinctions is by no means essential. On the contrary, it marks a low stage of state development. The highest form of the state, the democratic republic, which under our modern conditions of society is more and more becoming an inevitable necessity, and is the form of state in which alone the last decisive struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie can be fought out—the democratic republic officially knows nothing any more of property distinctions. In it wealth exercises its power indirectly, but all the more surely. On the one hand, in the form of the direct corruption of officials, of which America provides the classical example; on the other hand, in the form of an alliance between government and Stock Exchange, which becomes the easier to achieve the more the public debt increases and the more joint-stock companies concentrate in their hands not only transport but also production itself, using the Stock Exchange as their centre. The latest French republic as well as the United States is a striking example of this; and good old Switzerland has contributed its share in this field. But that a democratic republic is not essential for this fraternal alliance between government and Stock Exchange is proved by England and also by the new German Empire, where one cannot tell who was elevated more by universal suffrage, Bismarck or Bleichröder. And lastly, the possessing class rules directly through the medium of universal suffrage. As long as the oppressed class, in our case, therefore, the proletariat, is not yet ripe to emancipate itself, it will in its majority regard the existing order of society as the only one possible and, politically, will form the tail of the capitalist class, its extreme Left wing. To the extent, however, that this class matures for its self-emancipation, it constitutes itself as its own party and elects its own representatives, and not those of the capitalists. Thus, universal suffrage is the gauge of the maturity of the working class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state; but that is sufficient. On the day the thermometer of

universal suffrage registers boiling point among the workers, both they and the capitalists will know what to do.

The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no idea of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the split of society into classes, the state became a necessity owing to this split. We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. Along with them the state will inevitably fall. Society, which will reorganise production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers, will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning-wheel and the bronze axe.

* * *

Thus, from the foregoing, civilisation is that stage of development of society at which division of labour, the resulting exchange between individuals, and commodity production, which combines the two, reach their complete unfoldment and revolutionise the whole hitherto existing society.

Production at all former stages of society was essentially collective and, likewise, consumption took place by the direct distribution of the products within larger or smaller communistic communities. This production in common was carried on within the narrowest limits, but concomitantly the producers were masters of their process of production and of their product. They knew what became of the product: they consumed it, it did not leave their hands; and as long as production was carried on on this basis, it could not grow beyond the control of the producers, and it could not raise any strange, phantom powers against them, as is the case regularly and inevitably under civilisation.

But, slowly, division of labour crept into this process of production. It undermined the collective nature of production and appropriation, it made appropriation by individuals the largely prevailing rule, and thus gave rise to exchange between individuals—how, we examined above. Gradually, the production of commodities became the dominant form.

With the production of commodities, production no longer for one's own consumption but for exchange, the products necessarily pass from hand to hand. The producer parts with his

product in the course of exchange; he no longer knows what becomes of it. As soon as money, and with it the merchant, steps in as a middleman between the producers, the process of exchange becomes still more complicated, the ultimate fate of the product still more uncertain. The merchants are numerous and none of them knows what the other is doing. Commodities now pass not only from hand to hand, but also from market to market. The producers have lost control of the aggregate production of the conditions of their own life, and the merchants have not acquired it. Products and production become the play-things of chance.

But chance is only one pole of an interrelation, the other pole of which is called necessity. In nature, where chance also seems to reign, we have long ago demonstrated in each particular field the inherent necessity and regularity that asserts itself in this chance. What is true of nature holds good also for society. The more a social activity, a series of social processes, becomes too powerful for conscious human control, grows beyond human reach, the more it seems to have been left to pure chance, the more do its peculiar and innate laws assert themselves in this chance, as if by natural necessity. Such laws also control the fortuities of the production and exchange of commodities; these laws confront the individual producer and exchanger as strange and, in the beginning, even as unknown powers, the nature of which must first be laboriously investigated and ascertained. These economic laws of commodity production are modified at the different stages of development of this form of production; on the whole, however, the entire period of civilisation has been dominated by these laws. To this day, the product is master of the producer; to this day, the total production of society is regulated, not by a collectively thought-out plan, but by blind laws, which operate with elemental force, in the last resort in the storms of periodic commercial crises.

We saw above how human labour power became able, at a rather early stage of development of production, to produce considerably more than was needed for the producer's maintenance, and how this stage, in the main, coincided with that of the first appearance of the division of labour and of exchange between individuals. Now, it was not long before the great "truth" was discovered that man, too, may be a commodity; that human power may be exchanged and utilised by converting man into a slave. Men had barely started to engage in exchange when they themselves were exchanged. The active became a passive, whether man wanted it or not.

With slavery, which reached its fullest development in civili-

sation, came the first great cleavage of society into an exploiting and an exploited class. This cleavage has continued during the whole period of civilisation. Slavery was the first form of exploitation, peculiar to the world of antiquity; it was followed by serfdom in the Middle Ages, and by wage labour in modern times. These are the three great forms of servitude, characteristic of the three great epochs of civilisation; open, and, latterly, disguised slavery, are its steady companions.

The stage of commodity production, with which civilisation began, is marked economically by the introduction of 1) metal money and, thus, of money capital, interest and usury; 2) the merchants acting as middlemen between producers; 3) private ownership of land and mortgage; 4) slave labour as the prevailing form of production. The form of the family corresponding to civilisation and under it becoming the definitely prevailing form is monogamy, the supremacy of the man over the woman, and the individual family as the economic unit of society. The cohesive force of civilised society is the state, which in all typical periods is exclusively the state of the ruling class, and in all cases remains essentially a machine for keeping down the oppressed, exploited class. Other marks of civilisation are: on the one hand, fixation of the contrast between town and country as the basis of the entire division of social labour; on the other hand, the introduction of wills, by which the property holder is able to dispose of his property even after his death. This institution, which was a direct blow at the old gentile constitution, was unknown in Athens until the time of Solon; in Rome it was introduced very early, but we do not know when.* Among the Germans it was introduced by the priests in order that the good honest German might without hindrance bequeath his property to the Church.

With this constitution as its foundation civilisation has accomplished things with which the old gentile society was totally unable to cope. But it accomplished them by playing on the

* Lassalle's *Das System der erworbenen Rechte (System of Acquired Rights)* turns, in its second part, mainly on the proposition that the Roman testament is as old as Rome itself, that in Roman history there was never "a time when testaments did not exist"; that the testament arose rather in pre-Roman times out of the cult of the dead. As a confirmed Hegelian of the old school, Lassalle derived the provisions of the Roman law not from the social conditions of the Romans, but from the "speculative conception" of the will, and thus arrived at this totally unhistoric assertion. This is not to be wondered at in a book that from the same speculative conception draws the conclusion that the transfer of property was purely a secondary matter in Roman inheritance. Lassalle not only believes in the illusions of Roman jurists, especially of the earlier period, but he even excels them. [Note by Engels.]

most sordid instincts and passions of man, and by developing them at the expense of all his other faculties. Naked greed has been the moving spirit of civilisation from the first day of its existence to the present time; wealth, more wealth and wealth again; wealth, not of society, but of this shabby individual was its sole and determining aim. If, in the pursuit of this aim, the increasing development of science and repeated periods of the fullest blooming of art fell into its lap, it was only because without them the ample present-day achievements in the accumulation of wealth would have been impossible.

Since the exploitation of one class by another is the basis of civilisation, its whole development moves in a continuous contradiction. Every advance in production is at the same time a retrogression in the condition of the oppressed class, that is, of the great majority. What is a boon for the one is necessarily a bane for the other; each new emancipation of one class always means a new oppression of another class. The most striking proof of this is furnished by the introduction of machinery, the effects of which are well known today. And while among barbarians, as we have seen, hardly any distinction could be made between rights and duties, civilisation makes the difference and antithesis between these two plain even to the dullest mind by assigning to one class pretty nearly all the rights, and to the other class pretty nearly all the duties.

But this is not as it ought to be. What is good for the ruling class should be good for the whole of the society with which the ruling class identifies itself. Therefore, the more civilisation advances, the more it is compelled to cover the ills it necessarily creates with the cloak of love, to embellish them, or to deny their existence; in short, to introduce conventional hypocrisy—unknown both in previous forms of society and even in the earliest stages of civilisation—that culminates in the declaration: The exploiting class exploits the oppressed class solely and exclusively in the interest of the exploited class itself; and if the latter fails to appreciate this, and even becomes rebellious, it thereby shows the basest ingratitude to its benefactors, the exploiters.*

* I had intended at the outset to place the brilliant critique of civilisation, scattered through the works of Fourier, by the side of Morgan's and my own. Unfortunately, I cannot spare the time. I only wish to remark that Fourier already considered monogamy and property in land as the main characteristics of civilisation, and that he described it as a war of the rich against the poor. We also find already in his works the deep appreciation of the fact that in all imperfect societies, those torn by conflicting interests, the individual families (*les familles incohérentes*) are the economic units. [Note by Engels.]

And now, in conclusion, Morgan's verdict on civilisation:

"Since the advent of civilisation, the outgrowth of property has been so immense, its forms so diversified, its uses so expanding and its management so intelligent in the interests of its owners that it has become, on the part of the people, *an unmanageable power. The human mind stands bewildered in the presence of its own creation.* The time will come, nevertheless, when human intelligence will rise to the mastery over property, and define the relations of the state to the property it protects, as well as the obligations and the limits of the rights of its owners. The interests of society are paramount to individual interests, and the two must be brought into just and harmonious relation. A mere property career is not the final destiny of mankind, if progress is to be the law of the future as it has been of the past. The time which has passed away since civilisation began is but a fragment of the past duration of man's existence; and but a fragment of the ages yet to come. The dissolution of society bids fair to become the termination of a career of which property is the end and aim, because such a career contains the elements of self-destruction. Democracy in government, brotherhood in society, equality in rights and privileges, and universal education, foreshadow the next higher plane of society to which experience, intelligence and knowledge are steadily tending. *It will be a revival, in a higher form of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes.*" (Morgan, *Ancient Society*, p. 552.)

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LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE END OF CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY¹⁰⁰

FOREWORD TO THE 1888 EDITION

In the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, published in Berlin, 1859, Karl Marx relates how the two of us in Brussels in the year 1845 set about "to work out in common the opposition of our view"—the materialist conception of history which was elaborated mainly by Marx—"to the ideological view of German philosophy, in fact, to settle accounts with our erstwhile philosophical conscience. The resolve was carried out in the form of a criticism of post-Hegelian philosophy. The manuscript, two large octavo volumes, had long reached its place of publication in Westphalia when we received the news that altered circumstances did not allow of its being printed. We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly as we had achieved our main purpose—self-clarification."^{*}

Since then more than forty years have elapsed and Marx died without either of us having had an opportunity of returning to the subject. We have expressed ourselves in various places regarding our relation to Hegel, but nowhere in a comprehensive, connected account. To Feuerbach, who after all in many respects forms an intermediate link between Hegelian philosophy and our conception, we never returned.

In the meantime the Marxist world outlook has found representatives far beyond the boundaries of Germany and Europe and in all the literary languages of the world. On the other hand, classical German philosophy is experiencing a kind of rebirth abroad, especially in England and Scandinavia, and even in Germany itself people appear to be getting tired of the pauper's broth of eclecticism which is ladled out in the universities there under the name of philosophy.

In these circumstances a short, coherent account of our relation to the Hegelian philosophy, of how we proceeded, as well as of how we separated, from it, appeared to me to be required

* See present edition, Vol. 1, p. 505.—Ed.

property comes to an end. Whilst previously in history a particular condition always appeared as accidental, now the isolation of individuals and the particular private gain of each man have themselves become accidental.

The individuals, who are no longer subject [68] to the division of labour, have been conceived by the philosophers as an ideal, under the name "Man". They have conceived the whole process which we have outlined as the evolutionary process of "Man", so that at every historical stage "Man" was substituted for the individuals and shown as the motive force of history. The whole process was thus conceived as a process of the self-estrangement of "Man",* and this was essentially due to the fact that the average individual of the later stage was always foisted on to the earlier stage, and the consciousness of a later age on to the individuals of an earlier. Through this inversion, which from the first is an abstract image of the actual conditions, it was possible to transform the whole of history into an evolutionary process of consciousness.

* * *

Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly must organise itself as State. The term "civil society" [*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*]** emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relationships had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval communal society. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organisation evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms the basis of the State and of the rest of the idealistic*** superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name.

[11.] The Relation of State and Law to Property

The first form of property, in the ancient world as in the Middle Ages, is tribal property, determined with the Romans chiefly by war, with [69] the Germans by the rearing of cattle.

* [Marginal note by Marx:] Self-estrangement.

** "*Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*" can mean either "bourgeois society" or "civil society".—Ed.

*** i.e., ideal, ideological.—Ed.

In the case of the ancient peoples, since several tribes live together in one town, the tribal property appears as State property, and the right of the individual to it as mere "possession" which, however, like tribal property as a whole, is confined to landed property only. Real private property began with the ancients, as with modern nations, with movable property.—(Slavery and community) (*dominium ex jure Quiritum**). In the case of the nations which grew out of the Middle Ages, tribal property evolved through various stages—feudal landed property, corporative movable property, capital invested in manufacture—to modern capital, determined by big industry and universal competition, i.e., pure private property, which has cast off all semblance of a communal institution and has shut out the State from any influence on the development of property. To this modern private property corresponds the modern State, which, purchased gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation, has fallen entirely into their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extend to it, as reflected in the rise and fall of State funds on the stock exchange. By the mere fact that it is a *class* and no longer an *estate*, the bourgeoisie is forced to organise itself no longer locally, but nationally, and to give a general form to its mean average interest. Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests. The independence of the State is only found nowadays in those countries where the estates have not yet completely developed into classes, where the estates, done away with in more advanced countries, still have a part to play, and where there exists a mixture; countries, that is to say, in which no one section of the population can achieve dominance over the others. This is the case particularly in Germany. The most perfect example of the modern State is North [70] America. The modern French, English and American writers all express the opinion that the State exists only for the sake of private property, so that this fact has penetrated into the consciousness of the normal man.

Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole

* Ownership in accordance with the law applying to full Roman citizens.—Ed.

civil society of an epoch is epitomised, it follows that the State mediates in the formation of all common institutions and that the institutions receive a political form. Hence the illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis—on *free* will. Similarly, justice is in its turn reduced to the actual laws.

Civil law develops simultaneously with private property out of the disintegration of the natural community. With the Romans the development of private property and civil law had no further industrial and commercial consequences, because their whole mode of production did not alter.* With modern peoples, where the feudal community was disintegrated by industry and trade, there began with the rise of private property and civil law a new phase, which was capable of further development. The very first town which carried on an extensive maritime trade in the Middle Ages, Amalfi, also developed maritime law.³⁴ As soon as industry and trade developed private property further, first in Italy and later in other countries, the highly developed Roman civil law was immediately adopted again and raised to authority. When later the bourgeoisie had acquired so much power that the princes took up its interests in order to overthrow the feudal nobility by means of the bourgeoisie, there began in all countries—in France in the sixteenth century—the real development of law, which in all countries except England proceeded [71] on the basis of the Roman Codex. In England, too, Roman legal principles had to be introduced to further the development of civil law (especially in the case of movable property). (It must not be forgotten that law has just as little independent history as religion.)

In civil law the existing property relationships are declared to be the result of the general will. The *jus utendi et abutendi*** itself asserts on the one hand the fact that private property has become entirely independent of the community, and on the other the illusion that private property itself is based solely on the private will, the arbitrary disposal of the thing. In practice, the *abuti**** has very definite economic limitations for the owner of private property, if he does not wish to see his property and hence his *jus abutendi***** pass into other hands, since actually the thing, considered merely with reference to his will, is not

* [Marginal note by Engels:] (Usury!)

** The right of using and consuming (also: abusing), i.e., of disposing of a thing at will.—Ed.

*** Consuming or abusing.—Ed.

**** The right of abusing.—Ed.

a thing at all, but only becomes a thing, true property in intercourse, and independently of the law (a *relationship*, which the philosophers call an *idea**). This juridical illusion, which reduces law to the mere will, necessarily leads, in the further development of property relationships, to the position that a man may have a legal title to a thing without really having the thing. If, for instance, the income from a piece of land is lost owing to competition, then the proprietor has certainly his legal title to it along with the *jus utendi et abutendi*. But he can do nothing with it: he owns nothing as a landed proprietor if in addition he has not enough capital to cultivate his land. This illusion of the jurists also explains the fact that for them, as for every code, it is altogether fortuitous that individuals enter into relationships among themselves (e.g., contracts); it explains why they consider that these relationships [can] be entered into or not at will, [72] and that their content rests purely on the individual [free] will of the contracting parties.

Whenever, through the development of industry and commerce, new forms of intercourse have been evolved (e.g., insurance companies, etc.), the law has always been compelled to admit them among the modes of acquiring property.**

[12. Forms of Social Consciousness]

The influence of the division of labour on science.

The role of *repression* with regard to the State, right, morality, etc.

[In the] law the bourgeois must give themselves a general expression precisely because they rule as a class.

Natural science and history.

There is no history of politics, law, science, etc., of art, religion, etc.***

Why the ideologists turn everything upside-down.

Religionists, jurists, politicians.

Jurists, politicians (statesmen in general), moralists, religionists.

* [Marginal note by Marx:] For the philosophers *relationship=idea*. They only know the relation of "Man" to himself and hence for them all real relations become ideas.

** Further, at the end of the manuscript, there are notes written in Marx's hand which were intended for his further elaboration.—Ed.

*** [Marginal note by Marx:] To the "community" as it appears in the ancient State, in feudalism and in the absolute monarchy, to this bond correspond especially the [Catholic] religious conceptions.

SECTION 5.— THE STRUGGLE FOR A NORMAL WORKING-DAY.
 COMPULSORY LAWS FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE
 WORKING-DAY FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE 14TH TO THE END
 OF THE 17TH CENTURY

"What is a working-day? What is the length of time during which capital may consume the labour-power whose daily value it buys? How far may the working-day be extended beyond the working-time necessary for the reproduction of labour-power itself?" It has been seen that to these questions capital replies: the working-day contains the full 24 hours, with the deduction of the few hours of repose without which labour-power absolutely refuses its services again. Hence it is self-evident that the labourer is nothing else, his whole life through, than labour-power, that therefore all his disposable time is by nature and law labour-time, to be devoted to the self-expansion of capital. Time for education, for intellectual development, for the fulfilling of social functions and for social intercourse, for the free-play of his bodily and mental activity, even the rest time of Sunday (and that in a country of Sabbatarians!)¹—moonshine! But in its blind un-

walks during the performance of his work 15-20 miles in every 6 hours! And the work often lasts 14 or 15 hours! In many of these glass works, as in the Moscow spinning mills, the system of 6 hours' relays is in force. "During the working part of the week six hours is the utmost unbroken period ever attained at any one time for rest, and out of this has to come the time spent in coming and going to and from work, washing, dressing, and meals, leaving a very short period indeed for rest, and none for fresh air and play, unless at the expense of the sleep necessary for young boys, especially at such hot and fatiguing work... Even the short sleep is obviously liable to be broken by a boy having to wake himself if it is night, or by the noise, if it is day." Mr. White gives cases where a boy worked 36 consecutive hours; others where boys of 12 drudged on until 2 in the morning, and then slept in the works till 5 a. m. (3 hours!) only to resume their work. "The amount of work," say Trembleure and Tufnell, who drafted the general report, "done by boys, youths, girls, and women, in the course of their daily or nightly spell of labour, is certainly extraordinary." (l. c., xliii. and xlv.) Meanwhile, late by night perhaps, self-denying Mr. Glass-Capital, primed with port wine, reels out of his club homeward droning out idiotically, "Britons never, never shall be slaves!"

In England even now occasionally in rural districts a labourer is condemned to imprisonment for desecrating the Sabbath, by working in his front garden. The same labourer is punished for breach of contract if he remains away from his metal, paper, or glass works on the Sunday, even if it be from a religious whim. The orthodox Parliament will hear nothing of Sabbath breaking if it occurs in the process of expanding capital. A memo-

restrainable passion, its were-wolf hunger for surplus-labour, capital oversteps not only the moral, but even the merely physical maximum bounds of the working-day. It usurps the time for growth, development, and healthy maintenance of the body. It steals the time required for the consumption of fresh air and sunlight. It higgles over a meal-time, incorporating it where possible with the process of production itself, so that food is given to the labourer as to a mere means of production, as coal is supplied to the boiler, grease and oil to the machinery. It reduces the sound sleep needed for the restoration, reparation, refreshment of the bodily powers to just so many hours of torpor as the revival of an organism, absolutely exhausted, renders essential. It is not the normal maintenance of the labour-power which is to determine the limits of the working-day; it is the greatest possible daily expenditure of labour-power, no matter how diseased, compulsory, and painful it may be, which is to determine the limits of the labourers' period of repose. Capital cares nothing for the length of life of labour-power. All that concerns it is simply and solely the maximum of labour-power, that can be rendered fluent in a working-day. It attains this end by shortening the extent of the labourer's life, as a greedy farmer snatches increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility.

The capitalistic mode of production (essentially the production of surplus-value, the absorption of surplus-labour), produces thus, with the extension of the working-day, not only the deterioration of human labour-power by robbing it of its normal, moral and physical, conditions of development and function. It produces also the premature exhaustion and death of this labour-power itself.¹ It extends the labourer's time of production during a given period by shortening his actual life-time.

rial (August 1863), in which the London day-labourers in fish and poultry shops asked for the abolition of Sunday labour, states that their work lasts for the first 6 days of the week on an average 15 hours a-day, and on Sunday 8-10 hours. From this same memorial we learn also that the delicate gourmards among the aristocratic hypocrites of Exeter Hall, especially encourage this "Sunday labour." These "holy ones," so zealous in *cute curandā*, show their Christianity by the humility with which they bear the over-work, the privations, and the hunger of others. *Obsequium ventris istis (the labourers) perniciosius est.*

¹ "We have given in our previous reports the statements of several experienced manufacturers to the effect that over-hours ... certainly tend prematurely to exhaust the working power of the men." (l. c., 64, p. xiii.)

But the value of the labour-power includes the value of the commodities necessary for the reproduction of the worker, or for the keeping up of the working-class. If then the unnatural extension of the working-day, that capital necessarily strives after in its unmeasured passion for self-expansion, shortens the length of life of the individual labourer, and therefore the duration of his labour-power, the forces used up have to be replaced at a more rapid rate and the sum of the expenses for the reproduction of labour-power will be greater; just as in a machine the part of its value to be reproduced every day is greater the more rapidly the machine is worn out. It would seem therefore that the interest of capital itself points in the direction of a normal working-day.

The slave-owner buys his labourer as he buys his horse. If he loses his slave, he loses capital that can only be restored by new outlay in the slave-mart. But "the rice-grounds of Georgia, or the swamps of the Mississippi may be fatally injurious to the human constitution; but the waste of human life which the cultivation of these districts necessitates, is not so great that it cannot be repaired from the teeming preserves of Virginia and Kentucky. Considerations of economy, moreover, which, under a natural system, afford some security for humane treatment by identifying the master's interest with the slave's preservation, when once trading in slaves is practised, become reasons for racking to the uttermost the toil of the slave; for, when his place can at once be supplied from foreign preserves, the duration of his life becomes a matter of less moment than its productiveness while it lasts. It is accordingly a maxim of slave management, in slave-importing countries, that the most effective economy is that which takes out of the human chattel in the shortest space of time the utmost amount of exertion it is capable of putting forth. It is in tropical culture, where annual profits often equal the whole capital of plantations, that negro life is most recklessly sacrificed. It is the agriculture of the West Indies, which has been for centuries prolific of fabulous wealth, that has engulfed millions of the African race. It is in Cuba, at this day, whose revenues are reckoned by millions, and whose planters are princes, that we see in the servile class, the coarsest fare, the most exhausting and unremitting toil, and even the absolute destruction of a portion of its numbers every year."¹

¹ Cairnes, "The Slave Power," pp. 110, 111.

Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur. For slave-trade read labour-market, for Kentucky and Virginia, Ireland and the agricultural districts of England, Scotland, and Wales, for Africa, Germany. We heard how over-work thinned the ranks of the bakers in London. Nevertheless, the London labour-market is always over-stocked with German and other candidates for death in the bakeries. Pottery, as we saw, is one of the shortest-lived industries. Is there any want therefore of potters? Josiah Wedgwood, the inventor of modern pottery, himself originally a common workman, said in 1785 before the House of Commons that the whole trade employed from 15,000 to 20,000 people.¹ In the year 1861 the population alone of the town centres of this industry in Great Britain numbered 101,302. "The cotton trade has existed for ninety years. . . . It has existed for three generations of the English race, and I believe I may safely say that during that period it has destroyed nine generations of factory operatives."²

No doubt in certain epochs of feverish activity the labour-market shows significant gaps. In 1834, e.g. But then the manufacturers proposed to the Poor Law Commissioners that they should send the "surplus-population" of the agricultural districts to the north, with the explanation "that the manufacturers would absorb and use it up."³ "Agents were appointed with the consent of the Poor Law Commissioners. . . . An office was set up in Manchester, to which lists were sent of those workpeople in the agricultural districts wanting employment, and their names were registered in books. The manufacturers attended at these offices, and selected such persons as they chose; when they had selected such persons as their 'wants required,' they gave instructions to have them forwarded to Manchester, and they were sent, ticketed like bales of goods, by canals, or with carriers, others tramping on the road, and many of them were found on the way lost and half-starved. This system had grown up unto a regular trade. This House will hardly believe it, but I tell them, that this traffic in human flesh was as well kept up, they were in effect as regularly sold to these [Manchester] manufacturers as slaves are sold to the cotton-grower in the United States. . . . In 1860, 'the cotton trade was

¹ John Ward: "The Borough of Stoke-upon-Trent," London, 1843, p. 42.

² Ferrand's Speech in the House of Commons, 27th April, 1863.

³ "Those were the very words used by the cotton manufacturers," l. c.

at its zenith.' . . . The manufacturers again found that they were short of hands. . . . They applied to the 'flesh agents,' as they are called. Those agents sent to the southern downs of England, to the pastures of Dorsetshire, to the glades of Devonshire, to the people tending kine in Wiltshire, but they sought in vain. The surplus-population was 'absorbed.'" The *Bury Guardian* said, on the completion of the French treaty, that "10,000 additional hands could be absorbed by Lancashire, and that 30,000 or 40,000 will be needed." After the "flesh agents and sub-agents" had in vain sought through the agricultural districts, "a deputation came up to London, and waited on the right hon. gentleman [Mr. Villiers, President of the Poor Law Board] with a view of obtaining poor children from certain union houses for the mills of Lancashire."¹

¹ I. e. Mr. Villiers, despite the best of intentions on his part, was "legally" obliged to refuse the requests of the manufacturers. These gentlemen, however, attained their end through the obliging nature of the local poor law boards. Mr. A. Redgrave, Inspector of Factories, asserts that this time the system under which orphans and pauper children were treated "legally" as apprentices "was not accompanied with the old abuses" (on these "abuses" see Engels, l. c.), although in one case there certainly was "abuse of this system in respect to a number of girls and young women brought from the agricultural districts of Scotland into Lancashire and Cheshire." Under this system the manufacturer entered into a contract with the workhouse authorities for a certain period. He fed, clothed, and lodged the children, and gave them a small allowance of money. A remark of Mr. Redgrave to be quoted directly seems strange, especially if we consider that even among the years of prosperity of the English cotton trade, the year 1860 stands unparalleled, and that, besides, wages were exceptionally high. For this extraordinary demand for work had to contend with the depopulation of Ireland, with unexampled emigration from the English and Scotch agricultural districts to Australia and America, with an actual diminution of the population in some of the English agricultural districts, in consequence partly of an actual breakdown of the vital force of the labourers, partly of the already effected dispersion of the disposable population through the dealers in human flesh. Despite all this Mr. Redgrave says: "This kind of labour, however, would only be sought after when none other could be procured, for it is a high-priced labour. The ordinary wages of a boy of 13 would be about 4s. per week, but to lodge, to clothe, to feed, and to provide medical attendance and proper superintendence for 50 or 100 of these boys, and to set aside some remuneration for them, could not be accomplished for 4s. a-head per week." (Report of the Inspector of Factories for 30th April, 1860, p. 27.) Mr. Redgrave forgets to tell us how the labourer himself can do all this for his children out of their 4s. a-week wages, when the manufacturer cannot do it for the 50 or 100 children lodged, boarded, superintended all together. To guard against false conclusions from the text, I ought here to remark that the English cotton industry, since it was placed under the Factory Act of 1850 with its regulations of labour-time, &c., must be regarded as the model industry of England. The English cotton operative is in every

What experience shows to the capitalist generally is a constant excess of population, i. e., an excess in relation to the momentary requirements of surplus-labour-absorbing capital, although this excess is made up of generations of human beings stunted, short-lived, swiftly replacing each other, plucked, so to say, before maturity.¹ And, indeed, experience shows to the intelligent observer with what swiftness and grip the capitalist mode of production, dating, historically speaking, only from yesterday, has seized the vital power of the people by the very root—shows how the degeneration of the industrial population is only retarded by the constant absorption of primitive and physically uncorrupted elements from the country—shows how even the country labourers, in spite of fresh air and the principle of natural selection, that works so powerfully amongst them, and only permits the survival of the strongest, are already beginning to die off.² Capital that has such good reasons for denying the sufferings of the legions of workers that surround it, is in practice moved as much and as little by the sight of the coming degradation and final depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun. In every

respect better off than his Continental companion in misery. "The Prussian factory operative labours at least ten hours per week more than his English competitor, and if employed at his own loom in his own house, his labour is not restricted to even those additional hours." ("Rep. of Insp. of Fact.," 31st October, 1855, p. 103.) Redgrave, the Factory Inspector mentioned above, after the Industrial Exhibition in 1851, travelled on the Continent, especially in France and Germany, for the purpose of inquiring into the conditions of the factories. Of the Prussian operative he says: "He receives a remuneration sufficient to procure the simple fare, and to supply the slender comforts to which he has been accustomed . . . he lives upon his coarse fare, and works hard, wherein his position is subordinate to that of the English operative." ("Rep. of Insp. of Fact.," 31st Oct., 1855, p. 85.)

¹ The over-worked "die off with strange rapidity; but the places of those who perish are instantly filled, and a frequent change of persons makes no alteration in the scene." ("England and America." London, 1833, vol. I, p. 55. By E. G. Wakefield.)

² See "Public Health. Sixth Report of the Medical Officer of the Privy Council, 1863." Published in London 1864. This report deals especially with the agricultural labourers. "Sutherland . . . is commonly represented as a highly improved county . . . but . . . recent inquiry has discovered that even there, in districts once famous for fine men and gallant soldiers, the inhabitants have degenerated into a meagre and stunted race. In the healthiest situations, on hill sides fronting the sea, the faces of their famished children are as pale as they could be in the foul atmosphere of a London alley." (W. Th. Thornton. "Over-population and its Remedy." l. c., pp. 74, 75.) They resemble in fact the 30,000 "gallant Highlanders" whom Glasgow pigs together in its wynds and closes, with prostitutes and thieves.

stock-jobbing swindle every one knows that some time or other the crash must come, but every one hopes that it may fall on the head of his neighbour, after he himself has caught the shower of gold and placed it in safety. *Après moi le déluge!* is the watchword of every capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Hence Capital is reckless of the health or length of life of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society.¹ To the out-cry as to the physical and mental degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work, it answers: Ought these to trouble us since they increase our profits? But looking at things as a whole, all this does not, indeed, depend on the good or ill will of the individual capitalist. Free competition brings out the inherent laws of capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist.²

The establishment of a normal working-day is the result of centuries of struggle between capitalist and labourer. The history of this struggle shows two opposed tendencies. Compare, e.g., the English factory legislation of our time with the

¹ "But though the health of a population is so important a fact of the national capital, we are afraid it must be said that the class of employers of labour have not been the most forward to guard and cherish this treasure.... The consideration of the health of the operatives was forced upon the mill-owners." (*Times*, November 5th, 1861.) "The men of the West Riding became the clothiers of mankind... the health of the workpeople was sacrificed, and the race in a few generations must have degenerated. But a reaction set in. Lord Shaftesbury's Bill limited the hours of children's labour," &c. ("Report of the Registrar-General," for October 1861.)

² We, therefore, find, e.g., that in the beginning of 1863, 26 firms owning extensive potteries in Staffordshire, amongst others, Josiah Wedgwood, & Sons, petition in a memorial for "some legislative enactment." Competition with other capitalists permits them no voluntary limitation of working time for children, &c. "Much as we deplore the evils before mentioned, it would not be possible to prevent them by any scheme of agreement between the manufacturers.... Taking all these points into consideration, we have come to the conviction that some legislative enactment is wanted." ("Children's Employment Comm." Rep. 1., 1863, p. 322.) Most recently a much more striking example offers. The rise in the price of cotton during a period of feverish activity, had induced the manufacturers in Blackburn to shorten, by mutual consent, the working-time in their mills during a certain fixed period. This period terminated about the end of November, 1871. Meantime, the wealthier manufacturers, who combined spinning with weaving, used the diminution of production resulting from this agreement, to extend their own business and thus to make great profits at the expense of the small employers. The latter thereupon turned in their extremity to the operatives, urged them earnestly to agitate for the 9 hours' system, and promised contributions in money to this end.

English Labour Statutes from the 14th century to well into the middle of the 18th.¹ Whilst the modern Factory Acts compulsorily shortened the working-day, the earlier statutes tried to lengthen it by compulsion. Of course the pretensions of capital in embryo—when, beginning to grow, it secures the right of absorbing a *quantum sufficit* of surplus-labour, not merely by the force of economic relations, but by the help of the State—appear very modest when put face to face with the concessions that, growling and struggling, it has to make in its adult condition. It takes centuries ere the "free" labourer, thanks to the development of capitalistic production, agrees, i.e., is compelled by social conditions, to sell the whole of his active life, his very capacity for work, for the price of the necessaries of life, his birthright for a mess of pottage. Hence it is natural that the lengthening of the working-day, which capital, from the middle of the 14th to the end of the 17th century, tries to impose by State-measures on adult labourers, approximately coincides with the shortening of the working-day which, in the second half of the 19th century, has here and there been effected by the State to prevent the coining of children's blood into capital. That which to-day, e.g., in the State of Massachusetts, until recently the freest State of the North-American Republic, has been proclaimed as the statutory limit of the labour of children under 12, was in England, even in the middle of the 17th century, the normal working-day of able-bodied artisans, robust labourers, athletic blacksmiths.²

¹ The Labour Statutes, the like of which were enacted at the same time in France, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, were first formally repealed in England in 1813, long after the changes in methods of production had rendered them obsolete.

² "No child under 12 years of age shall be employed in any manufacturing establishment more than 10 hours in one day." General Statutes of Massachusetts, 63, ch. 12. (The various Statutes were passed between 1836 and 1858.) "Labour performed during a period of 10 hours on any day in all cotton, woollen, silk, paper, glass, and flax factories, or in manufactories of iron and brass, shall be considered a legal day's labour. And be it enacted, that hereafter no minor engaged in any factory shall be holden or required to work more than 10 hours in any day, or 60 hours in any week; and that hereafter no minor shall be admitted as a worker under the age of 10 years in any factory within this State." State of New Jersey. An Act to limit the hours of labour, &c., § 1 and 2. (Law of 18th March, 1851.) "No minor who has attained the age of 12 years, and is under the age of 15 years, shall be employed in any manufacturing establishment more than 11 hours in any one day, nor before 5 o'clock in the morning, nor after 7.30 in the evening." (Revised Statutes of the State of Rhode Island, &c., ch. 139, § 23, 1st July, 1857.)

The first "Statute of Labourers" (23 Edward III., 1349) found its immediate pretext (not its cause, for legislation of this kind lasts centuries after the pretext for it has disappeared) in the great plague that decimated the people, so that, as a Tory writer says, "The difficulty of getting men to work on reasonable terms (*i.e.*, at a price that left their employers a reasonable quantity of surplus-labour) grew to such a height as to be quite intolerable."¹ Reasonable wages were, therefore, fixed by law as well as the limits of the working-day. The latter point, the only one that here interests us, is repeated in the Statute of 1536 (Henry VII.). The working-day for all artificers and field labourers from March to September ought, according to this statute (which, however, could not be enforced), to last from 5 in the morning to between 7 and 8 in the evening. But the meal-times consist of 1 hour for breakfast, $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours for dinner, and $\frac{1}{2}$ an hour for "noon-meate," *i.e.*, exactly twice as much as under the factory acts now in force.² In winter, work was to last from 5 in the morning until dark, with the same intervals. A statute of Elizabeth of 1562 leaves the length of the working-day for all labourers "hired for daily or weekly wage" untouched, but aims at limiting the intervals to $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours in the summer, or to 2 in the winter. Dinner is only to last 1 hour, and the "afternoon-sleep of half an hour" is only allowed between the middle of May and the middle of August. For every hour of absence 1d. is to be subtracted from the wage. In practice, however, the conditions were much more favourable to the labourers than in the statute-book. William Petty, the

¹ "Sophisms of Free Trade." 7th Ed. London, 1850, p. 205, 9th Ed., p. 253. This same Tory, moreover, admits that "Acts of Parliament regulating wages, but against the labourer and in favour of the master, lasted for the long period of 464 years. Population grew. These laws were then found, and really became, unnecessary and burdensome." (*l. c.*, p. 206.)

² In reference to this statute, J. Wade with truth remarks: "From the statement above (*i.e.*, with regard to the statute) it appears that in 1496 the diet was considered equivalent to one-third of the income of an artificer and one-half the income of a labourer, which indicates a greater degree of independence among the working-classes than prevails at present; for the board, both of labourers and artificers, would now be reckoned at a much higher proportion of their wages." (J. Wade, "History of the Middle and Working Classes," pp. 24, 25, and 577.) The opinion that this difference is due to the difference in the price-relations between food and clothing then and now is refuted by the most cursory glance at "Chronicon Preciosum, &c." By Bishop Fleetwood. 1st Ed., London, 1707; 2nd Ed., London, 1745.

father of Political Economy, and to some extent the founder of Statistics, says in a work that he published in the last third of the 17th century: "Labouring-men (then meaning field-labourers) work 10 hours per diem, and make 20 meals per week, *viz.*, 3 a day for working-days, and 2 on Sundays; whereby it is plain, that if they could fast on Friday nights, and dine in one hour and an half, whereas they take two, from eleven to one; thereby thus working $\frac{1}{20}$ more, and spending $\frac{1}{20}$ less, the above-mentioned (tax) might be raised."¹ Was not Dr. Andrew Ure right in crying down the 12 hours' bill of 1833 as a retrogression to the times of the dark ages? It is true, these regulations contained in the statute mentioned by Petty, apply also to apprentices. But the condition of child-labour, even at the end of the 17th century, is seen from the following complaint: "'Tis not their practice (in Germany) as with us in this kingdom, to bind an apprentice for seven years; three or four is their common standard: and the reason is, because they are educated from their cradle to something of employment, which renders them the more apt and docile, and consequently the more capable of attaining to a ripeness and quicker proficiency in business. Whereas our youth, here in England, being bred to nothing before they come to be apprentices, make a very slow progress and require much longer time wherein to reach the perfection of accomplished artists."²

¹ W. Petty, "Political Anatomy of Ireland, Verbum Sapienti." 1672, Ed. 1691, p. 10.

² "A Discourse on the necessity of encouraging Mechanick Industry," London, 1690, p. 13. Macaulay, who has falsified English history in the interests of the Whigs and the bourgeoisie, declares as follows: "The practice of setting children prematurely to work ... prevailed in the 17th century to an extent which, when compared with the extent of the manufacturing system, seems almost incredible. At Norwich, the chief seat of the clothing trade, a little creature of six years old was thought fit for labour. Several writers of that time, and among them some who were considered as eminently benevolent, mention with exultation the fact that in that single city, boys and girls of very tender age create wealth exceeding what was necessary for their own subsistence by twelve thousand pounds a year. The more carefully we examine the history of the past, the more reason shall we find to dissent from those who imagine that our age has been fruitful of new social evils. ... That which is new is the intelligence and the humanity which remedies them." ("History of England," vol. I., p. 417.) Macaulay might have reported further that "extremely well-disposed" *amis du commerce* in the 17th century, narrate with "exultation" how in a poorhouse in Holland a child of four was employed, and that this example of "*vertu mise en pratique*" passes muster in all the humanitarian works, à la Macaulay, to the time of Adam Smith. It

Still, during the greater part of the 18th century, up to the epoch of Modern Industry and machinism, capital in England had not succeeded in seizing for itself, by the payment of the weekly value of labour-power, the whole week of the labourer, with the exception, however, of the agricultural labourers. The fact that they could live for a whole week on the wage of four days, did not appear to the labourers a sufficient reason that they should work the other two days for the capitalist. One party of English economists, in the interest of capital, denounces this obstinacy in the most violent manner, another party defends the labourers. Let us listen, *e.g.*, to the contest between Postlethwayt whose Dictionary of Trade then had the same reputation as the kindred works of MacCulloch and MacGregor to-day, and the author (already quoted) of the "Essay on Trade and Commerce."¹

Postlethwayt says among other things: "We cannot put an end to those few observations, without noticing that trite remark in the mouth of too many; that if the industrious poor can obtain enough to maintain themselves in five days, they will not work the whole six. Whence they infer the necessity of even the necessaries of life being made dear by taxes, or any other means, to compel the working artisan and manufacturer to labour the whole six days in the week, without ceasing.

It is true that with the substitution of manufacture for handicrafts, traces of the exploitation of children begin to appear. This exploitation existed always to a certain extent among peasants, and was the more developed, the heavier the yoke pressing on the husbandman. The tendency of capital is there unmistakably; but the facts themselves are still as isolated as the phenomena of two-headed children. Hence they were noted "with exultation" as especially worthy of remark and as wonders by the far-seeing "*amis du commerce*," and recommended as models for their own time and for posterity. This same Scotch sycophant and fine talker, Macaulay, says: "We hear to-day only of retrogression and see only progress." What eyes, and especially what ears!

¹ Among the accusers of the workpeople, the most angry is the anonymous author quoted in the text of "An Essay on Trade and Commerce, containing Observations on Taxes, &c.," London, 1770. He had already dealt with this subject in his earlier work: "Considerations on Taxes." London, 1765. On the same side follows Polonius Arthur Young, the unutterable statistical prattler. Among the defenders of the working-classes the foremost are: Jacob Vanderlint, in: "Money Answers all Things." London, 1734; the Rev. Nathaniel Forster, D. D., in "An Enquiry into the Causes of the Present High Price of Provisions," London, 1767; Dr. Price, and especially Postlethwayt, as well in the supplement to his "Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce," as in his "Great Britain's Commercial Interest explained and improved." 2nd Edition, 1755. The facts themselves are confirmed by many other writers of the time, among others by Josiah Tucker.

I must beg leave to differ in sentiment from those great politicians, who contend for the perpetual slavery of the working people of this kingdom; they forget the vulgar adage, all work and no play. Have not the English boasted of the ingenuity and dexterity of her working artists and manufacturers which have heretofore given credit and reputation to British wares in general? What has this been owing to? To nothing more probably than the relaxation of the working people in their own way. Were they obliged to toil the year round, the whole six days in the week, in a repetition of the same work, might it not blunt their ingenuity, and render them stupid instead of alert and dexterous; and might not our workmen lose their reputation instead of maintaining it by such eternal slavery? And what sort of workmanship could we expect from such hard-driven animals? Many of them will execute as much work in four days as a Frenchman will in five or six. But if Englishmen are to be eternal drudges, 'tis to be feared they will degenerate below the Frenchmen. As our people are famed for bravery in war, do we not say that it is owing to good English roast beef and pudding in their bellies, as well as their constitutional spirit of liberty? And why may not the superior ingenuity and dexterity of our artists and manufacturers, be owing to that freedom and liberty to direct themselves in their own way, and I hope we shall never have them deprived of such privileges and that good living from whence their ingenuity no less than their courage may proceed."¹ Thereupon the author of the "Essay on Trade and Commerce" replies: "If the making of every seventh day an holiday is supposed to be of divine institution, as it implies the appropriating the other six days to labour" (he means capital as we shall soon see) "surely it will not be thought cruel to enforce it That mankind in general, are naturally inclined to ease and indolence, we fatally experience to be true, from the conduct of our manufacturing populace, who do not labour, upon an average, above four days in a week, unless provisions happen to be very dear. . . . Put all the necessaries of the poor under one denomination; for instance, call them all wheat, or suppose that. . . . the bushel of wheat shall cost five shillings and that he (a manufacturer) earns a shilling by his labour, he then would be obliged to work five days only in a week. If the bushel of wheat should cost

¹ Postlethwayt, l. c., "First Preliminary Discourse," p. 14.

but four shillings, he would be obliged to work but four days; but as wages in this kingdom are much higher in proportion to the price of necessaries. . . . the manufacturer, who labours four days, has a surplus of money to live idle with the rest of the week I hope I have said enough to make it appear that the moderate labour of six days in a week is no slavery. Our labouring people do this, and to all appearance are the happiest of all our labouring poor,¹ but the Dutch do this in manufactures, and appear to be a very happy people. The French do so, when holidays do not intervene.² But our populace have adopted a notion, that as Englishmen they enjoy a birthright privilege of being more free and independent than in any country in Europe. Now this idea, as far as it may affect the bravery of our troops, may be of some use; but the less the manufacturing poor have of it, certainly the better for themselves and for the State. The labouring people should never think themselves independent of their superiors. It is extremely dangerous to encourage mobs in a commercial state like ours, where, perhaps, seven parts out of eight of the whole, are people with little or no property. The cure will not be perfect, till our manufacturing poor are contented to labour six days for the same sum which they now earn in four days."³ To this end, and for "extirpating idleness, debauchery and excess," promoting a spirit of industry, "lowering the price of labour in our manufactories, and easing the lands of the heavy burden of poor's rates," our "faithful Eckart" of capital proposes this approved device: to shut up such labourers as become dependent on public support, in a word, paupers, in "an ideal workhouse." Such ideal workhouse must be made a "House of Terror," and not an asylum for the poor, "where they are to be plentifully fed, warmly and decently clothed, and where they do but little work."⁴ In this "House of Terror," this "ideal workhouse, the poor shall work 14 hours in a day, al-

¹ "An Essay," &c. He himself relates on p. 96 wherein the "happiness" of the English agricultural labourer already in 1770 consisted. "Their powers are always upon the stretch, they cannot live cheaper than they do, nor work harder."

² Protestantism, by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays, plays an important part in the genesis of capital.

³ "An Essay," &c., pp. 15, 41, 96, 97, 55, 57, 69.— Jacob Vanderlint, as early as 1734, declared that the secret of the out-cry of the capitalists as to the laziness of the working people was simply that they claimed for the same wages 6 days' labour instead of 4.

⁴ l. c., p. 242.

lowing proper time for meals, in such manner that there shall remain 12 hours of neat-labour."¹

Twelve working-hours daily in the Ideal Workhouse, in the "House of Terror" of 1770! 63 years later, in 1833, when the English Parliament reduced the working-day for children of 13 to 18, in four branches of industry to 12 full hours, the judgment day of English Industry had dawned! In 1852, when Louis Bonaparte sought to secure his position with the bourgeoisie by tampering with the legal working-day, the French people cried out with one voice "the law that limits the working-day to 12 hours is the one good that has remained to us of the legislation of the Republic!"² At Zürich the work of children over 10, is limited to 12 hours; in Aargau in 1862, the work of children between 13 and 16, was reduced from 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 12 hours; in Austria in 1860, for children between 14 and 16, the same reduction was made.³ "What a progress," since 1770! Macaulay would shout with exultation!

The "House of Terror" for paupers of which the capitalistic soul of 1770 only dreamed, was realised a few years later in the shape of a gigantic "Workhouse" for the industrial worker himself. It is called the Factory. And the ideal this time fades before the reality.

¹ l. c. "The French," he says, "laugh at our enthusiastic ideas of liberty." l. c., p. 78.

² "They especially objected to work beyond the 12 hours per day, because the law which fixed those hours, is the only good which remains to them of the legislation of the Republic." ("Rep. of Insp. of Fact.," 31st October, 1856, p. 80.) The French Twelve Hours' Bill of September 5th, 1850, a bourgeois edition of the decree of the Provisional Government of March 2nd, 1848, holds in all workshops without exceptions. Before this law the working-day in France was without definite limit. It lasted in the factories 14, 15, or more hours. See "Des classes ouvrières en France, pendant l'année 1848. Par M. Blanqui." M. Blanqui the economist, not the Revolutionist, had been entrusted by the Government with an inquiry into the condition of the working-class.

³ Belgium is the model bourgeois state in regard to the regulation of the working-day. Lord Howard of Welden, English Plenipotentiary at Brussels, reports to the Foreign Office, May 12th, 1862: "M. Rogier, the minister, informed me that children's labour is limited neither by a general law nor by any local regulations; that the Government, during the last three years, intended in every session to propose a bill on the subject, but always found an insuperable obstacle in the jealous opposition to any legislation in contradiction with the principle of perfect freedom of labour."

SECTION 6.—THE STRUGGLE FOR THE NORMAL WORKING-DAY.
 COMPULSORY LIMITATION BY LAW OF THE WORKING-TIME.
 THE ENGLISH FACTORY ACTS, 1833 TO 1864

After capital had taken centuries in extending the working-day to its normal maximum limit, and then beyond this to the limit of the natural day of 12 hours,¹ there followed on the birth of machinism and modern industry in the last third of the 18th century, a violent encroachment like that of an avalanche in its intensity and extent. All bounds of morals and nature, age and sex, day and night, were broken down. Even the ideas of day and night, of rustic simplicity in the old statutes, became so confused that an English judge, as late as 1860, needed a quite Talmudic sagacity to explain "judicially" what was day and what was night.² Capital celebrated its orgies.

As soon as the working-class, stunned at first by the noise and turmoil of the new system of production, recovered, in some measure, its senses, its resistance began, and first in the native land of machinism, in England. For 30 years, however, their concessions conquered by the workpeople were purely nominal. Parliament passed 5 Labour Laws between 1802 and 1833, but was shrewd enough not to vote a penny for their carrying out, for the requisite officials, &c.³

¹ "It is certainly much to be regretted that any class of persons should toil 12 hours a day, which, including the time for their meals and for going to and returning from their work, amounts, in fact, to 14 of the 24 hours.... Without entering into the question of health, no one will hesitate, I think, to admit that, *in a moral point of view*, so entire an absorption of the time of the working-classes, without intermission, from the early age of 13, and in trades not subject to restriction, much younger, must be extremely prejudicial, and is an evil greatly to be deplored.... For the sake, therefore, of public morals, of bringing up an orderly population, and of giving the great body of the people a reasonable enjoyment of life, it is much to be desired that in all trades some portion of every working-day should be reserved for rest and leisure." (Leonard Horner in "Reports of Insp. of Fact. for 31st Dec., 1841.")

² See "Judgment of Mr. J. H. Otway, Belfast. Hilary Sessions, County Antrim, 1860."

³ It is very characteristic of the régime of Louis Philippe, the bourgeois King, that the one Factory Act passed during his reign, that of March 22nd, 1841, was never put in force. And this law only dealt with child-labour. It fixed 8 hours a day for children between 8 and 12, 12 hours for children between 12 and 16, &c., with many exceptions which allow night-work even for children 8 years old. The supervision and enforcement of this law are, in a country where every mouse is under police administration, left to the good-will of the *amis du commerce*. Only since 1853, in one single department—

They remained a dead letter. "The fact is, that prior to the Act of 1833, young persons and children were worked all night, all day, or both *ad libitum*."¹

A normal working-day for modern industry only dates from the Factory Act of 1833, which included cotton, wool, flax, and silk factories. Nothing is more characteristic of the spirit of capital than the history of the English Factory Acts from 1833 to 1864.

The Act of 1833 declares the ordinary factory working-day to be from half-past five in the morning to half-past eight in the evening, and within these limits, a period of 15 hours, it is lawful to employ young persons (*i.e.*, persons between 13 and 18 years of age), at any time of the day, provided no one individual young person should work more than 12 hours in any one day, except in certain cases especially provided for. The 6th section of the Act provided: "That there shall be allowed in the course of every day not less than one and a half hours for meals to every such person restricted as hereinbefore provided." The employment of children under 9, with exceptions mentioned later, was forbidden; the work of children between 9 and 13 was limited to 8 hours a day, night-work, *i.e.*, according to this Act, work between 8.30 p. m. and 5.30 a. m., was forbidden for all persons between 9 and 18.

The law-makers were so far from wishing to trench on the freedom of capital to exploit adult labour-power, or, as they called it, "the freedom of labour," that they created a special system in order to prevent the Factory Acts from having a consequence so outrageous.

"The great evil of the factory system as at present conducted," says the first report of the Central Board of the Commission of June 28th, 1833, "has appeared to us to be that it entails the necessity of continuing the labour of children to the utmost length of that of the adults. The only remedy for this evil, short of the limitation of the labour of adults, which would, in our opinion, create an evil greater than that which is sought to be remedied, appears to be the plan of working double sets of children." . . . Under the name of System of Relays, this "plan" was therefore carried out, so that, *e.g.*,

the Département du Nord—has a paid government inspector been appointed. Not less characteristic of the development of French society, generally, is the fact, that Louis Philippe's law stood solitary among the all-embracing mass of French laws, till the Revolution of 1848.

¹ "Report of Insp. of Fact.," 30th April, 1860, p. 50.

from 5.30 a. m. until 1.30 in the afternoon, one set of children between 9 and 13, and from 1.30 p. m. to 8.30 in the evening another set were "put to," &c.

In order to reward the manufacturers for having, in the most barefaced way, ignored all the Acts as to children's labour passed during the last twenty-two years, the pill was yet further gilded for them. Parliament decreed that after March 1st, 1834, no child under 11, after March 1st, 1835, no child under 12, and after March 1st, 1836, no child under 13, was to work more than eight hours in a factory. This "liberalism," so full of consideration for "capital," was the more noteworthy as, Dr. Farre, Sir A. Carlisle, Sir B. Brodie, Sir C. Bell, Mr. Guthrie, &c., in a word, the most distinguished physicians and surgeons in London, had declared in their evidence before the House of Commons, that there was danger in delay. Dr. Farre expressed himself still more coarsely. "Legislation is necessary for the prevention of death, in any form in which it can be prematurely inflicted, and certainly this (*i.e.*, the factory method) must be viewed as a most cruel mode of inflicting it."

That same "reformed" Parliament, which in its delicate consideration for the manufacturers, condemned children under 13, for years to come, to 72 hours of work per week in the Factory Hell, on the other hand, in the Emancipation Act, which also administered freedom drop by drop, forbade the planters, from the outset, to work any negro slave more than 45 hours a week.

But in no wise conciliated, capital now began a noisy agitation that went on for several years. It turned chiefly on the age of those who, under the name of children, were limited to 8 hours' work, and were subject to a certain amount of compulsory education. According to capitalistic anthropology, the age of childhood ended at 10, or at the outside, at 11. The more nearly the time approached for the coming into full force of the Factory Act, the fatal year 1836, the more wildly raged the mob of manufacturers. They managed, in fact, to intimidate the government to such an extent that in 1835 it proposed to lower the limit of the age of childhood from 13 to 12. In the meantime the pressure from without grew more threatening. Congress failed the House of Commons. It refused to throw children of 13 under the Juggernaut Car of capital for more than 8 hours a day, and the Act of 1833 came into full operation. It remained unaltered until June, 1844.

In the ten years during which it regulated factory work,

first in part, and then entirely, the official reports of the factory inspectors teem with complaints as to the impossibility of putting the Act into force. As the law of 1833 left it optional with the lords of capital during the 15 hours, from 5.30 a. m. to 8.30 p. m., to make every "young person," and "every child" begin, break off, resume, or end his 12 or 8 hours at any moment they liked, and also permitted them to assign to different persons, different times for meals, these gentlemen soon discovered a new "system of relays," by which the labour-horses were not changed at fixed stations, but were constantly re-harnessed at changing stations. We do not pause longer on the beauty of this system, as we shall have to return to it later. But this much is clear at the first glance: that this system annulled the whole Factory Act, not only in the spirit, but in the letter. How could factory inspectors, with this complex book-keeping in respect to each individual child or young person, enforce the legally determined work-time and the granting of the legal meal-times? In a great many of the factories, the old brutalities soon blossomed out again unpunished. In an interview with the Home Secretary (1844), the factory inspectors demonstrated the impossibility of any control under the newly invented relay system.¹ In the meantime, however, circumstances had greatly changed. The factory hands, especially since 1838, had made the Ten Hours' Bill their economic, as they had made the Charter their political, election-cry. Some of the manufacturers, even, who had managed their factories in conformity with the Act of 1833, overwhelmed Parliament with memorials on the immoral competition of their false brethren whom greater impudence, or more fortunate local circumstances, enabled to break the law. Moreover, however much the individual manufacturer might give the rein to his old lust for gain, the spokesmen and political leaders of the manufacturing class ordered a change of front and of speech towards the workpeople. They had entered upon the contest for the repeal of the Corn Laws, and needed the workers to help them to victory. They promised, therefore, not only a double-sized loaf of bread, but the enactment of the Ten Hours' Bill in the Free-trade millennium.² Thus they still less dared to oppose a measure intended only to make the law of 1833 a reality. Threatened in their holiest interest,

¹ "Rept. of Insp. of Fact.," 31st October, 1849, p. 6.

² "Rept. of Insp. of Fact.," 31st October, 1848, p. 98.

the rent of land, the Tories thundered with philanthropic indignation against the "nefarious practices"¹ of their foes.

This was the origin of the additional Factory Act of June 7th, 1844. It came into effect on September 10th, 1844. It places under protection a new category of workers, viz., the women over 18. They were placed in every respect on the same footing as the young persons, their work-time limited to twelve hours, their night-labour forbidden, &c. For the first time, legislation saw itself compelled to control directly and officially the labour of adults. In the Factory Report of 1844-1845, it is said with irony: "No instances have come to my knowledge of adult women having expressed any regret at their *rights* being thus far interfered with."² The working-time of children under 13 was reduced to $6\frac{1}{2}$, and in certain circumstances to 7 hours a-day.³

To get rid of the abuses of the "spurious relay system," the law established besides others the following important regulations:—"That the hours of work of children and young persons shall be reckoned from the time when any child or young person shall begin to work in the morning." So that if A, e.g., begins work at 8 in the morning, and B at 10, B's work-day must nevertheless end at the same hour as A's. "The time shall be regulated by a public clock," for example, the nearest railway clock, by which the factory clock is to be set. The occupier is to hang up a "legible" printed notice stating the hours for the beginning and ending of work and the times allowed for the several meals. Children beginning work before 12 noon may not be again employed after 1 p. m. The afternoon shift must therefore consist of other children than those employed in the morning. Of the hour and a half for meal-times, "one hour thereof at the least shall be given before three of the clock in the afternoon. . . . and at the same period of the day. No child or young person shall be employed more than five hours before 1 p. m. without an interval for meal-time of at least 30 minutes. No child or young person [or female] shall be employed or allowed to remain in any room in which any manufacturing process is then [*i.e.*, at meal-times] carried on," &c.

¹ Leonard Horner uses the expression "nefarious practices" in his official reports. ("Report of Insp. of Fact.," 31st October, 1859, p. 7.)

² "Rept.," &c., 30th Sept., 1844, p. 15.

³ The Act allows children to be employed for 10 hours if they do not work day after day, but only on alternate days. In the main, this clause remained inoperative.

It has been seen that these minutiae, which, with military uniformity, regulate by stroke of the clock the times, limits, pauses of the work, were not at all the products of Parliamentary fancy. They developed gradually out of circumstances as natural laws of the modern mode of production. Their formulation, official recognition, and proclamation by the State, were the result of a long struggle of classes. One of their first consequences was that in practice the working-day of the adult males in factories became subject to the same limitations, since in most processes of production the co-operation of the children, young persons, and women is indispensable. On the whole, therefore, during the period from 1844 to 1847, the 12 hours' working-day became general and uniform in all branches of industry under the Factory Act.

The manufacturers, however, did not allow this "progress" without a compensating "retrogression." At their instigation the House of Commons reduced the minimum age for exploitable children from 9 to 8, in order to assure that additional supply of factory children which is due to capitalists, according to divine and human law.¹

The years 1846-47 are epoch-making in the economic history of England. The Repeal of the Corn Laws, and of the duties on cotton and other raw material; Free-trade proclaimed as the guiding star of legislation; in a word, the arrival of the millennium. On the other hand, in the same years, the Chartist movement and the 10 hours' agitation reached their highest point. They found allies in the Tories panting for revenge. Despite the fanatical opposition of the army of perjured Free-traders, with Bright and Cobden at their head, the Ten Hours' Bill, struggled for so long, went through Parliament.

The new Factory Act of June 8th, 1847, enacted that on July 1st, 1847, there should be a preliminary shortening of the working-day for "young persons" (from 13 to 18), and all females to 11 hours, but that on May 1st, 1848, there should be a definite limitation of the working-day to 10 hours. In other respects, the Act only amended and completed the Acts of 1833 and 1844.

Capital now entered upon a preliminary campaign in order to hinder the Act from coming into full force on May 1st, 1848. And

¹ "As a reduction in their hours of work would cause a larger number (of children) to be employed, it was thought that the additional supply of children from 8 to 9 years of age would meet the increased demand" (l. c., p. 13).

the workers themselves, under the pretence that they had been taught by experience, were to help in the destruction of their own work. The moment was cleverly chosen. "It must be remembered, too, that there has been more than two years of great suffering (in consequence of the terrible crisis of 1846-47) among the factory operatives, from many mills having worked short time, and many being altogether closed. A considerable number of the operatives must therefore be in very narrow circumstances; many, it is to be feared, in debt; so that it might fairly have been presumed that at the present time they would prefer working the longer time, in order to make up for past losses, perhaps to pay off debts, or get their furniture out of pawn, or replace that sold, or to get a new supply of clothes for themselves and their families."¹

The manufacturers tried to aggravate the natural effect of these circumstances by a general reduction of wages by 10%. This was done, so to say, to celebrate the inauguration of the new Free-trade era. Then followed a further reduction of $8\frac{1}{3}\%$ as soon as the working-day was shortened to 11, and a reduction of double that amount as soon as it was finally shortened to 10 hours. Wherever, therefore, circumstances allowed it, a reduction of wages of at least 25% took place.² Under such favourably prepared conditions the agitation among the factory workers for the repeal of the Act of 1847 was begun. Neither lies, bribery, nor threats were spared in this attempt. But all was in vain. Concerning the half-dozen petitions in which workpeople were made to complain of "their oppression by the Act," the petitioners themselves declared under oral examination, that their signatures had been extorted from them. "They felt themselves oppressed, but not exactly by the Factory Act."³ But if the manufacturers did not succeed in making the workpeople speak as they wished, they themselves shrieked all the louder in press and Parliament in the name of the workpeople.

¹ "Rep. of Insp. of Fact.," 31st Oct., 1848, p. 16.

² I found that men who had been getting 10s. a week, had had 1s. taken off for a reduction in the rate of 10 per cent., and 1s. 6d. off the remaining 9s. for the reduction in time, together 2s. 6d., and notwithstanding this, many of them said they would rather work 10 hours." l. c.

³ "Though I signed it [the petition], I said at the time I was putting my hand to a wrong thing. 'Then why did you put your hand to it?' 'Because I should have been turned off if I had refused.' Whence it would appear that this petitioner felt himself 'oppressed,' but not exactly by the Factory Act." l. c., p. 102.

They denounced the Factory Inspectors as a kind of revolutionary commissioners like those of the French National Convention ruthlessly sacrificing the unhappy factory workers to their humanitarian crotchet. This manoeuvre also failed. Factory Inspector Leonard Horner conducted in his own person, and through his sub-inspectors, many examinations of witnesses in the factories of Lancashire. About 70% of the workpeople examined declared in favour of 10 hours, a much smaller percentage in favour of 11, and an altogether insignificant minority for the old 12 hours.¹

Another "friendly" dodge was to make the adult males work 12 to 15 hours, and then to blazon abroad this fact as the best proof of what the proletariat desired in its heart of hearts. But the "ruthless" Factory Inspector Leonard Horner was again to the fore. The majority of the "over-timers" declared: "They would much prefer working ten hours for less wages, but that they had no choice; that so many were out of employment (so many spinners getting very low wages by having to work as piecers, being unable to do better), that if they refused to work the longer time, others would immediately get their places, so that it was a question with them of agreeing to work the longer time, or of being thrown out of employment altogether."²

The preliminary campaign of capital thus came to grief, and the Ten Hours' Act came into force May 1st, 1848. But meanwhile the fiasco of the Chartist party whose leaders were imprisoned, and whose organisation was dismembered, had shaken the confidence of the English working-class in its own strength. Soon after this the June insurrection in Paris and its bloody suppression united, in England as on the Continent, all fractions of the ruling classes, landlords and capitalists, stock-exchange wolves and shop-keepers, Protectionists and Free-traders, government and opposition, priests and freethinkers, young whores and old nuns, under the common cry for the salvation of Property, Religion, the Family and Society. The working-class was everywhere proclaimed,

¹ p. 17, l. c. In Mr. Horner's district 10,270 adult male labourers were thus examined in 181 factories. Their evidence is to be found in the appendix to the Factory Reports for the half-year ending October 1848. These examinations furnish valuable material in other connexions also.

² l. c. See the evidence collected by Leonard Horner himself, Nos. 69, 70, 71, 72, 92, 93, and that collected by Sub-Inspector A., Nos. 51, 52, 58, 59, 62, 70, of the Appendix. One manufacturer, too, tells the plain truth. See No. 14, and No. 265, l. c.

placed under a ban, under a virtual law of suspects. The manufacturers had no need any longer to restrain themselves. They broke out in open revolt not only against the Ten Hours' Act, but against the whole of the legislation that since 1833 had aimed at restricting in some measure the "free" exploitation of labour-power. It was a pro-slavery rebellion in miniature, carried on for over two years with a cynical recklessness, a terrorist energy all the cheaper because the rebel capitalist risked nothing except the skin of his "hands."

To understand that which follows we must remember that the Factory Acts of 1833, 1844, and 1847 were all three in force so far as the one did not amend the other: that not one of these limited the working-day of the male worker over 18, and that since 1833 the 15 hours from 5.30 a. m. to 8.30 p. m. had remained the legal "day," within the limits of which at first the 12, and later the 10 hours' labour of young persons and women had to be performed under the prescribed conditions.

The manufacturers began by here and there discharging a part of, in many cases half of, the young persons and women employed by them, and then, for the adult males, restoring the almost obsolete night-work. The Ten Hours' Act, they cried, leaves no other alternative.¹

Their second step dealt with the legal pauses for meals. Let us hear the Factory Inspectors. "Since the restriction of the hours of work to ten, the factory occupiers maintain, although they have not yet practically gone the whole length, that supposing the hours of work to be from 9 a. m. to 7 p. m. they fulfil the provisions of the statutes by allowing an hour before 9 a. m. and half an hour after 7 p. m. [for meals]. In some cases they now allow an hour, or half an hour for dinner, insisting at the same time, that they are not bound to allow any part of the hour and a half in the course of the factory working-day."² The manufacturers maintained therefore that the scrupulously strict provisions of the Act of 1844 with regard to meal-times only gave the operatives permission to eat and drink before coming into, and after leaving the factory—*i.e.*, at home. And why should not the workpeople eat their dinner before 9 in the morning? The crown lawyers, however, decided that the prescribed meal-times "must be in the interval during the working-hours, and

¹ Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848, pp 133, 134.

² Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1848, p. 47.

that it will not be lawful to work for 10 hours continuously, from 9 a. m. to 7 p. m., without any interval."¹

After these pleasant demonstrations, Capital preluded its revolt by a step which agreed with the letter of the law of 1844, and was therefore legal.

The Act of 1844 certainly prohibited the employment after 1 p. m. of such children, from 8 to 13, as had been employed before noon. But it did not regulate in any way the 6½ hours' work of the children whose work-time began at 12 mid-day or later. Children of 8 might, if they began work at noon, be employed from 12 to 1, 1 hour; from 2 to 4 in the afternoon, 2 hours; from 5 to 8.30 in the evening, 3½ hours; in all, the legal 6½ hours. Or better still. In order to make their work coincide with that of the adult male labourers up to 8.30 p. m., the manufacturers only had to give them no work till 2 in the afternoon; they could then keep them in the factory without intermission till 8.30 in the evening. "And it is now expressly admitted that the practice exists in England from the desire of mill-owners to have their machinery at work for more than 10 hours a-day, to keep the children at work with male adults after all the young persons and women have left, and until 8.30 p. m. if the factory-owners choose."² Workmen and factory inspectors protested on hygienic and moral grounds, but Capital answered:

"My deeds upon my head! I crave the law,
The penalty and forfeit of my bond."

In fact, according to statistics laid before the House of Commons on July 26th, 1850, in spite of all protests, on July 15th, 1850, 3,742 children were subjected to this "practice" in 257 factories.³ Still, this was not enough. The lynx eye of Capital discovered that the Act of 1844 did not allow 5 hours' work before mid-day without a pause of at least 30 minutes for refreshment, but prescribed nothing of the kind for work after mid-day. Therefore, it claimed and obtained the enjoyment not only of making children of 8 drudge without intermission from 2 to 8.30 p. m., but also of making them hunger during that time.

¹ Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848, p. 130

² Reports, &c., l. c., p. 142.

³ Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1850, pp. 5, 6.

"Ay, his heart,
So says the bond."¹

This Shylock-clinging to the letter of the law of 1844, so far as it regulated children's labour, was but to lead up to an open revolt against the same law, so far as it regulated the labour of "young persons and women." It will be remembered that the abolition of the "false relay system" was the chief aim and object of that law. The masters began their revolt with the simple declaration that the sections of the Act of 1844 which prohibited the *ad libitum* use of young persons and women in such short fractions of the day of 15 hours as the employer chose, were "comparatively harmless" so long as the work-time was fixed at 12 hours. But under the Ten Hours' Act they were a "grievous hardship."² They informed the inspectors in the coolest manner that they should place themselves above the letter of the law, and re-introduce the old system on their own account.³ They were acting in the interests of the ill-advised operatives themselves, "in order to be able to pay them higher wages." "This was the only possible plan by which to maintain, under the Ten Hours' Act, the industrial supremacy of Great Britain." "Perhaps it may be a little difficult to detect irregularities under the relay system; but what of that? Is the great manufacturing interest of this country to be treated as a secondary matter in order to save some little trouble to Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors of Factories?"⁴

All these shifts naturally were of no avail. The Factory Inspectors appealed to the Law Courts. But soon such a cloud of dust in the way of petitions from the masters overwhelmed the Home Secretary, Sir George Grey, that in a circular of August 5th, 1848, he recommends the inspectors not "to lay informations

¹ The nature of capital remains the same in its developed as in its undeveloped form. In the code which the influence of the slave-owners, shortly before the outbreak of the American Civil War, imposed on the territory of New Mexico, it is said that the labourer, in as much as the capitalist has bought his labour-power, "is his (the capitalist's) money." The same view was current among the Roman patricians. The money they had advanced to the plebeian debtor had been transformed *vid* the means of subsistence into the flesh and blood of the debtor. This "flesh and blood" were, therefore, "their money." Hence, the Shylock-law of the Ten Tables. Linguet's hypothesis that the patrician creditors from time to time prepared, beyond the Tiber, banquets of debtors' flesh, may remain as undecided as that of Daumer on the Christian Eucharist.

² Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1848, p. 28.

³ Thus, among others, Philanthropist Ashworth to Leonard Horner, in a disgusting Quaker letter. (Reports, &c., April, 1849, p. 4.)

⁴ *l. c.*, p. 140.

against mill-owners for a breach of the letter of the Act, or for employment of young persons by relays in cases in which there is no reason to believe that such young persons have been actually employed for a longer period than that sanctioned by law." Hereupon, Factory Inspector J. Stuart allowed the so-called relay system during the 15 hours of the factory day throughout Scotland, where it soon flourished again as of old. The English Factory Inspectors, on the other hand, declared that the Home Secretary had no power dictatorially to suspend the law, and continued their legal proceedings against the pro-slavery rebellion.

But what was the good of summoning the capitalists when the Courts, in this case the country magistrates—Cobbett's "Great Unpaid"—acquitted them? In these tribunals, the masters sat in judgment on themselves. An example. One Eskrigge, cotton-spinner, of the firm of Kershaw, Leese, & Co., had laid before the Factory Inspector of his district the scheme of a relay system intended for his mill. Receiving a refusal, he at first kept quiet. A few months later, an individual named Robinson, also a cotton-spinner, and if not his Man Friday, at all events related to Eskrigge, appeared before the borough magistrates of Stockport on a charge of introducing the identical plan of relays invented by Eskrigge. Four Justices sat, among them three cotton-spinners, at their head this same inevitable Eskrigge. Eskrigge acquitted Robinson, and now was of opinion that what was right for Robinson was fair for Eskrigge. Supported by his own legal decision, he introduced the system at once into his own factory.¹ Of course, the composition of this tribunal was in itself a violation of the law.² These judicial farces, exclaimed Inspector Howell, "urgently call for a remedy—either that the law should be so altered as to be made to conform to these decisions, or that it should be administered by a less fallible tribunal, whose decisions would conform to the law . . . when these cases are brought forward. I long for a stipendiary magistrate."³

The crown lawyers declared the masters' interpretation of the Act of 1848 absurd. But the Saviours of Society would not

¹ Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1849, pp. 21, 22 Cf like examples *ibid.* pp. 4, 5.

² By I. and II. Will. IV., ch. 24, s. 10, known as Sir John Hobhouse's Factory Act, it was forbidden to any owner of a cotton-spinning or weaving mill, or the father, son, or brother of such owner, to act as Justice of the Peace in any inquiries that concerned the Factory Act.

³ *l. c.*

allow themselves to be turned from their purpose. Leonard Horner reports, "Having endeavoured to enforce the Act . . . by ten prosecutions in seven magisterial divisions, and having been supported by the magistrates in one case only. . . . I considered it useless to prosecute more for this evasion of the law. That part of the Act of 1844 which was framed for securing uniformity in the hours of work, . . . is thus no longer in force in my district (Lancashire). Neither have the sub-inspectors or myself any means of satisfying ourselves, when we inspect a mill working by shifts, that the young persons and women are not working more than 10 hours a-day. . . . In a return of the 30th April, . . . of mill-owners working by shifts, the number amounts to 114, and has been for some time rapidly increasing.

In general, the time of working the mill is extended to $13\frac{1}{2}$ hours, from 6 a. m. to $7\frac{1}{2}$ p. m., . . . in some instances it amounts to 15 hours, from $5\frac{1}{2}$ a. m. to $8\frac{1}{2}$ p. m."¹ Already, in December, 1848, Leonard Horner had a list of 65 manufacturers and 29 overlookers who unanimously declared that no system of supervision could, under this relay system, prevent enormous over-work.² Now, the same children and young persons were shifted from the spinning-room to the weaving-room, now, during 15 hours, from one factory to another.³ How was it possible to control a system which, "under the guise of relays, is some one of the many plans for shuffling 'the hands' about in endless variety, and shifting the hours of work and of rest for different individuals throughout the day, so that you may never have one complete set of hands working together in the same room at the same time."⁴

But altogether independently of actual over-work, this so-called relay system was an offspring of capitalistic fantasy such as Fourier, in his humorous sketches of "Courtes Séances," has never surpassed, except that the "attraction of labour" was changed into the attraction of capital. Look, for example, at those schemes of the masters which the "respectable" press praised as models of "what a reasonable degree of care and method can accomplish." The *personnel* of the workpeople was

¹ Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1849, p. 5.

² Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1849, p. 6.

³ Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1849, p. 21.

⁴ Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848, p. 95.

sometimes divided into from 12 to 14 categories, which themselves constantly changed and rechanged their constituent parts. During the 15 hours of the factory day, capital dragged in the labourer now for 30 minutes, now for an hour, and then pushed him out again, to drag him into the factory and to thrust him out afresh, hounding him hither and thither, in scattered shreds of time, without ever losing hold of him until the full 10 hours' work was done. As on the stage, the same persons had to appear in turns in the different scenes of the different acts. But as an actor during the whole course of the play belongs to the stage, so the operatives, during 15 hours, belonged to the factory, without reckoning the time for going and coming. Thus the hours of rest were turned into hours of enforced idleness, which drove the youths to the pot-house, and the girls to the brothel. At every new trick that the capitalist, from day to day, hit upon for keeping his machinery going 12 or 15 hours without increasing the number of his hands, the worker had to swallow his meals now in this fragment of time, now in that. At the time of the 10 hours' agitation, the masters cried out that the working mob petitioned in the hope of obtaining 12 hours' wages for 10 hours' work. Now they reversed the medal. They paid 10 hours' wages for 12 or 15 hours' lordship over labour-power.¹ This was the gist of the matter, this the masters' interpretation of the 10 hours' law! These were the same unctuous Free-traders, perspiring with the love of humanity, who for full 10 years, during the Anti-Corn Law agitation, had preached to the operatives, by a reckoning of pounds, shillings, and pence, that with free importation of corn, and with the means possessed by English industry, 10 hours' labour would be quite enough to enrich the capitalists.² This revolt of capital, after two years was at last crowned with victory by a decision of one of the four highest Courts of Justice in England, the Court of Exchequer, which in a case brought before it on February 8th, 1850, decided that the manufacturers were certainly acting against the sense of the Act of 1844, but that this Act itself contained certain words that rendered it meaningless. "By this decision, the Ten Hours' Act was

¹ See Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1849, p. 6, and the detailed explanation of the "shifting system," by Factory Inspectors Howell and Saunders, in "Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848." See also the petition to the Queen from the clergy of Ashton and vicinity, in the spring of 1849, against the "shift system."

² Cf. for example, "The Factory Question and the Ten Hours Bill." By R. H. Greg, 1837.

abolished."¹ A crowd of masters, who until then had been afraid of using the relay system for young persons and women, now took it up heart and soul.²

But on this apparently decisive victory of capital, followed at once a revulsion. The workpeople had hitherto offered a passive, although inflexible and unremitting resistance. They now protested in Lancashire and Yorkshire in threatening meetings. The pretended Ten Hours' Act, was thus simple humbug, parliamentary cheating, had never existed! The Factory Inspectors urgently warned the Government that the antagonism of classes had arrived at an incredible tension. Some of the masters themselves murmured: "On account of the contradictory decisions of the magistrates, a condition of things altogether abnormal and anarchical obtains. One law holds in Yorkshire, another in Lancashire; one law in one parish of Lancashire, another in its immediate neighbourhood. The manufacturer in large towns could evade the law, the manufacturer in country districts could not find the people necessary for the relay system, still less for the shifting of hands from one factory to another," &c. And the first birthright of capital is equal exploitation of labour-power by all capitalists.

Under these circumstances a compromise between masters and men was effected that received the seal of Parliament in the additional Factory Act of August 5th, 1850. The working-day for "young persons and women," was raised from 10 to $10\frac{1}{2}$ hours for the first five days of the week, and was shortened to $7\frac{1}{2}$ on the Saturday. The work was to go on between 6 a. m. and 6 p. m.,³ with pauses of not less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours for meal-times, these meal-times to be allowed at one and the same time for all, and conformably to the conditions of 1844. By this an end was put to the relay system once for all.⁴ For children's labour, the Act of 1844 remained in force.

¹ F. Engels: "The English Ten Hours' Bill." (In the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Politisch-ökonomische Revue." Edited by K. Marx. April number, 1850, p. 13.) The same "high" Court of Justice discovered, during the American Civil War, a verbal ambiguity which exactly reversed the meaning of the law against the arming of pirate ships.

² Rep., &c., for 30th April, 1850.

³ In winter, from 7 a. m. to 7 p. m. may be substituted.

⁴ "The present law (of 1850) was a compromise whereby the employed surrendered the benefit of the Ten Hours' Act for the advantage of one uniform period for the commencement and termination of the labour of those whose labour is restricted." (Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1852, p. 14.)

One set of masters, this time as before, secured to itself special seigniorial rights over the children of the proletariat. These were the silk manufacturers. In 1833 they had howled out in threatening fashion, "if the liberty of working children of any age for 10 hours a day were taken away, it would stop their works."¹ It would be impossible for them to buy a sufficient number of children over 13. They extorted the privilege they desired. The pretext was shown on subsequent investigation to be a deliberate lie.² It did not, however, prevent them, during 10 years, from spinning silk 10 hours a day out of the blood of little children who had to be placed upon stools for the performance of their work.³ The Act of 1844 certainly "robbed" them of the

"liberty" of employing children under 11 longer than $6\frac{1}{2}$ hours a day. But it secured to them, on the other hand, the privilege of working children between 11 and 13, 10 hours a day, and of annulling in their case the education made compulsory for all other factory children. This time the pretext was "the delicate texture of the fabric in which they were employed, requiring a lightness of touch, only to be acquired by their early introduction to these factories."⁴ The children were slaughtered out-and-out for the sake of their delicate fingers, as in Southern Russia the horned cattle for the sake of their hide and tallow. At length, in 1850, the privilege granted in 1844, was limited to the departments of silk-twisting and silk-winding. But here, to make amends to capital bereft of its "freedom," the work-time for children from

11 to 13 was raised from 10 to $10\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Pretext: "Labour in silk mills was lighter than in mills for other fabrics, and less likely in other respects also to be prejudicial to health."⁵ Official medical inquiries proved afterwards that, on the contrary, "the average death-rate is exceedingly high in the silk districts, and amongst the female part of the population is higher even than it is in the cotton districts of Lancashire."⁶ Despite the protests

¹ Reports, &c., for Sept., 1844, p. 13.

² l. c.

³ l. c.

⁴ "Reports, &c., for 31st Oct., 1846," p. 20.

⁵ Reports, &c., for 31st Oct., 1861, p. 26.

⁶ l. c. p. 27. On the whole the working population, subject to the Factory Act, has greatly improved physically. All medical testimony agrees on this point, and personal observation at different times has convinced me of

of the Factory Inspector, renewed every 6 months, the mischief continues to this hour.¹

The Act of 1850 changed the 15 hours' time from 6 a. m. to 8.30 p. m., into the 12 hours from 6 a. m. to 6 p. m. for "young persons and women" only. It did not, therefore, affect children who could always be employed for half an hour before and $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours after this period, provided the whole of their labour did not exceed $6\frac{1}{2}$ hours. Whilst the bill was under discussion, the

Factory Inspectors laid before Parliament statistics of the infamous abuses due to this anomaly. To no purpose. In the background lurked the intention of screwing up, during prosperous years, the working-day of adult males to 15 hours by the aid of the children. The experience of the three following years showed that such an attempt must come to grief against the resistance of the adult

it. Nevertheless, and exclusive of the terrible death-rat  of children in the first years of their life, the official reports of Dr. Greenhow show the unfavourable health condition of the manufacturing districts as compared with "agricultural districts of normal health." As evidence, take the following table from his 1861 report: —

Percentage of Adult Males engaged in manufactures.	Death-rate from Pulmonary Affections per 100,000 Males.	Name of District.	Death-rate from Pulmonary Affections per 100,000 Females.	Percentage of Adult Females engaged in manufactures.	Kind of Female Occupation.
11.3	598	Wigan	644	18.0	Cotton
21.5	708	Blackburn	734	34.9	Do.
37.3	547	Halifax	564	20.4	Worsted
41.2	611	Bradford	603	30.0	Do.
41.0	694	Macclesfield	804	26.0	Silk
44.3	588	Leek	705	17.2	Do.
50.6	724	Stoke-upon-Trent	665	19.3	Earthenware
30.4	726	Woolstanton	727	13.9	Do.
	305	Eight healthy agricultural districts	340		

¹ It is well known with what reluctance the English "Free-traders" gave up the protective duty on the silk manufacture. Instead of the protection against French importation, the absence of protection to English factory children now serves their turn.

male operatives. The Act of 1850 was therefore finally completed in 1853 by forbidding the "employment of children in the morning before and in the evening after young persons and women." Henceforth with a few exceptions the Factory Act of 1850 regulated the working-day of all workers in the branches of industry that come under it.¹ Since the passing of the first Factory Act half a century had elapsed.²

Factory legislation for the first time went beyond its original sphere in the "Printworks' Act of 1845." The displeasure with which capital received this new "extravagance" speaks through every line of the Act. It limits the working-day for children from 8 to 13, and for women to 16 hours, between 6 a. m. and 10 p. m., without any legal pause for meal-times. It allows males over 13 to be worked at will day and night.³ It is a Parliamentary abortion.⁴

However, the principle had triumphed with its victory in those great branches of industry which form the most characteristic creation of the modern mode of production. Their wonderful development from 1853 to 1860, hand-in-hand with the physical and moral regeneration of the factory workers, struck the most purblind. The masters from whom the legal limitation and regulation had been wrung step by step after a civil war of half a century, themselves referred ostentatiously to the contrast with the branches

¹ During 1859 and 1860, the zenith years of the English cotton industry, some manufacturers tried, by the decoy bait of higher wages for overtime, to reconcile the adult male operatives to an extension of the working-day. The hand-mule spinners and self-actor minders put an end to the experiment by a petition to their employers in which they say, "Plainly speaking, our lives are to us a burthen; and, while we are confined to the mills *nearly two days a week more* than the other operatives of the country, we feel like helots in the land, and that we are perpetuating a system injurious to ourselves and future generations. . . This, therefore, is to give you most respectful notice that when we commence work again after the Christmas and New Year's holidays, we shall work 60 hours per week, and no more, or from six to six, with one hour and a half out." (Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1860, p. 30.)

² On the means that the wording of this Act afforded for its violation cf. the Parliamentary Return "Factories Regulation Act" (6th August, 1859), and in it Leonard Horner's "Suggestions for amending the Factory Acts to enable the Inspectors to prevent illegal working, now becoming very prevalent."

³ "Children of the age of 8 years and upwards, have, indeed, been employed from 6 a. m. to 9 p. m. during the last half year in my district." (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1857, p. 39.)

⁴ "The Printworks' Act is admitted to be a failure, both with reference to its educational and protective provisions." (Reports, &c, for 31st October, 1862, p. 52.)

of exploitation still "free."¹ The Pharisees of "Political Economy" now proclaimed the discernment of the necessity of a legally fixed working-day as a characteristic new discovery of their "science."² It will be easily understood that after the factory magnates had resigned themselves and become reconciled to the inevitable, the power of resistance of capital gradually weakened, whilst at the same time the power of attack of the working-class grew with the number of its allies in the classes of society not immediately interested in the question. Hence the comparatively rapid advance since 1860.

The dye-works and bleach-works all came under the Factory Act of 1850 in 1860;³ lace and stocking manufactures in 1861.

In consequence of the first report of the Commission on the employment of children (1863) the same fate was shared by the manufacturers of all earthenwares (not merely pottery), lucifer-matches, percussion-caps, cartridges, carpets, fustian-cutting, and many processes included under the name of "finishing." In the year 1863 bleaching in the open air⁴ and baking

¹ Thus, e.g., E. Potter in a letter to the *Times* of March 24th, 1863. The *Times* reminded him of the manufacturers' revolt against the Ten Hours' Bill.

² Thus, among others, Mr. W. Newmarch, collaborator and editor of Tooke's "History of Prices." Is it a scientific advance to make cowardly concessions to public opinion?

³ The Act passed in 1860, determined that, in regard to dye and bleach-works, the working-day should be fixed on August 1st, 1861, provisionally at 12 hours, and definitely on August 1st, 1862, at 10 hours, i.e., at 10 $\frac{1}{2}$

hours for ordinary days, and 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ for Saturday. Now, when the fatal year, 1862, came, the old farce was repeated. Besides, the manufacturers petitioned Parliament to allow the employment of young persons and women for 12 hours during one year longer. "In the existing condition of the trade (the time of the cotton famine), it was greatly to the advantage of the operatives to work 12 hours per day, and make wages when they could." A bill to this effect had been brought in, "and it was mainly due to the action of the operative bleachers in Scotland that the bill was abandoned." (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1862, pp. 14-15.) Thus defeated by the very workpeople, in whose name it pretended to speak, Capital discovered, with the help of lawyer-spectacles, that the Act of 1860, drawn up, like all the Acts of Parliament for the "protection of labour," in equivocal phrases, gave them a pretext to exclude from its working the calenderers and finishers. English jurisprudence, ever the faithful servant of capital, sanctioned in the Court of Common Pleas this piece of pettifoggery. "The operatives have been greatly disappointed. They have complained of over-work, and it is greatly to be regretted that the good intention of the legislature should have failed by reason of a faulty definition." (l. c., p. 18.)

⁴ The "open-air bleachers" had evaded the law of 1860, by means of the lie that no women worked at it in the night. The lie was exposed by the

were placed under special Acts, by which, in the former, the labour of young persons and women during the night-time (from 8 in the evening to 6 in the morning), and in the latter, the employment of journeymen bakers under 18, between 9 in the evening and 5 in the morning were forbidden. We shall return to the later proposals of the same Commission, which threatened to deprive of their "freedom" all the important branches of English Industry, with the exception of agriculture, mines, and the means of transport.¹

Factory Inspectors, and at the same time Parliament was, by petitions from the operatives, lax of its notions as to the cool meadow-fragrance, in which bleaching in the open-air was reported to take place. In this aerial bleaching, drying-rooms were used at temperatures of from 90° to 100° Fahrenheit, in which the work was done for the most part by girls. "Cooling" is the technical expression for their occasional escape from the drying-rooms into the fresh air. "Fifteen girls in stoves. Heat from 80° to 90° for linens, and 100° and upwards for cambrics. Twelve girls ironing and doing-up in a small room about 10 feet square, in the centre of which is a close stove. The girls stand round the stove, which throws out a terrific heat, and dries the cambrics rapidly for the ironers. The hours of work for these hands are unlimited. If busy, they work till 9 or 12 at night for successive nights." (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1862, p. 56.) A medical man states: "No special hours are allowed for cooling, but if the temperature gets too high, or the workers' hands get soiled from perspiration, they are allowed to go out for a few minutes.... My experience, which is considerable, in treating the diseases of stove workers, compels me to express the opinion that their sanitary condition is by no means so high as that of the operatives in a spinning factory (and Capital, in its memorials to Parliament, had painted them as floridly healthy, after the manner of Rubens). The diseases most observable amongst them are phthisis, bronchitis, irregularity of uterine functions, hysteria in its most aggravated forms, and rheumatism. All of these, I believe, are either directly or indirectly induced by the impure, overheated air of the apartments in which the hands are employed, and the want of sufficient comfortable clothing to protect them from the cold, damp atmosphere, in winter, when going to their homes." (l. c., pp. 56-57.) The Factory Inspectors remarked on the supplementary law of 1860, torn from these open-air bleachers: "The Act has not only failed to afford that protection to the workers which it appears to offer, but contains a clause ... apparently so worded that, unless persons are detected working after 8 o'clock at night they appear to come under no protective provisions at all, and if they do so work, the mode of proof is so doubtful that a conviction can scarcely follow." (l. c., p. 52.) "To all intents and purposes, therefore, as an Act for any benevolent or educational purpose, it is a failure; since it can scarcely be called benevolent to permit, which is tantamount to compelling, women and children to work 14 hours a day with or without meals, as the case may be, and perhaps for longer hours than these, without limit as to age, without reference to sex, and without regard to the social habits of the families of the neighbourhood, in which such works (bleaching and dyeing) are situated." (Reports, &c., for 30th April, 1863, p. 40.)

¹ Note to the 2nd Ed. Since 1866, when I wrote the above passages, a re-action has again set in.

SECTION 7.—THE STRUGGLE FOR THE NORMAL WORKING-DAY.
RE-ACTION OF THE ENGLISH FACTORY ACTS
ON OTHER COUNTRIES

The reader will bear in mind that the production of surplus-value, or the extraction of surplus-labour, is the specific end and aim, the sum and substance, of capitalist production, quite apart from any changes in the mode of production, which may arise from the subordination of labour to capital. He will remember that as far as we have at present gone, only the independent labourer, and therefore only the labourer legally qualified to act for himself, enters as a vendor of a commodity into a contract with the capitalist. If, therefore, in our historical sketch, on the one hand, modern industry; on the other, the labour of those who are physically and legally minors, play important parts, the former was to us only a special department, and the latter only a specially striking example of labour exploitation. Without, however, anticipating the subsequent development of our inquiry, from the mere connexion of the historic facts before us, it follows:

First. The passion of capital for an unlimited and reckless extension of the working-day, is first gratified in the industries earliest revolutionised by water-power, steam, and machinery, in those first creations of the modern mode of production, cotton, wool, flax, and silk spinning, and weaving. The changes in the material mode of production, and the corresponding changes in the social relations of the producers¹ gave rise first to an extravagance beyond all bounds, and then in opposition to this, called forth a control on the part of Society which legally limits, regulates, and makes uniform the working-day and its pauses. This control appears, therefore, during the first half of the nineteenth century simply as exceptional legislation.² As soon as this primitive dominion of the new mode of production was conquered, it was found that, in the meantime, not only had many other branches of production been made to adopt the same factory system, but that manufactures with more or less obsolete methods, such as potteries, glass-making, &c., that old-fashioned handicrafts, like baking, and, finally, even that the so-called domestic indus-

¹ "The conduct of each of these classes (capitalists and workmen) has been the result of the relative situation in which they have been placed." (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1848, p. 113.)

² "The employments, placed under restriction, were connected with the manufacture of textile fabrics by the aid of steam or water-power. There were two conditions to which an employment must be subject to cause it to be inspected, viz., the use of steam or water-power, and the manufacture of certain specified fibres." (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1864, p. 8.)

tries, such as nail-making,¹ had long since fallen as completely under capitalist exploitation as the factories themselves. Legislation was, therefore, compelled to gradually get rid of its exceptional character, or where, as in England, it proceeds after the manner of the Roman Casuists, to declare any house in which work was done to be a factory.²

Second. The history of the regulation of the working-day in certain branches of production, and the struggle still going on in others in regard to this regulation, prove conclusively that the isolated labourer, the labourer as "free" vendor of his labour-power, when capitalist production has once attained a certain stage, succumbs without any power of resistance. The creation of a normal working-day is, therefore, the product of a protracted civil war, more or less dissembled, between the capitalist class and the working-class. As the contest takes place in the arena of modern industry, it first breaks out in the home of that industry—England.³ The English factory workers were the champions, not only of the English, but of the modern working-class generally, as their theorists were the first to throw down the gauntlet to the theory of capital.⁴ Hence, the philosopher of the Factory, Ure,

¹ On the condition of so-called domestic industries, specially valuable materials are to be found in the latest reports of the Children's Employment Commission.

² "The Acts of last Session (1864) ... embrace a diversity of occupations, the customs in which differ greatly, and the use of mechanical power to give motion to machinery is no longer one of the elements necessary, as formerly, to constitute, in legal phrase, a 'Factory.'" (Reports, &c., for 31st October, 1864, p. 8.)

³ Belgium, the paradise of Continental Liberalism, shows no trace of this movement. Even in the coal and metal mines, labourers of both sexes, and all ages, are consumed, in perfect "freedom," at any period, and through any length of time. Of every 1,000 persons employed there, 733 are men, 88 women, 135 boys, and 44 girls under 16; in the blast-furnaces, &c., of every 1,000, 668 are men, 149 women, 98 boys, and 85 girls under 16. Add to this the low wages for the enormous exploitation of mature and immature labour-power. The average daily pay for a man is 2s. 8d., for a woman, 1s. 8d., for a boy, 1s. 2½ d. As a result, Belgium had in 1863, as compared with 1850, nearly doubled both the amount and the value of its exports of coal, iron, &c.

⁴ Robert Owen, soon after 1810, not only maintained the necessity of a limitation of the working-day in theory, but actually introduced the 10 hours' day into his factory at New Lanark. This was laughed at as a communistic Utopia; so were his "Combination of children's education with productive labour" and the Co-operative Societies of working-men, first called into being by him. To-day, the first Utopia is a Factory Act, the second figures as an official phrase in all Factory Acts, the third is already being used as a cloak for reactionary humbug.

denounces as an ineffable disgrace to the English working-class that they inscribed "the slavery of the Factory Acts" on the banner which they bore against capital, manfully striving for "perfect freedom of labour."¹

France limps slowly behind England. The February revolution was necessary to bring into the world the 12 hours' law,² which is much more deficient than its English original. For all that, the French revolutionary method has its special advantages. It once for all commands the same limit to the working-day in all shops and factories without distinction, whilst English legislation reluctantly yields to the pressure of circumstances, now on this point, now on that, and is getting lost in a hopelessly bewildering tangle of contradictory enactments.³ On the other hand, the French law proclaims as a principle that which in England was only won in the name of children, minors, and women, and has been only recently for the first time claimed as a general right.⁴

¹ Ure: "French translation, *Philosophie des Manufactures*." Paris, 1836, Vol. II., pp. 39, 40, 67, 77, &c.

² In the *Compte Rendu of the International Statistical Congress at Paris, 1855*, it is stated: "The French law, which limits the length of daily labour in factories and workshops to 12 hours, does not confine this work to definite fixed hours. For children's labour only the work-time is prescribed as between 5 a. m. and 9 p. m. Therefore, some of the masters use the right which this fatal silence gives them to keep their works going, without intermission, day in, day out, possibly with the exception of Sunday. For this purpose they use two different sets of workers, of whom neither is in the workshop more than 12 hours at a time, but the work of the establishment lasts day and night. The law is satisfied, but is humanity?" Besides "the destructive influence of night-labour on the human organism," stress is also laid upon "the fatal influence of the association of the two sexes by night in the same badly-lighted workshops."

³ "For instance, there is within my district one occupier who, within the same curtilage, is at the same time a bleacher and dyer under the Bleaching and Dyeing Works Act, a printer under the Print Works Act, and a finisher under the Factory Act." (Report of Mr. Baker, in Reports, &c., for October 31st, 1861, p. 20.) After enumerating the different provisions of these Acts, and the complications arising from them, Mr. Baker says: "It will hence appear that it must be very difficult to secure the execution of these three Acts of Parliament where the occupier chooses to evade the law." But what is assured to the lawyers by this is law-suits.

⁴ Thus the Factory Inspectors at last venture to say: "These objections (of capital to the legal limitation of the working-day) must succumb before the broad principle of the rights of labour... There is a time when the master's right in his workman's labour ceases, and his time becomes his own, even if there were no exhaustion in the question." (Reports, &c., for 31st Oct., 1862, p. 54.)

In the United States of North America, every independent movement of the workers was paralysed so long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labour cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded. But out of the death of slavery a new life at once arose. The first fruit of the Civil War was the eight hours' agitation, that ran with the seven-leagued boots of the locomotive from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from New England to California. The General Congress of Labour at Baltimore (August 16th, 1866) declared: "The first and great necessity of the present, to free the labour of this country from capitalistic slavery, is the passing of a law by which eight hours shall be the normal working-day in all States of the American Union. We are resolved to put forth all our strength until this glorious result is attained."¹ At the same time, the Congress of the International Working Men's Association at Geneva, on the proposition of the London General Council, resolved that "the limitation of the working-day is a preliminary condition without which all further attempts at improvement and emancipation must prove abortive . . . the Congress proposes eight hours as the legal limit of the working-day."

Thus the movement of the working-class on both sides of the Atlantic, that had grown instinctively out of the conditions of production themselves, endorsed the words of the English Factory Inspector, R. J. Saunders: "Further steps towards a reformation of society can never be carried out with any hope of success, unless the hours of labour be limited, and the prescribed limit strictly enforced."²

It must be acknowledged that our labourer comes out of the process of production other than he entered. In the market he stood as owner of the commodity "labour-power" face to face with other owners of commodities, dealer against dealer. The contract by which he sold to the capitalist his labour-power proved, so to say, in black and white that he disposed of himself freely.

¹ "We, the workers of Dunkirk, declare that the length of time of labour required under the present system is too great, and that, far from leaving the worker time for rest and education, it plunges him into a condition of servitude but little better than slavery. That is why we decide that 8 hours are enough for a working-day, and ought to be legally recognised as enough; why we call to our help that powerful lever, the press; . . . and why we shall consider all those that refuse us this help as enemies of the reform of labour and of the rights of the labourer." (Resolution of the Working Men of Dunkirk, New York State, 1866.)

² Reports, &c., for Oct., 1848, p. 112.

The bargain concluded, it is discovered that he was no "free agent," that the time for which he is free to sell his labour-power is the time for which he is forced to sell it,¹ that in fact the vampire will not lose its hold on him "so long as there is a muscle, a nerve, a drop of blood to be exploited."² For "protection" against "the serpent of their agonies," the labourers must put their heads together, and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social barrier that shall prevent the very workers from selling, by voluntary contract with capital, themselves and their families into slavery and death.³ In place of the pompous catalogue of the "inalienable rights of man" comes the modest Magna Charta of a legally limited working-day, which shall make clear "when the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins."⁴ Quantum mutatus ab illo!

¹ "The proceedings (the manoeuvres of capital, e.g., from 1848-50) have afforded, moreover, incontrovertible proof of the fallacy of the assertion so often advanced, that operatives need no protection, but may be considered as free agents in the disposal of the only property which they possess—the labour of their hands and the sweat of their brows." (Reports, &c., for April 30th, 1850, p. 45.) "Free labour (if so it may be termed) even in a free country, requires the strong arm of the law to protect it." (Reports, &c., for October 31st, 1864, p. 34.) "To permit, which is tantamount to compelling... to work 14 hours a day with or without meals," &c. (Repts., &c., for April 30th, 1863, p. 40.)

² Friedrich Engels, l. c., p. 5.

³ The 10 Hours' Act has, in the branches of industry that come under it, "put an end to the premature decrepitude of the former long-hour workers." (Reports, &c., for 31st Oct., 1859, p. 47.) "Capital (in factories) can never be employed in keeping the machinery in motion beyond a limited time, without certain injury to the health and morals of the labourers employed; and they are not in a position to protect themselves." (l. c., p. 8.)

⁴ "A still greater boon is the distinction at last made clear between the worker's own time and his master's. The worker knows now when that which he sells is ended, and when his own begins; and by possessing a sure foreknowledge of this, is enabled to pre-arrange his own minutes for his own purposes." (l. c., p. 52.) "By making them masters of their own time (the Factory Acts) have given them a moral energy which is directing them to the eventual possession of political power" (l. c., p. 47). With suppressed irony, and in very well weighed words, the Factory Inspectors hint that the actual law also frees the capitalist from some of the brutality natural to a man who is a mere embodiment of capital, and that it has given him time for a little "culture." "Formerly the master had no time for anything but money; the servant had no time for anything but labour" (l. c., p. 48).

CHAPTER XI RATE AND MASS OF SURPLUS-VALUE

In this chapter, as hitherto, the value of labour-power, and therefore the part of the working-day necessary for the reproduction or maintenance of that labour-power, are supposed to be given, constant magnitudes.

This premised, with the rate, the mass is at the same time given of the surplus-value that the individual labourer furnishes to the capitalist in a definite period of time. If, e.g., the necessary labour amounts to 6 hours daily, expressed in a quantum of gold=3 shillings, then 3s. is the daily value of one labour-power or the value of the capital advanced in the buying of one labour-power. If, further, the rate of surplus-value be=100%, this variable capital of 3s. produces a mass of surplus-value of 3s., or the labourer supplies daily a mass of surplus-labour equal to 6 hours.

But the variable capital of a capitalist is the expression in money of the total value of all the labour-powers that he employs simultaneously. Its value is, therefore, equal to the average value of one labour-power, multiplied by the number of labour-powers employed. With a given value of labour-power, therefore, the magnitude of the variable capital varies directly as the number of labourers employed simultaneously. If the daily value of one labour-power=3s., then a capital of 300s. must be advanced in order to exploit daily 100 labour-powers, of n times 3s., in order to exploit daily n labour-powers.

In the same way, if a variable capital of 3s., being the daily value of one labour-power, produce a daily surplus-value of 3s., a variable capital of 300s. will produce a daily surplus-value of 300s., and one of n times 3s. a daily surplus-value of n×3s. The mass of the surplus-value produced is therefore equal to the surplus-value which the working-day of one labourer supplies

geoisie with the bourgeoisie and with Bonaparte. Defeat of the petty-bourgeois democracy.

2. June 13, 1849 to May 31, 1850. Parliamentary dictatorship of the party of Order. It completes its rule by abolishing universal suffrage, but loses the parliamentary ministry.

3. May 31, 1850 to December 2, 1851. Struggle between the parliamentary bourgeoisie and Bonaparte.

(a) May 31, 1850 to January 12, 1851. Parliament loses the supreme command of the army.

(b) January 12 to April 11, 1851. It is worsted in its attempts to regain the administrative power. The party of Order loses its independent parliamentary majority. Its coalition with the republicans and the *Montagne*.

(c) April 11, 1851 to October 9, 1851. Attempts at revision, fusion, prorogation. The party of Order decomposes into its separate constituents. The breach between the bourgeois parliament and press and the mass of the bourgeoisie becomes definite.

(d) October 9 to December 2, 1851. Open breach between parliament and the executive power. Parliament performs its dying act and succumbs, left in the lurch by its own class, by the army and by all the remaining classes. Passing of the parliamentary regime and of bourgeois rule. Victory of Bonaparte. Parody of restoration of empire.

VII

On the threshold of the February Revolution, the *social republic* appeared as a phrase, as a prophecy. In the June days of 1848, it was drowned in the blood of the *Paris proletariat*, but it haunts the subsequent acts of the drama like a ghost. The *democratic republic* announces its arrival. On June 13, 1849, it is dissipated together with its *petty bourgeois*, who have taken to their heels, but in its flight it blows its own trumpet with redoubled boastfulness. The *parliamentary republic*, together with the bourgeoisie, takes possession of the entire stage; it enjoys its existence to the full, but December 2, 1851 buries it to the accompaniment of the anguished cry of the royalists in coalition: "Long live the Republic!"

The French bourgeoisie balked at the domination of the working proletariat; it has brought the *lumpenproletariat* to domination, with the chief of the Society of December 10 at the head. The bourgeoisie kept France in breathless fear of the future terrors of red anarchy; Bonaparte discounted this future for it when, on December 4, he had the eminent bourgeois of the Boulevard Montmartre and the Boulevard des Italiens shot down

at their windows by the liquor-inspired army of order. It apotheosised the sword; the sword rules it. It destroyed the revolutionary press; its own press has been destroyed. It placed popular meetings under police supervision; its salons are under the supervision of the police. It disbanded the democratic National Guards; its own National Guard is disbanded. It imposed a state of siege; a state of siege is imposed upon it. It supplanted the juries by military commissions; its juries are supplanted by military commissions. It subjected public education to the sway of the priests; the priests subject it to their own education. It transported people without trial; it is being transported without trial. It repressed every stirring in society by means of the state power; every stirring in its society is suppressed by means of the state power. Out of enthusiasm for its purse, it rebelled against its own politicians and men of letters; its politicians and men of letters are swept aside, but its purse is being plundered now that its mouth has been gagged and its pen broken. The bourgeoisie never wearied of crying out to the revolution what Saint Arsenius cried out to the Christians: "*Fuge, tace, quiesce!* Flee, be silent, keep still!" Bonaparte cries to the bourgeoisie: "*Fuge, tace, quiesce!* Flee, be silent, keep still!"

The French bourgeoisie had long ago found the solution to Napoleon's dilemma: "*Dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera républicaine ou cosaque.*"* It had found the solution to it in the "*république cosaque.*" No Circe, by means of black magic, has distorted that work of art, the bourgeois republic, into a monstrous shape. That republic has lost nothing but the semblance of respectability. Present-day** France was contained in a finished state within the parliamentary republic. It only required a bayonet thrust for the bubble to burst and the monster to spring forth before our eyes.

Why did the Paris proletariat not rise in revolt after December 2?

The overthrow of the bourgeoisie had as yet been only decreed: the decree had not been carried out. Any serious insurrection of the proletariat would at once have put fresh life into the bourgeoisie, would have reconciled it with the army and ensured a second June defeat for the workers.

On December 4 the proletariat was incited by bourgeois and *épiciers* to fight. On the evening of that day several legions of the National Guard promised to appear, armed and uniformed, on the scene of battle. For the bourgeois and the *épiciers* had

* "In fifty years Europe will be republican or Cossack."—Ed.

** i.e., after the *coup d'état* of 1851.—Ed.

got wind of the fact that in one of his decrees of December 2 Bonaparte abolished the secret ballot and enjoined them to record their "yes" or "no" in the official registers after their names. The resistance of December 4 intimidated Bonaparte. During the night he caused placards to be posted on all the street corners of Paris, announcing the restoration of the secret ballot. The bourgeois and the *épiciers* believed that they had gained their end. Those who failed to appear next morning were the bourgeois and the *épiciers*.

By a *coup de main* during the night of December 1 to 2, Bonaparte had robbed the Paris proletariat of its leaders, the barricade commanders. An army without officers, averse to fighting under the banner of the *Montagnards* because of the memories of June 1848 and 1849 and May 1850, it left to its vanguard, the secret societies, the task of saving the insurrectionary honour of Paris, which the bourgeoisie had so unresistingly surrendered to the soldiery that, later on, Bonaparte could sneeringly give as his motive for disarming the National Guard—his fear that its arms would be turned against it itself by the anarchists!

"*C'est le triomphe complet et définitif du Socialisme!*"* Thus Guizot characterised December 2. But if the overthrow of the parliamentary republic contains within itself the germ of the triumph of the proletarian revolution, its immediate and palpable result was the victory of Bonaparte over parliament, of the executive power over the legislative power, of force without phrases over the force of phrases. In parliament the nation made its general will the law, that is, it made the law of the ruling class its general will. Before the executive power it renounces all will of its own and submits to the superior command of an alien will, to authority. The executive power, in contrast to the legislative power, expresses the heteronomy of a nation, in contrast to its autonomy. France, therefore, seems to have escaped the despotism of a class only to fall back beneath the despotism of an individual, and, what is more, beneath the authority of an individual without authority. The struggle seems to be settled in such a way that all classes, equally impotent and equally mute, fall on their knees before the rifle butt.

But the revolution is thoroughgoing. It is still journeying through purgatory. It does its work methodically. By December 2, 1851, it had completed one half of its preparatory work; it is now completing the other half. First it perfected the parliamentary power, in order to be able to overthrow it. Now that it

* "This is the complete and final triumph of socialism!"—Ed.

has attained this, it perfects the *executive power*, reduces it to its purest expression, isolates it, sets it up against itself as the sole target, in order to concentrate all its forces of destruction against it. And when it has done this second half of its preliminary work, Europe will leap from its seat and exultantly exclaim: Well grubbed, old mole!*

This executive power with its enormous bureaucratic and military organisation, with its ingenious state machinery, embracing wide strata, with a host of officials numbering half a million, besides an army of another half million, this appalling parasitic body, which enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes all its pores, sprang up in the days of the absolute monarchy, with the decay of the feudal system, which it helped to hasten. The seigniorial privileges of the landowners and towns became transformed into so many attributes of the state power, the feudal dignitaries into paid officials and the motley pattern of conflicting mediaeval plenary powers into the regulated plan of a state authority whose work is divided and centralised as in a factory. The first French Revolution, with its task of breaking all separate local, territorial, urban and provincial powers in order to create the civil unity of the nation, was bound to develop what the absolute monarchy had begun: centralisation, but at the same time the extent, the attributes and the agents of governmental power. Napoleon perfected this state machinery. The Legitimist monarchy and the July monarchy added nothing but a greater division of labour, growing in the same measure as the division of labour within bourgeois society created new groups of interests, and, therefore, new material for state administration. Every *common* interest was straightway severed from society, counterposed to it as a higher, *general* interest, snatched from the activity of society's members themselves and made an object of government activity, from a bridge, a schoolhouse and the communal property of a village community to the railways, the national wealth and the national university of France. Finally, in its struggle against the revolution, the parliamentary republic found itself compelled to strengthen, along with the repressive measures, the resources and centralisation of governmental power. All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it. The parties that contended in turn for domination regarded the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the victor.

But under the absolute monarchy, during the first Revolution, under Napoleon, bureaucracy was only the means of preparing

* Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I, Scene V.—Ed.

the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Under the Restoration, under Louis Philippe, under the parliamentary republic, it was the instrument of the ruling class, however much it strove for power of its own.

Only under the second Bonaparte does the state seem to have made itself completely independent. As against civil society, the state machine has consolidated its position so thoroughly that the chief of the Society of December 10 suffices for its head, an adventurer blown in from abroad, raised on the shield by a drunken soldiery, which he has bought with liquor and sausages, and which he must continually ply with sausage anew. Hence the downcast despair, the feeling of most dreadful humiliation and degradation that oppresses the breast of France and makes her catch her breath. She feels dishonoured.

And yet the state power is not suspended in mid air. Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class of French society at that, the *small-holding [Parzellen] peasants*.

Just as the Bourbons were the dynasty of big landed property and just as the Orleans were the dynasty of money, so the Bonapartes are the dynasty of the peasants, that is, the mass of the French people. Not the Bonaparte who submitted to the bourgeois parliament, but the Bonaparte who dispersed the bourgeois parliament is the chosen of the peasantry. For three years the towns had succeeded in falsifying the meaning of the election of December 10 and in cheating the peasants out of the restoration of the empire. The election of December 10, 1848, has been consummated only by the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851.

The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small holding, a peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much

as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organisation among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself.

Historical tradition gave rise to the belief of the French peasants in the miracle that a man named Napoleon would bring all the glory back to them. And an individual turned up who gives himself out as the man because he bears the name of Napoleon, in consequence of the *Code Napoléon*, which lays down that *la recherche de la paternité est interdite*.* After a vagabondage of twenty years and after a series of grotesque adventures, the legend finds fulfilment and the man becomes Emperor of the French. The fixed idea of the Nephew was realised, because it coincided with the fixed idea of the most numerous class of the French people.

But, it may be objected, what about the peasant risings in half of France, the raids on the peasants by the army, the mass incarceration and transportation of peasants?

Since Louis XIV, France has experienced no similar persecution of the peasants "on account of demagogic practices."

But let there be no misunderstanding. The Bonaparte dynasty represents not the revolutionary, but the conservative peasant; not the peasant that strikes out beyond the condition of his social existence, the small holding, but rather the peasant who wants to consolidate this holding; not the country folk who, linked up with the towns, want to overthrow the old order through their own energies, but on the contrary those who, in stupefied seclusion within this old order, want to see themselves and their small holdings saved and favoured by the ghost of

* Inquiry into paternity is forbidden.—Ed.

the empire. It represents not the enlightenment, but the superstition of the peasant; not his judgement, but his prejudice; not his future, but his past; not his modern Cévennes,²³³ but his modern Vendée.¹⁸⁹

The three years' rigorous rule of the parliamentary republic had freed a part of the French peasants from the Napoleonic illusion and had revolutionised them, even if only superficially; but the bourgeoisie violently repressed them, as often as they set themselves in motion. Under the parliamentary republic the modern and the traditional consciousness of the French peasant contended for mastery. This progress took the form of an incessant struggle between the schoolmasters and the priests. The bourgeoisie struck down the schoolmasters. For the first time the peasants made efforts to behave independently in the face of the activity of the government. This was shown in the continual conflict between the *maires* and the prefects. The bourgeoisie deposed the *maires*. Finally, during the period of the parliamentary republic, the peasants of different localities rose against their own offspring, the army. The bourgeoisie punished them with states of siege and punitive expeditions. And this same bourgeoisie now cries out about the stupidity of the masses, the vile multitude, that has betrayed it to Bonaparte. It has itself forcibly strengthened the empire sentiments (*Imperialismus*) of the peasant class, it conserved the conditions that form the birthplace of this peasant religion. The bourgeoisie, to be sure, is bound to fear the stupidity of the masses as long as they remain conservative, and the insight of the masses as soon as they become revolutionary.

In the risings after the *coup d'état*, a part of the French peasants protested, arms in hand, against their own vote of December 10, 1848. The school they had gone through since 1848 had sharpened their wits. But they had made themselves over to the underworld of history; history held them to their word, and the majority was still so prejudiced that in precisely the reddest Departments the peasant population voted openly for Bonaparte. In its view, the National Assembly had hindered his progress. He had now merely broken the fetters that the towns had imposed on the will of the countryside. In some parts the peasants even entertained the grotesque notion of a convention side by side with Napoleon.

After the first revolution had transformed the peasants from semi-villeins into freeholders, Napoleon confirmed and regulated the conditions on which they could exploit undisturbed the soil of France which had only just fallen to their lot and slake their youthful passion for property. But what is now causing the ruin

of the French peasant is his small holding itself, the division of the land, the form of property which Napoleon consolidated in France. It is precisely the material conditions which made the feudal peasant a small-holding peasant and Napoleon an emperor. Two generations have sufficed to produce the inevitable result: progressive deterioration of agriculture, progressive indebtedness of the agriculturist. The "Napoleonic" form of property, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century was the condition for the liberation and enrichment of the French country folk, has developed in the course of this century into the law of their enslavement and pauperisation. And precisely this law is the first of the "*idées napoléoniennes*" which the second Bonaparte has to uphold. If he still shares with the peasants the illusion that the cause of their ruin is to be sought, not in this small-holding property itself, but outside it, in the influence of secondary circumstances, his experiments will burst like soap bubbles when they come in contact with the relations of production.

The economic development of small-holding property has radically changed the relation of the peasants to the other classes of society. Under Napoleon, the fragmentation of the land in the countryside supplemented free competition and the beginning of big industry in the towns. The peasant class was the ubiquitous protest against the landed aristocracy which had just been overthrown. The roots that small-holding property struck in French soil deprived feudalism of all nutriment. Its landmarks formed the natural fortifications of the bourgeoisie against any surprise attack on the part of its old overlords. But in the course of the nineteenth century the feudal lords were replaced by urban usurers; the feudal obligation that went with the land was replaced by the mortgage; aristocratic landed property was replaced by bourgeois capital. The small holding of the peasant is now only the pretext that allows the capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages. The mortgage debt burdening the soil of France imposes on the French peasantry payment of an amount of interest equal to the annual interest on the entire British national debt. Small-holding property, in this enslavement by capital to which its development inevitably pushes forward, has transformed the mass of the French nation into troglodytes. Sixteen million peasants (including women and children) dwell in hovels, a large number of which have but one opening, others only two and the most favoured only three. And windows are to a house what the five senses are to the head. The bourgeois order, which at the beginning of the century set the state to stand guard over the

newly arisen small holding and manured it with laurels, has become a vampire that sucks out its blood and brains and throws them into the alchemistic cauldron of capital. The *Code Napoléon* is now nothing but a *codex* of restraints, forced sales and compulsory auctions. To the four million (including children, etc.) officially recognised paupers, vagabonds, criminals and prostitutes in France must be added five million who hover on the margin of existence and either have their haunts in the countryside itself or, with their rags and their children, continually desert the countryside for the towns and the towns for the countryside. The interests of the peasants, therefore, are no longer, as under Napoleon, in accord with, but in opposition to the interests of the bourgeoisie, to capital. Hence the peasants find their natural ally and leader in the *urban proletariat*, whose task is the overthrow of the bourgeois order. But *strong and unlimited government*—and this is the second “*idée napoléonienne*,” which the second Napoleon has to carry out—is called upon to defend this “material” order by force. This “*ordre matériel*” also serves as the catchword in all of Bonaparte’s proclamations against the rebellious peasants.

Besides the mortgage which capital imposes on it, the small holding is burdened by *taxes*. Taxes are the source of life for the bureaucracy, the army, the priests and the court, in short, for the whole apparatus of the executive power. Strong government and heavy taxes are identical. By its very nature, small-holding property forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy. It creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over the whole surface of the land. Hence it also permits of uniform action from a supreme centre on all points of this uniform mass. It annihilates the aristocratic intermediate grades between the mass of the people and the state power. On all sides, therefore, it calls forth the direct interference of this state power and the interposition of its immediate organs. Finally, it produces an unemployed surplus population for which there is no place either on the land or in the towns, and which accordingly reaches out for state offices as a sort of respectable alms, and provokes the creation of state posts. By the new markets which he opened at the point of the bayonet, by the plundering of the Continent, Napoleon repaid the compulsory taxes with interest. These taxes were a spur to the industry of the peasant, whereas now they rob his industry of its last resources and complete his inability to resist pauperism. And an enormous bureaucracy, well-gallooned and well-fed, is the “*idée napoléonienne*” which is most congenial of all to the second Bonaparte. How could it be otherwise, seeing that alongside the actual

classes of society he is forced to create an artificial caste, for which the maintenance of his regime becomes a bread-and-butter question? Accordingly, one of his first financial operations was the raising of officials’ salaries to their old level and the creation of new sinecures.

Another “*idée napoléonienne*” is the domination of the *priests* as an instrument of government. But while in its accord with society, in its dependence on natural forces and its submission to the authority which protected it from above, the small holding that had newly come into being was naturally religious, and authority, and driven beyond its own limitations naturally becomes irreligious. Heaven was quite a pleasing accession to the narrow strip of land just won, more particularly as it makes the weather; it becomes an insult as soon as it is thrust forward as substitute for the small holding. The priest then appears as only the anointed bloodhound of the earthly police—another “*idée napoléonienne*.” On the next occasion, the expedition against Rome will take place in France itself, but in a sense opposite to that of M. de Montalembert.

Lastly, the culminating point of the “*idées napoléoniennes*” is the preponderance of the *army*. The army was the *point d’honneur** of the small-holding peasants, it was they themselves transformed into heroes, defending their new possessions against the outer world, glorifying their recently won nationhood, plundering and revolutionising the world. The uniform was their own state dress; war was their poetry; the small holding, extended and rounded off in imagination, was their fatherland, and patriotism the ideal form of the sense of property. But the enemies against whom the French peasant has now to defend his property are not the Cossacks; they are the *huissiers*** and the tax collectors. The small holding lies no longer in the so-called fatherland, but in the register of mortgages. The army itself is no longer the flower of the peasant youth; it is the swamp-flower of the peasant *lumpenproletariat*. It consists in large measure of *remplaçants*, of substitutes, just as the second Bonaparte is himself only a *remplaçant*, the substitute for Napoleon. It now performs its deeds of valour by hounding the peasants in masses like chamois, by doing *gendarme* duty, and if the internal contradictions of his system chase the chief of the Society of December 10 over the French border, his army, after some acts of brigandage, will reap, not laurels, but thrashings.

* Matter of honour, a point of special touch.—Ed.

** *Huissiers*; Bailiffs.—Ed.

One sees: all "idées napoléoniennes" are ideas of the undeveloped small holding in the freshness of its youth; for the small holding that has outlived its day they are an absurdity. They are only the hallucinations of its death struggle, words that are transformed into phrases, spirits transformed into ghosts. But the parody of the empire (*des Imperialismus*) was necessary to free the mass of the French nation from the weight of tradition and to work out in pure form the opposition between the state power and society. With the progressive undermining of small-holding property, the state structure erected upon it collapses. The centralisation of the state that modern society requires arises only on the ruins of the military-bureaucratic government machinery which was forged in opposition to feudalism.*

The condition of the French peasants provides us with the answer to the riddle of the general elections of December 20 and 21, which bore the second Bonaparte up Mount Sinai, not to receive laws, but to give them.

Manifestly, the bourgeoisie had now no choice but to elect Bonaparte. When the puritans at the Council of Constance²³⁴ complained of the dissolute lives of the popes and wailed about the necessity of moral reform, Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly thundered at them: "Only the devil in person can still save the Catholic Church, and you ask for angels." In like manner, after the *coup d'état*, the French bourgeoisie cried: Only the chief of the Society of December 10 can still save bourgeois society! Only theft can still save property; only perjury, religion; bastardy, the family; disorder, order!

As the executive authority which has made itself an independent power, Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard "bourgeois order." But the strength of this bourgeois order lies in the middle class. He looks on himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew. Consequently, he looks on himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class. But by protecting its material power, he generates its political power

* In the 1852 edition this paragraph ended with the following lines, which Marx omitted in the 1869 edition: "The demolition of the state machine will not endanger centralisation. Bureaucracy is only the low and brutal form of a centralisation that is still afflicted with its opposite, with feudalism. When he is disappointed in the Napoleonic Restoration, the French peasant will part with his belief in his small holding, the entire state edifice erected on this small holding will fall to the ground and the proletarian revolution will obtain that chorus without which its solo song becomes a swan song in all peasant countries."—Ed.

anew. The cause must accordingly be kept alive; but the effect, where it manifests itself, must be done away with. But this cannot pass off without slight confusions of cause and effect, since in their interaction both lose their distinguishing features. New decrees that obliterate the border line. As against the bourgeoisie, Bonaparte looks on himself, at the same time, as the representative of the peasants and of the people in general, who wants to make the lower classes of the people happy within the frame of bourgeois society. New decrees that cheat the "True Socialists"¹⁶⁴ of their statecraft in advance. But, above all, Bonaparte looks on himself as the chief of the Society of December 10, as the representative of the *lumpenproletariat* to which he himself, his entourage, his government and his army belong, and whose prime consideration is to benefit itself and draw California lottery prizes from the state treasury. And he vindicates his position as chief of the Society of December 10 with decrees, without decrees and despite decrees.

This contradictory task of the man explains the contradictions of his government, the confused groping about which seeks now to win, now to humiliate first one class and then another and arrays all of them uniformly against him, whose practical uncertainty forms a highly comical contrast to the imperious, categorical style of the government decrees, a style which is faithfully copied from the Uncle.

Industry and trade, hence the business affairs of the middle class, are to prosper in hothouse fashion under the strong government. The grant of innumerable railway concessions. But the Bonapartist *lumpenproletariat* is to enrich itself. The initiated play *tripotage** on the bourse with the railway concessions. But no capital is forthcoming for the railways. Obligation of the Bank to make advances on railway shares. But, at the same time, the Bank is to be exploited for personal ends and therefore must be cajoled. Release of the Bank from the obligation to publish its report weekly. Leonine agreement of the Bank with the government. The people are to be given employment. Initiation of public works. But the public works increase the obligations of the people in respect of taxes. Hence reduction of the taxes by an onslaught on the *rentiers*, by conversion of the five per cent bonds to four-and-a-half per cent. But, once more, the middle class must receive a *douceur*** Therefore doubling of the wine tax for the people, who buy it *en détail*, and halving of the wine tax for the middle class, who drink it *en gros*. Disso-

* *Tripotage*: Hanky-panky.—Ed.

** *Douceur*: Sop.—Ed.

lution of the actual workers' associations, but promises of miracles of association in the future. The peasants are to be helped. Mortgage banks that expedite their getting into debt and accelerate the concentration of property. But these banks are to be used to make money out of the confiscated estates of the House of Orleans. No capitalist wants to agree to this condition, which is not in the decree, and the mortgage bank remains a mere decree, etc., etc.

Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. But he cannot give to one class without taking from another. Just as at the time of the Fronde it was said of the Duke of Guise that he was the most *obligeant* man in France because he had turned all his estates into his partisans' obligations to him, so Bonaparte would fain be the most *obligeant* man in France and turn all the property, all the labour of France into a personal obligation to himself. He would like to steal the whole of France in order to be able to make a present of her to France or, rather, in order to be able to buy France anew with French money, for as the chief of the Society of December 10 he must needs buy what ought to belong to him. And all the state institutions, the Senate, the Council of State, the legislative body, the Legion of Honour, the soldiers' medals, the washhouses, the public works, the railways, the *état-major** of the National Guard to the exclusion of privates, and the confiscated estates of the House of Orleans—all become parts of the institution of purchase. Every place in the army and in the government machine becomes a means of purchase. But the most important feature of this process, whereby France is taken in order to give to her, is the percentages that find their way into the pockets of the head and the members of the Society of December 10 during the turnover. The witticism with which Countess L., the mistress of M. de Morny, characterised the confiscation of the Orleans estates: "*C'est le premier vol** de l'aigle****" is applicable to every flight of this eagle, which is more like a raven. He himself and his adherents call out to one another daily like that Italian Carthusian admonishing the miser who, with boastful display, counted up the goods on which he could yet live for years to come: "*Tu fai conto sopra i beni, bisogna prima far il conto sopra gli anni.*"**** Lest they make a mistake in the years, they count the minutes. A bunch of blokes push their

* *Etat-major*: General Staff.—Ed.

** *Vol* means flight and theft. (Note by Marx.)

*** "It is the first flight (theft) of the eagle."—Ed.

**** "Thou countest thy goods, thou shouldst first count thy years." [Note by Marx.]

way forward to the court, into the ministries, to the head of the administration and the army, a crowd of the best of whom it must be said that no one knows whence he comes, a noisy, disreputable, rapacious bohème that crawls into gallooned coats with the same grotesque dignity as the high dignitaries of Soullouque. One can visualise clearly this upper stratum of the Society of December 10, if one reflects that *Véron-Crevel*[†] is its preacher of morals and *Granier de Cassagnac* its thinker. When Guizot, at the time of his ministry, utilised this Granier on a hole-and-corner newspaper against the dynastic opposition, he used to boast of him with the quip: "*C'est le roi des drôles*," "he is the king of buffoons." One would do wrong to recall the Regency²³⁵ or Louis XV in connection with Louis Bonaparte's court and clique. For "often already, France has experienced a government of mistresses; but never before a government of *hommes entretenus*."^{††}

Driven by the contradictory demands of his situation and being at the same time, like a conjurer, under the necessity of keeping the public gaze fixed on himself, as Napoleon's substitute, by springing constant surprises, that is to say, under the necessity of executing a *coup d'état en miniature* every day, Bonaparte throws the entire bourgeois economy into confusion, violates everything that seemed inviolable to the Revolution of 1848, makes some tolerant of revolution, others desirous of revolution, and produces actual anarchy in the name of order, while at the same time stripping its halo from the entire state machine, profanes it and makes it at once loathsome and ridiculous. The cult of the Holy Tunic of Treves²³⁶ he duplicates at Paris in the cult of the Napoleonic imperial mantle. But when the imperial mantle finally falls on the shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, the bronze statue of Napoleon will crash from the top of the Vendôme Column.¹⁹⁶

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* In his work, *Cousine Bette*, Balzac delineates the thoroughly dissolute Parisian philistine in Crevel, a character which he draws after the model of Dr. Véron, the proprietor of the *Constitutionnel*. [Note by Marx.]

** The words quoted are those of Madame Girardin. [Note by Marx.]
Hommes entretenus: Kept men.—Ed.

Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship Of the Proletariat!

—In commemoration of the centenary of the Paris Commune

by the Editorial Departments of *Renmin Ribao*,
Hongqi and *Jiefangjun Bao*

I. The Principles of the Paris Commune Are Eternal

March 18 this year marks the centenary of the Paris Commune. Full of profound feelings of proletarian internationalism, the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people under the teaching of their great leader Chairman Mao warmly celebrate this great "festival of the proletariat"¹ together with the proletariat and the revolutionary people throughout the world.

One hundred years ago the proletariat and the broad masses of the people of Paris in France staged a heroic armed uprising and founded the Paris Commune. This was the first proletarian regime in the history of mankind, the first great attempt of the proletariat to overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Paris Commune abolished the army and police of the reactionary bourgeois government and replaced them with the armed people; the gun was in the hands of the working class.

The Paris Commune broke the bourgeois bureaucratic apparatus enslaving the people, founded the working class's own government, adopted a series of policies to safeguard the interests of the working people and organized the masses to take an active part in running the state.

In the fight to found and defend the proletarian regime, the heroes of the Paris Commune displayed extraordinary revolutionary initiative, soaring revolutionary enthusiasm and self-sacrificing heroism, winning the admiration of the revolutionary people generation after generation.

Although the Paris Commune failed as a result of the military onslaught and bloody suppression carried out by butcher Thiers in league with Bismarck, its his-

torical contributions are indelible. As Marx said: The glorious movement of March 18 was "the dawn of the great social revolution which will liberate mankind from the regime of classes for ever."²

While the battle was still raging in a Paris darkened by the smoke of gunfire, Marx declared: "But even if the Commune is crushed, the struggle will only be postponed. The principles of the Commune are eternal and cannot be destroyed; they will declare themselves again and again until the working class achieves its liberation."³

What are the revolutionary principles that Marx and Engels, the great teachers of the proletariat, summed up on the basis of the practice of the Paris Commune?

In a word, "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes."⁴ The proletariat must use revolutionary violence to "break" and "smash"⁵ the old state machinery and carry out the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁶

In expounding this principle, Marx stressed: The first premiss of the dictatorship of the proletariat "is an army of the proletariat. The working class must win the right to its emancipation on the battlefield."⁷ Only by relying on revolutionary armed force can the proletariat overthrow the rule of reactionary classes and go on to fulfil its whole historical mission.

Marx also said: The state of the dictatorship of the proletariat will "be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time."⁸

As Lenin said: "One of the most remarkable and most important ideas of Marxism on the subject of the

state" is "the idea of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (as Marx and Engels began to call it after the Paris Commune)."⁹ To persist in revolutionary violence to smash the bourgeois state machine and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, or to maintain the bourgeois state machine and oppose the dictatorship of the proletariat — this has been the focus of repeated struggles between Marxism on the one hand and revisionism, reformism, anarchism and all kinds of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology on the other, the focus of repeated struggles between the two lines in the international communist movement for the past hundred years. It is precisely on this fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat that all revisionism, from the revisionism of the Second International to modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its centre, has completely betrayed Marxism.

A century's history has proved to the full that the Marxist theory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat is invincible.

Forty-six years after the Paris Commune uprising, the proletariat of Russia, led by the great Lenin, won victory in the October Socialist Revolution through armed uprising, opening up a new world era of proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship. Lenin said: On the path of breaking the old state machine, the Paris Commune "took the first world-historical step. . . . The Soviet Government took the second."¹⁰

Seventy-eight years after the Paris Commune uprising, the Chinese people, led by the great leader Chairman Mao, won victory in the revolution. Chairman Mao blazed a trail in establishing rural base areas, encircling the cities from the countryside and finally taking the cities. He led the Chinese people through protracted revolutionary wars in overthrowing the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism, in breaking the old state machine and bringing about in China the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

II. It Is of the Utmost Importance for the Revolutionary People to Take Hold of the Gun

The historical experience of the Paris Commune has fully demonstrated that taking hold of revolutionary arms is of the utmost importance to the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Since then Chairman Mao has been leading Chinese people in continuing the revolution under dictatorship of the proletariat and advancing triumphantly along the socialist road.

Fighting bravely, advancing wave upon wave, supporting and encouraging each other in the past century, the proletariat, the oppressed people and oppressed nations of the world have been promoting socialist revolution and the national democratic revolution and have won most brilliant victories. As Chairman Mao Tsetung points out: "This is the historic epoch in which world capitalism and imperialism going down to their doom and world socialism people's democracy are marching to victory."¹¹ The cause of the Paris Commune is spreading far and wide at a higher stage in the new historical conditions. The world has undergone an earth-shaking change.

In commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Paris Commune, Marx and Engels, with jubilant revolutionary feeling, told the European working class: "Thus the Commune which the powers of the old world believed to be exterminated, lives stronger than ever and thus we may join you in the cry: Vive la Commune!"¹² Today, the flames of the revolutionary torch raised by the Paris Commune are ablaze throughout the world, and the days of imperialism, social-imperialism and all reaction are numbered. In celebrating the centenary of the Paris Commune at such a time, Marxist-Leninists, the proletariat and the revolutionary people the world over have all the more reason to shout with unbounded confidence: Long live the Commune! Long live the victory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat!

In commemorating the Paris Commune, we should study the Marxist-Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, learn from historical experience, criticize modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist renegade clique as its centre, adhere to the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary line, and unite with the people of the world to win still greater victories.

Explaining the experience of the Paris Commune, Lenin referred to Engels' important thesis that workers emerged with arms from every revolution in France and that, therefore, the disarming of

was the first commandment for the bourgeois state at the helm of the state. On this conclusion Lenin commented: "The essence of the matter—also, by the way, on the question of the state (the oppressed class arms?)—is here remarkably well grasped."¹³

The Paris Commune was born in the fierce struggle between armed revolution and armed counter-revolution. The 72 days of the Paris Commune were 72 days of armed uprising, armed struggle and armed defence. The very fact that the proletariat of Paris had taken hold of the gun struck the greatest terror into the hearts of the bourgeois reactionaries. And a fatal error of the Paris Commune lay precisely in the fact that it showed excessive magnanimity towards counter-revolution and did not march on Versailles immediately, thus giving Thiers a breathing space to muster his reactionary forces for an onslaught on revolutionary Paris. As Engels said: "Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough?"¹⁴

Comrade Mao Tsetung has concisely summed up the tremendous importance of armed struggle and the people's army and advanced the celebrated thesis "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."¹⁵ He points out: "According to the Marxist theory of the state, the army is the chief component of state power. Whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army."¹⁶

Violent revolution is the universal principle of proletarian revolution. A Marxist-Leninist party must adhere to this universal principle and apply it to the concrete practice of its own country. Historical experience shows that the seizure of political power by the proletariat and the oppressed people of a country and the seizure of victory in their revolution are accomplished invariably by the power of the gun; they are accomplished under the leadership of a proletarian party, by acting in accordance with that country's specific conditions, by gradually building up the people's armed forces and fighting a people's war on the basis of arousing the broad masses to action, and by waging repeated struggles against the imperialists and reactionaries. This is true of the Russian revolution, the Chinese revolution, and the revolutions of Albania, Viet Nam, Korea and other countries, and there is no exception.

On the other hand, a proletarian party suffers setbacks in the revolution if it fails to go in for or gives up revolutionary armed force, and there have been serious lessons: Some parties failed to take hold

of the gun and were helpless in the face of sudden attacks by imperialism and its lackeys and of counter-revolutionary suppression, and as a result millions of revolutionary people were massacred. In some cases where the revolutionary people had already taken up arms and their armed forces had grown considerably, certain parties handed over the people's armed forces and forfeited the fruits of the revolution because they sought official posts in bourgeois governments or were duped by the reactionaries.

In the past decades, many Communist Parties have participated in elections and parliaments, but none has set up a dictatorship of the proletariat by such means. Even if a Communist Party should win a majority in parliament or participate in the government, this would not mean any change in the character of bourgeois political power, still less the smashing of the old state machine. The reactionary ruling classes can proclaim the election null and void, dissolve the parliament or directly use violence to kick out the Communist Party. If a proletarian party does no mass work, rejects armed struggle and makes a fetish of parliamentary elections, it will only lull the masses and corrupt itself. The bourgeoisie buys over a Communist Party through parliamentary elections and turns it into a revisionist party, a party of the bourgeoisie—are such cases rare in history?

The proletariat must use the gun to seize political power and must use the gun to defend it. The people's army under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party is the bulwark of the dictatorship of the proletariat and among the various factors for preventing the restoration of capitalism it is the main one. Having a people's army armed with the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the proletariat can deal with any complicated situation in the domestic or international class struggle and safeguard the proletarian state.

The contemporary liberation movement of the oppressed nations is an important component part and a great ally of the proletarian world revolution. The national democratic revolution and the socialist revolution are related to each other and at the same time distinct from each other; they represent two different stages and are different in character. However, to win complete victory in the national democratic revolution, it is likewise necessary to get prepared for a trial of armed strength with the imperialists and reactionaries. For the oppressed nations, it is likewise most important to take hold of the gun.

Since World War II, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism headed by the United States have incessantly launched wars of aggression and resorted ever more frequently to such means as military in-

tervention, armed subversion and invasion by mercenary troops to suppress the countries and people that are fighting for or have already gained independence. Incomplete statistics show that U.S. imperialism has engineered and launched armed intervention and armed aggression on more than 50 occasions in the past 25 years. As for U.S.-engineered armed subversion, examples are too numerous to be counted. Therefore, in order to win liberation and safeguard their national independence and state sovereignty and effectively combat aggression and subversion by imperialism and its lackeys, all the oppressed nations must have their own anti-imperialist armed forces and be prepared at all times to counter wars of aggression with revolutionary wars. The war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation waged by the people of the three countries of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia has set a brilliant example to the oppressed nations and people all over the world. The struggles against aggression and subversion waged by the people of many other

countries and regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America have likewise provided valuable experience.

In his solemn statement "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!", Chairman Mao points out: "A weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big. The people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression by a big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, dare to take up arms and grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country. This is a law of history."¹⁷

As Comrade Lin Biao says, "people's war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys."¹⁸ The proletariat and the oppressed people and nations the world over will all change from being unarmed and unskilled in warfare to taking up arms and being skilled in warfare. U.S. imperialism and all its lackeys will eventually be burned to ashes in the fiery flames of the people's war they themselves have kindled.

III. Revolution Is the Cause of the Masses in Their Millions

The historical experience of the Paris Commune tells us that to be victorious in the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat it is imperative to rely on the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses in their millions and give full play to their great power as the makers of history. Lenin said: "The autocracy cannot be abolished without the revolutionary action of class-conscious millions, without a great surge of mass heroism, readiness and ability on their part to 'storm heaven', as Marx put it when speaking of the Paris workers at the time of the Commune."¹⁹

Marx, the great teacher of the proletariat, highly valued the revolutionary initiative of the masses of the people and set us a brilliant example of the correct attitude to adopt towards the revolutionary mass movement.

In the autumn of 1870, prior to the founding of the Paris Commune, Marx pointed out that the conditions were not ripe for an uprising by the French workers. But when the proletariat of Paris did rise in revolt with heaven-storming revolutionary heroism in March 1871, Marx, regarding himself as a participant, promptly and firmly supported and helped this proletarian revolution. Although he perceived the mistakes of the Commune and foresaw its defeat, Marx considered the revolution the most glorious exploit of the French working class.

For he regarded this movement "as a historic experience of enormous importance, as a certain advance of the world proletarian revolution, as a practical step that was more important than hundreds of programmes and arguments."²⁰ In a letter to L. Kugelmann at that time, Marx expressed his fervent praise: "What elasticity, what historical initiative, what a capacity for sacrifice in these Parisians!" "History has no like example of like greatness!"²¹ Lenin saw in this letter a gulf between the proletarian revolutionaries and the opportunists and hoped that it would be "hung in the home . . . of every literate Russian worker."²²

Contrary to the Marxists, all the opportunists and old and new revisionists oppose the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and they inevitably have a mortal fear of and bitter hatred for the masses, and they deride, curse and sabotage the revolutionary mass movement. When the Russian armed uprising of December 1905 failed, Plekhanov stood aloof and accused the masses, saying: "They should not have taken to arms." Lenin indignantly criticized Plekhanov's aristocratic attitude towards the revolutionary mass movement and denounced him as an infamous Russian renegade from Marxism. Lenin pointed out that without the "general rehearsal" of 1905, victory in the October Revolution in 1917 would have been impossible.

1959, when our great teacher Chairman Mao
condemned the Peng Teh-huai Right-opportunist anti-
clique for slandering and opposing the revolu-
tionary mass movement, he sharply told these anti-
clique renegades:

"Please look and see how Marx and Lenin com-
mented on the Paris Commune, and Lenin on the Rus-
sian revolution!" "Do you see how Lenin criticized the
renegade Plekhanov and those 'bourgeois gentlemen
and their hangers-on,' 'the curs and swine of the mori-
bund bourgeoisie and of the petty-bourgeois democrats
who trail behind them'? If not, will you please have
a look?"²³ Chairman Mao used this historical experi-
ence as a profound lesson to educate the whole Party
and urged our Party members and cadres to follow
the example of Marx and Lenin and take a correct
attitude towards the revolutionary mass movement.

"Revolution is the main trend in the world to-
day."²⁴ All round the globe, the people are thunder-
ing: Down with the U.S. aggressors and all their run-
ning dogs! The strategic rear areas of imperialism have
become front lines in the anti-imperialist struggle. The
victorious development of the war of the 'three peoples
of Indochina against U.S. aggression and for national
salvation has pushed the worldwide anti-U.S. struggle
to a new high. The struggle against the doctrine of
the hegemony of the two superpowers is gaining mo-
mentum. The national liberation movement in Asia
and Africa is shooting forward as violently as a raging
fire. The struggle of the people of Korea, Japan and
other Asian countries against the revival of Japanese
militarism by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries is
daily surging ahead. The Palestinian and other Arab
people are continuing their advance in the fight against
the U.S.-Israeli aggressors. Revolutionary mass move-
ments on an unprecedented scale have broken out in
North America, Europe and Oceania. The workers,
students, black people and other minority peoples in
the United States are daily awakening and rising in a
revolutionary storm against the reactionary rule of the
Nixon government and its policy of aggression. In
Latin America, the "backyard" of U.S. imperialism, the
long-suppressed anti-U.S. fury in the hearts of the peo-
ple has now burst forth, and a new situation has
emerged characterized by joint struggle for the defence
of their national interests and state sovereignty. The
revolutionary struggle of the people in certain East
European countries against social-imperialism is in the
ascendant. The spring thunder of revolution is sound-
ing even in hitherto relatively quiescent areas. React-
ing on and encouraging each other, these struggles
have merged into the powerful torrent of the world
people's revolutionary movement.

In the face of the present great revolutionary
movement, every revolutionary party and every rev-
olutionary will have to make a choice. To march at
the head of the masses and lead them? To trail behind
them, gesticulating and criticizing? Or to stand in their
way and oppose them? Genuine Marxist-Leninist par-
ties and all revolutionaries must warmly support the
revolutionary actions of the masses, firmly march at
the head of the mass movement and lead the masses
forward.

The political parties of the proletariat and all rev-
olutionaries "ought to face the world and brave the
storm, the great world of mass struggle and the mighty
storm of mass struggle."²⁵ They must share weal and
woe with the masses, modestly learn from them, be
their willing pupils, be good at discovering their rev-
olutionary initiative and draw wisdom and strength
from them. Only by plunging into the mighty storm
of the mass movement can a political party of the
proletariat temper itself and grow in maturity. And
only through the practice of the masses in class strug-
gle can a correct programme or line be formulated,
developed, tested and carried out.

The mainstream of the revolutionary mass move-
ment is always good and always conforms to the de-
velopment of society. In the mass movement various
trends of thought exert their influence, various factions
emerge and various kinds of people take part. This is
only natural. Nothing on earth is absolutely pure.
Through their practice in struggle and repeated com-
parison, the broad masses of the people will eventually
distinguish between what is correct and what is erro-
neous; they will eventually cast aside revisionism and
all that is erroneous and accept and grasp the revolu-
tionary truth of Marxism-Leninism. A proletarian
party must go deep among the masses and work pa-
tiently, painstakingly and for a long time, so as con-
stantly to raise their political consciousness and lead
the mass movement forward along the correct road.

The question of first importance for the revolu-
tion is to distinguish between enemies and friends, to
unite with our real friends and attack our real enemies.
The development of the revolutionary mass movement
calls for the constant strengthening of unity within the
revolutionary forces and the smashing of the plots to
split and sabotage hatched by the imperialists, revi-
sionists and reactionaries. The people, who constitute
over 90 per cent of the population — the workers, peas-
ants, students and all those who refuse to be op-
pressed by imperialism — invariably want to make
revolution. In order to defeat U.S. imperialism and all
its running dogs, it is imperative to form a broad united

front, unite with all forces that can be united, the enemy excepted, and carry out arduous struggle.

Comrade Mao Tsetung points out: "Direct reliance on the revolutionary masses is a basic principle of the Communist Party."²⁶ We must rely on the masses and launch mass movements when we fight for political power. We must likewise rely on the masses, launch mass movements and adhere to the mass line

in all our work when we engage in the socialist revolution and socialist construction after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. "As long as we rely on the people, believe firmly in the inexhaustible creative power of the masses and hence trust and identify ourselves with them, no enemy can crush us while we can crush every enemy and overcome every difficulty."²⁷

IV. It Is Essential to Have a Genuine Marxist-Leninist Party

In summing up the experience of the Paris Commune, Marx and Engels explicitly stated: "In its struggle against the collective power of the propertied classes, the working class cannot act as a class except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to all old parties formed by the propertied classes."²⁸ This is a condition indispensable to seizing victory in the proletarian revolution, establishing and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, and realizing the ultimate goal of abolishing classes.

The fundamental cause of the failure of the Paris Commune was that, owing to the historical conditions, Marxism had not yet achieved a dominant position in the workers' movement and a proletarian revolutionary party with Marxism as its guiding thought had not yet come into being. On the other hand, Blanquism and Proudhonism which were then dominant in the Paris Commune could not possibly lead the proletarian revolution to victory.

Historical experience shows that where a very favourable revolutionary situation and revolutionary enthusiasm on the part of the masses exist, it is still necessary to have a strong core of leadership of the proletariat, that is, "a revolutionary party . . . built on the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary style."²⁹ Only such a party can lead the proletariat and the broad masses in defeating imperialism and its running dogs and winning victory in the revolution.

A revolutionary situation appeared in many countries at the time of World War I. However, since almost all the political parties of the Second International had degenerated into revisionist, social-chauvinist parties, it was out of the question for them to lead the proletariat in seizing political power. Only in Russia, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party founded

by Lenin, was the Great October Socialist Revolution crowned with success.

During and after World War II, the revolution triumphed in China thanks to the leadership of the Communist Party of China with Chairman Mao as its leader; in some other countries, also under the leadership of Marxist-Leninist parties, the revolution was victorious or protracted revolutionary struggles were persevered in. But in certain countries, the revolution failed because the opportunist, revisionist line had got the upper hand in the parties.

For world revolution the situation today is better than ever before. The objective situation urgently demands strong leadership by genuine Marxist-Leninist parties, and the building of proletarian revolutionary parties which completely break with the revisionist line, which are consolidated ideologically, politically and organizationally and which have a broad mass character.

To be able to lead the revolution, it is of fundamental importance for a proletarian party to take Marxism-Leninism as its guiding thought, integrate the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the revolution in its own country, and formulate and implement a correct line suited to the conditions of that country. With a correct line, a weak force can grow strong, armed forces can be built up from scratch, and political power can be attained. With an erroneous line, the revolution will suffer setbacks and the gains already won will be forfeited.

In leading the Chinese people's revolution through protracted struggles, Comrade Mao Tsetung repeatedly pointed out: "As soon as it was linked with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism gave an entirely new complexion to the Chinese revolution"³⁰ and "it has been the consistent ideological principle of our Party to

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integrate Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution."³¹

Comrade Mao Tsetung further expounded this fundamental principle in his important inscription for Japanese worker friends: "The Japanese revolution will undoubtedly be victorious, provided the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism is really integrated with the concrete practice of the Japanese revolution."³²

A proletarian party should, in accordance with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, use the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoints and methods to carry out deep-going investigations and study of the class relations in society, make concrete analyses of the present conditions and the history of its own country and the characteristics of the revolution in that country, and solve the theoretical and practical problems of the revolution independently. It is necessary to learn from international experience, which, however, should not be copied mechanically; a proletarian party should creatively develop its own experience in the light of the realities of its own country. Only thus can it guide the revolution to victory and contribute to the cause of the proletarian world revolution.

To keep on integrating theory with practice, a proletarian party must maintain close ties with the masses, go deep among them and adopt the method of leadership, "from the masses, to the masses,"³³ so that the party's correct line and principles can be translated into mass action. At the same time it should be good at summing up experience and lessons, carry out criticism and self-criticism, persist in doing what is right and correct what is wrong in the interests of the people, and find out the laws of development through practice in struggle and then use them to guide the practical struggle.

Comrade Mao Tsetung says: "Opposition and struggle between ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the Party; this is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes and between the new and the old in society."³⁴ To ensure that its

political line is correct and its organization consolidated, a proletarian party must conduct uncompromising struggles against opportunism and revisionism of every description, against the ideologies of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes.

The struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism, the struggle between the two lines in the international communist movement, is a protracted one. For more than a decade, the Chinese Communist Party, the Albanian Party of Labour and all the genuine Marxist-Leninists of the world have together waged a resolute ideological, theoretical and political struggle against modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism as its centre and have won great victories. But the struggle is by no means over. To keep on promoting the proletarian world revolution, the Marxist-Leninist parties and the revolutionary people in various countries have an important task to fulfil, namely, to continue criticizing modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism as its centre and carry this struggle through to the end.

The ideologies of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes have long dominated society. The bourgeoisie invariably does its utmost to influence, corrupt and "corrode" the Communist Party ideologically by every means and through every channel, whether in developed capitalist countries or in economically backward countries; whether the status of the Communist Party is legal or not; whether before the seizure of political power by the proletariat or after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. If a proletarian party fails to wage resolute struggles against the inroads of bourgeois ideology, it cannot possibly maintain its ideological, political and organizational independence and will turn into an appendage of the bourgeoisie and its political parties. The proletarian party can bring its fighting strength into play and achieve victory in the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat only by using Marxism-Leninism as its weapon of criticism and sticking to class struggle in the realm of ideology to defeat the reactionary bourgeois world outlook with the proletarian world outlook.

V. The Modern Revisionists Are Renegades From the Revolutionary Principles of the Paris Commune

At the time when the proletariat and the revolutionary people of the world are marking the grand centenary of the Paris Commune, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique is putting on an act, talking glibly about "loyalty to the principles of the Commune"³⁵ and

making itself up as the successor to the Paris Commune. It has no sense of shame at all.

What right have the Soviet revisionist renegades to talk about the Paris Commune? It is these renegades who have usurped the leadership of the Soviet Party

and as a result the Soviet state founded by Lenin and defended by Stalin has changed its political colour. It is they who have turned the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and put social-imperialism and social-fascism into force. This is gross betrayal of the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune.

From Khrushchov to Brezhnev, all have tried to mask their dictatorship of the bourgeoisie as the "state of the whole people." Khrushchov used to say that the Soviet Union had been "transformed . . . into a state of the whole people."³⁶ Now Brezhnev and his ilk say that theirs is a "Soviet socialist state of the whole people"³⁷ and that what they practise is "Soviet democracy." All this is humbug.

The Soviet, a great creation of the Russian proletariat, embodied the fact that the working people were masters in their own house, and it was a glorious title. However, the name "Soviet," like the name "Communist Party," can be used by Bolsheviki or Mensheviki, by Marxist-Leninists or revisionists. What is decisive is not the name but the essence, not the form but the content. In the Soviet Union today, the name "Soviet" has not changed, nor has the name of the state, but the class content has changed completely. With its leadership usurped by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, the Soviet state is no longer an instrument with which the proletariat suppresses the bourgeoisie, but has become a tool with which the restored bourgeoisie suppresses the proletariat. The Soviet revisionist renegades have turned the Soviet Union into a paradise for a handful of bureaucrat-monopoly-capitalists of a new type, a prison for the millions of working people. This is the whole content of what they call a "Soviet socialist state of the whole people" and "Soviet democracy." It is by no means the fact that "the state of the whole people is a direct continuation of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat,"³⁸ but rather that Brezhnev's line is a "direct continuation" of Khrushchov's line. This is essentially why Brezhnev and his like are clinging desperately to the slogan of the "state of the whole people."

Their frenzied opposition to violent proletarian revolution is another concentrated expression of the betrayal of the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique. Brezhnev and his company clamorously demand of "the leaders of the proletariat to reduce violence to the minimum at every stage of the struggle and employ milder forms of compulsion"; they bleat that "armed struggle and civil war are accompanied by colossal sacrifices and sufferings on the part of the masses of

the people by destruction of the productive forces, by the annihilation of the best revolutionary cadres. To find a pretext for their fallacy of "peaceful transition," this group of renegades wantonly distort history, even preaching that the Paris Commune was "initially" an "almost completely bloodless revolution."³⁹

The revolution of the Paris Commune was from beginning to end a life-and-death fight between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, a struggle of violence between revolution and counter-revolution. In less than six months before the Paris Commune uprising the people of Paris had staged two armed uprisings, and both were bloodily suppressed by the reactionaries. And in the battles following the uprising, tens of thousands of workers and other working people laid down their lives. How can this revolution be described as an "initially" "almost completely bloodless revolution"? Marx pointed out: "Working men's Paris, with its Commune, will be for ever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs are enshrined in the great heart of the working class. Its exterminators history has already nailed to that eternal pillory from which all the prayers of their priests will not avail to redeem them."⁴⁰ The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has now come out into the open and is playing the part of the priests saying prayers for the exterminators. This is a monstrous insult to the martyrs of the Paris Commune!

The Soviet revisionist renegades try in a hundred and one ways to justify counter-revolutionary violence but they curse revolutionary violence with clenched teeth. Under the rule of violence by imperialism and the reactionaries, the working people suffer unending pain and large numbers of them die every day, every hour. It is precisely to put an end to this man-eating system so as to free the people from exploitation and enslavement that the oppressed people carry out violent revolution. But the Soviet revisionist renegades level so many criminal charges against the revolutionary armed forces and their revolutionary wars, making allegations about the "sufferings of the people," the "annihilation of cadres" and "destruction of the productive forces," and so on and so forth. Doesn't the logic of theirs mean that the first law under heaven is for the imperialists and reactionaries to oppress and massacre the people, whereas it is a hellish crime for the revolutionary people to take up arms and rise in resistance?

The Soviet revisionist renegades want the people of all countries to reduce revolutionary violence "to the minimum," but they themselves keep on increasing counter-revolutionary violence to the maximum. Indi-

... the life or death of Soviet people, Brezhnev
... are going all out for militarism and the
... race, spending more and more rubles on more
... more planes, guns, warships, guided missiles and
... weapons. It is by means of this monstrous
... apparatus of violence that these new tsars oppress the
... masses at home and maintain their colonial rule
... abroad, trying to bring a number of countries under
... their control. It is this apparatus of violence that they
... are using as capital for bargaining with U.S. imperial-
... ism, pushing power politics and dividing spheres of
... influence.

The Soviet revisionist renegades want the revolu-
... tionary people to employ "milder forms of compulsion"
... against counter-revolution, while they themselves use
... the most savage and brutal means to deal with the
... revolutionary people.

May we ask:

Is it a "milder" form when you send large numbers
... of armed troops and police to suppress the people of
... different nationalities in your country?

Is it a "milder" form when you station large num-
... bers of troops in some East European countries and
... the Mongolian People's Republic to impose a tight con-
... trol over them, and even carry out the military occupa-
... tion in Czechoslovakia, driving tanks into Prague?

And is it a "milder" form when you engage in
... military expansion everywhere and insidiously conduct
... all manner of subversive activities against other coun-
... tries?

What the Soviet revisionist renegades have done
... fully shows that they not only oppose violent revolu-

tion but use violence to oppose revolution. They put
... on benevolent airs, but actually they are "the worst
... enemies of the workers — wolves in sheep's clothing."⁴¹

And there is a Miyamoto revisionist clique in
... Japan, which, too, zealously opposes violent revolution
... and the dictatorship of the proletariat and urges that
... it is "necessary to make every effort"⁴² to take the
... parliamentary road. Racking their brains, they allege
... that according to the dictionary the word "violence"
... means "brute force" or "lawless force," and the people
... should not make such a revolution.⁴³ They also say
... that some people are "frightened" by the phrase — the
... dictatorship of the proletariat — which is a "very
... inappropriate" translation, and it is necessary to "make
... a really accurate translation" in the future.⁴⁴ In order
... to maintain U.S. imperialist and Japanese militarist
... violence and to oppose the Japanese people making
... revolution, the Miyamoto clique even seeks help from
... the dictionary, falls back on semantics and juggles with
... words. How modern revisionism has degenerated
... ideologically!

Comrade Mao Tsetung points out: "The socialist
... system will eventually replace the capitalist system; this
... is an objective law independent of man's will."⁴⁵
... Khrushchov, the arch-representative of modern revi-
... sionism, has long been swept into the rubbish heap of
... history. Novotny and Gomulka, who followed
... Khrushchov's revisionist line, have also toppled in their
... turn. There can be no doubt that whoever runs counter
... to the laws of history, betrays the revolutionary prin-
... ciples of the Paris Commune and turns traitor to the
... proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the prole-
... tariat will come to no good end.

VI. Persist in Continuing the Revolution Under The Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Strive for Still Greater Victories

Historical experience since the Paris Commune,
... especially since the October Revolution, shows that
... the capture of political power by the proletariat is not
... the end but the beginning of the socialist revolution.
... To consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and
... prevent the restoration of capitalism, it is necessary to
... carry the socialist revolution through to the end.

The world proletarian revolutionary movement has
... gone through twists and turns on its road forward.
... When capitalism was being restored in the homeland

of the October Revolution, for a time it seemed
... doubtful whether the revolutionary principles of the
... Paris Commune, the October Revolution and the
... dictatorship of the proletariat were still valid. The
... imperialists and reactionaries were beside themselves
... with joy. They thought: Since the Soviet Union has
... changed through "peaceful evolution," won't it be
... possible to overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat
... in China in the same way? But, the salvos of the
... Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution initiated and led

by Chairman Mao himself have destroyed the bourgeois headquarters headed by the renegade, hidden traitor and scab Liu Shao-chi and exploded the imperialists' and modern revisionists' fond dream of restoring capitalism in China.

Chairman Mao has comprehensively summed up the positive and negative aspects of the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat, inherited, defended and developed the Marxist-Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, advanced the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat and solved, in theory and practice, the most important question of our time — the question of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing the restoration of capitalism. Thus he has made a great new contribution to Marxism-Leninism and charted our course for carrying the proletarian revolution triumphantly to the end. In China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao Tsetung Thought and Chairman Mao's revolutionary line are being integrated more and more deeply with the revolutionary practice of the people in their hundreds of millions to become the greatest force in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Socialist society covers a considerably long historical period. Throughout this period, there are still classes, class contradictions and class struggle. The struggle still focuses on the question of political power. The defeated class will still struggle; these people are still a class and this class still exists. They will invariably seek their agents within the Communist Party for the purpose of restoring capitalism. Therefore, the proletariat must not only guard against enemies like Thiers and Bismarck who overthrew the revolutionary political power by force of arms; it must in particular guard against such careerists and schemers as Khrushchov and Brezhnev who usurped party and state leadership from within. In order to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and prevent the restoration of capitalism, the proletariat must carry out the socialist revolution not only on the economic front, but also on the political front and ideological and cultural front and exercise all-round dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture. It is essential to enable the Party members, the cadres and the masses to grasp the sharpest weapon, Marxism-Leninism, and to distinguish between the correct and erroneous lines, between genuine and sham Marxism, and between materialism and idealism, so as to ensure that our Party and state will always advance along Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line.

Chairman Mao says: "The final victory of a socialist country not only requires the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people at home, but also involves the victory of the world revolution and the abolition of the system of exploitation of man by man over the whole globe, upon which all mankind will be emancipated."⁴⁶

The revolutionary movement of the proletariat is always international in character. Therefore, the victory of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat calls for the realization of the great slogans: "Working men of all countries, unite!"⁴⁷ and "Workers and oppressed nations of the world, unite!"⁴⁸ The proletariat of the capitalist countries should support the struggle for liberation of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, the people of the colonies and semi-colonies should support that of the proletariat of the capitalist countries, and the people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help the people who are still fighting for liberation. This is the principle of proletarian internationalism.

The Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution. The revolutionary cause of the Chinese people is closely bound up with that of the other peoples of the world. We always regard the revolutionary struggles of the people of other countries as our own and as helping the Chinese people. We should learn from other revolutionary peoples, firmly support their struggles and fulfil our bounden duty. We should carry forward the proletarian internationalist spirit, further strengthen our militant unity with all genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations, and strengthen our militant unity with the proletariat, the oppressed people and oppressed nations of the world for the seizure of still greater victories.

A hundred years ago, Marx said of the Paris Commune: "Whatever . . . its fate at Paris, it will make *le tour du monde*."⁴⁹ This great prediction of Marx is more and more becoming a glorious reality. Reviewing the past and looking into the future, we declare with increasing conviction: The final destruction of imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction is inevitable, and so is the complete emancipation of the proletariat, the oppressed people and the oppressed nations!

The *Internationale* written by Eugene Pottier, the poet of the Paris Commune, is today reverberating through the world. "No more tradition's chain shall bind us." "We shall be all." "Let each stand in his place; The Internationale shall be the human race." Let the imperialists, social-imperialists and all reac-

...series tremble in the storm of the world pro-
letarian revolution! "The proletarians have nothing to
lose but their chains. They have a world to win."⁵⁰

NOTES

¹ Engels, "Message of Greetings to the French Workers on the 21st Anniversary of the Paris Commune", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 22, p. 331.

² Marx, "Resolutions of the Meeting in Honour of the First Anniversary of the Paris Commune", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 18, p. 61.

³ Marx, "The Record of a Speech on the Paris Commune", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 17, p. 677.

⁴ Marx, "The Civil War in France", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 17, p. 355.

⁵ Marx, "The Civil War in France", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 17, p. 360.

Marx, "To L. Kugelmann", April 12, 1871, *Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on the Paris Commune*, second Chinese ed., People's Publishing House, 1971, p. 215.

⁶ Marx, "On the Seventh Anniversary of the International", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 17, p. 468.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Marx, "The Civil War in France", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 17, p. 358.

⁹ Lenin, "The State and Revolution", *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 25, p. 389.

¹⁰ Lenin, "First Congress of the Communist International", *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 28, p. 443.

¹¹ Mao Tsetung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Chinese ed., Vol. 4, p. 1260.

¹² Marx and Engels, "To the Chairman of the Slavonic Meeting in London in Celebration of the Anniversary of the Paris Commune", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 19, p. 271.

¹³ Lenin, "The State and Revolution", *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 25, p. 436.

¹⁴ Engels, "On Authority", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 18, p. 344.

¹⁵ Mao Tsetung, "Problems of War and Strategy", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Chinese ed., Vol. 2, p. 535.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Mao Tsetung, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!" May 20, 1970.

¹⁸ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" September 3, 1965.

¹⁹ Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 15, p. 152.

²⁰ Lenin, "The State and Revolution", *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 25, p. 401.

²¹ Marx, "To L. Kugelmann", April 12, 1871, *Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin on the Paris Commune*, second Chinese ed., People's Publishing House, 1971, p. 215.

²² Lenin, "Preface to the Russian Translation of the Letters of K. Marx to L. Kugelmann", *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 12, p. 101.

²³ Chairman Mao's instruction on "The Correct Attitude Marxists Should Take Towards the Revolutionary Mass Movement", August 15, 1959, where he quotes Lenin's "A Great Beginning" and "Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution", *Lenin, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 29, p. 386 and Vol. 33, p. 35.

²⁴ See note 17.

²⁵ Mao Tsetung, "Get Organized!", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Chinese ed., Vol. 3, p. 936.

²⁶ From "Absorb Proletarian Fresh Blood", editorial of the journal *Hongqi*, No. 4, 1968.

²⁷ Mao Tsetung, "On Coalition Government", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Chinese ed., Vol. 3, p. 1097.

²⁸ Marx and Engels, "Resolutions of the General Congress of the International Working Men's Association Held at the Hague", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 18, p. 165.

²⁹ Mao Tsetung, "Revolutionary Forces of the World Unite. Fight Against Imperialist Aggression!", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Chinese ed., Vol. 4, p. 1360.

³⁰ Mao Tsetung, "Reform Our Study", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Chinese ed., Vol. 3, p. 795.

³¹ Mao Tsetung, "Opening Address at the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", September 15, 1956.

³² Chairman Mao's important inscription for Japanese worker friends, September 18, 1962, *Renmin Ribao*, September 18, 1968.

³³ Mao Tsetung, "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Chinese ed., Vol. 3, p. 901.

³⁴ Mao Tsetung, "On Contradiction", *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Chinese ed., Vol. 1, p. 294.

³⁵ "The Paris Commune and the Present", article in Soviet revisionist *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1971.

³⁶ N. S. Khrushchov's report on the "Programme of the C.P.S.U." at the Soviet revisionist "22nd Congress", October 18, 1961.

³⁷ L. I. Brezhnev's report at the meeting in "commemoration" of the centenary of Lenin's birth, April 21, 1970.

³⁸ "The State of the Whole People and Democracy", article in the Soviet revisionist *Pravda*, June 7, 1970.

³⁹ Sinister anti-China book compiled by F. Konstantinov and others, Russian ed., the "Mysl" Publishing House, U.S.S.R., published in August 1970, pp. 119-120.

⁴⁰ Marx, "The Civil War in France", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 17, p. 384.

⁴¹ Engels, "Preface to the Second German Edition of 'The Condition of the Working Class in England', 1892", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 22, p. 373.

⁴² Sanzo Nosaka's talk, *Akahata*, January 3, 1971.

⁴³ Korehito Kurahara's speech at a Japanese revisionists' meeting in "commemoration" of the centenary of Lenin's birth, *Akahata*, April 2, 1970.

⁴⁴ Kenji Miyamoto's speech at a meeting convened by the Japanese revisionist Kyoto committee, *Akahata*, March 20, 1970.

⁴⁵ Mao Tsetung, "Speech at the Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in Celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution", November 6, 1957.

⁴⁶ From Comrade Lin Piao's report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China.


⁴⁷ Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Chinese ed., People's Publishing House, 1964, p. 58.

⁴⁸ Lenin, "Speech at the Meeting of Activists of the Moscow Organizations of the R.C.P. (B)", *Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 31, p. 412.


⁴⁹ Marx, "The First Draft of 'The Civil War in France'", *Marx and Engels, Collected Works*, Chinese ed., Vol. 17, p. 587.

⁵⁰ See note 47.


Members of the Paris Commune in session.



The Paris Commune, holding high the great banner of proletarian internationalism, demolished the "Victory Column" on the Place Vendome, a symbol of Napoleonic militarism and chauvinism, and renamed the place "International Square." Commune fighters on the square.




its establishment, Paris Commune put a series of decrees that breaking the old machinery and improving the living and working conditions of the working people. Upper: On the abolition of the standing army and its replacement by the National Guard. Lower: On the improvement of the working conditions for bakers. Left: "The Labourers of the Commune." Right: On the separation of the church and the state.



◀ Fighters of the Paris Commune put up street barricades, determined to defend the Commune at all costs.

▼ The last group of Commune fighters heroically sacrificed their lives at this wall at the Pere Lachaise Cemetery. Since then it has been called "The Wall of the Communards" by the revolutionary masses. It will always inspire the proletariat all over the world to keep firmly in mind the principles of the Paris Commune and fight to the end for the emancipation of all mankind.



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The Paris Commune

For the convenience of our readers, we print in the following pages background material on the Paris Commune in connection with the article "Long Live the Dictatorship of the Proletariat!" — in commemoration of the centenary of the Paris Commune in the Editorial Departments of "Renmin Ribao," "Jingji" and "Jiefangjun Bao" which appeared in P.R., 1971. — Ed.

On March 18, 1871, the proletariat and the masses of the revolutionary people of Paris in France held an armed uprising against the reactionary rule of the bourgeoisie. The great Paris Commune came into being. This was the first rehearsal of world historic significance staged by the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The revolution of the Paris Commune occurred while France was at war with Prussia and national and class contradictions had become very acute.

In July 1870, Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon III), Emperor of the Second French Empire, started a war against Prussia. The French army met with repeated setbacks and the Prussian army marched into French territory. On September 1 and 2, Napoleon III suffered a disastrous defeat at Sedan; he surrendered to Prussia and was taken prisoner. The rout of the French army in the war weakened the power of the ruling class; at the same time, the war heightened the consciousness of the people and accelerated the approach of the revolution. The revolution broke out in Paris on September 4. The Second Empire collapsed like a house of cards and the Third French Republic was proclaimed. However, power fell into the hands of the bourgeoisie again and a so-called "government of national defence" was formed by the reactionary officer Trochu.

From the day of its formation, this "government of national defence" carried out a series of schemes designed to collude with the enemy and betray the country. On January 23, 1871, it concluded with Prussia the "Convention on Armistice and the Capitulation of Paris." On February 17, the French National Assembly, a motley bunch of landlords and monarchists, set up the reactionary government headed by the butcher and traitor Thiers. On February 26, Thiers and Bismarck signed the preliminary peace treaty under which France agreed to cede Alsace and the eastern part of Lorraine to Prussia and pay an indemnity of 5,000 million francs.

When the Prussian troops closed in on Paris and besieged it, broad sections of the people in the city took up arms and enrolled in the National Guard. The number of National Guards soon grew to 300,000, with workers constituting the great majority. The antagonism between the armed proletariat and the reactionary

bourgeois government came into the open in an increasingly sharp conflict. The people of Paris staged two uprisings on October 31, 1870 and January 22, 1871. Both were suppressed by the traitorous government. In spite of this, the broad masses of workers did not lay down their arms. Therefore, immediately after its formation, the Thiers government plotted to disarm the workers. In the early hours of March 18, Thiers sent his reactionary troops to seize the artillery of the National Guard on the Buttes Montmartre in the northern part of the city, but they were beaten back by the heroic people of Paris and the National Guard. Under the leadership of the Central Committee of the National Guard, the proletariat and other labouring people of Paris staged an armed uprising and occupied government institutions the same day. The Central Committee of the National Guard became the provisional government of the revolution. The reactionary Thiers government fled to Versailles.

On March 26, the people of Paris elected the Members of the Commune. The Paris Commune was proclaimed on March 28.

Referring to the Paris Commune, Marx pointed out: "Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working-class government." (*The Civil War in France*)

The first decree announced by the Paris Commune after its establishment was the abolition of the bourgeois standing army and its replacement by the armed populace.

The Paris Commune broke the bourgeois bureaucratic apparatus that enslaved the people. The Commune governed the state by combining legislative with executive functions. To make the government officials real servants of the people, the Commune abolished the system of high salaries and all privileges enjoyed by former government officials.

Economically, the Paris Commune took a series of measures to safeguard the interests of the working class and other labouring people. It handed over to co-operative workmen's societies the manufactories and workshops abandoned or closed down by the capitalists. The employers were prohibited from using fines or deductions to rob the workers of their wages. The Commune ordered the toiling people's property in the pawnshops to be returned to the owners; it issued a decree postponing payments and remitting part of house-rents, etc.

The Paris Commune announced the separation of church and state, the disendowment of all churches as proprietary bodies and the exclusion from schools of all religious symbols and religious activities. Thus it set about breaking the long-standing tools for spiritual repression of the people.

Fine sons and daughters of the working class of many countries participated in the revolutionary cause

of the Commune, some of them becoming Members of the Commune. The Commune specially decreed the dismantling of the Vendome Column, a symbol of bourgeois chauvinism, erected in the centre of Paris. The Paris Commune revolution displayed the noble spirit of proletarian internationalism.

The red banner of the proletarian revolution fluttering over Paris was a mortal threat to the old world. The reactionary Thiers government, massing its reactionary armed forces in Versailles, initiated attacks on the Paris Commune on April 2. Prussia's Chancellor Bismarck transferred the 100,000 Bonapartist troops captured during the Franco-Prussian war to the Versailles government to slaughter the workers of Paris. On May 21, the reactionary Versailles troops fought their way into Paris, while the heroic Paris workers threw up street barricades in armed resistance. Fierce street fighting started; this is known in history as the "blood-soaked week of May." The people of Paris, including women and children, took part in defending the regime of the proletariat. Every street and every house became a fortress of the Commune fighters to defend themselves and destroy the enemy. On May 24, the reactionary Thiers troops seized the Hotel de Ville, which housed the Commune organs. On May 27, the Commune fighters finally retreated to Pere Lachaise cemetery in the eastern part of Paris and carried on a stubborn life-and-death struggle with the enemy until all of them had heroically laid down their lives at the "Wall of the Communards."

On May 28, the Versailles bandits occupied the whole of Paris and started a ruthless massacre of the people there. The city again fell under the dark rule of the bourgeoisie.

The great teachers of the proletariat, Marx and Engels, paid constant and enthusiastic attention to the struggle of the proletariat of Paris and highly praised their heroism and revolutionary initiative. While in

London, Marx and Engels used every possible means to maintain contact with the Paris Commune, give it support and help. Marx gave the Paris Commune much valuable advice and sent out several hundred letters to all branches of the First International, calling on the workers in different countries to support the Paris Commune. Only two days after the fall of the Commune, Marx read out to the General Council of the First International his famous work *The Civil War in France*, comprehensively explaining the tremendous contribution of the Paris Commune and summing up its experience and lessons. Marx pointed out: "The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes." The proletariat must use revolutionary violence to break and smash the state machinery of the bourgeoisie and carry out the dictatorship of the proletariat, for only then can it fulfil all its historical tasks.

The fundamental reason for the failure of the Paris Commune was the lack of leadership by a proletarian political party with Marxism as its guiding ideology. The Commune made serious mistakes on some questions. As Marx and Engels pointed out, the Commune failed to take advantage of its success to march on Versailles, the den of counter-revolution, failed to suppress the counter-revolutionaries firmly and decisively, and failed to confiscate such important financial institutions as the Bank of France. Furthermore, the Commune did not form an alliance with the peasantry and win their support.

Though the Paris Commune lasted only 72 days, its heroic exploits in establishing and defending the dictatorship of the proletariat shine for ever. "The principles of the Commune are eternal." Its martyrs will live for ever in the hearts of the proletariat and revolutionary people of all countries. March 18 is eternally the glorious festival of the proletariat all over the world.

Thiers (1797-1877)

A reactionary bourgeois politician, traitor to his country and butcher who suppressed the Paris Commune uprising in French history. Minister of Internal Affairs in 1834, he stamped out the people's uprising in Lyon. Immediately after becoming head of the bourgeois government in February 1871, he sent reactionary troops to disarm the Paris people. Following the armed uprising by the proletariat of Paris on March 18, he fled to Versailles. Colluding with Bismarck and mustering reactionary forces, he strangled the Paris Commune revolution. Marx referred to Thiers as "a master in small state reguery, a virtuoso in perjury and treason, a craftsman in all the petty stratagems, cunning devices, and

base perfidies of parliamentary party-warfare; never scrupling, when out of office, to fan a revolution, and to stifle it in blood when at the helm of the state."

Bismarck (1815-1898)

Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Prussia (1862-1871). He was Chancellor of the Empire and concurrently Prime Minister of Prussia when the German Empire was founded in 1871. He fell from power in 1890. Representing the interests of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords and carrying out a militarist "blood and iron" policy, he ruthlessly suppressed the workers' movement at home and engaged in aggression and expansion abroad in an effort to establish German hegemony on the continent of Europe.

Versailles

A French city, it is located in the southwestern part of Paris. The Palace of Versailles, provisional residence of the French Emperor built in the 17th and 18th centuries, was inside the city. At the time of the Paris Commune revolution, the reactionary government led by Thiers fled there.

L. Kugelmann (1830-1902)

A surgeon in Hanover, Germany. He participated in revolutionary activities in his student days and became a member of the First International in 1865. He helped Marx disseminate *Capital* in Germany and frequently reflected the German situation in his correspondence with Marx. Though he revered and admired Marx and considered himself a disciple of Marx, he did not approve of violent proletarian revolution. Actually, he was a reformist.

1905 Revolution in Russia

The first bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia. Russia was defeated in the Russo-Japanese war which broke out in 1904. Class contradictions were intensified at home and the broad masses of the people manifested increasing discontent with the tsarist system. Demonstrations by the workers of St. Petersburg on January 9, 1905 met with bloody tsarist suppression. The storm of revolution engulfed the whole country in the autumn. Armed uprisings broke out in Moscow and many other cities in December. Despite its failure, this revolution tempered the proletariat and the peasantry and prepared the ground for the 1917 October Revolution.

Plekhanov (1856-1918)

Russia's first disseminator of Marxism and founder of Russia's first Marxist body, the "Emancipation of Labour" Group. He later became a Menshevik and degenerated into a social chauvinist during World War I. After the February revolution in 1917, he advocated maintaining the bourgeois provisional government, adopted an attitude of hostility towards the October Revolution and completely betrayed Marxism.

Blanquism

Louis Blanqui (1805-1881), a well-known leader of the French proletarian revolutionary movement in the 19th century. Twice sentenced to death, he spent almost half his life in prison. At the time of the Paris Commune, he was imprisoned in Versailles. He was elected a Member of the Commune in absence.

The Blanquist stood for political revolution and the overthrow of bourgeois rule. But they negated the theory of class struggle. Instead of relying on the broad masses of the people to carry out revolution and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, they tried to rely on the conspiratorial activities of a small number of people to seize political power for the realization of socialism.

Proudhonism

Pierre Proudhon (1809-1865), a 19th century French petty-bourgeois sociologist and economist. Proceeding from a petty-bourgeois stand, Proudhonism took capitalism to task and vainly hoped to perpetuate the system of small private ownership. It took the position that the method of eliminating capitalist exploitation was not to carry out proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat but to use peaceful economic reforms so as to get rid of the "bad" aspect of capitalism and build up "good" capitalism. Opposing every form of state power and authority, it represents an anarchist trend.

Social Chauvinism

Chauvinism is a kind of reactionary bourgeois nationalism, an ideological instrument of imperialism for committing aggression against and enslaving other nations. It was named after Chauvin, a French soldier who fanatically supported the policy of aggression and expansion of Napoleon I.

Social chauvinism pays lip service to socialism but in reality is chauvinism. During World War I, revisionist chieftains of the Second International betrayed the proletariat, took a chauvinist stand, voted for military budgets and supported the imperialist war waged by their bourgeois governments. Hence the name social chauvinism.

Eugene Pottier (1816-1887)

A poet of the Paris Commune. Born in a Paris worker's family, he became a worker at the age of 13. He wrote many militant poems calling on the French workers to fight the bourgeoisie. He actively participated in the 1848 revolution in France. He later joined the First International. When the Paris Commune was established in 1871, he was elected a Member of the Commune, and took part in fierce battles during the revolution. A few days after the failure of the revolution, he wrote the poem *The Internationale*. Seventeen years later worker-composer Pierre Degeyter set Pottier's poem to music.

(Continued on p. 23.)

(Continued from p. 6.)

two countries have set a good example for the development of friendly relations and co-operation between countries with different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Sino-Nepalese friendship is in the interests of our two peoples and conducive to the defence of peace in Asia and the world.

Nepal is a country with a long history, he continued. The Nepalese people are an industrious and brave people who have a glorious tradition of opposing foreign aggression. Under the leadership of His Majesty King Mahendra, the Nepalese Government and people have waged unremitting struggles to uphold national dignity and safeguard state sovereignty and have achieved marked successes.

Kuo Mo-jo said: The Chinese Government has consistently held that all countries, big or small, should be equal. We resolutely oppose big-nation chauvinism with big nations bullying the small and strong nations bullying the weak. Tempered through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Chinese people will, as always, support the just struggles of the people of all countries. The Chinese people will remain for ever the reliable friends of the Nepalese people in their struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty.

In his speech, Chairman Sharma said: There has been constant intercourse between our two peoples. We have been good neighbours and good friends throughout our history. This age-old relation between our two countries is being strengthened every day under the able leadership of His Majesty King Mahendra and Chairman Mao.

Under the able leadership of H.M. King Mahendra, Nepal is on the road to economic development and we

are very grateful to the People's Republic of China for providing us with different technical and financial assistance. It is not only China's economic aid which has been considerable, that has helped us, but more important than that the spirit behind that aid has been appreciated more. We shall not forget this and also your support to us in times of difficulties.

Adhering to the principles of peaceful coexistence, Chairman Sharma declared, the relationship between our two countries is going very satisfactorily. Your selfless help to our economic development and support of our policy of non-alignment and neutrality as formulated by our beloved King Mahendra are highly appreciated by our Government and the people.

He concluded by saying: We on our part have always been a sincere friend of the Chinese people. We rejoice at the progress and achievements they make and we believe no world problem can be meaningfully discussed without the participation of the People's Republic of China; and hence at the United Nations we have always advocated the restoration of the rightful seat to the People's Republic of China.

Premier Chou Greets President Yahya Khan on Pakistan National Day

Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, on March 22 sent a message to General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, extending warm congratulations on the National Day of the republic. The message says:

"On the occasion of the National Day of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, I, on behalf of the Chinese Government and people and in my own name, express warm congratulations to Your Excellency and, through Your Excellency, to the Pakistan Government and people,

"The Pakistan Government pursues an independent foreign policy which is effective in international affairs. The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard national independence and oppose foreign aggression and interference.

"May the Pakistan Government and people score new achievements under Your Excellency's leadership. May the profound friendship between the Chinese and Pakistan peoples and the friendly relations and co-operation between China and Pakistan based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence develop."

Premier Chou Congratulates Hafez Assad on Election As Syrian President

Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, on March 17 sent a message of warm congratulations to Hafez Assad on his being elected President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The message reads:

"On the occasion of your being elected President of the Syrian Arab Republic, I express warm congratulations to you on behalf of the Chinese Government and people.

"I sincerely wish the Syrian Government and people continuous victories in the struggle against the aggression by U.S. imperialism and Israeli Zionism. May the militant friendship between the peoples of China and Syria and the friendly relations between the two countries grow and develop constantly."

CORRECTION

In No. 12, p. 30, right-hand column, first line, for "the country's second largest city" read "the country's second largest industrial city."

music, and the battle song of the proletarian whole world was born.

The French Second Empire and Third Republic

The bourgeois revolution broke out in France in 1789. The First Republic was established in 1792. Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon I) made himself emperor in 1804, and set up the First Empire.

When the February revolution took place in 1848, the Second Republic was brought into being. Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III) established the Second Empire in December 1852.

In September 1870, the Second Empire was overthrown and the Third Republic was formed.

Vendome Column

A statue of Napoleon I was placed atop the bronze column erected in Vendome Square in the centre of Paris. Napoleon I made this column from 1,200 captured artillery pieces to show off the victory of his wars of aggression. Called the "Victory Column," it was a symbol of aggression and chauvinism.

After its founding, the Paris Commune adopted a decree on April 12, 1871 calling for the dismantling of the column. It pointed out that it was a memorial to barbarism and a glorification of militarism. The Vendome Column was dismantled on May 16. It was restored by the bourgeois government in 1875.

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The present English translation of V. I. Lenin's *The State* is a reprint of the text given in V. I. Lenin, *Marx, Engels, Marxism*, English edition, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951.

Printed in the People's Republic of China

COMRADES, according to the plan adopted by you and conveyed to me, the subject of today's talk is the state. I do not know how familiar you are already with this subject. If I am not mistaken your courses have only just begun and this is the first time you will be approaching this subject systematically. If that is so, then it may very well be that in the first lecture on this difficult subject I may not succeed in making my exposition sufficiently clear and comprehensible to many of my listeners. And if this should prove to be the case, I would request you not to be perturbed by the fact, because the question of the state is a most complex and difficult one, perhaps one that more than any other has been confused by bourgeois scholars, writers and philosophers. It should not therefore be expected that a clear understanding of this subject can be obtained from one brief talk, at a first sitting. After the first talk on this subject you should make a note of the passages which you have not understood or which are not clear to you, and return to them a second, a third and a fourth time, so that what you have not understood may be further supplemented and elucidated afterwards, both by reading and by various lectures and talks. I hope that we may manage to meet once again and that then we shall be able to exchange opinions

on all supplementary questions and to see what has remained most unclear. I also hope that in addition to talks and lectures you will devote some time to reading at least some of the most important works of Marx and Engels. I have no doubt that these most important works are to be found in the catalogues of literature and in the handbooks which are available in your library for the pupils of the Soviet and Party school; and although, again, some of you may at first be dismayed by the difficulty of the exposition, I must again warn you that you should not be perturbed by this fact and that what is unclear at a first reading will become clear at a second reading, or when you subsequently approach the question from a somewhat different angle. For I once more repeat that the question is so complex and has been so confused by bourgeois scholars and writers that anybody who desires to study this question seriously and to master it independently must attack it several times, return to it again and again and consider the question from various angles in order to attain a clear and firm understanding of it. And it will be all the easier to return to this question because it is such a fundamental, such a basic question of all politics, and because not only in such stormy and revolutionary times as the present, but even in the most peaceful times, you will come across this question every day in any newspaper in connection with any economic or political question. Every day, in one connection or another, you will be returning to this question: what is the state, what is its nature, what is its significance and what is the attitude of our party, the party that is fighting for the overthrow of capitalism, the Communist Party — what is its attitude to the state? And the chief thing is that as a result of your reading, as a result of the talks and

lectures you will hear on the state, you should acquire the ability to approach this question independently, since you will be meeting this question on the most diverse occasions, in connection with the most trifling questions, in the most unexpected conjunctures, and in discussions and disputes with opponents. Only when you learn to find your way about independently in this question may you consider yourself sufficiently confirmed in your convictions and able with sufficient success to defend them against anybody and at any time.

After these brief remarks, I shall proceed to deal with the question itself — what is the state, how did it arise and what fundamentally should be the attitude to the state of the party of the working class, which is fighting for the complete overthrow of capitalism — the Communist Party?

I have already said that you will scarcely find another question which has been so confused, deliberately and undeliberately, by representatives of bourgeois science, philosophy, jurisprudence, political economy and journalism, as the question of the state. To this day this question is very often confused with religious questions; not only representatives of religious doctrines (it is quite natural to expect it of them), but even people who consider themselves free from religious prejudice, very often confuse the specific question of the state with questions of religion and endeavour to build up a doctrine — very often a complex one, with an ideological, philosophical approach and argumentation — which claims that the state is something divine, something supernatural, that it is a *certain force*, by virtue of which mankind has lived, and which confers on people, or which can confer on people, which brings with it, something that is not of man, but is given him from without — that it is a force

of divine origin. And it must be said that this doctrine is so closely bound up with the interests of the exploiting classes—the landlords and the capitalists—so serves their interests, has so deeply permeated all the customs, views and science of the gentlemen who represent the bourgeoisie, that you will meet with relics of it on every hand, even in the view of the state held by the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who reject with disgust the suggestion that they are under the sway of religious prejudices and are convinced that they can regard the state with sober eyes. This question has been so confused and complicated because it affects the interests of the ruling classes more than any other (yielding in this respect only to the foundations of economic science). The doctrine of the state serves as a justification of social privilege, a justification of the existence of exploitation, a justification of the existence of capitalism—and that is why it would be the greatest mistake to expect impartiality on this question, to approach this question in the belief that people who claim to be scientific can give you a purely scientific view on the subject. In the question of the state, in the doctrine of the state, in the theory of the state, when you have become familiar with this question and have gone into it sufficiently deeply, you will always discern the mutual struggle of different classes, a struggle which is reflected or expressed in a conflict of views on the state, in the estimate of the role and significance of the state.

To approach this question as scientifically as possible we must cast at least a fleeting glance back on the history of the rise and development of the state. The most reliable thing in a question of social science, and one that is most necessary in order really to acquire the habit of approaching this question correctly and not allowing oneself to get lost

in the mass of detail or in the immense variety of conflicting opinions—the most important thing in order to approach this question scientifically is not to forget the underlying historical connection, to examine every question from the standpoint of how the given phenomenon arose in history and what principal stages this phenomenon passed through in its development, and, from the standpoint of its development, to examine what the given thing has become today.

I hope that in connection with the question of the state you will acquaint yourselves with Engels' book, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. This is one of the fundamental works of modern Socialism, every sentence of which can be accepted with confidence, in the assurance that it has not been said at random but is based on immense historical and political material. Undoubtedly, not all the parts of this work have been expounded in an equally popular and comprehensible way; some of them presume a reader who already possesses a certain knowledge of history and economics. But I again repeat that you should not be perturbed if on reading this work you do not understand it at once. That hardly happens with anyone. But returning to it later, when your interest has been aroused, you will succeed in understanding the greater part of it, if not the whole of it. I mention this book because it gives the correct approach to the question in the sense mentioned. It begins with a historical sketch of the origin of the state.

In order to approach this question correctly, as every other question—for example, the question of the origin of capitalism, the exploitation of man by man, Socialism, how Socialism arose, what conditions gave rise to it—every such question can be approached soundly and confidently only if

we cast a glance back on the history of its development as a whole. In connection with this question it should first of all be noted that the state has not always existed. There was a time when there was no state. It appears wherever and whenever a division of society into classes appears, whenever exploiters and exploited appear.

Before the first form of exploitation of man by man arose, the first form of division into classes—slaveowners and slaves—there existed the patriarchal family, or, as it is sometimes called, the *clan* family. (Clan—generation, kinship, when people lived together according to kinship and generation.) Fairly definite traces of these primitive times have survived in the life of many primitive peoples; and if you take any work whatsoever on primitive culture, you will always come across more or less definite descriptions, indications and recollections of the fact that there was a time, more or less similar to primitive communism, when the division of society into slaveowners and slaves did not exist. And in those times there was no state, no special apparatus for the systematic application of force and the subjugation of people by force. It is such an apparatus that is called the state.

In primitive society, when people lived in small family groups and were still at the lowest stages of development, in a condition approximating to savagery—an epoch from which modern, civilized human society is separated by several thousands of years—there were yet no signs of the existence of a state. We find the predominance of custom, authority, respect, the power enjoyed by the elders of the clan; we find this power sometimes accorded to women—the position of women then was not like the downtrodden and oppressed condition of women today—but nowhere do we find a

special *category* of people who are set apart to rule others and, for the sake and purpose of rule, systematically and permanently to wield a certain apparatus of coercion, an apparatus of violence, such as is represented at the present time, as you all realize, by the armed detachments of troops, the prisons and the other means of subjugating the will of others by force—all that which constitutes the essence of the state.

If we abstract ourselves from the so-called religious teachings, subtleties, philosophical arguments and the various opinions advanced by bourgeois scholars, if we abstract ourselves from these and try to get at the real essence of the matter, we shall find that the state really does amount to such an apparatus of rule separated out from human society. When there appears such a special group of men who are occupied with ruling and nothing else, and who in order to rule need a special apparatus of coercion and of subjugating the will of others by force—prisons, special detachments of men, armies, etc.—then there appears the state.

But there was a time when there was no state, when general ties, society itself, discipline and the ordering of work were maintained by force of custom and tradition, or by the authority or the respect enjoyed by the elders of the clan or by women—who in those times not only frequently enjoyed equal status with men, but not infrequently enjoyed even a higher status—and when there was no special category of persons, specialists in ruling. History shows that the state as a special apparatus for coercing people arose only wherever and whenever there appeared a division of society into classes, that is, a division into groups of people some

of whom are permanently in a position to appropriate the labour of others, where some people exploit others.

And this division of society into classes must always be clearly borne in mind as a fundamental fact of history. The development of all human societies for thousands of years, in all countries without exception, reveals a general conformity to law, a regularity and consistency in this development; so that at first we had a society without classes — the original patriarchal, primitive society, in which there were no aristocrats; then we had a society based on slavery — a slave owning society. The whole of modern civilized Europe has passed through this stage — slavery ruled supreme two thousand years ago. The vast majority of peoples of the other parts of the world also passed through this stage. Among the less developed peoples traces of slavery survive to this day; you will find the institution of slavery in Africa, for example, at the present time. Slaveowners and slaves were the first important class divisions. The former group not only owned all the means of production — the land and the implements, however primitive they may have been in those times — but also owned people. This group was known as slaveowners, while those who laboured and supplied labour for others were known as slaves.

This form was followed in history by another — feudalism. In the great majority of countries slavery in the course of its development evolved into serfdom. The fundamental division of society was now into feudal landlords and peasant serfs. The form of relations between people changed. The slaveowners had regarded the slaves as their property; the law had confirmed this view and regarded the slave as a chattel completely owned by the slaveowner. As far as the peasant serf was concerned, class oppression and depen-

dence remained, but it was not considered that the feudal landlord owned the peasants as chattels, but that he was only entitled to their labour and to compel them to perform certain services. In practice, as you know, serfdom, especially in Russia, where it survived longest of all and assumed the grossest forms, in no way differed from slavery.

Further, with the development of trade, the appearance of the world market and the development of money circulation, a new class arose within feudal society — the capitalist class. From the commodity, the exchange of commodities and the rise of the power of money, there arose the power of capital. During the eighteenth century — or rather, from the end of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth century — revolutions took place all over the world. Feudalism was eliminated in all the countries of Western Europe. This took place latest of all in Russia. In 1861 a radical change took place in Russia as well, as a consequence of which one form of society was replaced by another — feudalism was replaced by capitalism, under which division into classes remained, as well as various traces and relics of serfdom, but in which the division into classes fundamentally assumed a new form.

The owners of capital, the owners of the land, the owners of the mills and factories in all capitalist countries constituted and still constitute an insignificant minority of the population who have complete command of the labour of the whole people, and, consequently, command, oppress and exploit the whole mass of labourers, the majority of whom are proletarians, wage workers, that procure their livelihood in the process of production only by the sale of their own worker's hands, their labour power. With the transition to capitalism, the peasants, who were already disunited and downtrodden

in feudal times, were converted partly (the majority) into proletarians, and partly (the minority) into wealthy peasants who themselves hired workers and who constituted a rural bourgeoisie.

This fundamental fact—the transition of society from primitive forms of slavery to serfdom and finally to capitalism—you must always bear in mind, for only by remembering this fundamental fact, only by inserting all political doctrines into this fundamental framework will you be able properly to appraise these doctrines and understand what they refer to; for each of these great periods in the history of mankind—slaveowning, feudal and capitalist—embraces scores and hundreds of centuries and presents such a mass of political forms, such a variety of political doctrines, opinions and revolutions, that this extreme diversity and immense variety can be understood—especially in connection with the political, philosophical and other doctrines of bourgeois scholars and politicians—only by firmly holding, as to a guiding thread, to this division of society into classes, this change in the forms of class rule, and from this standpoint examining all social questions—economic, political, spiritual, religious, etc.

If you examine the state from the standpoint of this fundamental division, you will find that before the division of society into classes, as I have already said, no state existed. But as the social division into classes arose and took firm root, as class society arose, the state also arose and took firm root. The history of mankind knows scores and hundreds of countries that have passed through or are still passing through slavery, feudalism and capitalism. In each of these countries, despite the immense historical changes that have taken place, despite all the political vicissitudes and all the

revolutions associated with this development of mankind, in the transition from slavery through feudalism to capitalism and to the present world-wide struggle against capitalism, you will always discern the rise of the state. It has always been a certain apparatus which separated out from society and consisted of a group of people engaged solely, or almost solely, or mainly, in ruling. People are divided into ruled, and into specialists in ruling, those who rise above society and are called rulers, representatives of the state. This apparatus, this group of people who rule others, always takes possession of a certain apparatus of coercion, of physical force, irrespective of whether this violence over people is expressed in the primitive club, or, in the epoch of slavery, in more perfected types of weapons, or in the firearms which appeared in the Middle Ages, or, finally, in modern weapons, which in the twentieth century are marvels of technique and are entirely based on the latest achievements of modern technology. The methods of violence changed, but whenever there was a state there existed in every society a group of persons who ruled, who commanded, who dominated and who in order to maintain their power possessed an apparatus of physical coercion, an apparatus of violence, with those weapons which corresponded to the technical level of the given epoch. And by examining these general phenomena, by asking ourselves why no state existed when there were no classes, when there were no exploiters and exploited, and why it arose when classes arose—only in this way shall we find a definite answer to the question of the essence of the state and its significance.

The state is a machine for maintaining the rule of one class over another. When there were no classes in society, when, before the epoch of slavery, people laboured in prim-

itive conditions of greater equality, in conditions when productivity of labour was still at its lowest, and when primitive man could barely procure the wherewithal for the crudest and most primitive existence, a special group of people, specially separated off to rule and dominate over the rest of society, had not yet arisen, and could not have arisen. Only when the first form of the division of society into classes appeared, only when slavery appeared, when a certain class of people, by concentrating on the crudest forms of agricultural labour, could produce a certain surplus, when this surplus was not absolutely essential for the most wretched existence of the slave and passed into the hands of the slaveowner, when in this way the existence of this class of slaveowners took firm root—then in order that it might take firm root it was essential that a state should appear.

And it did appear—the slaveowning state, an apparatus which gave the slaveowners power and enabled them to rule over the slaves. Both society and the state were then much smaller than they are now, they possessed an incomparably weaker apparatus of communication—the modern means of communication did not then exist. Mountains, rivers and seas were immeasurably greater obstacles than they are now, and the formation of the state was confined within far narrower geographical boundaries. A technically weak state apparatus served a state confined within relatively narrow boundaries and a narrow circle of action. Nevertheless, there did exist an apparatus which compelled the slaves to remain in slavery, which kept one part of society subjugated to and oppressed by another. It is impossible to compel the greater part of society to work systematically for the other part of society without a permanent apparatus of coercion. So long as there were no classes, there was no

apparatus like this. When classes appeared, everywhere and always as this division grew and took firmer hold, there also appeared a special institution—the state. The forms of state were extremely varied. During the period of slavery we already find diverse forms of the state in the most advanced, cultured and civilized countries according to the standards of the time—for example, in ancient Greece and Rome, which rested entirely on slavery. At that time the difference was already arising between the monarchy and the republic, between the aristocracy and the democracy. A monarchy is the power of a single person, a republic is the absence of any nonelected power; an aristocracy is the power of a relatively small minority, a democracy is the power of the people (democracy in Greek literally means the power of the people). All these differences arose in the epoch of slavery. Despite these differences, the state of the slaveowning epoch was a slaveowning state, irrespective of whether it was a monarchy or a republic, aristocratic or democratic.

In every course on the history of ancient times, when hearing a lecture on this subject you will hear about the struggle which was waged between the monarchical and republican states. But the fundamental fact is that the slaves were not regarded as human beings—not only were they not regarded as citizens, they were not even regarded as human beings. Roman law regarded them as chattels. The law of manslaughter, not to mention the other laws for the protection of the person, did not extend to slaves. It defended only the slaveowners, who were alone recognized as citizens with full rights. But whether a monarchy was instituted or a republic, it was a monarchy of the slaveowners or a republic of the slaveowners. All rights under them

were enjoyed by the slaveowners, while the slave was a chattel in the eyes of the law; and not only could any sort of violence be perpetrated against a slave, but even the murder of a slave was not considered a crime. Slaveowning republics differed in their internal organization: there were aristocratic republics and democratic republics. In an aristocratic republic a small number of privileged persons took part in the elections; in a democratic republic everybody took part in the elections — but again only the slaveowners, everybody except the slaves. This fundamental fact must be borne in mind, because it throws more light than any other on the question of the state and clearly demonstrates the nature of the state.

The state is a machine for the oppression of one class by another, a machine for holding in obedience to one class other, subordinated classes. There are various forms of this machine. In the slaveowning state we had a monarchy, an aristocratic republic or even a democratic republic. In fact the forms of government varied extremely, but their essence was always the same: the slaves enjoyed no rights and constituted an oppressed class; they were not regarded as human beings. We find the same thing in the feudal state.

The change in the form of exploitation transformed the slaveowning state into the feudal state. This was of immense importance. In slaveowning society the slave enjoys no rights whatever and is not regarded as a human being; in feudal society the peasant is tied to the soil. The chief token of serfdom was that the peasants (and at that time the peasants constituted the majority; there was a very poorly developed urban population) were considered attached to the land — hence the very concept serfdom. The peasant might work a definite number of days for himself on the plot

assigned to him by the landlord; on the other days the peasant serf worked for his lord. The essence of class society remained: society was based on class exploitation. Only the landlords could enjoy full rights; the peasants had no rights at all. In practice their condition differed very little from the condition of slaves in the slaveowning state. Nevertheless a wider road was opened for their emancipation, for the emancipation of the peasants, since the peasant serf was not regarded as the direct property of the landlord. He could work part of his time on his own plot, could, so to speak, belong to himself to a certain extent; and with the wider opportunities for the development of exchange and trade relations the feudal system steadily disintegrated and the scope of emancipation of the peasantry steadily widened. Feudal society was always more complex than slave society. There was a greater element of development of trade and industry, which even in those days led to capitalism. In the Middle Ages feudalism predominated. And here too the forms of state varied, here too we find both the monarchy and the republic, although the latter was much more weakly expressed. But always the feudal landlord was regarded as the only ruler. The peasant serfs were absolutely excluded from all political rights.

Both under slavery and under the feudal system a small minority of people could not dominate over the vast majority without coercion. History is full of the constant attempts of the oppressed classes to throw off oppression. The history of slavery contains records of wars of emancipation from slavery which lasted for decades. Incidentally, the name "Spartacist" now adopted by the German Communists — the only German party which is really fighting the yoke of capitalism — was adopted by them because

Spartacus was one of the most prominent heroes of one of the greatest revolts of slaves, which took place about two thousand years ago. For many years the seemingly omnipotent Roman Empire, which rested entirely on slavery, experienced shocks and blows under the impact of a vast uprising of slaves who armed and united to form a vast army under the leadership of Spartacus. In the end they were defeated, captured and put to torture by the slaveowners. Such civil wars mark the whole history of the existence of class society. I have just mentioned an example of the greatest of these civil wars in the epoch of slavery. The whole epoch of feudalism is likewise marked by constant uprisings of the peasants. For example, in Germany in the Middle Ages the struggle between the two classes—the landlords and the serfs—assumed wide dimensions and was transformed into a civil war of the peasants against the landlords. You are all familiar with similar examples of repeated uprisings of the peasants against the feudal landlords in Russia.

In order to maintain their rule and to preserve their power, the landlords had to have an apparatus by which they could unite under their subjugation a vast number of people and subordinate them to certain laws and regulations; and all these laws fundamentally amounted to one thing—the maintenance of the power of the landlords over the peasant serfs. And this was the feudal state, which in Russia, for example, or in quite backward Asiatic countries, where feudalism prevails to this day—it differed in form—was either republican or monarchical. When the state was a monarchy, the rule of one person was recognized; when it was a republic, the participation of the elected representatives of landlord society was in one degree or another

recognized—this was in feudal society. Feudal society represented a division of classes under which the vast majority—the peasant serfs—were completely subjected to an insignificant minority—the landlords, who owned the land.

The development of trade, the development of commodity exchange, led to the crystallization of a new class—the capitalists. Capital arose at the close of the Middle Ages, when, after the discovery of America, world trade developed enormously, when the quantity of precious metals increased, when silver and gold became the instrument of exchange, when money circulation made it possible for individuals to hold tremendous wealth. Silver and gold were recognized as wealth all over the world. The economic power of the landlord class declined and the power of the new class—the representatives of capital—developed. The reconstruction of society was such that all citizens supposedly became equal, the old division into slaveowners and slaves disappeared, all were regarded as equal before the law irrespective of what capital each owned; whether he owned land as private property, or was a starveling who owned nothing but his labour power—all were equal before the law. The law protects everybody equally; it protects the property of those who have it from attack by the masses who, possessing no property, possessing nothing but their labour power, grow steadily impoverished and ruined and become converted into proletarians. Such is capitalist society.

I cannot dwell on it in detail. You will return to this question when you come to discuss the program of the Party—you will then hear a description of capitalist society. This society advanced against serfdom, against the old feudal system, under the slogan of liberty. But it was liberty for those who owned property. And when feudalism was

shattered, which occurred at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century — in Russia it occurred later than in other countries, in 1861 — the feudal state was then superseded by the capitalist state, which proclaims liberty for the whole people as its slogan, which declares that it expresses the will of the whole people and denies that it is a class state. And here there developed a struggle between the Socialists, who are fighting for the liberty of the whole people, and the capitalist state — a struggle which has now led to the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic and which embraces the whole world.

To understand the struggle that has been started against world capital, to understand the essence of the capitalist state, we must remember that when the capitalist state advanced against the feudal state it entered the fight under the slogan of liberty. The abolition of feudalism meant liberty for the representatives of the capitalist state and served their purpose, inasmuch as serfdom was breaking down and the peasants had acquired the opportunity of owning as their full property the land which they had purchased for compensation or in part by quit rent — this did not concern the state: it protected property no matter how it arose, because the state rested on private property. The peasants became private owners in all the modern civilized states. Even when the landlord surrendered part of his land to the peasant, the state protected private property, rewarding the landlord by compensation, sale for money. The state as it were declared that it would fully preserve private property, and it accorded it every support and protection. The state recognized the property rights of every merchant, industrialist and manufacturer. And this society, based on private property, on the power of capital, on the complete

subjection of the propertyless workers and labouring masses of the peasantry, proclaimed that its rule was based on liberty. Combating feudalism, it proclaimed freedom of property and was particularly proud of the fact that the state had supposedly ceased to be a class state.

Yet the state continued to be a machine which helped the capitalists to hold the poor peasants and the working class in subjection. But in outward appearance it was free. It proclaimed universal suffrage, and declared through its champions, preachers, scholars and philosophers, that it was not a class state. Even now, when the Soviet Socialist Republics have begun to fight it, they accuse us of violating liberty, of building a state based on coercion, on the suppression of some by others, whereas they represent a popular, democratic state. And now, when the world socialist revolution has begun, and just when the revolution has succeeded in some countries, when the fight against world capital has grown particularly acute, this question of the state has acquired the greatest importance and has become, one might say, the most burning one, the focus of all political questions and of all political disputes of the present day.

Whatever party we take in Russia or in any of the more civilized countries, we find that nearly all political disputes, disagreements and opinions now centre around the conception of the state. Is the state in a capitalist country, in a democratic republic — especially one like Switzerland or America — in the freest democratic republics, an expression of the popular will, the sum total of the general decision of the people, the expression of the national will, and so forth; or is the state a machine that enables the capitalists of the given country to maintain their power over the working class and the peasantry? That is the fundamental question around

which all political disputes all over the world now centre. What do they say about Bolshevism? The bourgeois press abuses the Bolsheviks. You will not find a single newspaper that does not repeat the hackneyed accusation that the Bolsheviks violate popular rule. If our Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in their simplicity of heart (perhaps it is not simplicity, or perhaps it is the simplicity which the proverb says is worse than robbery) think that they discovered and invented the accusation that the Bolsheviks have violated liberty and popular rule, they are ludicrously mistaken. Today not a single one of the richest newspapers in the richest countries, which spend tens of millions on their distribution and disseminate bourgeois lies and imperialist policy in tens of millions of copies — there is not one of these newspapers which does not repeat these basic arguments and accusations against Bolshevism, namely, that America, England and Switzerland are advanced states based on popular rule, whereas the Bolshevik Republic is a state of bandits in which liberty is unknown, and that the Bolsheviks have violated the idea of popular rule and have even gone so far as to disperse the Constituent Assembly. These terrible accusations against the Bolsheviks are repeated all over the world. These accusations bring us fully up against the question — what is the state? In order to understand these accusations, in order to examine them and have a fully intelligent attitude towards them, and not to examine them on hearsay but with a firm opinion of our own, we must have a clear idea of what the state is. Here we have capitalist states of every kind and all the theories in defence of them which were created before the war. In order to answer the question properly we must critically examine all these theories and views.

I have already advised you to turn for help to Engels' book, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. This book says that every state in which private ownership of the land and means of production exists, in which capital dominates, however democratic it may be, is a capitalist state, a machine used by the capitalists to keep the working class and the poor peasants in subjection; while universal suffrage, a Constituent Assembly, parliament are merely a form, a sort of promissory note, which does not alter the essence of the matter.

The forms of domination of the state may vary: capital manifests its power in one way where one form exists, and in another way where another form exists — but essentially the power is in the hands of capital, whether there are voting qualifications or not, or whether the republic is a democratic one or not — in fact the more democratic it is the cruder and more cynical is the rule of capitalism. One of the most democratic republics in the world is the United States of America, yet nowhere (and those who were there after 1905 probably know it) is the power of capital, the power of a handful of billionaires over the whole of society, so crude and so openly corrupt as in America. Once capital exists, it dominates the whole of society, and no democratic republic, no form of franchise can alter the essence of the matter.

The democratic republic and universal suffrage were an immense progressive advance on feudalism: they have enabled the proletariat to achieve its present unity and solidarity, to form those firm and disciplined ranks which are waging a systematic struggle against capital. There was nothing

even approximately resembling this among the peasant serfs, not to speak of the slaves. The slaves as we know revolted, rioted, started civil wars, but they could never create a class-conscious majority and parties to lead the struggle, they could not clearly realize what they were aiming for, and even in the most revolutionary moments of history they were always pawns in the hands of the ruling classes. The bourgeois republic, parliament, universal suffrage — all represent great progress from the standpoint of the world development of society. Mankind moved towards capitalism, and it was capitalism alone which, thanks to urban culture, enabled the oppressed proletarian class to learn to know itself and to create the world working-class movement, the millions of workers organized all over the world in parties — the Socialist parties which are consciously leading the struggle of the masses. Without parliamentarism, without an electoral system, this development of the working class would have been impossible. That is why all these things have acquired such great importance in the eyes of the broad masses of people. That is why a radical change seems to be so difficult. It is not only the conscious hypocrites, scientists and priests that uphold and defend the bourgeois lie that the state is free and that it is its mission to defend the interests of all; so also do a large number of people who sincerely adhere to the old prejudices and who cannot understand the transition from the old capitalist society to Socialism. It is not only people who are directly dependent on the bourgeoisie, not only those who are oppressed by the yoke of capital or who have been bribed by capital (there are a large number of all sorts of scientists, artists, priests, etc., in the service

of capital), but even people who are simply under the sway of the prejudice of bourgeois liberty that have taken up arms against Bolshevism all over the world because of the fact that when it was founded the Soviet Republic rejected these bourgeois lies and openly declared: you say your state is free, whereas in reality, as long as there is private property, your state, even if it is a democratic republic, is nothing but a machine used by the capitalists to suppress the workers, and the freer the state, the more clearly is this expressed. Examples of this are Switzerland in Europe and the United States in the Americas. Nowhere does capital rule so cynically and ruthlessly, and nowhere is this so clearly apparent, as in these countries, although they are democratic republics, no matter how finely they are painted and notwithstanding all the talk about labour democracy and the equality of all citizens. The fact is that in Switzerland and America capital dominates, and every attempt of the workers to achieve the slightest real improvement in their condition is immediately met by civil war. There are fewer soldiers, a smaller standing army, in these countries — Switzerland has a militia and every Swiss has a gun at home, while in America there was no standing army until quite recently — and so when there is a strike the bourgeoisie arms, hires soldiery and suppresses the strike; and nowhere is this suppression of the working-class movement accompanied by such ruthless severity as in Switzerland and America, and nowhere does the influence of capital in parliament manifest itself as powerfully as in these countries. The power of capital is everything, the stock exchange is everything, while parliament and elections are marionettes, puppets. . . . But the

eyes of the workers are being opened more and more, and the idea of Soviet government is spreading wider and wider, especially after the bloody carnage through which we have just passed. The necessity for a relentless war on the capitalists is becoming clearer and clearer to the working class.

Whatever guise a republic may assume, even the most democratic republic, if it is a bourgeois republic, if it retains private ownership of the land, mills and factories, and if private capital keeps the whole of society in wage slavery, that is, if it does not carry out what is proclaimed in the program of our Party and in the Soviet Constitution, then this state is a machine for the suppression of some people by others. And we shall place this machine in the hands of the class that is to overthrow the power of capital. We shall reject all the old prejudices about the state meaning universal equality — for that is a fraud: as long as there is exploitation there cannot be equality. The landlord cannot be the equal of the worker, or the hungry man the equal of the full man. The proletariat casts aside the machine which was called the state and before which people bowed in superstitious awe, believing the old tales that it means popular rule — the proletariat casts aside this machine and declares that it is a bourgeois lie. We have deprived the capitalists of this machine and have taken it over. With this machine, or bludgeon, we shall destroy all exploitation. And when the possibility of exploitation no longer exists anywhere in the world, when there are no longer owners of land and owners of factories, and when there is no longer a situation in which some gorge while others starve — only when the possibility of this no longer exists shall we consign this machine to the

scrap heap. Then there will be no state and no exploitation. Such is the view of our Communist Party. I hope that we shall return to this subject in subsequent lectures, and return to it again and again.

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The present, second edition is published almost without change, except that section 3 has been added to Chapter II.

The Author

Moscow
December 17, 1918

CHAPTER I

CLASS SOCIETY AND THE STATE

1. THE STATE AS THE PRODUCT OF THE IRRECONCILABILITY OF CLASS ANTAGONISMS

What is now happening to Marx's teaching has, in the course of history, happened repeatedly to the teachings of revolutionary thinkers and leaders of oppressed classes struggling for emancipation. During the lifetime of great revolutionaries, the oppressing classes constantly hounded them, received their teachings with the most savage malice, the most furious hatred and the most unscrupulous campaigns of lies and slander. After their death, attempts are made to convert them into harmless icons, to canonize them, so to say, and to surround their *names* with a certain halo for the "consolation" of the oppressed classes and with the object of duping the latter, while at the same time emasculating the *essence* of the revolutionary teaching, blunting its revolutionary edge and vulgarizing it. At the present time, the bourgeoisie and the opportunists within the working-class

movement concur in this "doctoring" of Marxism. They omit, obliterate and distort the revolutionary side of this teaching, its revolutionary soul. They push to the foreground and extol what is or seems acceptable to the bourgeoisie. All the social-chauvinists are now "Marxists" (don't laugh!). And more and more frequently, German bourgeois scholars, but yesterday specialists in the annihilation of Marxism, are speaking of the "national-German" Marx, who, they aver, educated the workers' unions which are so splendidly organized for the purpose of conducting a predatory war!

In such circumstances, in view of the unprecedentedly widespread distortion of Marxism, our prime task is to *re-establish* what Marx really taught on the subject of the state. For this purpose it will be necessary to quote at length from the works of Marx and Engels themselves. Of course, long quotations will render the text cumbersome and will not help at all to make it popular reading, but we cannot possibly avoid them. All, or at any rate, all the most essential passages in the works of Marx and Engels on the subject of the state must without fail be quoted as fully as possible, in order that the reader may form an independent opinion of the totality of the views of the founders of scientific Socialism and of the development of those views, and in order that their distortion by the now prevailing "Kautskyism" may be documentarily proved and clearly demonstrated.

Let us begin with the most popular of Engels' works, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, the sixth edition of which was published in Stuttgart as far back as 1894. We shall have to translate the quotations from the German originals, as the Russian translations, although very numerous, are for the most part either incomplete or very unsatisfactory.

Summing up his historical analysis, Engels says:

"The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it 'the reality of the ethical idea,' 'the image and reality of reason,' as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of 'order'; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state." (Pp. 177-78, sixth German edition.)³

This expresses with perfect clarity the basic idea of Marxism on the question of the historical role and the meaning of the state. The state is the product and the manifestation of the *irreconcilability* of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where and to the extent that class antagonisms objectively *cannot* be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.

It is precisely on this most important and fundamental point that the distortion of Marxism, proceeding along two main lines, begins.

On the one hand, the bourgeois and particularly the petty-bourgeois ideologists, compelled under the weight of indisputable historical facts to admit that the state only exists where there are class antagonisms and the class struggle, "correct"

Marx in such a way as to make it appear that the state is an organ for the *reconciliation* of classes. According to Marx, the state could neither arise nor maintain itself if it were possible to reconcile classes. According to the petty-bourgeois and philistine professors and publicists it appears — very frequently they benignantly refer to Marx to prove this — that the state does reconcile classes. According to Marx, the state is an organ of class *rule*, an organ for the *oppression* of one class by another; it is the creation of “order,” which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between the classes. In the opinion of the petty-bourgeois politicians, order means precisely the reconciliation of classes, and not the oppression of one class by another; to moderate the conflict means reconciling classes and not depriving the oppressed classes of definite means and methods of struggle to overthrow the oppressors.

For instance, when, in the Revolution of 1917, the question of the significance and role of the state arose in all its magnitude as a practical question demanding immediate action on a mass scale, all the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks immediately and completely sank to the petty-bourgeois theory that the “state” “reconciles” classes. Innumerable resolutions and articles by politicians of both these parties are thoroughly saturated with this petty-bourgeois and philistine “reconciliation” theory. That the state is an organ of the rule of a definite class which *cannot* be reconciled with its antipode (the class opposite to it), is something the petty-bourgeois democrats will never be able to understand. Their attitude towards the state is one of the most striking manifestations of the fact that our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks are not Socialists at all

(a point that we Bolsheviks have always maintained), but petty-bourgeois democrats with near-Socialist phraseology.

On the other hand, the “Kautskyite” distortion of Marxism is far more subtle. “Theoretically,” it is not denied that the state is an organ of class rule, or that class antagonisms are irreconcilable. But what is lost sight of or glossed over is this: if the state is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms, if it is a power standing *above* society and “*increasingly alienating* itself from it,” then it is obvious that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, *but also without the destruction* of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this “alienation.” As we shall see later, Marx very definitely drew this theoretically self-evident conclusion as a result of a concrete historical analysis of the tasks of the revolution. And — as we shall show in detail further on — it is precisely this conclusion which Kautsky . . . has “forgotten” and distorted.

2. SPECIAL BODIES OF ARMED MEN, PRISONS, ETC.

Engels continues:

“In contradistinction to the old gentile [tribal or clan] organization, the state, first, divides its subjects according to territory.”

Such a division seems “natural” to us, but it cost a prolonged struggle against the old form of tribal or gentile society.

"The second distinguishing feature is the establishment of a public power which no longer directly coincided with the population organizing itself as an armed force. This special public power is necessary, because a self-acting armed organization of the population has become impossible since the cleavage into classes. . . . This public power exists in every state; it consists not merely of armed people but also of material adjuncts, prisons and institutions of coercion of all kinds, of which gentile [clan] society knew nothing."

Engels further elucidates the concept of the "power" which is termed the state — a power which arose from society, but places itself above it and alienates itself more and more from it. What does this power mainly consist of? It consists of special bodies of armed men which have prisons, etc., at their command.

We are justified in speaking of special bodies of armed men, because the public power which is an attribute of every state does not "directly coincide" with the armed population, with its "self-acting armed organization."

Like all great revolutionary thinkers, Engels tries to draw the attention of the class-conscious workers to the very fact which prevailing philistinism regards as least worthy of attention, as the most habitual and sanctified not only by firmly rooted, but one might say by petrified prejudices. A standing army and police are the chief instruments of state power. But can it be otherwise?

From the viewpoint of the vast majority of Europeans of the end of the nineteenth century whom Engels was addressing, and who had not lived through or closely observed a single great revolution, it could not be otherwise. They

completely failed to understand what a "self-acting armed organization of the population" was. To the question, whence arose the need for special bodies of armed men, placed above society and alienating themselves from it (police and standing army), the West-European and Russian philistines are inclined to answer with a few phrases borrowed from Spencer or Mikhailovsky, by referring to the growing complexity of social life, the differentiation of functions, and so forth.

Such a reference seems "scientific," and effectively dulls the senses of the man in the street by obscuring the most important and basic fact, namely, the cleavage of society into irreconcilably antagonistic classes.

Were it not for this cleavage, the "self-acting armed organization of the population" would differ from the primitive organization of a stick-wielding herd of monkeys, or of primitive man, or of men united in clans, by its complexity, its high technique, and so forth; but such an organization would still be possible.

It is impossible, because civilized society is split into antagonistic and, moreover, irreconcilably antagonistic classes, the "self-acting" arming of which would lead to an armed struggle between them. A state arises, a special power is created, special bodies of armed men, and every revolution, by destroying the state apparatus, clearly demonstrates to us how the ruling class strives to restore the special bodies of armed men which serve *it*, and how the oppressed class strives to create a new organization of this kind, capable of serving not the exploiters but the exploited.

In the above argument, Engels raises theoretically the very same question which every great revolution raises before us in practice, palpably and, what is more, on a scale of mass action, namely, the question of the relation between "special"

bodies of armed men and the "self-acting armed organization of the population." We shall see how this question is concretely illustrated by the experience of the European and Russian revolutions.

But let us return to Engels' exposition.

He points out that sometimes, for example, in certain parts of North America, this public power is weak (he has in mind a rare exception in capitalist society, and those parts of North America in its pre-imperialist days where the free colonist predominated), but that, generally speaking, it grows stronger:

"... The public power grows stronger, however, in proportion as class antagonisms within the state become more acute, and as adjacent states become larger and more populated. We have only to look at our present-day Europe, where class struggle and rivalry in conquest have screwed up the public power to such a pitch that it threatens to devour the whole of society and even the state."

This was written not later than the beginning of the nineties of the last century, Engels' last preface being dated June 16, 1891. The turn towards imperialism — meaning the complete domination of the trusts, meaning the omnipotence of the big banks, meaning a grand-scale colonial policy, and so forth — was only just beginning in France, and was even weaker in North America and in Germany. Since then "rivalry in conquest" has made gigantic strides — especially as, by the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century, the whole world had been finally divided up among these "rivals in conquest," i.e., among the great predatory powers. Since then, military and naval armaments have grown to monstrous proportions, and the predatory war of

1914-17 for the domination of the world by England or Germany, for the division of the spoils, has brought the "devouring" of all the forces of society by the rapacious state power to the verge of complete catastrophe.

As early as 1891 Engels was able to point to "rivalry in conquest" as one of the most important distinguishing features of the foreign policy of the Great Powers, but in 1914-17, when this rivalry, many times intensified, has given rise to an imperialist war, the social-chauvinist scoundrels cover up the defence of the predatory interests of "their own" bourgeoisie with phrases about "defence of the fatherland," "defence of the republic and the revolution," etc.!

3. THE STATE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF THE OPPRESSED CLASS

For the maintenance of the special public power standing above society, taxes and state loans are needed.

"In possession of the public power and of the right to levy taxes, the officials," Engels writes, "as organs of society, now stand *above* society. The free, voluntary respect that was accorded to the organs of the gentile (clan) constitution does not satisfy them, even if they could gain it..." Special laws are enacted proclaiming the sanctity and immunity of the officials. "The shabbiest police servant" has more "authority" than the representatives of the clan, but even the head of the military power of a civilized state may well envy an elder of a clan the "uncoerced respect" of society.

Here the problem of the privileged position of the officials as organs of state power is raised. The main question indicated is: what is it that places them *above* society? We shall see how this theoretical question was answered in practice by the Paris Commune in 1871 and how it was slurred over in a reactionary manner by Kautsky in 1912.

“As the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but as it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class.” Not only were the ancient and feudal states organs for the exploitation of the slaves and serfs but “the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital. By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence of both.” Such were the absolute monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Bonapartism of the First and Second Empires in France, and the Bismarck regime in Germany.

Such, we may add, is the Kerensky government in republican Russia since it began to persecute the revolutionary proletariat, at a moment when, owing to the leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats, the Soviets have *already* become impotent, while the bourgeoisie is not *yet* strong enough simply to disperse them.

In a democratic republic, Engels continues, “wealth exercises its power indirectly, but all the more surely,” first, by means of the “direct corruption of officials” (America); second, by means of “an alliance between the government and Stock Exchange” (France and America).

At the present time, imperialism and the domination of the banks have “developed” both these methods of upholding and giving effect to the omnipotence of wealth in democratic republics of all descriptions into an unusually fine art. If, for instance, in the very first months of the Russian democratic republic, one might say during the honeymoon of the “Socialist” S.-R.’s [Socialist-Revolutionaries] and the Mensheviks joined in wedlock to the bourgeoisie, Mr. Palchinsky, in the coalition government, obstructed every measure intended for curbing the capitalists and their marauding practices, their plundering of the treasury by means of war contracts; and if later on Mr. Palchinsky resigned (and, of course, was replaced by another exactly such Palchinsky), and the capitalists “rewarded” him with a “soft” job at a salary of 120,000 rubles per annum — what would you call this — direct or indirect bribery? An alliance between the government and the directors of syndicates, or “merely” friendly relations? What role do the Chernovs, Tseretelis, Avksentyevs and Skobelevs play? Are they the “direct” or only the indirect allies of the millionaire treasury-looters?

The reason why the omnipotence of “wealth” is better *secured* in a democratic republic, is that it does not depend on the faulty political shell of capitalism. A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism, and, therefore, once capital has gained control of this very best shell (through the Palchinskys, Chernovs, Tseretelis and Co.),

it establishes its power so securely, so firmly, that *no* change, either of persons, of institutions, or of parties in the bourgeois-democratic republic, can shake it.

We must also note that Engels is most definite in calling universal suffrage an instrument of bourgeois rule. Universal suffrage, he says, obviously summing up the long experience of German Social-Democracy, is "the gauge of the maturity of the working class. It cannot and never will be anything more in the present-day state."

The petty-bourgeois democrats, such as our Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and also their twin brothers, all the social-chauvinists and opportunists of Western Europe, expect just this "more" from universal suffrage. They themselves share and instil into the minds of the people the false notion that universal suffrage "in the *modern* state" is really capable of ascertaining the will of the majority of the toilers and of securing its realization.

Here we can only indicate this false notion, only point out that Engels' perfectly clear, precise and concrete statement is distorted at every step in the propaganda and agitation of the "official" (i.e., opportunist) Socialist parties. A detailed exposure of the utter falsity of this notion which Engels brushes aside here is given in our further account of the views of Marx and Engels on the "*modern*" state.

Engels gives a general summary of his views in the most popular of his works in the following words:

"The state, then, has not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no conception of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the state

became a necessity owing to this cleavage. We are now rapidly approaching a stage in the development of production at which the existence of these classes not only will have ceased to be a necessity, but will become a positive hindrance to production. They will fall as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. Along with them the state will inevitably fall. The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe."

We do not often come across this passage in the propagandist and agitational literature of present-day Social-Democracy. But even when we do come across it, it is mostly quoted in the same manner as one bows before an icon, i.e., it is done to show official respect for Engels, and no attempt is made to gauge the breadth and depth of the revolution that this relegating of "the whole state machine to the Museum of Antiquities" presupposes. In most cases we do not even find an understanding of what Engels calls the state machine.

4. THE "WITHERING AWAY" OF THE STATE AND VIOLENT REVOLUTION

Engels' words regarding the "withering away" of the state are so widely known, they are so often quoted, and so clearly reveal the essence of the customary adulteration of Marxism to look like opportunism that we must deal with them in detail. We shall quote the whole argument from which they are taken.

"The proletariat seizes the state power and transforms the means of production in the first instance into state property. But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms; it puts an end also to the state as state. Former society, moving in class antagonisms, had need of the state, that is, an organization of the exploiting class at each period for the maintenance of its external conditions of production; that is, therefore, mainly for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in the conditions of oppression (slavery, villeinage or serfdom, wage labour) determined by the existing mode of production. The state was the official representative of society as a whole, its summation in a visible corporation; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which itself, in its epoch, represented society as a whole: in ancient times, the state of the slave-owning citizens; in the Middle Ages, of the feudal nobility; in our epoch, of the bourgeoisie. When ultimately it becomes really representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous. As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the anarchy of production hitherto, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social

relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it *withers away*. It is from this standpoint that we must appraise the phrase 'free people's state'—both its temporary justification for agitational purposes, and its ultimate scientific inadequacy—and also the demand of the so-called anarchists that the state should be abolished overnight." (*Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science [Anti-Dühring]*, pp. 301-03, third German edition.)⁴

It may be said without fear of error that of this argument of Engels' which is so remarkably rich in ideas, only one point has become an integral part of socialist thought among modern socialist parties, namely, that according to Marx the state "withers away"—as distinct from the anarchist doctrine of the "abolition" of the state. To prune Marxism in such a manner is to reduce it to opportunism, for such an "interpretation" only leaves a vague notion of a slow, even, gradual change, of absence of leaps and storms, of absence of revolution. The current, widespread, mass, if one may say so, conception of the "withering away" of the state undoubtedly means toning down, if not repudiating, revolution.

Such an "interpretation," however, is the crudest distortion of Marxism, advantageous only to the bourgeoisie; in point of theory, it is based on a disregard for the most important circumstances and considerations indicated, say, in Engels' "summary" argument we have just quoted in full.

In the first place, at the very outset of his argument Engels says that, in seizing state power, the proletariat thereby "abolishes the state as state." It is not "good form" to ponder over the meaning of this. Generally, it is either ignored altogether, or is considered to be something in the nature of "Hegelian weakness" on Engels' part. As a matter of fact, however, these words briefly express the experience of one of the greatest proletarian revolutions, the Paris Commune of 1871, of which we shall speak in greater detail in its proper place. As a matter of fact, Engels speaks here of the proletarian revolution "abolishing" the *bourgeois* state, while the words about the state withering away refer to the remnants of the *proletarian* state *after* the socialist revolution. According to Engels the bourgeois state does not "wither away," but is "*abolished*" by the proletariat in the course of the revolution. What withers away after this revolution is the proletarian state or semi-state.

Secondly, the state is a "special repressive force." Engels gives this splendid and extremely profound definition here with the utmost lucidity. And from it follows that the "special repressive force" for the suppression of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, of millions of toilers by handfuls of the rich, must be replaced by a "special repressive force" for the suppression of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat (the dictatorship of the proletariat). This is precisely what is meant by "abolition of the state as state." This is precisely the "act" of taking possession of the means of production in the name of society. And it is self-evident that *such* a replacement of one (bourgeois) "special force" by another (proletarian) "special force" cannot possibly take place in the form of "withering away."

Thirdly, in speaking of the state "withering away," and the even more graphic and colourful "ceasing of itself," Engels refers quite clearly and definitely to the period *after* "the state has taken possession of the means of production in the name of the whole of society," that is, *after* the socialist revolution. We all know that the political form of the "state" at that time is the most complete democracy. But it never enters the head of any of the opportunists who shamelessly distort Marxism that Engels is consequently speaking here of *democracy* "ceasing of itself," or "withering away." This seems very strange at first sight; but it is "incomprehensible" only to those who have not pondered over the fact that democracy is *also* a state and that, consequently, democracy will also disappear when the state disappears. Revolution alone can "abolish" the bourgeois state. The state in general, i.e., the most complete democracy, can only "wither away."

Fourthly, after formulating his famous proposition that "the state withers away," Engels at once explains specifically that this proposition is directed against both the opportunists and the anarchists. In doing this Engels puts in the forefront that conclusion drawn from the proposition that "the state withers away" which is directed against the opportunists.

One can wager that out of every 10,000 persons who have read or heard about the "withering away" of the state, 9,990 are completely unaware, or do not remember, that Engels directed his conclusions from this proposition *not* against the anarchists *alone*. And of the remaining ten, probably nine do not know the meaning of "free people's state" or why an attack on this slogan means an attack on the opportunists. This is how history is written! This is

how a great revolutionary teaching is imperceptibly falsified and adapted to prevailing philistinism! The conclusion directed against the anarchists has been repeated thousands of times, vulgarized, dinned into people's heads in the shallowest form and has acquired the strength of a prejudice; whereas the conclusion directed against the opportunists has been slurred over and "forgotten"!

The "free people's state" was a program demand and a widely current slogan of the German Social-Democrats in the seventies. This slogan is devoid of all political content except for the fact that it describes the concept of democracy in the pompous philistine fashion. In so far as it hinted in a legally permissible manner at a democratic republic, Engels was prepared to "justify" its use "for a time" from an agitational point of view. But it was an opportunist slogan, for it expressed not only an embellishment of bourgeois democracy, but also failure to understand the socialist criticism of the state in general. We are in favour of a democratic republic as the best form of the state for the proletariat under capitalism; but we have no right to forget that wage slavery is the lot of the people even in the most democratic bourgeois republic. Furthermore, every state is a "special force for the suppression" of the oppressed class. Consequently, *every* state is *not* "free" and *not* a "people's state." Marx and Engels explained this repeatedly to their party comrades in the seventies.

Fifthly, this very same work of Engels', of which everyone remembers the argument about the withering away of the state, also contains an argument of the significance of violent revolution. Engels' historical analysis of its role becomes a veritable panegyric on violent revolution. This "no one remembers"; it is not good form in modern Socialist

parties to talk or even think about the significance of this idea, and it plays no part whatever in their daily propaganda and agitation among the masses. And yet, it is inseparably bound with the "withering away" of the state into one harmonious whole.

Here is Engels' argument:

"... That force, however, plays another role" (other than that of a diabolical power) "in history, a revolutionary role; that, in the words of Marx, it is the midwife of every old society which is pregnant with the new, that it is the instrument by the aid of which the social movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilized political forms — of this there is not a word in Herr Dühring. It is only with sighs and groans that he admits the possibility that force will perhaps be necessary for the overthrow of the economic system of exploitation — unfortunately, because all use of force, forsooth, demoralizes the person who uses it. And this in spite of the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has resulted from every victorious revolution! And this in Germany, where a violent collision — which indeed may be forced on the people — would at least have the advantage of wiping out the servility which has permeated the national consciousness as a result of the humiliation of the Thirty Years' War. And this parson's mode of thought — lifeless, insipid and impotent — claims to impose itself on the most revolutionary party which history has known!" (P. 193, third German edition, Part II, end of Chap. IV.)

How can this panegyric on violent revolution, which Engels insistently brought to the attention of the German Social-Democrats between 1878 and 1894, i.e., right up to

the time of his death, be combined with the theory of the "withering away" of the state to form a single doctrine?

Usually the two are combined by means of eclecticism, by an unprincipled, or sophistic selection made arbitrarily (or to please the powers that be) of now one, now another argument, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, if not more often, it is the idea of the "withering away" that is placed in the forefront. Dialectics are replaced by eclecticism — this is the most usual, the most widespread phenomenon to be met with in present-day official Social-Democratic literature in relation to Marxism. This sort of substitution is, of course, no new thing, it was observed even in the history of classic Greek philosophy. In falsifying Marxism in opportunist fashion, the substitution of eclecticism for dialectics is the easiest way of deceiving the masses; it gives an illusory satisfaction; it seems to take into account all sides of the process, all tendencies of development, all the conflicting influences, and so forth, whereas in reality it presents no integral and revolutionary conception of the process of social development at all.

We have already said above, and shall show more fully later, that the teaching of Marx and Engels concerning the inevitability of a violent revolution refers to the bourgeois state. The latter *cannot* be superseded by the proletarian state (the dictatorship of the proletariat) through the process of "withering away," but, as a general rule, only through a violent revolution. The panegyric Engels sang in its honour, and which fully corresponds to Marx's repeated declarations (recall the concluding passages of *The Poverty of Philosophy*⁵ and the *Communist Manifesto*,⁶ with their proud and open proclamation of the inevitability of a violent revolution; recall what Marx wrote nearly thirty years

later, in criticizing the Gotha Program⁷ of 1875, when he mercilessly castigated the opportunist character of that program) — this panegyric is by no means a mere "impulse," a mere declamation or a polemical sally. The necessity of systematically imbuing the masses with *this* and precisely this view of violent revolution lies at the root of *all* the teachings of Marx and Engels. The betrayal of their teaching by the now predominant social-chauvinist and Kautskyite trends is expressed in striking relief by the neglect of *such* propaganda and agitation by both these trends.

The supersession of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution. The abolition of the proletarian state, i.e., of the state in general, is impossible except through the process of "withering away."

A detailed and concrete elaboration of these views was given by Marx and Engels when they studied each separate revolutionary situation, when they analyzed the lessons of the experience of each individual revolution. We shall now pass to this, undoubtedly the most important, part of their teaching.

VII

SHOULD WE PARTICIPATE IN BOURGEOIS
PARLIAMENTS?

It is with the utmost contempt—and the utmost levity—that the German “Left” Communists reply to this question in the negative. Their arguments? In the passage quoted above we read:

“... All reversion to parliamentary forms of struggle, which have become historically and politically obsolete, must be emphatically rejected...”

This is said with ridiculous pretentiousness, and is patently wrong. “Reversion” to parliamentarianism, forsooth! Perhaps there is already a Soviet republic in Germany? It does not look like it! How, then, can one speak of “reversion”? Is this not an empty phrase?

Parliamentarianism has become “historically obsolete”. That is true in the propaganda sense. However, everybody knows that this is still a far cry from overcoming it in *practice*. Capitalism could have been declared—and with full justice—to be “historically obsolete” many decades ago, but that does not at all remove the need for a very long and very persistent struggle on the basis of capitalism. Parliamentarianism is “historically obsolete” from the standpoint of *world history*, i.e., the era of bourgeois parliamentarianism is over, and the era of the proletarian dictatorship has begun. That is incontestable. But world history is counted in decades. Ten or twenty years earlier or later makes no difference when measured with the yardstick of world history; from the standpoint of world history it is a trifle that cannot be considered even approximately. But for that very reason, it is a glaring theoretical error to apply the yardstick of world history to practical politics.

Is parliamentarianism “politically obsolete”? That is quite a different matter. If that were true, the position of the “Lefts” would be a strong one. But it has to be proved by a most searching analysis, and the “Lefts” do not even know how to approach the matter. In the “Theses on Parliamentarianism”, published in the *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* No. 1, February 1920, and obviously expressing the Dutch-Left or Left-Dutch strivings, the analysis, as we shall see, is also hopelessly poor.

In the first place, contrary to the opinion of such outstanding political leaders as Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the German “Lefts”, as we know, considered parliamentarianism “politically obsolete” even in January 1919. We know that the “Lefts” were mistaken. This fact alone utterly destroys, at a

single stroke, the proposition that parliamentarianism is “politically obsolete”. It is for the “Lefts” to prove why their error, indisputable at that time, is no longer an error. They do not and cannot produce even a shred of proof. A political party’s attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it fulfils in *practice* its obligations towards its *class* and the *working people*. Frankly acknowledging a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions that have led up to it, and thrashing out the means of its rectification—that is the hallmark of a serious party; that is how it should perform its duties, and how it should educate and train its *class*, and then the *masses*. By failing to fulfil this duty and give the utmost attention and consideration to the study of their patent error, the “Lefts” in Germany (and in Holland) have proved that they are not a *party of a class*, but a circle, not a *party of the masses*, but a group of intellectuals and of a few workers who ape the worst features of intellectualism.

Second, in the same pamphlet of the Frankfurt group of “Lefts”, which we have already cited in detail, we read:

“... The millions of workers who still follow the policy of the Centre [the Catholic “Centre” Party] are counter-revolutionary. The rural proletarians provide the legions of counter-revolutionary troops.” (Page 3 of the pamphlet.)

Everything goes to show that this statement is far too sweeping and exaggerated. But the basic fact set forth here is incontrovertible, and its acknowledgement by the “Lefts” is particularly clear evidence of their mistake. How can one say that “parliamentarianism is politically obsolete”, when “millions” and “legions” of *proletarians* are not only still in favour of parliamentarianism in general, but are downright “counter-revolutionary”!? It is obvious that parliamentarianism in Germany is *not yet* politically obsolete. It is obvious that the “Lefts” in Germany have mistaken *their desire*, their politico-ideological attitude, for objective reality. That is a most dangerous mistake for revolutionaries to make. In Russia—where, over a particularly long period and in particularly varied forms, the most brutal and savage yoke of tsarism produced revolutionaries of diverse shades, revolutionaries who displayed amazing devotion, enthusiasm, heroism and will power—in Russia we have observed this mistake of the revolutionaries at very close quarters; we have studied it very attentively and have a first-hand knowledge of it; that is why we can also see it especially clearly in others. Parliamentarianism is of course “politically obsolete” to the Communists in Germany; but—and that is the whole point—we must *not* regard what is obsolete *to us* as something obsolete *to a class*,

the masses. Here again we find that the "Lefts" do not know how to reason, do not know how to act as the party of a class, the party of the masses. You must not sink to the level of the masses, to the level of the backward strata of the class. That is incontestable. You must tell them the bitter truth. You are in no way bound to call their bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary judgements what they are—prejudices. But at the same time you must soberly follow the actual state of the class-consciousness and preparedness of the entire class (not only of its communist guard), and of all the working people (not only of their advanced elements.)

Even if only a fairly large minority of the industrial workers, and not "millions" and "legions", follow the lead of the Catholic clergy—and a similar minority of rural workers follow the landowners and kulaks (Grossbauern)—it undoubtedly signifies that parliamentarianism in Germany has not yet politically outlived itself, that participation in parliamentary elections and in the struggle on the parliamentary rostrum is obligatory on the party of the revolutionary proletariat specifically for the purpose of creating the backward strata of its own class, and for the purpose of awakening and enlightening the undeveloped, downtrodden and ignorant rural masses. Whilst you lack the strength to do away with bourgeois parliaments and every other type of reactionary institution, you must work within them because it is there that you will still find workers who are duped by the priests and misled by the conditions of rural life; otherwise you risk turning into nothing but windbags.

Third, the "Left" Communists have a great deal to say in praise of us Bolsheviks. One sometimes feels like telling them to praise us less and to try to get a better knowledge of the Bolsheviks' tactics. We took part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Russian bourgeois parliament, in September-October 1917. Were our tactics correct or not? If not, then this should be clearly stated and proved, for it is necessary in evolving correct tactics for international communism. If they were correct, then certain conclusions must be drawn. Of course, there should be no question of placing conditions in Russia on a par with conditions in Western Europe. But as regards the particular question of the meaning of the concept that "parliamentarianism has become politically obsolete", due account should be taken of our experience, for unless concrete experience is taken into account such concepts very easily turn into empty phrases. In September-November 1917, did we, the Russian Bolsheviks, have more right than any Western Communists to consider that parliamentarianism was politically obsolete in Russia? Of course we did, for the point is not whether bourgeois parliaments

have existed for a long time or a short time, but how far the masses of the working people are prepared (ideologically, politically and practically) to accept the Soviet system and to dissolve the bourgeois-democratic parliament (or allow it to be dissolved). It is an absolutely incontestable and fully established historical fact that, in September-November 1917, the urban working class and the soldiers and peasants of Russia were, because of a number of special conditions, exceptionally well prepared to accept the Soviet system and to disband the most democratic of bourgeois parliaments. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks did not boycott the Constituent Assembly, but took part in the elections both before and after the proletariat conquered political power. That these elections yielded exceedingly valuable (and to the proletariat, highly useful) political results has, I make bold to hope, been proved by me in the above-mentioned article, which analyses in detail the returns of the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Russia.

The conclusion which follows from this is absolutely incontrovertible: it has been proved that, far from causing harm to the revolutionary proletariat, participation in a bourgeois-democratic parliament, even a few weeks before the victory of a Soviet republic and even after such a victory, actually helps that proletariat to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be done away with; it facilitates their successful dissolution, and helps to make bourgeois parliamentarianism "politically obsolete". To ignore this experience, while at the same time claiming affiliation to the Communist International, which must work out its tactics internationally (not as narrow or exclusively national tactics, but as international tactics), means committing a gross error and actually abandoning internationalism in deed, while recognising it in word.

Now let us examine the "Dutch-Left" arguments in favour of non-participation in parliaments. The following is the text of Thesis No. 4, the most important of the above-mentioned "Dutch" theses:

"When the capitalist system of production has broken down, and society is in a state of revolution, parliamentary action gradually loses importance as compared with the action of the masses themselves. When, in these conditions, parliament becomes the centre and organ of the counter-revolution, whilst, on the other hand, the labouring class builds up the instruments of its power in the Soviets, it may even prove necessary to abstain from all and any participation in parliamentary action."

The first sentence is obviously wrong, since action by the masses, a big strike, for instance, is more important than parliamentary activity at all times, and not only during a revolution or in a revolutionary situation. This obviously untenable and historically and politically incorrect argument merely shows very

clearly that the authors completely ignore both the general European experience (the French experience before the revolutions of 1848 and 1870; the German experience of 1878-90, etc.) and the Russian experience (see above) of the importance of combining legal and illegal struggle. This question is of immense importance both in general and in particular, because in all civilised and advanced countries the time is rapidly approaching when such a combination will more and more become—and has already partly become—mandatory on the party of the revolutionary proletariat, inasmuch as civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is maturing and is imminent, and because of the savage persecution of the Communists by republican governments and bourgeois governments generally, which resort to any violation of legality (the example of America is edifying enough), c. The Dutch, and the Lefts in general, have utterly failed to understand this highly important question.

The second sentence is, in the first place, historically wrong. The Bolsheviks participated in the most counter-revolutionary parliaments, and experience has shown that this participation is not only useful but indispensable to the party of the revolutionary proletariat, after the first bourgeois revolution in Russia (1905), so as to pave the way for the second bourgeois revolution (February 1917), and then for the socialist revolution (October 1917). In the second place, this sentence is amazingly illogical. A parliament becomes an organ and a "centre" (in reality it never has been and never can be a "centre", but that is by the way) of counter-revolution, while the workers are building up the instruments of their power in the form of the Soviets, then it follows that the workers must prepare—ideologically, politically and technically—for the struggle of the Soviets against parliament, for the dispersal of parliament by the Soviets. But it does not at all follow that this dispersal is hindered, or is not facilitated, by the presence of a Soviet opposition within the counter-revolutionary parliament. In the course of our victorious struggle against Denikin and Kolchak, we never found that the existence of a Soviet and proletarian opposition in their camp was immaterial to our victories. We know perfectly well that the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly on January 5, 1918 was not hampered but was actually facilitated by the fact that, within the counter-revolutionary Constituent Assembly which was about to be dispersed, there was a consistent Bolshevik, as well as an inconsistent Left Socialist-Revolutionary, Soviet opposition. The authors of the theses are engaged in muddled thinking; they have forgotten the experience of many, if not all, revolutions, which shows the great usefulness, during a revolution, of a combination of mass action outside a reactionary parliament with an

opposition sympathetic to (or, better still, directly supporting) the revolution within it. The Dutch, and the "Lefts" in general, argue in this respect like doctrinaires of the revolution, who have never taken part in a real revolution, have never given thought to the history of revolutions, or have naïvely mistaken subjective "rejection" of a reactionary institution for its actual destruction by the combined operation of a number of objective factors. The surest way of discrediting and damaging a new political (and not only political) idea is to reduce it to absurdity on the plea of defending it. For any truth, if "overdone" (as Dietzgen Senior put it), if exaggerated, or if carried beyond the limits of its actual applicability, can be reduced to an absurdity, and is even bound to become an absurdity under these conditions. That is just the kind of disservice the Dutch and German Lefts are rendering to the new truth of the Soviet form of government being superior to bourgeois-democratic parliaments. Of course, anyone would be in error who voiced the outmoded viewpoint or in general considered it impermissible, in all and any circumstances, to reject participation in bourgeois parliaments. I cannot attempt here to formulate the conditions under which a boycott is useful, since the object of this pamphlet is far more modest, namely, to study Russian experience in connection with certain topical questions of international communist tactics. Russian experience has provided us with one successful and correct instance (1905), and another that was incorrect (1906), of the use of a boycott by the Bolsheviks. Analysing the first case, we see that we succeeded in preventing a reactionary government from convening a reactionary parliament in a situation in which extra-parliamentary revolutionary mass action (strikes in particular) was developing at great speed, when not a single section of the proletariat and the peasantry could support the reactionary government in any way, and when the revolutionary proletariat was gaining influence over the backward masses through the strike struggle and through the agrarian movement. It is quite obvious that *this* experience is not applicable to present-day European conditions. It is likewise quite obvious—and the foregoing arguments bear this out—that the advocacy, even if with reservations, by the Dutch and the other "Lefts" of refusal to participate in parliaments is fundamentally wrong and detrimental to the cause of the revolutionary proletariat.

In Western Europe and America, parliament has become most odious to the revolutionary vanguard of the working class. That cannot be denied. It can readily be understood, for it is difficult to imagine anything more infamous, vile or treacherous than the behaviour of the vast majority of socialist and Social-Democratic parliamentary deputies during and after the war. It would,

however, be not only unreasonable but actually criminal to yield to this mood when deciding *how* this generally recognised evil should be fought. In many countries of Western Europe, the revolutionary mood, we might say, is at present a "novelty", or a "rarity", which has all too long been vainly and impatiently awaited; perhaps that is why people so easily yield to that mood. Certainly, without a revolutionary mood among the masses, and without conditions facilitating the growth of this mood, revolutionary tactics will never develop into action. In Russia, however, lengthy, painful and sanguinary experience has taught us the truth that revolutionary tactics cannot be built on a revolutionary mood alone. Tactics must be based on a sober and strictly objective appraisal of all the class forces in a particular state (and of the states that surround it, and of all states the world over) as well as of the experience of revolutionary movements. It is very easy to show one's "revolutionary" temper merely by hurling abuse at parliamentary opportunism, or merely by repudiating participation in parliaments; its very ease, however, cannot turn this into a solution of a difficult, a very difficult, problem. It is far more difficult to create a really revolutionary parliamentary group in a European parliament than it was in Russia. That stands to reason. But it is only a particular expression of the general truth that it was easy for Russia, in the specific and historically unique situation of 1917, to *start* the socialist revolution, but it will be more difficult for Russia than for the European countries to *continue* the revolution and bring it to its consummation. I had occasion to point this out already at the beginning of 1918, and our experience of the past two years has entirely confirmed the correctness of this view. Certain specific conditions, viz., (1) the possibility of linking up the Soviet revolution with the ending, as a consequence of this revolution, of the imperialist war, which had exhausted the workers and peasants to an incredible degree; (2) the possibility of taking temporary advantage of the mortal conflict between the world's two most powerful groups of imperialist robbers, who were unable to unite against their Soviet enemy; (3) the possibility of enduring a comparatively lengthy civil war, partly owing to the enormous size of the country and to the poor means of communication; (4) the existence of such a profound bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement among the peasantry that the party of the proletariat was able to adopt the revolutionary demands of the peasant party (the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the majority of whose members were definitely hostile to Bolshevism) and realise them at once, thanks to the conquest of political power by the proletariat—all these specific conditions do not at present exist in Western Europe, and a repetition of such

or similar conditions will not occur so easily. Incidentally, apart from a number of other causes, that is why it is more difficult for Western Europe to *start* a socialist revolution than it was for us. To attempt to "circumvent" this difficulty by "skipping" the arduous job of utilising reactionary parliaments for revolutionary purposes is absolutely childish. You want to create a new society, yet you fear the difficulties involved in forming a good parliamentary group made up of convinced, devoted and heroic Communists, in a reactionary parliament! Is that not childish? If Karl Liebknecht in Germany and Z. Höglund in Sweden were able, even without mass support from below, to set examples of the truly revolutionary utilisation of reactionary parliaments, why should a rapidly growing revolutionary mass party, in the midst of the post-war disillusionment and embitterment of the masses, be unable to *forge* a communist group in the worst of parliaments? It is because, in Western Europe, the backward masses of the workers and—to an even greater degree—of the small peasants are much more imbued with bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices than they were in Russia; because of that, it is *only* from within such institutions as bourgeois parliaments that Communists can (and must) wage a long and persistent struggle, undaunted by any difficulties, to expose, dispel and overcome these prejudices.

The German "Lefts" complain of bad "leaders" in their party, give way to despair, and even arrive at a ridiculous "negation" of "leaders". But in conditions in which it is often necessary to hide "leaders" underground, the *evolution* of good "leaders", reliable, tested and authoritative, is a very difficult matter; these difficulties *cannot* be successfully overcome without combining legal and illegal work, and *without testing the "leaders", among other ways*, in parliaments. Criticism—the most keen, ruthless and uncompromising criticism—should be directed, not against parliamentarianism or parliamentary activities, but against those leaders who are unable—and still more against those who are *unwilling*—to utilise parliamentary elections and the parliamentary rostrum in a revolutionary and communist manner. Only such criticism—combined, of course, with the dismissal of incapable leaders and their replacement by capable ones—will constitute useful and fruitful revolutionary work that will simultaneously train the "leaders" to be worthy of the working class and of all working people, and train the masses to be able properly to understand the political situation and the often very complicated and intricate tasks that spring from that situation.*

* I have had too little opportunity to acquaint myself with "Left-wing" communism in Italy. Comrade Bordiga and his faction of Abstentionist Com-

At a time when the membership of the German Social-Democratic Party has grown to 970,000 and when the circulation of an American socialist weekly has climbed to 984,000 copies, anyone who has eyes to see must acknowledge that a proletarian is powerless when alone but that millions of proletarians are all-powerful.

Pravda No. 120, September 18, 1912
Signed: *M.N.*

Vol. 18, pp. 335-36

THE RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Wilson, a "Democrat", has been elected President of the United States of America. He has polled over six million votes, Roosevelt (the new National Progressive Party) over four million, Taft (Republican Party) over three million, and the socialist Eugene Debs 800,000 votes.

The world significance of the U.S. elections lies not so much in the great increase in the number of socialist votes as in the far-reaching *crisis* of the *bourgeois* parties, in the amazing force with which their decay has been revealed. Lastly, the significance of the elections lies in the unusually clear and striking revelation of *bourgeois reformism* as a means of combating socialism.

In *all* bourgeois countries, the parties which stand for capitalism, i.e., the bourgeois parties, came into being a long time ago, and the greater the extent of political liberty, the more solid they are.

Freedom in the U.S.A. is most complete. And for a whole *half-century*—since the Civil War over slavery in 1860-65—*two* bourgeois parties have been distinguished there by remarkable solidity and strength. The party of the former slave-owners is the so-called Democratic Party. The capitalist party, which favoured the emancipation of the Negroes, has developed into the Republican Party.

Since the emancipation of the Negroes, the distinction between the two parties has been diminishing. The fight between these two parties has been mainly over the height of customs duties. Their fight *has not had any serious impor-*

lance for the mass of the people. The people have been deceived and diverted from their vital interests by means of spectacular and meaningless *duels* between the two bourgeois parties.

This so-called bipartisan system prevailing in America and Britain has been one of the most powerful means of preventing the rise of an independent working-class, i.e., genuinely socialist, party.

And now the bipartisan system has suffered a fiasco in America, the country boasting the most advanced capitalism! What caused this fiasco?

The strength of the working-class movement, the growth of socialism.

The old bourgeois parties (the "Democratic" and the "Republican" parties) have been facing towards the past, the period of the emancipation of the Negroes. The new bourgeois party, the National Progressive Party, is facing towards the *future*. Its programme turns entirely on the question whether capitalism is to be or not to be, on the issues, to be specific, of protection for the workers and of "trusts", as the capitalist associations are called in the U.S.A.

The old parties are products of an epoch whose task was to develop capitalism as speedily as possible. The struggle between the parties was over the question *how* best to expedite and facilitate this development.

The new party is a product of the present epoch, which raises the issue of the very existence of capitalism. In the U.S.A., the freest and most advanced country, this issue is coming to the fore more clearly and broadly than anywhere else.

The entire programme and entire agitation of Roosevelt and the Progressives turn on how to *save capitalism* by means of *bourgeois reforms*.

The bourgeois reformism which in old Europe manifests itself in the chatter of liberal professors has all at once come forward in the free American republic as a party four millions strong. This is American style.

We shall save capitalism by reforms, says that party. We shall grant the most progressive factory legislation. We shall establish state control over *all* the trusts (in the U.S.A.

that means over *all* industries!). We shall establish state control over them to eliminate poverty and enable everybody to earn a "decent" wage. We shall establish "social and industrial justice". We revere *all* reforms—the *only* "reform" we don't want is *expropriation of the capitalists!*

The national wealth of the U.S.A. is now reckoned to be 120 billion (thousand million) dollars, i.e., about 240 billion rubles. Approximately *one-third* of it, or about 80 billion rubles, belongs to *two* trusts, those of Rockefeller and Morgan, or is subordinated to these trusts! Not more than 40,000 families making up these two trusts are the masters of 80 million wage-slaves.

Obviously, so long as these modern slave-owners are there, all "reforms" will be nothing but a deception. Roosevelt has been *deliberately* hired by the astute multimillionaires to preach this deception. The "state control" they promise will become—if the capitalists keep their capital—a means of combating and crushing strikes.

But the American proletariat has already awakened and has taken up his post. He greets Roosevelt's success with cheerful irony, as if to say: You lured four million people with your promises of reform, dear impostor Roosevelt. Very well! Tomorrow those four million will see that your promises were a fraud, and don't forget that they are following you *only* because they feel that it is *impossible* to go on living in the old way.

Pravda No. 164, November 9, 1912
Signed: V.I.

Vol. 18, pp. 402-04

AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN AMERICA

We have already pointed out in *Pravda* the great importance of the Republican Party split in America and the formation of Roosevelt's Progressive Party.

Now the elections are over. The Democrats have won, and at once the consequences predicted by the socialists are beginning to tell. Roosevelt's Progressive Party, with its 4.5 million votes, is a specimen of the broad bourgeois-reformist trend which has come on the scene in sweeping American fashion.

What happens to this trend is of general interest because, in one form or another, it exists in *all* capitalist countries.

In any bourgeois-reformist trend there are two main streams: the bourgeois bigwigs and politicians, who deceive the masses with promises of reform, and the cheated masses, who feel that they cannot go on living in the old way, and follow the quack with the loudest promises. And so we find the brand-new Progressive Party in America splitting at the seams right after the elections.

The bourgeois politicians who made use of Roosevelt's quackery to dupe the masses are already yelling about a *merger* with the Republican Party. What's the idea? It is simply this: the politicians want the cushy jobs which the victorious party in America hands out to its supporters with especial brazenness. The Republican split gave the victory to the Democrats. These are now ecstatically sharing out the luscious public pie. Is it surprising that their rivals are prepared to renounce the Progressive Party and return to the *consolidated* Republican Party, which has every chance of defeating the Democrats?

Indeed, this looks very much like a cynical cheap sale of "party loyalties". But we see exactly the same thing in *all* capitalist countries; and the *less* freedom there is in a country, the dirtier and fouler is this sale of party loyalties among the bourgeois sharks, and the greater is the importance of backstairs intrigues and private connections in procuring concessions, subsidies, bonanza legal cases (for the lawyers), etc.

The other wing of any bourgeois-reformist trend—the cheated masses—has now also revealed itself in the highly original, free and lucid American style. "Scores who had voted for the Progressive Party," writes *Appeal to Reason*, the New York workers' paper, "now come to socialist editorial offices and bureaux for all kinds of information. They are mostly young people, trusting, inexperienced. They are the sheep shorn by Roosevelt, without any knowledge of politics or economics. They instinctively feel that the Socialist Party, with its one million votes, is a more serious proposition than Roosevelt's 4.5 million, and what they want to know most is whether the minimum reforms promised by Roosevelt can be implemented."

"Needless to say," the paper adds, "we are glad to give every one of these 'progressives' *any* information, and never let any of them leave without socialist literature."

The lot of capitalism is such that its sharpest operators cannot help "working"—for socialism!

Written before November 25
(December 8), 1912

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Vol. 36, pp. 204-05

historical conditions is correct. But Stalin's pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, when the national question was not yet regarded by Marxists as a question of world significance, when the Marxists' fundamental demand for the right to self-determination was regarded not as part of the proletarian revolution, but as part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be ridiculous not to see that since then the international situation has radically changed, that the war, on the one hand, and the October Revolution in Russia, on the other, transformed the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As far back as October 1916, in his article, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", Lenin said that the main point of the national question, the right to self-determination, had ceased to be a part of the general democratic movement, that it had already become a component part of the general proletarian, socialist revolution. I do not even mention subsequent works on the national question by Lenin and by other representatives of Russian communism. After all this, what significance can Semich's reference to the passage in Stalin's pamphlet, written in the period of the *bourgeois-democratic* revolution in Russia, have at the present time, when, as a consequence of the new historical situation, we have entered a new epoch, the epoch of *proletarian* revolution? It can only signify that Semich quotes outside of space and time, without reference to the living historical situation, and thereby violates the most elementary requirements of dialectics, and ignores the fact that what is right for one historical situation may prove to be wrong in another historical situation.⁶

From this it can be seen that there are two kinds of world revolution, the first belonging to the bourgeois or capitalist category. The era of this kind of world revolution is long past, having come to an end as far back as 1914 when the first imperialist world war broke out, and more particularly in 1917 when the October Revolution took place. The second kind, namely, the proletarian-socialist world revolution, thereupon began. This revolution has the proletariat of the capitalist countries as its main force and the oppressed peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies as its allies. No matter what classes, parties or individuals in an oppressed nation join the revolution, and no matter whether they themselves are conscious of the point or understand it,

so long as they oppose imperialism, their revolution becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and they become its allies.

Today, the Chinese revolution has taken on still greater significance. This is a time when the economic and political crises of capitalism are dragging the world more and more deeply into the Second World War, when the Soviet Union has reached the period of transition from socialism to communism and is capable of leading and helping the proletariat and oppressed nations of the whole world in their fight against imperialist war and capitalist reaction, when the proletariat of the capitalist countries is preparing to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism, and when the proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie in China have become a mighty independent political force under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Situated as we are in this day and age, should we not make the appraisal that the Chinese revolution has taken on still greater world significance? I think we should. The Chinese revolution has become a very important part of the world revolution.

Although the Chinese revolution in this first stage (with its many sub-stages) is a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution and is not yet itself a proletarian-socialist revolution in its social character, it has long become a part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and is now even a very important part and a great ally of this world revolution. The first step or stage in our revolution is definitely not, and cannot be, the establishment of a capitalist society under the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie, but will result in the establishment of a new-democratic society under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes of China headed by the Chinese proletariat. The revolution will then be carried forward to the second stage, in which a socialist society will be established in China.

This is the fundamental characteristic of the Chinese revolution of today, of the new revolutionary process of the past twenty years (counting from the May 4th Movement of 1919), and its concrete living essence.

V. THE POLITICS OF NEW DEMOCRACY

The new historical characteristic of the Chinese revolution is its division into two stages, the first being the new-democratic revolution.

How does this manifest itself concretely in internal political and economic relations? Let us consider the question.

Before the May 4th Movement of 1919 (which occurred after the first imperialist world war of 1914 and the Russian October Revolution of 1917), the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie (through their intellectuals) were the political leaders of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The Chinese proletariat had not yet appeared on the political scene as an awakened and independent class force, but participated in the revolution only as a follower of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. Such was the case with the proletariat at the time of the Revolution of 1911.

After the May 4th Movement, the political leader of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution was no longer the bourgeoisie but the proletariat, although the national bourgeoisie continued to take part in the revolution. The Chinese proletariat rapidly became an awakened and independent political force as a result of its maturing and of the influence of the Russian Revolution. It was the Chinese Communist Party that put forward the slogan "Down with imperialism" and the thoroughgoing programme for the whole bourgeois-democratic revolution, and it was the Chinese Communist Party alone that carried out the Agrarian Revolution.

Being a bourgeoisie in a colonial and semi-colonial country and oppressed by imperialism, the Chinese national bourgeoisie retains a certain revolutionary quality at certain periods and to a certain degree — even in the era of imperialism — in its opposition to the foreign imperialists and the domestic governments of bureaucrats and warlords (instances of opposition to the latter can be found in the periods of the Revolution of 1911 and the Northern Expedition), and it may ally itself with the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie against such enemies as it is ready to oppose. In this respect the Chinese bourgeoisie differs from the bourgeoisie of old tsarist Russia. Since tsarist Russia was a military-feudal imperialism which carried on aggression against other countries, the Russian bourgeoisie was entirely lacking in revolutionary quality. There, the task of the proletariat was to oppose the bourgeoisie, not to unite with it. But China's national bourgeoisie has a revolutionary quality at certain periods and to a certain degree, because China is a colonial and semi-colonial country which is a victim of aggression. Here, the task of the proletariat is to form a united front with the national bourgeoisie against imperialism and

the bureaucrat and warlord governments without overlooking its revolutionary quality.

At the same time, however, being a bourgeois class in a colonial and semi-colonial country and so being extremely flabby economically and politically, the Chinese national bourgeoisie also has another quality, namely, a proneness to conciliation with the enemies of the revolution. Even when it takes part in the revolution, it is unwilling to break with imperialism completely and, moreover, it is closely associated with the exploitation of the rural areas through land rent; thus it is neither willing nor able to overthrow imperialism, and much less the feudal forces, in a thorough way. So neither of the two basic problems or tasks of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution can be solved or accomplished by the national bourgeoisie. As for China's big bourgeoisie, which is represented by the Kuomintang, all through the long period from 1927 to 1937 it nestled in the arms of the imperialists and formed an alliance with the feudal forces against the revolutionary people. In 1927 and for some time afterwards, the Chinese national bourgeoisie also followed the counter-revolution. During the present anti-Japanese war, the section of the big bourgeoisie represented by Wang Ching-wei has capitulated to the enemy, which constitutes a fresh betrayal on the part of the big bourgeoisie. In this respect, then, the bourgeoisie in China differs from the earlier bourgeoisie of the European and American countries, and especially of France. When the bourgeoisie in those countries, and especially in France, was still in its revolutionary era, the bourgeois revolution was comparatively thorough, whereas the bourgeoisie in China lacks even this degree of thoroughness.

Possible participation in the revolution on the one hand and proneness to conciliation with the enemies of the revolution on the other — such is the dual character of the Chinese bourgeoisie, it faces both ways. Even the bourgeoisie in European and American history had shared this dual character. When confronted by a formidable enemy, they united with the workers and peasants against him, but when the workers and peasants awakened, they turned round to unite with the enemy against the workers and peasants. This is a general rule applicable to the bourgeoisie everywhere in the world, but the trait is more pronounced in the Chinese bourgeoisie.

In China, it is perfectly clear that whoever can lead the people in overthrowing imperialism and the forces of feudalism can win the people's confidence, because these two, and especially imperialism, are

the mortal enemies of the people. Today, whoever can lead the people in driving out Japanese imperialism and introducing democratic government will be the saviours of the people. History has proved that the Chinese bourgeoisie cannot fulfil this responsibility, which inevitably falls upon the shoulders of the proletariat.

Therefore, the proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie undoubtedly constitute the basic forces determining China's fate. These classes, some already awakened and others in the process of awakening, will necessarily become the basic components of the state and governmental structure in the democratic republic of China, with the proletariat as the leading force. The Chinese democratic republic which we desire to establish now must be a democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people led by the proletariat, that is, a new-democratic republic, a republic of the genuinely revolutionary new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies.

This new-democratic republic will be different from the old European-American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship, which is the old democratic form and already out of date. On the other hand, it will also be different from the socialist republic of the Soviet type under the dictatorship of the proletariat which is already flourishing in the U.S.S.R., and which, moreover, will be established in all the capitalist countries and will undoubtedly become the dominant form of state and governmental structure in all the industrially advanced countries. However, for a certain historical period, this form is not suitable for the revolutions in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. During this period, therefore, a third form of state must be adopted in the revolutions of all colonial and semi-colonial countries, namely, the new-democratic republic. This form suits a certain historical period and is therefore transitional; nevertheless, it is a form which is necessary and cannot be dispensed with.

Thus the numerous types of state system in the world can be reduced to three basic kinds according to the class character of their political power: (1) republics under bourgeois dictatorship; (2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; and (3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes.

The first kind comprises the old democratic states. Today, after the outbreak of the second imperialist war, there is hardly a trace of democracy in many of the capitalist countries, which have come or are coming under the bloody militarist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

Certain countries under the joint dictatorship of the landlords and the bourgeoisie can be grouped with this kind.

The second kind exists in the Soviet Union, and the conditions for its birth are ripening in capitalist countries. In the future, it will be the dominant form throughout the world for a certain period.

The third kind is the transitional form of state to be adopted in the revolutions of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Each of these revolutions will necessarily have specific characteristics of its own, but these will be minor variations on a general theme. So long as they are revolutions in colonial or semi-colonial countries, their state and governmental structure will of necessity be basically the same, *i.e.*, a new-democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several anti-imperialist classes. In present-day China, the anti-Japanese united front represents the new-democratic form of state. It is anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist; it is also a united front, an alliance of several revolutionary classes. But unfortunately, despite the fact that the war has been going on for so long, the work of introducing democracy has hardly started in most of the country outside the democratic anti-Japanese base areas under the leadership of the Communist Party, and the Japanese imperialists have exploited this fundamental weakness to stride into our country. If nothing is done about it, our national future will be gravely imperilled.

The question under discussion here is that of the "state system". After several decades of wrangling since the last years of the Ching Dynasty, it has still not been cleared up. Actually it is simply a question of the status of the various social classes within the state. The bourgeoisie, as a rule, conceals the problem of class status and carries out its one-class dictatorship under the "national" label. Such concealment is of no advantage to the revolutionary people and the matter should be clearly explained to them. The term "national" is all right, but it must not include counter-revolutionaries and traitors. The kind of state we need today is a dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes over the counter-revolutionaries and traitors.

The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

Such was the solemn declaration made in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, held in 1924 during the period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation. For sixteen years the Kuomintang has violated this declaration and as a result it has created the present grave national crisis. This is a gross blunder, which we hope the Kuomintang will correct in the cleansing flames of the anti-Japanese war.

As for the question of "the system of government", this is a matter of how political power is organized, the form in which one social class or another chooses to arrange its apparatus of political power to oppose its enemies and protect itself. There is no state which does not have an appropriate apparatus of political power to represent it. China may now adopt a system of people's congresses, from the national people's congress down to the provincial, county, district and township people's congresses, with all levels electing their respective governmental bodies. But if there is to be a proper representation for each revolutionary class according to its status in the state, a proper expression of the people's will, a proper direction for revolutionary struggles and a proper manifestation of the spirit of New Democracy, then a system of really universal and equal suffrage, irrespective of sex, creed, property or education, must be introduced. Such is the system of democratic centralism. Only a government based on democratic centralism can fully express the will of all the revolutionary people and fight the enemies of the revolution most effectively. There must be a spirit of refusal to be "privately owned by the few" in the government and the army; without a genuinely democratic system this cannot be attained and the system of government and the state system will be out of harmony.

The state system, a joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes and the system of government, democratic centralism — these constitute the politics of New Democracy, the republic of New Democracy, the republic of the anti-Japanese united front, the republic of the new Three People's Principles with their Three Great Policies, the Republic of China in reality as well as in name. Today we have a Republic of China in name but not in reality, and our present task is to create the reality that will fit the name.

Such are the internal political relations which a revolutionary China, a China fighting Japanese aggression, should and must establish without fail; such is the orientation, the only correct orientation, for our present work of national reconstruction.

VI. THE ECONOMY OF NEW DEMOCRACY

If such a republic is to be established in China, it must be new-democratic not only in its politics but also in its economy.

It will own the big banks and the big industrial and commercial enterprises.

Enterprises, such as banks, railways and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this is the main principle of the regulation of capital.

This is another solemn declaration in the Manifesto of the Kuomintang's First National Congress held during the period of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, and it is the correct policy for the economic structure of the new-democratic republic. In the new-democratic republic under the leadership of the proletariat, the state enterprises will be of a socialist character and will constitute the leading force in the whole national economy, but the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as does not "dominate the livelihood of the people", for China's economy is still very backward.

The republic will take certain necessary steps to confiscate the land of the landlords and distribute it to those peasants having little or no land, carry out Dr. Sun Yat-sen's slogan of "land to the tiller", abolish feudal relations in the rural areas, and turn the land over to the private ownership of the peasants. A rich peasant economy will be allowed in the rural areas. Such is the policy of "equalization of landownership". "Land to the tiller" is the correct slogan for this policy. In general, socialist agriculture will not be established at this stage, though various types of co-operative enterprises developed on the basis of "land to the tiller" will contain elements of socialism.

China's economy must develop along the path of the "regulation of capital" and the "equalization of landownership", and must never be "privately owned by the few"; we must never permit the few capitalists and landlords to "dominate the livelihood of the people"; we must never establish a capitalist society of the European-American type or allow the old semi-feudal society to survive. Whoever dares

the scheme to turn the movement for constitutional government into the private concern of a few bureaucrats, to oppose the attacks on the new army, the persecution of the League of Self-Sacrifice and the massacre of progressives in Shansi,¹ to oppose the activities of the Three People's Principles Youth League in kidnapping people along the Hsienyang-Yulin Highway and the Lunghai Railway,² to oppose such shameless practices as taking nine concubines and making fortunes of 100 million yuan out of the national crisis, and to oppose the unbridled brutality of the corrupt officials and the local tyrants and evil gentry. Without opposing all these and without unity and progress, "resistance" will be just empty talk and victory a vain hope. What will be the political orientation of the *New China News* in its second year? It will be to stress unity and progress and oppose all the vicious practices which are detrimental to the war, so that further successes can be achieved in our cause of resistance to Japan.

NOTES

¹ The League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation in Shansi was a local anti-Japanese mass organization formed in 1936 which co-operated closely with the Communist Party. It played an important role in the anti-Japanese fighting there. In December 1939 Yen Hsi-shan, the Kuomintang warlord-governor of Shansi, openly began to suppress the league in the western part of the province and brutally killed a great number of Communists, officers of the league and other progressives.

² In 1939 the Kuomintang drew a cordon along the Hsienyang-Yulin Highway and the Lunghai (Kansu-Haichow) Railway by setting up a number of check-posts in the guise of "hostels" of the Three People's Principles Youth League. Secret agents posted at these hostels, working together with the Kuomintang troops, arrested progressive young people and intellectuals entering or leaving the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and interned them in concentration camps, where they were either cruelly murdered or compelled to turn informer against the Communist Party.

NEW-DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

February 20, 1940

It is highly significant that representatives of the people of all circles in Yen-an are meeting here today to inaugurate the Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government and that everybody has become interested in constitutionalism. What is the purpose of our meeting? It is to facilitate the full expression of the popular will, the defeat of Japan and the building of a new China.

Armed resistance to Japan, which we all support, is already being carried out, and the question now is only one of persevering in it. But there is something else, namely, democracy, which is not being carried out. Both are of paramount importance to China today. To be sure, China lacks many things, but the main ones are independence and democracy. In the absence of either, China's affairs will not go well. And while there are two things lacking, there are also two superfluous ones. What are they? Imperialist oppression and feudal oppression. It is because of these two superfluous things that China has become a colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The principal demands of the nation today are for independence and democracy, and therefore imperialism and feudalism must be destroyed. They must be destroyed resolutely, thoroughly, and without the least mercy. Some say that only

Comrade Mao Tse-tung delivered this speech before the Yen-an Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government. Confused by Chiang Kai-shek's deceptive propaganda at the time, many comrades in the Party thought that perhaps the Kuomintang really would establish a constitutional government. Comrade Mao Tse-tung here exposed Chiang Kai-shek's deceit, wrested the propaganda weapon of "constitutional government" from his hands and turned it into a weapon for awakening the people to demand freedom and democracy from Chiang Kai-shek. Thereupon, Chiang Kai-shek immediately packed up this bag of tricks, and never again throughout the whole War of Resistance Against Japan did he dare to propagate his so-called constitutional government.

construction is needed, not destruction. Well, we should like to ask: Shouldn't Wang Ching-wei be destroyed? Shouldn't Japanese imperialism be destroyed? Shouldn't the feudal system be destroyed? Construction is certainly out of the question unless you destroy these evils. Only by destroying them can China be saved and construction be set going; otherwise, it will all be an idle dream. Only by destroying the old and the rotten can we build the new and the sound. Combine independence and democracy and you have resistance on the basis of democracy, or democracy in the service of resistance. Without democracy, resistance will fail. Without democracy, resistance cannot be maintained. With democracy, we shall certainly win even if we have to go on resisting for eight or ten years.

What is constitutional government? It is democratic government. I agree with what our old Comrade Wu¹ has just said. What kind of democratic government do we need today? New-democratic government, the constitutional government of New Democracy. Not the old, outmoded, European-American type of so-called democracy which is bourgeois dictatorship, nor as yet the Soviet type of democracy which is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Democracy of the old type, practised in other countries, is on its way out and has become reactionary. Under no circumstances should we accept such a reactionary thing. The sort of constitutional government which the Chinese die-hards are talking about is the old type of bourgeois democracy found abroad. But while they talk about it, they do not really want even that; they are using such talk to deceive the people. What they really want is a one-party fascist dictatorship. The Chinese national bourgeoisie, on the other hand, does want this type of constitutional government and would like to establish a bourgeois dictatorship in China, but it can never succeed. For the Chinese people do not want such a government and would not welcome a one-class dictatorship by the bourgeoisie. China's affairs must be decided by the vast majority of the Chinese people, and the monopoly of government by the bourgeoisie alone must be absolutely rejected. Then what about socialist democracy? Of course, it is very good, and will eventually prevail throughout the world. But today this type of democracy is not yet practicable in China, and we must therefore do without it for the time being. Not until certain conditions are present will it be possible to have socialist democracy. The kind of democratic government we need today is neither democracy of the old type nor yet democracy of the socialist type, but New Democracy

which is suited to the conditions of present-day China. The constitutional government to be promoted is new-democratic constitutional government.

What is new-democratic constitutional government? It is the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries. Someone once said, "If there is food, let everyone share it." I think this can serve to illustrate New Democracy. Just as everyone should share what food there is, so there should be no monopoly of power by a single party, group or class. This idea was well expressed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang:

The so-called democratic system in modern states is usually monopolized by the bourgeoisie and has become simply an instrument for oppressing the common people. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's Principle of Democracy means a democratic system shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few.

Comrades, in studying constitutional government we shall read various books, but above all, we must study this manifesto, and this passage should be learned by heart. "Shared by all the common people and not privately owned by the few" — this is the substance of what we describe as new-democratic constitutional government, as the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries; such is the constitutional government we need today. And it is the form which a constitutional government of the anti-Japanese united front should take.

The purpose of our meeting today is to promote or urge the establishment of constitutional government. Why do we have to "urge" it? If everybody were marching forward, then nobody would need to be urged. Why do we trouble to hold this meeting? Because some people, instead of marching forward, are lying down and refusing to move on. Not only do they refuse to move forward, they actually want to go back. You call on them to go forward, but they would rather die than do so; these people are die-hards. They are so stubborn that we have to hold this meeting to give them an "urging". Where does the term "urge" come from? Who first applied it in this connection? Not we, but that great and venerated man, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who said: "For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the national revolution. . . ." Read his Testament and you will find the following

words: "Most recently I have recommended the convocation of the national assembly . . . and its realization in the shortest possible time must in particular be urged. This is my heartfelt charge to you." Comrades, not an ordinary "charge" but a "heartfelt charge". A "heartfelt charge" is not just the usual kind of charge, so how can it be lightly ignored? Again, "the shortest possible time"; first, not the longest time, second, not a relatively long time, and third, not just a short time but "the shortest possible time". If we want the national assembly to come into being in the shortest possible time, then we have to "urge" it. Dr. Sun Yat-sen has been dead for fifteen years, but to this day the national assembly he recommended has not been convened. Fiddling every day with political tutelage, certain people have senselessly fiddled away the time, turning "the shortest possible time" into the longest time, and yet they are for ever invoking Dr. Sun Yat-sen's name. How Dr. Sun's ghost would rebuke these unworthy followers of his! It is perfectly clear that without "urging", there will be no moving forward; "urging" is needed because many are moving back and many others are not yet awakened.

As some people are not moving forward, we have to urge them. We have to urge others because they are slow. That is why we are calling many meetings to urge the establishment of constitutional government. The youth have held such meetings, and so have the women, the workers, the schools, government organizations and army units. It is all very lively and very good. And now we are holding this general meeting for the same purpose, so that all of us can go into action to urge the speedy enforcement of constitutional government and the immediate application of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings.

Some say: "You are in Yen-an while those people are in various other places. What is the use of your urging them if they take no notice?" Yes, there is some use. For things are moving and they will have to take notice. If we hold more meetings, write more articles, make more speeches and send more telegrams, they will find it impossible not to take notice. I think our numerous meetings in Yen-an to promote constitutional government have a twofold purpose. One is to study the problem and the other is to push people forward. Why do we have to study? Because supposing they do not go forward and you urge them, and they then ask why you are pushing, it is necessary to be able to answer. To do so, we have to make a serious study of the hows and whys of constitutional government. This is exactly what our old Comrade Wu has been talking about in some detail. All schools,

government organizations and army units and all sections of the people should study the problem of constitutional government confronting us.

Once we have studied it, we can push people forward. To push them forward is to urge them on and, as we push in all fields, things will all gradually move ahead. The many little streams will merge into a great river to wash away all that is rotten and filthy, and new-democratic constitutional government will emerge. The effect of such pushing will be very great. What we do in Yen-an is bound to influence the whole country.

Comrades, do you imagine that once the meetings have been held and the telegrams dispatched, the die-hards will be bowled over, will start moving forward, will submit to our orders? No, they will not be as docile as that. A great many of them are graduates of special training schools for die-hards. Die-hards they are today, and die-hards they will remain tomorrow and even the day after. What does die-hard mean? "Hard" means to be inflexible and "die" means to be dead set against progress today, tomorrow and even the day after. Such are the people we call die-hards. To make them listen to us is no easy matter.

As far as the constitutional governments the world has so far known are concerned, whether in Britain, France, the United States or the Soviet Union, a body of basic laws, that is, a constitution, has generally been promulgated after a successful revolution to give recognition to the actual establishment of democracy. But China's case is different. In China the revolution has not yet succeeded and, except in areas like our Border Region, democratic government is not yet a fact. The fact is that China today is under semi-colonial and semi-feudal rule, and even if a good constitution were promulgated, it would inevitably be hindered by the feudal forces and obstructed by the die-hards, so that it would be impossible to carry it out smoothly. Thus the present movement for constitutional government has to strive for a democracy that is not yet achieved, rather than to affirm a democracy that has already become a fact. This means a major struggle, and it is certainly no light or easy matter.

Those who have all along opposed constitutional government² are now paying it lip-service. Why? Because they are under pressure from the people, who want to fight Japan, and they have to temporize a little. They are even shouting at the top of their voices, "We have always stood for constitutional government!" and making a terrific din. For years we have been hearing the words "constitutional

government", but so far we have seen no trace of it. These people say one thing and do another and may be called double-dealers in constitutional government. Their "always stood for" is truly an example of their double-dealing. The die-hards of today are precisely such double-dealers. Their constitutional government is a swindle. In the not too distant future you may get a constitution, and a president into the bargain. But as for democracy and freedom, heaven alone knows when they will give you that. China has already had a constitution. Did not Tsao Kun promulgate one?³ But where were democracy and freedom to be found? As for presidents, there have been a number of them. The first, Sun Yat-sen, was good, but he was edged out by Yuan Shih-kai. The second was Yuan Shih-kai, the third Li Yuan-hung,⁴ the fourth Feng Kuo-chang⁵ and the fifth Hsu Shih-chang,⁶ indeed a great many, but were they any different from the despotic emperors? Both the constitution and the presidents were fakes. At the present time the so-called constitutional and democratic governments of countries like Britain, France and the United States are in fact man-eating governments. The same is true of Central and South America where many countries display the republican signboard but in fact have no trace of democracy. Similarly with China's present-day die-hards. Their talk of constitutional government is only "selling dog-meat under the label of a sheep's head". They display the sheep's head of constitutional government while selling the dog-meat of one-party dictatorship. I am not attacking them groundlessly; my words are well-founded, because for all their talk about constitutional government they do not give the people a particle of freedom.

Comrades, real constitutional government will never come easily; it can only be obtained through hard struggle. Therefore you must not expect that it will come immediately after we have held our meetings, sent our telegrams and written our articles. Nor must you expect that once the People's Political Council⁷ passes a resolution, the National Government issues a decree, and the national assembly⁸ meets on November 12, promulgates a constitution and even elects a president, everything will be fine and all will be right with the world. That is impossible, so don't get confused. This needs to be explained to the common people so that they will not be confused either. Things will never be that easy.

Should we then lament the cause as lost? Things are so difficult that it seems hopeless. But that is not so either. There is still hope for constitutional government, and great hope at that, and China

will certainly become a new-democratic state. Why? The difficulties arise because of trouble-making by the die-hards, but they cannot go on being die-hards for ever, and that is why we still have high hopes. The die-hards of the world may be die-hards today and remain so tomorrow and even the day after, but not for ever; in the end they will have to change. Wang Ching-wei, for example, was a die-hard for a very long time, yet he could not keep on acting the die-hard within the anti-Japanese ranks and had to go over to the Japanese. Chang Kuo-tao, to take another example, was also a die-hard for a very long time, but he, too, took to his heels after we held a number of meetings and struggled repeatedly against him. Actually, the die-hards may be hard, but they are not hard unto death, and in the end they change — into something filthy and contemptible, like dog's dung. Some change for the better and that is also the result of our repeated struggles against them — they come to see their mistakes and change for the better. In short, die-hards do change eventually. They always have many schemes in hand, schemes for profiting at others' expense, for double-dealing, and so on. But they always get the opposite of what they want. They invariably start by doing others harm but end by ruining themselves. We once said that Chamberlain was "lifting a rock only to drop it on his own toes", and this has now come to pass. Chamberlain had set his heart on using Hitler as the rock with which to crush the toes of the Soviet people, but since that September day last year when war broke out between Germany on the one side and Britain and France on the other, the rock in his hands has fallen on his own toes. To this day he is still smarting from it. Similar instances abound in China. Yuan Shih-kai wanted to crush the toes of the common people but in the event hurt himself, and he died just a few months after becoming emperor.⁹ Tuan Chi-ji, Hsu Shih-chang, Tsao Kun, Wu Pei-fu and all the rest wanted to repress the people, but finally they were all overthrown by the people. Whoever tries to profit at others' expense will come to no good end.

I think that, unless they move forward, the anti-Communist die-hards of today can be no exception to this rule. On the high-sounding pretext of unification, they are planning to liquidate the progressive Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region, the progressive Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, the progressive Communist Party and mass organizations. They have any number of schemes of this sort. But I believe the outcome will be not the liquidation of progress by die-hardism but the liquidation of die-hardism by progress. Indeed, to

escape liquidation the die-hards have no alternative but to move forward. Hence we have often advised them not to attack the Eighth Route Army, the Communist Party and the Border Region. If they must, they had better make a resolution starting as follows: "Determined as we are to liquidate ourselves and provide the Communist Party with ample opportunity to expand, we, the die-hards, assume the responsibility for attacking the Communist Party and the Border Region." The die-hards have had plenty of experience in "suppressing the Communists", and should they now want to have another go, they are free to do so. If after eating their fill and having a good sleep, they feel like doing some "suppression", that is up to them. However, they must be prepared for the above resolution to go into effect, for it is unalterable. The "suppression of the Communists" in the past ten years invariably turned out in conformity with this resolution. Any further "suppression" will also conform to it. Hence I advise them not to go in for "suppression". For what the whole nation wants is not "suppression of the Communists" but resistance, unity and progress. Therefore, anyone who tries to "suppress the Communists" is bound to fail.

In short, retrogression eventually produces the reverse of what its promoters intend. There is no exception to this rule either in modern or in ancient times, in China or elsewhere.

The same is true of constitutional government today. If the die-hards keep on opposing it, the result will certainly be the reverse of what they intend. The movement for constitutional government will never follow the course decided on by the die-hards, but will run counter to their intentions, and it will inevitably take the course decided on by the people. This is certain, for the people throughout the country demand it, and so do the current of China's historical development and the whole trend of world affairs. Who can resist it? The wheel of history cannot be pushed back. However, the work we have undertaken requires time and cannot be accomplished overnight; it requires effort and cannot be done in a slipshod way; it requires the mobilization of the great masses of the people and cannot be done effectively by a single pair of hands. It is a very good thing that we are holding this meeting here today; after our meeting we shall write articles and send telegrams, and we shall also hold similar meetings in the Wutai Mountains, the Taihang Mountains, northern China, central China and all over the country. If we go on doing this and keep it up for several years, that will be just about right. We must

make a good job of it, we must win democracy and freedom, we must establish new-democratic constitutional government. If this is not done and the die-hards are allowed to have their way, the nation will perish. This is the way we must work to avoid national subjugation. For this purpose everybody must exert himself. If we do so, there is great hope for our cause. It must further be understood that after all the die-hards are only a minority, while the majority consists not of die-hards but of people capable of moving forward. With the majority pitted against the minority, plus the efforts we exert, the hope will be even greater. That is why I say that, difficult though the task may be, there is great hope.

NOTES

¹ Old Comrade Wu is Comrade Wu Yu-chang, who was then Chairman of the Yen-an Association for the Promotion of Constitutional Government.

² "Those" refers to the Kuomintang reactionary clique headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

³ In 1923 Tsao Kun, a big Northern warlord, had himself elected President of the Republic by bribing 590 members of parliament with 5,000 silver dollars each. He then promulgated a constitution, which came to be known as the "Tsao Kun Constitution" or the "Constitution of Bribery".

⁴ Li Yuan-hung was originally commander of a brigade in the armed forces of the Ching Dynasty. He was compelled by his officers and men to side with the revolution during the Wuchang Uprising in 1911 and was made military governor of Hupeh Province. He later became Vice-President and then President of the Republic under the regime of the Northern warlord clique.

⁵ Feng Kuo-chang was one of Yuan Shih-kai's underlings. After Yuan's death, he became the leader of the Chihli (Hopei) group of the Northern warlord clique. In 1917 he got rid of Li Yuan-hung and became President himself.

⁶ Hsu Shih-chang was a politician in the service of the Northern warlord clique. He was elected President in 1918 by the parliament controlled by Tuan Chi-jui.

⁷ The People's Political Council was a mere advisory body reluctantly set up by the Kuomintang government after the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. The members were all "invited" by the Kuomintang government. Nominally it included the representatives of all anti-Japanese political parties and groups, but it was actually dominated by the Kuomintang majority. It had no power to influence the policies or the measures adopted by the Kuomintang government. As Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang became more and more reactionary, the number of Kuomintang and other reactionaries on the council increased while the number of democrats decreased and their freedom of speech was severely curtailed, until the council increasingly became a mere tool of Kuomintang reaction. After the Southern Anhwei Incident of 1941, the Communist members of the council boycotted its meetings several times in protest against the Kuomintang's reactionary measures.

⁸ A resolution demanding that the Kuomintang government convene a national assembly and establish a constitutional government at a fixed date was passed at the Fourth Session of the People's Political Council in September 1939, on the proposal of the Communist Party and the democrats of other parties and groups. In November 1939 the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang announced that the national assembly would be convened on November 12, 1940. Though much publicized to dupe the people, this pledge came to nothing.

⁹ Yuan Shih-kai proclaimed himself emperor on December 12, 1915, but was forced to give up the title on March 22, 1916.

ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE BASE AREAS


March 6, 1940

1. This is a time when the anti-Communist die-hards of the Kuomintang are doing all they can to prevent us from setting up organs of anti-Japanese democratic political power in northern and central China and other places, while we on our part must set them up, and in the major anti-Japanese base areas it is already possible for us to do so. Our struggle with the anti-Communist die-hards over this issue in northern, central and northwestern China can help to promote the establishment of united front organs of political power over the whole country and it is being followed attentively by the whole nation. Therefore, this issue must be handled carefully.

2. The political power we are establishing during the anti-Japanese war is of a united front character. It is the political power of all those who support both resistance and democracy; it is the joint democratic dictatorship of several revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries. It differs from the counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the landlord class and the bourgeoisie as well as from the worker-peasant democratic dictatorship of the Agrarian Revolution period. A clear understanding of the character of this political power and conscientious efforts to put it into practice will greatly help to spread democracy through the country. Any deviation, either to the "Left" or the Right, will create a very bad impression on the whole nation.

3. The convening of the Hopei Provincial Assembly and the elections to the Hopei Administrative Council, preparations for which have just been started, will be of exceptional importance. Equally important will be the establishment of the new organs of political power in northwestern Shansi, in Shantung, in areas north of the Huai

This inner-Party directive was written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.



THE STATE AND CLASS STRUGGLE: TRENDS IN MARXIST POLITICAL SCIENCE

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A STRIKING FEATURE of Marxist political studies is its relatively backward character. There have been fewer Marxist studies of politics than of class formation and structure (sociology), capitalist production (economics), and past class struggles (history). The lag is especially great in the United States. Many Marxist political studies available in English are by foreign scholars (including Amin, Frank, Miliband, Offe, and Poulantzas) and by American Marxists from other social science disciplines (including Esping-Andersen, O'Connor, and Wallerstein).

One reason for the underdeveloped state of Marxist political studies is the lack of systematic political analysis in Marx's own writing. Although all that Marx wrote might be considered political, in that it attempted to understand the structural basis of inequality and to participate in revolutionary change, Marx engaged in little systematic analysis of the

I am grateful to Richard Shryock for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

formal sphere of politics and the state. As is well known, his mature writing studied the nature of capitalist production, and he died before he could write a projected volume on the state. While Marx analyzed specific political events (for example, the nineteenth-century French revolutions and the German socialist movement), he did not provide an integrated account of politics, the state, and class struggle within capitalism comparable to his analyses of commodity production.

There have been few attempts to fill this void since Marx. Several major Marxist theorist-activists made major contributions in the period around the First World War, including Lenin, Luxemburg, and Trotsky. In the contemporary period, Third World revolutionary figures, including Che, Fanon, and Mao, have adapted Marx's analysis to peasant societies. But until the recent past, with the towering exception of Gramsci, there was little creative Marxist political analysis of Western Europe and the United States—the capitalist heartland that Marx considered the most propitious region for launching a worldwide socialist revolution.

Perry Anderson (1976) has argued that the paucity of Marxist political studies in the West can be traced to the defeat of a working class insurrectionary surge in the period around the First World War. He suggests that Marxist political theorizing is difficult in the absence of an active, mass-based socialist movement. After the First World War, the revolutionary impulse migrated eastward. However, under the leadership of Lenin and especially Stalin, the orthodox communist parties of the Third International became an extension of Soviet foreign policy and engaged in political analyses that were sectarian, dogmatic, and out of tune with Western realities (see Claudin, 1975).

Italian Communist Party leader Antonio Gramsci (1971) was among the few Marxist theorists in the interwar period who rejected the Bolshevik model as inappropriate for socialist revolution in the West. Because the Russian state was rela-

tively weak and Russian society "gelatinous," social revolution could be achieved by overrunning the state—what Gramsci called a "war of movement." However, in the West, the state was stronger and could not easily be stormed. Further, bourgeois hegemony was not exercised solely through the state but also through a complex system of trenches and fortifications within civil society. Revolutionary parties in the West needed to wage what Gramsci called a war of fixed position, in which they slowly developed counterhegemony within civil society. Revolution could not be achieved in one rapid movement.

The rediscovery of Gramsci and the attempt to adapt Marxist political analysis to developments within advanced capitalism are quite recent. Anderson argues that a revival of Marxist political theory in the West was stimulated by the events of May 1968 in France, when 10 million workers staged the largest general strike in history. The turbulence of the late 1960s marked the reentry of the Western working classes on the historical stage, after a long absence due to fascist repression and cold war polarization. Once the working classes mobilized, political analysis soon followed. The few years since the late 1960s have been the most fertile period of Marxist political analysis in Western history.

If Anderson is correct that Marxist political analysis is difficult in the absence of a militant workers' movement, the underdevelopment of Marxist political studies in the United States becomes especially understandable. Despite widespread working class protest, a central characteristic of American politics is the lack of a large socialist movement. The same factors inhibiting socialism in the United States help explain the retarded character of Marxist political science. Because capitalist hegemony has been so secure in the United States, it has been harder to demystify. Further, the elusive character of the American state defuses working class opposition and hinders Marxist political analysis. Federalism and

grass-roots autonomy fragment political authority and disguise the state. This does not mean the state does not exist, but that a first step—unnecessary in Western Europe—is to discern the existence of a state.

Non-Marxist political science has helped to legitimate inequality and the absence of alternatives to political and economic arrangements in the United States. For several decades after the Second World War, the dominant approach and outlook were what I have elsewhere called *apologetic pluralism* (Kesselman, 1982). Pluralist theory took the framework of a capitalist political economy for granted; political "maturity" consisted in isolating and narrowing the sphere of formal politics so that fundamental alternatives to the status quo were not articulated. Not coincidentally, by this measure the United States was considered the most politically modern and developed nation, since capitalist hegemony was most secure in the United States.

Apologetic pluralism argued that, given procedural democracy, all groups were free to participate in politics. Further, since no group was able to achieve its goals entirely and every group was able to achieve them partially, it followed that a rough equality of resources existed. In Robert Dahl's phrase, inequalities were dispersed rather than cumulative (Dahl, 1961). This approach minimized the importance of class, racial, and sexual divisions. Further, the losers in the pluralist game had no one but themselves to blame. Dahl observed, "By their propensity for political passivity the poor and uneducated disenfranchise themselves" (1956:8). (Dahl has considerably revised his earlier views along the lines suggested by radical critics; in recent work, he stresses the inadequacies of pluralism [1977, 1978]).

Until the last decade, approaches opposed to pluralism within American political science were quite unthinkable. So all-pervasive was the hegemony of pluralist theory and practice that it was not presented as one approach competing with

others, but as the only alternative to fascist and Soviet totalitarianism.

However, political events of the 1960s soon contradicted pluralist theory; pluralism seemed singularly inappropriate to account for university occupations, racial revolt, and aggressive war. Some political scientists discovered Marxism after reaching the limits of a critique of pluralism. A first wave of scholarship questioned pluralist research but accepted the pluralist framework. Scholars demonstrated that inequalities of power and income within the United States were extensive, cumulative, and persistent; political officials were recruited from a narrow social and economic group and did not accurately represent the interests of the poor; the political system institutionalized racial and economic inequality, producing systematic biases in the operation of pluralism; nondecisions and abuses of power by political authorities severely narrowed the range of political alternatives; and concentrations of private power limited American democracy. (For a review, see Kesselman, 1982.)

This research was a severe indictment of how pluralism failed to keep its democratic promises. But the critics' choice of research problems, methods, and theory was indirect testimony to the continued influence of pluralism. In the 1970s, many scholars abandoned a pluralist approach to develop a Marxist perspective in American political science.

What produced this epistemological and political break? Anderson's analysis of the historical conditions promoting Marxist theorizing is useful, when adapted to American circumstances. A Marxist political approach did not develop in a political vacuum, and it was not solely the intellectual limitations of pluralism that provoked the development of Marxism. During the 1960s, many of the scholars later embracing Marxism were participant-observers in the civil rights, antiwar, women's, and new left movements. Their dissident political

beliefs and actions coexisted uneasily with their academic research and teaching, which (even when critical) often accepted dominant liberal values. Although the slogans of protest movements in the 1960s were often oversimplified, they captured more of the complexity of American politics than dominant pluralist research, which generally ignored major political conflicts, studied trivial issues with great sophistication, or supported political repression.

The defeat of the left in the 1970s provided a forced opportunity for theoretical reflection. Some activists obtained academic positions which enabled them to deepen their reflection and to share the results. Marxist political studies was born from a collision between realities in the United States and elsewhere—imperialism, inequality, repression, racism, and sexism—and the myths of pluralism, democracy, and incrementalism purveyed in American government textbooks and scholarly research by the major figures in American political science.

Not much more than a decade ago, the only well-known Marxist political scientist in North America was C. B. MacPherson, and the only well-known Marxist work his criticism of the Hobbesian and Lockean foundations of liberalism (1962; also see Marcuse, 1964, whose work was politically relevant and influential). Marxism remains heavily underrepresented in every political science department in the United States. It is a rare department that contains a self-designated Marxist among its tenured faculty. Few students have the opportunity to take courses in which Marxism and Marxist approaches to politics are presented in depth. Marxist faculty members and students are subject to censorship and other forms of repression. Nonetheless, there has been a remarkable growth of Marxism within American political science. One indication is the increasing attention to Marx's own writing (see Draper, 1977; Gilbert, 1981; Miliband, 1977; Ollman, 1976, 1979; and

Thomas, 1980). Another is a veritable explosion of Marxist political research, some of which will be reviewed below. A third indication is the publication of Marxist and radical textbooks and anthologies. (For example, in the field of American government, see textbooks by Dolbeare and Edelman, 1981; Greenberg, 1980; Katznelson and Kesselman, 1979; and Parenti, 1980.) Marxist political studies are published in many left journals in the United States. (For a list, see the bibliography.)

Marxism has also influenced non-Marxist political research. (See Crouch, 1979; Lindberg et al., 1975; Lindblom, 1977; Skocpol, 1979; and Stepan, 1978.) Marxism has even had an important impact on organized American political science. The vitality of Marxist approaches is reflected in the numerous Marxist presentations at professional association conferences. The theme of the 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) was "Restoring the State to Political Science." Many of the liveliest panels at annual meetings are sponsored by the Caucus for a New Political Science (a radical caucus of the APSA) or by conference groups on political economy and socialist societies whose membership overlaps with the Caucus. Caucus candidates for president of the APSA, including Peter Bachrach and Bertell Ollman, have received substantial support in APSA elections.

Marxist political studies is highly permeable to contributions by European and American Marxists in related social sciences. Although works by American Marxists will be emphasized in this essay, an adequate account of current discussions on the state, class struggle, and politics requires that attention also be given to Marxists working outside the United States and in other disciplines.

While there are lively debates among American Marxists, a broad convergence toward a distinctive approach can be discerned. Marxist political studies has been influenced by the "old left," which emphasized the primacy of material produc-

tion organized under private control within capitalism, and the "new left," which challenged domination in multiple spheres and stressed the need to democratize personal as well as political and economic life. The new Marxist political approach highlights the centrality and complexity of state activity and class struggle. While it emphasizes the importance of structural constraints, it focuses on how men and women, organized into classes, struggle against these constraints to make history. Marxists have come to recognize the importance of some topics studied by non-Marxists, which they neglected in the past, especially political institutions such as parties and bureaucracy.

The study of formal institutions and decision making is the stuff of traditional political science. Yet Marxists reject both the conventional approach, which studies these phenomena in isolation from class struggle and state activity, and the conventional division of American political science into political theory, American government, comparative government, and international relations. Marxists argue that the traditional problems and subfields of political science must be analyzed from a holistic, dialectical perspective that places primary emphasis on state activity and class conflict.

Although most, but not all, of the scholars whose contributions are analyzed in this essay consider their work Marxist or radical, some do not. Further, given the lively debates over methods, analysis, and conclusions among Marxists studying politics, there is no "orthodox" Marxist approach in American political science. The range of problems studied is enormous; this essay will be highly selective in scope.

Marxists have studied such political issues as the development of the world capitalist system (Wallerstein, 1974, 1979); United States militarism (Adams, 1981), imperialism (Arnson and Klare, 1981; Klare, 1981), and their relation to the Third World (Chomsky and Herman, 1979; and Petras, 1979); the political economy of transitions to socialism in the Third

World (Mittelman, 1981); and the character of Soviet societies (Bahro, 1978; Bettelheim, 1976, 1978). (The works listed are a few representative examples.)

The major focus of American Marxist political studies has been on the state and class struggle within advanced capitalism, consistent with Marx's argument that revolutionary change on a world scale would most likely originate in the advanced capitalist societies. While Marxists stress the primacy of class antagonism as a key to understanding these societies (Przeworski, 1977; Wright, 1980), class divisions are not the only significant source of conflict. Marxists have studied sexual and racial inequality as well as the relationship between these factors and class inequality (Eisenstein, 1978; Hartsock 1980; Katznelson, 1976; Sargent, 1980; Wilson, 1978; and Young, 1980). Other arenas that are both locations for class struggle and often contribute to reproducing capitalism include economic and political reforms (Piven and Cloward, 1979), schooling (Bowles and Gintis, 1976), urban politics (Castells, 1977; Balbus, 1973; Mollenkopf, 1975), culture (Aronowitz, 1973; Williams, 1977), and character structure and sexual repression (Ollman, 1979).

Within the formal democratic sphere, liberal democracy and welfare state reforms reflect the contradictory tendencies of class struggle and compromise. Economic and political reforms within advanced capitalism have been achieved by working class struggles, and have both stabilized class inequality and enabled the working and other subordinate classes to struggle more effectively. Focusing on the relationship of the state to class struggle and compromise provides a framework for understanding both the stability and expansion of advanced capitalism in the postwar period and how capitalism has been internally undermined in the present crisis.

The remainder of this essay reviews Marxist research on the form and activities of the interventionist capitalist state, variations in class struggle and compromise, and the current

crisis of capitalism and its relation to socialist possibilities. While these questions are far from exhausting the political issues within advanced capitalism that Marxists are currently studying, they represent several important case studies of recent Marxist political analyses.

State Form and Class Struggle

In the late 1960s and 1970s, there was extensive debate among Marxists about the form and activities of the capitalist state, as well as about the reasons for the state's favored ties to capital. While differences remain on these issues, there has been considerable convergence in recent years. For example, in their first books on the subject, Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas, who did the most to rekindle interest in Marxist political theory, presented sharply differing analyses (Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas, 1973). In their latest books, their positions were practically indistinguishable (Miliband, 1977; Poulantzas, 1978).

Marxists now stress the far-ranging and contradictory role of the capitalist state. (Several recent approaches are Block, 1979; Gold et al., 1975; Holloway and Picciotto, 1978; Therborn, 1978*b*; and Wright, 1978.) Poulantzas was among the first Marxists to stress the separation between the economic and political spheres within capitalism. This represented a break from the traditional Marxist conception of the state as blindly subservient to capital. However, Poulantzas argued that the state's autonomy is relative and that such autonomy from capital is necessary to reproduce private control of production. Under capitalism, the "state is not a class instrument but rather the state of a society divided into classes" (Poulantzas, 1973:191).

If the state is not a mere instrument of capital, it is indirectly dependent on capital. Offe and Ronge have suggested that the limits of capitalist state autonomy derive from the fact

that the state does not control production directly but is dependent on capital accumulation to generate a surplus which can be taxed to finance its own activities. This produces a natural convergence between state and capital based on what Offe and Ronge call "institutional self-interest": "Every occupant of state power is basically interested in promoting those conditions most conducive to accumulation" (Offe and Ronge, 1975:140).

Gaining the good will of capital, however, is no easy task—and yet this is far from exhausting the state's task of reproducing capitalism. Poulantzas argues that the state requires partial autonomy from capital so that it can organize and defend the common interests of capital, a feat capital is unable to accomplish on its own because it is divided by market competition. However, the same conflicts that prevent capitalists from uniting make it difficult for the state to represent their common interests.

The state's quest to reproduce the capitalist system is further complicated because it must gain the support of workers and other subordinate groups who work, vote, and pay taxes. In order to disorganize the working class, as well as organize a hegemonic coalition of class forces stretching beyond the bourgeoisie, the state needs relative autonomy from capital so that it can sponsor reforms most capitalists oppose. The state is shaped by the pervasiveness of class struggle within capitalism. "The internal structure of the state is simultaneously a *product*, an *object*, and a *determinant* of class conflict" (Esping-Andersen et al., 1976:191). The relationship of the state to class struggle shapes and limits the state's role in capitalist reproduction.

State Activity

Marxist interest in the state was stimulated by the vast extension of state activity since the 1930s. Before the shift, Marxists

agreed that the capitalist state engaged primarily in repressive activity, to overcome challenges to capitalist law, order, and property; and selective inaction, to narrow the public sphere. Current Marxist research highlights more far-flung state activity within the ideological, economic, and political spheres to reproduce capitalism as well as the contradictory relationship between state activities and class struggle.

Marxist theories of the capitalist state first gained a wide hearing among political scientists as a result of research and subsequent debate by Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas (Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas, 1973). Miliband studied how the economically powerful were able to use their superior resources to gain control over the state and make it serve their interests. Poulantzas identified what he argued was a distinctive feature of a capitalist mode of production: the separation between control over the means of production and control over the means of legal coercion. Yet, despite their differences, both Miliband and Poulantzas minimized state repression and economic intervention, and argued that the state's primary activity consisted of the ideological legitimation of capitalism. In the most powerful analysis of the capitalist state by an American Marxist, O'Connor (1973) integrated the state's repressive, economic, and ideological roles in his argument that the state faces an inescapable dilemma. It must not only attempt to repress social discontent and gain voluntary consent for capitalist dominance (what he called the function of legitimization) but it must simultaneously sponsor measures to assist capital accumulation. State expenditures for legitimization and accumulation involve it in a contradiction which eventually produces a fiscal crisis, in which it appears as if the state can no longer pay for all that it does. Although the purpose of state expenditures is to counteract crisis tendencies, they have contributed to a fiscal crisis which has endangered capitalist stability.

Yet new social divisions related to the development of

corporate capitalism make it difficult for the working class to seize the initiative. Workers employed by large corporations and the state are a privileged segment of the working class. As a result of workers' high productivity in the corporate sector, and corporate capital's market power, workers in this sector tend to have stable employment, higher wages, and union representation. By a system of administered prices, corporate employers can pass along wage hikes to consumers. Workers employed by small, labor-intensive firms are especially penalized, since their wages are determined by competitive market forces and are therefore lower. The development of advanced capitalism has divided the working class as a result of dual labor markets in sectors with different production processes and social relationships.

O'Connor relates the state's activities in the economic and ideological spheres and identifies structural tendencies that have political repercussions. Yet actual class struggles find little place in this account. (His current work is directed to this issue. See O'Connor, 1979.) Part of the reason may be that O'Connor concentrates exclusively on the United States, where, given the lack of a large socialist movement, organized class struggle is mild. Yet, if the operation of advanced capitalism creates tendencies toward cleavages within the working class, as described by O'Connor, this need not automatically produce political divisions. In most advanced capitalist societies, socialist movements have helped to bridge divisions within the working class created by economic tendencies comparable to those O'Connor describes.

Many recent Marxist political studies have analyzed the varying relationship between state policies and class struggle in different advanced capitalist nations. State policies crystallize the specific form of class struggle within a given society. "Political challenge by the working class shapes the historical development of state structure. The actual structures of the state are thus not a simple reflection of capitalist interests but a

contradictory reflection of class struggle between workers and capitalists" (Esping-Andersen et al., 1976:192).

This approach represents a rethinking of liberal democracy, the characteristic political form within advanced capitalism. Traditionally, Marxists have viewed liberal democracy as a bourgeois device to conceal class rule. Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) suggest why: liberal political forms tend to dissolve class interest into individual interest and thus impede working class attempts to define its interests and forge socialist forms of association. (Also see Przeworski, 1980a, 1980b; and Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1980.) However, without rejecting this argument entirely, other Marxists stress an opposite tendency within liberal democracy. For example, Gintis (1980) suggests that the working class has used a language of individual rights to express its collective demands and, in the process, has extended liberal democracy to serve working class interests.

Wolfe (1977) has studied the historically changing balance within liberal democracy between what he identifies as the capitalist tendency inherent in liberalism and the socialist tendency inherent in democracy. Liberal democracy attempts to square the circle and represents an ultimately self-contradictory marriage of opposites. The contradictions of liberal democracy can be seen in the paradox that "Not all capitalist societies are liberal, but all liberal societies are capitalist. . . . Not all socialist societies are democratic, but any genuinely democratic society would have to be socialist" (Wolfe, 1977:6). Wolfe describes different phases in the uneasy coexistence of capitalist and democratic tendencies. Perhaps the most characteristic form of liberal democracy has been the situation described by pluralism, which Wolfe calls the *Franchise State*. It involved a parceling out of state power through barter with private groups in an attempt to preserve capitalist control. The Franchise State permitted struggles over marginal shares of distribution, but not over control of

production. Yet like earlier forms of the liberal democratic state, it was only a temporary solution, and was undermined by the confusion that it fostered between public and private, by the attempt to preserve capitalism while eliminating competition, and by the increasing need for state intervention and planning at the same time that the state was denied an independent role. The Franchise State crumbled when the state began to exercise authority commensurate with the benefits it dispensed.

The most recent attempt to reconcile democracy and liberalism is the *Dual State*, which developed in the United States following the Second World War. It dealt with the conflict between democracy and liberalism by segregating them in different regions of the state: an open, public, democratic face, and a closed, secret side. The two are separate but not equal: as in Bagehot's cabinet government, decisive state power is exercised behind closed doors.

Public opposition to the Dual State developed in the wake of revelations through the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, and other evidence of excesses by the invisible government. No new compromise, however, has developed to reconcile liberalism and democracy. Instead, there is a crisis of legitimacy and a possible parting of the ways of capitalism and democracy.

Wolfe admirably describes the changing character of the capitalist state. But by focusing exclusively on the United States, he minimizes the wide contrasts between class struggle in different capitalist nations in the postwar period. In particular, he obscures advances achieved by the working class in other capitalist nations. (Wolfe, 1978, partially remedies this.)

Cross-National Variations in Class Struggle and Compromise

Marxist political studies has gone far beyond the accurate yet

limited observation that working classes occupy a structurally subordinate position within capitalism. Many current research efforts focus on variations in the political orientation and strategy of the working class in different capitalist societies. Marxist scholars have attempted to understand three distinctive forms of class conflict and compromise—United States exceptionalism, social democracy, and the radical working class stance exemplified by Eurocommunism—and how state policies are cause and effect of the three political alternatives.

United States Exceptionalism.

The United States is the most powerful capitalist nation and has played a uniquely important role in shaping world history. The United States is also the only advanced capitalist society without a large, working class-based socialist party. Because the working class is not politically organized, state policies are less likely to serve working class interests. This helps to explain why, despite a long period of rapid capital accumulation and high per capita income, the United States has among the highest degree of income inequality of industrialized nations and is virtually unique among them in lacking adequate public facilities, such as housing and medical care, essential for decent subsistence. In the absence of a strong socialist movement, capital and the state have been less responsive to the interests of workers and the poor. A key issue for Marxists is what explains the virtual absence of an anticapitalist opposition within the United States.

Katznelson (1981) challenges the view that the exceptional character of American politics derives from a passive, disorganized labor movement. Workers have often displayed a high degree of militance, reflected in the frequency, duration, and size of strikes. What is exceptional about the United States, however, is the strong barrier dividing workplace struggles from community-based political struggles; "the radical separation in people's consciousness, speech, and

activity of the politics of work from the politics of community." Unlike workers in Western Europe, once American workers leave the workplace, they have tended to identify themselves not as workers but as members of ethnic groups.

Katznelson argues that capitalism generally divides workplace and community relations in order to concentrate production within the factory, where workers can be more closely supervised. (Also see Marglin, 1974, on this point.) In other capitalist nations, however, large socialist parties have attempted to bridge the divide between work and community by proposing public control of both spheres. In the United States, the urban political machine aggregated workers' votes on an ethnic, rather than a class basis.

Katznelson suggests that American urban politics can be considered "city trenches" (an allusion to Gramsci) which serve to fragment the working class and to divide workers in their role as laborers and citizens. Other Marxist political research has studied the national political consequences of American working class fragmentation (Aglietta, 1979; Aronowitz, 1979c; Davis, 1980). A different approach to American politics, partly inspired by Mills's *The Power Elite* (1956), has focused on ruling class recruitment, processes, and planning (Domhoff, 1967, 1970, 1979; and Sklar, 1980).

A key development in American politics was the formation of a political coalition, in the New Deal and the period after the Second World War, between organized labor and large-scale capital. Metzgar (1980) describes the arrangement as "negotiated class struggle," in which organized labor received economic gains in return for accepting capital's dominance in the workplace. The coalition provided some benefits for workers and the poor but it also increased the division of the American working class, analyzed by O'Connor, between unionized workers stably employed by the corporate sector, and unorganized workers employed by the economically marginal, competitive sector of small capital.

Gold (1977) names the ruling political alliance the "Keynesian coalition." Judis and Wolfe suggest the term "cold-war liberalism" for the "attempt to create majority support for American capitalism through state intervention into the economy and overseas expansion" (1977:16; also see Wolfe, 1981). For several decades, these accounts agree, the cross-class alliance provided political cohesion within the United States which facilitated capitalist expansion both within the United States and abroad. The disintegration of the alliance beginning in the 1970s has been cause and effect of the current worldwide crisis of capitalism.

Social Democracy.

Marxists have traditionally regarded social democracy as a vehicle for modernizing capitalism through state planning and regulation, and stabilizing capitalism through reforms to co-opt the working class. Social democracy might be considered a kind of historic compromise between labor and capital, in which representatives of the working class control the political sphere while capital controls production (see Przeworski, 1980b).

However, Marxist research on recent changes within social democracy suggests an intriguing possibility. In order to maximize support, social democratic movements and regimes may be forced to propose socialist measures to deal with problems that cannot be resolved within a capitalist framework. The process has been studied in Great Britain and Sweden.

Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972) and Panitch (1977) have argued that British workers did not consciously seek to jeopardize British capitalism during the 1950s and 1960s. Nonetheless, organized labor's militance had this effect. Because of international economic competition, British capital was unable to pass along higher labor costs through higher prices. Consequently, profits were squeezed "between money wage in-

creases on the one hand and progressively more severe international competition on the other" (Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972:62). As it became difficult to muster capital for new investments—and unprofitable to invest given high labor costs—British capitalism entered a period of crisis. The labor movement was forced either to heed the call for "wage discipline" (that is, help bail out British capitalism) or, by using its growing strength, to seek control over the productive apparatus, that is, adopt a socialist perspective.

Esping-Andersen (1978, 1980) and Andrew Martin (1975, 1979) have discerned a similar but somewhat different process within Swedish social democracy. The differences derive from the dynamism of the Swedish economy, as opposed to the economic stagnation in Great Britain, and this in turn is paradoxically related to the Swedish Social Democratic Party's long period in office. During more than forty years, the Social Democratic party, in partnership with the national manual labor confederation of trade unions, sponsored government policies to stimulate economic growth, maintain high levels of employment and stable prices, and redistribute the surplus through extensive welfare state programs. State policies dealt effectively with newly emerging problems, and social democratic majorities were mobilized under changing conditions. (For a contrary view, see Therborn, 1978a.)

However, the social democratic miracle ended in the 1970s as domestic problems piled up and international economic growth, on which Sweden's export-based industries depended, ground to a halt. As in Great Britain, the labor movement was forced to choose between pushing forward in a socialist direction or being pushed back. Esping-Andersen suggests that "the long-term strength and cohesion of social democracy is contingent on its ability [to establish democratic control over production]" (1980:259).

Przeworski (1980a, 1980b; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1980) takes a contrary position to this line of reasoning. He

suggests that there are structural constraints which make it unlikely that social democratic movements and regimes will pursue an anticapitalist strategy. First, the logic of liberal democracy, by which formal political power is distributed on the basis of electoral majorities, impels a socialist party to appeal to a broad range of classes and groups and thus to de-emphasize a distinctive working class-based socialist program. Second, given the power of capital to disinvest, thus creating economic crisis which penalizes the working class, socialist movements usually tend not only to avoid antagonizing capital but to nurture business confidence (Block, 1977). Third, contrary to the thrust of Marx's analysis, there is ample theoretical and historical evidence that the interests of contending classes can be partially reconciled within a capitalist framework, thus minimizing the pressure for socialist change. Under certain conditions, social democratic movements and regimes can forge class compromises that provide material benefits to the working class. (In fact, as Esping-Andersen and Martin have argued, social democratic regimes may be best qualified to forge stable class compromises within capitalism.) In current work, Przeworski (1980c) explores the possibility that capitalism may nonetheless generate nonmaterial radical needs, rooted in the search for "free time," that provide a new revolutionary impetus.

While some Marxist research suggests that northern European social democratic parties may soon attempt to shift control over production from capital to a worker-controlled state, this has long been the major aim of communist parties in southern Europe. Yet Marxists emphasize that these parties, too, are in flux.

Eurocommunism.

The working classes of southern Europe have been the least integrated into dominant capitalist economic and political institutions. The dialectic of exclusion and working class radical-

ism in these societies helps explain why they have the largest communist parties within advanced capitalism. During much of the period since the Russian Revolution, the communist parties of southern Europe conformed to the Bolshevik model. Since Stalin's death, and especially since the 1960s, they have adopted a vision and strategy that seeks to reconcile socialism and democracy. The Eurocommunist parties argue that the road to socialism lies in extending democratic features of advanced capitalism. Rather than the antithesis of presently existing liberal democracy, socialism represents its full fruition. The way to socialism can be prepared through state-sponsored structural reforms, for example, democratic planning and nationalization of key industries, sponsored by a democratically elected united front coalition. (For the leading account by a Eurocommunist in English, see Carrillo, 1978. A critical analysis is Mandel, 1977. For American Marxist analyses, see Boggs and Plotke, 1980; Fine, 1981; Hammond, 1979, 1980; Peppe, 1979; and Kesselman, 1980.)

American Marxists differ sharply in their analyses of Eurocommunism. Some see it as a potential breakthrough to socialist transformation within the advanced capitalist societies, others as a new form of opportunism. Jensen and Ross (1979, 1980) adhere to the former position. They generally accept that the Eurocommunist strategy may be effective in overturning capitalist dominance and ushering in a socialist transition. However, they recognize the erratic character of the Eurocommunist parties' behavior (especially the French Communist Party, the PCF; on which they concentrate): "The PCF was not a monolith, but a body vibrant with contradictions" (1979:82). They suggest that strain occurs within the PCF because different aspects of party activity have changed at different rates. The major contradiction stems from "a thoroughly de-Bolshevized version of social transformation and the much less modernized practices in the realms of strategy, alliance behavior, and internal life" (1980:264-265). In particular, they

ruefully observe that the party's democratic centralism remains "long on centralism and short on democracy" (1980:289).

Boggs (1980) does not share Jensen and Ross's belief in the radical potential of Eurocommunist theory and strategy. He argues that the Eurocommunist parties are a product of the archaic economies of southern Europe. Because the bourgeoisie has been forced to ally with precapitalist and early capitalist groups (peasants, rural notables, small shopkeepers, and large landowners), it has been unable to sponsor a thoroughgoing capitalist rationalization. These societies remain economically and socially backward.

Eurocommunism offers a solution to this stalemate, which has become more severe in the current economic crisis. In a fashion reminiscent of social democratic parties, the Eurocommunist parties promise to sponsor capitalist rationalization as well as to discipline the unruly working classes of southern Europe to accept austerity measures. In Boggs's view, the Eurocommunist parties are more interested in strengthening the forces of production and the state in these societies than in democratizing and socializing the relations of production and administration. Contrary to Jensen and Ross, Boggs believes that the transformation and democratization that Eurocommunism promises is "limited to bourgeois categories of economic and political development. The 'new course,' however successful it might be on its own terms, contains no revolutionary project for overcoming the division of labor" (1980:447; see Hammond, 1978, for a parallel critique.) Rather than serving as the organic intellectual of the working class (the phrase is Gramsci's), the Eurocommunist parties emerge from Boggs's analysis as a collective capitalist.

Crisis

Marx argued that all societies, and particularly capitalist societies, are divided by internal contradictions that periodi-

cally disrupt political stability and provoke crisis. After several decades of political stability, a structural crisis of world capitalism appears to be developing. Marxists were among the first to predict the emergence of the present crisis, to suggest that it had deeper roots than the Vietnam War or OPEC price rises, and to provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the crisis. (See, for example, Castells, 1980; Frank, 1980; Mandel, 1978; Urpe, 1978; and Wright, 1978).

However, there is vigorous controversy among Marxists on the specific causes of the present crisis. Some see it as rooted in structural impediments to capital accumulation, for example, the rising organic composition of capital—the increase in the proportion of investment devoted to technology and the like over that part which goes into wages. (Mandel, 1975). Others stress the importance of political factors. Two related political causes will be described here: the shifting balance of class forces and state intervention.

Although the working class is a principal victim, it may also have contributed to the crisis as a result of its past success. (See Arrighi, 1978, and O'Connor, 1979.) Esping-Andersen and Friedland (1981) argue that the Western working classes have partially blocked capital's attempt to maintain profitability at workers' expense. The contemporary crisis signifies the political exhaustion of existing class alignments. This can be seen in the three variants of class compromise within advanced capitalism. In the United States, the Marxist research cited above has explored how the postwar alliance of organized labor and corporate capital has crumbled. Workers no longer support corporate expansionism and they have grown increasingly embittered by rising taxes, rising inflation, rising unemployment, and dwindling state benefits. Social democratic regimes have been battered and many social democratic parties driven from office as the problems generated by capitalist production have proved intractable. As Esping-Andersen and Martin suggest, the key question has become

whether social democratic coalitions will resist the pressure to save capitalism and instead enunciate socialist goals. In most cases, social democratic parties have hesitated—and lost office. But the conservative governments replacing them have failed even more. In southern Europe, the exclusion of the working class has come home to haunt conservative regimes as Eurocommunism and, in France, a powerful Socialist party, create a basis for leftist electoral coalitions to reach power.

Class compromises of liberal democracy have produced diminishing returns. Intervening to regulate class conflict and counteract crisis tendencies, capitalist states have exacerbated class conflict and fueled the crisis. The erosion of the distinction between the public and private spheres increases the possibility of uniting the two on a democratic socialist basis. At present, however, the predominant tendency is in the opposite direction, as evidenced by the drive to curtail welfare state benefits and repress political dissent (what Gross, 1980, calls "friendly fascism"). (Also see Parenti, 1978, and Sklar, 1980.) Crisis represents an opportunity for capital to recoup concessions made in the past and to reap additional advantages. As crisis deepens, socialism may become more salient, but this requires a plausible socialist alternative, the lack of which is painfully obvious in current Marxist scholarship.

Visions of Socialism

Marxists have learned much from the successes and failures of past class struggles. But there is a new recognition of the multiple difficulties confronting a democratic socialist transformation. The present crisis has (until now) weakened and divided working classes within and across nations. Further, the more distant goal of socialism has been heavily tarnished.

Among many questions Marxists need to study further are: the relationship between immediate and fundamental reforms, the relationship of socialist parties to working and other

subordinate classes, the relationship between direct and representative democracy within socialism, and the character and role of bureaucracy within socialism. These issues do not arise in a historical vacuum; they have become salient because of setbacks in past and present class struggles. After quoting Rudolf Bahro (1978), "Communism is not only necessary, it is also possible," Raymond Williams (1980:3) sorrowfully and eloquently observes:

. . . the quiet words carry a major historical irony. For what has now to be proved, before an informed and sceptical audience, is indeed possibility. . . . Where the proof really matters is . . . where intention and consequence, desire and necessity, possibility and practice, have already bloodily interacted. Thus we are no longer in any position to cry great names or announce necessary laws, and expect to be believed. The information and the scepticism are already too thoroughly lodged at the back of our own minds.

Marxists have come to recognize the magnitude of the socialist project, if the economic, political, and cultural division of labor is to be overcome. Within the economy, Marxists argue that the Soviet example demonstrates that it is insufficient to transfer control over production from one group to another, while leaving hierarchy and the division of labor intact. (See Aronowitz, 1979a, 1979b; Carnoy and Shearer, 1980; Stephens, 1980; and Wright, 1978.) Within the political sphere, new forms of direct democracy must be devised to break down the division of labor in politics and administration. Wright questions how "control of the government by the Left [can] contribute to expanding and deepening the class capacities of the working class?" (1978:241). A cultural revolution is also needed, to overcome what Bahro calls "subalternity" and what Williams defines as "sceptical subordination" that things cannot really change (1980:8).

In order to divide and conquer, capitalism exploits not only class divisions but sexual and racial cleavages. Marxists have come to recognize that blacks, Hispanics, and women have distinct histories, cultures, and grievances, and that these differences should be highlighted rather than obscured. Similarly, in creating class coalitions, differences in class structure and historical perspective among different capitalist societies must be appreciated. A socialist movement must be structured, as capital increasingly is, at the level of the world capitalist system, in particular linking working class and peasant movements within Third World nations to socialist movements within the advanced capitalist nations.

During the postwar period of capitalist expansion, when non-Marxist social science claimed that capitalist political and economic institutions could (or already had) overcome the major problems of industrial society, critical political scholarship ripened into a Marxist critique of this claim. Marxist political studies have explored how changes in class struggles and capitalist state activities have pervaded all spheres of social life within advanced capitalist societies and other regions of the world. During the current period of capitalist stagnation and crisis, when non-Marxist social science argues that material scarcity, inequality, and hierarchy are intractable, it is no longer sufficient to establish that capitalism is incapable of dealing with the problems that it has generated. The most urgent goal (one where there have been few contributions) is to prove, before a skeptical and informed audience, that democratic socialism is possible. However difficult the task, more than ever the alternative remains socialism or barbarism.

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MARX AMONG THE PHILOSOPHERS

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Introduction

AS RECENTLY AS twenty years ago, Marxism was an esoteric and marginal subject in philosophical scholarship and in the philosophical curriculum of colleges and universities in the United States. Real, live, self-confessed Marxist academics could be counted on the fingers of two hands (with some fingers left over). The study of Marx and of Marxism by non-Marxist or anti-Marxist scholars fared little better in the groves of academe. One could not tell from an examination of the then-current philosophical scene that Marxism was in fact one of the major intellectual and philosophical worldviews. The chill of the Cold War had inhibited a small surge of earlier, post-World War II interest in Marxist philosophy. Moreover, Stalinist orthodoxy had alienated a significant number of actual and potential Marxists by its dogmatic, mechanical, and catechistic formulation of dialectical materialism, as well as by its reign of intellectual and political terror at home, and by the invasion of Hungary in 1956. A number of Marxist philosophers who had been excluded from teaching positions during

ous weeds which had worked their way into the top ranks of the Party. But there was no explanation of how or why they got there. Were they just peculiarly corrupt individuals? Or did their rise indicate some basic flaw in the society? The new movement tries to answer precisely that question: it is above all an investigation of the social roots of revisionism; and it finds those roots not in individual weakness but in the nature of a socialist society itself. From this analysis emerges a new understanding: how to act to prevent revisionism in the future. The new movement provides the tools with which the Chinese people can themselves recognize and restrict bourgeois ideas and privileges whenever and wherever they first begin to emerge. In this way, they can act to prevent the rise of future Liu Shao-chis and Lin Piaos. And the movement points the way toward the changes in the entire society which are necessary to continue the march toward communism, while at the same time raising the consciousness of the people so as to advance that march.

There must not be the least let-up on our part. Our fight against revisionism is a protracted struggle, not one or two trials of strength. Our task is to work ceaselessly to dig up the soil that breeds revisionism, a task, as Lenin put it, of creating conditions in which it will be impossible for the bourgeoisie to exist or for a new bourgeoisie to arise.⁶

NOTES

1. See Barbara Ehrenreich, "Democracy in China," *Monthly Review* (September 1974).
2. Cited in "Study Well the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," editorial in *Renmin Ribao*, February 9, 1975, reprinted in *Peking Review* No. 7 (February 14, 1975).
3. Liang Hsiao and Lu Pin, "New Constitution: Fundamental Charter for Consolidating the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Peking Review* No. 28 (July 11, 1975). The phrase in quotes at the end of the passage is from Lenin.
4. Chang Chun-chiao, *Peking Review*, No. 14 (April 4, 1975). Since "abundance" is a relative term, the question can, of course, be asked: At what level of abundance is the transition to full communism possible, and who determines this?
5. "Study Well the Theory. . . .," *loc. cit.*
6. "Study Well the Theory. . . .," *loc. cit.*

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MARXIST THEORIES OF THE CAPITALIST STATE

BY DAVID A. GOLD,
CLARENCE Y. H. LO,
AND ERIK OLIN WRIGHT

This is a revised version of a paper distributed, and presented orally in abbreviated form, at the San Francisco meetings of the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) in December 1974. The widespread interest which the paper aroused, then and subsequently, indicated both to the authors and to us that it should be made available to a larger audience. In proposing publication in MR, one of the authors wrote: "Many authors working within the Marxist tradition are unfamiliar with what we judge to be the most important ongoing research on the capitalist state. To cite one example, in the article 'The Tanzanian State' by Haroub Othman, which you published in the December 1974 issue of MR, the author says that, with the exception of Gramsci and Miliband, Marxists haven't written anything of importance on the state since Lenin. Such a view indicates to us that Othman is not familiar with recent and continuing work of Marxists on the capitalist state. I fear that such unfamiliarity is only too prevalent. It occurred to us that publication in MR would be the best way to reach the largest number and widest variety of interested people." Accordingly, we are publishing it, in two instalments.

The authors are members of the San Francisco *Kapitalistate* Collective, which they explain as follows: "*Kapitalistate: Working Papers on the Capitalist State* is an international journal publishing Marxist research on the state—articles, theoretical notes, analyses of current events, reports on work in progress, book reviews, etc. There are a number of *Kapitalistate* collectives in the United States and other countries. The San Francisco Collective, in addition to participating in editorial, production, and distribution work for the journal, has written an essay on Watergate which appeared in *Kapitalistate* No. 3. Currently the San Francisco collective is studying the role of political parties in the capitalist state. The present paper, while written by three of the members, is part of the work of the group as a whole."—THE EDITORS

This paper will present a summary of some recent developments in Marxist thinking on the capitalist state.* The summary is necessarily brief and schematic since the main purpose is to present ideas and not to discuss them fully or to extend them into a grand synthesis. The ideas and authors discussed are those that have most heavily influenced our thinking and those which we judge to have the greatest potential for guiding future research on the state.

While Marxists have always had much to say about the state, it has only been fairly recently that the creation of a theory of the state has been considered an explicit task. Recent attempts at theorizing have drawn heavily on conceptualizations of the state that were largely implicit in earlier work. Three such implicit perspectives, which may be characterized as the instrumentalist, the structuralist, and the Hegelian-Marxist traditions, have been especially important in guiding current Marxist work on the state.

Much of the recent work has been concerned primarily with explicating these traditions, formulating them into more coherent and systematic theories of the state, and using them to study various specific empirical problems. A number of attempts are being made, however, to go beyond the boundaries defined by these traditional approaches. Some of these are explicit attempts to reconcile, synthesize, and extend the traditional elements; others are beginning to develop new theoretical tools.

This paper will focus first on the traditional approaches. While, as we shall argue below, there is no necessary incompatibility among these various strands of thinking, many Marxists have treated them as quite irreconcilable, and much of the recent work on the state has taken the form of a polemic against one or another alternative perspective. It will therefore be useful, as a point of departure, to lay out the basic logic

* Most of the authors discussed here attempt to develop a theory of the state in advanced capitalist countries. Although their theories can be applied to the analysis of the state in Third World countries, the unique conditions in underdeveloped nations require modifications of the theory which are beyond the scope of this paper.

of these orientations. This discussion will be followed by an explication and brief analysis of some of the recent developments that have attempted to move beyond the more traditional frameworks. We will conclude with some general remarks on theoretical work that remains to be done.

THE TRADITIONS

Very few Marxist works on the state can be considered pure examples of an instrumentalist, structuralist, or Hegelian-Marxist perspective. The logic behind identifying a theoretical perspective as structuralist, instrumentalist, or Hegelian-Marxist is not to imply that every statement which it contains can be neatly pigeonholed into a single category. The point is that in any theory certain parts are systematically organized and integrated into a coherent set of propositions whereas other parts have more the status of ad hoc amendments. What we mean, therefore, by an "instrumentalist theory" of the state is a theory in which the ties between the ruling class and state are systematically examined, while the structural context within which those ties occur remains largely theoretically unorganized. A "structuralist theory," in a complementary way, systematically elaborates how state policy is determined by the contradictions and constraints of the capitalist system, while instrumental manipulation remains a secondary consideration. Finally, a "Hegelian-Marxist theory" places its emphasis on consciousness and ideology, while the link to accumulation and instrumental manipulation stays in the background.

Regardless of which of these traditions is drawn upon most heavily, virtually all Marxist treatments of the state begin with the fundamental observation that the state in capitalist society broadly serves the interests of the capitalist class. Marx and Engels stated this premise in its classic form in *The Communist Manifesto*: "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."

Given this axiom, Marxist theories of the state generally attempt to answer two complementary questions: "Why does the state serve the interests of the capitalist class?" and "How

does the state function to maintain and expand the capitalist system?" But while Marxist works on the state have generally shared these underlying questions, they have dealt with them with varying degrees of sophistication, have formulated them at different levels of abstraction and with different methodological principles, and have given considerably different emphases to one or the other.

Instrumentalist Theories of the State

The instrumentalist perspective provides a fairly straightforward answer to the question, "Why does the state serve the interests of the capitalist class?" It does so because it is controlled by the capitalist class. Ralph Miliband (1969: p. 22)* expresses this position clearly:

In the Marxist scheme, the "ruling class" of capitalist society is that class which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society.

Similarly, Paul Sweezy (1942: p. 243) describes the relationship of economically dominant classes to the state in the following way:

[The class-domination theory of the state] recognizes that classes are the product of historical development and sees in the state an instrument in the hands of the ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself.

The research agenda associated with this perspective has focused primarily on studying the nature of the class which rules, the mechanisms which tie this class to the state, and the concrete relationships between state policies and class interests. The method consists of detailed studies of the sociology of the capitalist class, in the first instance simply to show that it exists; studies of the direct personal links between this class and the

* Throughout this article, bibliographic references will be indicated by placing the date of publication and page number in parentheses. The full reference may be found in the bibliography at the end of the article. Numbered notes will also be found at the end of the article.

state apparatus, and links between the capitalist class and intermediary institutions (such as political parties, research organizations, and universities); specific examples of how government policy is shaped; and reinterpretations of episodes from the annals of history.¹

There are, of course, examples of instrumentalist work done at various levels of sophistication. Much of the work of G. William Domhoff, for example, rests almost entirely at the very personal level of showing the social connections between individuals who occupy positions of economic power. Other instrumentalists, most notably Ralph Miliband, have attempted to situate the analysis of personal connections in a more structural context. While most of his analysis still centers on the patterns and consequences of personal and social ties between individuals occupying positions of power in different institutional spheres, Miliband stresses that even if these personal ties were weak or absent—as sometimes happens when social democratic parties come to power—the policies of the state would still be severely constrained by the economic structure in which it operates. Furthermore, he moves away from a voluntaristic version of instrumentalism by stressing the social processes which mold the ideological commitments of the "state elite."² Nevertheless, in spite of these elements in Miliband's work, the systematic aspect of his theory of the state remains firmly instrumentalist. In summarizing the general argument

* In one place Miliband (1973: p. 85n) even argues that the state must have a certain degree of autonomy from manipulation by the ruling class: "A simple illustration of the point is the common interpretation of the most familiar of all the Marxist formulations on the state, that which is to be found in *The Communist Manifesto*, where Marx and Engels assert that 'the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.' This has regularly been taken to mean not only that the state acts *on behalf* of the dominant class . . . but that it acts *at the behest* of that class which is an altogether different assertion and, as I would argue, a vulgar deformation of the thought of Marx and Engels. . . . [T]he notion of common affairs assumes the existence of particular ones; and the notion of the whole bourgeoisie implies the existence of separate elements which make up that whole. This being the case, there is an obvious need for an institution of the kind they refer to, namely the state; and the state *cannot* meet this need without enjoying a certain degree of autonomy. In other words, the notion of autonomy is embedded in the definition itself, is an intrinsic part of it."

of his major work on the state, Miliband (1969: p. 146) writes:

What is wrong with pluralist-democratic theory is not its insistence on the fact of competition [over state policies] but its claim (very often its implicit assumption) that the major organized "interests" in these societies, and notably capital and labor, compete on more or less equal terms, and that none of them is therefore able to achieve a decisive and permanent advantage in the process of competition. . . . In previous chapters it was shown that business, particularly large-scale business, did enjoy such an advantage *inside* the state system, by virtue of the composition and ideological inclinations of the state elite. In this chapter we shall see that business enjoys a massive superiority *outside* the state system as well, in terms of immensely stronger pressures which, as compared with labor and any other interest, it is able to exercise in the pursuit of its purposes.

The functioning of the state is thus still fundamentally understood in terms of the instrumental exercise of power by people in strategic positions, either directly through the manipulation of state policies or indirectly through the exercise of pressure on the state.

The instrumentalist perspective has made a number of important contributions to a Marxist theory of the state.² It has generated much research that has helped to build a sociology of the capitalist class. In particular, it has contributed to piercing the veil of legitimacy that hangs over many of the specific institutions that systematically link the capitalist class to the state. Instrumentalist research has also been of great importance in bringing to light the conflicts that exist within the capitalist class. Such work has made a considerable contribution toward an understanding of the local basis of capitalist class power and of the interrelationships between local, regional, and national institutions of the capitalist class.

Despite these successes, the instrumentalist perspective has some major deficiencies which make it unsuitable as a general theory of the capitalist state. Much of the empirical work represents an explicit attempt to confront the conclusions of pluralists. While largely successful in such confrontations, this work has failed to transcend the framework that the pluralists use. The emphasis, especially in American power-structure re-

search, has been on social and political groupings rather than classes defined by their relationship to the means of production.³ Furthermore, like most pluralists, instrumentalist writers tend to see social causes simply in terms of the strategies and actions of individuals and groups. While in pluralist theory there are many such groups, all working for their interests and influencing the state, in instrumentalist theory there is only one overwhelmingly dominant group. But the logic of social causation remains the same. With rare exceptions, there is no systematic analysis of how the strategies and actions of ruling-class groups are limited by impersonal, structural causes. At times the exercise of power and the formation of state policy seem to be reduced to a kind of voluntarism on the part of powerful people.

In a slightly different vein, there are numerous examples of state activity that appear not to fit even the sophisticated variants of instrumentalism. On a number of occasions, reforms undertaken by the state were opposed by large segments of the business community, as, for example, during the New Deal. Even when such reforms are ultimately co-optive, to treat all reforms as the result of an instrumentalist use of the state by capitalists is to deny the possibility of struggle over reform. There are also state policies which cannot easily be explained by direct corporate initiatives but which may come from within the state itself. These tend to speak to broad, rather than specific, capitalist interests. To explain these fully there is the need for a logic of the capitalist state, both in terms of its relations to civil society and in terms of its internal operations.

Finally, there are important realms of state-related activity which are clearly not manipulated by specific capitalists or coalitions, such as culture, ideology, and legitimacy. These possess a degree of autonomy which tends to place them outside the realm of simple manipulation (see Williams, 1973).

Structuralist Theories of the State

The structuralist analysis of the state categorically rejects the notion that the state can be understood as a simple "instrument" in the hands of a ruling class. In a critique of the work of Miliband, Nicos Poulantzas, a French structuralist Marxist, wrote that

the *direct* participation of members of the capitalist class in the state apparatus and in the government, even where it exists, is not the important side of the matter. The relation between the bourgeois class and the state is an *objective relation*. This means that if the *function* of the state in a determinate social formation and the *interests* of the dominant class in this formation coincide, it is by reason of the system itself: the direct participation of members of the ruling class in the state apparatus is not the *cause* but the *effect*, and moreover a chance and contingent one, of this objective coincidence. (1969: p. 245)

The fundamental thesis of the structuralist perspective is that the functions of the state are broadly determined by the structures of the society rather than by the people who occupy positions of state power.* Therefore, the starting point of the structuralist analysis is generally an examination of the class structure in the society, particularly the contradictions rooted in the economy. Structuralists then analyze how the state attempts to neutralize or displace these various contradictions. The structuralist theory of the state thus attempts to unravel the functions the state must perform in order to reproduce capitalist society as a whole. These functions determine the specific policies and organization of the state. According to the structuralists, the concrete ways in which the state meets the functions vary with such factors as the level of capitalist development and the forms of class struggle.

The most elaborate structuralist-Marxist model of the state is presented by Poulantzas, especially in his book *Political Power and Social Classes*.⁴ Following Marx, Poulantzas argues that in capitalist society the crucial economic contradiction centers on the ever-increasing social character of production on the one hand and the continuing private appropriation of the surplus

* The concept of structure is constantly used by structuralist writers, but rarely explicitly defined. Structure does *not* refer to the concrete social institutions that make up a society, but rather to the systematic functional interrelationships among these institutions. Maurice Godelier (1972: p. 336) stated it this way: "Structures should not be confused with visible 'social relations' but constitute a level of reality invisible but present behind the visible social relations." The analysis of the structure of a capitalist society is thus the analysis of the functional relationship of various institutions to the process of surplus-value production and appropriation.

product on the other. This contradiction poses two complementary threats to the reproduction of the system as a whole. On the one hand, the contradiction between social production and private appropriation poses the threat of *working-class unity*, which becomes potentially stronger as the social nature of the production process deepens, and which eventually contains the possibility of the destruction of capitalism itself. On the other hand, this contradiction poses the threat of *capitalist-class disunity*, fostered by the continued private and competitive appropriation of surplus. This lack of unity threatens the ability of the capitalist class to contain struggles by the working class. The state plays the decisive role of mediating this contradiction, of providing the "factor of unity in a social formation" operating to counteract the combined threats of working-class unity and capitalist disunity.

Poulantzas analyzes this function of the capitalist state, the promotion of unity in a social formation, in terms of its impact on the working class and the capitalist class:

(a) *The working class*. The state serves the function of atomizing the working class, of disintegrating its political unity through the transformation of workers into individualized citizens while at the same time representing itself as the integrated, universal interest of the society as a whole. This is accomplished through the institutions of bourgeois democracy and justice, which create the appearance of equality, fair play, due process, etc., and through various kinds of economic concessions made by the state which help to transform the political struggle of the working class as a whole into narrow, economic interest-group struggles of particular segments of the working class.

(b) *The capitalist class*. The state serves the function of guaranteeing the long-run interests of the capitalist class as a whole. Poulantzas stresses that the bourgeoisie cannot be considered a homogeneous ruling class with an unambiguous class-wide interest. Rather, the bourgeoisie is a highly fractionated class, with divergent interests at the political as well as economic levels. These diverse class fractions are organized into what Poulantzas (following Gramsci) calls the "power bloc," a political coalition under the domination of a particular hegemonic fraction. Such a power bloc, however, is always pre-

carious, possessing only limited ability to enforce the concessions to the working class which are so necessary for the stability of the long-term interests of the capitalist class as a whole. The only way that these interests can be protected, therefore, is through the relative autonomy of the state, through a state structure which is capable of transcending the parochial, individualized interests of specific capitalists and capitalist class fractions. A state which was the tool of one capitalist grouping would be utterly incapable of accomplishing this.*

This relative autonomy, however, is not an invariant feature of the capitalist state. Particular capitalist states will be more or less autonomous depending upon the degree of internal divisiveness, the contradictions within the various classes and fractions which constitute the power bloc, and upon the intensity of class struggle between the working class and the capitalist class as a whole.

The absence of any real discussion of how social mechanisms regulate these various functional relationships seriously weakens Poulantzas's structural analysis. Although there is a fairly rich discussion of *how* the relative autonomy of the state protects the class interests of the dominant class, and of the functional *necessity* for such a state structure, there is no explanation of the social mechanisms which guarantee that the state will in fact function in this way.

One obvious way out of this difficulty would be to employ some notion of "class consciousness." It could then be argued that class-conscious capitalists guide the development of state structures which accomplish the needed functional patterns. Structuralist writers, however, have almost completely rejected the usefulness of consciousness as an explanation for any aspect of social structure. They insist that class consciousness is a catch-all residual category used by Marxists to "explain" things that more systematic theory fails to resolve. Consciousness, the structuralists argue, explains nothing; the point is to explain

* By "relative autonomy" the structuralists mean relative autonomy from manipulation by specific capitalist-class members or interests. They do not mean that the state is autonomous in any real sense from the structural requirements of the economy.

consciousness through an analysis of the dynamics of society. But if class consciousness doesn't provide a way out, structuralists have not advanced any more suitable way to deal with these theoretical difficulties. While the instrumentalist perspective has tended toward voluntarism to explain state activities, the structuralists have almost entirely eliminated conscious action from their analysis.

As in the other perspectives on the state, there are examples of structuralist writings that exhibit differing degrees of theoretical sophistication. Much Marxian political economy has at least implicitly held the view that state policies respond almost exclusively to economic contradictions. This view of the state might be termed "economic structuralism." Other state activities and non-economic influences on economic policy are treated secondarily, or not at all. The state is perceived as having little or no autonomy, and its non-economic activities are seen as directly derived from the logic of accumulation.

To be both accurate and fair, it must be pointed out that in such economic structuralism there is generally no attempt to develop a full theory of the state. The state is incorporated in an analysis that has its main purpose elsewhere. Nevertheless, we feel that the issues discussed in these works cannot be successfully resolved without a more complete view of the state.

Baran and Sweezy (1966) present one of the most important examples of such economic structuralism. They discuss the state primarily in terms of how it aids in the surplus absorption process. State activities are defined by a structural contradiction in the economy, but at the same time there is an attempt to integrate elements of an instrumentalist analysis. The particularistic actions of capitalist groups are seen as being in conflict with the need for the state to act for the class as a whole, so that the actual ways in which the state attempts to absorb the rising surplus are a result of an interaction between the structural needs and the particular interests. But the economic contradictions dominate the analysis and the instrumentalist evidence is interpreted within that framework. Other contradictions, such as those arising from ideology or class con-

flicts, play a very minor role. The thrust of the work, then, is basically that of economic structuralism.*

Hegelian-Marxist Perspectives

There are many Marxists who derive their primary inspiration from Hegel and the early writings of Marx and Engels, and more recently from Lukacs and writers such as Habermas, Marcuse, and others in the tradition of the Frankfurt School (or what is sometimes called "critical theory"). Instead of focusing on the *why* and *how* of the relationship between the state and the capitalist class, the Hegelian-Marxist perspective operates at a somewhat higher level of abstraction. The key question appears to be, "What is the state?" The basic answer is that the state is a mystification, a concrete institution which serves the interests of the dominant class, but which seeks to portray itself as serving the nation as a whole, thereby obscuring the basic lines of class antagonism. Thus, the state represents a universality, but a false one, an "illusory community."⁶

Most of the writings in this perspective take off from this point and examine how the mystification occurs. They have placed great emphasis on ideology, consciousness, legitimacy, and the mediating role of institutions and ideas, thereby contributing significantly to current thinking on politics. However, the Hegelian-Marxist perspective has not developed a coherent theory of the state or even a well-defined logic of the relation between state and society. There is little analysis of specific state actions or concrete politics in these writings, so it is difficult to connect these ideas with an empirical reality. Perhaps because of this, the key notions of false consciousness and false

* There are other examples of economic structuralism. Ackerman and MacEwan (1972) and MacEwan (1972) treat the state as the enforcer of the rules of the game of the accumulation process but do not reflect on the state's ability to alter or influence those rules. Boddy and Crotty (1974) develop a class-conflict theory of macro-economic policy, but the class conflict being posited is only at the level of the wage bargain, not at the level of the state. In this analysis, the state is the arena for choosing a strategy for the capitalist class. Mattick (1969) and Yaffe (1973) consider that state intervention ultimately worsens the tendencies toward crises that are endemic to the capitalist accumulation process. In their work, the state is seen as having even less potential for mediating contradictions than in other versions of economic structuralism.

ideology remain incomplete; it is unclear how and why they remain false when they are being continually confronted with the reality of daily life under capitalism.

Antonio Gramsci, who is difficult to classify within any one perspective, can be considered as one thinker emerging from the Hegelian-Marxist tradition who avoids the pitfalls of over-abstraction. Gramsci analyzed capitalist ideology both theoretically and empirically, studying cultural changes in Italy and America induced by changes in production relations. His theory of civil society and the state, and his concrete discussions of fascism and the collapse of political parties in interwar Europe are examples of a Marxist analysis that is developed in both the political-economic and ideological dimensions. "The Southern Question," Gramsci's essay on the ideological and political factors that produce alliances between classes stands as a Marxist classic. Through his examination of the groups that could possibly support the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie of northern Italy, Gramsci developed the notion of "hegemony," a key concept in the analysis of capitalist domination through the state. His work has been an important influence on Poulantzas, among others, who has attempted to incorporate such political phenomena into a more systematic theory of capitalist society.

(To be continued)

NOTES

1. For examples of each type of work see: Domhoff (1967); Miliband (1969) and Nichols (1972); Domhoff (1970, Part 2); Kolko (1963) and Weinstein (1968). The literature on financial-interest groups has also contributed to the formation of an empirical picture of the capitalist class in the United States. See Menshikov (1969). For valuable instrumental analyses of U.S. foreign policy, see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko (1972) and Eakins (1969).
2. The remainder of this section draws heavily on Mollenkopf (1975).
3. For the development of such a criticism, see Balbus (1971). For an exchange between an instrumentalist and a structuralist that delves into many of the key issues, see Poulantzas (1969), Miliband (1970, 1973). The empirical analysis of Menshikov (1969) builds on production categories.
4. Another, less complete, example is Althusser (1971). For analyses of Poulantzas's theoretical framework, see Wright and Perrone (1973), Miliband (1973), and Bridges (1974).

5. For examples of works in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition which include some discussion of the state, see Marcuse (1969), Ollman (1971) and Avineri (1968).

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MARXIST THEORIES OF THE CAPITALIST STATE PART 2

BY DAVID A. GOLD,
CLARENCE Y. H. LO,
AND ERIK OLIN WRIGHT

Part 1 of this article, in the October issue of MR, presented and commented on three major Marxist theories of the state: the instrumentalist, the structuralist, and the Hegelian-Marxist.—THE EDITORS

NEW DEPARTURES

It has become apparent to many Marxists that the instrumentalist perspective is simply inadequate as a guide to understanding the state in advanced capitalist society. While many policies are the outcome of control by specific capitalists, and some government agencies appear to be the tools of specific capitalist interests, it is impossible to see how the complex apparatus of the state can be understood adequately in a model which sees policy outcomes primarily in terms of class-conscious manipulations by the ruling class. But the structuralist alternative is also inadequate. For, while it does situate the formation of policy in the context of the functioning of the capitalist system as a whole, it generally does not explain the social mechanisms which actually generate a class policy that is compatible with the needs of the system. Finally, the Hegelian-Marxist perspective is inadequate because it is so highly abstract

that it is difficult to use in the analysis of a particular historical situation. In addition, the centrality it places on ideology and consciousness often tends to undermine the materialist basis of Marxist theory.

Many of the new departures in the theory of the state have tried to overcome these weaknesses. Three examples seem especially interesting: Claus Offe seeks to transcend the instrumentalist and structuralist limitations through a more precise specification of what is particularly capitalist about the capitalist state; James O'Connor develops a theory of state finance that is rooted in the process of accumulation of monopoly capitalism; and Alan Wolfe attempts to impart more concreteness to the abstractions of the Hegelian side of Marxism.

The Internal Structure of the Capitalist State

Claus Offe, a student of Jürgen Habermas, has been influenced by the Hegelian-Marxist tradition but has since ventured into new areas. His major theoretical work on the state (1972c, 1973b) begins with the question: How can we prove the class character of the capitalist state? How can we demonstrate that it is a *capitalist state* and not merely a *state in capitalist society*? From the start, he rejects both the instrumentalist and structuralist approaches to this problem. Both of these, Offe argues, only examine the *external* determination of state activity: the instrumentalists explain the state in terms of the external manipulation of the state apparatus by the ruling class; the structuralists explain the state by the external constraints which limit the scope of possible state activities. But in neither case do they provide a theory of the mechanisms within the state which guarantee its class character. This is the theoretical problem which Offe attempts to solve.^{1*}

The key concept Offe introduces to understand the internal structure of the state is "selective mechanisms." These constitute a wide range of institutional mechanisms within the state apparatus which (under ideal conditions) serve three crucial functions: (1) *negative selection*: the selective mechanisms

* Numbered notes and a bibliography will be found at the end of the article.

systematically exclude anti-capitalist interests from state activity; (2) *positive selection*: from the range of remaining alternatives, the policy which is in the interests of capital as a whole is selected over policies serving the parochial interests of specific capitalist groups; (3) *disguising selection*: the institutions of the state must somehow maintain the appearance of class-neutrality while at the same time effectively excluding anti-capitalist alternatives. Most of Offe's analysis consists of an abstract discussion of the contradictory character of these selective mechanisms and the methodological problems involved in studying them.

In his discussion of negative selection, Offe specifies four general levels of mechanisms which operate as a hierarchical filter system: structure, ideology, process, and repression. Each level excludes possibilities which have not yet been screened out by the previous levels. *Structural* selective mechanisms refer to the broad limits of possible state actions defined by the overall structure of political institutions. In particular, Offe emphasizes the importance of constitutional guarantees of private property which exclude a wide range of anti-capitalist policies from entering the agenda of state activity. Of the many issues not excluded by the structure of political institutions, *ideological* mechanisms determine which are actually articulated and perceived as problems to be solved. Some potential policy options become "non-events" because they are not in the realm of acceptable discourse. *Decision-making* rules provide

certain interests with a headstart . . . by granting them chronological priority [and] relatively more favorable coalition chances or the opportunity to employ specific power resources. Every procedural rule creates conditions of being favored, or conversely being excluded, for certain topics, groups, or interests. (Offe, 1973a: p. 11)

Finally, the *repressive* apparatus of the state excludes given alternatives through direct coercion.

While it is easy to specify abstractly such negative selective mechanisms, it is extremely difficult to study their class character empirically. To understand the intrinsic class nature of the selective mechanisms it is necessary to study the *excluded* possibilities. But excluded options are, by necessity, intrinsically dif-

ficult to define and observe. The problem is compounded by the disguising selective mechanisms, which mystify the entire process of class determination of state activity. Offe concludes that when the selective mechanisms of the state are functioning effectively, it is virtually impossible to demonstrate empirically the class nature of the state. (This does not mean, of course, that the class interests served by particular policies cannot be studied in the tradition of instrumentalist and structuralist research. But again, merely showing that state policies serve capitalist interests does not prove that the state is a *capitalist state*, a state which necessarily serves capitalist interests.)

Offe's solution to this methodological dilemma is to shift the focus of analysis from the normal functioning of the state to the state in crisis situations. In periods of political crisis the selective mechanisms begin to break down and the state is forced to rely more and more on repression in order to maintain its class character, thus revealing the class nature of the excluded options. The analysis of the class nature of the state thus depends upon revolutionary practice, potentially generating a "crisis of crisis management" which exposes the inner nature of the state itself.

Offe's analysis of *positive* selective mechanisms (the mechanisms which generate a positive capitalist class policy rather than merely excluding anti-capitalist possibilities) raises a variety of additional issues. Offe argues that contradictions internal to the state interfere with the state's development of an effective policy in the interest of capital as a whole. The state engages in two types of positive activities which Offe (1974) calls "allocative policies" and "productive policies." In both of these the state plays an important role in providing the necessary conditions for continued capital accumulation. In the former the state merely coordinates and regulates the allocation of resources that have already been produced; in the latter the state becomes directly involved in the production of goods and services required for the accumulation process.*

* There is no suggestion in this analysis that there was ever a period in which the capitalist state engaged only in allocative policies. From the very earliest periods of capitalism, the direct involvement of the state in the accumulation process has been important. The point is

In the case of purely allocative policies, the state does not need to adopt a truly optimal policy from the point of view of capital as a whole. Most allocative policies have, therefore, been formulated by capitalist interest-groups which influence the state through the mechanisms described by the instrumentalist writers. As monopoly capitalism develops, however, the contradictions in the accumulation process push the state into direct involvement in production. As the state directly produces more and more of the conditions of accumulation, it becomes increasingly important that the state's policies be rational from the point of view of capital as a whole. Such policies cannot, therefore, be left to the give-and-take of competing capitalist interests, but must be planned to serve the collective capitalist interest.

Offe argues that the capitalist state is fundamentally incapable of such planning. Whereas the criterion for capitalist rationality is unambiguous for the individual capitalist—profit maximization through the production and sale of commodities—there can be no equally unambiguous criteria for the capitalist state. Since the state does not produce for the market, its activities cannot be governed by the logic of commodity production. The rationality of state production must therefore be defined in terms of production for use rather than production for exchange.

The crucial political question is, therefore, what kinds of use-value criteria determine state production. Offe shows that many of the structures which are important in negative selection (such as rigid bureaucratic procedures and constitutional and ideological defenses of private property) are obstacles to the development of selective mechanisms which can guarantee that state production will serve the general interests of capital. The state's attempts to overcome these obstacles weaken the negative selective mechanisms and increase the possibilities of anti-capitalist political forces affecting state policies. There is thus an intensifying contradiction between the state's changing role in the accumulation process, which requires rational state

that this involvement has been growing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and that this growth poses serious problems for the "rationality" of state activities from the point of view of capital.

involvement in production, and the internal structures of the state which determine its class nature as a capitalist state.

The Theory of the Fiscal Crisis

James O'Connor (1973) develops a theory of the state budget that is rooted in the reality of contemporary American society.² He tries to explain the fiscal crisis, the observed tendency of state expenditures to grow faster than revenues. O'Connor's theory has three constituent elements. First, there is the recognition that the capitalist state must attempt to perform two contradictory functions—accumulation and legitimation. The state attempts to support the accumulation of private capital while trying to maintain social peace and harmony. Since accumulation is crucial to the reproduction of the class structure, legitimation necessarily involves attempts to mystify the process and to repress or manage discontent. Both accumulation and legitimation are translated into demands for state activity. But while this implies an increase in state expenditures, the revenues for meeting these needs are not always forthcoming, since the fruits of accumulation (greater profits) are not socialized. This is the fiscal crisis.

Second, the state is analyzed as an integral element in the accumulation process. O'Connor divides the economy into three sectors. The growth of the monopoly sector is based on the expansion of capital and technology. It is the prime accumulating sector of the economy. The competitive sector grows on the basis of the expansion of labor power which has been "freed" by accumulation and growth in the monopoly sector. Thus, unlike in other Marxist analyses, the competitive sector does not necessarily decline with accumulation but expands because of the growth process in the monopoly sector. However, with less technical change, smaller growth in capital, and unstable markets, the labor force in the competitive sector is a marginal one, increasingly segmented from the monopoly sector.

The state sector includes production organized by the state itself, such as education, and production contracted out to private capitalists, such as military equipment. Neither type of production is subject to market discipline. One result is low productivity and inflationary tendencies within the state budget.

All three of these sectors of the economy are part of a single contradictory process: the growth of the monopoly sector leads directly and indirectly to the growth of the state and the competitive sector; the expansion of the state in turn becomes a source of further growth of the monopoly sector as more and more of the costs of accumulation are socialized; the growth of the competitive sector increases the social expenses of the state and thus hampers its ability to further underwrite monopoly sector growth. In the end it becomes impossible to understand the dynamics of any one sector without developing a theory which encompasses all three.

The third element of O'Connor's schema concerns the relationship of specific items of state expenditure to the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state. "Social capital" expenditures are those that aid accumulation by private capitalists: social insurance which helps reduce the reproduction costs of labor power, and state-financed industrial development projects which increase the productivity of a given amount of labor power are two examples. These expenditures do not directly produce surplus value but they do aid private capitalists in their attempts to increase the total amount of surplus value and are thus *indirectly productive*. "Social expenses" are those expenditures such as police and welfare that are necessitated by the attempt to maintain social harmony. While such expenditures may potentially reduce certain kinds of losses to capitalists (as in riots) they do not contribute, even indirectly, to the expansion of the pool of surplus value. Despite some empirical difficulties in locating expenditures neatly in one category or the other, the schema is a powerful one for delineating the underlying social tensions and contradictions that find their "solution" in the state budget. The fiscal crisis, at its root, is a social crisis.

One of the main results of this analysis is that the state loses much of its superstructural character. The state is increasingly involved in accumulation, not just to protect the conditions of accumulation as earlier Marxist thinking emphasized, but to participate actively in the creation of those conditions. Although the state is not rigidly determined or circumscribed by accumulation, there is a strong dialectical link.

In addition, the state and the entire political system are seen

as continually weighing alternative political strategies. For example, the welfare-warfare state, which is explained as a result of contradictions created by the accumulation process, is not the only possible course for the state to follow. It is the result of a combination of strategy, structure, and political conflict. O'Connor specifically raises the possibility of an alternative course, a social-industrial complex, which would attempt to solve the same contradictions but would be based on a different political coalition and would have different long-term consequences.

Another important implication of O'Connor's work centers on the analysis of the discontent that arises from state activity. Taxpayers' revolts are indicative of the lack of total success in the state's attempts to mystify its role in accumulation. Workers whose labor power is superfluous also rebel. They are superfluous because, as a consequence of the accumulation process in the monopoly sector, private capital cannot find a way of gaining surplus value from the employment of their labor power. But as the state is increasingly called upon to manage or repress their discontent, the state itself becomes the target. In both cases, there is increasing conflict in the realm of the political at precisely the moment when the state is being called upon to do more in the realm of the economic.

Alienated Politics and the Legitimacy Crisis of the State

Alan Wolfe (1974) introduces the term "alienated politics" in an attempt to lay the groundwork for a Marxist theory of politics. Wolfe is explicitly attempting to extend the Hegelian-Marxist tradition while drawing on elements of structuralism. He argues that the basic concepts Marx used in his economics can serve as metaphors in developing such a theory. Just as alienated labor is a distortion of people's need to engage in productive activity, alienated politics is a distortion of community. The capitalist state is part of the theory of politics in that the state is the "political institution which claims primary responsibility for reproducing alienated politics, that is, for maintaining a political system based upon the extraction and imposition of power from people." (Wolfe, 1974: p. 149)

The value theory framework represents an alternative metaphor, not logically different from alienation but an extension.

The metaphor here is that as people engage in creating a community they expend a power. Just as labor power is reimposed upon people as capital, via surplus value, the state is understood as the reimposition of a "surplus" political power whose original source lies in people's social activity.

In capitalism, politics is an activity that is separate from people's daily lives. It takes the form of struggles for control over the state, which is fetishized, worshipped for its own sake. Real politics, the creation of community, becomes an unrealizable private search. Also, since the state does one thing while appearing to do another, "politics" takes on an opaque quality, which, like the commodity form, must be pierced to understand the underlying reality.⁸

As the basis of a theory, such metaphors lead toward the study of the state in terms of the way it extracts power from people and imposes it back upon them in its attempts to reproduce the capitalist order. Extraction involves mechanisms by which people are divided from each other (such as, for example, the use of ideology or the manipulation of scarcity) while imposition involves mechanisms by which this appropriated power is used on people (such as repression).

In a forthcoming book, Wolfe uses the theory of alienated politics to analyze how democratic principles have been distorted to produce an ideology that legitimates the capitalist state. This ideology has always contained two antagonistic elements: "liberalism," the political ideology that underwrites the state's role in supporting capital accumulation, and "democracy," the principle of participation and equality that legitimates the state. The contradictions of liberal-democracy have, in the course of capitalist development, produced a series of types of capitalist states, each of which has attempted to reconcile this ideological tension with the objective conditions of accumulation. But because of the continual transformation of the conditions of accumulation and the continual class struggle over democracy itself, none of these forms of the state has been capable of permanently solving the problem of legitimating the capitalist state; every historically attempted solution has only led to new forms of legitimation crisis.

Though the capitalist state distorts struggles for democracy

into an ideology of liberal democracy which, if still in a precarious way, is compatible with the state's role in reproducing capitalism, it is a mistake to view the state as a simple product of capitalist interests alone. The particular shape of the capitalist state has been the result of class struggle, and struggle can continue to affect that shape. Thus, Wolfe argues, the state should be seen as an appropriate arena for class struggle. As Wolfe reminds us, the ultimate purpose of constructing a Marxist theory of the capitalist state is not just to study the state, but to transform it.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Many of the recent developments in Marxist theories of the capitalist state can be interpreted as attempts to restore the dialectic to the analysis of the state, thereby applying the methodology that Marx himself used so successfully. This enterprise has taken place at different levels of abstraction and has focused on different problems in state theory. Alan Wolfe's theory of alienated politics represents an attempt to develop a language for discussing politics which captures the dialectic between the material-social activities by which people create communities and the alienated forms of that activity embodied in the state. Claus Offe's work on the internal selective mechanisms of the state elaborates the dialectical relationship between the policies of the state and capitalist class interests as they emerge from the accumulation process. The internal structures of the state are analyzed as contradictory mechanisms which mediate this relationship. Contradiction is brought into the heart of the state itself and is seen as being an essential part of the process of policy formation in capitalist society.

James O'Connor's work is similarly focused on restoring the dialectic between the accumulation process and state activity. Whereas Offe approaches this problem through a theoretical elaboration of the internal mechanisms of the state, O'Connor has attempted to examine more fully the direct and indirect role the state plays in the accumulation process itself. The state's activity is no longer seen simply as an external response to dynamics rooted in the accumulation process, but as an intrinsic element in that process.

These various attempts at strengthening the dialectical quality of a Marxist theory of the state have gone a long way toward undermining the rigid architectural image of the state as part of a superstructure erected on the economic base of society. While none of the works here discussed represents a fully elaborated theory of the state, they do provide the groundwork on which such a theory can be built. A number of general propositions can be made which define the contours within which such a general theory of the capitalist state might be developed. We offer these only as a preliminary formulation reflecting the current stage of our own thinking rather than as actual elements of a complete synthesis of the ideas discussed in this paper.

(1) The capitalist state must be conceived both as a structure constrained by the logic of the society within which it functions and as an organization manipulated behind the scenes by the ruling class and its representatives. *The extent to which actual state policies can be explained through structural or instrumental processes is historically contingent.* There are periods in which the state can be reasonably understood as a self-reproducing structure which functions largely independently of any external manipulation, and other times when it is best viewed as a simple tool in the hands of the ruling class. Certain parts of the state apparatus may be highly manipulated by specific capitalist interests while other parts may have much more structural autonomy. But in no situation can state activity be completely reduced to either structural or instrumental causation. The state is always *relatively* autonomous: it is neither completely autonomous (i.e., free from active control by the capitalist class) nor simply manipulated by members of the ruling class (i.e., free from any structural constraints). As Marx put it so eloquently in his analysis of the French state in the mid-nineteenth century: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."

(2) *The internal structures of the state, as well as the concrete state policies shaped within those structures, are the objects of class struggle.* A theory of the state must not regard

the structures of the state as historical givens but must attempt to explain the development of the structures themselves. Otherwise, the analysis takes on a static quality. Offe's work to a certain extent exemplifies this problem. While he does describe the ways in which the selective structures of the nineteenth-century capitalist state differ from those of the contemporary state, and he discusses in rich detail the contradictory quality of the dominant structures of the present period, he offers no theory of the actual transformation of state structures. His theoretical work thus lacks the systematic inclusion of history.

O'Connor's work moves at least partially in the direction of a more historical theory. While he never formulates an explicit theory of the transformation of state structures, there is implicit in his work the view that not only are state policies as such the objects of class struggle, political coalition formation, etc., but so are the structures of the state themselves. Gösta Anderson and Roger Friedland (1975) have made this notion explicit and carried the analysis considerably further. They argue that a theory of the state must contain a theory of what they call political class struggle, a theory of the ways in which class struggle itself transforms the internal organization of the state. In such a theory the state is seen not merely as helping to reproduce the capitalist system in contradictory ways, but as being itself shaped by the class struggle which results from those contradictions.

We believe that this extension of the analysis of Offe and O'Connor is an important direction for further work on the theory of the capitalist state. For the moment, however, it remains a somewhat ad hoc argument. As in much of Marxist theory, explanations based on "history" or "class consciousness" or "class struggle" often have a residual quality to them. To say that the structures of the state are the objects of class struggle and that class struggle explains the specific evolution of structures is only a starting point. It is further necessary to develop a proper theory of such political class struggle itself.

(3) The notion of the "relative autonomy of the state" needs further theoretical development. Structuralist writers have conceptualized this notion by treating the state as relatively autonomous with respect to direct, instrumental manipulations

by the capitalist class. Offe's analysis of the contradiction between the state's role in the accumulation process and the selective mechanisms which determine its class character suggests that the state may also become relatively autonomous from the logic of accumulation itself. The word "relative" is crucial; there is no implication that the capitalist state can ever be emancipated from the constraints of a capitalist social formation. But there is the implication that as the state becomes more and more implicated in the productive sphere itself, as larger realms of social activity become *decommodified* (in the sense that production becomes organized around politically determined use-values rather than exchange-values), the state can develop a much greater degree of autonomy than is understood by the conventional Marxist notion of "relative autonomy." This further suggests that it may make sense to talk of the state as such having an emergent "interest," rather than simply seeing the state as in some sense reflecting the interests of the bourgeoisie. The analysis of an interest of the state is undeveloped within the Marxist perspective. But it is a line of thought which we feel is worth pursuing.*

(4) With the development of capitalism from the early phases of monopoly capitalism into advanced monopoly capitalism the reproduction of favorable conditions for accumulation depends more and more upon the active intervention of the state. There is no guarantee that the state will in fact discover the correct forms of such intervention, nor even that it will avoid making catastrophic mistakes. The only certainty is that the re-

* Two examples of works stressing the interest of the state *per se* are *Roots of War* by Richard Barnet and *The Logic of World Power* by Franz Schurmann. Responding to the economic dislocations caused by the Vietnam war, these writers have argued that American imperialism is more in the interest of the state than in the interests of capitalism. Barnet's view is that although the state is constrained by economic structures, specific decisions are largely controlled in an instrumental fashion by political and bureaucratic elites. Schurmann places less emphasis on economic factors and claims that American imperialism is the result of executive power backed by popular ideology. Schurmann does present excellent evidence that bureaucratic factions have greatly influenced U.S. policy in Indochina. For a Marxist analysis of U.S. foreign policy that recognizes that bureaucracies and political parties mediate between conflicting policy options, see Lo (1975).

quirements for such an expanded role of the state will increase, particularly in the direction of increasingly direct involvement in the accumulation process.

It is especially important that future theoretical and empirical work on the capitalist state should attempt to understand the relationship of the internationalization of capital to the dynamics of state involvement in accumulation. Work on the theory of the capitalist state is now developing the tools for analyzing the relationship of the state to accumulation within a national context; it is only beginning to explore the implications of the continuation of the nationally based state in the face of an accumulation process which is increasingly supranational. (See Martinelli and Somaini, 1973.)

(5) The increasing pressure on the state to become involved in the accumulation process has a number of contradictory consequences which in turn will shape the further development of state structures and state policies:

(a) The institutionalized mechanisms that evolved in earlier periods of capitalist development become less and less effective as mechanisms for policy formation under the newer requirements for accumulation. In Offe's terms, the selective mechanisms appropriate for "allocative" policies are not functional for "productive" policies. This points to the likelihood that there will be a period of greater instrumental manipulation of the state by ruling-class groups in attempts to restructure the state in ways more compatible with the new requirements for accumulation. An increasingly instrumental relationship of the ruling class (or fractions of the ruling class) to the state is a critical mechanism for the development of new state structures which, if successful, make further direct manipulation less necessary.

(b) Simultaneously, however, the increasing involvement of the state directly in the accumulation process has the effect of politicizing the accumulation process itself in the sense that more and more decisions about accumulation are at least partially made in public agencies rather than in private corporate offices. Explicit or implicit political criteria increasingly enter into the organization of production and the allocation of resources in the accumulation process, replacing more purely

market criteria. The result is that class struggle in turn tends to become more politicized. It becomes increasingly difficult to contain working-class demands at the level of firms and industries; demands tend to become increasingly directed toward the state and toward state structures.

Ruling-class groups organized to restructure the state apparatus thus have to respond to quite contradictory forces: on the one hand there is the necessity of creating structures more capable of directly planning and managing the accumulation process; on the other hand, there is the necessity of containing or reversing the growing politicization of class struggle which has resulted from the increasing role of the state in the economy.

While we are still in the middle of this transitional period of state restructuring, some of the elements of the "solution" are becoming apparent. In particular, the combination of executive centralization and the growth of technocratic legitimations for state policies can be interpreted as at least partial attempts to handle these contradictions. It is perhaps characteristic of the dialectical quality of the development of Marxist theory itself that the new directions in the theory of the state are emerging at precisely the time when the capitalist state is undergoing such qualitative change.

NOTES

1. See also, Sardei-Bierman, *et al.* (1973) for a critique of Offe's work.
2. O'Connor (1973); see also: San Francisco *Kapitalistate* Group (1974).
3. For an empirical study of the political meaning of sports ideology, which also discusses alienated forms of political activity, see Balbus (1975).

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XIII

THE STATE

1. THE STATE IN ECONOMIC THEORY

PROBABLY few would deny that the state plays a vital role in the economic process. There are still many, however, who would argue that the state can and should be kept out of economic theorizing.

From one point of view, this is not difficult to understand. So long as economics is regarded as a science of the relations between man and nature in the manner of the modern school, the state requires consideration only at the level of application and not as a part of the subject matter of the science. There is no state on Robinson Crusoe's island, yet economics is as relevant to Robinson as it is to twentieth-century America. From this standpoint the state cannot logically be a concern of theoretical economics; it must be regarded as one of the factors which shape and limit the application of economic principles to any given set of actual conditions.*

All this is changed when we take the position that economics is the science of the social relationships of production under historically determined conditions. Failure to include the state in the subject matter of economics then becomes an arbitrary and unjustifiable omission. In view of this, and after what has been said about Marx's fundamental approach to economics in earlier chapters, no further explanation seems required to justify the inclusion of a chapter on the state in our examination of Marxian economics. A word of caution is, however, necessary before we proceed.

As in the case of crises, Marx never worked out a systematic and formally complete theory of the state. That he originally

* See the Introduction above, pp. 3-8.

intended to do so is clear. For example, he opens the Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy* with the following words:

I consider the system of bourgeois economy in the following order: Capital, landed property, wage labor; state, foreign trade, world market . . . The first part of the first book, treating of capital, consists of the following chapters: 1. Commodity; 2. Money, or simple Circulation; 3. Capital in general. The first two chapters form the contents of the present work . . . Systematic elaboration on the plan outlined above will depend upon circumstances.¹

The plan underwent substantial alterations in the course of time, as an examination of the three volumes of *Capital* makes clear, but the state always remained in the background and never received the 'systematic elaboration' which Marx evidently had hoped to accord it. It follows that a neat summary of his views is out of the question. Instead we shall try to present a summary theoretical treatment of the state which is consistent with Marx's numerous and scattered remarks on the subject and which at the same time provides the necessary supplement to the main body of theoretical principles dealing with the development of the capitalist system.*

2. THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF THE STATE

There is a tendency on the part of modern liberal theorists to interpret the state as an institution established in the interests of society as a whole for the purpose of mediating and reconciling the antagonisms to which social existence inevitably gives rise. This is a theory which avoids the pitfalls of political metaphysics and which serves to integrate in a tolerably satisfactory fashion a considerable body of observed fact. It contains, how-

* Among the most important Marxist writings on the state the following may be mentioned: Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, particularly Ch. ix; Lenin, *The State and Revolution*; Rosa Luxemburg, 'Sozialreform oder Revolution?' *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. III. An English translation of the latter work is available (*Reform or Revolution?*, Three Arrows Press, N. Y., 1937), but it is unfortunately not a very satisfactory one. A reasonably adequate survey of a large body of Marxist literature on the state is contained in S. H. M. Chang, *The Marxist Theory of the State* (1931).

ever, one basic shortcoming, the recognition of which leads to a theory essentially Marxian in its orientation. A critique of what may be called the class-mediation conception of the state is, therefore, perhaps the best way of introducing the Marxian theory.

The class-mediation theory assumes, usually implicitly, that the underlying class structure, or what comes to the same thing, the system of property relations is an immutable datum, in this respect like the order of nature itself. It then proceeds to ask what arrangements the various classes will make to get along with each other, and finds that an institution for mediating their conflicting interests is the logical and necessary answer. To this institution powers for maintaining order and settling quarrels are granted. In the real world what is called the state is identified as the counterpart of this theoretical construction.

The weakness of this theory is not difficult to discover. It lies in the assumption of an immutable and, so to speak, self-maintaining class structure of society. The superficiality of this assumption is indicated by the most cursory study of history.* The fact is that many forms of property relations with their concomitant class structures have come and gone in the past, and there is no reason to assume that they will not continue to do so in the future. The class structure of society is no part of the natural order of things; it is the product of past social development, and it will change in the course of future social development.

Once this is recognized it becomes clear that the liberal theory goes wrong in the manner in which it initially poses the problem. We cannot ask: Given a certain class structure, how will the various classes, with their divergent and often conflicting interests, manage to get along together? We must ask: How did a particular class structure come into being and by what means is its continued existence guaranteed? As soon as an attempt is made to answer this question, it appears that the state has a function in society which is prior to and more fundamental than

* Many theorists recognize this up to a point, but they believe that what was true of past societies is not true of modern society. In other words, capitalism is regarded as the final end-product of social evolution. See the discussion of this point in Chapter 1 above.

any which present-day liberals attribute to it. Let us examine this more closely.

A given set of property relations serves to define and demarcate the class structure of society. From any set of property relations one class or classes (the owners) reap material advantages; other classes (the owned and the non-owners) suffer material disadvantages. A special institution capable and willing to use force to whatever degree is required is an essential to the maintenance of such a set of property relations. Investigation shows that the state possesses this characteristic to the fullest degree, and that no other institution is or can be allowed to compete with it in this respect. This is usually expressed by saying that the state, and the state alone, exercises sovereignty over all those subject to its jurisdiction. It is, therefore, not difficult to identify the state as the guarantor of a given set of property relations.

If now we ask, where the state comes from, the answer is that it is the product of a long and arduous struggle in which the class which occupies what is for the time the key positions in the process of production gets the upper hand over its rivals and fashions a state which will enforce that set of property relations which is in its own interest. In other words any particular state is the child of the class or classes in society which benefit from the particular set of property relations which it is the state's obligation to enforce. A moment's reflection will carry the conviction that it could hardly be otherwise. As soon as we have dropped the historically untenable assumption that the class structure of society is in some way natural or self-enforcing, it is clear that any other outcome would lack the prerequisites of stability. If the disadvantaged classes were in possession of state power, they would attempt to use it to establish a social order more favorable to their own interests, while a sharing of state power among the various classes would merely shift the locale of conflict to the state itself.

That such conflicts within the state, corresponding to fundamental class struggles outside, have taken place in certain transitional historical periods is not denied.* During those long pe-

* For an example, see the discussion of 'The Conditions of Fascism,' pp. 329-32, below.

riods, however, when a certain social order enjoys a relatively continuous and stable existence, the state power must be monopolized by the class or classes which are the chief beneficiaries.

As against the class-mediation theory of the state, we have here the underlying idea of what has been called the class-domination theory. The former takes the existence of a certain class structure for granted and sees in the state an institution for reconciling the conflicting interests of the various classes; the latter, on the other hand, recognizes that classes are the product of historical development and sees in the state an instrument in the hands of the ruling classes for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself.

It is important to realize that, so far as capitalist society is concerned, 'class domination' and 'the protection of private property' are virtually synonymous expressions. Hence when we say with Engels that the highest purpose of the state is the protection of private property,² we are also saying that the state is an instrument of class domination. This is doubtless insufficiently realized by critics of the Marxian theory who tend to see in the notion of class domination something darker and more sinister than 'mere' protection of private property. In other words they tend to look upon class domination as something reprehensible and the protection of private property as something meritorious. Consequently, it does not occur to them to identify the two ideas. Frequently, no doubt, this is because they have in mind not capitalist property, but rather private property as it would be in a simple commodity-producing society where each producer owns and works with his own means of production. Under such conditions there are no classes at all and hence no class domination. Under capitalist relations, however, property has an altogether different significance, and its protection is easily shown to be identical with the preservation of class dominance. Capitalist private property does not consist in things—things exist independently of their ownership—but in a social relation between people. Property confers upon its owners freedom from labor and the disposal over the labor of others, and this is the essence of all social domination whatever form it may assume. It follows that the protection of property is fundamentally the assurance of social domination to owners over non-

owners. And this, in turn, is precisely what is meant by class domination, which it is the primary function of the state to uphold.

The recognition that the defense of private property is the first duty of the state is the decisive factor in determining the attitude of genuine Marxist socialism towards the state. 'The theory of the Communists,' Marx and Engels wrote in the *Communist Manifesto*, 'can be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.' Since the state is first and foremost the protector of private property, it follows that the realization of this end cannot be achieved without a head-on collision between the forces of socialism and the state power.*

3. THE STATE AS AN ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT

The fact that the first concern of the state is to protect the continued existence and stability of a given form of society does not mean that it performs no other functions of economic importance. On the contrary, the state has always been a very significant factor in the functioning of the economy within the framework of the system of property relations which it guarantees. This principle is generally implicitly recognized by Marxist writers whenever they analyse the operation of an actual eco-

* The treatment of the relation between the state and property has of necessity been extremely sketchy. In order to avoid misunderstanding, the following note should be added. The idea that the state is an organization for the maintenance of private property was by no means an invention of Marx and Engels. On the contrary, it constituted the cornerstone of the whole previous development of political thought from the breakdown of feudalism and the origins of the modern state. Bodin, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Adam Smith, Kant, and Hegel—to mention but a few outstanding thinkers of the period before Marx—clearly recognized this central function of the state. They believed private property to be the necessary condition for the full development of human potentialities, the *sine qua non* of genuine freedom. Marx and Engels added that freedom based on private property is freedom for an exploiting class, and that freedom for all presupposes the abolition of private property, that is to say the achievement of a classless society. Nevertheless, Marx and Engels did not forget that the realization of a classless society (abolition of private property) is possible only on the basis of certain definite historical conditions; without the enormous increase in the productivity of labor which capitalism had brought about, a classless society would be no more than an empty Utopia.

nomie system, but it has received little attention in discussions of the theory of the state. The reason for this is not difficult to discover. The theory of the state has usually been investigated with the problem of transition from one form of society to another in the foreground; in other words, what we have called the primary function of the state has been the subject of analysis. Lenin's *State and Revolution*—the title clearly indicates the center of interest—set a precedent which has been widely followed.* Consequently, the theory of the state as an economic instrument has been neglected, though evidently for our purposes it is necessary to have some idea of the essentials of Marx's thinking on the subject.

Fortunately Marx, in his chapter on the length of the working day,³ provides a compact and lucid analysis of the role of the state in relation to one very important problem of capitalist economy. By examining this chapter in some detail we can deduce the guiding principles of Marxist teaching on the role of the state within the framework of capitalist property relations.

The rate of surplus value, one of the key variables in Marx's system of theoretical economics, depends on three factors: the productivity of labor, the length of the working day and prevailing subsistence standards. It is therefore a matter of importance to discover the determinants of the length of the working day. This is clearly not a question of economic law in any narrow sense. As Marx put it,

apart from extremely elastic bounds, the nature of exchange of commodities itself imposes no limits to the working day, no limit to surplus labor. The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the working day as long as possible . . . On the other hand . . . the laborer maintains his right as a seller when he wishes to reduce the working day to one of definite normal duration. There is here, therefore, an antimony, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence it is that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working day presents itself as the result of a struggle, a

* For example, Chang's book, cited above, follows Lenin's outline very closely.

struggle between collective capital, i.e. the class of capitalists, and collective labor, i.e. the working class.⁴

After describing certain forms, both pre-capitalist and capitalist, of exploitation involving the duration of the working day, Marx examines 'The Struggle for a Normal Working Day' in the historical development of English capitalism. The first phase of this struggle resulted in 'Compulsory Laws for the Extension of the Working Day from the Middle of the 14th to the End of the 17th Century.'⁵ Employers, straining to create a trained and disciplined proletariat out of the available pre-capitalist material, were frequently obliged to resort to the state for assistance. Laws extending the length of the working day were the result. For a long time, however, the extension of the working day was a very slow and gradual process. It was not until the rapid growth of the factory system in the second half of the eighteenth century that there began that process of prolonging hours of work which culminated in the notorious conditions of the early nineteenth century:

After capital had taken centuries in extending the working day to its normal maximum length, and then beyond this to the limit of the natural day of 12 hours, there followed on the birth of machinism and modern industry in the last third of the 18th century a violent encroachment like that of an avalanche in its intensity and extent . . . As soon as the working class, stunned at first by the noise and turmoil of the new system of production, recovered in some measure its senses its resistance began.⁶

The beginnings of working-class resistance ushered in the second phase of the development: 'Compulsory Limitation by Law of the Working Time, The English Factory Acts, 1833 to 1864.'⁷ In a series of sharp political struggles, the workers were able to wring one concession after another from their opponents. These concessions took the form of laws limiting hours of work for ever wider categories of labor, until by 1860 the principle of limitation of the working day was so firmly established that it could no longer be challenged. Thereafter progress pursued a smoother course.

The limitation of the working day was not simply a question of concessions by the ruling class in the face of a revolutionary

threat, though this was undoubtedly the main factor. At least two other considerations of importance have to be taken into account. Marx noted that,

Apart from the working class movement that daily grew more threatening, the limiting of factory labor was dictated by the same necessity which spread guano over the English fields. The same blind eagerness for plunder that in the one case exhausted the soil had, in the other, torn up by the roots the living forces of the nation.⁸

Moreover, the question of factory legislation entered into the final phase of the struggle for political mastery between the landed aristocracy and the industrial capitalists:

However much the individual manufacturer might give the rein to his old lust for gain, the spokesmen and political leaders of the manufacturing class ordered a change in front and of speech toward the workpeople. They had entered upon the contest for the repeal of the Corn Laws and needed the workers to help them to victory. They promised, therefore, not only a double-sized loaf of bread, but the enactment of the Ten Hours Bill in the Free Trade millennium . . .⁹

And after repeal of the Corn Laws had gone through, the workers 'found allies in the Tories panting for revenge.'¹⁰ Thus factory legislation derived a certain amount of support from both sides to the great struggle over free trade.

Finally Marx concluded his treatment of the working day with the following statement:

For 'protection' against 'the serpent of their agonies' the laborers must put their heads together and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social barrier that shall prevent the very workers from selling, by voluntary contract with capital, themselves and their families into slavery and death. In place of the pompous catalogue of the 'inalienable rights of man' comes the modest Magna Charta of a legally limited working day, which shall make clear 'when the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins.' *Quantum mutatus ab illo!*¹¹

What general conclusions can be deduced from Marx's discussion of the working day? The principle of most general bearing

was stated by Engels. Answering the charge that historical materialism neglects the political element in historical change, Engels cited the chapter on the working day 'where legislation, which is surely a political act, has such a trenchant effect' and concluded that 'force (that is, state power) is also an economic power' and hence is by no means excluded from the causal factors in historical change.¹² Once this has been established, it is necessary to ask under what circumstances and in whose interest the economic power of the state will be brought into action. On both points the analysis of the working day is instructive.

First, the state power is invoked to solve problems which are posed by the economic development of the particular form of society under consideration, in this case capitalism. In the earlier period a shortage of labor power, in the later period over-exploitation of the laboring population were the subjects of state action. In each case the solution of the problem required state intervention. Many familiar examples of a similar character readily come to mind.

Second, we should naturally expect that the state power under capitalism would be used first and foremost in the interests of the capitalist class since the state is dedicated to the preservation of the structure of capitalism and must therefore be staffed by those who fully accept the postulates and objectives of this form of society. This is unquestionably true, but it is not inconsistent to say that state action may run counter to the immediate economic interests of some or even all of the capitalists provided only that the overriding aim of preserving the system intact is promoted. The legal limitation of the working day is a classic example of state action of this sort. The intensity of class antagonism engendered by over-exploitation of the labor force was such that it became imperative for the capitalist class to make concessions even at the cost of immediate economic advantages.*

* This example makes clear the concession character of state action favoring the working class, since it could not possibly be maintained that the workers had a share in state power in England at the time the main factory acts were passed. In this connection it is sufficient to recall that the Reform Act of 1832 contained high property qualifications for voting and it was not until 1867 that the franchise was next extended. By this time the most important victories in the struggle for factory legislation had already been won.

For the sake of preserving domestic peace and tranquility, blunting the edge of class antagonisms, and ultimately avoiding the dangers of violent revolution, the capitalist class is always prepared to make concessions through the medium of state action. It may, of course, happen that the occasion for the concessions is an actual materialization of the threat of revolution.* In this case their purpose is to restore peace and order so that production and accumulation can once again go forward uninterruptedly.

Let us summarize the principles underlying the use of the state as an economic instrument within the framework of capitalism. In the first place, the state comes into action in the economic sphere in order to solve problems which are posed by the development of capitalism. In the second place, where the interests of the capitalist class are concerned, there is a strong predisposition to use the state power freely. And, finally, the state may be used to make concessions to the working class provided that the consequences of not doing so are sufficiently dangerous to the stability and functioning of the system as a whole.

It should be noted that none of these conclusions lends support to the revisionist view that socialism can be achieved through a series of piecemeal reforms. On the contrary, they grow out of and supplement the basic principle that the state exists in the first instance for the protection of capitalist property relations. Reforms may modify the functioning of capitalism but never threaten its foundation. Rosa Luxemburg stated the true Marxian position succinctly in the following words:

'Social control' . . . is concerned not with the limitation of capitalist property, but on the contrary with its protection. Or, speaking in economic terms, it does not constitute an attack on capitalist exploitation but rather a normalization and regularization of this exploitation.¹³

Marx never said anything to contradict this, and to cite his chapter on the working day, as revisionists frequently do, in

* For example, Marx remarked that in France, 'the February [1848] revolution was necessary to bring into the world the 12 hours' law.' *Capital* 1, p. 328.

support of the gradualist standpoint is simply to betray a misunderstanding of his entire theoretical system.

4. THE QUESTION OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Up to this point nothing has been said about the form of government in capitalist society. Is it possible that the principles of state action which have been examined do not hold in a fully democratic capitalist society? (By 'fully democratic' we mean no more than what exists today in most of the English-speaking world: parliamentarism combined with universal suffrage and organizational freedom in the political sphere.)

If Marxist theory answers this question in the negative, this must not be interpreted to mean that the question of democracy is regarded as of no importance, but only that democracy does not alter the basic significance of the state in relation to the economy. The existence of democracy is, of course, a matter of prime importance particularly to the working class. Only under a democratic form of government can the working class organize freely and effectively for the achievement of its ends, whether they happen to be socialist or merely reformist in character. It is for this reason that one of the first demands of the labor movement in all non-democratic countries has always been the establishment of democratic forms of government. Moreover, for the ruling class democracy has always constituted a potential threat to the stability of its position and has consequently been granted grudgingly, with limitations, and usually only under severe pressure. Marx stated the main issues very forcibly in discussing the democratic French constitution of 1848:

The most comprehensive contradiction of this constitution consisted in the following: the classes whose social slavery the constitution is to perpetuate, proletariat, peasants, petty bourgeois, it puts in possession of political power through universal suffrage. And from the class whose old social power it sanctions, the bourgeoisie, it withdraws the political guarantees of this power. It forces its rule into democratic conditions, which at every moment help the hostile classes to victory and jeopardize the very foundations of bourgeois society.¹⁴

Democracy brings the conflicts of capitalist society into the open in the political sphere; it restricts the freedom of the capitalists to use the state in their own interests; it reinforces the working class in demanding concessions; finally, it even increases the possibility that the working class will present demands which threaten the system itself and so must be rejected by the capitalists and their state functionaries regardless of the consequences. As we shall see later on, these are all matters of the greatest importance in determining the actual course of capitalist evolution; but they do not contradict the principles set forth in the preceding section. There is, in other words, nothing in the nature of democracy to make us change our view of the fundamental functions and limits of state action in capitalist society. Again, we must insist that the revisionists, in holding the opposed view, that socialism can be gradually substituted for capitalism by the methods of capitalist democracy, were in reality abandoning Marx altogether.

The fallacy of the revisionist position was never more clearly pointed out than by Rosa Luxemburg in her polemic against Bernstein and Schmidt in 1899:

According to Conrad Schmidt, the achievement of a social democratic majority in parliament should be the direct way to the gradual socialization of society . . . Formally, to be sure, parliamentarism does express the interests of the entire society in the state organization. On the other hand, however, it is still capitalist society, that is to say, a society in which capitalist interests are controlling . . . The institutions which are democratic in form are in substance instruments of the dominant class interests. This is most obvious in the fact that so soon as democracy shows a disposition to deny its class character and to become an instrument of the real interests of the people, the democratic forms themselves are sacrificed by the bourgeoisie and their representatives in the state. The idea of a social democratic majority appears therefore as a calculation which, entirely in the spirit of bourgeois liberalism, concerns itself with only one side—the formal side—of democracy but which leaves out of account the other side, its real content.¹⁵

The spread of fascism in the last two decades, particularly in those countries where working-class organization had reached

its greatest development, has done much to weaken the belief in the possibility of a gradual transition to socialism through the methods provided by capitalist democracy. Otto Bauer, one of the outstanding representatives of the Second International and long leader of the Austrian socialists, expressed a widespread view when he wrote, in 1936, that the experience of fascism 'destroys the illusion of reformist socialism that the working class can fill the forms of democracy with socialist content and develop the capitalist into a socialist order without a revolutionary jump.'¹⁰ Rosa Luxemburg's warning that in an extremity 'the democratic forms themselves are sacrificed by the bourgeoisie and their representatives in the state' has turned out to be well-founded. We shall return to this question in greater detail in Chapters XVIII and XIX below.

5. EVALUATING THE ROLE OF THE STATE

It might seem that we are now ready to consider the problem of the state in relation to chronic depression, which was raised at the end of the last Part. But this would be an error. Chronic depression is only one of the problems of capitalism requiring state action, and to treat it in isolation would be certain to lead to false conclusions.

It must be recalled once again that the analysis of the preceding chapters has been carried through on a relatively high level of abstraction in several important respects. In particular we have assumed, except in occasional *excursi*, a closed and freely competitive capitalist system. In reality present-day capitalism is neither closed nor freely competitive. What we see around us is an interrelated world economy consisting of numerous capitalist, semi-capitalist, and non-capitalist nations in which varying degrees of monopoly are a common phenomenon. As we shall see, these facts are not accidental; they belong to the very nature of capitalism as a phase of world history. To abstract from them was a necessary, but at the same time, provisional stage in our analysis. The time has now come to go beyond this position, to take account of a variety of aspects of capitalist development which have so far been omitted from consideration. In so doing we shall find that new problems and conditions are introduced

which profoundly affect our view of the future of capitalism and the role of the state therein.

Our next tasks must, therefore, be to analyse the structural and institutional tendencies of capitalism which modify its competitive character; and to analyse the developing characteristics of world economy. We shall find the two tasks interrelated in the closest way. Only when these tasks have been completed will we be in a position to apply the principles brought out in the present chapter and to evaluate concretely the role of state activity in deciding the fate of the capitalist order.

The Origins of the Capitalist State

The state is a relatively new development in the history of human society. The first states did not arise until around the fourth millennium B.C. Thus states have existed for only about 6,000 years. All human societies before that time and most human societies since (that is, primitive hunting and gathering and simple horticultural societies) have been without states. Those societies that have never known states have very different solutions to the problems of maintaining order, resolving conflicts, collective decision making, and the implementation of the collective will than do state societies. Primitive societies are organized along lines of kinship, rather than along lines of class, state power, or territory. Crimes and warfare are handled within that kinship framework through such institutions as blood vengeance (where the relatives of the offended party seek retribution for offenses) and a popular militia system where all adult males serve during times of war, but no one is a full-time soldier.

The most primitive social forms are far more democratic and equalitarian than anything class societies have ever known. These societies have no powerful chiefs or strong leaders of any kind. What leadership there is is based on voluntary consent to *proved* leadership abilities. Real decision-making power rests in assemblies of the whole tribe, and within these leadership is exercised through persuasion.¹

A considerable amount of data on a thousand different (mostly primitive)

¹ For good descriptions of primitive democracy, see Morton Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society* (New York: Random House, 1967), chapter 3; Krader, *The Formation of the State*, chapter 2; Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), chapters 5 and 6; Eleanor Leacock, Introduction to Engels, *The Origin*; and Lewis Morgan, *Ancient Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1964).

societies studied by anthropologists have been brought together by George Murdock and published as the *Ethnographic Atlas*. The systematic codification of the various traits of each society allows researchers to correlate the frequency of one type of trait with that of any other type. Thus we can determine what proportion of a certain kind of society has one or another institution.

Hunting and gathering societies are the most primitive type of society. Food is secured in essentially the same manner as all other mammals secure theirs — through capturing animals and collecting roots, berries, and fruits. Before 10,000 years ago *all* societies of *Homo sapiens* were at this stage of development. Until a few hundred years ago most societies on earth were still of this type. A few hunting and gathering societies still exist in the remote areas of the Amazon Basin, Southeast Asia, and Central Africa. There is no record of any anthropologist having discovered such a society with a chief who had substantial power. Only about 36 percent of such societies had a leader with moderate power.²

Horticultural societies are those that secure most of their food from working the land with hoes or digging sticks. Simple horticultural societies do not have metallurgy and thus use only wooden sticks to work the land, whereas advanced horticultural societies, having metallurgy, use metal hoes, shovels, rakes, and other hand tools to work the land. Thirty-eight percent of all simple horticultural societies (about which data have been collected in the *Ethnographic Atlas*) and 63 percent of all advanced horticultural societies had chiefs with substantial power (compared with 0 percent of the hunters and gatherers). Virtually all agricultural societies (those that use the plow, typically harnessed to a beast of burden, to secure food) have leaders with substantial power.³ Thus it is clear that the more developed a society (the more advanced its technology and the wealthier it is), the greater the differences in political power.

The state developed as a social institution in response to the growth of classes — that is, the development of a division of labor between those who produced goods and services and those who supervised and benefited from the production of them. While all societies probably differentiate among people on the basis of prestige (for example, the older or the better hunters have a somewhat higher status), only a few in the history of humankind have had classes. The development of class lines among people (which were not only maintained throughout people's lifetimes but were also hereditary) required qualitative changes in the democratic political institutions that hunting and gathering societies had employed from time immemorial to make decisions, adjudicate disputes, and ensure social order.

The division of society into rich and poor, which supplanted the old kin-based organization, meant that the institutions of blood vengeance and the popular militia ceased to function properly in their task of maintaining social order. When the poor of one clan or family stole from the rich of another, the poor members of the latter clan or family did not have the motivation to avenge their

² Gerhard Lenski, *Human Societies* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 138.

³ *Idem.*

rich relatives. Instead, they were likely to sympathize with the poor criminals, even though they were not their kin. A professional police, army, and criminal justice system therefore had to be developed to secure the wealth of the minority. Similarly, the maintenance of the privileges of the wealthy required the replacement of the tribal councils by undemocratic mechanisms of decision making. Unless the democratic assemblies were subverted, nothing would stand in the way of the overwhelming majority of the poor from limiting the privileges, or even confiscating the wealth of the rich.⁴

The breakdown of primitive equalitarian and communal economic institutions that precipitated the collapse of the primitive democratic institutions can be documented from data reported in Murdock's *Ethnographic Atlas*. Using his definition of class, about 2 percent of all hunting and gathering societies and 17 percent of simple horticultural societies studied by anthropologists have been found to have a class system. This compares with 54 percent of advanced horticultural and 71 percent of agricultural societies.⁵ Anthropologists have found only a few hunting and gathering societies with private ownership of land. In 14 percent of simple horticultural societies and in 47 percent of advanced horticultural societies, however, private ownership of land is the rule.⁶ And in agricultural societies, private ownership of land is even more common. That even 2 percent of hunting and gathering societies had class systems and that a small percentage had any private property rights to land at all is almost certainly a result of extended contact with class societies through trade and political domination, which induced the development of these institutions in what otherwise would have been fully equalitarian and communal social orders.⁷ Anthropological data clearly indicate that the more advanced a society is, the more likely it is to have considerable economic inequality as well as private ownership of wealth.

After the development of the state only a minority continued to have the right to exercise legitimate force (that is, the full-time police and soldiers). The process of decision making ceased to be the prerogative of all adults (or all adult

⁴ According to Engels, the invention of a mechanism was needed by the newly wealthy and privileged that

... would not only safeguard the newly-acquired property of private individuals against the communistic traditions of the gentile order, would not only sanctify private property, formerly held in such light esteem, and pronounce this sanctification the highest purpose of human society, but would also stamp the gradually developing new forms of acquiring property, and consequently, of constantly accelerating increase in wealth, with the seal of general public recognition; an institution that would perpetuate, not only the newly-rising class division of society, but also the right of the possessing class to exploit the non-possessing classes and the rule of the former over the latter.

And this institution arrived. The *state* was invented.

From Engels, *The Origin*, p. 263.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁷ See Leacock, Introduction to Engels, *The Origin*.

males) and was now vested in the hands of the economically hegemonic class. The process of the implementation of those decisions was no longer voluntary or based on group social pressure, but now came to be dependent on the ultimate sanction of physical force exercised by the police and soldiers who were paid by, and commanded by, the full-time decision makers and administrators in the state bureaucracy.*

Primitive democracy broke down gradually without people being aware that it was occurring. The transformation occurred along with basic changes in the techniques of production, the consequent great increase in wealth, and the rise of social classes. The possibility for classes and the state to exist arose with the development of a technology sufficiently productive to produce an economic surplus large enough to allow the dominant economic class and state officials, full-time soldiers, and police to exist without themselves having to work. The realization of this possibility was a product first of the functionally necessary and socially rational allocation of resources, and then, increasingly, of the self-interest of those entrusted to manage the common affairs.

The first differentials in authority and privilege were established democratically because of the increases in efficiency that were foreseen would result from a division of labor. The initial functionally necessary differences, although rather small, were enough to allow for the operation of the forces of self-interest (forces which could no longer be effectively controlled by popular social pressure). The rich increasingly exercised influence over the public officials when they themselves did not hold the public offices. The self-interest of the originally democratically selected public trustees converged with that of the rich, either because public office was used to accumulate wealth or wealth was used to obtain office — or because the two strata simply merged. The accumulation of private property in the hands of the wealthy and political prerogatives in the hands of public trustees was greatly limited by the traditions and institutions of the primitive democracy that acted as a fetter on the excessive concentration of wealth and personal power. To eliminate the barrier caused by popular control, the traditional institutions had to be abrogated and a state substituted for them.†

* For good analyses and descriptions of the breakdown of primitive society and the rise of the state, see: Engels, *The Origin*; Krader, *The Formation of the State*, chapters 3 and 4; Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society*, chapters 5 and 6; Lenski, *Power and Privilege*, chapter 7; and Karl Polanyi et al., eds., *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957).

† Engels insists that the origins of the state must be understood in terms of the functions it performed:

In each such community there were from the beginning certain common interests the safeguarding of which had to be handed over to individuals, true, under the control of the community as a whole: adjudication of disputes; repression of abuse of authority by individuals; control of water supplies, especially in hot countries; and finally, when conditions were still absolutely primitive, religious functions. Such offices are found in aboriginal communities of every period — in the oldest German marks and even today in India. They are naturally endowed with a certain measure

The growth of trade is one important process that undermines the kin-based communal organization of primitive society. While almost all societies engage in some trade, the most primitive — the hunters and gatherers and the simple horticultural peoples — tend to be self-sufficient and thus engage in relatively little trade. But as the means of production develop their traditional self-sufficiency is increasingly difficult to maintain and trade becomes increasingly important.¹⁰ This is the case because groups become stationary and can no longer acquire all the things they could when they were nomadic, and because their increasingly complex technology means that more materials are needed. As it develops a tribe tends to specialize in the supply or production of one or another item, depending on its geographical location near a source of a certain metal, salt, or a certain kind of food. This tribal specialization results in the creation of specialists within a tribe, who collect, produce, and transport the trade goods. As trade becomes more important for a tribe, these groups — particularly those that control the actual trading process — use their position to increase and consolidate their privileges and wealth. External trade thus induces internal differentiation, and consequently internal trade among those who are specialized in the process of maintaining external trade. Trade within the tribe greatly accelerates the process of destruction of the traditional communal ties as well as the creation of a rich and a poor that cuts across the old kinship ties.

Political differentiation can arise in another way. As population and population density increase within a society, the need for the coordination of economic activities to obtain more food from a given territory grows. Hence the political leaders whose social responsibility (a responsibility initially democratically delegated to it) is to coordinate economic projects — especially to control flooding and maintain irrigation — become increasingly important. These leaders (like traders) tend to use their entrusted authority to consolidate and augment their advantage, thus betraying the initial delegation.

This latter process appears to be the way the state developed in the Nile River valley, Mesopotamia, and other river valleys where the precondition of

of authority and are the beginnings of state power. The productive forces gradually increase; the increasing density of the population creates at one point common interests, at another conflicting interests, between the separate communities, whose grouping into larger units brings about in turn a new division of labour, the setting up of organs to safeguard common interests and combat conflicting interests. . . .

Here we are only concerned with establishing the fact that the exercise of a social function was everywhere the basis of political supremacy; and further that political supremacy has existed for any length of time only when it discharged its social functions. However great the number of despotisms which rose and fell in Persia and India, each was fully aware that above all it was the entrepreneur responsible for the collective maintenance of irrigation throughout the river valleys, without which no agriculture was possible there.

From Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, pp. 247-248.

¹⁰ See Polanyi, *Trade and Market*.

dense population settlement was the control of flooding and irrigation works. In areas of regular rainfall where water control projects were not the precondition of dense settlement — and especially in areas around the fringes of the great states established in the river valleys (in areas where trade with the river states was facilitated) — the first process of state formation described earlier appears to have been predominant (for example, in ancient Greece and Rome).

It has also been argued that political differentiation occurred through military conquest and through the leadership of priests. The military conquest theory argues that one tribe conquered another and forced those it conquered to work for the conquerors, thus establishing class society. The priest theory argues that the developing class of priests convinced the tribal members to excuse them from physical labor, give them a luxurious standard of living, and defer to their authority. While it is possible that the state could have originated by either of these routes, these processes are more likely to have merely accelerated the development of the state already occurring by means of one of the first two processes discussed earlier. Military conquest as a way to establish class society is only viable if the conquered society is already producing a considerable economic surplus beyond its own basic needs.¹¹ If it were producing such a surplus, it is likely that either a class of merchants or state officials had already developed, or was at least well on the way to developing, and thus that the conquest merely substituted one group of rulers for another, rather than actually creating a state out of nothing. Similarly, if a group of priests is able to talk its way into becoming a ruling class of a new state, it is highly likely that the priests are also performing an essential economic function, such as the construction and maintenance of waterworks, and are using religious ideology to justify and consolidate their new privileges.

The consolidation of a ruling class that has a virtual monopoly of power, wealth, and privilege can be a result of any of these processes. The different composition of various ruling classes in earlier societies is a function of the relative importance of one or another of these. In some early class societies the core of the ruling class was the merchants, in others the controllers of the state apparatus, and in others the war leaders. But quite naturally, whatever may have been the predominant way in which a group consolidated its power, once it becomes a ruling class it uses its power base to gain or attempt to gain a monopoly of power in all areas. Thus, a group that may have achieved a strong position through its monopoly on trade can use its wealth to capture control of the political apparatus, the military structure, and the popular ideology as well as to secure for itself the ownership of the land and the productive apparatus of the society. Similarly, leaders whose power is initially based on the control of the political apparatus or military conquest can consolidate their position through gaining control over the economy.

The crystallization of class society occurred with the introduction of the plow. By greatly facilitating weed control and the maintenance of soil fertility, it significantly increased the available economic surplus, and hence the oppor-

¹¹ See Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, part II, chapters 2 to 4.

tunities for those with more power and privilege to expand and consolidate their social position. The state reached its full development with the consolidation of absolute power by the ruling class and the creation of the great empires of antiquity.

The state attained very different forms and came to serve very different interests over the centuries. In some societies, such as the ancient empires, the state was very powerful — so powerful in fact as to totally dominate society in the interests of the state officials, who came to own the land and other means of production.¹² In other societies, the central state was so weak as to be without significant powers to dominate developments in the countryside. In such weak states, political power was concentrated in local officials/landowners, who came to control very small areas.¹³ Such was the situation in feudal Europe before the rise of capitalism and the development of the strong central states of the immediate precapitalist period.

The Development of the Capitalist State

Like primitive society before it, feudal society was a noncommercial society largely divided into self-sufficient local units. And like primitive society, it also was gradually dissolved by expanding commerce. Increased population density was one of the main forces encouraging innovations, a growing division of labor, and the migration of peasants from the land and into the towns. The creation of towns was encouraged by the feudal lords who wanted to secure the goods they were capable of producing or securing from afar. The competition among lords for more and better goods for use in warfare and for conspicuous consumption was another important factor encouraging the growth of towns and, hence, the unanticipated dissolution of feudalism. A class of rich merchants and the institution of the guilds grew up early in the history of the towns as a result of the growing demand for economic services. In the lords' struggle among themselves for hegemony it became increasingly important for them to cultivate the favor of the towns and their chief merchants, money lenders, and guild masters. The struggle among the lords for dominance grew more serious as the means became available for the creation of strong central states.¹⁴

¹² For analyses of such states, see Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957); Lenski, *Power and Privilege*, chapters 8 and 9; Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (New York: International Publishers, 1965); and Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction to Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*.

¹³ See Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1937); and Lenski, *Power and Privilege*, chapters 8 and 9.

¹⁴ Unfortunately, the social structure of feudal Europe and the contradictions of feudal society that gave rise to the formation of strong states in the immediate precapitalist period

The intense competition among the feudal lords for dominance meant that the bourgeoisie of the towns were courted by all sides. The struggling lords needed goods, especially military goods, to fight their wars. It was the bourgeoisie that could both supply the goods and loan the money to buy them. The bourgeoisie tended to favor the centralizing forces because the profitability of commerce and the prosperity of the towns depended on increased political centralization to facilitate trade and to eliminate the feudal restrictions on commerce and trade (for example, local customs duties, monetary systems, and measurement units). The bourgeoisie wanted an end to the perpetual wars that disrupted trade as well as an end to the great barriers to growing trade thrown up by the decentralized political units.

The tendency for a strong centralized state to develop under conditions of increasing commercialism almost reached its culmination in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries in Europe. During this period very strong absolutist monarchies developed. In these absolutisms the ruler was virtually all powerful, and the central state became the coordinating institution in society and the dominant force in the economy. Although most actual production took place in units owned by the landlords, the guilds, or private individuals, the state played a major economic role through economic regulation and state monopolies.

As powerful as they were, the monarchs never succeeded in subordinating the merchant class, which was able to maintain its autonomy. The merchants were simply too important to the kings to subordinate totally to royal control. The protracted and intense competition among the relatively small nation-states of Europe, together with the struggles between the nobility and the centralizing monarchs within each state, meant that the bourgeoisie, wooed by all sides, was protected. The bourgeoisie's mastery of technology and control over trade was a very valuable asset to all the competing forces. Thus, the bourgeoisie increased their power and wealth until finally they became more powerful than the feudal lords and centralizing monarchs that gave them birth. They acquired the ability to force a dissolution of the absolutist state and establish republics — either formal republics, such as France and Switzerland, or constitutional monarchies, such as England and Holland. The developing bourgeoisie was able to overcome the tendencies attempting to consolidate the modern despotic state and eventually was able to achieve power in almost all the European countries.

The major function of the early capitalist state established by the bourgeoisie was to guarantee the class rule of the capitalists. State functions during the early phase of industrial capitalism (for example, the nineteenth century in Britain or America) tended to be restricted to preserving law and order (that is, keeping the masses in line); guaranteeing private property at home and overseas; collecting

cannot be examined in depth in this book. Good analyses of the breakdown of feudalism and the birth of capitalism are contained in Paul Sweezy et al., *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (New York: Science and Society, 1967); and Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1947), chapters 2 to 4.

taxes; recording births, deaths, and income for purposes of taxation and raising armies; guaranteeing contracts; providing the infrastructure (railroads, canals, communications) for the new industries; facilitating the growth of private industry; mediating among the various wealthy interests; and securing a cheap and disciplined labor force for private enterprise. The new bare-bones state of early capitalism had only a small bureaucracy, made few social payments, and (in England and America at least) had a small standing army. Consequently, taxes were greatly reduced and collected indirectly (largely through tariffs on imports). Balanced state budgets became the rule and the state debt was radically reduced. In the capitalist states that industrialized after Great Britain and the United States, there was a strong tendency for the state to directly involve itself in capitalist development to a much greater extent than in these two countries. Once Great Britain had shown the way and demonstrated that military and economic power come with industrialization, the powerful state bureaucracies and landed classes in other countries (for example, Germany and Japan) consciously adopted policies of strong state support for capitalist development up to and including the actual founding and running of productive enterprises by the state until such point as they could be turned over to private capital to be run at a profit.¹⁵ In such countries the British model of the laissez-faire state never was tried. In countries such as Germany and Japan, the capitalist state was from the beginning heavily involved in the direct management of the economy.

Perhaps the principal task of the early capitalist state in Europe was creating and disciplining the labor force of industrial capitalism. The state collaborated closely with the commercial agricultural interests that wanted the peasants off the land so it could be turned over to such commercial uses as sheep grazing. The state abrogated the traditional rights of the peasantry, such as the use of common grazing land for their animals; common woodland for firewood, building materials, and hunting; rights to the water of streams; and so on. It also collaborated with the agricultural interests to deprive the peasants of legal title to their land. As a result many peasants were forced to migrate under pain of starvation to the towns. The forcibly displaced peasants resisted the degrading and tedious labor of the mills, which demanded twelve to sixteen hours a day six or seven days a week under the most miserable conditions for a wage that barely allowed one to keep one's family alive. Therefore the state again stepped in to ensure that the new migrants would overcome their initial resistance and take such jobs. It resorted to a wide range of draconian measures to force people into the mills. Begging was outlawed and made punishable by the chopping off of one's hands. Petty theft (including the mere stealing of bread) was made a capital offense. (During this period in Great Britain there were over 200 separate offenses for which the death

¹⁵ See Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review, 1957), chapter 5; Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*; John Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1948); Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*; and Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany* (New York: Macmillan, 1915).

penalty could be exacted.) Vagrancy (having no visible means of support) was made a crime and punishable by deportation to the colonies. Welfare of any kind was given only under conditions that were even more degrading and humiliating than mill labor. The poorhouse system was instituted, which forced people to work under such oppressive conditions that the mills were paradise by comparison. The state broke the resistance of the former peasants and played the key role in the creation of a working class.¹⁶

The state in both Europe and America prohibited as conspiracies against property unions, strikes, or collective actions of any kind against employers on the part of workers. Such actions, together with working-class riots, demonstrations, radical agitation and propaganda, were systematically and harshly repressed. The laissez-faire nature of the state had only to do with letting the capitalists enrich themselves. The state showed nothing but a strong hand to the working class, against whom the repressive state apparatus was consistently used.¹⁷

The economic contradictions of early competitive capitalism soon forced the state — even in Great Britain and America — to assume a more active role in directing the economy. The rapidly growing working class, which came to present an increasing danger to the social order, forced the state to mitigate its earlier purely repressive policies and resort to expanded social welfare, legally supported collective bargaining, compulsory education, and patriotism, which became the principal mechanisms for keeping the working class in line. The violent economic cycles of unemployment, trade, profit, and production forced the state to intervene to regulate the business cycle, the banking system, the stock market, and foreign trade in the interests of guaranteeing reasonable prosperity. The abuses of the new unregulated monopolies — especially those in transportation, communications, and power — forced the state to regulate these sectors to ensure that these basic services were provided on a reliable basis for a reasonable fee to all capitalists, while preserving the capitalist character of their industries. In Europe, essential enterprises such as railroads, steel, coal mining, and airlines that private enterprise was unwilling or unable to operate at a profit were developed or nationalized by the state to ensure the profitability of the private sector in general. The vast growth in the state bureaucracy that these expanded functions required created a need for large sums to finance social service payments (unemployment benefits, disability benefits, old age pensions, and medical care) and a large standing army (needed because of the rivalry among states for overseas markets and to ensure against domestic insurrection). This in turn required the

¹⁶ For descriptions of the role of the state in the creation of the British working class, see Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution* (New York: New American Library, 1964); E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); G. D. H. Cole, *The Common People: 1746–1938* (London: Methuen, 1938); and *A Short History of the British Working Class Movement: 1789–1947* (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1948).

¹⁷ See Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*; Louis Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940, 1965); and Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*.

reinstating of direct taxation, deficit financing, and the growth of massive state debts (which also proved very profitable to the bankers who collected the interest).¹⁴

The Historical Development of Parliamentary Forms

As the commercial class became the dominant class in society, it established republican and parliamentary forms as the instruments of its rule. These forms are best suited to articulate the diverse interests within this class and work out a common class will. The wealthy classes selected representatives of their various diverse interests to sit in a common body, where they worked out compromises among these interests and made state policies in the interest of the wealthy as a whole.

In a precapitalist-class society most upper-class people (as well as most villagers) share similar interests. But in a capitalist society there is a wide diversity of economic interests among the commercial classes. There are merchants, financiers, industrialists, and agricultural capitalists — all of whom share conflicting economic interests. Among the industrialist interests are importers, exporters, producers for the domestic markets, capital goods producers, consumer goods producers, new wealth, old wealth, governmental contractors, nongovernmental contractors, transportation, energy and communications companies, durable and nondurable goods producers, overseas investors, domestic investors, and so on. Because of this immense diversity of economic, and hence political interests, the commercial classes have encouraged the development of parliamentary and republican forms of government to work out compromises and a common will that benefits the maximum number of divergent interests within the class.

Another important reason for the prevalence of parliamentary and republican forms in commercial societies is the special need in such economies for the rule of law. Such economies are highly fragile. They involve a wide range of contracts, and require forecasts of future wages, prices, interest rates, availability of materials, market conditions, and the like. Consequently, businesses must have assurances from the state that it will not arbitrarily interfere with the system of contracts and expectations. The best guarantee of moderation and lack of arbitrariness on the part of the state is the parliamentary form, where the commercial elite governs itself in a manner that requires compromise and mutual respect. Another generally desirable property is the inertia of the parliamentary policy-making process, where committees hold hearings, make reports, and conduct floor debates with pressures applied and compromises made at all stages.

¹⁴ See Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967); James Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State 1900–1918* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Harold Faulkner, *The Decline of Laissez Faire 1897–1917* (New York: Rinehart, 1951); and Carlton Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism, 1871–1900* (New York: Harper and Row, 1941).

In contrast to parliamentary forms, strongman rule brings with it arbitrary and unpredictable interference in the economy. The commercial upper class abrogates such forms only under the most extreme duress. It turns to overt dictatorship and military strongman or fascist rule only when there appears to be no other way to ensure its own rule. Dictatorial methods are especially necessary when the rule of the commercial class is first instituted (before it has been able to consolidate its position) and in the periods of its decline and crisis (when its rule is threatened by the rise of new social classes — see chapter 12). Whenever possible, the bourgeoisie does its best to restore parliamentary forms as quickly as possible after a strongman takeover.

The commercially dominant states of the ancient world, such as Athens, tended to be republican. The ancient traditions of primitive democracy had almost withered away in ancient Greece, but were restored after the growth of the commercial power of the city-states — not on the old basis, where all tribal members were full participants, but on a new basis of all *citizens* (perhaps only about 10 to 15 percent of the population). Within its ruling class, Athens enjoyed a democracy as thorough as any in the ancient world. With the conquest of the small, predominantly commercial societies by the giant despotic states, such as late Rome, republican and parliamentary forms disappeared.

It was not until the revival of commerce in the thirteenth century that republican and parliamentary forms reappeared in the leading commercial areas of Western Europe. These were areas in which the rising cities, because of the extreme decentralization of the feudal society, had been able to secure considerable political autonomy. Thus many of the medieval cities of Italy (Venice being the best known) whose business was foreign trade emerged as parliamentary republics. The development of republican city-states in Italy was paralleled by similar developments throughout the loosely organized Holy Roman Empire. North of the Alps, the Hanseatic league cities emerged on a similar basis as the Italian city-states. In areas of greater central state control, such as Spain, Holland, England, and France, the commercial classes pressured the centralized monarchy for greater institutionalization of republican and parliamentary forms.

As a result of such pressure from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries in Spain, the cities and their ruling commercial classes were granted increasing powers. The Cortes (Spanish Parliament) became an important institution for the commercial class's participation in the state. Because of the king's dependence on the commercial classes for financial support, he was forced to grant increasing powers to this body. During the fourteenth century, France developed a powerful Estates General led by the commercial classes. Again it was the king's need of financial support that led him to grant the emerging parliament greater powers.

In both Spain and France, however, from the fifteenth century on, the power of the emerging parliaments (which had never been fully consolidated) withered away under attack by the increasingly powerful state bureaucracies. The withering away of the power of the commercial classes coincided with the general depression of world trade during this period as well as with the birth of a new

absolutism. The basis of political power was control over the state machinery, just as it had been in the Roman Empire or any of the classical despotisms. Such rule was itself never fully consolidated, however, since the bureaucratic upper class remained dependent on the commercial classes. The internal struggle for power between the various lords and the external struggle among the various nation-states forced the state bureaucrats to encourage the bourgeoisie and to continue to grant privileges and concessions to the cities. Although ascendant from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries in Western Europe, the new absolutist states eventually collapsed under the onslaught of the commercial classes, which successfully demanded the abolition of despotic forms and feudal remnants as well as the reinstatement and full development of republican and parliamentary forms. The conflict between the declining bureaucratic and feudal forms and the rising bourgeois interests was decided largely through violent revolution, military struggle, and civil war (for example, the rebellion of Holland against Spain, the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, and the French Revolution).¹⁹

Unlike what happened in France and Spain, the developing parliamentary forms were not defeated in the most commercial states, Holland and England, where the commercial forces proved stronger than the state bureaucratic forces. The commercial classes became a power in the British state just as the commercial classes in France and Spain were becoming an influence in their countries. In the thirteenth century the House of Commons obtained the right to tell the king how much money it was willing to grant him to meet his military or personal expenses. In exchange for being granted money for war and personal expenses, the king had to grant the general petitions of the towns and agree to institutionalize and increase the power of Parliament. Beginning in the fourteenth century, Parliament met regularly once a year. The concessions granted earlier by the king were turned into rights. Parliament gradually became the source of governmental legitimacy, and in the fifteenth century the House of Commons made good its claim to initiate all money bills and to regulate elections.

The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries saw English kings attempt to imitate their brothers on the Continent and consolidate absolutist rule in England. They attempted to bring the British commercial classes to heel and eliminate the power of Parliament. The effort to establish absolutist forms in Britain was frustrated by the English Revolution. With the execution of Charles I in 1649, Parliament became the center of state power. Until the Restoration after Cromwell's death, the commercial classes were able to dominate the British state. More than just beating back the attempt of the kings to establish absolutist forms, they went on the offensive and assumed state power on their own.²⁰

After the restoration of the monarchy, Parliament continued to play the

¹⁹ For an account of early parliamentary forms in Europe, see Edward Cheney, *The Dawn of a New Era 1250—1453* (New York: Harper and Row, 1936), chapters 2 and 3.

²⁰ See Christopher Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1958), and *The Century of Revolution* (Edinburgh: T. Nelson, 1961).

dominant role. The attempt to establish absolutist forms in Britain had been completely defeated. The struggle among mercantile capital, industrial capital, and landed property (which had long since been commercialized, serfdom having been largely abolished by the fourteenth century) for dominance in the English state continued until the 1830s, when the industrial capitalists established hegemony over the other segments of the commercial classes. Parliamentary forms developed further and consolidated themselves earlier in England because England was always a major and eventually *the* leading commercial power in the world. The development and triumph of parliamentarianism in the British Isles must be understood as a natural result of the early development and consolidation of commercial, and later industrial capitalist forms in that country.

In the early bourgeois republics political participation was limited to property holders — at first only to the most wealthy, and later, as the influence of the petty bourgeoisie increased, to all the owners of property. Beginning with the French Revolution, all classes in Europe became politically mobilized. France was the first major country to extend the franchise to all adult males. France was also the first to draft all adults (of all classes) into the army. The other countries of Europe were forced to follow suit on both counts to compete militarily. In feudal Europe the masses of the peasantry were not used in the military. In fact, it was a crime for peasants to even possess arms. The prohibition on the use of peasant armies was for good reasons. Armed peasants were likely to turn their weapons against their own lords. The development of mass armies throughout Europe in the nineteenth century was thus a major factor in the expansion of the franchise.²¹ The rise in popular agitation and the growth of Socialist movements in the working class also made it expedient to extend the franchise to all, thus meeting in a formal way the demands of the masses for political participation.

The corollary of the universal franchise was necessarily the development of mechanisms to guarantee that the franchise was not exercised by the masses to disturb the rule of property. It was imperative that the masses believe that *they* were controlling the state, when in fact they were being manipulated to support the upper-class interests. The incorporation of the masses into politics required the implementation of several other mechanisms for ensuring their loyalty. Expanded welfare services (unemployment, old age pensions, disability insurance, compensation for injuries, and medical and child support); universal compulsory education (with emphasis on political indoctrination in civics, history, geography, and religion); the creation of urban political machines to harvest the workers' votes and of mass political parties that could use demagogic appeals to patriotism, religion, and racism to befuddle the masses; the recognition and co-optation of trade unions and their transformation from instruments of class struggle into mechanisms for the management of labor conflict; the development of mass media (popular sensationalist newspapers, magazines, paperbacks, and, eventually, radio and television) to permeate the working classes with the ideology of the upper class; the encouragement of religious revivals among the masses; the development

²¹ See Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

of mass observer sports into which the masses could channel their aggressions; and the repression of radicals were all necessary corollaries of permitting the masses to vote.

The Development of the Capitalist State in the United States

As an example of the process of capitalist state formation, it is useful to look at the foundation and development of the American state. Parallel processes occurred in other capitalist countries. But because it is the most powerful state in the history of the world, and because most of the readers of this book are probably more familiar with its history than with that of any other state, it serves as a case study illustrating the general process.

The war for national liberation fought by the Americans against the British involved two different struggles: (1) the struggle of the small farmers, merchants, and artisans against the privileges and prerogatives of monopoly and wealth, both British and American; and (2) the struggle of the wealthy planters and merchants against the restrictions placed on their profit-making opportunities by the British state, over which they had little influence. The vast majority of whites in the colonies (small independent farmers) wanted the universal franchise (in many of the colonies only a minority of the adult males held sufficient property to be allowed to vote), equal representation for all in the legislatures (no multiple votes for certain classes, areas, or institutions), and the abolition of feudalistic privileges and restrictions governing the sale of land, property ownership, or practicing certain occupations. They wanted an end to arbitrary state decrees, judicial proceedings, and taxes. In short, they demanded equal treatment for all, thoroughly democratic institutions, and the guarantee of the basic rights of the people — that is, equality, democracy, and liberty. This class found its chief proponent in Tom Paine, whose book, *Common Sense*, inflamed the colonies against British autocracy.

The wealthy classes of slave owners and big merchants had several serious conflicts with the British, whose state was controlled by commercial and agricultural interests operating from the West Indies and the British Isles. The British state, working to defend the economic interests of those who controlled it, acted to prohibit industrial manufacture in the colonies, thus forcing the colonists to purchase all their manufactured goods from British capitalists. It prohibited the importation of raw materials from anywhere but British possessions, thus guaranteeing higher priced British commodities (especially sugar) a secure market even though considerably cheaper commodities were available from the French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch. The British forbade settlement to the west of the Appalachian Mountains to secure the area for British fur-trading interests. This was devastating for the slave-holding plantation lords of the South, who required

²² See Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism 1871—1900*, chapter 5.

new land in the West to keep the slave system profitable. The conflict of interests between American wealth and those who controlled the British state became so fundamental that the American upper class was forced to attempt to establish independence from Britain or suffer irreparable economic losses. The two struggles — that of the wealthy and that of the lower middle class — merged into the successful War of Independence.

The movement for independence emerged gradually. There had been at least two major uprisings against British rule prior to the 1770s — that of Nathaniel Bacon in Virginia in 1676, and that of Jacob Leisler in New York in 1689 to 1691. Both had been put down by the British and their leaders hanged. Resentment against the British smoldered and flared up again in the 1760s when the British attempted to increase their control over the colonial governments and increase the taxes extracted from the colonial economy. In 1765 an organization called the Sons of Liberty was established. It was mostly composed of lower middle-class individuals and engaged primarily in discussion and propaganda about British oppression. In 1772, through the new Committees of Correspondence, the focus of oppositional activities shifted to mass action and political agitation. It was this organization that organized the famous Boston Tea Party, the embargos against British goods, and the first Continental Congress. In 1775 the organization was transformed into the Committees of Safety, whose primary function was the organization of a popular militia and army to engage in revolutionary war against British rule. (The Committees of Safety could be said to be "the political arm" of the Revolutionary Army.)²³

The War of Independence was not only a war against the British state, it was also a civil war. Approximately one-third of the colonists remained loyal to Britain and fought on the "other side." As in all civil wars, the internecine struggle got nasty. Concentration camps were set up, houses were burned, property confiscated, and "tories" tortured, killed, and driven out of certain areas. The Revolutionary War created 100,000 refugees who were forced to settle in Canada and the West Indies. The Committees of Safety set up dictatorships in the various colonies without the benefit of elections (which could not be held in the middle of a civil war), raised money, collected weapons and supplies for the troops, and carried on the administration of civil affairs until regular legislatures could be convened. The war was bitterly fought and was won by the Americans only with substantial support (troops and materials) from the Dutch, the Spanish, and especially the French.²⁴

Although very strong at the outset of the Revolutionary War, the radical petty bourgeoisie emerged from the war in a subordinate position to the wealthy upper classes. Despite the fact that many of the demands of the petty bourgeoisie were realized with the elimination of feudal restrictions and the expansion of democratic institutions and liberties, the wealthy remained in control of the states and held their economic privileges intact. A depression in 1785 to 1786, which

²³ Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism*, part II.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, chapters 12 and 13.

hit the small farmers particularly hard, resulted, however, in the revival of popular radical agitation against the privileges of wealth. When there were large numbers of mortgage foreclosures during this period, the state legislatures which were predominantly influenced by small farmers tended to stay mortgage payments, abolish imprisonment for debt, and encourage inflation through accelerated printing of paper money to lessen the burden of debt repayment. It was an actual farmers' uprising in central Massachusetts that worried the wealthy the most. In 1786 a group of farmers led by Daniel Shays took over the town of Springfield and burned the courthouse mortgage records. This insurrection had to be put down by the militia sent in from Boston.²⁵

State power after the War of Independence resided in each of the thirteen states. The central government that was set up under the Articles of Confederation had neither the power to tax nor to raise an army without the consent of the individual states. It was so weak as to be virtually irrelevant. This political situation — especially with the revival of radical agitation in 1785 — became increasingly disagreeable to the wealthy merchant and planter interests. The moneyed interests did not like the states issuing paper money, since it was causing an inflation which meant that they as creditors were being paid back in money worth less than that originally loaned out. The slave-owning plantation lords of the South were increasingly fearful of slave rebellions incited by either successful insurrections in the nearby Caribbean or by white farmer revolts in the North. No individual state government felt confident that its own small militia would by itself be able to put down either a massive slave uprising or a revolt of small farmers. The rich trading interests of the Northern cities were being hurt by the absence of a navy to protect their shipping (American flag ships were easy prey for pirates, who didn't have to worry about retaliation); by the lack of consistent tariffs against European manufactured goods (to create a guaranteed market for higher priced American goods); and by the existence of internal tariffs restricting trade among the various states, which hindered the development of sufficiently large domestic markets. The rich land speculators and fur interests of the West were having considerable trouble because they were unable to control the Indians in the absence of a strong army. Large numbers of the wealthy had bought up most of the paper money issued by the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War to finance the fighting. This paper money soon became worthless because the central "state" did not have the power to tax. Since the money could not buy anything, its original holders happily parted with it for from 5 to 20 percent of its face value to those who chose to speculate that someday the central state would be in a position to make the money good. Most of their paper accumulated in the hands of a relatively few wealthy individuals.²⁶

²⁵ For discussions of the revival of radical agitation among small farmers in the 1780s, see Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism*, chapter 14; and Charles Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1913, 1962), chapter 2.

²⁶ Beard, *An Economic Interpretation*, chapters 2, 3, and 4.

As a result of their unhappiness over the absence of a strong central government to serve their collective interests, the wealthy merchants and plantation lords agitated and organized for the establishment of a new strong central state. After failing in their attempt to get the established governmental institutions to transform themselves through legal channels, they stepped outside of existing constitutional arrangements and simply issued a call for a new constitutional convention (ignoring the old confederate structure). The delegates to the constitutional convention were chosen by state legislatures that had *not* been elected on the issue of revising the state structure. In addition, women, blacks, indentured servants, and one-third of all free adult white males were not allowed to vote for legislative representatives. The legislatures, not always knowing exactly what was happening, responded to the call to select people to go to Philadelphia by generally appointing the people who seemed the most interested in the idea. As a result the delegates were virtually unanimously in favor of a strong central government organized to secure the rule of large property. Not one delegate of the fifty-five was a small farmer or mechanic. Five-sixths had a direct material interest in seeing a strong central state that would guarantee large property. Forty of the delegates held the paper money issued by the Continental Congress to finance the Revolutionary War, fourteen held land west of the Appalachian Mountains, twenty-four were creditors and mortgage holders, eleven were merchants or manufacturers, and fifteen were slave owners. These delegates knew their interests and were well aware of the impact of the document they wrote.²⁷

The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention were held in complete secrecy, since it was important that the public not understand the true nature of the document being written and the motives for those responsible for it. Nevertheless, the position papers (*The Federalist Papers*) issued in defense of the document and the later memoirs of participants made it clear that the two overriding concerns of the writers of the American Constitution were the protection of the privileges of private property and guarantees against the force of majority rule.

Since they were operating outside of the existing legal structure, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention arbitrarily established the rules by which it would be activated. They simply said that once nine of the thirteen states ratified the document in special ratifying conventions elected for the purpose the document would go into effect and the strong federal state would come into being.

In many states the vote for the delegates to the ratifying conventions was rushed through without adequate chance for public debate. The farmers in the back country had very little chance to debate the issue or find out the significance of what was happening (after all, the proceedings of the convention had been secret). Conversely, the moneyed interests concentrated in the larger coastal towns were well informed, conscious of their interests, and well organized. They knew in advance what was at stake. They were able to marshal their forces quickly and effectively. Wealth, talent, and professional skills were on the side of the federalist forces. Since they did not understand the gravity of what was about to happen, the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, chapter 5.

majority of the eligible voters took little interest in the issue of ratification and did not vote in the elections. Only about 160,000 people (approximately 20 to 25 percent of the adult white male population) voted in the ratifying elections, suggesting a rather low level of public concern (even off-year congressional elections in the United States get twice this proportion of the eligible vote). Of course, blacks, women, and many propertyless white men had no input into the process of ratification, as they were not eligible to vote.

In six of the states, including the three most populous (New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts), the delegates elected to the ratifying convention were initially either opposed to ratification or very evenly divided between the pro- and anti-ratification forces. The backcountry small farmers sent mostly anticonstitution delegates to the ratifying convention, while the more urban coastal areas almost unanimously sent proconstitution representatives. In the course of the deliberations of the ratifying conventions, majorities for ratification were eventually obtained in all but two states (North Carolina and Rhode Island). Although these two states refused to ratify it, the Constitution did become effective in the other eleven states. North Carolina and Rhode Island were eventually forced to join the new federal state under threat of economic sanctions from the new government. The proconstitution forces were able to secure majorities in the key states only by the promise of adding ten *amendments* to the basic document guaranteeing the basic rights and liberties of the small farmers (the Bill of Rights). Since the original document was concerned exclusively with the protection of private property and the establishment of constraints on popular rule, it made no reference to such radical issues as the rights of free speech, religion, trial by jury, and the right to bear arms.²⁸

It is difficult to maintain that the Constitution was a deliberate expression of the will of the people. Rather, it was a class document, revealing the class nature of the American state. Many of the major provisions of the Constitution are guarantees of private property. States were forbidden to issue money (to restrict inflation to benefit creditors at the expense of debtors). The federal and state governments were forbidden to impair the obligations of business and labor contracts. The federal government was given the exclusive right to regulate interstate and international commerce. The federal government was given the power to regulate bankruptcy proceedings and to protect patents. The federal government was given the right to dispose of the lands west of the Appalachians. The federal government was mandated to maintain an army and navy and to "ensure a republican form of government" in each state. The provision for the establishment of an army and the guarantee of a republican form of government were instituted primarily to protect against domestic insurrection on the part of black slaves, small white farmers, and Indians. The federal government was given the authority to suppress such insurrections wherever they were to occur. The federal government was mandated to take over and pay at 100 percent of face value the Revolutionary War debts not only of the Continental Congress, but also of each individual state. This resulted in a bonanza for the wealthy money speculators

²⁸ Ibid., chapters 8, 9, and 10.

who had bought this paper from the poor soldiers and small suppliers of the troops for from 5 to 20 percent of face value.

Those articles of the Constitution that do not deal with guaranteeing private property have to do with frustrating the popular will. The convention considered the establishment of a constitutional monarchy with George Washington as king, but decided that antiroyalist sentiment was too strong among the masses to gain popular assent to such a system. Popular representative forms were too dear to the people who had just fought a seven-year war for equality, liberty, and democracy. The drafters of the Constitution, however, designed a system that would function like a constitutional monarchy in greatly constricting the rule of popular majorities, while using democratic forms. There would be two "houses" of Congress, the representatives to only one of which would be elected by the people (a parallel to the British House of Commons). Since there was no hereditary aristocracy, representatives to the other house would be selected by the state legislatures (a parallel to the British House of Lords). No legislation could be enacted without the concurrence of both houses, the democratic House of Representatives (designed to be the voice of the people) and the aristocratic Senate (the voice of the notables). To insulate the Senators from popular pressures exerted indirectly through the state legislatures, their terms were established at six years, one-third of the body being *appointed* every two years.

As further guarantees against popular majorities infringing on the rights of property through the legislature, the president (the equivalent of the constitutional monarch) was given the power to veto any legislation passed by both legislative bodies. Such a veto could only be overridden by a two-thirds vote of each legislature voting separately. To isolate the president from popular pressures, his office was filled through a process participated in only by local notables (the electors) who were in turn "appointed" in a manner determined by the state legislatures. There are no stipulations in the U.S. Constitution for either the direct *or* the indirect election of the president by the people. The president was given very strong powers appropriate to a constitutional monarch. During his fixed term of office he cannot be recalled by either the people or the legislature (except because of extreme misbehavior). He appoints the heads of governmental agencies, the commanders of the military, the judges of the federal courts, and foreign ambassadors. His appointments of judges, administrators, and ambassadors were made subject to approval of the Senate (the body designed to consist of the American equivalent of an aristocracy), but *not* of the House of Representatives (the body designed to be the voice of the people). This was to guarantee that the president's appointees would not offend any important sectors of the upper class. It also would ensure their isolation from the control of the people. Not only were federal judges made appointive (thereby isolated from popular influence), but they were given life tenure. Once appointed by the president and approved by the Senate, judges can only be removed for extreme misconduct. It was important that the judicial system, which was designed to defend the interests of property against the common people, be isolated from pressures from those people. Note that the Senate was also given the *exclusive* right to try all impeachments and to approve all

treaties (both requiring a two-thirds-vote). To ensure that popular majorities could not democratize the basic document, it was made very difficult to amend. A majority of both branches of Congress plus three-fourths of the state legislatures must approve changes in the basic document. In sum, the Constitution was a set of rules for stabilizing the rule of the wealthy against the common people. It established a state that appeared democratic enough to be legitimate in the eyes of the people, while it allowed for the propertied upper classes to run things pretty much as they pleased.

The state established by the Constitution was dominated by a coalition of Southern slave owners and rich Northern merchants until the 1850s. A balance was maintained for a considerable time by having the Senate consist of 50 percent Southern representatives of the slave lords and 50 percent representatives of the Northern commercial interests. From the 1840s on, however, the rising class of industrial capitalists in the North became increasingly powerful as these states industrialized.

The ascendancy of industrial over merchant capital in the North led to a growing and fundamental conflict of interests between the wealthy classes in the North and those in the South. The commercial interests in the North that dominated the cotton trade (acting as the intermediary between England and the industrialists of the North) profited considerably from credit, shipping, buying and selling, and insurance, and thus were not antagonistic toward the slave system. This was not the case with the Northern industrialists, however. They fought for high tariffs on imported European manufactured goods to guarantee a secure market for their own, more expensive products in the South. The South, which wanted to purchase the cheapest possible goods wherever they could be found, fought for the reduction or elimination of tariffs. The South wanted to make the settlement of the western lands difficult for small farmers to create a favorable environment for the introduction and growth of large plantations utilizing slave labor. Conversely, the northern commercial and industrial forces saw more profit in encouraging the rapid development of small family farming and the production of grains by free labor as well as a political advantage in securing a basis for political support for the industrial interests. The Northern interests wanted to facilitate the development of the West by having the state develop canals and railways that would tie the West closely to the Northeast (the river system of the West naturally tied this area with the South). Thus, the South strongly opposed public support for East-West canals and railways. The only railway to the West Coast it supported was one that was to run through Texas to southern California — that is, one that would encourage the expansion of the slave system. The South also opposed the encouragement of European migration to the industrial cities of the North (since this would increase the economic power of the developing capitalist class) and subsidies to U.S. shipping (why should Southerners pay taxes only to have their shipping charges increased?). Then again, the Southern planters favored allowing what amounted to again allowing the states to issue paper money (because of the inflation and consequent relief of the planters' debt to the North this would entail). The cotton-producing slave states (unlike the slave-breeding

states of the upper South whose profits depended on a protected market) wanted to reopen the slave trade to reduce the costs of labor. The resulting conflict between the two segments of the upper class was so sharp that neither system (neither the slave economy of the South nor the capitalist economy of the North) was able to thrive because of the constraints that the other put on its development through its veto power in the U.S. state.²⁹

The U.S. state was essentially paralyzed until 1860, when the new Republican party won the presidential election. The Republican party was organized in the 1850s as a coalition between the rising class of industrial capitalists and the small farmers (especially those in the West). The older Democratic party was left in the hands of the big merchants of the North and the slaveholders of the South. The Republican party, while far from being radical, took considerably stronger positions on the principal economic issues of the day than did the Democratic party. The Republicans' program offered support to both the small farmers and industrial capitalists. Note that the Republican party did not call for the abolition of slavery, but rather for its containment in the areas where it already existed, thereby leaving the settlement of the remainder of the West to the small farmers and big railroads. Lincoln's presidential victory, however, gave the signal to the South that the U.S. state had tilted to the North. Since they no longer had any reasonable hope of dominating the central state, they had little choice but to attempt to secede from the federal union created seventy years before. Upon secession they set up a new state that was the clear and consistent instrument of the slave-owning class. The Civil War thus became the second of two prolonged and violent civil conflicts that have torn America apart in its short 200-year history.

The superior economic basis of the North inevitably enabled it to militarily conquer the South, thereby bringing about the collapse of the slave lords' state. After a short period of struggle among the victors that took place between the moderate and radical wings of the Republican party — a contest that almost culminated in the removal of President Johnson (Lincoln's man) — the industrial capitalist class emerged as the master of the U.S. state. In the first years of their undisputed rule, marked by the overwhelming victory of the radical Republicans in the 1866 elections, they quickly enacted the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution freeing the slaves and promising full political rights to blacks. They also began the implementation of a policy of reconstruction for the South. This policy was designed to undermine the social basis of the political power of the old slave lords by creating a firm alliance between the black freedmen and the poor white farmers of the South within the Republican party. The loyalty of the blacks was virtually automatic, since this party had waged the Civil War, granted emancipation, and promised full equality. The loyalty of the poor white farmers was to be expected since the program of the

²⁹ The account of the causes of the Civil War is taken largely from Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism*, part III; Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, chapter 3; and Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery*.

Republicans (which was successful among the small farmers of the West) was designed in the interests of this class. With the creation of a solid basis for Republicanism in the South, these states could eventually enter the Union, sending representatives to the national legislature who would be fully supportive of the policies of the industrial capitalists. The actual program instituted in the South under the protection of the Union army of occupation included the abolition of property qualifications for voting, which traditionally had disenfranchised many poor whites in the South, the abolition of property qualifications for holding office, free education, the abolition of imprisonment for debt, the establishment of social services, the decentralization of local and town governments, and a more equitable tax structure.³⁰

The Republican strategy for winning the South, however, failed. It did not go far enough in creating the economic basis for a Republican majority. Although the proposal was seriously debated in Congress, the necessary step of expropriating the plantations of the old slave lords and the redistribution of the land to the freedmen *and* poor whites along with sufficient capital to work the land ("forty acres and a mule") was rejected as setting too dangerous a precedent.

Consequently, because its economic position remained largely intact, the Southern ruling class was able to reassert its hegemony within its region. Blacks were intimidated because, although they were formally free, they were forced to become sharecroppers for their old slave lords to survive. Many of the poor whites, resenting the defeat of the South in the Civil War and the presence of the Union army of occupation, resisted the Republican attempts to win their support for the Reconstruction governments even though the Republicans' economic policies were favorable to them. The futility of trying to establish Republicanism in the South was apparent by the mid-1870s, and in 1877 the Union army of occupation was withdrawn from the South and the attempt at reconstruction ended. The industrial capitalists were able to give up on the attempt to establish Republicanism in the South because the social basis of their rule had by 1877 been firmly established in the West. The Republican party had built up a firm foundation of support among the small farmers of the rapidly growing western states. Many of these states had been admitted into the Union in the postwar period. Thus even without the Southern states, the Republican party (the party of industrial capital) was able to hold the presidency in all but eight years until 1912.

The abandonment of Reconstruction also crystallized a new alignment of classes in the United States. The period in which the primary contest for state power in the United States was between the industrial capitalists and the slave lords (1840s to 1865) gave way to one in which the primary struggle was between industrial capital (and its auxiliary agricultural and textile capitalists of the South — the transformed slave lords) and the small farmers and rising industrial working class.

The emerging primary contradiction was demonstrated in the growing threat to property from these classes, which was manifested in the example of the

³⁰ Hacker, *The Triumph of American Capitalism*, part III.

Paris Commune of 1871 (a workers' uprising in Paris), the rapidly growing urban industrial slums, and the increasing incidents of rioting and strikes by the working class in the United States. The fear of the new working class peaked in the summer of 1877, when widespread and violent rioting erupted in the working-class areas of most major industrial cities. In these riots hundreds of people were killed and the authorities lost control over large areas of the cities for weeks.¹¹ The capitalist class also had to cope with the rising militancy of the farmers in both the South and the West, which was to culminate in the 1890s in the People's party and its demand for the nationalization of the railroads and banks.

Growing discontent among the small farmers and the workers forced the Northern and Southern upper classes together under the overall hegemony of industrial capital. The Southern wealthy accepted their defeat in the Civil War and their secondary place in the U.S. economy and state in exchange for the reestablishment of their hegemony within the states of the old Confederacy and their integration into the industrial capitalist system.

The rule of industrial capital has not been seriously challenged since the defeat of the slave lords in the 1860s. The capitalist class turned the state completely into its instrument. The state heavily subsidized the building of the railways and internal improvements. High protective tariffs were established. Immigration of laborers was encouraged. Free land was given to the farmers and the railroads. The working class was kept in line and prevented from organizing. In every way the state facilitated the rapid and unimpeded advance of industrial capital.

During the generation after the Civil War, the state played a laissez-faire role in the economy. It guaranteed the conditions in which private business could prosper without attempting to direct, regulate, or manage the economy. Gradually, however, as the contradictions of capitalism matured and the monopolies secured firm control in industry after industry, the state's role in the management of the economy began to increase. The first large increase in the state's economic role occurred in the two decades after 1900 (the so-called "Progressive era"), and the second during Franklin Roosevelt's presidency (the New Deal and World War II). During these two periods, the monopoly capitalist state reached its mature form. In both phases of its development the impetus for its expansion came from the giant corporations.

After a period of mergers and corporate formation, by 1900 it became apparent that the new corporate interests required the elimination of the cut-throat competition among themselves, the control of the erratic fluctuations in the economy, and the ability to plan for the future.¹² The inability of the corporations

¹¹ See Robert Bruce, *1877: Year of Violence* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970); and Richard Boyer and Herbert Morais, *Labor's Untold Story* (New York: United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 1955).

¹² See Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism*; Weinstein, *The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal States*; Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, 1957); and Faulkner, *The Decline of Laissez Faire*.

and banks to rationalize and stabilize the corporate economy led them to turn to the state for assistance. Only state regulation could solve their problems. A number of regulatory agencies were set up to control the sectors of the economy that the corporations wanted regulated. Each of these regulatory commissions was essentially controlled by the "regulated" industries themselves.

The expansion of state activities not only provided for the self-regulation of business and ensured economic stability and predictability for the corporations, but it also served as a safety valve for democratic and radical ferment. For example, popular demands for nationalization of the railways and banks such as those put forth by the Populists in the 1890s were defused as the corporations were able to claim that federal "control" had ended the abuses of the system.

The programs begun during the Progressive era were extended during the Franklin Roosevelt administration. During the worst depression the country has ever known (and the potential of massive disruption that it raised), a series of governmental programs were instituted that were designed to increase the stability of the system by ameliorating some of the harshest aspects of capitalism, integrating the most active segments of the working class into the system, and providing enough buying power in the economy to keep employment and profits at respectable levels. Social security was instituted to provide subsistence income to the special victims of the system (the unemployed, the disabled, the aged, and mothers with dependent children), trade unions and collective bargaining were encouraged, and a massive program of public works, and eventually military spending, was launched.³³

The heavy involvement of the state in the capitalist economy was consolidated during World War II. It was the unprecedented military spending of that period that in fact ended the Great Depression. The upper class learned the lesson that to ensure prosperity (while at the same time exerting U.S. world hegemony and cooling out the domestic class struggle with jingoism), the state would have to sustain the economy with a very heavy and continuing infusion of military spending. In 1946 the U.S. state's responsibility to ensure economic prosperity was incorporated into law with the passage of a full employment act establishing the Council of Economic Advisers, the Economic Report of the President, and the legitimacy of the state's role in moderating economic cycles and ensuring sufficient economic demand. Since 1946 the state's involvement in the U.S. economy has gradually increased as the state comes to manage ever more of the economy and spend an ever increasing percentage of the GNP.

Summary

The state is a rather new form of political decision making and administration. States have existed for only about 1 percent of the time that humans have lived together in societies. Primitive classless societies operated without states, but with

³³ See Domhoff, *The Higher Circles*, chapter 6.

democratic assemblies of all adults (or at least all adult males). States and the rule of the masses of common people by a small ruling class developed at the same time that societies became differentiated by classes. States developed to consolidate and preserve the domination of the newly developed privileged classes.

The redevelopment of strong central states in Europe occurred because of an alliance between the rich merchants and the centralizing monarchs, who had a common interest in suppressing the power of the feudal lords. The victory and consolidation of unshared rule by the capitalist class often occurred only after a process of violent revolution and civil war. The capitalist state developed in Europe in the period between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries to advance the interest of the rising capitalist class against the other classes in society and to coordinate the affairs of the bourgeoisie as a whole.

Parliamentary forms tend to occur together with commercial societies because of the complexity of the structure of interests in such social forms and because of the special need for predictability and stability. Parliamentary forms became dominant in many Western European countries long before anyone but the richest landowners and merchants were allowed to vote. The franchise was not generally extended to the masses of the common people until after the middle of the nineteenth century. This was done largely to generate legitimacy for the system and to co-opt seething discontent in such a way as not to surrender any appreciable amount of actual power to the masses.

The capitalist state in the United States has grown up within the framework established by the U.S. Constitution, a document written by and for the alliance of Northern merchants and Southern slave lords in the late 1780s. The ascendant industrial capitalist class, after fighting a bloody civil war against the declining slave owners of the South, won full control of the state in 1865. It implemented laissez-faire politics until the early years of the twentieth century, when various reforms were implemented to facilitate the growth and consolidation of monopoly capitalist institutions and defuse discontent. Chapters 8 and 9 analyze the function of the capitalist state during the mid- and late twentieth century.

not happen then, and notwithstanding the contemporary advances of information technology, it is not likely to happen now. (3) The social and economic changes linked to new technologies have to be understood – as the next chapter and subsequent chapters will help to make clear – in a world context. A good deal of manufacturing industry which supplies the West with a substantial proportion of its goods is now located outside of those societies themselves. The supposed coming of the post-industrial society is probably better described as a realignment of the world economy, in which the capitalist countries provide the administrative ‘centre’ of a world economic system (albeit one that may be undergoing significant processes of transition).

The Modern State

There is one highly important set of changes occurring over the past century to which I have so far referred only in passing: the expanding role of the state in social life. The enlargement of the activities of the state can be documented in various ways. On the economic level, the state in the capitalist societies has come to play an increasingly direct role in supervising productive activity. In most such countries the state directly employs over 40 per cent of the economically active labour force, who work either within its own administrative apparatus or in nationalised industries. States have also attempted more and more to ‘intervene’ in economic activity by seeking to influence the supply of and demand for goods, engaging in economic planning, prices and incomes policies, and so on. But the state also intrudes into a variety of other aspects of

social life: participating in the foundation and organisation of prisons, asylums, hospitals, and in the provision of that array of services included under the general rubric of 'welfare'.

In view of this it is surprising that, at least until fairly recently, the state has been largely ignored in sociology – by those of a Marxist persuasion as well as by others. In part this circumstance arose as a consequence of an especially unfortunate division of labour in the social sciences. The objective of sociology, it was assumed, is the study of 'society', understood as what nineteenth-century thinkers used to call 'civil society': the economy, family, and other institutions outside the state. Analysis of the state was then allocated as the specific province of the discipline of 'politics', or 'political science'. In some degree, however, avoidance of study of the state has deeper intellectual roots, stretching back to the nineteenth century. Marxism and non-Marxist sociology have a common ancestry in the critique of classical economic theory. In the latter, the state was assigned a minimal role. According to the early economists, the most important driving forces of social change are centred in production, and therefore in the realm of 'civil society'. The state provides a legal framework which guarantees that economic contracts are protected, and generally oversees the interests of the community.

Later thinkers became dissatisfied with this view. For those standing in the mainstream of sociology – we might again instance Durkheim – the state has

a more positive and significant part to play than the early economists suggested. The expansion of the activities of the state is a necessary and unobjectionable element in the development of a social order committed to progressive social reform. The state is seen here as a benign set of institutions that has a direct involvement in furthering the eradication of class divisions and inequalities. Marx's view, by contrast, was that the economists failed to recognise the class character of the state. Far from being a means of dissolving class divisions, the state is inherently involved with sustaining them: with protecting the interests of the dominant class against those of other classes in society. But in neither tradition of thought did the state become the object of systematic study. For non-Marxist and Marxist writers alike, the supposed *effects* of state activities were the focus of attention, rather than the state itself. Marx himself in fact left only a few fragmentary texts dealing with the state, his energies being concentrated upon criticising early economic theory on its own terrain: the relationships involved in capitalist production.

The state and classes: recent views

Over the past decade or so, however, the modern state has become the subject of lively discussion, especially among Marxist authors. Marxists have become pointedly aware of the rudimentary character of accounts of the state contained in Marx's

writings, and have sought to elaborate in some considerable detail upon their implications. Miliband's book, in fact, was one of the first contributions to this resurgent concern with the state. Two other influential authors in this field are Poulantzas and Offe. (See especially Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, London, New Left Books, 1973 [first published 1968]; Claus Offe, *Structural Problems of the Capitalist State*, London, Macmillan, 1982 [first published 1972]. Miliband and Poulantzas have been involved in a series of direct interchanges about how the state should be analysed; these I remark upon briefly below.)

The various comments that Marx made about the capitalist state can be construed in two ways. In some places Marx speaks as if the state were the direct instrument of class rule, controlled in an immediate way by the capitalist class. There is a passage, for example, where Marx talks of the state as the 'executive committee of the bourgeoisie'. But there are other contexts in which Marx seems to claim that the class character of the state consists in the fact that the state officialdom protects the overall continuity of capitalist production. Although it may not be obvious at first sight, there is potentially a very substantial difference between these two views. The first implies both that the dominant class is a unitary social formation, and that this class manipulates the state at will. Consequently, this standpoint is easily attacked, and it is this type of conception which has been challenged by so-called 'pluralist' writers. According to the pluralist inter-

pretation, which fits closely with the ideas expressed by Dahrendorf and other advocates of the theory of industrial society, there is no homogeneous 'ruling class' in the Western societies. Instead, there exist diversified sets or pluralities of elites, each having only quite limited power to influence governmental policies.

The second view derived from Marx allows for the recognition that there may be considerable divisions, and frictions, within ruling circles, in a society which remains a class society. Poulantzas develops this standpoint in his writings on the state – albeit in an often ponderously obscure style, and in a way that is open to criticism. In the first interpretation of Marx mentioned above, the state appears as manipulated by the ruling class. According to Poulantzas, however, the state has what he calls a 'relative autonomy' from the capitalist class, which itself is characteristically internally divided. The state, in other words, has a certain degree of independent power, but no more than a certain degree; and this power is used to sustain the general institutional framework of capitalist enterprise. The state may initiate policies counter to the short-term interests of certain capitalistic groupings, in order to defend the longer-term interest of perpetuating the system as a whole. An example might be where the government introduces anti-trust legislation in the face of opposition from businessmen who wish to carry through a merger of firms in a particular economic sector.

This sort of analysis of the state is undeniably

more sophisticated than those based upon the first, or 'instrumentalist', interpretation of Marx. Poulantzas, in fact, regards Miliband's book as falling into this category, and on this basis has subjected it to critical attack. Miliband, Poulantzas argues, is too concerned to demonstrate that elites in the capitalist societies are cohered by common educational backgrounds, familial relationships, friendship relations, and so on. Miliband confronts the theory of industrial society, and political pluralism, too much in their own terms – trying to show that there does, after all, remain a coherent propertied class at the reins of government. But the existence of schisms in the upper echelons, Poulantzas argues, does not in and of itself show that capitalist class domination has been undermined. Such schisms are normal anyway. What is of decisive importance is that the institutional mechanisms of capitalist production persist.

Although the debate between Poulantzas and Miliband cannot be said to have been a particularly instructive or fruitful one – the participants too often talk past one another – it does highlight very well some of the general issues with which I introduced this book. For Poulantzas's overall standpoint, although a Marxist one, conforms closely to certain of the elements of the model of sociology which I criticised. In Poulantzas's scheme, which is strongly influenced by the 'structuralist Marxism' of the contemporary French philosopher Louis Althusser, social actors are explicitly regarded as 'bearers of modes of production'. Put in other terms,

human agency is explained as the outcome of social causes. Human beings do not appear here as knowledgeable agents: their 'double involvement' with society is not conceptualised. Thus Miliband aptly criticises Poulantzas for indulging in what he calls a sort of 'structural super-determinism', whatever the rights and wrongs of the rest of the dispute (Ralph Miliband, 'The capitalist state: a reply to Nicos Poulantzas', *New Left Review*, no. 59, 1970).

Let me go a bit further with this point, for as well as reinforcing the importance of the theoretical considerations discussed in the opening chapter, it is directly germane to the question of the state. How does the state achieve this 'relative autonomy' that Poulantzas talks about; what does it consist of? Poulantzas's answers to these questions are vague and elusive. It is not clear what the relative autonomy of the state is based on, how relative it is, or what it is relative to. We can, I think, clarify these things, but only by departing from the sort of deterministic standpoint adopted by Poulantzas. The best way of clarifying some of the specific features of the capitalist state is by drawing a comparison with other types of states that have existed in history – agrarian states or empires. In most of the latter, the personnel of the ruling class were also the state officialdom; state and dominant class were one and the same. But in capitalist societies such is not the case. The members of the dominant class – that is, the leaders of business or industry – may quite often take a direct part in

government. But by and large the industrial leadership and state officialdom are institutionally distinct from one another. In capitalism, to use the oft-quoted phrase of an early Marxist of the turn of the century, Karl Kautsky, 'the ruling class does not rule'. Both versions of what Marx had to say on the state in a sense agree on this, but its implications can be drawn in a way so as to illuminate the idea of relative autonomy.

The state in capitalism is dependent for its revenue upon the successful prosecution of business activity; it could not survive were it not for the prosperity of industrial enterprise, which, however, it does not directly control, such control being the province of the capitalist class. Autonomy of action on the part of state officialdom is thus strongly limited by its dependence upon capitalistic enterprise. This is the institutional setting for state autonomy, and at the same time the basic source of the limited or 'relative' nature of that autonomy. However, none of these phenomena can be, or should be, interpreted in a mechanical fashion. The increasing intrusion of the state into economic life is part and parcel of attempts of state personnel to influence the general operation of economic enterprise. It is not only Marxists who have been aware of the dislocations and crises to which capitalist economies tend to be subject. State administrators are as aware of this as anyone, and are chronically involved in seeking to 'manage' the economy.

So far, this is in general agreement with Poulantzas's views, although expressed in different

terms from those he favours. But there is, I think, a further element of fundamental importance relevant to the autonomy of the state. This is the power of the organised working class itself – expressed both as union power and in the influence of labour or socialist parties upon the conduct of government. Poulantzas explains why state and capitalist class should often be at odds solely in terms of divisions within that class: state politics may favour one sector of capital rather than another. But the state also has to attempt to cope with the influence of organised labour. If in the early years of industrial capitalism this was not of great moment, such is hardly the case today. The struggles and changes I have described in the preceding chapter have not just 'incorporated' the working class into economic and political institutions that have remained unaltered; the citizenship rights which have been won have shifted the balance of power in the state, even if they have not led to the revolutionary upheavals Marx foresaw.

Offe's writings at this point serve as an apt corrective to Poulantzas's emphases. According to Offe, the state cannot be adequately understood in terms of either version of Marx mentioned above, although the second is more nearly correct than the first. The state is actually sandwiched between two inherently antagonistic or 'contradictory' influences. The modern state is committed to a range of measures – including social welfare, but also a range of other services – provided for the community as a whole. But however much the state may attempt

to 'manage' economic growth, its income is fundamentally dependent upon wealth generated by privately owned capital and the corporations: that is, upon processes which it does not directly administer. The services the state must organise have to be paid for by income derived indirectly, via taxation. But those who have command over economic life – the business leaders, or capitalist class – tend to resist the endeavours of the state to secure the income needed to provide these community services. This is because while some such services (e.g. the provision and maintenance of a good road system) are desired as much by the dominant class as by others, many (e.g. the provision of welfare benefits) are primarily utilised by those in the lower orders of society.

The result, according to Offe, is a constant tension between what he calls the 'commodification' and 'de-commodification' of social relationships. A commodity is any product or service that can be bought or sold; hence a commodified relationship is one that a price can be put on, that is marketable. De-commodification means removing social relationships from the marketplace, organising them by criteria other than the economic. Labour or socialist parties on the whole tend to create or pursue policies that expand non-commodified relationships. The promotion of educational opportunities or free hospital care for everyone would be examples. Conservative parties, on the other hand, drawing most of their support from the upper or middle classes, are likely to seek to preserve commodified

relations, or even to 're-commodify' them. Such would be the case, for example, with governmental policies aimed at paying for the costs of education through loan schemes, or which extend the sphere of private medicine.

The sort of standpoint set out by Offe conforms in a general way to the discussion of the significance of citizenship rights and the nature of the 'welfare state' which I sketched in the preceding chapter. The theorists of industrial society have been inclined to treat these as 'completed' phenomena that have served to undergird a stable liberal-democratic industrial order; and they have seen them as having effectively dissolved class conflict in any sense close to that analysed by Marx. But if I am right, they are chronically enmeshed in class conflict rather than undermining it; and the 'welfare state' is thus a relatively fragile creation. In a political climate of conservatism such as today, this is easier to see than it was a decade or two ago, for some current conservative governments have mounted a more sustained attempt to 're-commodify' areas of welfare services than has been seen for a long time.

The state and bureaucracy

If Marxist authors have contributed very substantially to the analysis of the modern state in the respects thus mentioned, there are two contexts in which their discussions have tended to be notably deficient. One is the association of the state with

bureaucracy, and more generally with administrative power; the other is the association of the state with the *nation*, and of the *nation-state* with military power and *violence*. We cannot look to the theory of industrial society to provide a guide for coping with these issues either, because it is too much entangled with the traditions of thought from which Marxism derives.

There is, however, one major figure in social theory whose ideas do offer a resource for approaching such issues: Max Weber. Prior to Weber, the term 'bureaucracy' was generally used as equivalent to 'state bureaucracy', that is, as referring to state functionaries. Weber's writings on bureaucracy continue to be particularly concerned with the state, but he extends the term considerably, so that it has reference to any form of large-scale organisation. According to Weber, the advance of bureaucracy is intimately tied up with the expansion of capitalism. The link between the two is to be found in what Weber calls 'rational-legal' norms. One of the distinctive features of capitalist economic enterprise, according to Weber, is its routinised character: production depends upon the calculation of profit and expenditure, in relation to the input of raw materials and labour-power, and to the output of goods. This routinised form can be created only by the adoption of impersonal rules which specify procedure and make possible exact economic calculation. For Weber it was not fortuitous that the origins of capitalist enterprise in Europe coincided with the invention of double-entry book-

keeping; this was the concrete means of economic calculation necessary to routinised economic activity.

Rational-legal norms may guide capitalist enterprise, but, according to Weber, they have much broader application to the administration of bureaucratic organisations in general. In the state, they are epitomised in the formation of an apparatus of formal, codified law; in other organisations, by formalised rules of procedure of various sorts. A bureaucratized organisation is distinguished by a number of specific traits. Weber's famous characterisation of these in his major work, *Economy and Society*, is as an 'ideal type' – a concept to which he accorded a basic role in his approach to the social sciences. An ideal type is a 'one-sided exaggeration' of certain aspects of reality, with which reality may then be compared. Thus Weber's ideal-typical formulation of bureaucracy lists a whole set of traits which will rarely, if ever, be found in fully developed form in any actual organisation. (See Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, vol. 2, pp. 956–94 [original German publication 1922].) It involves a pyramidal hierarchy of authority, arranged in terms of levels of official duties; bureaucratic officials are salaried, full-time staff, holding formal qualifications that are the condition of their appointment. There are two aspects of Weber's discussion of the connections between capitalism and bureaucracy that merit particular attention here. One concerns the consolidation of capitalist enterprise on a generalised basis. Weber lays considerably more

stress than Marx does upon the early development of a bureaucratised state apparatus as a condition for the spread of capitalism. The formation of a system of law, and a guaranteed monetary system, administered by the state, was the necessary basis for the extension of capitalist production on a large scale.

The more significant feature of Weber's discussion, for my concerns in this chapter at any rate, bears rather upon the *consequences* of the association of capitalism, established as a generic type of society, with the advance of bureaucracy. It is here that Weber, as it were, throws down the gauntlet to Marxists, and challenges the thesis that a socialist society can generate a more democratic order than is possible in capitalist liberal democracy. Weber argues that bureaucracy and democracy stand in a paradoxical relation to one another. By its very nature, bureaucracy promotes the centralisation of power in the hands of a minority: those at the apex of the organisation. Marx regarded the expropriation of the mass of the population, in a capitalist society, from control of their means of production as the source both of exploitative class domination and of the limited character of bourgeois democracy. But of course all of this was to be transformed with the advent of socialism, via the abolition of private property and classes. Workers would recover control of their means of production; the sham freedom of 'free wage-labour' would cede place to real freedoms of democratised industry.

Weber's analysis places this conception in extreme jeopardy. The expropriation of workers from control

of their means of production is not confined to the capitalist firm, and hence will not disappear with the transcendence of capitalism. According to Weber, loss of control over work processes – and the reduction of work to routinised operations, in which the majority are only 'cogs in a machine' – are characteristic of bureaucratisation in general. Industrial workers in a capitalist setting do not own, and have no formal control over, their means of production. But this is not specific to industry: the same is true of those at the lower levels of all bureaucratic organisations, such as large hospitals or universities – and it is true of participation in the government itself. The ideals of democracy, Weber emphasises, originated in small-scale societies in which those restricted segments of the population who were 'citizens' could assemble physically to exercise political power. But in the large-scale societies of contemporary times, in which citizenship rights have been extended to virtually everyone, this model of democracy becomes inapplicable. A modern democratic system presupposes a high level of bureaucratisation in the polity. To organise mass elections, there must be a firmly established 'rational-legal' system, accompanied by bureaucratised procedures ensuring that elections are properly co-ordinated and administered. Moreover, mass political parties also tend to become strongly bureaucratised, however open or democratic the goals to which they are supposedly dedicated. The modern era is one of 'party machine politics', in which the degree of participation of the ordinary citizen in the forging of political policies is strictly

limited. Weber was one of the originators of what is sometimes called the theory of 'democratic elitism'. Modern democracy allows individuals a certain influence, through the franchise, over the elites who will rule them; but there can be no question of recapturing forms of 'participatory democracy' in which the population would have more extensive control over their destinies.

Socialism in Weber's view would make things worse. For it would only further the spread of bureaucracy: the centralised direction of economic life inherent in socialist programmes would entail the development of a more heavily bureaucratised state than is characteristic of capitalist societies. Weber's assessment of capitalism and democracy is on the whole a pessimistic one. But he believed that liberal democracy sustains at least certain openings not covered by the enveloping tide of bureaucratisation. 'Democratic elitism' may be a limited form of political participation, but in the context of a multi-party system it is better than nothing. Moreover, although capitalism tends towards monopoly or oligopoly, it retains enough of a competitive character to permit freedoms of consumer choice that would become closed off where production is placed under central control.

Critical comments

Weber's views must be taken very seriously, and certainly provide a sobering jolt to anyone inclined to suppose that, either through reform or revolution,

the capitalist state can be readily transformed in the direction of securing higher levels of justice and freedom. But there are several reasons why his interpretation of the looming threat of bureaucratic domination cannot be accepted as it stands.

First, it seems mistaken to suppose, as Weber does, that the advance of bureaucracy produces a one-way movement of power away from those at the lower levels of organisations. Weber's student, Robert Michels (Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1968 [original German publication 1911]) generalised Weber's view in the shape of what he termed the 'iron law of oligarchy'. In Michels's words, 'who says organisation says oligarchy': in large-scale organisations power is necessarily concentrated in the hands of a few. But the iron law of oligarchy is neither an iron law nor even an accurate generalisation, expressed in unqualified form. Neither the increasing scale of societies or organisations within them (which Michels tended to place most emphasis upon), nor their increasing bureaucratisation (as stressed by Weber) lead inevitably to the consequences those authors suppose. This is, in fact, easy to demonstrate. Consider the following two examples, which are each very pertinent to my foregoing discussion of classes and the state. The modern economy is much more highly centralised than it was fifty years ago – due to the combination of factors I have mentioned, the growth of the megacorporations plus the increasing intrusion of the state into economic life. But some groups of workers have thereby gained

much *more* power than they enjoyed previously, because they work in particularly strategic sectors of the economy. Workers in public utilities, or in energy production and distribution, for instance, are cases in point. Take as a second example workers on a highly integrated production line, in which control of the work process is presumptively taken wholly out of the workers' hands. Some writers, even including those of a Marxist persuasion (see especially Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974) have reached the conclusion that such work settings 'sieve off' control of labour from the worker – thus reaching equally pessimistic conclusions to those of Weber and Michels. In fact, however, in highly co-ordinated work situations workers in certain respects acquire more power than they held before. For integrated production lines are particularly vulnerable to disruption by the co-ordinated action of small groups of workers.

Once more here we see the sociological importance of recognising that all social actors are knowledgeable agents, not merely the passive recipients of influences that irresistibly condition their conduct. The specific significance of this in such a context is that in bureaucratic organisations, including the state, there are more or less constant processes of the 'trading off' of resources. Power is usually a focus of active struggle, in which those in subordinate positions are by no means always the losers. To say this is not to write the views of Weber or Michels off as worthless, because there is no

doubt that they point to tendencies which are common and real enough. But they are not universally associated either with bureaucracy or with the increasing scale of social organisation.

Weber's concentration upon problems of bureaucratic domination, I think, led him to underestimate the salience of Marx's critique of the capitalist state. The separation of the 'political', in which everyone is a citizen, from the 'economic' remains a distinctive feature of the advanced capitalist societies. The franchise, I have argued, has been a very important medium of generating change in these societies. It remains the case, however, that the power which industrial employees are able to wield in the sphere of industry is negative: it is founded upon the collective withdrawal of labour, or other modes of making their presence felt (controlling the flow of the production line, blocking its operation, or sabotaging it in other ways). Neither blue-collar workers nor lower-level white-collar employees have any formal rights of participation in the policies shaped from above.

If those in subordinate positions are already often able to sustain considerable power by negative means, there is good reason to suppose that such power might be further expanded by the extension of citizenship rights to the industrial sphere. In other words, the possibilities of achieving forms of 'participatory democracy' in contemporary societies should not be dismissed as unequivocally as Weber presumed. This applies with particular force to the industrial workplace, as follows from Marx's analysis.

But it is difficult to deny that Marx, and many subsequent Marxists also, have been much too sanguine about how modes of participatory democracy might be successfully institutionalised in an anticipated socialist order. Existing socialist societies in Eastern Europe (with partial exceptions, such as Yugoslavian experiments with workers' self-management, and the activities of Solidarity in Poland) have hardly blazed the way in this respect.

The City: Urbanism and Everyday Life

Pre-capitalist and modern cities

Consider again at this point the recency of the changes that have transformed the contemporary world. Capitalist enterprise upon a broad scale dates from only the sixteenth century or so, and industrial capitalism from only the late eighteenth century – and first of all in an isolated pocket of the world at that. But the two hundred years since 1780 have witnessed more far-reaching transmutations in social life than occurred in the vast span of human history prior to that date. Nowhere is this more evident, as I indicated in the first chapter of the book, than in the character and spread of contemporary urbanism. In grasping the impact of modern urbanism, the historical aspect of the

On the Theory of the State

I

Who today can escape the question of the State and power? Who indeed does not talk about it? The current political situation, not only in France but in the whole of Europe, is certainly one reason for its topicality. But talk is not enough: we have to understand, know and explain. And for that, we must not hesitate to go straight to the root of the problems. We also have to grasp means adequate to the end, without giving in to the temptation of using a fashionable language of analogy and metaphor. No doubt my initial observations will seem rather arid. But unlike Alphonse Allias, I do not unfortunately have the time to pass on more quickly to the very exciting later chapters.

Whether overtly or not, all twentieth-century political theory has basically posed the same question: what is the relationship between the State, power and social classes? I repeat *twentieth-century* theory, because such was not always the case, at least not in this form. Marxism first had to make some headway. But since Max Weber, all political theory has constituted either a dialogue with Marxism or an attack upon it. At any event, who today would dream of denying the relationship between power and the dominant classes? Now, while the countless varieties of such theory pose the same question, the great majority also give the same basic answer: first there is the State or power (which is explicated in numerous different ways) and then the ruling classes establish with it specific relations of proximity or alliance. These relations are unravelled with varying degrees of sophistication, by reference to pressure groups acting on the State or flexible strategies spreading through the networks of power and taking shape in its structures. The account always comes down to the following: the State is constituted by an

original, impenetrable kernel and by 'the rest', which the ruling classes, coming on to the scene as if by chance, are able to affect and penetrate. Such a way of conceiving the State essentially rests on a Janus image, or better still, on an updated form of the half-human, half-beast Centaur-Power that already haunted Machiavelli. In some authors it is the human side that is bound up with social classes, in others it is the animal side.

There is just one problem with this. How can it explain what everyone who is not blind can observe every day, not as a philosopher but as an ordinary citizen? For it is obvious that we are hemmed in more and more tightly by a State whose most detailed practices demonstrate its connection with particular, and extremely precise, interests.

One variant of Marxism, which is still tied to a certain political tradition, claims to provide us with an answer. The State is equivalent to political domination, so the argument goes, in that each dominant class constructs a State according to its requirements, bending it at will to suit its own interests. In that sense, every State is merely a class dictatorship.

This purely instrumental conception of the State reduces *the state apparatus to state power*, thus failing to touch the heart of the matter. It is not that the State has no 'class nature'. But the real problem is the one which concerns every political theory of the State and which was posed by the founders of Marxism themselves. Indeed, although they approached the problem from a specific angle, it may be said to have obsessed them in their work. They saw the State as a *special apparatus*, exhibiting a peculiar material framework that cannot be reduced to given relations of political domination. As regards the capitalist State, the question may be formulated as follows: why, in general, does the bourgeoisie seek to maintain its domination by having recourse precisely to the national-popular State – to the modern representative State with all its characteristic institutions? For it is far from self-evident that the bourgeoisie would have chosen this particular form if it had been able to tailor a State to its requirements. While the bourgeoisie continues to derive many benefits from such a State, it is by no means always contented with it, any more than it was in the past.

This is a burning question, since it also concerns the present-day phenomenon of statism, in which, as we know only too well, the State's activity reaches into all spheres of everyday life. Here too, the variant of Marxism to which we have referred supplies a peremptory answer: these activities emanate in their entirety from the will of the dominant class or from that of its hired politicians. It is perfectly clear, however,

that a number of state functions (e.g., social security) cannot be reduced to political domination alone.

Even if we try to leave behind the image of the State as a mere product or appendage of the dominant class, we encounter essentially the same snare in the traditional answer of political theory. And theorists of another, more modern variant of Marxism, do not always avoid the trap. Invoking the dual nature of the State, they see *on the one hand* (still the great divide!) a kernel of the State that somehow exists side by side with classes and the class struggle. To be sure, the explanation they give of this kernel is not that of the other theories of power and the State: in particular, they make reference to the productive forces, to which they reduce the relations of production. This is the famous economic structure from which classes and class struggle are absent – a structure that is supposed to give rise to a truly 'special' State and to the purely technical (or, in more dignified language, the purely social) measures of the State. Then *on the other hand*, there is the State's other nature, this time related to classes and the class struggle. So, we have a second State, a super-State or a State within the State, which is grafted on to the back of the first. This one does have a class nature, operating in our case as the State of the bourgeoisie and of its political domination. The second State comes along to pervert, vitiate, contaminate or deflect the functions of the first.

I spoke just now of a particular variant of Marxism. But the phenomenon is much broader, extending to that left-technocratic ideology which is currently wreaking such havoc. This is above all the case not when it points to the productive forces, but when, in more prosaic fashion, it invokes the increasing complexity of the State's technical-economic tasks in so-called post-industrial societies.

Such a line of argument does not then differ all that much from the age-old answer of political theory, whether in its traditional form or in one better adapted to the tastes of the day. For all these theorists, there is a free-standing state power which is only afterwards utilized by the dominant classes in various ways. Quite frankly, they should talk not of the class nature, but of the class utilization of the State. The term mentioned earlier, the dual nature of the State, does not encompass the reality of these analyses: namely, the view that the State's true nature lies in the first, original State, while the second is just a question of habit. Just as political theory has for centuries conceived of the State as half-human, half-beast, so the genuine State or real power are here located not on the shady side (the side of classes) but on the other, sunny side.

There is a purpose behind these schematic representations. For if all political theory and all theories of socialism (including Marxism) revolve around this question, this is because it constitutes a real problem. While not of course the only one to arise in this field, it is nevertheless of central importance; and, as the reader will have guessed, it also involves the question of the transformation of the State in the transition to democratic socialism. Anyway, there is only one road that leads somewhere, only one answer that can break the vicious circle. In fact, we may begin by expressing this answer very simply: the State really does exhibit a peculiar material framework that can by no means be reduced to mere political domination. The state apparatus – that special and hence formidable something – is not exhausted in state power. Rather political domination is itself inscribed in the institutional materiality of the State. Although the State is not created *ex nihilo* by the ruling classes, nor is it simply taken over by them: state power (that of the bourgeoisie, in the case of the capitalist State) is written into this materiality. Thus, while all the State's actions are not reducible to political domination, their composition is nevertheless marked by it.

It will be no easy matter to demonstrate these propositions. For when the simplest questions are the real ones, they are also the most complex. In order to avoid losing ourselves in the maze, we must keep hold of the guiding thread: the basis of the material framework of power and the State has to be sought in the relations of production and social division of labour – but not in the sense which is normally understood and which has come to be accepted. By these terms I do not refer to an economic structure from which classes, the class struggle and forms of power are absent. Finally, it is because this constitutes the linchpin that I shall cling on to it in order to enter the current, much broader discussion on the State and power.

II

We must begin then by briefly recalling certain analyses that I have made in previous books.

The articulation of the State to the relations of production at once poses the question of the relationship between the State and the 'economic base'. We have to be quite clear about what is meant by 'economic base', since this will determine our notion of the way in which the State is bound up with the relations of production and the class struggle.

Today more than ever it is necessary to distance ourselves from the formalist-economist position according to which the economy is composed of elements that remain unchanged through the various modes of production – elements possessing an almost Aristotelian *nature* or *essence* and able to reproduce and regulate themselves by a kind of internal combinatory. As we know, that has been a constant temptation throughout the history of Marxism, and it is still with us today. Converging in this respect with traditional economism, such a conception obscures the role of struggles lodged in the very heart of the relations of production and exploitation. Furthermore, it treats the space or field of the economic (and consequently that of the state-political) as essentially immutable, as possessing intrinsic limits that are sketched out once and for all by its supposed self-reproduction. At the level of relations between State and economy, this ultimately rather ancient view of things can give rise to two misinterpretations, whose effects most frequently appear in a combined manner.

First, it may give weight to an old misunderstanding that results from a topological representation of 'base' and 'superstructure': namely, the conception of the State as a mere appendage or reflection of the economic sphere, devoid of its own space and reducible to the economy. According to this notion, the relation between State and economy is at best a matter of the State's famous 'rebound action' on an economic base considered as essentially self-sufficient. What is involved here is the traditional mechanistic-economist conception of the State – one whose implications and consequences are by now sufficiently well known for me to pass straight on.

The formalist position can also give rise to a second misunderstanding, in which the social totality is conceived in the form of *instances* or *levels* that are by nature or by essence autonomous from one another. Once the economy is apprehended in terms of a series of elements occupying their own spaces and remaining unchanged through the diverse modes of production (slavery, feudalism, capitalism), the conception will be extended by analogy to the superstructural instances (the State, ideology). It will then be the *a posteriori* combination of these inherently autonomous instances that will produce the various modes of production, since the essence of these instances is prior to their mutual relation within a mode of production.

This conception is again grounded on representation of an economic space intrinsically capable of reproducing itself. But instead of regarding the superstructural instances as appendages or reflections of the economy,

it threatens to turn them into substances, furnishing them with an independence of the economic base that remains constant through the various modes of production. The essential autonomy of the superstructural instances (the State, ideology) would then serve to legitimize the autonomy, self-sufficiency and self-reproduction of the economy. We can thus see the theoretical collusion of these two conceptions, for which the links between the State and the economic sphere are in principle relations of exteriority, whatever the forms used to designate them.

The constructivist image of 'base' and 'superstructure', which is supposed to allow the determining role of the economic sphere to be visualized after a fashion, cannot in fact provide a correct representation of the articulation of social reality, nor therefore of that determining role itself. It has even proved to be disastrous in more ways than one, and there is everything to be gained from not relying upon it. For my own part, I have long ceased to use it in analysis of the State.

These conceptions also have an effect on the delimitation and construction of objects for theoretical investigation. For they both admit the possibility and legitimacy of a *general theory of the economy* taken as an epistemologically distinct object – the theory, that is to say, of the transhistorical functioning of economic space. In this perspective, the differences presented by the object (the economy) from one mode of production to another are to be explained purely in terms of a self-regulating and rigidly demarcated economic space, whose *internal* metamorphoses and transformations are unravelled by the general theory of the economy ('economic science'). It is at the level of the so-called superstructures that the two conceptions diverge, finishing with opposite, and equally false, results. For the first, any specific examination of the superstructural fields as objects in their own right is quite simply inadmissible, since the general theory of the economy provides the keys to explaining the superstructures as mechanical reflections of the economic base. For the second, by contrast, this general theory has to be duplicated by analogy in a *general theory* of every superstructural field – in this case, the political field of the State. This theory, too, must have as its specific and separable object the reality of the State across the various modes of production; as an epistemological object, the State is conceived as having immutable boundaries fixed through its exclusion from the a-temporal domain of the economy. Thus, the intrinsic borders of the economy-object, which is deemed capable of reproducing itself by its inner laws, lead on to intrinsic borders of the State – a State, that is, with an immutable space enveloping the equally immutable space of the economy.

These are false conceptions, then. But what is the truth of the matter?

1. Let us first recall that the space or site of the economy is that of the relations of production and exploitation, and of the extraction of surplus labour (that is, in the capitalist mode of production, the reproduction and accumulation of capital, and the extraction of surplus-value). Now, neither in pre-capitalist modes nor in capitalism has this space ever formed a hermetically sealed level, capable of self-reproduction and possessing its own 'laws' of internal functioning. *The political field of the State* (as well as the sphere of ideology) *has always, in different forms, been present in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production.* (This was also true of the pre-monopoly stage of capitalism, despite the widespread illusion that the liberal State involved itself in the economy only for the purposes of creating and maintaining the 'material infrastructure' of production.) Of course, the position of the State vis-à-vis the economy has changed not only with the mode of production, but also with the stage and phase of capitalism itself. But in no manner can these changes ever be inscribed in a topological image of exteriority, according to which the State, as an instance always external to the economy, now intervenes in the relations of production themselves thereby penetrating economic space, and now remains outside that space acting only on its periphery. The position of the State vis-à-vis the economy is never anything but the modality of the State's presence in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production.

2. It follows that neither the concept of the economy nor that of the State can have the same extension, field or meaning in the various modes of production. Even at an abstract level, these modes cannot be grasped as purely economic forms deriving from an ever-changing combination of inherently constant economic elements that move in a closed and self-limited space. But nor do they constitute combinations of these elements with unchanging elements of other instances (the State) conceived as immutable substances. In short, a mode of production does not arise out of the combination of various instances, all of which possess an inalterable structure before they come into relation with one another. It is rather the mode of production itself – that totality of economic, political and ideological determinations – which fixes the boundaries of these spaces, sketching out their fields and defining their respective elements. They are *from the very beginning* constituted by their mutual relation and articulation – a process that is effected in each mode of production through the determining role of the relations of production.

But that determination always takes place within the unity of the mode of production.

3. Although, in the pre-capitalist modes of production, the direct producers were separated from the labour-object and the means of production through the economic property relation, they were not separated from them in the second constituent of the relations of production, namely, the relationship of possession. In feudalism, for example, the peasants and serfs were 'tied' to these objects and means, preserving relative mastery of the labour process without the direct intervention of the landlord. This resulted precisely in what Marx called the close 'overlapping' or 'mixedness' of the State and the economy. The exercise of legitimate violence is here implicit in the relations of production, since surplus labour has to be extracted from direct producers who possess the object and means of their labour. Because of these clear-cut relations between the State and the economy, their contour, scope and significance are quite other than in the capitalist mode of production.

In capitalism, the direct producers are entirely dispossessed of the object and means of their labour: they are separated from them not only in the economic property relation but also in the relationship of possession. We witness here the emergence of 'free labourers' possessing nothing but their labour power and unable to set the labour process in motion without the owner, whose involvement is juridically represented by the contractual buying and selling of labour power. It is this very structure of capitalist relations of production that makes a commodity of labour power itself and converts surplus labour into surplus-value. As regards the relationship between State and economy, this structure further generates the relative *separation* of the State and the economic sphere (accumulation of capital and production of surplus-value) – a separation which underlies the characteristic institutional framework of the capitalist State, since it maps out the new spaces and respective fields of the State and the economy. This separation of the State and the space of the reproduction of capital is therefore specific to capitalism: it must not be understood as a particular effect of essentially autonomous instances composed of elements that remain constant whatever the mode of production. It is rather a peculiar feature of capitalism, insofar as it maps out new spaces for the State and the economy by transforming their very elements.

What is involved here is not a real externality, such as would exist if the State intervened in the economy only from the outside. *The separation is*

nothing other than the capitalist form of the presence of the political in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production. This separation of State and economy and the presence-action of the former in the latter – in effect, two expressions of a single pattern of relations between State and economy under capitalism – traverse all the historical stages and phases of the mode of production; albeit in changing forms, they are rooted in the hard core of capitalist relations of production. Just as the State was not, in the pre-monopoly stage, really external to the space of the reproduction of capital, so the State's role in monopoly capitalism, especially the current phase, does not involve abolition of the separation of State and economy. The analysis that asserts the contrary is now quite widespread, but it is erroneous with regard both to the relations between State and economy in the pre-monopoly ('competitive' or 'liberal') stage of capitalism, and to the equivalent relations in the current stage and phase. The substantive changes undergone by these relations through the history of capitalism, resulting as they do from changes in the relations of production, are just 'transformed forms' of this separation and of the presence-action of the State in the relations of production.

Now, the very fact that the space, field and respective concepts of the state-political and the economy (relations of production) present themselves in different ways according to the mode of production, leads to a conclusion that runs counter to all formalist theoreticism. For just as there can be no general theory of the economy (no 'economic science') having a theoretical object that remains unchanged through the various modes of production, so can there be no 'general theory' of the state-political (in the sense of a political 'science' or 'sociology') having a similarly constant object. Such a theory would be legitimate only if the State constituted an instance that was by nature or essence autonomous and possessing immutable boundaries, and if that instance carried within itself the laws of its own historical reproduction. (I am here using the term general theory in the strong sense: that is, to denote a theoretical system both capable of explicating, on the basis of general and necessary propositions and as particular expressions of a single theoretical object, the types of State that arise in the various modes of production, and at the same time capable of unfolding the laws of transformation that characterize the object's metamorphoses, on its own constant ground, from one mode of production to another – that is to say, the passage or transition from one State to another.) What is perfectly legitimate, however, is a *theory of the capitalist State* which forges its specific object and concept: this is made possible by the separation of the space of the State and that of the

economy in the capitalist mode of production. In the same way, a theory of the capitalist economy is possible because of the separation of the State and the relations of production/labour process.

We may, of course, put forward *general theoretical propositions concerning the State*. But these would have the same status as those of Marx relating to 'production in general': that is, they could have no claim to the status of a general theory of the State. It is important to mention this point, given the stupendous dogmatism with which certain general propositions contained in the classics of Marxism are still being presented as the 'Marxist-Leninist theory of the State'. This was evident among those contributors to the recent PCF debate who wished to 'retain' the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹

There is certainly no general theory of the State to be found in the Marxist classics: not just because their authors were for one reason or another unable to complete one, but because there can never be any such theory. In fact, this is now a question of great topicality, as is illustrated particularly by the debate on the Italian left. In two recent articles, which have aroused enormous interest, Bobbio has re-emphasized the fact that Marxism has no general theory of the State. A number of Italian Marxists have felt obliged to reply that such a theory exists 'in embryo' in the classics of Marxism, and that its development constitutes a necessary and legitimate task.² But even though the reasons given by Bobbio are not the right ones, the fact remains that there is no general theory of the State because there can never be one. Here we must resist all those criticisms, whether advanced in good or in bad faith, which reproach Marxism for its supposed failings with regard to a general theory of power and the political. For it is precisely one of the merits of Marxism that, in this and other cases, it thrust aside the grand metaphysical flights of so-called political philosophy – the vague and nebulous theorizations of an extreme generality and abstractness that claim to lay bare the great secrets of History, the Political, the State, and Power. More than ever should this be noted today, when, in the face of the pressing political situation in Europe and especially France, we are once again witnessing the typically escapist phenomenon of large-scale systematizations – First and Final Philosophies of Power that, more often than not, simply regurgitate the stale terminology of the most traditional spiritualist metaphysics. They do this by cheerfully flooding the concept market

with the grandiose terroristic and mystifying Notions of the Despot, the Master, and a few more of the same stamp: from Deleuze to the 'new' philosophers, an exhaustive list would be long indeed.³ The philosophical fraternity may be enjoying itself in France, but in the end none of this is really very funny. For the genuine problems are too serious and complex to be resolved by pompous and ultra-simplistic generalizations that have never succeeded in explaining anything whatsoever.

This is not to say that there are no deficiencies in the Marxist analysis of power and the State; but they are not where they have been sought. What has been very costly for the popular masses throughout the world is not Marxism's lack of a general theory of power and the State, but precisely that eschatological and prophetic dogmatism which has for so long tried to fill the 'gap' with a 'Marxist-Leninist theory' of the State. The real, and thus important, deficiencies of Marxism in this respect concern those very fields where theorization is legitimate. In *Political Power and Social Classes*⁴ and in other works, I have shown that these deficiencies bear, for reasons I attempt to explain, on *both* the general theoretical propositions *and* the theory of the capitalist State. One result is the still inadequate analysis of the regime and State in the countries of the East.

Thus, although I shall seek below to deepen and elaborate the general propositions on the State, I shall do this not before, but step by step with an analysis of the capitalist State itself, which really is a possible and legitimate theoretical object. I am not guided in this by the long-standing and simplistic belief of Hegelian-Marxist historicism to the effect that capitalism constitutes the progressive and linear flowering of 'buds' contained in pre-capitalist modes of production – much as man is supposed to explain the ape. Too many theorists of power are still haunted by the idea that the capitalist State is the perfect materialization of some *Urstaat* constantly burrowing its way through historical reality, and that it therefore provides the ground on which to present general propositions on the State. (Of quite another order is the problem of the historical conditions – capitalism – that make possible the formulation of such propositions.) The specific autonomy of political space under capitalism – a circumstance that legitimizes theorizations of that space – is not the flawless realization of the State's supposed autonomy of essence

³ Gilles Deleuze and F. Guattari, *L'anti-Oedipe*, Paris 1975. As regards the current of 'new philosophers', I shall refer below to two works: B. H. Lévy, *La barbarie à visage humain*, Paris 1977, and André Glucksmann, *Les maîtres penseurs*, Paris 1977.

⁴ NLB 1973.

¹ See especially Etienne Balibar, *On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, NLB 1977.

² This whole controversy has been published as *Il marxismo e lo Stato*, 1976.

or nature, but the result of a separation from the relations of production that is peculiar to capitalism. The theory of the capitalist State cannot be simply deduced from general propositions on the State. If I present the two at the same time, it is because these propositions may best be illustrated by the object that can give rise to a specific theory: namely, the capitalist State.

To the extent that there can be no general theory of the State, posing general laws of its transformation through the various modes of production, so too can there be no such theory of the transition from one State to another – *especially not of the passage from the capitalist to the socialist State*. A theory of the capitalist State provides important elements regarding the State of transition to socialism. But not only do these elements have a different status from that of the theory of the capitalist State, they enjoy a quite unique status even among general theoretical propositions on the State. They can never be anything other than *applied theoretical-strategic notions*, serving, to be sure, as guides to action, but at the very most in the manner of road-signs. A ‘model’ of the State of transition to socialism cannot be drawn up: not as a universal model capable of being concretized in given cases, nor even as an infallible, theoretically guaranteed recipe for one or several countries. Certainly the analyses I myself shall make of the State of transition to socialism in Western Europe can have no such pretensions. We have to make a choice once and for all: and as we now know, one cannot ask any theory, however scientific it may be, to give more than it possesses – not even Marxism, which remains a genuine theory of action. *There is always a structural distance between theory and practice, between theory and the real.*

In fact, these two distances are but one. Marxism is no more ‘responsible’ for what is happening in the East than are the Enlightenment philosophers for totalitarian regimes in the West. This is true not in the trivial sense that pure Marxism is innocent of the deformations in the East, but because the distance between theory and the real holds good for every theory, including Marxism. And it overlaps the distance between theory and practice. To wish to close this gap involves making any theory say no matter what, or doing no matter what in the name of theory.

For this distance does not refer to a trench that cannot be filled, quite the contrary. As it happens, some are always lying in wait, ready to throw themselves into filling this ever-open gap. However liberating a theory may be, the ‘purity’ of its discourse is never enough to exclude the possibility of its being made to serve totalitarian ends by precisely those bricklayers who set to work on the distance between theory and practice –

those people skilled in application of texts and reduction of the real who can always lay claim to the theory in all its purity. The blame, then, does not lie with Marx, nor for that matter with Plato, Jesus, Rousseau or Voltaire. The distance between theory and the real always persists despite the effort to fill it. Stalin is not Marx’s ‘fault’, any more than Napoleon I was the fault of Rousseau, Franco of Jesus, Hitler of Nietzsche, or Mussolini of Sorel (even though their thoughts were employed, sometimes in their original purity, to give cover to these totalitarian systems).

All this cuts across the positions of the ‘new’ philosophers, who, as far as I am aware, have found no better way of tackling the problem than to repeat with much less intelligence and subtlety the arguments of Karl Popper.⁵ Thus, the totalitarian universe is supposed to derive from the ‘closed’ theoretical systems, or even from the *statist* aspect, of the major thinkers who inspired them. In such a view of things, the distance between theory and the real explains what would otherwise remain a monumental paradox: namely, the fact that totalitarian systems have referred precisely to thinkers who, in the context of their age, were unquestionably much less *statist* than others – to Jesus, Rousseau, Nietzsche, Sorel, and finally Marx, whose constant and primary concern was with the withering away of the State.

To return to my previous point: disregard of this distance between theory and the real, or the wish at all costs to reduce the gap between theory and practice, involves putting no matter what into the mouth of Marxism. Therefore, we cannot ask Marxism (this time, the ‘true’ Marxism) to provide an infallible formula, purged of all deviations, with which to ensure a genuine transition to democratic socialism. For it is no more able to give this kind of answer than it has been to plot the course of events in the East.

This is not to say that Marxism does not have a decisive role to play in analysing the State in the countries of so-called ‘real socialism’ (the USSR, Eastern Europe, China), where a certain kind of transition to socialism has been attempted with the results that we know. (I say merely ‘a decisive role’, because Marxism alone cannot explain everything.) Clearly such an analysis cannot content itself with historical investigation of ‘the concrete conditions of these countries’ or with an examination of the political strategy that was followed, however essential these may be. But does this mean that we need a general Marxist theory of the State that is capable of elucidating the totalitarian aspects of power in these

⁵ Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, London 1946.

countries – a sort of equivalent of the simplistic generalizations advanced in a terroristic tone by the various Gulag experts on the other side? I do not think so, despite, or rather because of, the fact that the problem of totalitarianism is so frighteningly real. It can never be understood in its full complexity by means of totalizing generalizations. Let's put it bluntly: in order to clear the way for analysis of modern totalitarianism and of its various aspects in the East, we must deepen and elaborate not only the general theoretical propositions on the State, but also the theory of the capitalist State itself, as it is connected with the relations of production and the capitalist social division of labour. I shall tackle both these tasks in examining the roots of totalitarianism.

Of course, all we can do here is provide the initial points of reference. The present-day State in Eastern Europe and China is a specific and highly complex phenomenon, and it can by no means be reduced to, or treated as a simple variant of, the capitalist State that forms the principal theme of this book. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the hidden roots of certain totalitarian features of the East lie essentially, though not exclusively (since capitalism is not the source of all evil⁶), in what I shall intentionally term *capitalist aspects* of this State, and of the relations of production and social division of labour that underlie it. This term should be understood in a purely indicative sense. For I shall not enter into the problem of whether these represent capitalist survivals in a particular kind of authoritarian socialism, effects of a capitalist environment-encirclement on socialist countries, or rather the arrival of these countries at a new but very real form of state capitalism. This problem is sufficiently important to merit a separate investigation. But my own position will carry certain consequences: given that some of my analyses relate not only to the State in general, but also to the capitalist State as it is connected with the relations of production and social division of labour, they will also apply *mutatis mutandis* to the States in the East. The reader should constantly bear this in mind, and in any case I recall it at certain points in the text.

Lastly, I should point out that the theory of the capitalist State can attain a genuinely scientific status only if it manages to grasp the reproduction and historical mutations of its object at the very place where they occur – that is to say, in the various social formations that are the sites of the class struggle. Thus, it will be necessary to explain on this basis the forms of State that correspond to the diverse stages and phases of

capitalism (the liberal State, the interventionist State, and so on); the differentiation between these and exceptional forms of State (fascism, military dictatorship, Bonapartism); and the character of the regimes that exist in various concrete countries. *The theory of the capitalist State cannot be isolated from the history of its constitution and reproduction.*

There is no question here of relapsing into empiricism and positivism, of constructing the theoretical object of the capitalist State, after the manner of a model or ideal type, through induction or comparative collation of the specific traits of the various capitalist States. Quite simply, while we retain the distinction between *mode of production* (an abstract-formal object in its economic, ideological and political determinations) and concrete *social formations* (articulations of several modes of production at a given historical moment), we must not regard these social formations as merely heaped up concretizations of abstractly reproduced modes of production; nor, therefore, should a concrete State be considered as a simple realization of the-State-of-the-capitalist-mode-of-production. Social formations are the actual sites of the existence and reproduction of modes of production. They are thus also the sites of the various forms of State, none of which can simply be deduced from the capitalist type of State understood as denoting an abstract-formal object. To situate the capitalist State first and foremost with reference to the relations of production is not the same as to construct on that basis the theoretical object of that State; it does not give rise, that is, to an ideo-typical object susceptible of being particularized or concretized in various ways according to the course of the class struggle in given social formations. A theory of the capitalist State can be elaborated only if it is brought into relation with the history of political struggles under capitalism.

III

We should now sum up what has been said so far. Although the relations of production delimit the given field of the State, it has a role of its own in the formation of these same relations. The way in which the State is bound up with the relations of production constitutes its primary relation with social classes and the class struggle. As regards the capitalist State, its relative separation from the relations of production – which is produced by those relations themselves – is the basis of its organizational

⁶ I owe this expression to Jean Daniel.

framework and already maps out the mode of its relation to social classes and the class struggle.

In reality, the production process is grounded on the *unity* of the labour process and the relations of production (the latter themselves consisting in the dual relationship of economic property and possession). This unity is realized through the *primacy* of the relations of production over the labour process – over what are often referred to as ‘productive forces’ and understood to include technology and the technical process. The view of traditional economism, which leads directly on to technicism, is that the relations of production are ultimately nothing other than the crystallization, envelope or reflection of a technological process of the productive forces themselves; in this way, its conception of the relations between base and superstructure is carried right into the heart of the production process. For us, however, it is the primacy of the relations of production over the productive forces that gives to their articulation the form of a *process* of production and reproduction. The productive forces do indeed have a materiality of their own that can by no means be ignored; but they are always organized under given relations of production. Thus, while the two may enter into contradiction with each other and undergo forms of uneven development, they always do so within a process that stems from the primacy of the relations of production. It is not the passage from the windmill to the steam-mill that explains the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Marx himself stressed this in all his works, including the later ones, despite certain ambiguities which resulted from the influence of the Enlightenment philosophy of technical progress on his thought.

From this primacy flows the presence of political (and ideological) relations within the relations of production: the latter, like their constituent relation of possession and economic property, find expression in class *powers* that are organically articulated to the political and ideological relations which concretize and legitimize them. These relations neither represent simple additions to already existing relations of production, nor do they merely react upon them in the mode of absolute exteriority or temporal sequence. They are themselves present in the constitution of the relations of production, in ways that vary with each mode of production. We should therefore rid ourselves of the now widespread idea that political (and ideological) relations enter only into the reproduction of the relations of production, which for their part retain all the original purity of self-generation. It is precisely because politico-ideological relations are already present in the actual constitution of the relations of production that they play such an essential role in their

reproduction; that is also why the process of production and exploitation involves reproduction of the relations of politico-ideological domination and subordination. This elementary datum is at the root of the State’s presence in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production, as the factor which concentrates, condenses, materializes and incarnates politico-ideological relations in a form specific to the given mode of production.

It is on the basis of this same datum that the State is first inserted in the constitution and reproduction of social classes – in short, in the class struggle. Insofar as they are bound up with the relations of politico-ideological domination and subordination, the relations of production delineate objective positions (social classes) which are themselves *only distinctions in the social division of labour as a whole* (relations of production – which play the dominant role – political relations, ideological relations). This consequence of the primacy of the relations of production over the productive forces also has implications for the position of social classes within the relations of production. It is *the social division of labour*, such as it expresses itself in the presence of the political and ideological relations within the production process, which has primacy over the technical division of labour. This is not to say that the technical division is reducible to the social, but that it never exists and is never reproduced except as incorporated in the latter.

Thus, even at the level of the relations of production, these class positions finding expression in powers consist in class practices and struggles. Just as the relations of production and the social division of labour do not constitute an economic structure outside (before) social classes, *so they do not belong to a field external to power and class struggle*. There are no social classes prior to their opposition in struggle: they are not posed ‘in themselves’ in the relations of production only to enter into struggle (become classes ‘for themselves’) afterwards and elsewhere. To situate the State with reference to the relations of production is to chart the original contours of its presence in the class struggle.

2

The Ideological Apparatuses: Does the State equal Repression plus Ideology?

The State's role in the constitution of the relations of production and in the delimitation-reproduction of social classes derives from the fact that it does not confine itself to the exercise of organized physical repression. The State plays an equally specific role in organizing ideological relations and the dominant ideology. Nor, as we shall see in a moment, is the State's highly active role restricted to the couplet repression + ideology.

Ideology does not consist merely in a system of ideas or representations: it also involves a series of *material practices*, embracing the customs and life-style of the agents and setting like cement in the totality of social (including political and economic) practices. Ideological relations are themselves essential to the constitution of the relations of possession and economic property, and to the social division of labour at the heart of the relations of production. The State cannot enshrine and reproduce political domination exclusively through repression, force or 'naked' violence, but directly calls upon ideology to legitimize violence and contribute to a consensus of those classes and fractions which are dominated from the point of view of political power. Ideology is always class ideology, never socially neutral. In particular, the ruling ideology constitutes an essential power of the ruling class.

The dominant ideology, then, is embodied in the state apparatuses. One of their functions is to elaborate, inculcate and reproduce that ideology – a function of considerable importance in the constitution and reproduction of social classes, class domination, and the social division of labour. This is true *par excellence* of those which have been termed *ideological state apparatuses*, whether they formally belong to the State or whether they retain a 'private' juridical character (e.g., the Church or religious apparatus, the educational apparatus, the official information network of radio and television, the cultural apparatus). Of course, the

dominant ideology also enters into the organization of other apparatuses (army, police, judicial system, prisons, state administration) whose principal responsibility is the exercise of legitimate physical violence.

However, the distinction between repressive and ideological apparatuses has quite clear limits. Before coming to these, I should mention the repressive role of the State, which is so self-evident that it is hardly ever discussed. Only too often does emphasis on the State's role in ideological relations lead to underestimation of its repressive functions.⁷

By repression should be understood first and foremost organized physical violence in the most material sense of the term: *violence to the body*. One essential condition of the establishment and maintenance of power is the coercion of bodies and the threat of violence or death. To be sure, the body is not simply a biological entity, but a political institution: the relations of the State to the body are thus considerably more complex and extensive than those of repression. Nevertheless, the State is always rooted in its physical constraint, manipulation and consumption of bodies. In every State, this takes place in two ways: through institutions which actualize bodily constraint and the permanent threat of mutilation (prison, army, police, and so on); and through a *bodily order* which both institutes and manages bodies by bending and moulding them into shape and inserting them in the various institutions and apparatuses. As a material reality, the State is synonymous with a kind of stunting regimentation and consumption of persons' bodies – in other words, with its incarnation in the very flesh of the subjects-objects of state violence. Since all bodies are political, we cannot speak here of bodily mortification by the State: for that would point to the image of an original body, which, while naturally free, is later politically distorted. But within the bodily order, it is still necessary to have personnel who train and discipline bodies with suitable physical devices. We shall see the peculiar features of the capitalist State when we go more deeply into the question of repression under the heading of law.

However, the very distinction between repressive and ideological apparatuses cannot be sustained except at a purely descriptive and indicative level. The underlying Gramscian conception may have the merit that it both extends the space of the State to the ideological institutions and emphasises the State's presence within the relations of production through its role in ideological relations. (But the fact remains

⁷ A point well made by Perry Anderson in 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', *New Left Review*, No. 100, November 1976–January 1977.

that it operates in a restrictive manner.) As I pointed out at the time, the conception as systematized by Althusser⁸ rests on the idea of a State that acts and functions through repression and ideological inculcation, and *nothing else*. It assumes that the State's efficacy somehow lies in what it forbids, rules out, and prevents; or in its capacity to deceive, lie, obscure, hide, and lead people to believe what is false. The restrictive character of its analysis of the State's role is in no way changed by locating this ideological function in material practices. For according to this conception, the economic is an instance capable of self-reproduction and self-regulation, in which the State serves merely to lay down the *negative rules* of the economic 'game'. Political power can only frame the economy: it cannot enter into it through its own positivity, since its reason for existence is to prevent, through repression and ideology, any unsettling encroachment in the economy. Of course, this old legalist image comes from the juridical-political philosophy of the early bourgeois State, and it has never corresponded to the reality of the latter.

With such a conception we clearly cannot understand the first thing about the State's peculiar role in the constitution of the relations of production: neither with respect to the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the so-called liberal stage of capitalism; nor *a fortiori* in the case of the present-day State, which intervenes at the very heart of the reproduction of capital. In short, the State also acts in a positive fashion, *creating, transforming and making* reality. It goes without saying that repression and ideological inculcation are present in the materiality of the State's current functions. But unless we are to play with words, it is hardly possible to grasp the State's economic activities by referring exclusively to this dual modality.

Moreover, to chart in this way the hold of power over the oppressed and downtrodden masses inevitably leads to an idealist, police conception of power, according to which the State dominates the masses either through police terror or internalized repression, (it matters little which), or else through trickery and illusion. Such a conclusion is here inescapable, because, even though care is taken not to identify ideology and 'false consciousness', the very term ideology can remain meaningful only if ideological procedures/operations are held to comprise a structure of concealment-inversion. But it is quite simply wrong to believe that the State only acts in this manner: the relation of the masses to power and

⁸ See Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in *Lenin and Philosophy*, N.I.B. 1971.

the State – in what is termed among other things a *consensus* – *always possesses a material substratum*. I say 'among other things', since in working for class hegemony, the State acts within an unstable equilibrium of compromises between the dominant classes and the dominated. The State therefore continually adopts material measures which are of positive significance for the popular masses, even though these measures represent so many concessions imposed by the struggle of the subordinate classes. This essential material aspect cannot be explained if the relationship between State and popular masses is reduced to the couplet repression-ideology. By the way, such a reduction also underlies (with the stress laid on consent) a whole series of current conceptions of power, especially those expressed in discussing the phenomenon of fascism.⁹ Thus, the masses are supposed to have 'wanted' repression or to have been cheated by fascist ideology. However, to analyse the State solely with the categories of repression-prohibition and ideology-concealment obviously leads one to *subjectivize* the reasons for consent (why people say yes to the prohibition) and to locate them either in ideology-trickery ('fascism deluded the masses') or in the wish for repression and love of the Master. In reality, even fascism was obliged to undertake a series of positive measures, such as absorption of unemployment, protection and sometimes improvement of the real purchasing power of certain sections of the popular masses, and the introduction of so-called social legislation. (Of course, this did not exclude increased exploitation through a rise in relative surplus-value – quite the contrary.) The invariable presence of ideological allurements does not therefore change the fact that the State also acted by producing a material substratum for mass consensus – a substratum which, while not the same as its ideological presentation in state discourse, was not simply reducible to propaganda.

These are doubtless not the only examples of genuinely positive action by the State. But for the moment, they should be enough to show that its field of activity goes far beyond repression and ideology.

Representation of the State by means of the couplet repression-ideology is dogged by a further misconception: that is to say, reproduction of the dominant ideology is confounded with straightforward concealment or dissimulation of the State's designs and objectives; the State is thus supposed to produce a uniformly mystifying discourse and never to take a step unless it is masked and shrouded in secrecy.

⁹ Such conceptions may be found in some contributions to the collective work, *Éléments pour une analyse du fascisme*, ed. M. A. Macciocchi, Paris 1976.

Such a description is false in several respects. One of the State's functions that goes beyond the mechanism of concealment-inversion peculiar to ideology concerns its strictly *organizational* role vis-à-vis the dominant class, including that of *formulating and openly expressing the tactics required to reproduce its power*. The State does not produce a unified discourse, but several discourses that are adapted to the various classes and differentially incarnated in its apparatuses according to their class destination. Or, to put it in another way, it produces a discourse that is broken into segments and fragments according to lines intersecting the strategy of power. The discourse or segments of discourse addressed to the dominant class and its various fractions (sometimes also to supporting classes) are quite explicitly discourses of organization. If the State and the tactics it embodies are never entirely concealed, this is not because corridor-talk finally becomes known regardless of the State's will, but because at a certain level tactical elaboration is an integral part of the State's provisions to organize the dominant classes: it appears on the state arena by virtue of its role in *representing* these classes (as was shown very clearly by de Gaulle's famous, and not in the least 'ideological' speech in May '68 . . .). There is an apparent contradiction here: virtually everything that the bourgeoisie and its power have carried out has been publicly stated and listed in one state discourse or another, even if it has not always been understood. Hitler, for example, never concealed his intention to exterminate the Jews. Not only does the State proclaim the truth of its power at a certain 'real' level; it also adopts the necessary means to elaborate and formulate political tactics. It produces knowledge and techniques of knowledge which go far beyond ideology, while naturally remaining imbricated in it. Thus, 'bourgeois' statistics and the state statistical bodies cannot be treated as mere mystification, but constitute elements of state knowledge to be used for the purposes of political strategy.

Of course, not anyone can talk the language of the State, and nor can it come from just anywhere. There is indeed a secrecy of power and bureaucracy – a secrecy, however, which is not the same as a one-way role of silence. It rather has the precise function of creating recognized networks within the State that will favour pronouncements from certain of its sites. With regard to the dominant class, bureaucratic silence often serves as the organizer of speech. If the State does not always express its strategy in discourse addressed to the dominant class, this is most frequently not because it is afraid of revealing its aims to the dominated, but because this strategy is only the outcome of the clash between various

tactics expressing themselves within the State and the circuits, networks and apparatuses that incarnate them. Since the strategy is therefore often not known in advance within (and by) the State itself, it is not always susceptible to rational formulation.

The index measuring the ideological composition of state discourse (as well as of its material practices) will thus fluctuate and change according to the class or class-fraction to which the State addresses itself and upon which it acts. The truth of power often escapes the popular masses. But the State does not intentionally conceal it from everyone: rather, for infinitely more complex reasons, the masses do not manage to hear the state discourse directed to the dominant classes.

Finally, a conception of state activity exclusively based on the couplet repression-ideology has the following consequences with regard to the state apparatuses:

(a) The exercise of power is split between two groups: the repressive and the ideological state apparatuses. This apportionment diminishes the specificity of the *economic state apparatus* by dissolving it into the various repressive and ideological apparatuses; it thus prevents us from locating the state network in which the power of the hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie is essentially concentrated; and it obscures the character of the modalities required to transform this economic apparatus in the transition to socialism – as distinct from those required to transform the repressive and ideological apparatuses.

(b) Certain apparatuses are distinguished in an almost nominalist or essentialist manner according to whether they are repressive (act mainly through repression) or ideological (act mainly through ideology). But this distinction is itself highly debatable. Depending on the form of State and regime and on the phase of reproduction of capitalism, a number of apparatuses can slide from one sphere to the other and assume new functions either as additions to, or in exchange for, old ones. To take a typical example, the army becomes in certain forms of military dictatorship an ideological-organizational apparatus functioning above all as a political party of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, we need hardly mention the persistently ideological role of a whole series of repressive apparatuses (the courts, prison, the police) – a role so pronounced that classification based on the extremely vague criterion 'mainly' (mainly repressive or mainly ideological) seems to fade away.

In summary, then, the space of the State may be divided between repressive and ideological apparatuses only at a purely descriptive level

and with several important reservations. Such a demarcation does have the merit of extending the state sphere to include certain apparatuses of hegemony that are often considered 'private', and of laying stress on the State's ideological activity. It nevertheless entails a conception of the State and of its activity that remains restrictive.

State, Powers and Struggles

As we have seen, the State plays a decisive role in the relations of production and the class struggle, entering into their constitution and, hence, their reproduction.

Now, one characteristic of Marxism's theoretical history (especially within the Third International) was its neglect of the specificity and altogether essential role of the State's political space – a neglect that was expressed in the view of the superstructure as a mere appendage of the base. Current criticisms of Marxism, however, refer to its supposed 'statism'. As long as Marxism neglected the State, it was guilty of economism; and when it speaks of the State, it can only have fallen into statism. Such criticisms are directed not merely at Stalinist political practice and the socio-political reality of the regimes in the East, but at Marxist theory itself. But although the State plays the essential role I have described, power is not, for Marxism, identifiable with or reducible to the State.

Taking into account the primacy (within the production process) of the relations of production over the productive forces, we are led to the conclusion that the relations of production and their components – possession and economic property – find expression in powers emanating from the sites that those relations delineate. As it turns out, these are class powers which all come down to the fundamental relations of exploitation: economic property denotes, among other things, the capacity (or power) to allocate the means of production for given ends, and to dispose of the products thereby obtained; while possession refers to the capacity (or power) to bring the means of production into play and master the labour process. These powers are themselves located in a network of relations between exploiters and exploited involving those clashes between different class practices that make up the class struggle:

in short, they are inserted in a system of inter-class *relations*. It is precisely by considering the economic process and the relations of production as a power network that we can grasp the fact that these relations of production are bound up, as constitutive powers, with the political and ideological relations which consecrate and legitimize them and which are present in these economic relations.

The following points are clear, then:

1. It is not true, as Foucault or Deleuze would have it, that relations of power are, for Marxism, 'in a position of exteriority vis-à-vis other types of relation: namely, economic processes . . .'¹⁰ The economic process *is* class struggle, *is* therefore relations of power – and not just economic power. (It is understood that these powers are specific through being attached to exploitation – a phenomenon rarely mentioned by Foucault and Deleuze.) In the case of classes, power comes down to objective positions rooted in the division of labour: it designates the capacity of each class to realize its specific interests in a relation of opposition to that capacity in other classes. It is therefore impossible for power to escape economic relations. Rooted in the production of surplus-value and in their relation to the politico-ideological powers, these power relations are furthermore concretized in specific institutions-apparatuses: the companies, factories or production units that are the site of the extraction of surplus-value and of the exercise of these powers.

2. Power is not at all reduced to, or identified with, the State – contrary to the assertions of Foucault and Deleuze that, for Marxism, 'power is state power: it is itself localized in a state apparatus [or] . . . identified with the State.'¹¹ No, as with the social division of labour and the class struggle, relations of power *go far beyond the State*.

They go beyond it even if we abandon the narrow, juridical definition of the State that surprisingly remains present in Foucault or Deleuze. All the apparatuses of hegemony, including those that are legally private (ideological and cultural apparatuses, the Church, etc.), all these form part of the State; whereas, for Foucault and Deleuze, the State is always limited to the public kernel of army, police, prisons, courts, and so on. This allows them to say that power also exists outside the State as they conceive it. But in fact, a number of sites of power which they imagine

to lie wholly outside the State (the apparatus of asylums and hospitals, the sports apparatus, etc.) are all the more sites of power in that they are included in the strategic field of the State.

I said *are all the more* and not *are constituted as*, because power goes far beyond the State, even broadly understood. This is true in a number of senses.

First of all, powers relating to the social classes and the class struggle are not reducible to the State. This is the case especially of powers in the relations of production, despite their intersection at several points with political power and despite the fact that they do not stand in an external relationship to the State. Now, it is true that the present-day capitalist State, which must at any event be broadly conceived, concentrates the various forms of power to an ever-increasing extent. Intervening more and more in every sphere of social reality, dissolving thereby the traditionally 'private' texture, the State spreads out into the tiniest vein and – what here concerns us most – tends to circumscribe power sectors and every class power. We can observe this in a phenomenon stemming from the current form of the separation of intellectual and manual labour – namely, the close relationship between the State and a form of knowledge that has been directly established as state discourse and hence become a technique of politics. We can see it too in the state penetration of the spheres of so-called collective consumption (transport, housing, health, national assistance, leisure) – areas in which the ideological-symbolic powers materialized in such constructions as municipal flats or cultural centres directly expand state relations. In each of these rather different examples, the relations between class powers and the State are becoming closer and closer. All the same, class powers – and not just economic ones – still stretch beyond the State. For instance, even if we take into account its ideological apparatuses, the State's discourse does not exhaust all political discourse; and yet it includes a class power in its structure. Similarly, ideological power is never exhausted by the State and its ideological apparatuses. For just as they do not create the dominant ideology, they are not the only, or even the primary, factors in the reproduction of the relations of ideological domination/subordination. The ideological apparatuses simply elaborate and inculcate the dominant ideology: as Max Weber already pointed out, it is not the Church that creates and perpetuates religion, but religion that creates and perpetuates the Church. In short, ideological relations always have roots which go beyond the state apparatuses and which always consist in relations of power.

¹⁰ Deleuze in his article on Foucault, 'Ecrivain non: un nouveau cartographe', *Critique*, Paris, December 1975. See also Michel Foucault, *La volonté de savoir*, Paris 1977.

¹¹ Foucault, *ibid.*, 1977, p. 123.

At this point, we should recall a further proposition. If class powers are not reducible to the State and always outmeasure its apparatuses, this is because, being rooted in the social division of labour and in exploitation, these powers have primacy over the apparatuses that embody them, most notably the State. This is but another form of the proposition according to which, in the complex relation between class struggle and the various apparatuses, *struggles play the primary and fundamental role*: even at the level of exploitation and the relations of production, these economic, political and ideological struggles occupy the very field of the relations of power.

But does this mean that the State has only a secondary and insignificant role in the material existence of power? Must we, in order to escape the imagery of a totalizing State, fall back into the illusion that the State is a mere appendage of the social? By no means. The State plays a constitutive role in the existence and reproduction of class powers, and more generally in the class struggle itself – a fact which refers us back to its presence in the relations of production. Now, this constitutive role should be understood in the strong sense of the term: it implies that we also distinguish ourselves from an entire contemporary current which, by insisting on the primacy of ‘the social’ (in the extremely vague sense in which ‘society’ is supposed to be a principle ‘instituting’ the State), arrives precisely at the image of the State as an appendage of the social. In its most recent form, this current is known above all in France through the analyses made over the last twenty years by the authors of the fifties review *Socialisme ou Barbarie* (Lefort, Castoriadis, et al.). By the charge of statism which they direct at Marxism, they exhibit the same errors as those of instrumentalist Marxism itself:¹² that is to say, they exhibit a conception of the State as a mere appendage of struggles and power. The importance of this current lies not so much in its actual analyses as in the way in which they are coupled with the libertarian tradition of the French workers’ movement – most notably in the CFDT and the *Assises du socialisme* tendency in the Socialist Party.¹³ This link-up with the self-management current is to a great extent the result of a misunderstanding: for what is involved is an attempt to ground a self-management policy, whose stress on the need for direct, rank-and-file democracy is largely justified, on a theory that neglects the real role of the State. At best, the wish is taken for reality,

¹² See Claude Lefort, ‘Maintenant’, in *Libre*, No. 1, 1977; C. Castoriadis, *L’institution imaginaire de la société*, Paris 1975. This current comes very close to the ‘anti-institutionalist’ tendency of G. Lapassade and R. Loureau.

¹³ I am referring especially to the journal *Faire*.

and an anti-State policy is deduced from a vision according to which the State is more or less disappearing as a phenomenon with a distinct role. In reality, however, it is the terrifyingly palpable role of the State which necessitates a transition to socialism largely based on direct, rank-and-file democracy; and that requires exact knowledge of the State and of its current role. The need for such knowledge is all the greater in that a certain tradition of Jacobin-statist socialism also starts out from a conception of the State as a mere appendage of the social and of social classes – only, for that tradition, unlimited strengthening of the State cannot have damaging consequences provided that it is a workers’ State functioning as an appendage of the working class.

Now, in order to circumscribe exactly the State’s constitutive role in the relations of production and the class struggle, and hence in the relations of power, we must once and for all distinguish this question, in its theoretical context, from the question of chronological origin and genesis (which came first, the chicken or the egg, the State or class struggle and the relations of production?); we must break from the positivist-empiricist, and indeed historicist, current which also exists within Marxism. *In the order of theoretical explanation*, it makes no sense whatever to speak of a social field of class division of labour and class power existing *prior* to the State; to speak, that is, of a chronologically and genealogically primordial layer which *subsequently* engenders a State intervening *post festum*. Wherever there is class division and thus class struggle and power, the State already exists as institutionalized political Power. Thus, there is no ‘state of nature’ or ‘state of society’ prior to the State, such as is imagined by a whole tradition that bears the clear impression of the Enlightenment political philosophy of the social contract. Right from the beginning, the State marks out the field of struggles, including that of the relations of production: it organizes the market and property relations; it institutes political domination and establishes the politically dominant class; and it stamps and codifies all forms of the social division of labour – all social reality – within the framework of a class-divided society.

It is in this precise sense that we cannot imagine any social phenomenon (any knowledge, power, language or writing) as posed in a state prior to the State: for all social reality must stand in relation to the State and to class divisions. This is not to say that no social reality has ever existed in the absence of, or chronologically prior to, the State and class division, but that within the frame of reference of a class-divided society with a State, such a reality cannot be imagined if abstraction is made of the State. Even if we admit that there actually was a social reality before the

emergence of the State, once the latter is posited, every social reality must be conceived as maintaining constitutive relations with it.

Thus, if (a particular) history is (the) history of class struggle, and if 'primitive' societies without a State are societies without such history, this is also because the latter does not exist without a State. There can be no history of struggles in which the State appears at a certain moment as the result and the fruit: such history is inconceivable without the State. It is not at all that the emergence of the State ushered in an irrecoverable time (History) in which there will be a State as long as there are Men. But, as Marx said, the end of class division spells the end of the State, and thus the end not of all Time but of that time or history which he called the prehistory of mankind.

Class division and class struggle cannot therefore be conceived as the *origin* of the State, in the sense of a genetic principle. But does this cast doubt on the basic proposition that the State is *grounded* on social struggles? Does it, in other words, question the determining role of the relations of production, and more generally the primacy of struggle and power relations over the State? In short, is it statism to pose the question of the State in this way?

I pose the question in this light in order to disentangle the skein of present-day analyses. For while these resemble one another in challenging the thesis that the State and power are grounded on the class struggle, they also exhibit a number of important differences. Thus, I shall reserve until later consideration of the relevant aspects of Foucault's problematic – one which essentially consists in referring the relationship between State and relations of production, between economic powers and political powers, to a 'diagram' of Power common to the various powers existing at a given point in time. At least this conception does not venture into a general theory of power since the dawn of time, and at least it does not see in the State the foundation of all social reality.

In fact, this is precisely what is done by the whole current of 'new philosophy', whose hollow and pretentious metaphysics of Power and the State – from Lévy to Glucksmann – merges with an old institutionalist tradition: namely, that which regards the State as the founding and instituting principle of every social relation, the *a priori* form of every conceivable social reality. Theirs is a truly primordial State of which social struggles are only the mirror-image and through which they come into existence. It is not Marxism but this conception itself which reduces all power to the State, seeing in it the consequence of that original reality, the Power-State. Here everything is always a replica of the

Master, the State and the Law (the debt to Lacan's version of psychoanalysis is evident); for there can be no struggles and no social reality of any kind – be it power, language, knowledge, speech, writing or desire – except *through* the Power-State. It is a *radical* evil which no struggle can extirpate, struggle itself being the mere double of the Prince – that is to say, of a phenomenon constituted in the original web of a Power-State whose eternal character rests on a metaphysical universality and necessity. This Power-State is therefore the foundation-origin of everything: the foundation because the origin, and vice versa. State totalitarianism is both primeval and eternal since the State is the subject of all possible History: instead of Kant, it is with Hegel that we find ourselves once again.

The State, then, is everything – to which the other current I mentioned answers with the symmetrically opposite conception that the social is everything and the State just its instituted appendage. The weights of the terms State and society are thereby changed, but the problematic remains one of a mechanical and linear causality grounded on a simplistic monist principle and superimposed on a first metaphysics.

At this point we should recall certain analyses that a number of us have been making for a long time. The determining role of the relations of production, or the primacy of class struggle over the State and its apparatuses, cannot be grasped according to a mechanical causality – one, moreover, which shifts over into a linear, chronological causality that we called *historicism*. But this determination and primacy do not necessarily refer to an existence historically prior to that of the State: whether such was the case or not is, if I may say so, another matter. This is true above all of the relationship between the State and the relations of production within a given mode of production, and of the transition from one mode of production to another. Marx already established this with perfect clarity when he distinguished between 'presupposition' or logical priority and historical-chronological precedence as two modes in which given relations of production may come before a particular State. In fact, determination of the State by the relations of production, or the primacy of struggles over the State, is inscribed in diverse temporalities and in historical forms marked by uneven development. Thus, in the order of historical genesis, a form of State may precede the relations of production to which it corresponds. Examples of this abound in Marx's work, and I have myself shown that the Absolutist State in Europe was predominantly capitalist while the relations of production still bore a feudal stamp.

Such examples tell us much of the relationship between a given

State and the prevailing relations of production and class struggles. But they have a more general bearing, since they relate to the origins of the State. As we have seen, the question of the historical origins of the State – the historico-genetic order of succession of, on the one hand, the State and, on the other, the relations of production and class powers – is not theoretically homogeneous with the question of the State's foundation in the relations of production, class struggles, and the relations of power.

However, a number of misconceptions are due to Engels himself. A tributary in this respect of the historicist notion of linear causality, Engels essentially tried to provide a foundation for the primacy of class struggle and division over the State by superimposing this question on that of the genesis of the State. In this way, he gave in to the myth of origins. One aim of *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* is to demonstrate that class division in the relations of production first appeared in the so-called primitive societies, only later giving birth to the State. But even granting the correctness of Engels's historical investigation, this does not, as he imagined, constitute a proof that the State is determined by, and grounded on, the relations of production; or rather, it would be a proof only if Marxism were a fully-integrated historicism.

Now, it is equally clear that a reverse historical sequence would furnish no proof of the opposite thesis – again unless we ourselves share the historicist problematic. I am especially thinking here of the work of Pierre Clastres, who argues that the passage from societies without a State to those with a State unfolded through the emergence of political power before class division in the relations of production; and who draws the conclusion (after many others) that the State played a fundamental and determining role with regard to such division. This argument is supposed to provide an overwhelming criticism of Marxism: 'So it is clearly the political break which is decisive, and not economic changes . . . And if one wishes to retain the Marxist concepts of infrastructure and superstructure, perhaps it should be admitted that the political is the infrastructure, while the economic is the superstructure . . .' And further: 'The political relation of power precedes and grounds the economic relation of exploitation. Before being economic, alienation is political: power comes before labour; the economic is a derivation from the political; and the emergence of the State determines the appearance of classes.'¹⁴ A striking example, if ever there was one, of historical reasoning according to linear causality! Moreover, in this case, it forms part of exactly the same

problematic as that of Engels. Supposing that Clastres's analyses are historically accurate – and I will take care not to make an assessment of my own – they are not at all in contradiction with Marxism, since the State's 'foundation' in the relations of production and in class division does not imply that these are necessarily the 'origin' of the State. Such analyses do not therefore call into question the determining role of the relations of production and the primacy of struggles over the State: they would constitute a refutation only for the positivist-empiricist, and even historicist, problematic which confuses *origin* and *foundation*. To take just one more example, Lévy falls into this problematic when he invokes Clastres's analyses in support of the thesis that the State is the eternal foundation, because the origin, of everything.¹⁵

Not only do class struggles have primacy over, and stretch far beyond, the State, but the relations of power also outmeasure the State in another sense: *relations of power do not exhaust class relations* and may go a certain way beyond them. Of course, they will still have class pertinency, continuing to be located, and to have a stake, in the terrain of political domination. But they do not rest on the same foundation as the social class division of labour, and are neither a mere consequence nor homologues or isomorphs of that division; this is so most notably in the case of relations between men and women. We now know that class division is not the exclusive terrain of the constitution of power, even though in class societies all power bears a class significance. The consequence is well known: radical transformation of the state apparatus in the transition to socialism is not enough for the totality of power relations to be abolished or transformed.

Now, although these power relations stretch beyond class relations, the State cannot keep aloof from them any more than they can be materialized and reproduced without specific apparatuses and institutions (the couple, the family). Through its activity and effects, the State intervenes in all the relations of power in order to assign them a class pertinency and enmesh them in the web of class powers. The State thereby takes over heterogeneous powers which relay and recharge the economic, political and ideological powers of the dominant class. The power exhibited in sexual relations between men and women, which is certainly dissimilar to that of class relations, is nevertheless invested in the latter and is mediated and reproduced as a class relation by the State and the company or factory: class power therefore traverses,

¹⁴ P. Clastres, *Les sociétés contre l'Etat*, Paris 1974, pp. 169, 172ff.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 74ff.

utilizes and gears down that other power, assigning to it a given political significance. The State is a class State not only insofar as it concentrates power based on class relations, but also in the sense in which it *tends* to spread through every power by appropriating its specific mechanisms (even though that power is never co-extensive with the State).

However important these points of clarification may be, it is still true that Marxism advances the following propositions:

- (a) Class power is the cornerstone of power in class-divided social formations, whose motive force is the class struggle;
- (b) Although grounded on economic power and the relations of production, political power is primordial in that changes in its character condition every essential transformation in the other fields of power (even if they are not themselves a sufficient condition);
- (c) In the capitalist mode of production, political power occupies a field and a place that are distinct from the other fields of power, however much they may intersect one another;
- (d) This power is pre-eminently concentrated and materialized by the State, which is thus the central site of the exercise of power.

Foucault and Deleuze, in particular, reject this set of propositions in favour of a vision which dilutes and scatters power among innumerable microsituations; they thereby seriously underestimate the importance of classes and the class struggle and ignore the central role of the State. I intend to say no more about them for the moment. But they here meet up with an old tradition of Anglo-Saxon sociology and political science, running from functionalism to institutionalism, from Parsons to Merton, Dahl, Lasswell and Etzioni – a tradition in which the centre of analysis is shifted from the State towards the ‘pluralism of micropowers’. Despite the fact that they explicitly developed all the characteristic points of the above vision, these writers remain relatively unknown in France, where political thought has always focussed on the (juridical) State. Indeed, it is this very unfamiliarity, linked with the well-known provincialism of the French intellectual arena, which allows these most hackneyed of ideas to be presented as something new. Foucault’s indisputable merits are therefore to be found in another region. What is truly remarkable is the fact that such discourse, which tends to blot out power by dispersing it among tiny molecular vessels, is enjoying great success at a time when the expansion and weight of the State are assuming proportions never seen before.

To sum up, all power (and not just class power) can exist only insofar

as it is materialized in certain apparatuses (and not just state apparatuses). These apparatuses are no mere appendages of power, but play a role in its constitution: the State itself is organically present in the generation of class powers. But in the relationship between power and apparatuses, and more especially between class struggle and apparatuses, the fundamental role is played by the (class) struggle, whose field is none other than that of the relations of power, economic exploitation, and political-ideological domination and subordination. Struggles always have primacy over, and constantly go beyond, the apparatuses or institutions.

Thus, contrary to seemingly libertarian, or indeed other, conceptions that feed off illusions, the State plays a constitutive role not only in the relations of production and the powers which they realize, but also in the totality of power relations at every level of society. Contrary to all statist conceptions, however – ranging from the burningly topical ones back to Max Weber and his vision of apparatuses/institutions as the original site and primary field of the constitution of power relations – it is struggles which make up the primary field of power relations and which invariably have primacy over the State. This is true not simply of economic struggles, but of the totality of struggles, political and ideological included. To be sure, the relations of production still play the determining role. But the primacy of struggles over the State goes beyond the sphere of the relations of production, since there can here be no question of an economic structure that founds struggles in its turn: quite simply, these relations of production are already relations of struggle and power. Now, this determining role is the essential and most general factor in *the very existence of struggles* and in the primacy of the totality of struggles over the State. To reject this as the foundation of struggle is to reject not only the determining role of the economic but the primacy of any kind of struggle over the State. Although it may seem that the tyranny of the economic would thereby be discarded, one is inevitably left with the devouring omnipotence of the Power-State.

Thus, of the false objections made against Marx’s thought, surely none is more ignorant and blind than the charge of statism – even when it springs from anti-statist political intentions of a perfect legitimacy, and even if it is based on the undeniably totalitarian aspects of the State in the countries of so-called real socialism. Nowhere else is this criticism of Marx presented with such bad faith as among the ‘new’ philosophers, most notably Glucksmann. Rather than deal with them myself, I shall hand over to Rancière – a writer who is, in other respects, far from gentle with Marx’s thought: ‘Glucksmann’s arguments are more radical when

he has to prove, against all evidence, that Marx lays stress on the State as the opposite of private society. In fact, it is the impossibility of providing the slightest proof that provides him with the ultimate proof. *Although a Chapter on the State had been envisaged, writes Glucksmann, it is, as if by chance, missing from Capital.* Well-known Stalinist logic: the best proof of people's guilt is the lack of all proof. For if there is no proof, it must be because they have hidden it; and if they have hidden it, then they must be guilty.¹⁶

Part One

¹⁶ See the article by Jacques Rancière in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 25–31 July 1977.

social wage are more useful to identify state activity as basically supporting either the ruling or the working class. All aspects of state policy—how it's financed, how it's organized, how it's distributed—can be summed up in such concepts so that the net reproductivity of a specific state activity can be assessed.

The concepts of social wage and social profit are potentially measurable, just as Marx's profit and wage are. They offer a common statement of the aggregate result of state activity. We define them as follows. Social profit is that amount of net surplus value that is extracted from workers via the complex structures of capitalism as a result of state policy or expenditure. Note that this frees us from the O'Connor emphasis on taxes and expenditures as the bulk of the state sector—a nonbudgetary regulation can be equally as “reproductive.” Social wage is the amount of net additions to the retained value of labor time that workers can wrest from capitalist property owners through conflict in the state arena. Any state activity can be scrutinized for its net impact on capital and labor by adding up the total effects of changes in prices, in real wages, in taxes, in real services received and finally in changes in productivity that result.

The notions of social wage and social profit could be used to describe aspects of any state production activity or policy. The distinctions of social wage and social profit would summarize the net outcome of struggles in the public sector. Thus a struggle over health care would balance the incidence of costs for it (including waste) with the receipt of service in either the public or the private sector. A better informed position for the working class might result from this process. Workers could then compare health care in the two sectors. In the private sector, health care of a certain quality (including prevention) now costs them so much of their labor time, as mediated through the wage system. Publicly provided health care of a comparable or better quality would cost them more or less of their labor time, depending on how public health is organized and mediated through the tax structure. This approach seems considerably more accurate and sophisticated than demanding “commodified” health care.

C. Reproductive and Unreproductive Politics

This distinction is fundamentally different from the previous two in that it does not consist of a distinction between two abstract, mutually exclusive categories but resembles a true dialectic where the precise dividing line is not important but where the distinction illuminates the struggle between capital and labor. As the authors state, “this final dimension of political demands is perhaps the least tangible yet the most important” (199). It is intangible precisely because it is not a logical duality, but a dimension where conflict

over a particular feature takes place. Thus it can capture the essence of class struggle.¹

It is a strong beginning for the analysis of class conflict within the state since a particular demand (e.g. national health service) can be viewed as politically both reproductive and unreproductive, depending on the outcome of the struggle over it. A clear political mission, then, for labor is to push for state sector policies and production that are unreproductive in their nature. The distinction is nonetheless not fully conceptualized in the article.

We have not yet worked out the analytic dimensions of the social wage-social profit schema and are unable to pursue them here. We would like to encourage Esping-Andersen, Friedland and Wright, whose article has pioneered the integration of class struggle into the analysis of the state, to join us in the construction of a theory that is analytically similar to, and as potent as, Marx's theory of the capitalist sphere of production. We are interested in pursuing the social profit-social wage dimension as an initial step. In doing so, we want to emphasize that the qualitative aspects of state ideological reproduction are equally in need of investigation. Furthermore, the existence of the state as a distinct institution with human actors who may have separate material interests and motivations cannot be ignored. The examination of the interests of state managers and workers, the formation of their consciousness, and their ability to manipulate state structure and class struggle to their own ends is the third major inquiry that our current reality presses upon us.

Footnote

1. The following chart portrays the difference between the first two categories and the third, illustrating the methodological advantages of the latter.

<i>Distinction</i>	<i>Statement</i>	<i>Pictogram*</i>	
Production/ Circulation	a state action, 'M' is either 'P' or 'C'	Production	Circulation
Commodity/ Noncommodity	a state action, 'M', is either 'C' or 'Nc'	Commodity	Noncommodity
Reproductive/ Nonreproductive	a state action, 'M', is the object of struggle between capital and labor over the social profit or social wage rate	Social Wage ↔ Social Profit	

*Boxes represent categorical slots that are supposed to be mutually exclusive but are not antagonistic or the necessary object of class struggle. In none of the cases is the boundary between the two complete, but only in the third is it the object of class struggle and dependent on the dynamics of that struggle.



Section One

The Shifting Qualities of the State

IS THE STATE OVERWHELMING?

The state is never neutral. Along with its beneficiaries, it leans to one side. Especially is this true when the businessman's (or "capitalist") state¹ intervenes to socialize its citizens in market society. In this context, the state works to shape peoples' minds. Before we explore how this is done, it is appropriate to make some preliminary remarks on the nature of the state.

The state is rightly regarded as a socializing institution, the most powerful of disseminating agents. It insists on the prerogative of regulating the flow of information to all its potential taxpayers and future war personnel. Others are also earmarked for concern, but the crucial matter is the way in which state elites investigate, regulate, and, when necessary, punish the nonelites. State elites claim for themselves a monopoly of violence (see Chapter 1). Nor are the political elites without a bias on class, scrutiny, and violent punishment. In a context where land, labor, and goods are produced for profit with minimal amount of state regulation, the businessman's state (more specifically, its leadership) dwells on public schools and scrutinizes texts and teachers of privately run educational institutions.

The state interests itself in the flow of all information. When necessary the state threatens

¹ I have written another paper, similar to this one and fully-footnoted, that is to appear in Larry Reynolds' *American Society*, to be published by David McKay Co., in 1973.

¹ In this analysis I will be referring primarily to the businessman's state, the state in which the corporate and banking propertied dominate. However, many of my remarks could apply to socialist and other state forms as well. In the last part I discuss revolutionary states of the nonbusinessman's variety.

what it does not own or regulate in the realm of the mass media. In a more paternal way, the state directly communicates to families, private police, churches, and like secondary institutions, it expects obedience, within limits, from these institutions. The state thereby becomes a primary and paternal distributor and censor of information, including accounts of its own nature and the behavior of its officers and functionaries. As a maker of its own design, the state distributes ideology, comprised in good portion, but not entirely, of those ideas which justify and at times obscure the relationships between the state and all other institutions, between the state and all persons in the society, between the propertied who strive to command and staff the upper levels of the state and the propertyless who are taught to obey.

The businessman's state strives to accommodate the demands of an economy geared to the use and exhaustion of human and other resources in order to achieve predictable levels of profit, high levels of corporate longevity (and prestige), and the successful promotion of executive careers. Indeed, the business executive becomes an important owner of investment capital, a person whose prestige, wealth, and knowledge makes him eligible to become a potential occupant of official positions within the state. There he can act to enhance his private career, corporate obligations, personal honor, and private fortunes. The businessman's state, then, is run by propertied directors of organizational power.

In its regulatory actions, the state rejects and often suppresses counterideologies, that is, formulas that question the legitimacy of state control and private property. Above all, the state disallows the serious dissemination of utopian

visions on societal alternatives. For example, the businessman's state prefers to prohibit a positive portrayal of communism in the public school system, for the state's leaders consider a competitive vision to be potentially subversive to its power, which it perpetuates, and to the economic interests, which it serves. The businessman's state looks askance at ideas that might in any way dissolve the ideological glue which supplements the organizational force, for the directors of the state are aware of the integrating function of ideas propounded by the state and other institutions such as religious organizations. Thus, for example, to the degree that people accept the myths of supply and demand and are unaware of the practices of administered pricing, they misperceive a reality defined by state elites as resting on the moral principles of the free market place. To the degree that masses inaccurately perceive but agree with this and related legitimating myths, the state defines these masses as they define themselves—as persons who accept a common moral order. To the degree that people define themselves as loyal to this order, they are less likely to take actions subversive of both state authority and private ownership of the means of production.

Given the signal importance of ideologies for political control, what is their content and how are they received? Here we are concerned both with content of themes and with forms of dissemination used to control populations which the state wishes to inculcate with certain favored ideologies. Previous major formulations on the matter of mental guidance by the state have portrayed a state striving to maintain a monopoly of violence and hence of day-to-day control through the distribution of myths to a readily brainwashed population. *The mass is generally depicted as being passive recipients at the end of a string of institutional disseminators.* From Marx through Mosca, Pareto, and Michels, to Lasswell, this theme recurs. *Paradoxically, the same writers have commented on the conditions under which the subordinate classes break with state ideologies and move toward the creation of revolutionary counter-symbolism and revolutionary organizations.* We must concern ourselves with the resolution of this seeming contradiction by approaching the problem in an orderly fashion.

MY ARGUMENT: THE STATE MUST SHIFT GEARS

Concern with the resolution of the contradiction just stated moves me to explore the following thesis, namely, *the ways in which the state formulates its justifications and uses force to maintain political control depend to a high degree on whether state ideologies are in fact being accepted by the mass of people within the subordinate classes.*

Mass acceptance of state myths is to a high degree dependent on whether objective conditions promote a period of political equilibrium or one of revolution. (For discussions of conditions that move states toward, into, and beyond revolution, see Chapters 1, 3, and 4.) During moments of equilibrium, the well-reasoned justification of political pluralism complements a state policy of repressive redirection with a modicum of state violence. During the early periods of revolutionary unrest, however, mass acceptance of state formulas wanes, as masses acquire utopian concern on structural changes. At this time, the state both persists in its commitment to political pluralism and attempts to coopt its critics. Furthermore, the state relies increasingly on shockingly illogical judicial, executive, and administrative actions. In this context, the state uses violence more frequently, and indiscriminately, to punish those deemed beyond the pale of state acceptance.

If the businessman's state fails and the socialist revolution is successful, i.e., if the alternate state becomes the official state, the revolutionary state will momentarily foster the dissemination of formulas consistent with the revolutionary aspirations of the great majority of the masses. Subsequently, the contradictory demands of revolutionary defense negate many of the prior gains associated with the struggle against inequality. Finally, subordinate classes and intellectuals react sharply against the alleged excesses and extremes of revolutionary behavior. Then there exists the slight possibility of rejuvenation of revolution and the achievement of equality through continuous struggle against those forces associated with the new inequality. At this point the state may well pursue a "cultural revolution" and use a modicum of violence to revitalize the revolution.

It is true that masses generally accept the myths (especially those on the inevitability of

inequality) presented to them by the state through the institutional network—the mass media, religious institutions, schools, families, prisons, and the like. But not always. Admittedly during moments of equilibrium, the state and ancillary institutions find little opposition to the successful flow of fabricated versions as to how the society is organized, what the societal alternatives are, and how the state can ensure the ideological status quo. By contrast, during protorevolutionary and truly revolutionary periods, ideology runs smack into the continuous and popular opposition of both *counterideology* and *utopian construction*. Counterideology depicts the damned present, while utopia incompletely designs the revolutionary future. Confronted with these increasingly popular expressions from below, the state expresses itself through reaffirmation of its own ideology and the increased use of violence.

The collision between ideology and utopia frequently occurs within the context of a political battlefield. Generally in attempting to analyze the soldiers of struggle, we fall back on the anthropomorphizing of class categories. Many speak of the proletariat standing up, or a coalition of peasants, intellectuals, workers, and progressive bourgeoisie, and so forth. We talk about coalition politics as if whole groups were allied. In fact, we know better, for what we observe over and over again are bits and pieces of classes, status groups, and generations coalescing. This being the case, unrefined class analysis makes little sense. Sections of classes may participate in a struggle, or even lead it, but we should not confuse the part with the whole and go so far as to attribute individual characteristics to an analytic category or a real group.

**THE CLUSTERS: MORAL CORE,
APOCALYPTIC RADICALS, AMBIVALENT
PARTISANS, DELIBERATE RADICALS, AND
THE QUIESCENT DUMB**

Clusters of political allies draw their membership from various sections of classes, status groups, and generations—the crucial sources of group behavior.

In our time, we can observe again and again that in one corner are the heterogeneous forces of economic conservatism and cultural tradi-

tionalism. These forces are a rag-tag combination drawn from all walks of life, and together they constitute the "moral core." The key carriers of societal folkways and mores, the unconscious purveyors of upper-class beliefs and values, the dreary reciters of eternal verities, they hang like albatrosses around the figurative necks of political movements seeking revolutionary change. Although led by an overwhelming majority of those who monopolize the strategic resources of society, the moral core includes, even as it rests upon, a sizable segment of those whom corporate wealth oppresses. For as numerous writers have indicated, it is normal for many of those who suffer repression—even the double exploitation of class-racial manipulation meted out by the white man in the black colonies—to adapt to circumstances in which the oppressed are without a revolutionary alternative by identifying with their oppressors.

This mental set remains among many of the oppressed as a form of cultural residue, one based on a previous adaptation maintained long after the society has passed from a condition of near-equilibrium to one of revolutionary flux. Political organizations simply have not had time to unwork the mental markings of the past. As such, the residual loyalty of these victims functions to legitimate the moral core's leadership and myths. What better way to make a ruling group respectable than to have an oppressed group testify its loyalty through continued identification and even emulation? After all, the affluent leadership can't be all that bad, since many miserable ones subscribe to it.

Flagrantly opposed to the moral core are the "apocalyptic radicals." Drawn from many classes but especially the *petite* bourgeoisie and the young working classes, these persons bring a total indictment against the corrupt present. They call for the creation of a revolutionary presence on all matters, they see and demand bipolarization now, they fully expect the forces of revolution to triumph soon, they live part of the future within their countercommunities (including both working class and *petit* bourgeois groups), they pen the rough outlines of the new society, thereby justifying the casualties of ongoing and pending armed struggle. The apocalyptic radicals are always visible in societies where a market economy exists—partly because some are publicly adopted and feted by the

more cosmopolitan members of the establishment. But they become most obvious when a society moves during the early prodromal period from ready adjustment of various parts to a period of rapid and near-total reorganization. During these moments, their numbers grow as does the din and influence of their revelations. The apocalyptic radicals often become paramount among the rank and file assembled at demonstration sites.

Somewhere between the moral core and the apocalyptic radicals are those who are both ideological and utopian. They are the "segmental partisans"—persons who have compartmentalized their minds to accept (a) portions of justifications of the present (ideology), (b) indictments of the ongoing (counterideology), and (c) formulations on revolutionary alternatives (utopianism). One moment allied with the moral core, segmental partisans consistently admonish those who violate the principles of the past. Yet, the next moment they sarcastically and inconsistently derogate the parameters of the same institutions whose rules and principles they had recently defended. Segmental partisans express contradictory statements, but many of their criticisms run deep. According to segmental partisans—a sizable minority of whom are intellectuals—the state sets boundaries around *institutions*, which behave within prescribed limits to socialize. *They* damn to irrational perdition the very ones whose "autonomous rationality" must be achieved if the moderate goals of the segmental partisans are to be realized.

Sometimes out of despair, the segmental partisans identify with the goals, if not the careening style, of the apocalyptic vanguard. Illustrative would be left-democrats, discussed in Chapter 9.

However confused the segmental partisans may be, it becomes the task of egalitarian movements to eliminate their central inconsistencies and to persuade the ambivalent to accept revolutionary utopias, which the converts can later help design more precisely.

To win the segmental partisans is no routine activity, and from the point of view of many within the radical movement, this task should *not* fall to the apocalyptic radicals, who tend to alienate most people, including each other. Through default, the job generally falls to the

"deliberate radicals," a category in many ways dissimilar to other radicals, especially the apocalyptic variety. Their relative calmness in the art of persuasion complements their insistence on viewing people's political beliefs as falling on a continuum. Indeed, deliberate radicals believe that persons can move up a scale from conservative to radical under the pressure of current events, participatory involvement, critical friendship, and political self-analysis. All those considerations press the deliberate radicals to be flexible but firm when dealing with persons who have internalized chunks of both the mores of the past and the utopian vision of the future. By contrast, apocalyptic radicals are more prone to be frenetic in life style, more apt to view individuals as all good or all bad, certainly more likely to condemn personally those unlike themselves, more predisposed to be impatient, rigid, inflexible, and high-handed.

The deliberate radicals best handle the guidance of the ambivalent partisans through situations in which the ambivalent do as much as they can for a particular cause and where the predictable repression of the state will and anger and press them to do more to solve the particular problem. It is the task of the deliberate radicals to help to interpret certain watershed events as they and the ambivalent partisans pass through crises loaded with potential for radicalization.

But to lead in such a way demands subtlety and perhaps an element of guile, qualities scarcely known among the apocalyptic radicals in search of immediate apocalypse. The deliberate radicals do not accept such a vision of forthcoming events, and above all they reject the related and dichotomous distinctions between the saved and the damned. The deliberate radicals eschew the belief that it is necessary for everyone to choose sides *now* in order to achieve a propertyless, classless, statusless, and stateless society.

Deliberate radicals propound a firm but patient evolutionary view on when and how revolution can take place. They believe that if and when a particular sequence of conditions and processes occurs—and revolutionaries should help to shape and accelerate the processes by widening the base of popular support—then there will in all probability follow a successful revolution. This calculating and activist approach leads many others to view the deliberate

radicals as cautious tacticians, if not manipulators. This view is correct. They are. They are generally persons with vision and a long-term approach to the problem of relating to people in order to resolve secondary contradictions (i.e., conflicts within one's own camp).

By contrast, the consciousness of the quiescent dumb is totally different from the perspective of the deliberate radicals. The quiescent dumb seem to be singularly mindless. They act like persons whose cortical areas have been dulled by the litany of all institutions. Their perspectives become antiscientific, especially in the realm of nonwork relations. What characterizes these people is unintelligent, nonscientific use of elementary information on the relation between state power and market economy. Their minds appear to be incapacitated, unable to think in terms of how the state and private property systematically control and exploit their very lives. For them their fortunes ride on chance, luck, cosmic dictation, or a combination of these. It is this group which makes a contribution to the old regime, but the worth of the contribution is ordinarily analogous to the significance of giant logs blocking the beach about to be traveled by an assault group.

The quiescent dumb are not part of the moral core, for they carry and practice few of the values of tradition. Quite frequently they believe little or nothing which lies beyond the bounds of their privatized, family-centered lives. Largely unknown to themselves, they are quite frequently cynics or pessimists—people who do not vote and in general do not believe in the pluralistic formulas on political participation. They do not attend church or school, except when necessary. Nor do they subscribe seriously to myths on the life hereafter, not to mention the life before passage. In the United States today, these people seldom apprehend televised materials (although their sets may be turned on for hours every day) or read newspapers, books, or magazines. However, when they do, they comprehend information only in a very limited number of areas and only in the most concrete sense.

It's as if they are incapable of learning in areas that vitally affect them. Nor do they share moral-core beliefs on the presumed goodness to

be derived from an understanding of public issues. Generally they are out of public life, but they are many. Yet they are sometimes in it, and then they can be significant. During political crises numbers of them can be activated by the defenders of the status quo to leave their political lethargy and to speak and to act on subjects which they only minimally understand. The quiescent dumb derive from all classes, status groups and generations. They are by no means drawn exclusively from the lumpen proletariat and the working poor, some of whose members are both highly informed and committed.

All these types constitute the principal actors who troup about the stage of politics during moments of equilibrium and revolution alike. But they do not move through time as if all stages were identical. For time includes periods, and if we are to understand history we must at the very least schematize its trajectory. And in our time to do so demands that we make relevant distinctions between the periods of stationary equilibrium and those associated with total cultural revolution:

1. The period of stationary equilibrium, or the prodromal period
2. The prodromal period itself
3. The coming to power of the radicals
4. The period of encirclement
5. Thermidor—the period of reaction

TRANSITIONAL REMARKS

Before considering the five stages of total cultural revolution, we turn to an important reading, for it should help to give some flesh to the skeleton already presented, as well as to the last section to be considered.

Max Nomad has summarized Waclaw Machajski's turn-of-the-century views on the mis-carriages of revolution fostered by those who pose as revolutionary intellectuals. It's been almost ten years since I first read this essay, and it's as stimulating now as it was then. The message is clear, although by no means proven. Intellectuals can conceivably abscond with revolutionary power and gyp the people in the name of revolution.

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Chapter

9

Left-Wing Democracy: Its Ideology and Criticism

Section One

The Fight Against Big Capital

DEMOCRACY: LEFT, RIGHT, AND CENTER

Left-democracy differs considerably from its right-wing counterpart. When people demand equality and view its achievement as possible through the parliamentary process, they place themselves in a camp far removed from those where elites insist on obedience to parliamentary procedures as the goal as well as the means of democracy. In the middle is the center-democratic position. Essentially social democratic, the center stands for the use of parliamentary processes to alleviate social problems stemming from a capitalist structure viewed as amenable to slow but continuous alteration.

To define democracy—left, right, and center—with more precision, we will concern ourselves with the ideology, structure, and the criticisms of all three forms. However, this chapter dwells primarily on left-democratic phenomena.

LEFT-DEMOCRACY

The ideology of left-democracy reflects its class, status, and generational bases. Historically, the most numerous supporters of left-democracy have been:

1. *The small farmers*, locked into a one-crop economy dependent on a world market price structure over which they have had little control.
2. *The marginal working class*, trapped also by economic vicissitudes such as cyclical unemployment.
3. *The intellectuals and students*, blessed with a plentitude of knowledge on the workings of the system but with little power to rectify structural problems.

Wheat farmers, black industrial workers, minority farmers, alienated ministers, rebellious

priests, wild poets, intense junior faculty, and finally, as well as most significantly in the United States today, the cyclically volatile students—all are committed to achieving either considerably greater equity for the downtrodden or the systematic introduction of equality into all aspects of human relations. In this regard, the most popular bromide has been "equality of opportunity," a vague self-contradictory formula whose very denotation of equality implies an inequality of origin. However, many left-democrats would press for economic, political, and social equality in perpetuity. Indeed, an occasional left-democrat goes so far as to favor grass-roots socialism, all the way from a left-agrarian populism to urban industrial democracy. In both instances the people would run their own co-ops, neighborhood councils, and city halls. Unlike social democrats and right-democrats, the left-democrats find little room for coordination from above. Hence left-democrats reject city managers, urban planners, and other elites *unless* the ordinary folk can instruct the managers continuously on how to carry out their tasks. Left-democrats believe: Let the people do it themselves.

Left-democratic *declarations* (and *not* my opinion) can be summarized as follows:

1. *Ultimately it is only through socialism or highly abridged capitalism that democracy can be made meaningful.* So long as powerful interests own the society's strategic resources, these interests will use their financial power to undermine the proper functioning of parliamentary procedures. They will cease to reflect any popular mandates for change. Given corporate obstruction of the parliamentary process, the people can and must regulate these vested interests. In the long haul, however, the people will

learn the pragmatic utility of a just but stern appropriation of monopoly capital—the giant corporations, bent on excessive profits, consumer overcharges, and legislative manipulations, which withstand governmental efforts to break them up into smaller units that are less capable of collusion. This state takeover of the monopolies is absolutely essential if the people are to achieve justice through parliamentary means.

2. *Agrarian socialism includes the nationalization of all corporate and banking resources.* Slated for nationalization would be heavy and light industries, public utilities, transportation, banking, and urban agglomerations of land. Set aside for private ownership would be considerable *land* in small and medium-size acreages, belonging to landholders engaged in farming; *small retail outlets* owned by those who have suffered long from the practices of monopolies and oligopolies; *private homes* owned by the persons who would continue to define their homes as their castles; *many producer and consumer cooperatives* established by the people themselves in such areas as artisan production, food retail, educational television and radio; the *mass media*, retained in large part by private persons to allow the people to continue to exercise their rights to justly criticize one another, as well as the state; and the *people's churches*, maintained separate from a state whose secularism could conceivably undermine an institution of mixed utility.

3. *Nationalization is but one step—it must be followed by people's control over production and distribution.* Let the people run every sphere. Wherever they may be, let the people govern. More specifically, let the people elect as they coordinate the managers of factories, mines, offices, retail outlets, recreation groups. Unless the people can participate in their own ongoing democratization, they will remain in a state of complete alienation. When folks become so alienated, the very condition encourages the formation of an organizational oligarchy. *It* constitutes the very antithesis of democracy.

For every Tennessee Valley Authority, let there be a people's council to guide it. For every organic food distribution center, let the folk elect their own representatives. For every university coffee house, let the employees set and enforce policy.

4. *Left-democratic theory assumes that, if and when the state nationalizes industries selectively and the people control them appropriately, the people will have taken a giant step toward control of their own political destinies.* The ideology consists of the following stipulations. Too long have powerful corporations and banks used their financial and related political powers *to prevent* the achievement of justice, *to distort* the natural functions of the legislature, *to undermine* the executive powers of the President, and *to bend* the judicial branches of government. By nationalizing these vested interests, establishing popular control, but allowing for the retention of a private sector, the popular state will create the preconditions for the meaningful operation of parliamentary forms.

5. *If and when the people do nationalize industries selectively, there will nonetheless re-emerge an oligarchy in many ways as reprehensible as those only recently replaced, unless the people can directly control their own institutions.* As odious as private capitalism is *state capitalism*, which has reference to a society in which the state nationalizes industries, concentrates decision-making on economic matters in the hands of the few, and deliberately denies significant decision-making power to the many. It distributes wealth and prestige to favor political leaders, markets goods on a profitable basis for the state-owned firms, and indeed treats labor as if it were a commodity. Current Communist Russia would be illustrative. In this sense, state capitalism is as bad as its predecessor. State capitalism in fact, proves to be synonymous with right-communism. And as such it is vulnerable to criticisms emanating from both the left-communist and left-democratic camps.

6. *On the penalty of losing: If and when the left fails to nationalize basic industries and capitalism remains, the corporate concentrators of private wealth and coercive strength will proceed to use their economic power to strangle even harder what remains of the parliamentary process through both gross and subtle purchases of politicians, parties, administrators, judges, and sundry others.* A heavy left-democratic defeat leaves a vacuum that invites a new formula justifying inequalities. The formula—pluralism—takes many forms, but foremost is the idea of people exerting an equal influence over political elites through the formation and use of pressure groups. In fact, the empirical world is different.

What passes for pluralistic lobbying of all concerned interests is in fact a lopsided purchasing of political figures always in need of campaign funds for the coming reelection, parties in need of recurrent financial replenishment, administrators in need of staff and favorable decisions on governmental and private appropriations, judges in need of career promotions, and so forth. After a serious left-democratic defeat, capital exacerbates those tendencies, creates new lacerations, and further demeans the parliamentary process.

7. *When the wealthy continue to control the parliamentary processes after a telling defeat of left-democrats, the great mass of people cannot solve their economic problems.* In the United States the major left-democratic battle was fought and lost between 1912 and 1918; a lesser effort occurred between 1930 and 1938. It, too, failed. Since that time the upper classes have governed with little threat from below. These upper classes continue to control the Congress, the chief executive and the judiciary.

Today many Americans have found that they cannot solve the country's major economic and overseas problems while working through the federal political processes controlled by the upper classes—unless their interests and those of the upper classes happen to coincide, which seldom happens. Hence, long-standing and deep grievances have generally accumulated—except when a benevolent and enlightened sector of the upper class sees fit to intervene in order to lessen the burden of blue-collar workers.

8. *When people cannot solve their problems through the parliamentary process, they have the right to revolution.* Ever since Samuel Adams, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson, left-democrats have held that if and when people cannot rely on the parliamentary process to solve their problems, they have the right to revolution. More recently, William O. Douglas has laid this right on the line:

George III was the symbol against which our Founders made a revolution now considered bright and glorious. George III had not crossed the seas to fasten a foreign yoke on us. George III and his dynasty had established and nurtured us and all that he did was by no means oppressive. But a vast restructuring of laws and institutions was necessary if the people were to be content.

That restructuring was not forthcoming and there was revolution.

We must realize that today's Establishment is the new George III. Whether it will continue to adhere to his tactics we do not know. If it does, the redress, honored in tradition, is also revolution.¹

Needless to say, this left-democratic opinion fails to find acceptance among contemporary right-democrats.

9. *The revolution directs its energies for the people and against those giant corporations and corrupt politicians who perpetuate both domestic exploitation of politically undefended workers and overseas wars that encourage the oppression of colonized people.* Should this revolution occur, it must direct its attention to deep domestic problems and overseas immoralities. Currently, such persistent domestic problems as poverty and environmental destruction demand immediate attention.

Overseas, our imperialist efforts must halt. U.S. military forces must no longer strive to protect areas traditionally used by American corporations as (a) sources of cheap raw materials, unskilled labor, and inexpensive goods, (b) purchasers of overpriced U.S. goods, (c) sites of U.S. investment, (d) stockyards for the accumulation of military hardware and the billeting of cannon-fodder, plus (e) battle areas established and maintained overseas by U.S. military forces to prevent insurgent revolutionary forces from taking state power. The United States must change its ways and encourage the withdrawal of its corporations from dependence on imperial roles at that moment when the progressive state instructs the U.S. military to withdraw from foreign battlefields.

The most urgent problems remain the domestic ones, although obviously the foreign and the home-front areas are intertwined.

10. *The domestic exploitation includes every kind of private and public chicanery that one can imagine.* With the elimination of imperialism the United States will have sufficient funds to deal with problems already thoroughly studied.

Indeed, the left-democrats lead in research concerned with corruption. Their exposés fill not only the lesser journals but the major news-

¹William O. Douglass, *Points of Rebellion* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), p. 95.

papers and popular bookshelves as well. Illustrative would be the current work of Ralph Nader.

Despite their energetic exposés, left-democrats remain caught within a contradiction. The ambivalence of the left-democratic movement can be captured in the following propensities: (a) to engage in parliamentary politics even though the movement has already defined these politics as useless for gaining peoples' power because of the intrinsic corruption of the parliamentary process, and (b) to back those revolutionaries who have opted against parliamentary forms and for urban guerilla warfare. Here the left-democrats philosophically straddle two quite different alternatives. In the meantime, they become principally involved in parliamentary politics. And on occasion they win a victory. Its occurrence, however infrequent, nonetheless vindicates their "choice." But the choice has little structural impact. Left-democratic drift into the morass of recurrent campaigns and predictable defeats is marked by a decadal victory of little practical consequence.

LEFT-DEMOCRATS AS POTENTIAL FASCISTS: THE NATURE OF THE ACCUSATION

In the last two decades a number of intellectuals have condemned left-democrats as authoritarian, antidemocratic and even antisemitic. Especially have these criticisms been directed against the agrarian populists of America's Great Plains—the agrarian radicals of Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, and by implication, the prairie provinces of Canada. The charge of the critics is clear: the populists once did (and continue to) display a disrespect for elected authority by insisting on their right to recall duly elected representatives judged to be faulty, their power to initiate legislation viewed as necessary, and finally, the right to use the referendum to undo legislation passed by "responsible" political leaders. Furthermore, this mass of culpable farmers and equally dislikable allies have on occasion used derogatory stereotypes to blacken certain respectable members of the community engaged in functionally important roles associated with grain storage, grain sale, farm implement manufacture, farm equipment purchase, railroad transportation, agricultural credit, and the public utilities. Perhaps even more disgusting was

the way in which populist demagogues played on public gullibility in order to sway the ordinary folk to believe that political improprieties were somehow linked to the manipulative propensities of corporate wealth.

So much for the criticisms of the past and ongoing populists. What has been their historical residue?

A more current condemnation of the populists has taken the form of blaming them for the advent of McCarthyism: the purge of American intellectuals from university and government positions, which ran between 1950 and 1956. The anti-McCarthy indictment holds that the key supporters of Senator Joseph McCarthy came from the geographical areas in which populism and rural progressivism had once flourished. Indeed, it was alleged, these two forms had prepared the way for McCarthyism by creating an intolerance of ambiguity, a rejection of the foreign, a repugnance against the complex, and a dislike of the sophisticated Easterner. All these attitudes comprised a syndrome which Joe McCarthy manipulated in order to get himself elected to Congress, where he could terrorize Eastern intellectuals of more gentle temperament and reformist persuasion. From Richard Hofstadter through Daniel Bell and many of their contemporaries, we find this indictment of America's foremost contributors to the left-democratic tradition.

But the historical record indicates that Hofstadter was wrong. For one thing, there has been little effort on the part of Hofstadter and like-minded essayists to clarify all the epistemological ambiguities associated with being "politically authoritarian." But even if we accept the term as a basis for carrying on discussion, we can only comment that there has been no sound basis for accusing the agrarian democrats of serious antisemitism or profoundly antidemocratic inclinations. None of America's strong antisemitic movements flourished in geographical zones with populist traditions. Rather, antisemitism, especially in its more virulent forms, such as those which thrived during the 1930s, has been principally a metropolitan phenomenon, popular among classes and status groups without populist commitments. Here we are talking about big-city "brown shirts," uniformed and violent imitators of the German Nazi phenomenon. It was Eastern and Midwest-

ern, but especially urban, German, Protestant, lower-middle and upper-working class. These antisemites were concentrated in cities such as New York, Detroit, and Chicago. Bitter antisemitism has also surfaced in some small towns, as in the case of the notorious Black Legion during the 1930s. But then, not everyone in those small towns falls within the populist tradition. Many residents did not, and perhaps many of these were the vicious antisemites. We do not know. Only time and research will tell us. Until then essays can not demonstrate whether the populist tradition was at fault.

The antidemocratic charges leveled against the populists have been grossly unfair, although it is true that grain farmers have frequently shown a disrespect for political leaders who were obviously acting in collusion with corporate interests. In this sense the populist democrats did view political authorities as potentially crooked. And they attempted to create mechanisms whereby each and every adult would have an electoral way of exerting his or her influence to correct these situations. These agrarians created the "recall," the "initiative," and the "referendum" to try to exact from legislatures machinery that would shape an economy consistent with the right to engage in the unrestricted expression of political ideas. It will be observed that this effort was not one of undoing civil liberties, but rather one of creating liberties that would merge with altered social conditions to allow for the full attainment of justice, freedom, and equality.

True, the interests of corporate wealth would be violated by such political efforts. During the process of appropriation, as well as the events leading to it, the agrarian democrats might use cartoons, speeches, and other forms of propaganda to stereotype the ones deemed worthy of such depictions. Granted also was the presence of orators, a small minority of them were antisemitic. But they articulated the grievances of farmers who were overcharged for the storage of their grains, cheated on the price of grain sold, unduly burdened by the costs paid for commodities shipped to markets, charged too much for the farm implements purchased from the farm machinery oligopoly, and squeezed periodically in the vice of fixed farm prices and declining grain prices, while being ignored by traditional politicians only

superficially concerned with wheat farmers' grievances, ruled against by state and federal judges committed to a laissez-faire ideology shared by the same individuals who dominated an economy and polity that obviously did not work to the advantage of the one-crop agrarians. Given the battles waged by agrarian democrats (especially one-crop wheat farmers) *against* oligarchical authorities and *for* the democratic right to carry on that struggle through a more direct, representative parliamentary system, it would be surprising indeed to discover that these agrarians had left a legacy which might predispose their sons to favor the repression of civil liberties.

For the record, when we examine the arguments and evidence alleging that populists were predecessors to McCarthyism, we are struck by the absence of such a correlation. Mike Rogin's study has provided us with this refutational material.² Not the Great Plains agrarians but certain cold-war intellectuals have created this correlation. And they have done so, not on the basis of statistical materials, but largely out of their own imaginations.

THE CURRENT PERTINENCE OF THE POPULIST INDICTMENT

Until recently it was popular to debate whether the United States has been ruled by a "power elite" or "governed through a plurality of contending pressure groups." Prominent in these discussions have been C. Wright Mills, Robert Dahl, David Riesman, and William Kornhauser. Perhaps these arguments are somewhat dated. In any event, we consider them more thoroughly in Chapter 10. By the year 1972, sufficient empirical material had been gathered to indicate the degree to which wealthy families in the United States have used their economic power, whether as family units or corporate entities, to bend the parliamentary processes and move them to work for these families. At times this bending creates a caricature of government—for example, when Congress creates a federal agency to regulate a private industry whose executives subsequently and informally pick as agency heads the very persons the agency is supposed to regulate.

² Michael P. Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Spector* (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1967).

G. William Domhoff compiled an impressive amount of documentation on these and related matters, and we spend considerable time discussing his materials.³ He has taken up the following items:

1. The control of the corporate economy.
2. The shaping of American foreign policy.
3. The control of the federal government.
4. The military, the CIA, and the FBI.
5. The control of state and local governments.

Unfortunately, we can summarize only part of these materials. We examine the first two matters in considerable detail, as we attempt to investigate the fallacious quality of the indictment against the populist charges.

THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE ECONOMY

Domhoff demonstrated the existence within the United States of an interlocking directorate which in fact runs the national corporate economy. Only several thousand families are involved. Their Social Register listings, familial wealthy, private school affiliations, club membership ties, corporate directorships, and top managerial positions *plus their high levels of overall agreement despite the presence of ideological differences* strongly registers this group as a nationwide upper class *acting for itself*. Nor are Domhoff's findings unique. They are consistent with the materials gathered by Floyd Hunter as well as W. Lloyd Warner and James Abegglin.⁴

In carrying out these activities, the American upper class depends heavily on the profession of law, and many upper-middle-class attorneys aspire to the upper class. Lawyers and law firms service the upper classes in a multiplicity of ways—as consultative specialists on corporate law, as representatives before judges prone to issue antilabor injunctions, or as legislative specialists committed to the promotion of special interests through the precise framing of law.

³ G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).

⁴ Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953); W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglin, *Big Business Leaders in America* (New York: Atheneum, 1963).

And they are found in many institutions, including foundations, foreign policy associations, and universities. These are but a fraction of their services.

THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN POLITY

Certain institutions enjoy a strong and constant influence on the shape of U.S. politics. *Shape* should not be confused with *control*, which is too strong a designation. But as Domhoff indicated, the establishment exercises a powerful directional influence on institutions in the United States.

I. *A Summary of Domhoff's Analysis*⁵

Domhoff analyzed the following institutions; here we merely list a portion of the totality:

A. *Tax-Exempt Charity Foundations*—such as the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation; groups which provide funds for a great variety of cultural, intellectual, and educational activities.

B. *Special Associations Aimed at Shaping Public Opinion on Special Issues*. Pertinent here is the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Foreign Policy Association (FPA). Both emphasize foreign affairs. Domestic issues receive careful scrutiny and singularly incisive recommendations through the Business Advisory Council (BAC), the Committee for Economic Development (CED), the National Advertising Council (NAC), and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM).

C. *The University*, especially the elite institutions which train most of the country's leading lawyers, academicians, and physicians. These schools provide high-quality expertise for those to be trained as well as for those already trained but in need of ongoing advice.

D. *The Mass Media*, themselves important in the spread of information and the related creation of opinion.

II. *An Elaboration of Domhoff's Analysis*

We can now examine more carefully each of these points.

⁵ Domhoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–83. Copyrighted material, reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

A. The Foundations

Domhoff focused on the thirteen largest foundations in the United States. His condensed summary on their control structure defies further abstraction:

Our data should be presented on a foundation-by-foundation basis, but to avoid tediousness we will restrict ourselves to several examples after making the following generalizations. Twelve of the top 13 foundations are controlled by members of the power elite, with two-thirds of their trustees coming from the upper class (51 percent) of major corporations (16 percent). The only exception is the Kellogg Foundation, which is controlled by local interests in central Michigan. The one-third of the trustees who are neither members of the upper class nor corporate executives are professional persons, most of them college presidents or college professors. Just over half of all trustees attended Harvard, Yale, or Princeton; 22 earned Phi Beta Kappa keys; 20 are in the Links Club of New York; and eight are on the board of the RAND Corporation, the Air Force "think factory" supported primarily by government contracts. There is a considerable interlock among the Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Sloan, and Commonwealth foundations, and this group has weaker ties to the Duke Endowment and the Danforth Foundation. No generalizations can be made about the ideological commitments of the foundations. Some support liberal and educational interests and ideological struggles which we have seen to be present within the upper class. In the following paragraphs we will go into more detail on six of the foundations: Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Lilly, Pew, and Danforth.⁶

The Ford Foundation has been impressive. It is by far the biggest foundation. We can observe that between its inception during the early 1950s and approximately 1967 it has spent more than \$80 million on educational television. This figure grows by \$6 million a year. Indeed, the chief creation of the Ford Foundation has been National Educational Television (NET), a network of 90 independent stations.

NET offers late-afternoon and evening

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

cultural and informative programs, as well as material for children. Nor is this programming reactionary. As Domhoff indicated, NET provides one of the many lines of communication between the more progressive sections of the upper-class and the upper-middle-class intelligentsia.

Consistent with this channel of idea dissemination and the liberality of the packaged opinions are other projects heavily supported by the Ford Foundation:

1. The Ford Foundation gave a \$15-million grant to the Fund for the Republic, a group which opposed McCarthyism (after it had already been responsible for considerable devastation).

2. The Ford Foundation was instrumental in establishing the liberal-oriented Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California.

3. The Ford Foundation largely subsidized Harvard's Russian Research Center, a group whose undisguised interest in the cold war is favored by certain sections of the U.S. government.

Turning to another Ford benefaction in the educational realm, the foundation has taken over the financing of Harvard's Russian Research Center from the Carnegie Foundation. It gave \$131,000 of the center's budget for 1965, with the remaining \$9,000 coming from Carnegie funds. With a staff of 57 scholars drawn from the many colleges and universities in the Boston area, this center provides consultants to the State Department and the CIA, as well as lecturers to the Army War College, the Foreign Service Institute, and the Council on Foreign Relations.⁷

Consistent with the Ford Foundation all-embracing concern is the breadth of upper-class backgrounds common to the Ford Foundation's Trustees (1967).

TRUSTEES OF THE FORD FOUNDATION⁸

Upper-Class Trustees

Stephen Bechtel is head of the little-known, but very large, Bechtel Construction Corporation of Oak-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 66, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-68, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

land, California. Mr. Bechtel is also a director of Morgan Guaranty Trust, Southern Pacific, Continental Can, Bechtel-McCone Corporation, and Stanford University, among others.

Eugene Black is a Southern-born aristocrat who is a long-time employee of the Rockefeller interests. He is a director of Chase Manhattan, IT&T, *The New York Times*, Cummins Engine, the Brookings Institution, and Johns Hopkins University, among others.

John Cowles (Exeter, Harvard) of Minneapolis is co-owner of the family publishing empire, which includes *Look Magazine* and newspapers in Minneapolis and Des Moines. He is also a trustee for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a director of the First National Bank of Minneapolis and the Equitable Life Insurance Company of Iowa.

Donald K. David is a Harvard Business School professor and dean who sits on several corporate boards.

Benson Ford (Hotchkiss, Princeton) is a director of the National Safety Council and chairman of the Board of the Traffic Safety Committee. He is a vice-president at Ford Motor Company.

Henry Ford II (Hotchkiss, Yale) is a director for General Electric, General Foods, and Philco. He runs the Ford Motor Company.

Roy E. Larsen (SR,* NY) is chairman of the executive committee of Time, Inc.

John J. McCloy (SR, NY) is a director of many corporations. As a former chairman of the board at Chase Manhattan he is a key interlock between the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller empire. Mr. McCloy is chairman of the Ford Foundation trustees.

Joseph Irwin Miller, the head of Cummins Engine Company, is a director of AT&T and many other corporations.

Bethuel Webster (SR, NY) is a corporation lawyer who was a consultant for John J. McCloy when McCloy was High Commissioner of Germany.

Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. (Exeter, Harvard), is a Jewish member of the upper class. Judge Wyzanski is married to another member of the Jewish aristocracy, Gisela Warburg, who came to this country to escape the Nazi persecution.

Others

Mark F. Ethridge is the editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, which is owned by Barry Bingham, who sits on the board of the Rockefeller Foundation. . . .

Laurence Gould is president of Carleton College.

Julius Stratton is president of MIT.

*"SR" designates membership in the local community's *Social Register*, a reputed indication of membership in the upper class.

Henry T. Heald was president of Ford Foundation at the time of this study. He was the president of Illinois Institute of Technology (1940-1952) and NYU (1952-1956) before joining the Ford Foundation. His training was as an engineer. He is a director of AT&T, U.S. Steel, Equitable Life, and Lever Brothers.

The Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations are structured along almost identical lines. The activities of the Rockefeller Foundation, the oldest and most famous if not the largest of the foundations, include studies of tropical diseases, subsidies to the Population Research Center at Harvard, and a Russian research center at Columbia as well as numerous other subsidies of universities. The Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation (1967) can be classified according to whether they are (a) upper-class members, (b) representatives from upper-class businesses, and (c) others.

TRUSTEES OF THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION⁹

Upper-Class Members

Barry Bingham (Middlesex School, Harvard) is the publisher of the *Louisville Courier-Journal* and the *Louisville Times*, and an heir to a Standard Oil fortune. He is an Episcopalian, a Democrat, and like many upper-class Southerners, a listee in the *Washington Social Register*.

Lloyd D. Brace (SR, Boston) is a Boston banker who sits on many corporate boards.

Arthur Amory Houghton, Jr. (SR, NY), is president of Corning Glass and a director of New York Life Insurance and U.S. Steel, among others.

John R. Kimberly (Phillips Andover, MIT) inherited the Kimberly-Clark Company of Wisconsin, which was originally a paper-making firm. He sits on the boards of Northwestern Mutual Life, First National City Bank of New York, Corning Glass, Lawrence College, and the Episcopalian Church Foundation, as well as being president and chairman of the family firm.

Lord Frank of Headington is an English lord.

John D. Rockefeller III (SR, NY) is the Rockefeller brother who specializes in cultural matters. As chairman of the foundation he has a firm grip on its activities. Other trustees come and go—he does not. He is president of the Japanese Society, the Asia Society, and the Council on Economic and Cultural

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Affairs. He is chairman of the National Council of the United Negro College Fund.

Thomas J. Watson, Jr. (SR, NY), is head of IBM and a director of Bankers Trust, Time, Inc., Cal Tech, and Brown University.

William B. Wood Jr. (SR, Baltimore), is vice-president of Johns Hopkins.

Representatives from Upper-Class Businesses

Frank M. Stanton is a retired investment banker who was a vice-president of the Rockefeller-associated First Boston Corporation from 1934 to 1955. He has been a First Boston Corporation director since 1940. He is not related to the Frank Stanton who is president of CBS and chairman of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

George D. Woods is chairman of the board at First Boston Corporation, which is the biggest underwriter of utilities in the world.

Others

Ralph Bunche (AB, UCLA; Ph.D., Harvard) is one of the nation's most prominent Negro citizens. A professor before he became a United Nations official, he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950.

Lowell T. Coggeshall, formerly a research physician with the foundation, is a dean at the Rockefeller-founded University of Chicago and a director of Commonwealth Edison of Chicago.

John S. Dickey is president of Dartmouth.

Lee A. DuBridge is president of Cal Tech.

Robert F. Goheen is president of Princeton.

Clifford M. Hardin is president of the University of Nebraska.

J. George Harrar, a former professor, is an expert on plant pathology who is the foundation's director for agriculture as well as its president.

Theodore Hesburgh is president of Notre Dame.

Clark Kerr was president of the University of California.

Of the Carnegie Corporation's fourteen trustees, twelve are members of the upper class. Several of the foremost members are: Frederick Eaton, who sits on the Commonwealth Fund as well as on several corporate boards; C. D. Jackson, of Time, Inc.; Devereaux Josephs, a member of the Sloan Foundation board as well as a multitude of corporate boards; Margaret Carnegie Miller; and Charles A. Thomas, president of Monsanto Chemical Company.

B. *The Associations*

The associations are intimately connected with the country's corporate elite, and they include the following:

1. The Council on Foreign Relations. Founded in 1921, CFR began during the late 1920s to receive considerable financial support from the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations. Members of the Council were heavily involved in U.S. State Department affairs during World War II. Who are its members? How is it financed? What are its activities?

The membership is restricted to 700 resident members—citizens whose residences or places of business are within 50 miles of the New York city hall—and 700 nonresident members. As Smoot points out, most members occupy important positions in business, finance, communications, and education. Our study of a sample of 210 resident members of the CFR shows that 82 were listed in the *Social Register*, which is 39 percent upper-class membership by this one criterion alone. However, even more significant is our study of the 51 men who have been directors since the council's inception. Ten of the 51 are currently trustees of one of the foundations studied in the previous section. Of the 22 recently or currently directors, 14 are in the *Social Register*. Among the better-known upper-class directors, past and present, are Paul Cravath, Norman Davis, Arthur H. Dean, Allen Dulles, Lewis Douglas, Averell Harriman, Devereux Josephs, Walter Lippmann, Adlai Stevenson, Myron Taylor, Paul Warburg, and Owen D. Young. Perhaps it is enough to say that John J. McCloy and David Rockefeller have been high officers in the association in recent years.¹⁰

The financing of the CFR indicates the extent of horizontal interlock which connects upper-class institutions. Of the CFR's income in a recent year, \$231,700 came from foundation grants, whereas \$112,000 emanated from "corporate service," which in turn entails a minimum fee of \$1,000. The CFR also receives \$210,300 from the publication of the highly influential journal, *Foreign Affairs*. The Council penetrates the normal political activities of our country's more plush panel rooms and auditoriums. The CFR presents speakers and seminars to those who subscribe to its Corporation ser-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 72, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

vice and to the Committees on Foreign Relations which the CFR has created in 30 cities.

The local committees are composed of 40 to 80 people who are generally the community leaders. They are professors, public-relations executives, lawyers, and corporate vice presidents, as well as several top members of the American business aristocracy residing in a particular city.

It will be remembered that this association derives much of its income from foundations. It will also be recalled who governs the foundations. Keep in mind, for example, that in 1967, 12 of the 14 trustees of the Carnegie Foundation enjoyed an upper-class standing. Hence they were in a position to relate to upper-class folk on the local CFR committees. This being the case, there can be little doubt that the "local committees" constitute key links between the national upper class, its local members, the upper middle class in general, and the powerful foundations.

In order to emphasize control at the top, Domhoff pointed to the documentation on the relation between the major foundations and the CFR in 1961:

For example, 10 of the 14 trustees of the Carnegie Corporation were members of the CFR in 1961. The overlap of the CFR with other major foundations is as follows: 10 of the Ford Foundation's 15 trustees are also members of the CFR; 12 of the 20 from the Rockefeller Foundation; 18 of the 26 from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 15 of the 26 from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching; 12 of the 16 from the Sloan Foundation; 6 of the 10 from the Commonwealth Fund; 13 of the 20 from the Twentieth Century Fund; and 7 of the 18 from the Fund for the Republic.¹¹

2. The Foreign Policy Association, the Committee for Economic Development, the Business Advisory Council, the National Advertising Council, and the National Association of Manufacturers are involved in the same kind of horizontal interlock. It finds yet another extension in university governance.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

C. *The Universities*

Domhoff showed that control of the country's leading universities by members of the American business aristocracy is more direct, certainly more visible, than with any other institution controlled by the upper class. Still, the upper classes do not mold opinions within universities. Faculty can promote considerable diversity, since the system of tenure protects all but the most wild of faculty outlaws. So Domhoff contended—the Leggett-Roach paper argues differently at the end of this chapter.

Nevertheless, upper-class control does exist. Most important is the occupancy of boards of directors positions by this class. Illustrative is the Board of Trustees of Columbia University (see Table 20.) The upper classes also have a habit of granting private financial support to universities. Family endowments, personal gifts, foundation grants, and corporate gifts extend the powerful base of upper-class influence.

Corporate control of the direction taken by universities should not be ignored. Members of the business aristocracy have stressed technical and practical training as opposed to traditional and classical education:

Thus, Joseph Wharton gave the University of Pennsylvania \$600,000 to found the Wharton School of Business and Finance, and George Eastman gave \$20 million to MIT between 1912 and 1920. According to Curti and Nash, the role of the Carnegie foundations and Rockefeller's General Education Board cannot be overestimated in understanding the structure of American higher education. The relationship between the corporate rich and academia is best exemplified by a school such as the University of Rochester. Most of the university's board is made up of officers of such Rochester-based corporations as Eastman Kodak, Xerox, and Taylor Instrument. The chairman of the board, who is also the president of Xerox, explained the relationship as follows:

To put it as crassly as possible, it's a matter of sheer self-interest—dollars and cents. Xerox will live or die by technology.¹²

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 78, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

TABLE 20 The Ruling Elite of Columbia University (The Top 22: 1968)

	<i>Mass Media Corporations¹</i>	<i>International Corporations²</i>	<i>National Corporations³</i>	<i>Defense Research Nexus⁴</i>	<i>Real Estate and Finance⁵</i>
1. Walter N. Thayer (Trustee)	Whitney Communications Corp. (Pr*)	John Hay Whitney Charitable Trust (1958) ^x (Tr)	National Dairy Products (Di)		Bankers Trust Co. (Di)
2. Arthur B. Krim (Trustee)	United Artists (Pr) Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon (Pa)	African-American Institute ^x (Di)	New School for Social Research (Di) Field Foundation (Tr)		
3. William A. M. Burden (Trustee)	Columbia Broadcasting System (Di)	American Metal Climax (Di) Fairfield Foundation (Di) ^x Atlantic Council (Di) ^x	Allied Chemical (Di)	Lockheed Aircraft (Di) Institute for Defense Analysis (CB)	Manufacturer's Hanover Trust (Di) William A.M. Durden & Co. (Pa)
4. John R. Dunning (Dean, School of Engineering)			National Urban League (Ad) Nuclear Energy Corp. (Di) Vitro Corp. (Di) National Science Foundation (Ad)	Defense Department (Ad) U.S. Army (Ad) Atomic Energy Office, U.S. Navy (Di) Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies (Di) City Investing Corporation (Di) Riverside Research Institute (Tr)	
5. Lawrence A. Wien (Trustee)	Educational Broadcasting Corporation (Tr)	Institute of International Education (Tr) ^x	Consolidated Edison (Di) Jonathan Logan (Di)		Wien, Lane & Klein (Pa)
6. Grayson L. Kirk (Trustee)		Socony-Mobil Oil (Di) Asia Foundation ^x (Di) Institute of International Education ^x (Tr)	Consolidated Edison (Di) IBM (Di)	Institute for Defense Analysis (Tr)	Morningside Heights, Inc. (Pr) Greenwich Savings Bank (Tr) Dividend Shares (Di) Nation-Wide Securities (Di)

Table 20 (Continued)

	<i>Mass Media Corporations¹</i>	<i>International Corporations²</i>	<i>National Corporations³</i>	<i>Defense Research Nexus⁴</i>	<i>Real Estate and Finance⁵</i>
7. Adrian M. Massie (Trustee)					Uris Building Corporation (Di) Greenwich Savings Bank (Tr) U.S. Life Insurance (Di) Investment Management Co. (Di) Pacific Insurance (Di) Trust Comm., Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust (Me)
8. Samuel R. Walker (Trustee)					William C. Walker & Sons Inc. (CB) City Investing Co. 1948-1967 (Di) Equitable Life Assurance (Di)
9. Harold F. McGuire (Trustee)			Shell Oil (Di)		Wickes, Riddell, Bloomer, Jacobi & McGuire (Pa) Seaboard Surety (Di)
10. Frank S. Hogan (Trustee)					District Attorney of New York County since 1911
11. Percy Uris (Trustee)					Uris Buildings Corporation (CB)
12. William S. Paley (Trustee)	Columbia Broadcasting System (CB)				
13. Arthur Hays Sulzberger (Trustee)	<i>New York Times</i> (CB)		Rockefeller Foundation (Tr) Woodrow Wilson Foundation (Di) American-Korean Foundation (Di)		

14. Andrew W. Cordier (Dean, School of International Affairs)	Secretary-General United Nations, 1946-1961 (Ad) State Dept. (Ad) Near East Foundation (Tr) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Tr)	Ford Foundation (Ad)	
15. Charles F. Luce (Trustee)	Columbia Broadcasting System (Di)	Consolidated Edison (CB)	Uris Building Corporation (Di)
16. Courtney C. Brown (Dean, School of Business)	Columbia Broadcasting System (Di)	Union-Pacific Railroad (Di) American Electric Power Company (Di) Associated Dry Goods (Di) Borden Company (Di)	Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust (Ad)
17. Frederick R. Kappet (Trustee)	Standard Oil N.J. (Di)	American Telephone & Telegraph (Di) General Foods (Di) International Paper (Di) Whirlpool (Di)	Aerospace Corporation (Di) Chase Manhattan Bank (Di) Metropolitan Life Insurance (Di)
18. Maurice T. Moore (Trustee)	Time, Inc. (Di)	Cravath, Swaine & Moore (Pa) Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corporation (Di) Monsanto Chemical (Di) Mead Corporation (Di)	General Dynamics (Di) Chemical Bank New York Trust (Di) First National City Bank (Di) Atlantic Mutual Insurance (Tr) Seaboard Surety (Di) Lazard Fund (Di)
19. Alan H. Temple (Trustee)			

Table 20 (Continued)

	<i>Mass Media Corporations¹</i>	<i>International Corporations²</i>	<i>National Corporations³</i>	<i>Defense Research Nexus⁴</i>	<i>Real Estate and Finance⁵</i>
20. William E. Peterson (Trustee)					Irving Trust Co. (Pr)
21. Benjamin J. Buttenswieser (Trustee)			Benrus Watch Co. (Di) Revlon (Di) Chock Full O'Nuts (Di)		Uris Building Corporation (Ad) Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (Pa) Tishman Realty & Construction (Di) Title Guarantee Co. (Di)
22. William C. Warren (Dean, School of Law)	ABC Vending (Di)				Central Savings Bank (Tr) Guardian Life Insurance (Di)

*LEGEND: (Di) - Director
(Ad) - Advisor
(Pr) - President
(Pa) - Partner
(CB) - Chairman of the Board

^xOrganizations marked with this sign (x) secretly received funds from the CIA.

¹Mass Media Corporations: Eight of the Top 22 are leading figures in major communications firms. Particularly heavy is CBS's representation (Paley, Burden, Brown). The prestigious *New York Times* is represented by their Board Chairman. The Whitney communications empire of television, radio, and publishing owned the now defunct *New York World-Journal-Tribune*. Krim's law firm is counsel for important communications companies. This concentration of interests is reflected in Columbia's large and expanding School of Journalism which produces skilled labor for the media industry. The School also houses the industry's American Press Institute. Columbia avails itself of these connections to manufacture a favorable public image.

²International Corporations: Administering the Empire. Seven Columbia rulers have primary ties to either U.S. corporations or non-profit organizations with an international domain. Kirk, McGuire, and Kappel are on the boards of oil companies dependent on foreign reserves for their survival. These and other corporations (such as Burden's American Metal Climax with mining interests in Africa) require skilled managers to oversee the corporate fiefdoms carved out by U.S. economic interests. Columbia's School of International Affairs is underwritten by these same corporations and in turn serves as a finishing school for the managers. The School is headed by State Department consultant and ex-U.N. administrator Cordier, who is noted for his role in the execution of the Congolese nationalist Patrice Lumumba. The Regional Institutes of the School perform research and intelligence that reinforce anti-nationalist ideology. Covert financing by the CIA has been uncovered in one institute project on Eastern Europe.

Six of the seven trustees engaged in overseas activity are prominent functionaries in seemingly apolitical organizations secretly funded by the CIA. For instance, Burden was a founder and is a director of the Fairfield Foundation, used by the CIA to pass over one million dollars to intellectual projects run by the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Kirk has played a crucial role in the CIA-founded and -funded Asia Foundation, which encouraged "cultural interaction" through publications, exchange programs and research.

(Continued on following page)

(Continued from preceding page)

³ National Corporations: Administering the Home Country. Five of the Top 22 have primary relationships with leading national corporations and several of the others have secondary interests. Corporations such as Consolidated Edison (represented by Trustees Kirk, Wien and Luce) gain private advantage through their ties to Columbia. The University manipulates land-holdings for and rents property from Con Ed. In addition to direct gain, national corporations benefit from the University's production of highly skilled labor, especially by the professional schools (Law, Business, Engineering and Applied Science). The Watson computer lab is operated by Columbia and IBM (of which Kirk is a Director). Teachers College and the School of Social Work manufacture the professionals to organize the national and local infrastructure to service corporate needs.

⁴ The Defense-Research Nexus: The Top 22 include five representatives of the military-industrial complex. Burden's Lockheed Aircraft and Moore's General Dynamics together receive 10% (\$3.6 billion) of all U.S. military contracts. Their existence is dependent upon production of the aircraft presently used in Vietnam. As Chairman of the Board of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Burden directs \$15 million worth of Pentagon-financed war research. IDA, specializing in evaluations of advanced weaponry and counterinsurgency technology, serves as a major idea factory for the Department of Defense. Sponsored by twelve major universities (including Columbia), IDA is shielded from attack by its academic facade. President Kirk adds to IDA's academic lustre by serving on its Board of Trustees. Columbia's officials also provide an academic cover for the Riverside Research Institute (formerly the Electronics Research Lab of Columbia University), whose secret military work is coordinated by IDA. RRI trustee Dunning, a Defense Dept. consultant and expert on atomic weapons, is a director of three private corporations dependent on military contracts. For example, Dunning's City Investing Corp. is a major subcontractor of Burden's Lockheed Aircraft and manufactures spray defoliant systems for chemical warfare.

⁵ Real Estate and Finance: Of the Top 22, at least fifteen have primary interlocking relationships with New York City's major real estate and finance companies. With over 60% of its \$245 million endowment in real estate Columbia is one of the largest property holders in New York City. Most disturbing is the association of four Columbia rulers (Uris, Massie, Buttenwieser and Brown) with the real estate and construction empire of Uris Building Corporation. Uris himself conveniently serves as President Kirk's advisor on University construction and expansion, a position well-suited for the promotion of his company. The proposed "Piers Project" between 125th and 135th streets adjacent to Hudson River will be constructed by Uris's firm. Trustee Hogan, doubling as District Attorney, can overlook any conflicts of interest. Tishman Realty and Construction is represented by Trustee Buttenwieser, and Trustee Wien is famous for his billion dollars speculation in property.

The lifeblood of real estate is the capital of banks, insurance companies and investment concerns which underwrite mortgages and loans. Columbia's real estate men are intimately connected with the largest banking and insurance firms. Dean Brown is an advisor to Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.; Trustee Massie is a director of Chemical Bank, sits with Kirk on the Board of Greenwich Savings Bank, and is a director of two major insurance companies; Buttenwieser is a partner in the investment concern of Kuhn, Loeb; Burden is a director of Manufacturer's Hanover Trust; Temple is a director of First National City Bank and Atlantic Mutual Insurance. The Rockefeller Brothers, who rent the land under Rockefeller Center from Columbia, have two of their financial concerns (Chase Manhattan Bank and Metropolitan Life Insurance) represented at Columbia by Kappel.

■ This information is based on a chart in "Who Rules Columbia" prepared by the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), New York.

Sometime ago, Hubert Beck published a study entitled *Men Who Control Our Universities*, providing the kind of detailed information necessary to help determine whether members of the upper class control the nation's leading universities. Again, Domhoff's terse summary will suffice:

Beck studied 727 trustees from 30 major universities, 14 private and 16 public. Among the universities were such prestigious Eastern schools as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and Cornell, as well as such highly regarded public institutions of the Midwest and West as Ohio State, Illinois, and the University of California. At the time of the study, 1934-1935, the 30 schools, which comprised the United States universities in the elite Association of American Universities, made up only 2.2 percent of the total number of institutions of higher education. However, they had 20 percent of the undergraduate students, 24 percent of the faculty, 47 percent of the graduate students in professional schools, 50 percent of the graduate students in the arts and sciences, and 77 percent of the awarded doctoral degrees. Needless to add, they also possessed a corner on talent. Nearly one-half of the college graduates in the *Who's Who* for 1929 had attended one of these institutions. In 1936, 50 graduates of Yale alone were college or university presidents.

As was the case for corporate directors and Wall Street lawyers, just about one-third of the trustees were in the *Social Register*. This percentage is especially impressive when it is added that the Southern-based University of North Carolina had 104 (!) trustees, and that most of the others not listed in the *Social Register* came from state universities which have no *Social Register* cities nearby. As might be expected, the trustees listed in the *Social Register* were much more likely to be at private institutions, and it goes without saying that Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia are controlled by members of the upper class. Beck developed other interesting information on the trustees of the elite universities which shows that they are members of the power elite. Nearly half of the top 200 industrial corporations and the top 200 financial corporations were represented on

the 30 boards. One hundred seventy-five men from 194 of these top 400 companies held 1321 positions as corporate directors, an average of seven to eight per trustee. This average is very similar to those found in our studies of corporate directors. Other findings by Beck include the fact that lawyers and judges made up 25 percent of the total group of trustees, while bankers and manufacturers each contributed 15 percent of the total. Some 45 percent of the trustees were listed in *Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives*. The trustees held 54 directorships in 29 major foundations; 24 trustees were on J. P. Morgan's 1929 "preferred list" to receive "new issue securities at less than their market value"; and 12 were on mining magnate James W. Gerard's (SR, NY) list of "52 men who run America." Seven of the trustees were on two boards in the top 30.

There is only one possible objection to Beck's little-known but definitive study: It is based upon the years 1934-1935. While these years are within the time span with which we are concerned, it might be claimed that changes have taken place over the past 30 years. There is no reason to believe that the dominance of the elite universities by members of the power elite has diminished, however. A study of 100 men from the 12 foundations showed that one-third of them also served as university trustees or university presidents. There were six interlocks with Duke University, three with Yale, two with Princeton, two with Amherst, two with Dartmouth, two with Cornell, and one each with such elite schools as Harvard, Smith, Stanford, Cal Tech, and Vanderbilt. As another example of this continuing interlock, there were 60 interlocks with universities among the top 20 industrialists studied in Chapter 2.¹³

D. *The Mass Media* help to shape and fill our consciousness. Yet it is difficult to gauge the impact of newspapers, magazines, television, and radio, except to say that they decide the limits within which discussion occurs. Perhaps the most persuasive influ-

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

ence is indirect—that is corporate advertising:

Newspapers and magazines, for example, are highly mechanized business operations which are run on a profit-making basis, and only a small part of their income is from reader support. When advertising is important, the threat of its discontinuance can often have effects upon editorial policy. However, what is even more important is that the dependency on advertising keeps the subscription price of the magazine or newspaper very low and thus makes it impossible for publications to exist which must depend in their infancy on reader support. The problem, in short, is getting a newspaper or magazine started in the first place. The role of advertising in keeping subscription prices low has precluded the entrance of new periodicals into the field. Thus, when a new magazine begins, it is dependent upon large financial backers, as was the case when sociologist Daniel Bell and publishing executive Irving Kristol founded *The Public Interest* in 1965. According to *Time* magazine, they relied "on backing from Wall Street, and other friends. . . ."¹⁴

Then of course there are the newspaper chains. The most famous is the Hearst Empire. Not as powerful as it once was, it is nonetheless impressive: twelve newspapers, fourteen magazines, three television stations, six radio stations, a news service, a photo service, a feature syndicate, and Avon paperbacks. The Hearst chain is but the best known and largest of chain newspapers.

Domhoff's summary remarks can be paraphrased as follows:

1. The majority of the instruments of the mass media are owned or directly controlled by members of the national upper class.
2. Yet a crazy-quilt kind of pluralism survives. There are plenty of locally owned newspapers, hundreds of independent and at times far-out radio and TV stations, plus numerous little magazines for every race, religious creed, and political denomination.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

3. But by controlling *major* opinion-molding institutions in the country, upper-class persons play a very important part in shaping the outer boundaries within which debates and discussions occur.

4. Still, as Domhoff put it:

Such factors as diversity within the upper class, the American libertarian tradition, the non-upper-class backgrounds of most reporters and scholars, and the myriad of locally or religiously controlled colleges, newspapers, and magazines keep this upper-class domination of major opinion-molding institutions from being translated into complete and monolithic control of American opinion.¹⁵

TRANSITIONAL REMARKS

One reaction to upper class controls has been agrarian socialism. Let us examine the social and political structure of North America's earliest experiment in agrarian socialism, one with clear-cut origins going back to the populist movement: the socialist government elected to office during World War II in the Canadian wheat province of Saskatchewan. We will observe the heavy emphasis placed by the ordinary citizens on popular participation at all levels of government. Indeed, the absence of authoritarianism, by any definition, is striking.

Although this socialist provincial government did pioneer work in various forms of social legislation, it did not, it could not, establish by itself a fully socialist government based on state ownership of a means of production directed by the people. Still, the government's behavior was a far-cry from the Joe McCarthy antics that would be expected of it if the Hofstadter thesis were correct.

More to the point is the wielding by the upper-class of controls to further their own interests, including their participation in university decision-making, a topic explored in the Leggett-Roach paper on antiwar demonstrations and upper-class repression at the University of Connecticut.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83, reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Chapter 10 The Right-Democratic Alternative

Section One *Competing Elites*

WHERE IT IS

What is right-democratic? Do its contentions about itself square with evidence on its performance?

As we indicated in Chapter 9, right-democratic ideology places heavy emphasis on the need for adult conformity to electoral procedural matters associated with parliamentary processes. Both the electoral and the parliamentary activities are buttressed by a host of legal mechanisms designed to sheathe the entire political system. More specifically, right-democratic ideology and practice stress the importance of electoral politics. This ideology dramatizes as it praises the relevance of worthy political elites competing with one another for the support of an electorate. Presumably the electors participate both in the choice of their political leaders and in the organization of their citizens' pressure groups—once they have selected those to run the state.

Let us be more precise about how right-democratic ideology defines the workings of the electoral process:

1. *Worthy political elites compete periodically at the polls in order to garner the affection and votes of the multitude.* Joseph A. Schumpeter undoubtedly stands as the foremost spokesman on right-democratic theory. A Catholic, born in Austria in the last half of the nineteenth century, Schumpeter was a well-known Christian-Democrat, political activist, cabinet minister, and antifascist. During the 1930s he emigrated to the United States, where he taught at Columbia University. Recognized for the brilliance of his lectures and books on political as well as economic theory, Schumpeter articulated his right-democratic revision of

classical democratic theory in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*.¹

In this volume Schumpeter rejected classical democratic theory, principally on the grounds that there is no common will on which people can act, since people cannot agree on the goals of a political system. Furthermore, even if everyone could agree on common ends, the ordinary person lacks the rationality to act on them consistently. It will be observed that Schumpeter attacked the key assumptions of English utilitarianism and not those of American populism—the populist movement did not assume that there exists a common good for all; rather, it insisted on the distinction between the people and the malefactors of wealth, since the goals of each were quite different.

In place of commitment to classical theory, Schumpeter argued for a different, more "realistic" definition of democracy: "The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."² In this chapter's readings, we will observe how Schumpeter attempted to justify this inversion of control from the bottom up.

Later in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* he discussed the implications of his analysis by noting that, according to this view:

democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any sense of the terms "people" and "rule." Democracy means only that people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them. But since they might decide this also in entirely undemocratic ways, we

¹ Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1950).

² *Ibid.*, p. 269.

have had to narrow our definition by adding a further criterion identifying the democratic method, viz., free competition among would-be leaders for the vote of the electorate.³

For this elitist form of democracy to succeed, certain preconditions must be met: "The first condition is that the human material of politics—the people who man the party machines, are elected to serve in parliament, rise to cabinet office—should be of sufficiently high quality."⁴

In the same context, Schumpeter argued that the only guarantee for the presence of such qualified persons:

is in the existence of a social stratum, itself a product of a severely selective process, that takes to politics as a matter of course. If such a stratum be neither too exclusive nor too easily accessible for the outsider and if it be strong enough to assimilate most of the elements it currently absorbs, it not only will present for the political career products of stocks that have successfully passed many tests in other fields—served, as it were, an apprenticeship in private affairs—but it will also increase their fitness by endowing them with traditions that embody experience, with a professional code and with a common fund of views.⁵

Schumpeter's statements on democracy required revision, as indicated by the works of such eminent political sociologists as Morris Janowitz.

2. *For a democratic election to take place, competing political candidates and their followers must abide by the rules of peaceable exchange of political ideas which are meaningfully deliberated by a participating electorate both concerned with electoral outcome and blessed with self-confidence under conditions that minimize the manipulative potentiality of the mass media.*

Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick have indicated⁶ their intellectual dependence on

³ *Ibid.* pp. 284–285. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 290. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 291. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers.

⁶ Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, *Competitive*

Schumpeter (as well as Harold Lasswell) in their definition of what constitutes democratic elections. From their point of view, a democratic election (a) demands competition between two (or more) opposing candidates; (b) requires efforts to maintain traditional voting blocs, seek independent voters, and recruit converts from the opposition; and (c) presses both parties to participate vigorously in an effort to win the election. But no matter who wins, both parties will do their best to enhance the likelihood of their winning subsequent elections.

Still, the meeting of these prerequisites is not enough for a democratic election to occur, for a politician can obtain a popular mandate through manipulation of unqualified voters rather than through the support of participating, self-confident citizens.

Janowitz and Marvick set forth four conditions that must be met if the results of a competition are to represent the voters' wishes (i.e., the consent of the electors.)⁷

First, there must be a high level of citizen participation among all social groups. Voting constitutes a form of participation. It indicates a propensity to play the game and to accept the outcome of the election according to the rules. But a high turnout by itself is by no means a sufficient indication of election through consent.

The second criterion has a social-psychological quality. Whether the politics of consent has occurred depends on how much of the citizen participation is based on attitudes of political self-confidence and a sense of self-interest in the outcome of the election. Crucial in this regard is how the voter feels about the impact of the election's outcome on his self-interest. If the belief that there is a relation between electoral outcome and self-interest is widespread, then a primary quality of politics of consent prevails. Related to sense of outcome is presence of self-confidence. Does the voter feel that he can affect public policy through his vote? If so, he fulfills a prerequisite for participation in democratic politics.

Third, if the politics of consent is operative, then competition must stimulate effective de-

Pressure and Democratic Consent (Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 1–10.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4–10.

liberation on the issues (and the candidates) to create a meaningful basis for voting decisions. Here the voter is simply called on to weigh the merits of the most important issues raised by the competing parties and to arrive at a "net judgment" on which party and/or candidate presents the better case for him.

The fourth and final point is straightforward and deals with the propensity of politicians to command portions of the mass media in order to manipulate voting publics. For the politics of consent to function appropriately, both sides must be able to make wide use of mass communications and to mobilize extensive pressure by means of the party canvass and primary-group relations. At the same time, the bulk of the voters must be able to retain freedom of choice in indicating political consent. Needless to say, institutional and legal controls must act as safeguards. But more is involved. The voters' predispositions must act as a safeguard against manipulation. Most important in this regard would be the climate of opinion common to primary groups such as the voter's family and his associates at work. They will tend to mediate the mass media, and ideally their collective opinions should help to safeguard the person from manipulation.

Here Janowitz and Marvick assume that when people are concerned with the outcome of an election and when they express high degrees of self-confidence, the mass media can do little to manipulate them. These authors also assume that voting is a measure of self-interest, whereas self-confidence is generally derived from primary relations, such as those associated with the family. In their study of the 1952 presidential election, the two writers discerned that television exposure is greatest among those who have high interest and self-confidence and lowest among those with the least interest and self-confidence. That being the case, apparently we have little to worry about insofar as the manipulative propensities of the mass media are concerned, for the media's greatest manipulative potential occurs among those who seldom watch television.

Janowitz and Marvick's revision of Schumpeter lacks at least one quality. It does not take into account the importance of pressure groups and their use of the mass media. Perhaps the foremost exponent of this subject is David Riesman, whose formulations we attempt to distill

in our discussion of the third major point in the right-democratic definition of the workings of the electoral process.

3. *Contrary to the opinions shared by the left within the United States, there exist two conditions favorable to the proper functioning of democracy: (a) plurally organized, status groups and generations, drawn from all classes, and equally able to use the lobby technique to secure the passage or defeat of legislation; and (b) the genuine possibility that those who are yet unorganized will become organized.* The result is clear. No one group can entertain a commanding power relationship over any other group on matters of power over government. In fact, one group can quite readily veto the efforts of others, so that fair compromise becomes the order of the day. In short, political power begets a countervailing force that results in the veto of the bad law, the reversal of the brazen court order, or the overturning of the harsh administrative ruling.

David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney⁸ have held that, although in the late nineteenth century there did exist a business ruling class in the United States, today the mass of people are found in groups which have the power to prevent events that might be inimical to their interests. The only exception consists of those unorganized and sometimes disorganized persons who have not yet invented their veto groups. But they will soon.

The vetoing goes on all the time at all political levels, so Riesman *et al.* allege, with the result that an amorphous power structure has been created. So much has this become the case that it is difficult to distinguish the rulers from the ruled, the good guys from the bad guys, the farm workers from the growers, the hospital workers from the administrators, and the auto workers from the auto magnates. Because of their similarities, no one group can make a singularly impressive moral case nowadays. Hence, it is difficult to take sides in alleged struggles. Partially because of the absence of moral certainties and associated bipolarizations, the political system works. Indeed, it deserves our loyal participation.

For Riesman and others, political elites are

⁸David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1956).

somewhat less obvious than they appear in the formulations of Schumpeter and Janowitz. Still they are there, and their guidance qualities enable a legitimate system to work, even for the downtrodden.

4. *Political elites and masses recognize both (a) the legitimacy of governmental legal authority and associated parliamentary procedures, and (b) the illegitimacy of the mass demonstration; the consequence is clear: political change through either violent means or nonviolent but violence-provoking techniques becomes unacceptable, even among the poor.*

Indeed, right-democratic theorists classify both insurrectionary behavior and police-irritating demonstrations, in the context of availability of parliamentary forms, as nonpolitical. These acts deserve the designation "nonpolitical" because they circumvent (a) the use of personal appeal to the executive, (b) the legal submission of the argumentative brief, (c) the workings of parliamentary bodies, and (d) reliance on pressure groups, the only forms of political expression allowable under the democratic system. And to define acts as nonpolitical is to suggest that they are unrelated to successful problem-solving. To make this propositional association is to judge such demonstration to be unacceptable and its instigators, perhaps, to be mentally unbalanced, for only the neurotic would rebel against such an obviously worthwhile system. And to make this aspersion is to discredit the instigators.

Crucial to this conservative position is the sanctity of the law. For example, during the initial moments of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement (October 1, 1964), there occurred an episode involving university students who tried to prevent a police car from leaving campus with an arrested student by surrounding the vehicle. A number of faculty had already addressed those assembled when Seymour M. Lipset spoke to the throng and charged that the students were acting "like the Ku Klux Klan." Southern segregationists also believed in breaking the law when they rejected it, instead of obeying decisions adopted in a democracy. Lipset had assumed that the university is a democracy and had thus earned student acceptance of its regulations.⁹

⁹ Hal Draper, *Berkeley: New Student Revolt* (New York: Grove, 1965), p. 47.

Pluralists such as Riesman and Lipset would admit that problems do occur within a democracy. But differences on problem resolution are to be handled peaceably by a contending plurality of heterogeneous groups. This approach should minimize the display of passion, despite contending group interests, in order to use and to maintain the parliamentary process, which is vulnerable to extremist pressures.

Even the poor should peaceably hold hat in hand—indeinitely, if need be—for the important thing is the preservation of the parliamentary forms. Nor should the poor give up, because even they can act successfully through the parliamentary system. As Arnold Rose has indicated,¹⁰ it is true that rich people can use their money to obtain special political opportunities through the use of lobbyists, advertisements, and campaign contributions. Yet these three channels are by no means closed to poor people:

A volunteer campaign worker for a congressman will have more influence on him than most lobbyists, and as much influence on him as a campaign contribution equivalent to the voluntary labour, roughly speaking. The fact that the political party in most states is an open, if not entirely democratic, voluntary association, and the fact that it is the single most important influence on most elected officials, also gives the non-wealthy citizen access to political power often greater than that of the wealthy, but not politically active, citizen.¹¹

Indeed, all that the poor need do is give one dollar a year to garner control of wayward politicians in need of the campaign dollar:

Even a nominal financial contribution from a majority of the citizens—say \$1.00 a year—would pay most or the cost of running all the political campaigns. (It has been estimated that \$175,000,000 was spent in all of the 1960 campaigns—national, state, county, and municipal. It is not likely that this amount would be spent in non-presidential election years. . . .) An increase in the number of volunteer workers would reduce the money costs of campaigning. If there were these two forms of increased participation,

¹⁰ Arnold Rose, *The Power Structure* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 491–492.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 491. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

there would then be no obligation on the elected officeholders to return political favors for large campaign contributions. Even if this sum of money should not quite suffice to pay all campaign costs, the citizens who had made a small contribution would not be likely to tolerate the buying of political favors with large contributions. Simple public awareness of the large costs of campaigning would produce enough pressure to achieve the democrat's dream of getting a significant amount of free publicity for political campaigns. These developments, along with more effective controls on certain types of campaign expenditures, would eliminate the pressure on public officeholders to be inequitable in their public actions.¹²

Yet as Rose later noted, politicians have ways of circumventing the laws they have to govern their own campaign expenditures. The modal technique is to make the agencies and powers designed to enforce the law somewhat vague. Another device is to create campaign committees to support candidates, with the assumption that they can gather and spend as much as they wish, irrespective of regulations on expenditures for candidates. Of course, even if some of the present loopholes were closed, others could be opened.

Rose admitted that all this may move the poor to wonder about their dollar-a-year contribution.

THE LEFT-DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM

Left-democrats fail to share the perspective summarized above. Briefly, their criticisms of right-democratic declarations are as follows:

1. *On worthy elites competing periodically at the polls in order to garner the votes of the mass.* What remains unclear in Schumpeter's formulation is his definition of merit. What is its content? He seems to stress professionalization. But clearly that is not enough, for professionalization could mean not only the acquisition of skills but crookedness, narrowness, selfishness, and like sins associated by some with such professions as medicine. The left-democratic criticism would argue that profes-

sionalization does not provide the key for understanding or controlling political elites.

More important is the power of the upper classes to decide which professionals will run for positions such as the presidency of the United States. Indeed, many presidential candidates are themselves millionaires and members of the upper class. These top politicians make themselves available, much as would a debutante, and they in turn sometimes find millionaires who will adopt them. Of course there are exceptions. Eugene McCarthy was an example. But even he depended heavily on millionaire support. Illustrative was the way Eugene McCarthy obtained campaign contributions from not only the ordinary citizen but the wealthy as well:

The McCarthy campaign had at least five contributors who gave \$100,000 or more. On the record, the largest contributor was Stewart R. Mott, philanthropist and son of a pioneer in the automobile industry, one of the founders of General Motors. After spending \$100,000 trying to persuade Rockefeller to run, . . . Mott turned to McCarthy and contributed and spent, by his own calculations, approximately \$210,000 on McCarthy's campaign. One gift of \$100,000 was publicly and dramatically announced at the August 15 [1968] M-Day rally at Madison Square Garden. Mott also became coordinator for special gifts and helped to raise substantial amounts in addition to his own contributions. Mott also gave \$43,700 to other Democrats and \$11,000 to various miscellaneous committees, for a total of \$364,700 in political contributions in 1968.

Mr. and Mrs. Jack J. Dreyfus, Jr., are listed as \$100,000-plus contributors, although some accounts say they gave as much as \$500,000 and are considered by some to be the single largest contributors to the McCarthy campaign. Dreyfus was a senior partner of the Wall Street firm of Dreyfus and Co., and a business associate of Howard Stein, McCarthy's finance chairman. . . .¹³

Wealth would appear to be relevant in determining outcome on not only the chief executive but the judicial levels as well. G. William Domhoff argued and demonstrated that in

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 478. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

¹³ Herbert E. Alexander, *Financing the 1968 Election* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1971), p. 50.

America the upper classes dominate the executive level of government, and through it, the judiciary. Here the connections are clear, for the President has discretionary appointment power to the judiciary. By contrast, when we consider the legislative level of government, the controls are less clear-cut. Nonetheless, they are telling.¹⁴

The upper classes control the chief executive position through their intervention, which is by no means unified, at the level of the presidential nominations. In order for a man to become a serious contender for the presidency, he must initially have the support of persons willing to pump hundreds of thousands of dollars into a campaign designed to build his image and to attract funds as well as public support. Illustratively, Eugene McCarthy needed and obtained a million dollars to initiate his campaign for the presidency.¹⁵ The normal procedure for a candidate is to find a millionaire campaign manager, who in turn seeks to obtain a number of wealthy persons who agree to support the candidate. If the campaign manager succeeds, he then surfaces his candidate as a person with sufficient resources to make himself a serious contender.

There is a reciprocal side to upper-class control of the chief executive's position, and although merit may be pertinent, its relevance seems to remain obscured by the significance of the ability to give. Once a candidate has won the presidential office, he appoints to important positions a number of upper-class campaign contributors, in proportions which go well beyond their relative population size. These upper-class appointments heavily favor key overseas diplomatic posts. However, not all such overseas positions are filled on the basis of size of campaign contribution. Appointments are sometimes based on seniority in the diplomatic service, merit, and like criteria based on presumed skill in pertinent interpersonal relations. Still, Nixon's 1968-1969 appointments to overseas slots and the size of the appointees' contributions (which far exceed Rose's recom-

mendation) to the 1968 campaign are of more than passing interest (see Table 22).

By contrast, the amount of an individual's contribution to the successful presidential campaign appears to be a much less significant factor in obtaining appointments to powerful executive posts at home. Here the most important variable seems to be the past effective loyalty of the powerful to the successful chief or the presumed fairness or neutrality of the selected (provided, of course, that the person is established in an upper-class position). Domestic upper-class appointments tend to include the major secretaryships—State, Treasury, and Defense. Upper-class appointments to a slightly lesser degree predominate in the Department of Commerce, and, of all places, in the Department of Labor, which should be staffed by representatives of organized labor in a society that is organized along pluralistic lines. Domhoff has observed that this class-biased appointment pattern for cabinet posts applies to both Republicans and Democrats.

In the cases of key cabinet posts, it appears that the criteria of "merit," whatever they might be, are confined to assessments of upper-class folk, and for good reason, since the upper classes are the ones who back the contenders in the race for the presidency. And to the victor goes the power to make appointments of the winning candidate's judiciary friends and colleagues. This does not mean that there is consensus at the top of the class structure on which meritorious figures should assume executive posts. On the contrary, the appointments tend to reflect the class-ethnic-religious backgrounds of the victorious managers and donors. For example, upper-class, white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant Republicans, occupying heavy industrial positions, have predominated in the selection and support of their party's presidential candidates. In turn, on leaving the winners' circle, the Hoovers, Eisenhowers, and Nixons have favored them when making key executive appointments. Jews, Catholics, blacks, and Chicanos receive short shrift. By contrast, the Democratic party hopefuls have looked to businessmen representing lighter industries, retail enterprises, and real estate. Unlike the homogeneous array of Republican upper-class contributors (the Rockefellers, the Mellons, the Pews, the Du Ponts, *et al.*), the key Democratic con-

¹⁴ G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 84-96, 103-107, 111-114. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

¹⁵ Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

TABLE 22 Contributions Among Selected Nixon Appointees, 1968-1969

<i>Name</i>	<i>Appointment</i>	<i>Contributions (in dollars)</i>
Annenberg, Walter H. Wynnewood, Pennsylvania	Ambassador to Great Britain	2,500 Rep.
DeRoulet, Vincent New York, New York	Ambassador to Jamaica	44,500 Rep.
Dudley, Guilford, Jr. Nashville, Tennessee	Ambassador to Denmark	51,000 Rep.
Gould, Kingdon Laurel, Maryland Washington, D.C.	Ambassador to Luxembourg	22,000 Rep.
Humes, John P. New York, New York	Ambassador to Austria	43,000 Rep.
Marshall, Anthony D. New York, New York	Ambassador to Malagasy Republic	25,000 Rep.
Melady, Thomas Patrick New York, New York	Ambassador to Republic of Burundi	500 Rep.
Middendorf, J. William, II New York, New York	Ambassador to Kingdom of the Netherlands	15,500 Rep.
Moore, John D. J. New York, New York	Ambassador to Ireland	1,000 Rep. 500 Dem.
Pritzlaff, John D., Jr. Phoenix, Arizona Scottsdale, Arizona	Ambassador to Malta	23,000 Rep.
Replogle, Luther I. Oak Park, Illinois	Ambassador to Iceland	6,500 Rep.
Rush, Kenneth New York, New York	Ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany	1,000 Rep.
Schmidt, Adolph W. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania	Ambassador to Canada	500 Rep.
Symington, J. Fife Lutherville, Maryland	Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago	5,000 Rep. 500 Misc.

Data from: Herbert E. Alexander, Financing the 1968 Election (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1971), pp. 353-354.

reordering of monopoly capital will occur depends on the one hand on the cohesiveness of the capitalist class and its capacity to generate a class politics in the interests of capital as a whole, and on the other, on the strength of socialist movements in the working class and their capacity to organize a class politics capable of transforming decommodified production in the service of capital into genuinely socialist production in the service of the working class.

Bureaucracy and the State

Our discussion of the historical transformations of the process of accumulation closed with a somewhat speculative discussion of the emergent solutions to the economic stagnation of the 1970s and the new contradictions which those solutions were likely to engender. The central proposition was that the capitalist state was likely to engage in qualitatively deeper forms of intervention into the economy, moving from intervention and planning at the level of market relations towards planning within production itself. Such a transformation in the role of the capitalist state would itself generate new contradictions specifically centred around the politicization of the accumulation process.

Such changes in the forms of state activity in capitalist societies and in the contradictions of accumulation are of crucial importance in any discussion of socialist politics. A number of questions are immediately posed: In what ways do these changes in the role of the state affect the relationship of the capitalist state to class struggle? Do these new contradictions open up new possibilities for the left to use the capitalist state as part of a revolutionary strategy? What implications do these developments have for the classic debate between peaceful, incremental roads to socialism and violent, revolutionary strategies for socialism?

I cannot rigorously answer most of these questions, but I will try to clarify some of the issues involved in answering them. In this chapter I will focus on one specific issue which underscores all of these questions on socialist strategies: the problem of bureaucracy. In particular, I will address the question: how should we understand the relationship between class struggle

and the internal structure of the state?¹ We will explore this question by comparing the analyses of bureaucracy and the state of two influential theorists, Max Weber and V. I. Lenin. In the next chapter we will link this discussion of bureaucracy and the capitalist state to the analysis of class formation and accumulation contradictions developed earlier.

In the summer of 1917, in opposite corners of Europe, two essays were written on the nature of the state, bureaucracy, and politics. One, *Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany*, was written by Max Weber; the other, *The State and Revolution*, was written by Vladimir Lenin. In spite of the obvious differences between the two men—one was a liberal German academician, the other a professional Russian revolutionary—they had certain things in common. Both were men of about fifty years of age whose intellectual lives had been decisively shaped by the work of Karl Marx. Both felt that their ideas on the state were strongly out of favour in the ruling circles of their respective countries. Both wrote their essays in the hopes of influencing political developments. In the immediate years following the publications of the essays, attempts were made to put the ideas of both into practice: Lenin's ideas in the attempt to build socialism after the Bolshevik Revolution, and Weber's in the attempt to create a viable parliamentary democracy in the Weimar Republic.

Both essays deal with many of the same questions, though in sharply different ways and leading to radically different conclusions: How can the state apparatus be controlled? Is it possible for the masses to govern and control the state? What is the relationship of representative institutions to the state bureaucracy in capitalist society? What can be done about the ever-increasing appropriation of power by bureaucrats? What are the consequences of socialism for the nature of the state? These are

1. While there has been a tremendous growth in Marxist theoretical work on the capitalist state in recent years, relatively little has been explicitly focused on the problem of the internal structures of the state. An especially interesting analysis of this question which explicitly contrasts the internal organization structures of the capitalist state with both the feudal state and the socialist state, is Goran Therborn, *What does the Ruling Class do when it Rules?*, London NLB 1978. For an earlier treatment of similar themes developed within the broad framework of the Frankfurt school, see the work of Claus Offe.

issues that are no less important today than half a century ago and are still matters of intense debate.

In the following section, Weber's argument in *Parliament and Government* will be laid out systematically. In a few places material will be drawn from *Economy and Society* (the bulk of which was written before 1917) to elaborate certain points more fully. This will be followed by a comparable presentation of Lenin's argument in *The State and Revolution*. After both Weber's and Lenin's analyses have been presented, the underlying assumptions of both positions will be compared, and the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments assessed.

Weber's Argument

By 1917 Weber was convinced that German politics were being conducted in a totally irresponsible and incompetent manner. As a German nationalist, he felt that it was crucial to understand the sources of this incompetence, for if it were not corrected, Germany "would be condemned to remain a small and conservative country, perhaps with a fairly good public administration in purely technical respects, but at any rate a provincial people without the opportunity of counting in the arena of world politics—and also without any moral right to it." (1462)² After examining the history of German politics in the years since Bismarck, Weber became convinced that "every German policy, irrespective of its goals, is condemned to failure in view of the given constitutional set-up and the nature of our policy machinery, and that this will remain so if conditions do not change." (1384) The critical aspect of this constitutional set-up was the powerlessness of parliament. Weber felt that while significantly strengthening parliamentary institutions would not guarantee a dramatic improvement in the quality of German politics, such a change was essential if there was to be any hope for the future.

This general conclusion concerning the necessity for a strong

2. All page numbers in parentheses in this section refer to the English language edition of *Economy and Society*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, New York 1968. Citations from pp. 1381–1462 are from Weber's essay "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany: A Contribution to the Political Critique of Officialdom and Party Politics". All other citations are from the text of *Economy and Society*.

parliament was based on a number of propositions about the nature of politics and bureaucracies and the problem of political leadership in "modern" society:

*Proposition 1. With the development of capitalism and the increasing complexity of society, the needs for rational administration expand both quantitatively and qualitatively. As a result, both public and private organizations tend to become more and more bureaucratized.*³

"The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization", Weber writes, "has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form." (973)⁴

3: Weber's formal definition of "bureaucracy" includes the following characteristics:

- (1) [Officials] are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations.
- (2) They are organized in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
- (3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.
- (4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection.
- (5) Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination or guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training or both. They are *appointed*, not *elected*.
- (6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money.
- (7) The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent.
- (8) It constitutes a career. There is a system of "promotion" according to seniority or to achievement or both. Promotion is dependent upon the judgement of superiors.
- (9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position.
- (10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office. (220-221).

4. By "monocratic form" or "monocracy" Weber means a bureaucratic organization at the top of which is a single individual rather than a group of individuals (a "collegial body").

Bureaucratic forms of organization increasingly characterize private business corporations, churches, political parties, and other organizations in which rational efficiency is important to success. "This is increasingly so", Weber argues, "the larger the association is, the more complicated its tasks are, and above all, the more its existence depends on power—whether it involves a power struggle on the market, in the electoral arena or on the battlefield." (1399) "The future," Weber concludes, "belongs to bureaucratization." (1401)

Proposition 2. As bureaucratization increases, the power of bureaucrats tends to increase, both with respect to nonbureaucratic organizations and with respect to the nonbureaucratic elements of bureaucracies

"The power of a fully developed bureaucracy", Weber writes, "is always great, under normal conditions, overtowering. The political master always finds himself, vis-à-vis the trained official, in the position of a dilettante facing the expert." (991) This progressively increasing power of bureaucracies and bureaucrats grows out of several interconnected characteristics of bureaucratic organization: (1) the practical effectiveness and increasing indispensability of bureaucratic organizations,⁵ (2) the expert technical knowledge controlled by the bureaucrats, and (3) the "administrative secrets" (knowledge about the inner workings of the bureaucracy) controlled by bureaucrats. This last element is especially important. Outsiders are in a weak position not merely because of the technical expertise of the bureaucrats, but because of the bureaucratic control of files, information, and procedures.

Given this constant expansion of bureaucratic power, it is increasingly problematic, Weber argues, whether or not any independent power will be able to control the state bureaucracy. In his discussion of bureaucracy as an ideal type Weber stresses

5. Weber writes: "The rule . . . cannot dispense with or replace the bureaucratic apparatus once it exists . . . [for] if the apparatus stops working, or if its work is interrupted by force, chaos results which is difficult to master by any improvised replacements from among the governed. . . . Increasingly the material fate of the masses depends upon the continuous and correct functioning of the ever more bureaucratic organizations of private capitalism and the idea of replacing them becomes more and more utopian." (988)

that "at the top of a bureaucratic organization there is necessarily an element which is at least not purely bureaucratic. The category of bureaucracy is one applied only to the exercise of control by means of a particular kind of administrative staff." (222) This non-bureaucratic top has an intrinsically political quality since it must deal with the alternative ends that the bureaucracy serves and not merely with the means for accomplishing those ends. With the growing power of the state bureaucracy, Weber argues, there is increasing danger that these political positions will become monopolized by the bureaucrats themselves, resulting in the development of a system of "completely unsupervised office holding". "In view of the growing indispensability of the state bureaucracy and its corresponding increase in power, how can there be any guarantee that any powers will remain which can check or effectively control the tremendous influence of this stratum [bureaucrats?]" (1403) The critical issue in this problem of controlling the bureaucracy is how people are selected to fill these top administrative-political positions, in particular, whether they are bureaucrats selected by behind-the-scenes "unofficial patronage" or professional politicians selected through open, parliamentary struggle.

Proposition 3. If the top administration of the state bureaucracy is in the hands of bureaucrats, then there will be a strong tendency for:

(A) the political direction of the bureaucracy to be irresponsible and ineffective, especially in times of crisis; and

(B) the behind-the-scenes influence of big capitalists in the running of the state bureaucracy to be maximized.

A. "The essence of politics", Weber writes, "is struggle": struggle over ends and the power to accomplish ends. Effective and responsible political leadership consists in knowing how to weigh competing and conflicting ends, how to negotiate compromises "sacrificing the less important for the more important" (1404), how to recruit allies and form coalitions in political battles, and so forth. These skills are arts that require intensive

training. For the political direction of the state bureaucracy to be effective it is therefore necessary that the top administrators be thoroughly trained in this art of politics, and furthermore, that mechanisms exist which hold them accountable for the *political* quality of their administration.

The entire structure and ethos of bureaucracy makes the professional bureaucrat unsuited for such a political directorate. While bureaucrats are highly skilled in techniques of rational execution of programmes, they are almost inevitably incompetent in political skills. This incompetence stems from the nature of bureaucratic responsibility: "An official who receives a directive which he considers wrong can and is supposed to object to it. If his superior insists on its execution, it is his duty and even his honour to carry it out as if it corresponded to his innermost conviction, and to demonstrate in this fashion that his sense of duty stands above his personal preference." (1404)

There is little or no scope for the development of political talents within the bureaucratic ranks, and as a result, career bureaucrats generally lack the capacity for real political leadership: "Our officialdom has been brilliant whenever it had to prove its sense of duty, its impartiality and mastery of organizational problems in the face of official, clearly formulated tasks of a specialized nature. . . . But here we are concerned with political, not bureaucratic achievements, and the facts themselves provoke the recognition which nobody can truthfully deny: That bureaucracy failed completely whenever it was expected to deal with *political* problems. This is no accident; rather it would be astonishing if capabilities inherently so alien to one another would emerge within the same political structure." (1417) The control of the administrative apex of the bureaucracy by bureaucrats thus leads to politically irresponsible and ineffective direction of bureaucratic activity. In times of peace and domestic tranquillity this might not be terribly serious; but when crisis occurs, the results can be devastating.

B. Ineffectiveness and irresponsibility are not the only costs of uncontrolled bureaucratic domination. In addition, Weber argues, it tends to maximize the covert influence of big capitalist interests in the administration of the state. "The big capitalist interests of the present day, like those of the past, are apt, in

political life—in parties and in all other connections that are important to them—to prefer monarchy [instead of collegial control such as parliament]. For monarchy is, from their point of view, more 'discreet'. The monocratic chief is more open to personal influence and is more easily swayed, thus making it more readily possible to influence the administration of justice and other governmental activity in favour of such powerful interests." (283–284) While the influence of large capitalist interests is by no means negligible even where there are strong parliaments (especially, Weber argues, when parties are organized as "political machines" as was common in the United States), those interests attain the most unrestricted scope when bureaucracy is the least controlled.⁶ This combination of a predominance of capitalist influence behind the scenes with irresponsible and ineffective political leadership of the state bureaucracy, Weber felt, characterized Germany from the time of Bismarck. The only way out of this situation, Weber argued, was for professional politicians to replace bureaucrats in the top administrative positions. For this to be possible, a strong parliament was essential.

Proposition 4. "Only a working, not merely speech-making parliament, can provide the ground for the growth and selective ascent of genuine leaders, not merely demagogic talents. A working parliament . . . is one which supervises the administration by continuously sharing its work." (1416)

While Weber feels that only professional politicians can bring effective and responsible leadership to the bureaucracy, he does not feel that politicians are necessarily any more moral or

6. In a typical liberal manner, Weber contrasts the influence of big capital on state policy to a more diffuse influence of a plurality of organized groups. In effect he is saying that to the extent the top of the state apparatus is dominated by the bureaucracy, the interests of big capital will dominate over the interests of "society". It is possible, without doing much violence to the logic of Weber's argument, to recast this analysis in terms of the contrast between the interests of particular capitalists and the interests of the capitalist class as a whole. That is, Weber's argument is equivalent to saying that bureaucratic domination of the apex of the state apparatus tends to generate a preponderance of particularistic capitalist interests over the interests of the class as a whole within the state.

honest than are professional bureaucrats: "The motives of party members are no more merely idealist than are the usual philistine interests of bureaucratic competitors in promotions and benefices. Here, as there, personal interests are usually at stake." (1415) What is of critical importance, Weber argues, is that "these universal human frailties do not prevent the selection of capable leaders." (1416) Politicians can become potentially effective leaders not because they have necessarily better personal qualities than bureaucrats, but because they operate in an institutional context which develops political talents, selects for leadership positions those individuals who most successfully demonstrate those talents, and holds those leaders accountable for the political quality of their actions. If such an institutional context is absent, professional politicians will behave much like bureaucrats who occupy positions of power at the top of the administration. In modern, complex industrial society, Weber insists, the only institution that can accomplish these tasks of political recruitment, training, and accountability is a powerful parliament.

A strong working parliament accomplishes three essential things: first, it provides the institutional means for effectively controlling the unrestrained power of the bureaucracy; second, it generates the talented political leadership necessary for responsibly directing bureaucratic activity; third, it provides the mechanisms for holding that leadership accountable.

A. Administrative supervision. A working parliament's effectiveness in controlling the bureaucracy stems from the active involvement of parliamentary committees in supervising and investigating the activities of various bureaucratic departments: "There is no substitute for the systematic cross-examination (under oath) of experts before a parliamentary commission in the presence of the respective departmental officials. This alone guarantees public supervision and a thorough inquiry. . . . The parliamentary right of inquiry should be an auxiliary means and, for the rest, a whip, the mere existence of which will force the administrative chiefs to account for their actions in such a way as to make its use unnecessary." (1418) Through such investigatory committees, the parliament shares in the work of administration by examining bureaucratic

records, formulating legislative measures to improve bureaucratic performance, adjusting budgets for various departments, and so forth.

B. Leadership creation. Parliamentary investigation and committee work is also one of the basic means for developing the leadership qualities of politicians: "Only such intensive training, through which the politician must pass in the committees of a powerful *working* parliament, turns such an assembly into a recruiting ground not for mere demagogues but for positively participating politicians. . . . Only such co-operation between civil servants and politicians can guarantee the continuous supervision of the administration and, with it, the political education of leaders and led." (1420) At the same time, a powerful parliament generates talented political leadership in at least three other ways. First, the sheer fact of power attracts individuals with leadership qualities; a powerless parliament makes a political career uninviting.⁷ Second, not only does power attract leadership talent, but also the process of parliamentary political battles cultivates that talent, particularly the ability to recruit allies and make the necessary compromises to establish a solid following. Third, the "natural selection" of the competitive struggle for power tends to push the more capable leadership into the top positions. In this process, political parties play an absolutely key role. As in all modern mass associations, there is a strong tendency for political parties to become bureaucratized and for the party functionary to replace talented politicians in positions of power. It is only when the stakes of parliamentary struggle are high, when victory brings real power to the party, that this tendency towards bureaucratic ossification is counteracted; a political party cannot afford to keep talented political leadership from rising if it hopes to be successful.

7. "In the face of the powerlessness of parliament [in Germany of 1917] and the resulting bureaucratic character of the ministerial positions, a man with a strong power drive and the qualities that go with it would have to be a fool to venture into this miserable web of mutual resentment and on this slippery floor of court intrigue, as long as his talents and energies can apply themselves in fields such as the giant enterprises, cartels, banks and wholesale firms. . . . Stripped of all phraseology, our so-called monarchic government amounts to nothing but this process of *negative selection* which diverts all major talents to the service of capitalist interests." (1413)

C. Political accountability. Finally, strong parliamentary institutions contain built-in mechanisms of accountability. When top administrative positions are filled by bureaucrats through behind-the-scenes deals, there is no way to hold them publicly accountable for their activity: "Unofficial patronage, then, is the worst form of parliamentary patronage—one that favours mediocrity since nobody can be held responsible. It is a consequence of our rule by conservative civil servants. . . . Patronage in this system is not in the hands of politicians and parties, which might be held responsible by the public, but works through private channels. . . ." (1429–1430) Where top positions are filled through open, parliamentary struggles, however, a certain minimum accountability is assured: "The politician, and above all, the party leader who is rising to public power, is exposed to public scrutiny through the criticism of opponents and competitors and can be certain that, in the struggle against him, the motives and means of his ascendancy will be ruthlessly publicized." (1450)

While the accountability that accompanies electoral campaigns does not by any means prevent demagoguery, it does tend to make the demagogue more politically responsible. Beyond electoral accountability, a strong parliament itself has the power (through parliamentary inquiry, votes of no confidence, etc.) to hold the top administrative leadership accountable for its actions. This interplay of competing parties, accountable, elected leadership, and investigative parliamentary committees creates a political structure that, Weber felt, would guarantee a minimum political responsibility on the part of the political leadership.

Weber's expectations about the benefits of a strong parliament were relatively limited. He certainly did not feel that it would automatically create a happy and prosperous society or even solve all of the political ills of industrial society. But he did feel that all other alternative political structures would not even be able to guarantee the minimum political effectiveness of a working parliament. In particular, he argues that for a variety of different reasons, monarchy, (1406) "passive" democracy, (983, 1453) and "active mass" democracy will all inevitably strengthen the purely bureaucratic control of the bureaucracy. The most important of these for the comparison with

Lenin is active mass democratization—the process of expanding in various ways the scope of participation of citizens in political life. Two of the principles of active democratization are: “(1) prevention of the development of a closed status group of officials in the interest of a universal accessibility of office, and (2) minimization of the authority of officialdom in the interest of expanding the sphere of influence of ‘public opinion’ as far as practicable. Hence, wherever possible, political democracy [i.e., active democracy] strives to shorten the term of office through election and recall, and to be relieved from a limitation to candidates with expert qualifications.” (985) The result is that while passive democratization tends to encourage bureaucratization, the principles of active democratization tend to work against bureaucratization.

This might lead one to believe that the most expansive, most “mass” active democratization would provide the best safeguard against bureaucratic domination. No, Weber says. Just as monarchic government cannot possibly supervise the bureaucracy, neither can a truly active *mass* democracy.

By “mass democracy” Weber means democratic states which lack significant and powerful “free representative institutions” (i.e., representative institutions in which the representatives are not narrowly mandated but rather are “free” to engage in political bargaining, struggle, etc.). Such democracies take one of two forms: either they are “direct democracies” or “plebiscitary democracies”. The former Weber feels cannot exist in a large and complex society. They would simply be technically impossible. The closest thing in modern society to direct democracy is “the Soviet type of republican organization where it serves as a substitute for immediate democracy since the latter is impossible in a mass organization.”⁸ (293) Soviet assemblies (as an ideal type) are characterized by imperative mandates, recall at any time, short terms of office, and other characteristics derived from the principles of direct democracy.⁹

8. Whenever Weber discusses “soviets” in *Parliament and Government and Economy and Society*, he treats them as an “ideal-type” organization that adapts the principles of direct democracy to the conditions of modern society. Nowhere does he discuss them as a concrete historical phenomenon or present any empirical data on the actual functioning of soviets.

9. The basic characteristics of direct democracy as elaborated by Weber are: (a) short terms of office, if possible only running between two general meetings of

Weber feels that the prospects for such mandated representative institutions to control bureaucracy are quite limited. Mandated assemblies would work reasonably well, Weber argues, only as long as there were no significant antagonisms between (and within) the representatives’ constituencies. As soon as serious conflicts occur, a mandated assembly would become completely impotent since the representatives would be prohibited from negotiating compromises. They would be forced to return to their constituency to alter their mandated position on every significant issue, thus making effective political bargaining impossible. The result would be a complete paralysis of the assembly and thus an incapacity to supervise effectively the bureaucracy. As soon as the principle of imperative mandates is relaxed, however, the representative ceases to be simply the delegated agent of the electors and begins to exercise real authority over them. The result is that the “soviet” form of direct democracy is transformed into the beginnings of a “parliamentary” system.

Plebiscitary democracy (i.e., formal government through mass votes on issues and leadership) is equally impractical: “The plebiscite as means of election as well as of legislation has inherent technical limitations, since it only answers ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Nowhere in mass states does it take over the most important function of parliament, that of determining the budget. In such cases the plebiscite would also obstruct more seriously the passing of all bills that result from a compromise between conflicting interests, for the most diverse reasons can lead to a ‘No’ if there is no means of accommodating opposed interests through negotiation. The referendum does not know the *com-*

the members; (b) liability to recall at any time; (c) the principle of rotation or of selection by lot in filling offices so that every member takes a turn at some time (making it possible to avoid the position of power of technically trained persons or of those with long experience and command of official secrets); (d) strictly defined mandate for the conduct of office laid down by the assembly of members (the sphere of competence is thus concretely defined and not of a general character); (e) a strict obligation to render an accounting to the general assembly; (f) the obligation to submit every unusual question which has not been foreseen to the assembly of members or to a committee representing them; (g) the distribution of power between large numbers of offices each with its own particular function; (h) the treatment of office as an avocation and not a full time occupation. (289)

promise upon which the majority of laws is based in every mass state with strong regional, social, religious and other cleavages." (1455) Since real government cannot in fact be conducted through constant referenda and plebiscites, there is a strong tendency for such systems to degenerate into "caesarist" forms of leadership selection: "Active mass democratization means that the political leader is no longer proclaimed a candidate because he has proved himself in a circle of *honoratoires*, then becoming a leader because of his parliamentary accomplishments, but that he gains the trust and faith of the masses in him and his power with the means of demagoguery. In substance this means a shift toward the *caesarist* mode of selection." (1451)

The critical characteristic of such caesarist leadership (i.e., leadership directly selected by a show of mass confidence) is that it is accountable to a working, powerful parliament. Because of his position of enormous power and prestige, such a leader usually has at his disposal all of the means necessary to guarantee mass support. But in the end, he is little different from a hereditary monarch in his capacity to control the bureaucratic apparatus, and like monarchic government, caesarist leadership tends to generate uncontrolled bureaucratic domination.

The only way out of these impasses, Weber maintains, is through active parliamentary democracy. While in any modern, mass state a certain tendency towards caesarism is inevitable, parliamentary institutions have the capacity to control such tendencies, and in so doing, to control the bureaucracy as well. Neither one-man rule, of either the caesarist or monarchic variety, nor mass rule, of either the soviet or plebiscitary variety, can accomplish this.

Lenin's Argument

The basic question that underlies Lenin's analysis in *The State and Revolution* is quite different from Weber's: How can the state be made to serve the interests of the working class? or alternatively, what is the relationship between the state apparatus and the goals of a socialist revolution? Such questions had particularly poignant implications in the summer of 1917, when the essay was written. The February Revolution had already occurred, establishing a bourgeois "constitutional"

government; the October Revolution was brewing. Such a conjuncture sharply raised a central theoretical issue that has preoccupied much writing and political struggle on the Left for a century: Should the state be considered an essentially *neutral apparatus* that merely needs to be "captured" by a working-class socialist political party for it to serve the interests of the working class, or is the apparatus of the state in capitalist society a distinctively *capitalist apparatus* that cannot possibly be "used" by the working class, and as a result, must be destroyed and replaced by a radically different form of the state?¹⁰ Lenin very decisively takes the latter position, arguing that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is incompatible with the bourgeois state apparatus, and therefore that the capitalist state must be smashed and replaced by new revolutionary "soviet" institutions.

Although much of the essay takes the form of a polemic against the more reformist perspective, Lenin's analysis does contain a fairly coherent theory of the state, bureaucracy, and the implications of socialism for state structure:

Proposition 1. "The state is a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when and insofar as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that class antagonisms are irreconcilable. . . . The state is an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another. . . . The state is a special organization of force: it is an organization of violence for the suppression of some class." (267, 268, 280)¹¹

10. These two conceptions of the state are frequently designated the "state in capitalist society" vs. the "capitalist state" theories. The writings of C. Wright Mills, G. William Domhoff, and to a much lesser extent Ralph Miliband fall mainly into the former, whereas Lenin and the French "structuralist" Marxists (Althusser, Poulantzas, and others) fall into the latter. The critical difference between the two centres on whether the state is analysed primarily in terms of who controls it (capitalists, elites, bureaucrats, etc.) or in terms of what kind of a state it is (feudal state, bourgeois state, socialist state, etc.). Of course, there is no necessary reason why the two perspectives cannot be combined.

11. All page references are to the one-volume edition of *Selected Works*, London 1969, unless otherwise specified.

Lenin adopts with very little modification the classic Marxian conception of the state. The state is defined not only in terms of the *means* at its disposal (the control of violence), but also in terms of the *ends* it serves (class domination and suppression of class struggle). This function is characteristic of all states, Lenin argues, including a socialist state; what differs is the class being oppressed and the class which rules. In a capitalist state, the bourgeoisie rules and the proletariat is suppressed; in a socialist state, the proletariat rules and the capitalist class is suppressed. All states imply repression.

Proposition 2. "A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism, and therefore, once capital has gained possession of this very best shell . . . it establishes its power so securely, so firmly, that no change of persons, institutions or parties in the bourgeois-democratic republic can shake it." (273)

This is the critical part of Lenin's argument. He argues not merely that capitalists happen to control the political institutions of a capitalist society, but also that those institutions are structured in ways which guarantee that control. In particular Lenin views parliament as a perfect instrument for ensuring capitalist domination. This is true for two reasons: First, parliament is an institution that mystifies the masses and legitimates the social order; second, the structure of capitalist society ensures that the bourgeoisie will necessarily control parliament.

A. Mystification and legitimation. The central way that parliament mystifies political life, according to Lenin, is that it appears to be the basic organ of power in the society, and thus gives the appearance that the people's elected representatives run the state, when in fact all important decisions are made behind the scenes: "Take any parliamentary country, from America to Switzerland, from France to Britain, Norway and so forth—in these countries the real business of 'state' is performed behind the scenes and is carried on by the departments, chancelleries and General Staffs. Parliament is given up to talk

for the special purpose of fooling the 'common people'." (296) Lenin argued that parliaments in capitalist society must necessarily be "mere talking-shops" since important state functions are controlled by the executive apparatus (the bureaucracy), and thus they necessarily become sources of political mystification.

B. Bourgeois control of parliament. Even if parliaments did have some residual power, they would still be instruments of capitalist class domination because of the direct control of parliament by the bourgeoisie: "[Bourgeois parliamentary democracy] is always hemmed in by the narrow limits set by capitalist exploitation, and consequently always remain, in effect, a democracy for the minority, only for the propertied classes, only for the rich. . . . Owing to the conditions of capitalist exploitation, modern wage slaves are so crushed by want and poverty that 'they cannot be bothered with democracy', 'they cannot be bothered with politics'; in the ordinary peaceful course of events the majority of the population is debarred from participation in public and political life. . . . If we look more closely into the machinery of capitalist democracy we see everywhere, in the 'petty'—supposedly petty—details of the suffrage (residential qualification, exclusion of women, etc.), in the technique of the representative institutions, in the actual obstacles to the right of assembly (public buildings are not for paupers!), in the purely capitalist organization of the daily press, etc., etc.—we see restriction after restriction upon democracy. These restrictions, exceptions, exclusions, obstacles for the poor seem slight . . . but in their sum total these restrictions exclude and squeeze out the poor from politics, from active participation in democracy." (326)

The net result is, according to Lenin, that the masses only get "to decide once every few years which member of the ruling class is to repress and crush the people through parliament—this is the real essence of bourgeois parliamentarism." (295)

Proposition 3. Bureaucracy is the basic structure through which the capitalist class rules. Furthermore, bureaucratic organization is suited only for capitalist domination.

Lenin bases this proposition on three arguments: bureaucracy is functional for capitalism; bureaucrats, big and small, are dependent on the bourgeoisie; and bureaucratic organization makes popular control of administration impossible.

A. *Bureaucracy is functional for capitalism.* "The development, perfection and strengthening of the bureaucratic and military apparatus", Lenin writes, "proceeded during all of the numerous bourgeois revolutions which Europe has witnessed since the fall of feudalism." (284) As class struggle intensified with the development of capitalism, the progressive expansion and centralization of the bureaucratic apparatus became necessary:—"in its struggle against the [proletarian] revolution, the parliamentary republic found itself compelled to strengthen, along with repressive measures, the resources and centralization of governmental power. All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it. The parties that contended in turn for domination regarded the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the victor" (282: quoting Marx, from the *Eighteenth Brumaire*).

Finally, the latest stages of capitalist development, Lenin argues, have led to an even greater level of bureaucratization: "Imperialism—the era of bank capital, the era of gigantic capitalist monopolies, of the development of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism—has clearly shown an extraordinary strengthening of the 'state machine' and an unprecedented growth in its bureaucratic and military apparatus against the proletariat both in monarchical and in the freest, most republican countries." (286)

Bureaucratization is thus seen by Lenin as a functional response by the capitalist state to the pressures of class struggle which accompany the development of capitalism.¹²

12. Not only does capitalism tend to result in the bureaucratization of bourgeois state institutions, it also tends to bureaucratize working class organizations: "We cannot do without officials under capitalism, under the rule of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat is oppressed, the working people are enslaved by capitalism. Under capitalism, democracy is restricted, cramped, curtailed, mutilated by all the conditions of wage slavery, and the poverty and misery of the people. This and this alone is the reason why the functionaries of our political organizations and the trade unions are corrupted—or rather tend to be corrupted—by the conditions of capitalism and betray a tendency to become bureaucrats, i.e., privileged persons divorced from the people and standing

B. *Dependence of bureaucrats on the bourgeoisie.* This is most obvious in the case of top bureaucratic positions, since these tend to be distributed as political spoils among the bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties. The "restricted nature" of bourgeois democracy guarantees that a revolutionary working-class party would never be able to partake in these spoils and thus could never control the top administrators. Furthermore, Lenin argues, this dependency on the bourgeoisie involves not merely the top echelons of the bureaucracy, but the apparatus as a whole: "In their works, Marx and Engels repeatedly show that the bourgeoisie are connected with these institutions [the bureaucracy and the standing army] by thousands of threads. Every worker's experience illustrates this connection in an extremely graphic and impressive manner. . . . In particular, it is the petty bourgeoisie who are attracted to the side of the big bourgeoisie and are largely subordinated to them through this apparatus, which provides the upper sections of the peasants, small artisans, tradesmen and the like with comparatively comfortable, quiet and respectable jobs raising their holders above the people." (283)¹³

C. *The separation of bureaucracy from the people.* For the working class to become a "ruling class" it is essential that institutions exist through which workers can "rule". Bureaucratic organization, Lenin insists, makes such mass participation impossible. This is a crucial part of Lenin's argument, for it ensures that the sheer existence of bureaucracy tends to further capitalist interests (or, at a minimum, to impede the realization

above the people. That is the *essence* of bureaucracy; and until the capitalists have been expropriated and the bourgeoisie overthrown, even proletarian functionaries will inevitably be 'bureaucratized' to a certain extent." (347) This bureaucratization of working class organizations, in Lenin's analysis, tends to undermine the political strength of the organization and the confidence of the people in their leadership. Such tendencies toward bureaucratization are thus also functional for capitalist interest.

13. In terms of the discussion in chapter 1, Lenin is in effect arguing that state bureaucrats are either directly bound to the bourgeoisie (top officials) or occupy contradictory class locations which link their interests at least partially to the bourgeoisie. Non-bureaucratic employees of the state—transportation workers, postal workers, janitors, etc.—would not be linked to the bourgeoisie in this way.

of working class interests). The key characteristics of bureaucratic organization which separate it from the masses are:

- (1) appointment of officials rather than election, and particularly, the impossibility of recall;
- (2) the high salaries and special privileges of officials, which concretely tie their interests to the bourgeoisie, create an aura of "official grandeur" about them, and place them "above the people"; and
- (3) the restricted quality of bourgeois democracy, which separates legislation from administrative activity and prevents the active participation of the people in either. While the conditions of life strongly impede active participation in democratic politics in general, the separation of legislative activity from administrative activity absolutely prohibits any mass participation in administration.

If Lenin's analysis of the relationship of bureaucracy and parliament to capitalism is substantially correct, then it is clear that these state structures offer little or no possibility of being "captured" and used for the interests of the working class. Even *if* parliament could be captured by a revolutionary working-class majority and even *if* that parliament somehow had real power, still, Lenin argues, "it is clear that the old executive apparatus, the bureaucracy, which is connected with the bourgeoisie, would be unfit to carry out the orders of the proletarian state." (304) Thus, if the working class wishes to take power as a new ruling class and organize society in its own interests, it has no other choice than to destroy the old structures and create new ones.

Proposition 4. Socialism requires the complete destruction of bourgeois state institutions and their replacement by a new form of complete democracy or proletarian democracy (or, equivalently, proletarian dictatorship).

What will be the basic principles of these new institutions and how will they differ from the old structures? To begin, let us look at parliament: "The way out of parliamentarism is not, of course, the abolition of representative institutions and the elective principle, but the conversion of the representative institu-

tions from talking shops into 'working' bodies. 'The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time' " [quoting Marx]. (296) The model of this proletarian representative assembly was the short-lived Paris Commune of 1871: "The commune substitutes for the venal and rotten parliamentarism of bourgeois society institutions in which freedom of opinion and discussion does not degenerate into deception, for the parliamentarians themselves have to work, have to execute their own laws, have themselves to test the results achieved in reality and to account daily to the constituents. Representative institutions remain, but there is *no* parliamentarism here as a special system, as the division of labour between legislative and executive, as a privileged position for the deputies. We cannot imagine democracy, even proletarian democracy, without representative institutions, but we can and must imagine democracy without parliamentarism. . . ." (297)

"Democracy introduced as fully and consistently as conceivable", writes Lenin, "is transformed from bourgeois to proletarian democracy". (293) But as in all democracies, proletarian democracy still constitutes a "state", i.e., an organization of violence for the suppression of some class. Thus, proletarian democracy is at the same time a dictatorship of the proletariat: "Simultaneously with an immense expansion of democracy, which for the first time becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the money-bags, the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists." (327)

Administration, meanwhile, would cease to be organized bureaucratically and would gradually become democratized until, eventually, "the whole population, without exception, [would] proceed to discharge state functions." This, of course, would not happen overnight: "Abolishing the bureaucracy at once, everywhere and completely, is out of the question. It is a utopia. But to smash the old bureaucratic machine at once and to begin immediately to construct a new one that will make possible the gradual abolition of all bureaucracy—this is not a utopia . . ." (297) This new form of administration would differ from traditional bureaucracy in a number of critical respects,

while in other respects it would be very similar to what Weber would call "bureaucratic" organization. To begin with the obvious differences: "The workers, after winning political power, will smash the old bureaucratic apparatus, shatter it to its foundations and raze it to the ground; they will replace it with a new one, consisting of the very same workers and other employees against whose transformation into bureaucrats the measures will at once be taken that were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: (1) not only election, but recall at any time; (2) pay not to exceed that of a workman; (3) immediate introduction of control and supervision by all, so that all may become 'bureaucrats' for a time and that, therefore, nobody may be able to become a 'bureaucrat'." (343)

The last of these three characteristics of socialist administration—mass participation in control and accounting—is clearly the most problematic. Lenin knew that such participation would necessarily be limited initially, but he was convinced that "the accounting and control necessary for this [the smooth running of production] have been simplified by capitalism to the utmost and reduced to extraordinarily simple operations—which any literate person can perform—of supervising and recording, knowledge of the four rules of arithmetic and issuing appropriate receipts." (337) The social conditions for mass participation in administration had also been created by capitalism and would be further developed by socialism: "The development of capitalism in turn creates the preconditions that enable all to take part in the administration of the state. Some of these preconditions are universal literacy, which has already been achieved in a number of the most advanced capitalist countries, then the 'training and disciplining' of millions of workers. . . . The possibility of this destruction [of bureaucracy] is guaranteed by the fact that socialism will shorten the working day, will raise the people to a new life, will create such conditions for the majority of the population as will enable everybody, without exception, to perform 'state functions', and this will lead to the complete withering away of every form of state in general." (336, 349)

Underlying this discussion of the possibilities of democratizing administrative control is a sharp distinction which Lenin draws between the roles of *bureaucrats* and *technical*

experts: "The question of control and accounting should not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists and so on. These gentlemen are working today in obedience to the wishes of the capitalists, and will work even better tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers." (337) The bureaucratic dimension of bourgeois administration thus centres on the way "control and accounting" are organized rather than on the total organization of the administration. In fact, Lenin regards the non-bureaucratic, technical aspects of bourgeois administration extremely favourably: "At the present the postal service is a business organized on the lines of a state-capitalist monopoly. Imperialism is gradually transforming all trusts into organizations of a similar type, in which, standing over the common people, who are overburdened and starved, one has the same bourgeois bureaucracy. But the mechanism of social management is here already at hand. Once we have overthrown the capitalist . . . we shall have a splendidly equipped mechanism, freed from the 'parasite', a mechanism which can very well be set going by the united workers themselves, who will hire technicians, foremen and accountants, and pay them all, as indeed all state officials in general, workmen's wages." (298–299)

This "splendidly equipped mechanism" is the "scientifically trained staff" responsible for the technical work of administration which is quite distinct from the "parasitic" bureaucratic structures of control and accounting. While the latter must be smashed by the working class, the former can be "captured" and used by the workers. The "complete democracy" Lenin stresses so much is limited to a democratization of control, not a democratization of technical expertise as such. The result would be that: "We shall reduce the role of state officials to that of simply carrying out our instructions as responsible, revocable, modestly paid 'foremen and accountants' (of course with the aid of technicians of all sorts, types and degrees)." (298) The democratization is also explicitly not meant to negate all subordination and authority in organization. To begin with, as Lenin says many times: "We are not utopians, we do not dream of dispensing at once with all administration, with all subordination. . . . No, we want the socialist revolution with people as they are now, with people who cannot dispense with sub-

ordination, control and 'foremen and accountants'. The subordination, however, must be to the armed vanguard of all the exploited and working people, i.e., to the proletariat. . . . We, the workers, shall organize large-scale production on the basis of what capitalism has already created, relying on our own experience as workers, establishing strict, iron discipline backed up by the state power of the armed workers." (298)

Beyond the problems of authority inherited from the old order, moreover, Lenin argues, there will always be a certain amount of subordination and authority which is technically determined: "The technique of all these enterprises [large-scale industrial production] makes absolutely imperative the strictest discipline, the utmost precision on the part of everyone carrying out his allotted task, for otherwise the whole enterprise may come to a stop, or machinery or the finished product may be damaged." (342) Finally, the proletarian state would be quite centralized, but it would be a quite different kind of centralism from that of capitalist societies: It would "oppose conscious democratic, proletarian centralism to bourgeois, military, bureaucratic centralism." (301)

Lenin was unwilling in *The State and Revolution* to give more than a very general image of what the structures of a socialist society would be like. He strongly felt that to attempt to construct *a priori* blueprints for the "good" society was a form of utopianism. He argued that the concrete forms of the socialist state would emerge in a dialectical process from the attempt at building socialism: "To develop democracy to the utmost, to find the forms for this development, to test them by practice, and so forth—all this is one of the component tasks of the struggle for the social revolution. Taken separately, no kind of democracy will bring socialism. But in actual life democracy will never be 'taken separately'; it will be 'taken together' with other things, it will exert its influence on economic life as well, will stimulate its transformation; and in its turn it will be influenced by economic development, and so on. This is the dialectics of living history." (320)

Comparisons

There is a very curious combination of close convergences and polar divergences between Weber's and Lenin's analyses of poli-

tics and bureaucracy. The basic starting points of their discussions are quite different: Weber is generally concerned with the problem of the *formal rationality* of political structures and in particular with the factors that contribute to political effectiveness and responsibility; Lenin, in contrast, is much more concerned with questions of *substantive rationality*, with the relationship of state structures to the *classends* that they serve. Both arguments, however, pivot around a very similar critique of bureaucratic domination and of parliamentary institutions that are purely "speech-making" assemblies (Weber) or "talking shops" (Lenin). Although in *The State and Revolution* Lenin never specifically addresses the problem of leadership effectiveness and responsibility which is so important to Weber, he does agree with Weber that when representative institutions are powerless, the real centre of power shifts to the bureaucracy. Both men agree that this tends to facilitate the political domination of purely capitalist interests. There is even one aspect of the solution to the problem that both Lenin and Weber share: the need to create representative institutions that are active, *working* bodies. But they differ substantially in the overall thrust of their conclusions: Lenin calls for the replacement of bureaucracy and parliamentary representation by "soviet" political institutions; Weber argues that soviets are unworkable and advocates instead the development of powerful, elitist working parliaments. The following comparison will try to illuminate the critical differences in the underlying assumptions about the social world which lead to these different conclusions.

Before examining those assumptions, it will be useful to juxtapose Lenin's and Weber's general arguments. (In order to make the steps in the arguments parallel, the order and form of the propositions have been somewhat changed from the presentation in the two previous sections.)

Weber

1. When parliament is merely a speechmaking assembly, the result is uncontrolled bureaucratic domination, which serves the interests of

Lenin

1. With parliament being merely a talking shop, the real centres of state power are located in the bureaucracy, which is controlled by and

capitalists and produces ineffective and irresponsible political leadership.

2. However, bureaucracies are inevitable and necessary given the conditions of modern technology and production, and the mass scale of the modern state.

3. Since bureaucracy cannot be eliminated, the problem is to create guarantees that will prevent bureaucrats from overstepping their proper place and controlling the political direction of the bureaucracy.

4. It is therefore necessary to develop institutions that will be able to create politically responsible and competent political leadership to direct that supervision.

5. This can only be done through a strong, working parliament which can control the bureaucracy.

serves the interests of the capitalist class.

2. Bureaucracy is not a technological imperative necessitated by modern technology and mass administration; it is a specifically *political* imperative for the stability of capitalism and the domination of the bourgeoisie.

3. In a capitalist society it is inevitable that representative institutions will be mere talking shops designed to fool the people; nothing can prevent the bureaucracy from being the real centre of power in advanced capitalist societies.

4. If socialism is to be established, institutions must be created that make it possible for the working class to be organized as the ruling class and that will make the masses politically sophisticated, class conscious participants in state administration.

5. This can only be accomplished by smashing parliament and bureaucracy and replacing them by a dictatorship of the proletariat organized in working assemblies and soviet administration.

The assumptions underlying these two trains of reasoning will be discussed under four general headings: (1) the determinants of organizational structure; (2) the nature of the state and politics; (3) organizational structure and accountability; (4) contradictions and the limits on the possible.

The Determinants of Organizational Structure

One of the serious difficulties in comparing Weber's and Lenin's conceptions of the determinants of organizational structure is that they use terms such as "bureaucracy", "technician", and "official" in quite different ways. In part, these different usages reflect merely semantic differences, but in important ways they also reflect theoretical differences.

Lenin differentiates between three basic organizational functions—policy-making, control-accounting, and "administration"—in his analysis of bureaucracy and the state, whereas Weber makes the distinction between only two—policy-making and administration.¹⁴ We will leave the discussion of policy-making to the next section (on the nature of the state) and focus here on the implications of Lenin's distinction between technical-administrative functions and accounting-control functions.

Throughout his analysis of bureaucracy, Lenin stresses the distinction between "bureaucrats" and "technicians". The former role corresponds to the control and accounting functions in organizations; the latter, to the technical-administrative functions. Weber does not ignore the issue of control and accounting in his discussion of bureaucracy, but he does not regard them as a distinctive function in the same way that Lenin does. Nowhere, moreover, does Weber emphasize the distinction between technical and bureaucratic roles in bureaucratic organizations. Control and accounting are partially absorbed as an integral part of the administrative func-

14. I am using the word "administration" here in a way that does not entirely correspond to either Lenin's or to Weber's usage, although it is closer to Lenin's. Lenin uses the expression "administration" to describe that aspect of public bureaucracies that would be left when bureaucrats would be replaced by officials elected by the people. I will use the term as a general expression to describe the function of executing policies or carrying out orders formulated by the political directorate.

tion of carrying out policy and partially absorbed in the function of policy-making itself.

This problem of the control and accounting functions in bureaucratic organizations bears directly on the question of the determinants of organizational structure. Both Lenin and Weber agree that those structural characteristics most closely related to the technical-administrative function are substantially determined by the technological and material conditions of modern society. But unlike Weber, Lenin does not feel that the control and accounting functions are determined in this same way. While the technical features of production may have become increasingly complex with capitalist development, Lenin argues that the strictly control and accounting functions "have become so simplified and can be reduced to such exceedingly simple operations of registration, filing and checking that they can be easily performed by every literate person". (294) In capitalist society these intrinsically simple functions of control and accounting are in the hands of bureaucrats, "i.e., privileged persons divorced from the people and standing above the people" (347), not because it is *technically* necessary or efficient, but because it is *politically* necessary for the bureaucratic apparatus to be effective in controlling the proletariat. This separation of officials from the people is further mystified by the "official grandeur" of bureaucratic positions, which has led most workers to *believe* that they would be incapable of participating in administration. Finally, the factual absence of any participation by the people in politics has meant that these skills, even though fundamentally simple, have not been cultivated in most workers. The result is a pervasive mystification of the entire apparatus of the state. Weber, needless to say, disagrees strongly with Lenin. He feels that the administrative tasks of the bureaucracy—including the control and accounting activities—are extremely complex and that the masses are in fact incapable of effectively performing them.

The Nature of the State and Politics: Elite-Organization vs. Class-Structure

The different assumptions that underlie Lenin's and Weber's conceptions of the state are reflected in their very definitions of

the state. Weber first defines the notion of "organization" and then defines the state as a special kind of organization.

organization: "A social relationship which is either closed or limits the admission of outsiders will be called an organization when its regulations are enforced by specific individuals: a chief and, possibly, an administrative staff." (48)

political organization: "A 'ruling organization' will be called 'political' insofar as its existence and order is continuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and application of physical force on the part of the administrative staff." (54)

the state: "A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a 'state' insofar as it successfully upholds the claim to the *monopoly* of the *legitimate* use of physical force in the enforcement of its order." (54)

Weber then makes the important following elaboration: "It is not possible to define a political organization, including the state, in terms of the end to which its action is devoted. All the way from the provision for subsistence to the patronage of art, there is no conceivable end which *some* political association has not at some time pursued. From the protection of personal security to the administration of justice, there is none which *all* have recognized. Thus it is possible to define the 'political' character of an organization only in terms of the *means* peculiar to it, the use of force." (55) At the core of this definition of the state, therefore, there is an individual—the chief—and his staff which have at their disposal a distinctive kind of means—the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Under certain circumstances the "chief" might be a group of people—a collegial body—but it is *never* a "class". Together the chief and his staff constitute an elite which controls this special kind of organization and uses it for a wide variety of purposes.

Lenin's notion of the state also centres around the use of force but it differs from Weber's definition in two central respects:

First, *the state is assumed to serve a specific function*, the suppression of class struggle and the maintenance of the domination of the ruling class (whatever that class might be). An institution or structure which did not serve such a function could not be a state in Lenin's analysis.

Second, *the state is conceived more as a "structure"* than simply

an organization controlled by an elite.¹⁵ Of course, in many ways Lenin also conceives of the state as a special organization and frequently he discusses the concrete "connections" between the bourgeoisie and the state, the specific ways in which they influence it and control it. When Lenin discusses the state in these terms, he is not particularly inconsistent with Weber's usage. What is different is that Lenin also sees the state as an apparatus that by its very structure supports the domination of a particular ruling class. What is most important to Lenin about the "policy-making function" is not primarily the concrete individuals who make the policies, but rather the class whose rule is guaranteed by the structures within which those policies are formulated.

In short, Weber's concept of the state centres on the ways in which *elites* control a particular kind of *organization*; Lenin's conception of the state centres on the ways in which *classes* rule through a particular kind of *structure*.

Organizational Form and Accountability

The difference between an elite-organizational and a class-structural conception of the state bears directly on Weber's and Lenin's treatments of the problem of powerless parliaments and bureaucracy. Weber sees the powerlessness of parliament and the resulting uncontrolled domination of the bureaucracy as fundamentally an *organizational and leadership problem*, the only solution for which is the creation of a special organizational form—a strong working parliament. Whether or not such a strong working parliament will exist in a particular situation Weber largely attributes to contingent historical circumstances, to the actions of great men and the accidents of great events. In the case of Germany, the potential for the development of a viable working parliamentary organization

15. "Structure" is a much broader and more complex notion than "organization". Lenin, of course, does not formalize his concept of the state in these terms and thus would not have had the occasion to define "structure". The important point in the present context is that when the state is regarded as a "structure", it is no longer conceived of as a tightly bounded instrument (organization which can be "controlled"); rather, it is conceived of as a complex network of institutions, organizations, and social relationships, or, to use Nicos Poulantzas's expression, "the organizing matrix behind institutions". (See *Political Power and Social Classes*, London 1973, p. 115n.)

had been severely damaged by the anti-parliamentary policies of one statesman, Bismarck.

Lenin sees the issue very differently. Parliaments are powerless and bureaucracies tend to be the site of the "real work of government" not because of some particular organizational failure, but because of the *structural requirements* of the stable domination of the capitalist class. Especially, in the "age of imperialism", when class struggle has become particularly intense and working class political parties potentially very strong, the bourgeoisie cannot rely on representative institutions to guarantee its rule, and thus it has tended to turn increasingly to the "executive" as the primary structure of class domination. The problem is not that parliamentary committees are not strong enough, that certain parliaments lack the formal constitutional right of inquiry, or that any particular statesman adopts strategies that undermine the stature of parliament. The problem is that parliament has ceased to be functional as an organ of class domination (but not as an instrument for legitimation—thus the maintenance of parliaments as "talking shops") for the bourgeoisie, and as a result, over a period of time, class conscious political leaders of the capitalist class have taken steps to see to it that parliamentary power has been reduced. From Lenin's perspective, therefore, the particular policies of a statesman like Bismarck, or the organizational failures of a particular kind of parliament should be understood as the *occasion* for the ascendancy of bureaucratic domination, but not as the crucial *cause* of that ascendancy.

Given Lenin's analysis of the causes of the powerlessness of parliaments and of bureaucratic domination, he sees the solution not in terms of organizational reform designed to cultivate effective leadership, but rather in terms of revolutionary change in the underlying class structure of the society (i.e., replacing the bourgeoisie by the proletariat as the ruling class). This does not mean that organizational structure is unimportant to Lenin. He spends a great deal of time, after all, saying how the specific structures of the capitalist state are incompatible with working class rule. But he treats those organizational characteristics as conceptually subordinate to the question of the class structure as such. Organizational structure becomes a kind of intervening variable that stabilizes and

generalizes the rule of a particular class, that rule being rooted in the basic class relations of the society. As a result of this emphasis on the class determination of organizational structure, Lenin never systematically deals with the problem of organizational accountability. The problem of accountability is solved for Lenin not by creating special organizational devices for controlling leadership, but by transforming the class structure within which any organizational form will operate. The assumption is that without such a transformation, no organizational form whatsoever could create a political leadership responsible and accountable to the working class, and that once the question of class domination is practically dealt with, the solution to the specifically organizational problems will be relatively straightforward.¹⁶

In Weber's analysis, Lenin's formulation is quite inadequate. Classes as such cannot rule; only individuals and small groups can actually run the state. At best such elites can formally be the representatives in a general way of a "class" and govern "in its name".¹⁷ What is decisive for the character of a society to Weber is much less which class the elite represents than the organizational structure of domination with which it governs. What matters most in modern society, whether capitalist or socialist, is the enormous power of the bureaucracy, and the most important political issue is whether or not organizational

16. This subordination of organizational issues to class structure creates an important asymmetry in Lenin's analysis. Because Lenin can observe the organizational consequences of bourgeois class domination, he can in considerable detail attack those organizational structures and show how they would be incompatible with proletarian rule. But since proletarian class domination does not yet exist, he cannot observe the organizational consequences of that class structure, and thus he is forced to remain quite vague about what those organizations would look like: "That is why we are entitled to speak only of the inevitable withering away of the state, emphasizing the protracted nature of this process and its dependence upon the rapidity of the development of the higher phase of communism, and leaving the question of the time required for, or the concrete forms of, the withering away quite open, because there is no material for answering these questions." (333)

17. Weber's position on the question of "class rule" is similar to that of Karl Kautsky, who insisted that a class "can only dominate but not govern." Lenin totally rejected such a position. In *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, Lenin wrote: "It is altogether wrong, also, to say that a class cannot govern. Such an absurdity can only be uttered by a parliamentary cretin who sees nothing but bourgeois parliaments, who has noticed nothing but 'ruling parties'."

forms will be created to contain that bureaucratic domination. In short, unless the organizational problem of accountability is solved, it matters little which class formally dominates. Lenin argues the exact opposite: unless the problem of class rule is solved, it matters little whether or not leadership is formally accountable.

The Meaning of Contradictions and the Limits on the Possible

Weber and Lenin suffer from complementary forms of theoretical underdevelopment, which have critical consequences for their ultimate conclusions. To state the contrast in somewhat simplified terms: Weber has an elaborate theory of organizational contradictions, but an underdeveloped theory of social contradictions; Lenin has a relatively developed theory of social contradictions, but a limited theory of organizational contradictions.

This theoretical underdevelopment has two critical consequences in Lenin's analysis. First, in Lenin's analysis of capitalist society, there is a partial fusion of his critique of capitalism as such and a critique of complex organizations. Bureaucratic organization is condemned because it serves capitalist interests in a capitalist society. While this may be true—even Weber says as much—it does not follow that this constitutes a criticism of bureaucracy as such. Without a theory of organizations, a theory of the internal dynamics and processes of organizations, it is not possible to see which criticisms should be directed at the distinctively capitalist context of bureaucracy and which should be directed at the bureaucratic structures themselves. While Lenin is probably correct that such a theory of internal, organizational processes can be understood only in the context of an analysis of class relations, his critique of capitalist organizational structures suffers from not developing such a theory.

Second, in Lenin's analysis of socialism there is virtually no analysis of the internal contradictions of soviet structures of organization. Lenin certainly does see conflict *between* soviet institutions and the "remnants" of capitalist society, but he does not see any contradictions *within* the organizational structures

of soviets themselves. Lenin felt that the main threat to the viability of soviet organization came from the tendencies towards bureaucratization surviving from bourgeois society. In his analysis, two processes were seen, as potentially counter-acting these bureaucratic pressures: (1) The vanguard party of the proletariat would actively assume the leadership role in building soviet institutions. The party would struggle against bureaucratic elements and would directly intervene in state activities to strengthen the participation of the masses in state administration. (2) As soviet organization became more and more pervasive, it would tend to inhibit the growth of bureaucracy. Since direct democracy and bureaucracy are antithetical principles of political organization, Lenin implicitly reasons that as the former becomes stronger and expands, the latter will necessarily become weaker and decline.

Weber would have sharply disagreed with Lenin's model of soviet organization in two main respects. First, he would have questioned the possibility of any political party being capable of operating in ways to strengthen soviet institutions. While the "vanguard party" might be formally committed to such intervention, Weber would argue that unless the leadership of the party were somehow systematically held accountable for their actions, there would be no guarantee that they would not themselves undermine soviet institutions. This would be especially likely since, like all mass organizations in modern society, the party itself would, in Weber's view, inevitably become bureaucratized. Second, Weber would strongly differ with Lenin's view of the relationship of direct democracy to bureaucratic growth: far from reducing bureaucratic tendencies, soviet institutions and all other forms of direct democracy (or plebiscitary democracy) in fact tend to increase bureaucratization. Thus, there is a fundamental contradiction in soviet organization, Weber would argue: on the one hand, soviets increase workers' formal participation in government and make the state seem much more democratic; on the other hand, soviet institutions would significantly increase bureaucracy, thus reducing substantive democracy and the real power of the working class.

Lenin never really provided a systematic answer to the first criticism, at least not in *The State and Revolution*. His fundamental belief was that the vanguard party, in which he had

enormous faith, would in fact function as a positive force for building soviet institutions, but he provides little reasoning to support this belief. In a curious way, the vanguard party occupies a position in Lenin's analysis parallel to the working parliament in Weber's: The party is an elite organization led by professional revolutionaries trained in the art of politics and capable, after the revolution, of providing firm leadership of the state apparatus in the interests of the proletariat. The critical problem is the lack of an adequate theory of the mechanisms which produce and reproduce this "leadership" capacity. For Weber the problem was fairly simple: the competitive political struggle of competing parties within a working parliament provided the structural mechanism whereby such a parliament could generate the necessary leadership to control the bureaucracy. Lenin never develops as specific a notion of precisely how the party would fulfil that role and of what mechanisms would keep the party responsive to the working class.¹⁸

Against the second criticism Lenin does have an implicit defence which rests on two assumptions: first, a belief in the essential simplicity of the control and accounting functions of administration and the capacity for the average worker to manage such functions; second, a belief that it was only the control and accounting functions, not the "purely technical" functions, that posed a serious threat of bureaucratic anti-democratic power. If both of these assumptions were correct, then it would be reasonable that literate workers, organized in democratic soviets, could gradually take over the control and accounting functions of administration and thus check the tendencies towards bureaucratization. If either assumption is incorrect,

18. Calling the Party the "vanguard" and proclaiming its leadership role does not help to articulate the real mechanisms which substantively tie it to the working class as a class and make the Party a vehicle for meaningful working class rule. Ralph Miliband has formulated this serious problem in Lenin's writings well: "What is the relationship between the *proletariat* whose dictatorship the revolution is deemed to establish, and the *party* which educates, leads, directs, organizes etc.? It is only on the basis of an *assumption* of a symbiotic, organic relationship between the two, that the question vanishes altogether; but while such a relationship may well have existed between the Bolshevik Party and the Russian proletariat in the months before the October Revolution, i.e., when Lenin wrote *The State and Revolution*, the assumption that this kind of relationship can ever be taken as an automatic and permanent fact belongs to the rhetoric of power, not to its reality." See "The State and Revolution", *Monthly Review*, Vol 11, No 11, 1970.

however, then Weber's criticisms would have to be taken more seriously.

The first assumption has a certain face validity to it. Given a general spread of education among workers, a shortening of the work week as a result of production for use instead of exchange and a general ideological commitment for mass participation in such control and accounting functions, it is at least plausible that such activities could be organized eventually in a genuinely democratic manner. While the immediate conditions for such democratic control of control and accounting might have been extremely unfavourable in Russia in 1917—because of mass illiteracy, the small size of the working class, the difficulty in shortening the work week to provide time for politics, etc.—nevertheless the longer term prospects were potentially much brighter.

The second assumption—that experts do not pose a threat of bureaucratic usurpation—is more problematic. Weber's basic argument is that the purely technical expert, by virtue of his necessary control over information and knowledge, his familiarity with the files, etc., is in a strategic position to appropriate power. Certainly the Chinese experiences of the conflict between "reds" and "experts", in which there have occurred strong tendencies for technical experts to encourage the growth of bureaucracy, reflects the potential forces for bureaucratization that lie within what Lenin considered to be the purely technical aspects of administration. While it is still an unresolved question whether or not a revolutionary, mass democratic control of the proletarian state is possible, the organizational problems and contradictions of such control are considerably more complex than Lenin acknowledged.¹⁹

Let us now look more carefully at the theoretical one-sidedness of Weber's analysis. In some ways Weber is much more slippery than Lenin. Lenin was a political militant. He was interested in highlighting points polemically, not in cov-

19. Lenin might have been correct that pure experts do not pose much of a direct threat of usurping political power. However, because of their positions of control over information, they may potentially be able to undermine or neutralize the political initiative of the working class. In this sense, they have considerable negative power—power to obstruct. This could create a sufficient political vacuum to allow bureaucrats proper to assume a much more important political role.

ering all his tracks for potential scholarly critics. Weber was an academician, who skilfully qualified most of the theoretical claims which he made. While Lenin almost entirely ignored the theoretical problems of organizational contradictions, Weber was careful at least to touch on everything. His problem is generally less one of absolute omissions, than of the relative emphasis and elaboration he gives various theoretical issues. In particular, his analysis lacks a developed conception of social contradictions within which organizational processes occur. This affects Weber's analysis in three inter-related ways.

First, Weber tends to ignore or minimize the relationship of the growth of bureaucracy (and the development of the state apparatus in general) to class struggle in capitalist society. Weber's basic model of bureaucratic development centres on the need for rational, predictable administration for capitalist enterprises to be able to make efficient calculations in their production decisions. The central variable which underlies the explanation is the need for *rationality*. Lenin emphasizes the need in capitalist society for the bureaucratic *repression* of class struggle. Both of these models are developmental and dynamic rather than static, since both of them predict a progressively increasing level of bureaucratization in capitalist society. The difference is that Weber's model describes a harmonious rationalization process, while Lenin's depicts a contradictory social control process. Without denying the validity of Weber's insights, his model clearly represents a one-sided understanding of bureaucracy and the state.

Second, the absence of an elaborated theory of social contradictions raises serious questions about Weber's notion of "responsible" and "effective" political leadership. Weber sets out his argument as if political responsibility, effectiveness and competence are purely technical questions concerning the means rather than the ends of political life. Such political effectiveness, Weber argues, requires political leaders to have certain special skills that enable them to pursue competently whatever political goals they and their party are committed to. However, "responsibility" and "effectiveness" have very different meanings depending upon the total social structure in which that leadership operates. To be a "responsible" and "effective" political leader in the context of parliamentary politics in a

capitalist society necessarily implies furthering the substantive goals of capitalism by accommodating oppositional forces to the requirements of capitalist social order. This is not because of the malevolence of such party leadership, and it is not because of the purely internal tendencies towards bureaucratization and oligarchy within political organizations. Rather, it is because of the essential content of the processes of political effectiveness and responsibility, given the constraints of operating within the structural framework of capitalist institutions.

As Weber stresses, to be an effective political leader in a parliamentary system means to know how to negotiate compromises and form political alliances. This means that a "responsible" leader must refrain from pursuing demands and goals that are non-negotiable. Once a particular bargain is reached, he must uphold it and try to prevent his constituency and party from undermining it. Leadership effectiveness thus requires the acceptance of political goals that are compatible with the functioning of the existing social order. This does not mean, of course, that change is prohibited, but it does constrain change within limits determined by the structures of capitalist society.

Effectiveness and responsibility are thus not "neutral" dimensions of technical, formal rationality; they intrinsically embody certain broad political orientations. In fact, it can be said that the more responsible and effective the leadership of political parties (of the right and the left) is, the more they will orient their political activity towards consensus, negotiation, compromise, and accommodation, i.e., the more solidly will their goals fall within the limits of system-compatibility. Effectiveness and responsibility thus become transformed into manipulation and mystification.

The easy answer to these objections would be to deny the existence of real social contradictions in a capitalist social order. For if unresolvable class antagonisms do not exist, if there really does exist a potential for genuine social consensus, then the compromises and bargains negotiated through parliamentary politics could be conceived in terms of a purely technical political effectiveness. Although there are parts of Weber's writings that seem to approach this pluralist image of a fundamentally harmonious social order, he more generally

acknowledges the existence of social classes with antagonistic and even irreconcilable class interests. Given this acknowledgement of real class divisions, Weber's plea for responsible, effective political leadership becomes a programme for stabilizing and strengthening capitalist hegemony.

Third, even aside from the question of the meaning of leadership effectiveness and responsibility, Weber's solution to the problem of bureaucratic domination in capitalist society—the creation of strong parliamentary institutions—tends to minimize the relationship of parliamentary institutions to class domination. While Weber does say that a weak parliament is functional for capitalist interests, he definitely does not say that parliaments are weak because of capitalist class domination. They are weak because of weak parliamentary traditions, constitutional obstacles, the policies of particular statesmen, rather than because of the basic requirements of capitalist domination. At best in Weber's discussion of parliaments, such social contradictions are treated as background variables; they are never systematically integrated into his analysis.

Just as Lenin's "solution" in effect abstracts the problems of constructing socialism from the real organizational contradictions of soviet institutions, Weber's "solution" abstracts parliamentary institutions from the social contradictions of capitalist society. While it might be true that a strong working parliament would be an effective check on bureaucracy if such a parliament could exist, it seems highly questionable that such an institution is possible given the contradictions of advanced capitalist society. Weber, of course, was very pessimistic about the long-term durability of parliaments. His pessimism, however, was always based on the organizational problems faced by parliaments when confronting the ever-expanding bureaucracy; he almost never discussed the relationship of parliamentary power to the general social contradictions in capitalist society.

Elements of a Synthesis: Class Struggle and Organizational Structure

Lenin never believed that a socialist revolution would instantly demolish bureaucratic structures. To imagine such an immedi-

ate transformation was, he always insisted, utterly utopian. However, Lenin did not anticipate the durability of bureaucratic structures after the revolution, and he certainly did not expect to see a widening rather than a narrowing of the scope of bureaucracy. In the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, Lenin acknowledged the problem of persistent bureaucracy. "We have been hearing complaints about bureaucracy for a long time," he wrote; "the complaints are undoubtedly well-founded". After briefly discussing the relative success in the debureaucratization of the judicial system, Lenin then went on to explain: "The employees in the other spheres of government are more hardened bureaucrats. The task here is more difficult. We cannot live without this apparatus; every branch of government creates a demand for such an apparatus. Here we are suffering from the fact that Russia was not sufficiently developed as a capitalist country. Germany, apparently, will suffer less from this because her bureaucratic apparatus passed through an evolutionary process which makes people dry but compels them to work and not just wear out armchairs, as happens in our offices."²⁰ (Lenin, 1965, v. 29:182) Several years later, in a letter concerning the reorganization of the council of people's commissars written in 1922, Lenin seemed much more despondent about the problem: "We are being sucked down by the rotten bureaucratic swamp into writing papers, jawing about decrees, drawing up decrees—and in this sea of paper, live work is being drowned."²¹

How did Lenin explain this persistence of bureaucratic forms and the difficulty of their eradication? Two themes underscore most of his accounts of the problem: (1) the low level of *culture*

20. *Collected Works*. Vol 29, Moscow 1965, p. 182.

21. In this letter Lenin went on to suggest what should be done about the bureaucratic morass: "work out written regulations for the bringing forward and consideration of questions, and check not less than once a month, you personally, whether the regulations are being observed and whether they are achieving their object, i.e., reduction of paper work, red tape, more sense of responsibility on the part of the People's Commissars, replacement of half-baked decrees by careful, prolonged, business-like checking-up on fulfillment and by checking of experience, establishment of personal responsibility (in effect, we have complete irresponsibility at the top . . .)" *On the Soviet State Apparatus*, Moscow 1969, pp. 331-332.

Ironically, in Weber's terms Lenin's suggestions amount to an intensification of bureaucratic structures, especially in the injunction to establish written regulations and regular check-ups on their application. It should also be noticed

and education of the Russian masses;²² and (2) the low level of *economic* and industrial development of the Soviet Union.²³ Nowhere, to my knowledge, does Lenin emphasize the specifically *political* dynamic at work in the reproduction and extension of bureaucratic structures in the post-revolutionary state apparatus.

We thus have a curious irony: Lenin correctly understands that bureaucratic organizations are not technically necessary, but rather are socially generated by the political imperatives of class domination; yet, his explanations of continuing bureaucracy after the revolution are primarily in terms of economic and ideological (cultural) factors, not political ones. Weber, on the other hand, saw bureaucracy as strictly technically-economically necessary, but saw the solutions to the "problem" of bureaucracy in exclusively political terms. While one might

that in this letter Lenin bemoans the irresponsibility of the top of bureaucratic offices, much as Weber criticized the irresponsibility of the top levels of the Prussian bureaucracy.

22. For example, in his discussion of bureaucracy at the Eighth Party Congress, Lenin contrasts the *legal* obstacles to direct democracy in the bourgeois republics with the *cultural* obstacles in the Soviet Republic: "We can fight bureaucracy to the bitter end, to a complete victory, only when the whole population participates in the work of government. In the bourgeois republics not only is this impossible but *the law itself prevents it*. . . . What we have done, was to remove these hindrances, but so far we have not reached the stage at which the working people could participate in government. Apart from the law, there is still the level of culture, which you cannot subject to any law. The result of this cultural level is that the Soviets, which by virtue of their programme are organs of government *by the working people*, are in fact organs of government *for the working people* by the advanced sections of the proletariat, but not by the working people as a whole. Here we are confronted by a problem which cannot be solved except by prolonged education." *Collected Works*, Vol 29, p. 183.

23. Aside from frequent general references to the "low level of development", Lenin makes the following specific reference to economic conditions and bureaucracy in his pamphlet "The Tax in Kind": "The evils of bureaucracy are not in the army, but in the institutions serving it. In our country bureaucratic practices have different economic roots [from those in bourgeois republics], namely, the atomised and scattered state of the small producers with their poverty, illiteracy, lack of culture, the absence of roads and *exchange* between agriculture and industry, the absence of connection and interaction between them." At the end of the essay he suggests that trade and exchange relations would help to alleviate bureaucratic evils: "Exchange is freedom of trade; it is capitalism. It is useful to us inasmuch as it will help us overcome the dispersal of the small producer, and to a certain degree combat the evils of bureaucracy; to what extent this can be done will be determined by practical experience." *Collected Works*, Vol 32, p. 351.

be able to explain this absence of a political discussion of bureaucracy in Lenin after the revolution in terms of the political conditions and struggles which he faced, nevertheless, the absence of such an analysis leaves his theory of bureaucracy seriously incomplete.

What we need to do, therefore, is to link more systematically the social-economic determinants of bureaucratic structure to the political determinants. The model of determination in Figure 4.1 attempts to lay out the basic shape of these relationships. Of particular importance in the present context are the diverse ways in which the forms of political class struggle are linked to the social-economic structure, the political organizational capacities of classes and the bureaucratic structure of the state. First, the forms of political class struggle are structurally limited by the underlying social-economic structure, and structurally selected by the organizational capacities of classes and the structure of the state apparatus. Secondly, political class struggle transforms the social-economic structure, political capacities and the structure of the state itself. Finally, the forms of political struggle mediate the relations of determination between the social-economic structure, political capacities and the structure of the state. Most importantly in the present discussion, this means that depending upon the nature of these struggles, the effects on state structures of the same underlying social-economic conditions will be different.

In terms of this heuristic model, Weber's analysis can be seen as primarily examining the linkages on the outside of the diagram. Weber paid particular attention to the ways in which social-economic conditions (or more precisely, technical-economic conditions) set limits on the structure of the state (rationalization and bureaucratization in response to the technical needs of industrial society); and the ways in which the political organizational capacities (the strength and vitality of parliamentary institutions) selects specific kinds of bureaucratic structures from within those limits (greater or lesser control of the bureaucracy by responsible, political leadership). Lenin was also concerned with the relationship of the social-economic structure to the structure of the state apparatuses (capitalist class domination produces bureaucratic administration), but he was much more interested than Weber with the




Figure 4.1 Model of Determination of the Bureaucratic Structure of the State Apparatuses

inside of the diagram: the ways in which class struggle is shaped by social and political structures and the ways in which class struggle transforms those structures.

Neither theorist, however, explicitly grappled with the relationship of mediation in a systematic way. It is this relationship which is particularly important in understanding the resilience of bureaucratic organization in the post-revolutionary period in the Soviet Union. Lenin was absolutely correct that the low cultural and economic level of Russia meant that it would be impossible immediately to destroy bureaucratic structures in the state, and that as a result it was of tremendous importance to create the economic and ideological preconditions for a full transition to socialism. What Lenin underestimated, however, was the importance of creating the political preconditions for the control of bureaucratic structures. In the terms of the present discussion, this would have meant specifying how political struggles could mediate the relationship of economic and cultural conditions to state structures and thus affect the shape and strength of those inevitable bureaucratic structures. To the extent that Lenin saw the problem in political terms, it was mainly as a "selection" problem: i.e., how the party might intervene in various bureaucratic organizations to improve the quality of their administration, to eliminate excesses, etc. (see footnote 20 above). He did not see this problem primarily in terms of a genuine political mediation process.

If this is the correct way to pose the problem of the relationship of political struggle to bureaucratization, then the question is: what kind of mediation was necessary? What forms of political struggle could have had the result of reducing the pressures towards bureaucratic expansion generated by economic and social conditions? What developments in the post-1917 period were most decisive in shaping the political mediations which actually did occur? Without pretending to have an adequate answer to these questions, it can be said that the progressive erosion of intra-party democracy as well as inter-party competition (i.e., the prohibition on the formation of intra-party factions and the abolition of all parties other than the Bolsheviks) were among the key developments in this process of political mediation. A deeper form of proletarian democracy would not have eliminated bureaucracy; and it would not

necessarily have guaranteed that the bureaucracy which continued to function would have been more efficient. But it would have changed the political terrain on which that bureaucracy was reproduced, by creating a broader mass of politically trained and sophisticated workers. This is not to say that such choices *could* have been made by the young Soviet Republic given the enormous pressures which it confronted. It might well have been utopian to attempt a thorough-going proletarian democracy in the 1920s. But whatever the causes of the choices which were made, the longer term consequence of the specific political mediations which historically emerged after the Revolution was to reproduce and strengthen bureaucracy and to undermine the political capacity of the working class.

This is the fundamental truth to Weber's analysis: bureaucratic power feeds on the political incapacity of non-bureaucrats and reinforces that incapacity. In his analysis, the pivotal category of non-bureaucrats was the parliamentary elite, and thus he was preoccupied with the problem of how to develop their political capacity. Within Marxist theory, the critical category of non-bureaucrats is the working class. The decisive question is, therefore, how to develop and strengthen the political capacity of this class, i.e., how to forge strong and meaningful social relations among workers at the political level. This can only be accomplished through the direct participation of workers in political struggles and political organizations—which means that after a socialist revolution, it is essential that the institutions of proletarian democracy be constantly defended and deepened.

In the following chapter we will examine what such political mediation means in contemporary capitalist societies.

5. We will not treat separately the third or "speculative" stages of Hegel's logical doctrine. Our characterization of dialectical reason actually embraces the key feature of speculative cognition, namely, the process of totalization or unification. Hegel describes the highest level of the logical doctrine thus:

The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition—the affirmative which is involved in their disintegration and in their transition.

(Hegel, 1975:119)

6. The reader should not confuse the notion of positivity as it appears in the rationality-positivity section of Hegel's *Logic* with the notion of positivity as it appears in the section on Positive Reason.

7. I includes the term "merely existing" to characterize empirical phenomena, in contrast to "being actual" which signifies the underlying true reality. True reality is always the concept. Reason shows that empirical phenomena are actually embodiments of the concept, and that reality is a process of becoming, leading towards an ever more perfect realization of the concept. Thus, true reality may be understood as the realm of reason.

To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual. . .

(Hegel, 1952:12)

T.M. Knox, Hegel's translator, offers the following interpretation of this famous passage:

If the actual is rational, then however tragic the actual may seem to be, reason will be able to find joy in it, because it will find itself in it as its essence.

(Hegel, 1952:303)

8. Hegel regards any entity capable of social action as, conceptually speaking, a form of will. This interpretation provides a direct, though frequently overlooked, link between Hegelian idealism and contemporary social scientific action theorists such as Talcott Parsons. Another and even more obvious link arises from the dialectical categories discussed in section two. If these categories are stripped of their dialectical character, they bear a remarkable resemblance to the Parsonian pattern-variables. These linkages help explain why certain modern social theorists, strongly influenced by Hegel, have also been attracted by the work of Parsons. Hegelian ideas, we might note, enter modern social science through at least two opposing channels: via Marx on the one hand, and via Max Weber on the other.
9. We should underscore, lest this paragraph invite misunderstanding, that the key passage approach does not always generate error and misunderstanding. It can be a useful way of concentrating attention on the main issues and gaining insight about the central intent of an author. But unless used with much circumspection, it is vulnerable to the dangers noted in Avineri's analysis.

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MODES OF CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE CAPITALIST STATE

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the interconnections between class struggle, state structures and state policies. Rather than view the state either as merely an instrument manipulated by the capitalist class, or as an apparatus determined by the structures of capitalist society, it is argued that the capitalist state must be analysed as an object, a product and a determinant of class struggle. In particular, the paper examines two aspects of this interconnection between the capitalist state and class struggle: 1) the ways in which class struggle shapes, in contradictory ways, the *structure* of the state, and reciprocally, the ways in which the structure of the state shapes class struggle; 2) the ways in which the content of state *policies* shapes and is shaped by the content of the demands raised in class struggle. The paper attempts to develop a conceptual framework within which such issues can be analysed, specifically focusing on the distinction between *production* and *circulation* politics, *commodity* and *noncommodity* politics, and *reproductive* and *unreproductive* politics. A series of brief case studies are provided to illustrate this conceptual schema.

I. CLASS STRUGGLE AND STATE STRUCTURE

The relationship between class conflict and the structure of the state in capitalist society has been analyzed in a variety of ways. We shall review four perspectives: pluralist, instrumentalist, structuralist, and political class analysis (2).

Pluralist, Instrumentalist and Structuralist Perspectives

A liberal perspective, long dominant in American social science, views

the state as a pluralist, aggregating mechanism in which agencies, programs and legislation are substantive responses to the demands and interests of competing groups. The relationship between class structure and the state has generally been viewed in two ways, both perspectives viewing the state as a political market place. The first sees class and interest conflict mediated through party competition and generally assumes an automatic responsiveness of politically neutral state agencies (see for example Lipset, 1960; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The second pluralist approach sees state agencies as directly accessible to interest groups and classes for particularized, non-electoral control, and thus as bases of political power (e.g. Dahl, 1961; McConnell, 1966). State bureaucracies become the battleground for specific interest groups, and competition between agencies for limited funding either reinforces or supplants party competition. The proliferation of programs and agencies on the one hand, and the differentiation of state levels on the other, is viewed as providing greater access for any interest to block gross injustice and at least secure a minimum foothold in the state (e.g. Rose, 1967; 1963) (3).

A second tradition sees the state as an "instrument" of the ruling class or dominant elite. This approach starts from a specific interpretation of Marx's superstructural view of the state:

The bourgeoisie has, at last, since the establishment of modern industry and the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (Marx, 1955).

A contemporary example of this view can be found in Sweezy's *The Theory of Capitalist Development*: "... state power must be monopolized by the class or classes which are the chief beneficiaries." Sweezy sees the state as, "... an instrument in the hands of the ruling classes for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself," (Sweezy, 1942: 243). Frequently this view infers the power of capitalists from the class composition of the personnel who hold key administrative or legislative roles within the state. Miliband summarizes the conventional Marxist position:

... it has remained a basic fact of life in advanced capitalist countries that the vast majority of men and women in these countries has been governed, represented, administered, judged and commanded in war by people drawn from other, economically and socially superior and relatively distant classes. (1969: 67)

We shall refer to this approach as *instrumentalist*. The theory of "corporate liberalism" is a sophisticated version of this approach (e.g. Hayes, 1964; Weinstein, 1968; Domhoff, 1970). This theory stresses the ability of progressive fractions of capital to preemptively determine the limits of reform through corporate financed, controlled and staffed policy research

The theory of corporate liberalism thus allows a political analysis of institutionalization and the cycles of capitalist participation.

A third general perspective on the state views state structure as determined by the systemic constraints and contradictions of capitalism. These constraints and contradictions need not affect state structure and function through overt political struggle and participation by individuals, interest groups, classes or parties. Rather, to the extent that the survival of the system is dependent upon the containment and solution of recurrent crises, overt class participation may not be required at all. The emphasis of the *structuralist* Marxist approach is on the inherent dynamics and imperatives of the social formation in which the state is embedded. We will distinguish two structuralist Marxist approaches to the state, a political and an economic one.

The political variant of structuralism has been most fully developed by Poulantzas (1973, 1974, 1975) and Althusser (1971). As Poulantzas has written:

The relation between the bourgeois class and the state is an objective relation. This means that if the function of the state in a determinate social formation and the interests of the dominant class coincide, it is by reason of the system itself; the direct participation of members of the ruling class in the State apparatus is not the cause but the effect, and moreover a chance and contingent one, of this objective coincidence. (1972: 245)

Poulantzas argues that the state functions as the factor of cohesion in a social formation, that the bourgeoisie is incapable of achieving sufficient political unity as a class to attain hegemonic domination and therefore that state power must organize this class, and that state power only attains a unity to the extent that it corresponds to the bourgeoisie's interests.

In its more historical and dynamic forms, this structuralist approach attempts to locate destabilizing consequences of adaptation through changing state structure and function in accordance with the political economy as a whole. In its more mechanistic forms this approach is unable to locate specific actors and historically dynamic class conflict as a motor of structural change.

The economic structuralist approach to the state locates a series of functions that the state must perform to temporarily resolve economically determined contradictions. For example, Baran and Sweezy, in *Monopoly Capital*, attribute to the state the function of guaranteeing effective demand to avert realization crises to which monopoly capitalism is particularly prone. Altvater argues for the functional necessity of the state as an institution not internally constrained by the imperatives of surplus value production:

... the state can thus be conceived neither as a mere political instrument nor as an institution set up by capital, but rather as a special form of the accomplishment of the social existence of capital.

Thus the state is residually defined by the functions capital units cannot perform (4).

Both structuralist approaches to the state do not locate power in decision-making processes, elite preemption and cooptation, or the conversion of economic power into observable political power. Rather power is located in the ability of the state to reproduce class relations and class domination through structural relations that need not be immediately visible. Thus while the apparent determinants of state action may involve the political defeat of the bourgeoisie, the consequences of that state action reproduce and reinforce that class' domination. Poulantzas writes:

... a line of demarcation can always be drawn within which the guarantee given by the capitalist state to the dominated classes' economic interests not only fails to threaten the political relation of class domination, but even constitutes an element of this relation. (1973: 191)

A major analytic problem with the structuralist approach is its inability to explain *class action* that arises from class consciousness (5). Class located individuals respond to the stimuli born out of the systemic logic, rather than act on the basis of self-conscious political practice.

On the other hand, the instrumentalist approach to the state tends to rely too heavily on observable class input into, and control of, policy formation. The instrumentalist perspective does not identify systemic constraints and imperatives that operate at all levels of society, including the state, which define and limit the range and form of possible class action. Thus, the instrumentalist perspective will tend to ignore the extent to which the demands and interests of the dominant class must take into account the limits of direct manipulation imposed by a historical social formation: internal state structure, state-economy relations, and economic structure.

The problem with both structuralist and instrumentalist approaches is, in fact, a much larger methodological one. To begin with, "systemic constraints" or "systemic imperatives" are not metaphysical abstractions. Rather, they are primarily products of historically specific struggles for class dominance. Present class action, class dominance, and class interests must be seen as present struggle arising out of and defined in terms of a structure which is historically determined.

Thus, an overemphasis on "structure" or "systemic logic" will tend to view class originated inputs and demands as "passive" responses to stimuli born out of the structure. On the other hand, the class instrumentalist perspective will tend to be somewhat situational and voluntaristic since it does not relate present class action to the historically determined constraints of the system. The instrumentalist view of the state stresses the *political input* into the state and the importance of the unequal class distribution of power. The structuralist view of the state stresses the *political output* of state activity by which capitalist domination is reproduced and the cohesion of the social formation assured (6).

approach can analytically distinguish the extent to which class action meditates between constraints and state structures, generates those constraints and structures, or at times is irrelevant to the relationship of economic constraints to the state (7).

Political Class Struggle: An Alternative View of the State

A fourth perspective is possible which focuses on state structure as an object of class struggle. The capitalist class attempts to create state structures which channel working class political activity in ways that do not threaten capitalist political dominance and objective interests. Working class challenge makes the success of such attempts problematic. A political class struggle perspective on the state tries to locate the state within the dialectical relationship between class dominance and systemic constraints.

There are two theoretical tasks to be accomplished in developing such a theory of the state. First, it is necessary to elaborate the nature of the internal structures of the state and their relationship to systemic contradictions. Second, it is necessary to understand the ways in which class struggle shapes, and is shaped by, those very structures.

An important approach is found in Claus Offe's work (1972, 1972, 1974). Offe attempts to analyze the extent to which the internal structures of the state permit it to pursue the interests of capital as a whole while simultaneously acting *with a degree* of "relative autonomy" from direct class domination, thereby assuring the legitimacy of its intervention. Offe distinguishes between the allocation and production functions of the state. Both functions support the process of private accumulation. The important difference lies in the way policies are made for the two functions. The allocation function refers to the ways that the public budget is allocated to regulate the capitalist market. Allocative policies are subject to direct political conflict, and therefore most clearly "instrumental" in character. Production policies, on the other hand, are more complex. These refer to state intervention to solve specific bottlenecks, externalities or crises due to breakdowns in private capital investment upon which accumulation in the system as a whole is contingent. Production intervention involves some form of physical input into the production process. Due to lack of capitalist class cohesiveness, the state takes on responsibility for managing crises through production policy. With no direct class-originated policy guidelines, the state itself is forced to devise decision rules that reproduce private capital accumulation.

However, while Offe extensively discusses the internal structures of the state, he fails to relate them systematically to class struggle. This is apparent in his analysis of the welfare state (Offe, 1972). Offe tends to view the modern welfare state as a mechanism directed at "endemic systemic problems and unmet social needs" (1972: 42). The welfare state is not seen as the product of political and ideological class conflict; rather Offe points to its development in "relative independence from political

exist independently of conscious political will and have thus some degree of autonomy to "compensate" for new problems which are byproducts of private capitalist growth. The state is seen as independent of direct class control, a technical apparatus for absorption of "newly created insecurities of political control which create immediate measures that avoid the socially destabilizing problem of the moment" (1972: 42) (8).

Offe's conception of autonomy and his primary focus on the consequences of state intervention as a crisis-solver, leads him to ignore the extent to which classes are differentially able to shape the state machinery and voice specific demands for state action. In other words, the power and ability of the state to resolve recurrent crises does not seem to originate from people as much as from systemic "push-effects" (1972: 45).

Jim O'Connor's work on the fiscal crisis of the state is one of the few attempts to deal both with the relationship of internal structures of the state to contradictions in the accumulation process and with the relationship of class struggle to those state structures. O'Connor analyzes how crises of corporate profitability are transformed into crises of state bankruptcy given the constraints of a tax-dependent state. He also analyzes the ways in which class struggle limits the state's ability to rationalize capitalism and the ways in which state structures have been reorganized to make them more impermeable to working class challenge.

O'Connor suggests that the decline in Congressional power, long ago noted by Mills (1956), and the concentration of power in an increasingly depoliticized executive is required for state rationalization of capitalism. Various structural changes accomplish this centralization of state power: the use of revolving funds; refusal to prohibit transfers between appropriations; lump sum appropriations; the ability of the executive to mingle appropriations and bring forward unexpended balances of former appropriations; and the allocation, program planning and policy controls increasingly vested in the Bureau of the Budget, Domestic Council and the Office of the Management of the Budget. The consequences of this centralization of power within the national state structure has been to increasingly depoliticize, technicalize, if not make invisible, major decisions about the structure and level of taxation and expenditure.

We shall elaborate the theory of the state implicit in O'Connor's and Offe's work by arguing that the internal structure of the state is simultaneously a *product*, an *object*, and a *determinant* of class conflict. State structure is itself a source of power. The organization of political authority differentially affects the access, political consciousness, strategy, and cohesion of various interests and classes. State structure is not neutral with respect to its effects on class conflict. The structure of the state intervenes between social needs and the way these needs are translated into political demands, between demands and state outputs, and between specific outputs and the ability to organize and raise new demands in the future.

Class struggle has repeatedly taken the form of political conflict over the structuring of state authority. As opposed to the "shell" requiring

starting point for the transformation of capitalist society. Gorz's strategic objective is *structural reform*, where the working class comes to control, if not constitute, new centers of state power with authority to make decisions that respond to needs beyond the capabilities of capitalism—e.g., controls over profit levels, rates of investment, technological change, and social investments (9). While it is very problematic whether or not the working class could actually control pieces of state power within the capitalist state, the critical point in the present discussion is that political challenge by the working class shapes the historical development of state structure. The actual structures of the state are thus not a simple reflection of capitalist interests, but a contradictory reflection of the class struggle between workers and capitalists.

The problem facing advanced capitalist social formations is *how can the capitalist state be structured so as to perform functions dictated by economic contradictions given the actual or potential existence of a politically organized working class?* As the state comes increasingly to be a necessary force in the development and regulation of the capitalist economy, as economic concentration and centralization render small disproportionalities and downturns increasingly dangerous and volatile, the political neutralization of an organized working class through structural change in the state has become more imperative for capitalist growth. Such structural change will always be contradictory, never completely successful. How successful such structural changes will be is contingent on the level of contradictions in the accumulation process and the organization and content of class struggle.

We shall review three historical examples of neutralization of politically organized and challenging segments of the working class through state structural change: the emergence of urban reform government; federal intergovernmental transfer programs for the central cities; and corporatist structures for national planning. In each case, structural change neutralized the political threat working class organization presented to capital accumulation.

Structural Change: Urban Reform Government

City government has been restructured towards a reform government since the Progressive Era. This illustrates the ways in which state structural change allows the performance of functions critical to capitalist development despite the existence of a politically challenging working class. The movement for reform government was controlled by capitalist elites operating through the National Civic Federation and other corporatist policy organizations, who feared the rise of an urban, working-class based Socialist Party movement (see Weinstein, 1968). Further, they were chary of the inefficiency and autonomy of political machines, the high cost of securing their own influence, and the potentially high ethnic working class influence over city expenditures and personnel. Given the need to radically expand city government functions at a time of rapid accumulation, industrialization and urbanization, the reform governmental structure effected a political neutralization of city government

ening (see Hays, 1969; Alford, 1973).

The reform movement developed a package of structural reforms which functioned to depoliticize city politics and insulate allocation and decision-making from class and ethnic political control: city manager form of executive, non-partisan and at-large elections, and small city councils. Through these various mechanisms reform government minimized the political organization, participation and influence of working class and ethnic groups concentrated in the city, while at the same time increasing the influence of dominant interests over decision-making and allocation.

Non-partisan and at-large elections resulted in the elimination of party organization in general, and Socialist Party political organization in particular (Hamilton, 1972). At-large elections made it increasingly expensive for candidates to enter campaigns, thus favoring those with sufficient private resources to pay election expenses and those people most likely to be socially conspicuous in the community. Ward-based elections had increased the likelihood that local working class or ethnic leadership would be generated and decreased the electoral opportunities of middle or upper class candidates due to the restrictiveness of residential requirements based on relatively class homogeneous wards. At-large elections decreased the probability of electing working class party candidates because the percentage of the city as opposed to the ward determined election to the council, thus requiring a higher level of aggregate working class turnout in the city as a whole (see Williams and Adrian, 1969). Non-partisan elections made it difficult for any party organization to survive in local politics and, in contrast to most Western European countries, effectively dissociated city political conflict from national partisan politics. Working class candidates must rely on party organization for electoral financing, organization, visibility and ideological identification through party label in order to get elected. Lacking a local, class-based party organization, manual workers have constituted a very small percentage of city council members in the U.S. in contrast to their percentage in the population. (10)

Under reform government, dominant business interests have more influence both at the city council level and through direct access to city agencies (see Miller, 1958a, 1958b; Morlock, 1973; Cornich, 1973). Reform government functioned to increase the autonomy of city agencies from partisan electoral accountability. Agencies were thus more permeable to the most intensely interested, best organized and economically most powerful interests. Because agencies are more autonomous from partisan control, they are more vulnerable and must seek out interest groups upon which they can institutionalize relationships of political support.

The city machines supplanted by reform government had functioned to politically incorporate the mass migration of working class ethnics, many of whom brought with them socialist ideology and party identification. (11) As Katznelson points out, the machines controlled both the political organization of social groups and the delivery of distributive outputs to those groups. While capitalist elites dominated the party machines, the high cost and uncertainty of that domination brought these structures into question. Hays (1969) has shown that it was the high cost of corruption for distributing favors for business that was one of the interests leading to

critical policy developments, while the machine controlled votes through delivery of patronage and distributive benefits to working class ethnic constituencies. The reformist restructuring of the city government is one illustration of how state structures have developed which effectively insulate areas of decision-making and allocation critical to capitalist interests from political accountability, thereby maximizing the translation of capitalist economic power into patterns of allocation and non-decisions favorable to those interests, while simultaneously minimizing the need for those capitalist interests to participate in manifestly political ways.

However, like all state structural change, the development of reform government has been internally contradictory. On the one hand, the departisanizing of city politics effectively destroyed the urban political party as an effective social control mechanism without providing a satisfactory replacement. Thus, the new black urban proletariat which emerged during the post-WW II period was not initially politically absorbed, which was one of the important factors contributing to the violent and politically costly rebellions of the 1960s. On the other hand, reform government destroyed the politically powerful mayor as the centralizing role in the city political system. As a result, it is much more difficult in the reformed city to effectively rationalize and coordinate the fragmentary maze of highly autonomous city agencies (see Newton, 1973, 1974). The new forms of urban pork barrel politics have consequently pushed the city towards fiscal crisis without making the city a location for efficient production for capital as a whole.

Structural Change: Intergovernmental Grants to the Cities

Presently, the central cities of the U.S. face a fiscal crisis which impinges upon city functions critical to capital and undermines the political domination of capitalist elites. As industry and upper income residents decentralize into a municipally fragmented metropolis, dissociating fiscal capacity from social needs, the central city fills up with an especially poor and often black segment of the working class. With their concomitant electoral power and potentially explosive demands for expenditures for adequate levels of basic social services, structural mechanisms (e.g. non-school special districts, regional authorities, inter-governmental project grants) have developed which insulate from popular control areas of policy-making and allocation upon which regional capital accumulation is dependent (see Feshbach and Shipnuck, 1973).

The structure of the federal inter-governmental transfer programs to the central cities was in the 1960's a particularly effective way by which state structures were politically insulated from challenging segments of the working class. Federal inter-governmental transfer programs and especially project grants located the origins of urban policy, and thus the limits of urban expenditure, outside the city. This favored those interests best able to organize on a national level—corporate policy groups, capitalist fractions like insurance companies, mortgage bankers, home building associations—and insulated policy formation from the poor and black who have been able to create electoral and non-electoral challenges.

ineffectual federations of local groups confined to legislative lobbying once the limits of substantive policy variation have already been defined (see Wolman and Thomas, 1970).

Further, the development of federal grants-in-aid have insulated urban agencies from political accountability. Federal programs have contributed to the proliferation of politically autonomous agencies with direct linkages to the federal bureaucracies and their administrative elites, making agencies more permeable to dominant capitalist interests which are best organized and have most at stake; and making any unitary, programmatic attack on urban problems impossible, thus contributing to the political fragmentation of lower class client groups. Without a unitary structure with the capacity to act, people who have most to gain from serious change have little incentive to politically participate (Newton, 1973).

Structures such as reform government and federal inter-governmental transfer programs depoliticize major segments of state power. Capitalist elites have been able to control the structure of city expenditures in ways that do not impinge upon the city functions critical to the continued profitability of the central city location, and which generate new fiscal resources without threatening the class-fragmented metropolis (Hill, 1974).

The proliferation of intergovernmental project grants for the cities has also been internally contradictory. For if such federal grants decreased the possibilities for political influence by the urban working class, they have also made rational policy formation by national and city executives even more difficult. At the national level the swelling national bureaucracies which resulted from the new federal urban programs were increasingly able to avoid Presidential control and become autonomous centers of policy formation. At the city level, both city managers and mayors were unable to control the federally funded city agencies because of these agencies' direct lines of communication to their federal sponsors. The erosion of urban executive power which resulted led finally to yet another structural change, revenue sharing, which promises new conflicts and contradictions.

Structural Change: Corporatism

The emergence of corporatist structures to politically incorporate the organized working class, given the increasing role of state intervention in the economy, is a third example of structural change that attempts to insulate the political regulation of the economy from working class control.

A variety of analysts have linked the attempts at political incorporation of the organized working class into subordinate positions in corporatist structures to the increasing imperatives for state planning of capitalist development. Shonfield (1965) has argued that the emergence of the positive capitalist state which attempts to maintain full employment, regulate labor conflict, control inflation and stabilize business cycles has been associated with the institutionalization of class conflict. Schmitter (1974) has analysed the emergence of societal corporatism in advanced capitalist nations. Corporatism in general is characterized by:

... singular, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered, sectorally compartmentalized, interest associations exercising representational monopolies and accepting (de jure or de facto) governmentally imposed or negotiated limitations on the type of leaders they elect and on the scope and intensity of demands they routinely make upon the state (1974: 99-100).

Schmitter argues that societal corporatism, a form of interest structuring not centrally imposed by an authoritarian state, emerges out of the decline of advanced pluralism. The institutionalization of class and interest conflict through societal corporatism assures state control and predictability of class conflict, the cooptation of working class elites in exchange for state guaranteed monopolization of working class access to state power. The process of corporatist development involves a variety of forms:

The modalities are varied and range from direct government subsidies for association, to official recognition of bonafide interlocuteurs, to devolved responsibilities for such public tasks as unemployment or accident insurance, to permanent membership in specialized advisory councils, to positions of control in joint public-private corporations, to informal, quasi-cabinet status, and finally to direct participation in authoritative economic and social councils (Schmitter, 1974: 111).

Warren (1972) also has suggested the importance of politically incorporating the working class as a political requirement for capitalist planning given the need to assure wage control in the context of international trade competition. Political incorporation was critical if the politicization of profit levels and class shares of income was to be averted. The solution, according to Warren, was,

The institutionalized integration of a bureaucratic trade union movement into the planning process, exchange for limited, but continuous economic and other gains for the working class—provided *all* independence of the movement is surrendered except over minor matters (Warren, 1972: 8).

Warren suggests that the early adoption of wage policies in Norway, Sweden, and Holland were only possible because social democratic parties were in power and could induce trade union wage control. Warren points out that after the failure of deflationary measures in response to inflationary wage-price spirals, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Belgium and Italy,

... all ushered in planning plus wage policies under the aegis of newly formed social democratic governments or governments with social democratic participation; in all cases major sections of the ruling class specifically opted for social democratic participation in government; in all cases a certain political resurgence of the working class occurred at the same time as inflation was accelerating, and followed the exposure of the irrationalities of previous strategies.

Warren goes on to point out that with their incorporation into state planning, social democratic parties abandoned the socialist elements in their programs and stressed the efficiency with which the party could manage state planned, full-employment capitalism.

Corporatism is also an internally contradictory mode of incorporating the working class. The premise of a corporatist strategy is that the inclusion of selected leaders of working class organizations (especially unions, but also on occasion left parties) in formal state planning processes will reduce working class opposition to state policies without requiring massive concessions to popular demands. This outcome will occur only if two things happen: first, the incorporated leadership must be seen as legitimate by the working class, and second, the leadership must be sufficiently insulated from day-to-day mass pressures to accept the imperatives of planning in the interests of capital accumulation. And here lies the contradictory quality of corporatism: If the leadership of the incorporated working class organizations is sufficiently isolated from the working class so that state planning is insulated from popular pressures, then that leadership will tend to gradually lose legitimacy and thus cease to function as a means for integrating the working class. If, on the other hand, the leadership maintains close ties to the working class and remains a legitimate instrument of real working class organizations, then corporatist planning will be hampered by the constant pressures for accommodation with mass demands. The first of these possibilities undermines the cooptive function of corporatism and will tend to accelerate the disintegration of the incorporated organizations. This can already be seen in the case of Social Democratic Parties in several European countries. The second of these possibilities undermines the planning function of corporatism and brings class struggle into the administrative heart of the state apparatus itself. In either case, corporatism, like other attempted structural solutions to political class struggle, remains an intensely contradictory strategy for the capitalist class.

In summary the three historical cases of reform government, federal intergovernmental urban transfer programs and corporatist planning all suggest the importance of analysing state structures as they mediate the relationship between classes (i.e. as a product and determinant of class conflict). Methodologically, this means that one cannot study a particular agency or legislative act in isolation from class struggle and the ways in which class struggle is internalized within the state. Consequently, in order to assess the contradictory ways by which state structure reproduces capitalist political domination it is necessary to analyze the location within state structures of the control of different policies and the location of political incorporation into the state of different class interests. Otherwise the state is likely to be seen as a neutral instrument or a functionalist thermostat for capitalist society.

The political struggles of the working class thus gain analytical importance absent from the "instrumental corporate liberal" and "structuralist" approaches. Political class struggle becomes the central

contradictory consequences of that restructuring. To paraphrase Marx, capitalists may manipulate the state, but they do not do so just as they please. The instrumental domination of the capitalist class is constrained by the structures of the state formed out of past class struggles, by the exigencies of current class struggles and by the contradictory consequences of state activity for future class struggle. (12)

II. THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL CLASS STRUGGLE

Our analysis so far can be summed up in several propositions:

1. State structures must be seen as the outcome of class struggle rather than as ahistorically given, perfect mechanisms for reproducing capitalist society and repressing the working class.
2. These structures mediate, in contradictory ways, the relationship between instrumental inputs into the state from the ruling class and functional outputs.
3. When successfully shaped by the capitalist class, these structures accomplish two critical tasks: a) they limit state interventions within bounds compatible with the imperatives of capital accumulation; b) they politically neutralize the working class in the sense of making its political demands congruent with the reproduction of capitalist social relations.
4. However—and this is very important—these structures are inevitably contradictory. They never provide a totally unproblematic solution to the challenge of political class struggle. The working class can never be perfectly incorporated, totally neutralized. The political question for the working class is never whether or not contradictions exist within the state, but rather how intense those contradictions are and how they can be exploited by the working class.

Our discussion thus far has largely focused on only one half of the dialectic between state structures and class struggle, namely the ways in which these structures are shaped by class struggle. It is equally important to see how the forms and directions of class struggle are shaped by the state. It is ultimately out of a dialectical theory of the relationship of class struggle to the state that a complete understanding of both will emerge. We will therefore now shift ground from a focus on the structure of the state to the nature of the political class struggle itself.

We will begin by discussing the range of possible types of political class struggle. Once we have elaborated these possibilities, we will return to the analysis of the state and see how these divergent forms of political class struggle pose different problems for the capitalist state and how the response of the state in turn poses constraints on political class struggle. Finally, we will look at the new patterns of emergent contradictions within the advanced capitalist state and discuss what new possibilities for working class political struggle appear on the horizon.

A Typology Of Political Class Struggle

In the following pages we will try to develop a typology of political class struggle.

tical demands and struggles of the working class vary; the *level* of social relations at which those demands are directed; the *form* of state activity implied by those demands; and the *structural consequences* of the demands.

Level refers to the specific sphere of class relations which is affected by the political demands. Capital is a social relationship, a mode of relating labor to the means of production. That social relationship can be conceptualized at two interpenetrating levels: *the level of production* refers to the actual organization of the production process, the ways in which the means of production and the labor process are controlled and surplus value is generated and appropriated. *The level of circulation* refers to exchange relationships between commodities, whether such commodities be different goods or services or in fact exchange relationships between capital and labor. Whereas surplus value is generated and appropriated at the level of production, it is realized at the level of circulation. Political demands that impinge on market relations, that concern the value of labor power, the distribution of taxation, the regulation of utility rate structures, etc., all represent demands at the level of circulation. Political demands, on the other hand, which concern the regulation of the labor process, the production of certain goods and services by the state, and so on, represent demands at the level of production. Demands about *what* is produced and *how* it is produced constitute demands at the production level; demands about the *distribution* of what is produced are demands at the circulation level (13).

Political demands do not merely have an object; they also, either explicitly or implicitly, concern the *means* by which they are to be met by the state. Whereas level refers to the object or location of political demands (i.e. whether they concern relations of circulation or production), *form* refers to the ways those demands are met by the state. A particularly important distinction in these terms is between what can be termed a *commodified form* and a *noncommodified form* of political demands. A commodity is something which is produced for exchange rather than simply for use. Political demands which take a commodified form are thus demands for the state to work through and reinforce market mechanisms to accomplish some objective. The noncommodified form of political demands, on the other hand, push the state to work outside the market or even to directly oppose market mechanisms. Thus, state subsidies to private businesses to provide certain goods or services would represent a relatively commodified form of state intervention, whereas the state directly producing those same goods and services would constitute a relatively noncommodified form. Obviously, many state activities represent mixed cases.

The final dimension of political demands is perhaps the least tangible, yet most important. By "structural consequences" of a political demand we refer to the extent to which it tends to be *reproductive* of capitalist social relations or *unreproductive*. Reproductive demands are demands which, if met, tend to reinforce, stabilize and expand the basic social relationships of capitalism. Unreproductive demands are demands which tend to weaken, destabilize, and undermine those social relationships. (It should be noted

constitutive of socialist social relations, but merely that they undermine capitalist ones.) (14)

Taking these three dimensions together we can construct a formal typology of political class struggle. This is illustrated in Chart 1 on the following page. Several preliminary comments on this typology are necessary. First, the typology is not meant to be exhaustive of all political class struggles. In particular, many struggles which are primarily directed at state structures per se cannot be classified as production vs. circulation or commodified infrastructure by contracting on the open market with private capital. Take, for example, highway construction. Particularly in the United States, the nomic activities. Second, although the dimensions on the chart have been labelled as polar types (circulation vs. production level; commodified vs. noncommodified forms; reproductive vs. unreproductive consequences), it is obvious that in reality these dimensions are much more continuous. Individual state activities can bridge levels, can be partially commodified and may be somewhat unreproductive. Indeed, a particular policy may fall into more than one slot in the chart. Third, where a particular demand falls in the chart cannot be defined abstractly. A demand which is reproductive under certain circumstances may be highly unreproductive under others. The typology is only useful when it is joined to a historical analysis of class struggle and state intervention in a particular social formation. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the typology is *not* a theory of class struggle, but merely a conceptual schema. It provides, we hope, a set of categories in terms of which a theory of class struggle and the state can develop, but in and of itself it is no more than a typology.

Before actually using the typology as a device for examining the dialectic between class struggle and the state, it will be helpful to go through each of the cells of the chart and give examples of the kinds of demands that would be characteristic of each combination. We will begin with the upper left hand corner and move towards the lower right hand corner.

Reproductive-Commodified-Circulation politics. Probably the simplest example of this category is tax-cuts. Tax-cuts under Keynesian state policies represent an attempt to bolster aggregate demand (a circulation objective) by giving people more money to spend in the market (a commodity form of intervention) and thereby stabilize the process of surplus value realization (a reproductive consequence). Other working class demands also fall into this category. For example, demands for unemployment payments or minimum wage laws, by themselves would generally constitute a form of reproductive-commodified-circulation politics. By giving workers money—either in the form of unemployment checks or in the form of higher minimum wages—the state deals with a problem at the level of circulation (imperfections in the labor market) with minimum disturbance of normal commodity relationships.

Reproductive-Commodified-Production politics. The classic example in this category is the demand that the state provide certain kinds of infrastructure by contracting on the open market with private capital. Take for example highway construction. Particularly in the United States, the state does not itself generally build highways, but rather contracts out such construction projects to private companies. Such

LEVEL of social relations at which political demands are directed

REPRODUCTIVE OF CAPITALIST SOCIAL RELATIONS		
FORM of state intervention implied by political demands		
	COMMODIFIED FORM	NON-COMMODIFIED FORM
CIRCULATION LEVEL	Tax-cuts; price supports and other government subsidies; unemployment payments; cash forms of welfare.	Libraries; free goods and services provided by the state; welfare in the form of free goods.
PRODUCTION LEVEL	Government contracting with private capital to build economic infrastructures; Nationalized profit-making industries (e.g. Renault).	National health services; free public education.
UNREPRODUCTIVE OF CAPITALIST SOCIAL RELATIONS		
FORM of state intervention implied by political demands		
	COMMODIFIED FORM	NON-COMMODIFIED FORM
CIRCULATION LEVEL	Adequate guaranteed income (not restricted to retired workers) sufficient to undermine the commodity status of labor power; wage demands combined with profit and price controls.	Community control of public services; community controlled rent boards.
PRODUCTION LEVEL	Demands for infrastructure construction under conditions of the fiscal crisis of the state.	Workers' takeovers of factories which restructured the labor process in ways which increase worker control within production; tenant control of public housing construction.

CHART 1: THE CONTENT OF POLITICAL CLASS DEMANDS

not be provided by private capital. It operates at the level of production, since the intervention is designed to actually produce something which would not otherwise be produced. And it takes a relatively *commodified* form since the state works through the market to produce the highway.

Reproductive-Noncommodified-Circulation politics. Whereas unemployment benefits in the form of cash represent a commodified form of circulation demands, welfare grants that take the form of free goods represent a noncommodified form of reproductive-circulation politics. When the government distributes free surplus food to the poor, for example, it is organizing the distribution of use values, not merely facilitating market mechanisms of distributing exchange values. The substitution of food stamps for free food in the 1960's is thus an example of the partial recommodification of a relatively noncommodified form of state activity. The political demand for public libraries represents an interesting example of this same category. Libraries represent a way of circulating books (to each according to his/her need) which is the antithesis of commodity exchange (to each according to his/her income). Libraries constitute reproductive state intervention because of their role in research, education, dissemination of ideology, etc., and because of their relatively limited use. If libraries were to become the main mechanism for distributing books, and if they began distributing a wide range of other use-values as well (records, tools, recreation equipment, art works, etc.), then in fact they would probably begin to be unproductive. This is a good example of how the same political demand can be reproductive or unproductive depending upon the magnitude of the demand and the particular circumstances in which it is made.

Reproductive-Noncommodified-Production politics. There are occasions where the state actually organizes production. If such production is still organized primarily on exchange value criteria, then in fact such production politics could still take a commodified form. This is the case in certain kinds of nationalized industries (such as Renault in France). But when such state production is fundamentally organized around use-value criteria, then we have a case of noncommodified production state activity. Working class demands for a national health service would be a good example. Equally, public education falls into this category: it represents the production of skilled labor power organized outside of market relations. While it is true that labor power is a commodity, the schools themselves do not generally exchange that commodity on the market.

Unproductive-Commodified-Circulation politics. We characterized unemployment insurance as a reproductive-commodity-circulation demand; an *adequate* guaranteed income for all workers, on the other hand, is clearly an unproductive demand. While still resting basically at the level of circulation and relying on a commodified form of state intervention, such a demand would seriously undermine the status of labor power itself as a commodity. If workers could live well without working, one of the critical elements of capitalist social control, wage discipline, would be undermined (see Piven and Cloward, 1971). This is not to say that such a demand, if won by the working class, would automatically lead to capital-

of the labor market, undermine the role of the reserve army of the unemployed, etc. Again, as in the earlier example of libraries, the magnitude of the demand is critical for assessing its reproductive/unreproductive consequences. A minimum guaranteed income might well be reproductive, being merely a form of welfare, whereas an adequate guaranteed income could be unreproductive.

Unreproductive-Commodified-Production politics. As was stated above, the typical reproductive-commodity-production demand is for the state to build social infrastructure through contracts with private capital. To call such activity reproductive assumed that, in fact, the state had the fiscal resources to build such infrastructures. However, under conditions of "fiscal crisis" when demands for state spending expand more rapidly than the capacity of the state to finance such demands, such infrastructure contracting can become unreproductive (O'Connor, 1973). More generally, when working class political demands for government spending on infrastructure cease to be subordinated to the requirements of accumulation and attempt to authentically serve working class interests, they will tend to become unreproductive. Again, this is especially the case under conditions of fiscal crisis.

Unreproductive-Noncommodified-Circulation politics. Political demands for expanding free goods and services distributed by the state become unreproductive beyond a certain point. The demands for community controlled boards to control the operations of various public agencies (police, schools, libraries, etc.) also can become unreproductive depending upon the political uses to which that control would be put. A good example would be the establishment of tenant controlled rent control boards which set rents and enforced building standards in such a way that residential real estate investment was no longer profitable. If such boards only induced disinvestment and evictions, they probably would be reproductive. If on the other hand such boards were able to force state or tenant controlled property development, as appears to be developing as a strategy of the Italian working class, they would potentially become unreproductive.

Unreproductive-noncommodified-Production politics. Political demands for worker's control of the labor process, and ultimately for workers' control of the entire production process, represent the purest form of unreproductive-noncommodified-production politics. To the extent that workers authentically control the apparatus of production, it becomes possible for use-value criteria — and furthermore for use-value criteria geared to working class interests — to gradually replace exchange value criteria within the production process itself. Under conditions where such control is limited to individual units of production, but not the entire system, such noncommodified production would remain highly constrained by capitalist commodity production in the society as a whole. Ultimately, therefore, unreproductive-noncommodified-production politics require not merely workers control of individual production units, but workers control of the entire apparatus of production, and this requires workers control of the state.

The Class Content of Political Class Struggle

It should be clear from the above discussion that the different cells in the typology of political class struggle have very different implications for class interests, and therefore bear very different relationships to the capitalist state. As a first approximation, the distinction between reproductive and unreproductive politics corresponds roughly to the distinction between capitalist class and working class interests. This does not mean that class struggle is absent *within* the reproductive half of the typology. Many struggles are fought over which of several reproductive policy alternatives is to be adopted and some of these may be less inconsistent with working class interests than others. To call a policy "reproductive" therefore, does not imply that it is completely antagonistic to working class interests; what it does mean is that when the working class makes political demands that are reproductive, working class interests have in some sense been subordinated to those of capital, and thus inevitably, they have been distorted.

A good example of the class content of reproductive politics is the demand for a National Health Service (reproductive-noncommodified-production politics). A National Health Service may well be in the interests of the working class in the United States, but it nevertheless represents a way of meeting working class needs for health care which subordinates those needs to the reproductive needs of capital. Various structural features of National Health Services guarantee this: bureaucratic organization, control by professional medical boards, insulation from working class participation in direction, etc. In the area of health, state intervention has primarily been limited to the level of health care delivery, rather than the production of health itself. This is a commonality between those countries like England and Denmark which have nationalized health care and the United States which has limited its intervention to the level of circulation, stressing the mass availability of health insurance programs. In all cases, this treatment of health care reinforces the individual as an *object* of state intervention through curative as opposed to preventive, social medicine.

For a national health service to serve the interests of the working class it would have to be controlled by workers and would have to deal with the causes of illness and thus preventive medicine. And such a health care system would inevitably generate conflict over production relations, the consequences of which — pollution, industrial accidents, poverty, the organization of personal careers, and the alienating structure of work — are the causes of many diseases (15). Such a health service, needless to say, would be highly unreproductive from the point of view of capital. To the extent, therefore, that the working class restricts itself to political demands that are reproductive of capitalist social relations, it must inevitably distort those interests through their subordination to the needs of capital.

The class content of political demands can be analyzed beyond the simple distinction between reproductive and unreproductive politics. The distinctions between commodified and noncommodified politics, and even

between circulation and production politics, also have important class implications. The type of political demands most compatible with capitalist class interests is represented by reproductive-commodified-circulation politics (the upper left hand cell in the typology). This type of state intervention flows most naturally from capitalist social relations, impinges on capitalist prerogatives in the least obtrusive ways, and enhances the realization potential of capitalist production.

Furthermore, commodified-circulation politics tend to be the most divisive for the working class. The working class is most differentiated and stratified in terms of labor market relations. Educated vs. uneducated workers, white vs. black workers, male vs. female workers, specialized vs. unspecialized workers, etc. may all share a common situation in terms of relations of production, but occupy very different positions in the market for labor power. When the working class restricts its political struggle to the commodified-circulation level, it does not engage in combat around issues which bear out the common conditions that define the position of the working class. The state's response to commodified circulation demands — for example, the proliferation of highly differentiated employment programs and wage legislation for different categories of work — tends to reinforce the myriad interest group divisions within the working class, and make a class conscious working class movement more difficult. Thus reproductive-commodified-circulation politics have tended to be the most compatible with capitalist class interests, both because they intrinsically pose the least potential threat to capitalist prerogatives and because they tend to most undermine the cohesion of the working class.

The primary organization around which working class reproductive-commodified-circulation politics are centered is the labor union, or *trade union*—a conceptualization which better conveys its political substance. Commodified-circulation politics, especially organized around the trade union, become primarily directed at individualized consumption, while divorced from *work* itself. As Gorz writes,

Trade unionism... confines itself to demanding higher individual purchasing power and at the same time greater leisure—in other words, non-work, in compensation for the fact that where his work is concerned his worker is a non-man. (1973: 85)

State intervention at the level of production, even when it is still reproductive and maintains a commodified form, poses greater potential problems for the capitalist class. When the state constructs infrastructure, the political issues of what kinds of infrastructures should be built, whose interests should it serve etc. are necessarily raised. All of these issues become posed in much sharper forms when the state not only intervenes at the level of production, but does so in a non-commodified way. When the state is not only involved in deciding what should be produced, but also in how it should be produced, the political criteria for production become more explicit, potentially making it much harder to maintain the fiction of a common interest for the whole people. Non-commod-

itized around use-value rather than strictly exchange-value criteria, and this immediately poses the question of class interests served by these criteria. The general resistance of the capitalist class to direct state participation in production at least in part reflects the intuitive reasoning by capitalists that such policies are intrinsically more precarious than commodified forms of state intervention in general, and commodified-circulation policies in particular.

Still, noncommodified production politics remain only potentially threatening to capitalist interests. In the absence of working class political organizations challenging the class interests served by such state activities, they can remain substantially reproductive of capitalist social relations. So, the crucial question becomes what is the relationship between noncommodified-production policies by the capitalist state and the development of class conscious working class organizations. While this is a very complex issue and ultimately can be answered only in terms of the concrete analysis of specific historical cases, one generalization seems possible. The working class is potentially much more unified at the level of production than at the level of circulation. It would be expected, therefore, that noncommodified-production interventions by the state would tend to reinforce market based divisions within the working class less strongly than commodified circulation interventions. Political struggles around noncommodified-production policies would therefore more easily tend to crystallize around class issues than only around interest group issues. This does not mean, of course, that divisions within the working class would spontaneously disappear during struggles over noncommodified production policies, but rather that such struggles would tend to build working class unity to a greater extent than struggles over circulation-commodity policies. This reflects the contradictory quality of the capitalist state: because of the imperatives of legitimation and accumulation, noncommodified-production interventions by the state may become necessary (e.g. nationalization of inefficient segments of capital, creation of a national health service, provision of universal public education, etc.), but those identical policies may in turn contribute to the political unity of the working class which makes the capitalist state—and ultimately the capitalist system—more precarious.

If reproductive-commodified-circulation policies represent the purest form of capitalist politics, unreproductive-noncommodified-production demands represent the purest form of class conscious working class politics. When the working class is organized around these kinds of demands it challenges the very premises of capitalist society. The working class becomes a class "for itself," and class politics must involve conflict for generalized power, involving ever larger segments of state power and state apparatus, calling into question not only the structure and legitimation of private production, but also the structure of the state. Political demands around social needs can no longer be reduced to the better commodification of labor power, and these demands can no longer be satisfied through consumption and non-work alone. In short, working class political struggle around noncommodified, unreproductive

directly undermine capitalist social relations, but in general they do not as sharply pose an alternative to those social relations as do unproductive-non-commodified-production politics. In particular, unproductive commodity politics at either the circulation or production level may tend to weaken capitalism, but they still reproduce the logic of commodification and thus fundamentally remain within the logic of capitalism.

Political class struggle can therefore be conceptualized as a struggle over which of these types of political demands will dominate, that is over the content of class conflict itself. The capitalist class tries to push demands towards commodified forms and away from the production level, and tries to exclude unproductive demands altogether; the working class, on the other hand, moves toward noncommodified politics, production politics and, ultimately unproductive politics. Needless to say, the movement towards this revolutionary pole has often been thwarted, and in periods of relatively uncontested capitalist hegemony, may remain only a latent possibility. It is therefore a question of fundamental importance for the development of revolutionary struggles around the state to understand the conditions under which circulation politics become transformed into production politics, commodified politics into noncommodified politics, and most importantly, reproductive politics into unproductive politics. We will now turn to an examination of a number of examples of such transformations.

Transformations of Political Class Conflict

Three ways by which political class struggles may be progressively transformed seem especially important under conditions of advanced monopoly capitalism: 1. The breakdown of commodified-circulation politics at the factory level caused by crises or accumulation within individual firms. 2. The breakdown of the state's capacity to pay for commodified-circulation politics as a result of the fiscal crisis of the state; 3. The deepening nature of capitalist contradictions which make pure commodified-circulation policies inadequate even from the point of view of capital. We will examine examples of each of these and then turn to a more detailed discussion of the transformations of political class struggle and state interventions in the case of one advanced capitalist country, Sweden.

1. Commodity politics breakdown at the factory level.

Recent years have witnessed a number of occasions in which commodified-circulation politics at the factory level temporarily broke down and led to the emergence of working class production politics. Such, for instance, has been the case with a number of factory take-overs initiated by workers due to plant closures. The 1974 Lipp factory take-over in France is a case in point. Faced with the threat of sudden unemployment and disruption of retirement benefits by the new management's decision to stop production of the famous Lipp watches, the workers turned to their unions, the CFDT and CGT, which failed to reverse the management's decision. Given the impossibility of further commodified-circulation pol-

itics in this situation, the only feasible alternative left to the workers who saw the enterprise as economically sound, was to take over control of production themselves, dispense with management and the board of directors and, instead, organize production through a system of collectivized decision-making. In this way workers effectively smashed the existing production relations within their work place, relations no longer sufficient to maintain the consensus of commodified-circulation politics upon which the bargaining process rests.

The Lipp case has since been replicated in a number of factories throughout Western Europe, such as the Triumph Motorcycle factory take-over in Great Britain and two factory take-overs in Denmark in 1975. The latter provide an interesting contrast with respect to our discussion. Two factories, the Rank-Arena television factory owned and controlled by a British corporation, and the Uniprint factory owned by Danish capital, were both to be closed down, not due to inefficiency or lack of an "adequate" rate of return, but rather to potentially higher profitability of location in other countries. Both factories were taken over by the workers, but the politics of the factory take-overs contrasted sharply. In the first case, the workers occupied the factory while negotiating with different sources of capital to maintain production. Private capitalists and the labor unions (LO) were asked to buy shares in the enterprise to avoid its closure. Thus, in this case the critical transformation towards working class production politics aimed at control was missing, and objectively the incident was directed at shoring up the principles of private capitalist ownership. The role of the LO is in this case highly illustrative. The LO offered to invest in a portion of the necessary shareholdings out of its pension fund. However, severe restrictions are imposed on how such funds can be used for productive investment:

- a) it would only hold shares up to 15% of the total capital, thus insuring that the enterprise remains under "private control."
- b) LO would only invest its funds in enterprises which are listed on the stock market.
- c) such investment would only occur under conditions where the firm has a "sound" financial rating.

The Uniprint incident provides a contrast to the extent that the workers declined any opportunities of strengthening the capital base of the firm through enlarged private shareholdings. Instead, in line with the Lipp case, the workers demanded full control over the management of the firm, thus alienating any potential union support—and for that matter any media support, which incidentally had been readily forthcoming in the Rank-Arena case. What the two cases serve to illustrate is that under the same conditions, the working class may react in politically totally different ways: either towards re-establishing the viability of commodified politics under occurrences of breakdown, or towards pursuing a radically different line of struggle, the outcome of which is highly uncertain and the support for which is still very meager.

2. The fiscal crisis of the state.

As we argued earlier, reproductive-commodified politics, especially, at

the level of circulation, are the most compatible with capitalist class interests since they simultaneously maximize divisions within the working class and minimize the possible threats to capitalist prerogatives. As long as the state has an ample tax base, commodified politics can continue apace. The difficulty is that there are intrinsic tendencies within advanced capitalism for commodified interventions by the state to expand more rapidly than its capacity to finance them. The result is the fiscal crisis of the state.

The underlying dynamics of the fiscal crisis have been extensively analysed by O'Connor in *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, and there is no need for us to recapitulate his arguments here. The critical point we wish to make is that as the fiscal crisis of the state deepens it becomes progressively more difficult for the state to restrict its interventions primarily to the commodified-circulation level. Simply to finance its commodified-circulation politics, the state is pushed towards intervening at the level of production. At a minimum this entails greater state involvement in coordinating and planning private commodity production (commodified-production interventions) in order to expand its tax base, but it may well move towards more basic state involvements in direct production of use-values (decommodified-production interventions).

3. *The contradictions of commodified-circulation politics.*

The pressures for movement away from simple commodified-circulation state interventions are more profound than simply the incapacity of the state to pay for such policies. Even if the state could find the wherewithall to continue commodified-circulation politics unabated, there would still be strong tendencies pushing the state towards production level politics because of the contradictions within the accumulation process itself. It is a common observation that in recent years there has been a gradual deterioration of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Often this is treated as merely an artifact of government policies, especially fiscal policies. In fact, this deterioration reflects the fundamental contradictions of accumulation in monopoly capitalism, some of which involve the state, but which cannot be reduced to "problems" in state intervention. Three aspects of these contradictions are especially important (see Wright, 1975):

- a) with technological development, especially within the monopoly sector, there has been an increasing tendency for the "surplus population to expand. Part of this pool of displaced workers has been absorbed in the competitive and state sectors of the economy, but in general there has been a tendency for higher unemployment for any given level of economic activity.
- b) Growing concentration and centralization of capital has increased the tendencies for monopoly pricing in many sectors of the economy and thus for any level of economic activity there is likely to be more inflation.
- c) This inflationary tendency is further heightened by two aspects of state intervention. First, as a consequence of the growth of the sur-

plus population (among other social pressures), the state has greatly increased its spending on welfare, police and other "social expenses," to use O'Connor's expression (i.e. state spending that is absolutely unproductive in the sense that it does not even indirectly lead to an expansion of surplus value). Secondly, Keynesian demand maintenance policies by the state have tended to create guaranteed markets for many monopoly corporations and thus reduce pressures for productivity increases. Both of these factors have contributed considerably to the increase in inflation for given levels of economic activity.

None of these tendencies can be dealt with effectively through commodified-circulation politics. The state must somehow become involved directly in organizing production, increasing productivity, employing the surplus population. Such intervention is made more difficult by the state's fiscal crisis, itself in part of a consequence of the very commodified politics that are incapable of handling the contradictions of accumulation.

It is ironic that the requirements for the reproduction of capitalism may necessitate a state which itself negates the commodity satisfaction of social needs, refuses to be subordinated to the market, and is thereby increasingly forced to enter into production both to meet those social needs and to finance that production. The fiscal crisis of the state points towards nationalization; only working class struggle will determine if it points towards socialization.

The Case of Sweden (16)

Sweden provides perhaps the best example of how a capitalist state, facing a working class which is highly organized around reproductive-commodified politics, especially at the level of circulation, is forced to adopt decommodified-production policies to an ever greater extent because of the deepening contradictions of advanced capitalism. The story of Sweden is a story of how Social Democratic governments have, by the single-minded pursuit of commodified-circulation politics, eroded the possibilities of restricting state activity to commodified forms at the level of circulation (17).

The Swedish labour movement in the form of the Social Democratic Party and the confederation of Swedish trade unions (LO) is in its essence based upon commodified-circulation working class demands. The ideological foundation rests upon the idea of "creeping socialism," which basically implies that skillful and strategic manoeuvre within the confines of bourgeois institutions by an increasingly organized proletariat will progressively secure larger and larger slices of the state structure for the working class ends. By progressively seizing structures of the capitalist state, the working class will eventually come to exert "structural power," i.e. state power to shape the structure of capitalist institutions for working class ends. With such power it is believed that "systemic power," i.e. power to transform the system of capitalism into a system of socialist production, will increasingly be realized (18).

In our terminology, social democratic theory postulates that the social democratic movement will gradually move from the politics of consumption relations towards the politics of production relations. The critical political question is whether or not this will be done in ways which merely reproduce capitalist relations of production at higher levels of efficiency and manageability, or whether social democratic policies contain the possibility of radically unproductive political demands. An examination of the Swedish case may help to answer this question.

Sweden was the first country to adopt the method of deficit public spending as a means to alleviate the problems of mass unemployment and the lack of aggregate demand during the early 1930's. From then on deficit budgets became an institutionalized part of state intervention under continued Social Democratic regimes throughout the 1940's. However, by the late 1940's the inherent limitations of "pure" Keynesianism began to manifest themselves in the form of spiralling inflation. In other words, the trade-off between full employment and price instability began to encroach upon the wage position of labor as well as upon the functioning of the economy in general. As a result, the legitimacy of such state intervention began to dwindle. The Social Democrats had nothing to respond with but wage and price controls.

After a few years of wage-stagnation, the LO refused to further support such measures, and instead pressured the Social Democrats to pursue a package of economic policies which to a much larger extent broke with the traditions of standard Keynesianism and a "free market economy." The "Rehn-Model," as their policy came to be known, involved large-scale government involvement with the mobility of labor. The idea was to pursue a policy of structural reform of the economy in order to solve the trade-off problem between unemployment and inflation by shifting resources from the least efficient and least profitable sectors of industry towards the most profitable ones. A comprehensive public Labor Market Exchange was established to retrain manpower rendered redundant by bankruptcies in inefficient enterprises and to redirect labor power efficiently to the most profitable sectors. The rationale for this type of intervention, with its focus on the mobility of labor rather than merely on the circulation of money, was to actively restructure the economy into one of a homogeneously high level of productivity. The objective was to weed out, rather than continue to subsidize, low productivity capital units which lagged behind in their ability to match profit expansion with wage increases. However, no attempts were made to transcend the realm of exchange relations, since it was still believed that further modifications in the market would be sufficient to solve these problems.

By the late 1960's, the Rehn model of state intervention began to prove inadequate due partially to technical-administrative difficulties of implementation, but mainly to the inability of the state to link any viable manpower policy to the uncertainties of capitalist investment decisions. Since it is impossible to reliably forecast (let alone influence) the volume and direction of private investment flows, an active manpower policy will at best be a patchwork solution. The failures of the Rehn model were blatantly visible in the form of rising unemployment rates throughout the country, strikes and labor unrest, and general economic stagnation.

Therefore, to protect its market position, labor began to pressure for solutions to the crisis which contained a higher degree of control over the mobility of *capital* as well as labor. A vehicle for this was, in fact, ready a hand in the form of massive savings in the relatively idle Pension Funds. The idea was to use these funds in a selective manner to steer investments in such a way as to strengthen the technological advantages of Swedish monopoly capital in international competition, thereby also acting to protect Swedish labor. This policy of indirectly allocating investment capital was accompanied by direct state investments in key sectors such as steel.

Thus it is clear that due to the constraints and contradictions in the accumulation process, an active Keynesian policy was pushed in Sweden from a primitive level of intervention in the mobility of money, through the mobility of labor, into the regulation of the mobility of capital. It was increasingly realized that the stabilization of the unemployment-inflation contradictions necessitated state regulation of capital.


Here is a case, then, where a capitalist state has gradually moved towards intervention at the level of production. The result, however, has not been to further politicize class relations. The Social Democrats and the LO find it opportune, if not a necessity, to wage the struggle in technicalized rather than politicized terms. Instead of struggling for autonomous centers of working class power, the general tendency has been for the expansion of corporatist structures. The net effect of the Swedish variant of the social democratic state policies has thus been to restructure and reproduce the system at a higher and more efficient level, thereby muting and diverting class struggle and reinforcing tendencies toward monopoly in the process of Swedish capital accumulation. Simultaneously, however, such policies have the effect of channeling class conflicts away from the private economic level towards the public. In these terms, we are again confronted with the double-edged character of state intervention: as production becomes more political, politics are increasingly depoliticized.

So, the question remains whether or not the Swedish working class, whose relationship to the state has for so long been mediated by the Social Democratic Party, will move beyond the limits of the emergent *re-productive-noncommodified-production* politics. In some ways the corporatist integration of the working class into the Swedish state, which has characterized Social Democratic politics, makes such a prospect seem unlikely. Nevertheless, such a corporatist strategy is highly contradictory, for while it appears to provide a basis for stable accommodation, it also potentially brings class struggle into the administrative heart of the state apparatus. The Swedish working class has already shown its capacity to influence both state policies and state structures within the limits of re-productive state interventions. Whether or not it will be able to shatter those limits while remaining within the framework of Social Democracy is perhaps the most pressing issue facing the Swedish working class.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The basic logic of the analysis of this paper is schematically laid out in

Chart 2. This chart indicates which of the possible interrelationships among the fundamental categories of our analysis we have examined, and which we have left largely undiscussed.



In Part I of the paper we focused on the relationship between the *organization* of political class struggle and the *structure* of the state. (By organization in this context we mean the capacity of the working class to organize politically vis-a-vis capital). We argued that state structure is not neutral but is a critical element in the mediation of class domination. Thus the structure of the state should be analyzed as the outcome of historical patterns of class struggle over the organization of the state apparatus. Working class struggles which potentially threaten the political domination of capital or the execution of state functions critical to the accumulation of capital necessitate ruling class restructuring of the state to preserve capitalist political domination and to insulate critical functions from working class influence.

In Part II we focused on the relationship between the *content* of political class struggle and state *policies*. We distinguished between three different aspects of political demands for state intervention: the level of intervention (production versus circulation); the form of intervention (commodified vs. noncommodified); and the consequences of intervention (reproductive or nonreproductive for capitalist social relations in the society as a whole). We argued that demands for state intervention which were at the level of circulation and capable of a commodified response were the most compatible with capitalist interests; whereas demands for state intervention at the level of production in noncommodified ways were the most likely to become unproductive and serve working class interests.

A number of important relationships illustrated in Chart 2 remain largely unexplored in our analysis:

1. *The relationship between the organization of class struggle and state policies.* We have briefly touched on one aspect of this relationship, namely the ways in which commodified state interventions (especially at the level of circulation) tend to be divisive of the working class, whereas noncommodified production politics tend to provide a basis for more unified working class political organization. It is equally important to explore the other direction of the relationship, the ways in which the organizational strength and cohesiveness of the working class has an impact on the content of state interventions. This has been the focus of most traditional Marxist analyses of "concessions" won by the working class from the capitalist state.

2. *The relationship between the content of class struggle and state structures.* Working class struggles at the level of commodified-circulation politics have tended to be associated with the proliferation of fragmented, insulated state agencies. In a real sense the anarchy of commodity production and circulation is reproduced in the anarchy of state structure (19). The question then arises how will this fragmented state structure change as political class struggle moves away from pure commodified-circulation politics? And reciprocally, as more centralized executive structures of the state develop (in response to the changing requirements for accumulation), what will be the consequences for the content of political class struggle?

3. *The relationship between the structure and policies of the state.* It is clear that certain kinds of policies are much more likely to develop under certain state structures than under others. Thus, the anarchic, fragmented structures of the "pluralist" state are quite un conducive to the emergence of coordinated, effective, reproductive-noncommodified-production state policies. There is considerable evidence that at the present time in many advanced capitalist countries a profound contradiction exists between the historically evolved structures of the capitalist state and the kinds of policies that are rationally required by advanced capitalism. As Offe has argued (1972), much of the attempted rationalization and reorganization of state administrative structures should be interpreted as attempts to make effective production policies more likely. In the terms of our analysis, the capacity for the state to generate reproductive interventions may be contingent upon the existence of certain kinds of structures.

4. *The relationship between the organization and content of political class struggle.* Considerable Marxist theory has been devoted to this particular problem. In particular, Lenin's classic statement about the relationship between trade union organization and economic (i.e. commodified circulation) demands deals directly with the link between the nature of working class organizations and the content of class struggle. The link, however, operates in both directions: not only do certain kinds of organizations tend to generate certain kinds of demands, but certain kinds of demands tend to reinforce or undermine given kinds of organization. In particular, as we have argued, commodified-circulation demands make class-wide organization around the common conditions of the proletariat more difficult, whereas noncommodified-production demands facilitate class organization. Political class struggle as a dynamic historical force must always be treated as the consequence of the interaction of both organization and content, rather than being reduced to either.

5. *The relationship between class struggle and the interaction of structure and policy.* This is the conceptually most complex relationship among the categories of our analysis. Political class struggle—as the outcome of the interaction of organization and content—not only influences state structure and state policy, but the very relationship between structure and policy. The capacity of a given state structure to generate reproductive policies itself depends upon the organization and content of working class struggles. The most rational and well-engineered state structure cannot guarantee rational policies for capital, since the state is always confronted by the potentiality of organized working class opposition. This does not mean that state structures can never function rationally (reproductively) in the interests of capital, but that such rational policy formation is historically contingent upon the nature of class struggle.

A full exploration of political class struggle and the state must involve a careful theoretical and empirical investigation of each of these relationships. Furthermore, it is critical to explore the overall historical transformations of the entire system of relationships pictured in Chart 2. We have indicated one sequence of such transformation in our discussion of the contradictions inherent in commodified-circulation politics which push the state towards production politics (20). The analytic problem and promise remains to specify the potentiality of apparently reproductive political demands to ultimately generate progressively unreproductive consequences. And on the other side to determine what, in the first flush, appear as unreproductive demands yet result in the reproduction of capitalist power.

FOOTNOTES

1. We are grateful for the constructive and stimulating comments and criticisms of the Madison, Wisconsin Kapitalist Group, the Bay Area Kapstate Group and the Michigan Kapstate Group, as well as the individual help of Michael Aiken, Robin Blackburn, Manuel Castells, Randall Collins, Jens Christiansen, David Cray, William Domhoff, David Gold, Eugene Havens, Alex Hicks, Edwin Johnson, James O'Connor, Michael Schulman, and Maurice Zeitlin.

2. Since we are only dealing with that part of an author's work that deals with the state, and since we extract elements of their work to illustrate these perspectives, we realize that we do not do full justice to the theoretical and empirical complexities of their contribution to this underdeveloped subject. Thus we ignore the historical location and specific political intentions of the different analysts of the capitalist state.

3. An excellent review and critique of the dominant American perspective can be found in James Sharpe, "American Democracy Reconsidered," *British Journal of Political Science*, 1973.

4. Another example is Mandel's recent book, *Der Spatkapitalismus*. Mandel sees the state as occupying a relatively autonomous position vis a vis individual class actors in order to secure the continued hegemony of the capitalist class as a whole. This autonomy has, to Mandel, structural causes:

Capital cannot in terms of its own activities produce the social character of its existence; it needs on its basis a special arrangement, which is not subordinated to its own (capital's) boundaries, which in this sense is a special arrangement (existing) beside and outside bourgeois society, and while never challenging capital, will simultaneously respond to the immanent necessities of capital, which capital itself has created. (1972: 436)

The structure of the state is determined over and above the compositions of personnel and strong capital-agency interlocks. This is reflected in the hierarchical division of labor in state institutions which parallel the prevailing relations of production. The increasingly autonomous power of the state to act corresponds to the increased difficulties of unhindered capital reproduction, and therefore "autonomous power" is *delegated* to the state out of the objective interest commonalities of the capitalist class.

5. For Poulantzas, people are "agents" of the social structure (1973: 206), and not conscious, existentially generative actors. Poulantzas writes, "... political class struggle has nothing to do with a ... process ... 'acted' by ... the class subject." (p. 77) Therefore it becomes impossible for this approach to specify the conditions under which the subjective interests of the capitalist class or members of it will coincide with the functions of the state.

6. We are indebted to Ralph Coates, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, for this point.

7. For an extremely interesting critique of the instrumentalist perspective see Mollenkopf (1975). For a discussion of various strands of structuralist and instrumentalist theories of the state which parallels our analysis, see Gold, Lo and Wright (1975).

8. This position conflicts with Martin, Strachey and others who have paid more attention to the conflictual political aspects of the introduction of the welfare state.

9. In the U.S., black community movements have begun to realize the importance of structural change in the metropolis and city government as vital to their ability to politically organize for more generalized political power necessary to effect change. For example, May (1971) has described how a politically organized West Oakland community struggled not simply to assure community representation in programs affecting them, but to constitute a new center of power with *legitimate authority*, co-equal with the city council, to control all agencies relevant to their community. Not only the immediate political outcome but the capacity for future political organization, depends on the decision of whether to try to control existent state structures, or to restructure that apparatus.

10. In the four U.S. cities studied by Williams and Adrian, the median percentage of manual workers on the city council was 8%. Newton and Morris (1974) have pointed out that in Britain, where nationally integrated urban parties are organized around labor union support, manual workers and labor union leaders are much more likely to get elected to the council than in the U.S.

11. Katznelson writes,

This dual broker, buffering role of the machines was critical in the cities at the turn of the century because the mass migration of Catholic and Jewish workers from Europe and blacks from the South brought into question the traditional hegemony of the Protestant ruling class. (1976).

12. The general approach we have outlined allows us to understand how politics in advanced capitalist states has appeared pluralist despite the reality of capitalist domination of the state. Pluralism, as the phenomenal form of political conflict in capitalist societies, can be understood as one manifestation of the political neutralization of the working class. The empirical data of pluralist theory are thus saved, but raised to a higher analytic level.

13. This distinction between the level of production and circulation is the cutting edge between Marxist and bourgeois treatments of class structure. Weber, in particular, totally ignores the level of production regarding class structure as derived from market relationships. For Weber, class refers to,

"... any group of people . . . (who have the same) typical chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions, and personal life experiences, insofar as this chance is determined by the . . . power . . . to dispose of goods or skills for the sake of income in a given economic order . . ." (pp. 181-182) From Max Weber, (New York: Oxford, 1947).

The analytic and political implications of Weber's definition of class pervade virtually all individual mobility and poverty research.

14. James O'Connor (1975) makes the distinction between what he calls 'anarchist labor' and 'socialist labor.' Anarchist labor is labor which simply negates capitalist principles. Socialist labor, on the other hand, embodies alternative principles of social organization.

15. As Hyman points out for England, the magnitude of industrial accidents is staggering — in 1970 twice as many days were lost through industrial accidents than from all forms of strike activity. (1972: 34)

16. The following discussion of the Swedish case relies heavily on the very important research done by Andrew Martin (1973, 1974). We are also indebted to him for further clarification and explanation of his ideas.

17. It should be emphasized that the case of Sweden is somewhat unique in that the unions organize almost 90% of manual workers and perhaps 70% of all salaried employees. Further, the Social Democratic Party has held office continuously for more than 40 years. This should be taken into account when drawing lessons from Sweden about the probable development of production politics in other capitalist nation states.

18. For further discussion of the distinction between structural and systemic power, see Alford and Friedland, 1975.

19. Thus the fragmented structure of the American state should not be seen merely as an abstract elite social control process or as a form of symbolic politics. Rather, the structure an abstract elite social control process or as a form of symbolic politics. Rather, the structure stimulating "social control" interpretation of the American health care structure, see Alford, (1975). For the "symbolic politics" approach, see Edelman, (1964).

20. Other examples of such sequences would include: where the working class has developed a production politics, the state has attempted to constrain and depoliticize its production interventions through particularly structured nationalizations (post WWII nationalizations in France, England). Where the state has been compelled to intervene in production because of the limits of capitalist initiative (e.g. nuclear energy development), it has often soon after acted to recommodify the product and return it to the level of capitalist circulation.

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of the party system as a mediator between the government and the people. (See the essay in this volume on modern political parties for a further discussion of this last point.)

To the extent that the top-down strategy of the Brookings analysts works, the distance between the government and the people will widen. This, in turn, paves the way for a major legitimization crisis in the years ahead. On the other hand, it is not altogether clear that the top-down strategy of crisis management proposed by Brookings will work very well even in the short run. Soon after Carter got into office, congressmen started criticizing the kinds of ideas he was getting from his advisors. Already in January, one congressman accused Carter of taking "bum advice" from a "bunch of conservative economists." By April, Carter had been forced to back down on his tax-rebate proposal and to accept most of Congress's pork-barrel dam projects. The chorus of criticism has now widened. Labor and black leaders, businessmen, academics, and the press are now freely criticizing many of the Administration's proposals. Eventually, the voice of discontent from the bottom—the unemployed, the minorities, the young, the urban dwellers—will once again be heard. And at that point, the carefully worked out strategy of the Brookings analysts will be revealed for what it is—the pipedream of a group of beleaguered technocrats.

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Typology and Class Struggle: Critical Notes on "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State"

*Capitol Kapitalistate Group**

The following critical response to the article by Gosta Esping-Andersen, Roger Friedland, and Erik Olin Wright arose from our discussions in the Capitol Kapitalistate Group on the article itself and from our general discussion of the condition and role of modern Marxist theory in understanding and supporting political struggle. First, we note the strengths of the article, especially its effort to lead us away from imitations of bourgeois social science methodology and back towards the richer Marxist method focused on historical and dialectical approaches. The central place accorded class struggle within the historical process that shapes the state seems to be a necessary and long overdue restoration of the Marxist concept of human agency.

We take issue, however, with the methodology used by Esping-Andersen, *et al.*, especially their emphasis on constructing a typology of class struggle (198ff). While thought provoking, their typology appears to be static and undialectical, reproducing some of the methodological shortcomings of bourgeois social science. We also question the notion "modes of class struggle" and the specific interpretations of the Marxist concepts of circulation and commodification. We offer both a sketch of the problems in their scheme and suggestions for a possible focus of attention, but do not pretend to have produced an alternative framework.

Self-Conscious Theory

Esping-Andersen *et al.* could better exploit the self-conscious nature of Marxist methodology, the unique superiority of which has always lain in an ability to self-consciously see its ideological role. An emphasis on the self-conscious and dialectical nature of this methodology would both strengthen their critique of structuralist and

* Ann Markusen, Paul Goldman, Len Rodberg, Heidi Hartmann, Meredith Turshen, Phil Brenner, Cathy Schoen, Grace Horowitz, Robb Burlage, Jim McWilliams, Gene Frankel.

instrumentalist approaches to state theory and lessen their tendency to lapse into the use of bourgeois concepts. *Real* theory stresses dialectics, with an emphasis on human beings as the subjects, not the objects, of history, and on the unity of theory and practice. At the same time it rejects the requirements of bourgeois theory, including arbitrary cause and effect, construction of static, empirically measurable categories, and the requirement of prediction. In the initial section of "Modes of Class Struggle," the characterization of instrumentalist and structuralist approaches might include a philosophical criticism of their flaws as static, not dialectical, models to accompany the author's useful perception of their resemblance to "inputs" and "outputs."

Without fully exploring this critique, we wish to point out that the instrumentalist approach, especially, incorporates the notion of cause-and-effect, not the dialectical action-and-reaction nor the unity of opposites simultaneously defining and changing each element. Structural models, in turn, incorporate the static features of conventional models, where categories have to be fixed, mutually exclusive, comprehensive, etc. Esping-Andersen *et al.* do begin to critique such stasis by emphasizing the interrelationship between history, evolution and structure, whereby institutions formed in previous struggles shape the nature of, and behavior of actors in, present struggles. However, their suggestion that we treat state structure as an object of class struggle leads to an analysis that similarly depends on static categories whose political meaning is not entirely clear.

A final point that deserves a hearing involves the lack of predictive capability in Marxist models. For bourgeois social scientists, the test of a good analysis is its ability to predict what will occur in the future. Our models cannot predict. This, however, is a strength, not a weakness, as it is grounded in the superiority of the Marxist view of the unity of theory and practice rather than the bourgeois ideology of "objective science." According to the latter, society operates in a mechanistic, unconscious way and the future is (partially) predictable on the basis of past personal and institutional behavior. Marxists understand that *conflict* is the means of determining the future and that *all* theory, by either obscuring or revealing this truth, is ideology.

The article's sections on historical change could better exploit the self-conscious character of Marxist theory by focusing more on working class participation in state struggle and the ways in which different ideologies (theories) reflect, inform, empower or mislead the participants. In general, we feel that the historical accounts in the paper underemphasize working class and community organization and opposition as forces challenging existing structures and shaping new ones. In the section on intergovernmental grants, for instance,

it seems that each structural arrangement served one or another faction of the ruling class. An alternative approach would examine the possibility that some structures were created, directly or indirectly, and ultimately used by organizations of working class people.

These critical remarks on present attempts to formulate theories and models of the state are not intended to suggest that such undertakings are not useful. On the contrary, we believe them to be essential to developing a working class understanding and ideology while warring against the liberal borrowing of theoretical constructs from bourgeois social science. This borrowing may be an unavoidable consequence of operating within the "academy" where the definition of "rigor" remains in the hands of bourgeois scientists who view dialectical discussions as fuzzy and ideological. Since we have learned and practiced in the academy, we tend to internalize its demands and unwittingly mime bourgeois analysis in our work. Consequently we must constantly remind ourselves of the power of the dialectical method and its emphasis on the interaction between theory and practice.

The Typology of "Modes of Class Struggle"

The article promises much with its title; it suggests that there are modes of class struggle, like modes of production, that allow us to dissect struggle over the state and explain changes in its form (although the term "mode" appears only sporadically in the subsequent text). The authors concede that "it is in and of itself no more than a typology" and consists of a set of categories within which a theory of class struggle and the state may be developed. The analysis, however, still suffers from some of the constraints of static and logical models and perhaps overestimates the power of its offerings. We discuss each set of categories in turn to illustrate the gist of our remarks on method and our later conclusions about political usefulness.

A. Production vs. Circulation Politics

Marx originally distinguished between the production of surplus value and the realization of surplus value in circulation in order to identify the membership of the "productive" or surplus-value producing segment of the working class. Recently, the usefulness of the concept "productive labor" has been challenged. For instance, if certain services are productive, then many functions previously considered unproductive may qualify for productive status. Thus there is extensive debate in general among Marxists about the definitions of, and boundaries between, production and circulation.

Esping-Andersen *et al.* employ a further variation of the production-circulation distinction by differentiating between *creation*—what is produced and how (production)—and *distribution*—or receipt of what is produced (circulation). This distinction, however, only imperfectly corresponds to the original definitions of production and circulation, which distinguish successive stages in the Money Capital—Commodity Capital—Money Capital process. Their definitions are in fact the exact counterpart of neoclassical definitions of allocation and distribution, which artificially separates the question of how returns to production are divided among classes from the question of what is produced and how. “Political demands that concern the value of labor power represent demands at the level of circulation. . . Political demands that concern the regulation of the labor process. . . represent demands at the level of production” (199). The labor theory of value posits that production decisions about what to produce and how to produce it are based solely on the ability to extract surplus value from workers employed in any particular process. The amount extracted can be affected by the various mechanisms Marx suggests in volume I of *Capital*: intensification, lengthening of the work day, the bargain over wages paid to the workers, and so on. The rate of surplus value depends directly on the wage level, so that struggles within the workplace or in the political arena that change the wage level can affect allocation decisions. *What* is produced, *how* it is produced and, with imperialism, *where* it is produced are all tied to the distribution of returns between capital and labor. For instance, if the push for a higher wage settlement by a union in a particular plant results in a shut down, more mechanization or a stepped-up production pace, the struggle over distribution has affected production decisions. In fact since World War II unions have collaborated in such decisions—the UMW accepted mechanization (and unemployment) and the USW accepted a no strike pledge, both in return for higher wages. At any level except the global, a change in the distribution of surplus value between wages and profits will affect production. Higher wages for U.S. workers, for example, encourage the exodus to production sites where cheaper labor exists.

Instead of distinguishing between production and circulation, which are not synonymous with allocation and distribution, and which are controversial categories to begin with, we suggest that the distinction between *public* and *private* be used. That is, there is a crucial difference between decisions about production and distribution made in the private sector and those in the public since the power and ideology in each sector are fundamentally different. The distinction between private wage-profit divisions and social wage-profit divisions allows us to see struggle in both spheres as class struggle and to compare structure and strategy in each. The Esping-

Andersen *et al.* production-distribution distinction underscores intra-class divisions. For example retired workers could gain more from “circulation” politics while their working daughters and sons would gain more from “production” politics. It is clearer and simpler to see these differences as stakes in the public and private sectors which, not being necessarily contradictory, can be a basis for unity.

B. Commodified vs. Non-Commodified Production

Similarly, we find the distinction between commodified demands and non-commodified demands imprecise and politically unclear. This distinction requires a sharper defense of both its meaningfulness and its boundaries. We detect an implicit suggestion that the authors generally view the state as a distribution rather than a production mechanism and that this serves as the source of these categories. However, the state also engages in production for both use and exchange. The conditions under which workers produce and the distribution of use value to members of society partially determine the significance of a production activity. Esping-Andersen *et al.* recognize the difficulties here: “Obviously, many state activities represent mixed cases” (199) and “if such production is still organized on exchange value criteria, then we have a case of noncommodified production state activity” (202). Unfortunately they do not fully explain “exchange value criteria” or “use value criteria,” a more crucial question than whether production is for use or exchange.

The political implications of this distinction are also unclear. There are numerous cases of noncommodified forms of production which are not unequivocally in the interests of the working class. Housework, when tied to the oppression of women in the home, is non-commodified production not in the interests of the working class as a whole. Similarly, any form of noncommodified production that benefits only a segment of the working class at the expense of others (as well as one that benefits the capitalist class alone) is clearly not in the interests of the working class. Finally, even programs which are universal (e.g. a free national health system) may not be in the interests of the working class if they are forced to support the entire tax burden for it. Questions of work relations within the noncommodified production process, of distribution of use values produced, and of the financing (tax or otherwise) scheme for it must be part of a distinction of this sort if it is to be politically useful. A recurrent weakness in many reformist demands is the short-sightedness that results from following an oversimplified distinction such as non-commodified vs. commodified production.

A more precise formulation is necessary if we are to gain political guidance from it. We assert that the concepts of social profit and

Contributions
(in dollars)

- 2,500 Rep.
- 44,500 Rep.
- 51,000 Rep.
- 22,000 Rep.
- 43,000 Rep.
- 25,000 Rep.
- 500 Rep.
- 15,500 Rep.
- 1,000 Rep.
500 Dem.
- 23,000 Rep.
- 6,500 Rep.
- 1,000 Rep.
- 500 Rep.
- 5,000 Rep.
500 Misc.

Mass.: Heath,

tributors constitute a mixed bag. Many are old-line aristocrats of Northeastern Protestant background, such as the Harrimans and the Roosevelts. Some are rich southerners, such as Senator James Eastland, the Mississippi-delta multimillionaire. Not a few are Catholic, like the Kennedy family. Of the wealthy, upper-class contributors to the Democratic party cause, a disproportionately large number are Jewish, like Mr. and Mrs. Jack Dreyfus, Jr., already mentioned as key backers of Eugene McCarthy.

There is truly ethnic pluralism among the millionaire supporters of the Democratic party. Of course, this upper-class breed of pluralism does not make the Democratic party the "party of the common man," as commonly held belief would suggest. Although plenty of working-class people vote Democratic, especially during economic recessions, these working-class people have little, if anything, to say about the selection of presidential candidates or the form of legislation to be passed in its behalf.

In this sense, Schumpeter's assumption—that democracy works through political elites going to the ordinary man rather than having the man in the street make the original as well as the final selection of the candidates—is not unreasonable. Schumpeter's theoretical opinions would be consistent with the data of both Domhoff and Alexander. What remains highly questionable is the subject of merit, especially on such matters as the selection of judicial elites.

Once nominated and elected to office, the President becomes a crucial figure in selecting members of the federal judiciary. What is less clear are the President's criteria for selection, although we can observe the numerous devices through which the upper classes can and do exert their influence. First, the President selects his appointees from a list drawn up by party leaders on the state level. Many of the state leaders themselves belong to the upper class as does the President. But more is involved, and here we encounter the invidious control exercised by a judiciary both sensitive to its class expectations and limited by its reactionary attitude to moderate ideology. For the judiciary itself has the power to screen and to delete potentially controversial appointments:

Working through an 11-member committee of lawyers, the [American Bar Association]

has won for itself the privilege of evaluating at a very early stage in the search for candidates, the merits of each person seriously considered by the Attorney-General for nomination to the federal bench. While the Committee's actual influence has varied with the Administration in power, it has had, at a minimum, considerable success in deterring the nomination of judges it deems unqualified. . . . (During the Eisenhower Administration), Attorney-General Rogers was under instructions not to recommend a nomination over the objections of the Committee except in unusual circumstances. . . . During the first two years of the Kennedy Administration, 158 adverse reports were made, of which eight were disregarded by the Attorney-General.¹⁶

Domhoff went on to point out:

Members of this committee are selected by the president of the American Bar Association with the advice of the incumbent committee chairman. In the case of Bernard Segal, chairman of the committee from 1956 through 1962, the power to advise the bar president was in effect power to appoint. A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, Segal is a member of one of Philadelphia's most eminent upper-class law firms, Schnader, Harrison, Segal, and Lewis. He is a Jewish member of the power elite. Who are the other members of the committee? To answer this question Joel Grossman studied a sample of 51 men which included all those who had served from 1946 to 1962. He found that they tended to come from large law firms, to have distinguished careers within the ABA, and to live in cities with populations over 100,000. James Moore supplemented Grossman's study by compiling more detailed information on 28 of the men who served between 1953 and 1963. Eight of these 28 men—29 percent—were members of the upper class. Three more were from large (power elite) law firms, four others had attended Harvard Law School, and five others were corporation directors. The rest came from elite law schools in their region, such as the University of Virginia and the University of Michigan. Except for those who lived in states where we have little information on the upper class, most of the non-upper-class committee members were in

¹⁶ Domhoff, op. cit., p. 109. Reprinted by permission.

socially elite clubs. [One of the requirements of the committee is that it have at least one member from each federal court circuit, so there are necessarily members from all parts of the country—Domhoff's note.]

Who are the men finally chosen as judges? In terms of the lower federal judiciary, they are men politically acceptable to local and state politicians, who usually recommended them to Washington friends in the first place, and politically and professionally acceptable to the judiciary committee of the ABA. A study by Moore of 25 judges from six of the 11 circuit courts and the U.S. Court of Customs and Patents revealed that three were members of the upper class and that 20 had attended Ivy League schools. Thirteen of the 25 judges were from Harvard and Yale alone. Twenty had been invited into one or more of the socially elite clubs listed in the 12 city editions of the *Social Register*. Since Moore chose his districts with the hope of maximizing the number of upper-class judges, it was necessary for us to look also at a circuit that would minimize that possibility. The fifth circuit, which encompasses the Deep South and Texas, had two judges who could be considered members of the upper class and four who could not. It can be concluded that most of the judges of the lower federal judiciary are not members of the upper class, but that they have rather substantial professional and political credentials that are carefully checked beforehand by a legal arm of the power elite, the Committee of the Federal Judiciary.

Turning to the Supreme Court, the situation is not different in terms of socio-economic status, training, and political connections. John Schmidhauser, in *The Supreme Court*, reported on his study of the 92 Supreme Court justices between 1789 and 1959. He found that the justices came

from socially advantaged families. . . . In the earlier history of the Court, he very likely was born in the aristocratic gentry class, although later he tended to come from the professionalized upper-middle class. . . . It seems reasonable to assume that very few sons of families outside the upper, or upper-middle, social and economic classes have been able to acquire the particular type of education and the subsequent professional, and especially political, associations which appear to be

unwritten prerequisites for appointment to the nation's highest tribunal.¹⁷

Although the power to select the President and the members of the judiciary helps the upper classes to secure their political position and thereby reinforce their economic well-being, they remain unsatisfied with their considerable strength. The upper classes reinforce their ability to influence and to coerce through congressional initiation and a *de facto* veto based on their control of committee chairmanships in the two houses of Congress. Here not merit but longevity in office determines who will become chairman. Seniority, committee chairmanships, and upper-class positions appear to be highly interconnected. First, as Domhoff has demonstrated, a disproportionately large number of these chairmen are members of the upper class themselves. Second, there is the power exerted by lobbies created, subsidized, and directed through committee chairmen both upper and upper-middle class. Studies show that these particular lobbies are most effective when their intent is to block legislation rather than to create it; still, the power to initiate is by no means absent. Third, the U.S. business aristocracy attempts to get its way through shaping of public opinion, which is led to express itself through blanket protests to Congressmen. Large sums of money are spent to create "grass-roots campaigns" which strongly suggest to voters and politicians alike that the public is storming for or against a particular proposal. Another device cited and documented by Domhoff is the use of the mass media, almost all of which are owned by the upper classes, to narrow the limits of debate over a particular issue and, perhaps, to forge one or several acceptable opinions.

The upper classes exert their influence through the President's inner circle of advisors as well as through the diplomatic corps. But perhaps the greatest mockery of both popular control and merit appointments stems from upper-class staffing and influence of the very agencies designed to regulate industries owned by these particular upper-class persons. Of these 33 agencies, certain ones stand out: the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Interstate

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 109–111. Reprinted by permission.

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Commerce Commission (ICC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Federal Power Commission (FPC). Domhoff documented the discrepancy between original intent and subsequent practice:

The constituent groups—the industries of the American business aristocracy that the agencies supposedly regulate—control the regulatory agencies in several ways. First, through committees and associations of specific industries, the industries give advice to the agencies. Second, they are able to control key appointments to the agencies by providing as candidates for the positions corporation executives, corporation lawyers, and various other salaried specialists. Most importantly, the industries can appeal to the President to block appointments that are not acceptable to them. Indeed, appointive power is the only power which the Executive branch legally holds over the regulatory agencies, which are not responsible to it. However, the importance of this appointive power can be seen in certain of President Eisenhower's appointments, which were explained by economist Seymour Harris:

Former congressman Albert M. Cole had voted against most public housing measures, so he was made head of the Housing and Home Finance Agency.

John B. Hollister was an outspoken isolationist, so he was the perfect choice to guide the International Cooperation Association.

The Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, Jerome F. Kuykendall, who was supposed to represent the public against the public utilities, had represented gas utilities in cases before the United States Public Service Commission.

Since no government report or academic study yet published contradicts our claim that those who are supposedly being regulated dominate the regulatory agencies, it is not necessary to go into laborious detail on any one agency. The reader is referred to Henry Kariel's *The Decline of American Pluralism*, Bernard Nossiter's *The Mythmakers*, and Grant McConnell's *Private Power and American Democracy* for relevant examples and detailed bibliography. A quote from one of the sources on regulatory agencies will suffice. It is from Judge Lee Loevinger, who was head of the Antitrust Division of the

Department of Justice at the time of the drug hearings in the early 1960s:

Unfortunately, the history of every regulatory agency in the government is that it comes to represent the industry or groups it's supposed to control. All of these agencies were fine when they were first set up, but before long they became infiltrated by the regulatees and are now more or less run by and for them. It's not a question of venality, either. More, the agency people consort with this or that representative of some special-interest group, and finally they all come to think alike. Every company that's concerned about government control and is big enough to manage it hires a man—or maybe four or five men—at anywhere from thirty to seventy thousand dollars a year to find out what we're up to. And, by God, they find out! They wine and dine the agency people and get to be great friends with them. Like a lot of people without much money, some bureaucrats are impressed by being around big shots and by the big life. Sooner or later, all of these agencies end up with constituents. And they represent them damned well, too.¹⁸

Apparently many leading political figures have "passed many tests in other fields—served, as it were, an apprenticeship in private affairs" and thereby qualified in Schumpeter's terms for higher political office. Whose interests they serve other than their own, however, is a matter to be determined. It would seem that decisions reached by key congressional committees, judges, and the chief executive branch itself have over the decades benefited the upper-class persons who control the span of political nomination.

2. *On the meaningful deliberation of political issues by a participating electorate both concerned with electoral outcome and blessed with self-confidence under conditions that minimize the manipulative potentiality of the mass media.* Here the critics would argue that Janowitz and Marvick missed the point. Democracy means, at the very least, that all sectors of the citizenry have equal access on matters of influencing government and that such equal influ-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 107–108. Reprinted by permission.

ence does not occur when the mass media are both owned by millionaire moderates (and conservatives) and directed to the maximization of their material interests at the expense of those less fortunate. The upper classes own most of the mass media, which are organized by the upper classes to earn profit. As Domhoff and many others have indicated, the TV programming, radio programs, and newspaper coverage are geared to this activity rather than to activities which might consistently and thoroughly expose the conditions and dilemmas faced by subordinate classes found within the capitalist system. Were the merchandizing of information on poverty profitable, television, radio, and newspapers might conceivably stress the bleak circumstances of the coal miners, the day-to-day anomie of many ghetto residents, the meager incomes of the Great Basin poor, and the cognitive poverty of many Americans intellectually overwhelmed by events around them. Furthermore, even when people are filled with self-confidence and committed to getting things done through the parliamentary process, they find that the mass media can manipulate electoral outcomes through the power to limit the discussion of certain issues, to overstress the insignificant, to disregard salient issues, to exaggerate the consequences of a progressive or radical proposal, to dwell on the extraneous nuances of politicians' personality characteristics—and to do all this with little likelihood of encountering public challenge and so being forced to terminate electoral *schmaltz*. The people must have their own media—perhaps noncentrally owned TV stations, magazines, newspapers, and radio—in order that challenging views might be expressed by their sponsors. In the meantime, the progressives and radicals remain hamstrung electorally.

What radical democrats most resent is the power of the TV oligopolies to set the limits within which national debates take place. How does limitation work? Here is one illustration: Popular, left-democratic candidates must use television to carry their messages on the need for progressive taxation of excess corporate profits, selective government ownership of utilities and industries, and enforcement of government laws on monopolistic and oligopolistic practices. Yet to use television to carry their arguments requires vast sums of money for candi-

dates. These sums, millions of dollars in the case of presidential candidates, must be obtained primarily from private sources. The working class lacks that kind of money for political contributors. The middle classes will donate part of it, but not enough. It is the upper classes who must give the lion's share. But why should they donate money to a left-democratic presidential candidate who threatens to increase the taxes of their corporations, nationalize some of *their* industries (utilities, for example, as part of regional development such as TVA) and break-up some of their profitable monopolistic practices? They won't give unless and until the left-democrat moves over towards the political center and thereby abandons his left-democratic point of view. The abandonment of that point of view constitutes a narrowing of limits of debate. Hence, the left-democratic position fails to find persistent and extensive expression through mass-media debate. Janowitz himself has recognized general limits of the mass media in his discussion of the public-relations efforts of the military.¹⁹ If the mass-media owners can define the limits of debate, they can use this power to maximize the potentiality for effectiveness of a chosen pressure group. Here wealth is pertinent, as we shall see.

3. *On the possibility of all classes, status groups, and generations organizing pressure groups lobbying for issues, passing legislation, and vetoing the reprehensible.* The left's criticism of the Riesman position is quite clear. One's ability to organize and sustain powerful lobbying groups and associated media is a direct function of the amount of wealth that can be mobilized, whereas amount of wealth available is directly related to class position. There are exceptions, such as organized labor; but the key decisions on lobby spending for labor are made by oligarchs who often have salaries, life styles, and attitudes barely distinguishable from many sections of the upper classes. The poor get left out. They have neither the economic resources, the organizational basis, nor the trained talent to lobby for change or to use the legal system. Lobbyists cost money. Cajoling key congressional chairmen through payment for expensive

¹⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 401-402.

Millions of dollars in the candidates, must be obtained from private sources. The same kind of money for the middle classes will not be enough. It is the state that gives the lion's share. The left-democrat who threatens the interests of their corporations, utilities, and regional development agencies? They won't give the left-democrat moves over and thereby abandon their point of view. The point of view constitutes the main point of debate. Hence, the left-democrat fails to find persistent support through mass-media and the recognized general public in his discussion of the limits of the military.¹⁹ If the left-democrat is to maximize the effectiveness of a chosen president, as we shall

for all classes, status is organizing pressure is passing legislation, and sustain powerful media is a direct source of wealth that can be used to increase the amount of wealth available to labor; but the key to increasing labor are made available salaries, life styles, and a shamble from many sources. The poor get left with the economic resources, and the trained talent in the legal system. Cajoling key congressmen for expensive

Professional Soldier (New York: 1961-402.

outings, courting the important members of state legislatures through banquets, wining and dining powerful members of city councils, making large contributions to the elections of any of these politicians—all this pressure grouping requires a large and continuous supply of funds channeled through on-going sophisticated organizations. The poor and the ordinary can't afford it. As a result, lobbying remains largely the political province of the economically powerful persons and groups. The upper classes may veto each other, or on occasion a section of the upper class may set aside a benevolent moment for the lower classes, as in the case of the Kennedy family support of the United Farm Workers in California, but such interludes are rare. Furthermore, once the upper classes have decided to intervene on the side of the poor, they decide where, how, and when the intervention will take place, how long the help will continue, and under what circumstances the behavior of the poor will result in the termination of upper-class support. Discretion to take away accompanies the power to give.

On the ethical side, as you will recall, Riesman *et al.* argued that it is hard to take sides politically because of the ongoing veto power of all groups and the claimed amorphous quality of power relations. To the left-democrat, the lines of power become clear during crises (i.e., during moments when the poor strike at extant power relations in the economy). Illustrative would be an effort on the part of farm workers in a California valley to organize a union. Under those circumstances, a working alliance is revealed between state politicians, appointed judges, elected sheriffs, subsidized Congressmen, elected mayors, chosen city council members, and local growers—all within the net of local privilege lodged within an even larger combination of powerful groups and individuals on the regional and national levels. The would-be organizers confront those who wield the power to issue an antilabor injunction, enforce the law, break the law, write the law, and avoid the law in order to continue to suppress the insurgent lower classes. The lower classes are committed to the use of the strike, the boycott, the rent-stoppage, the massive demonstrations, and the hard-nosed picket line. And this power is used to jail labor leaders, to do violence to labor organizers, and to intimidate the others.

This pattern has occurred most blatantly in California, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and other areas where proletarianized ethnic groups (e.g., Chicano and other minorities) are subject to ongoing control by the growers. One's ethical sympathy is extended to these groups because they seek greater equity, and justice—by the standards of the French Revolution.

Needless to say, the members of many groups who laud Social Darwinism and repressive Toryism will dismiss the ethical claims of the poor. These groups can be found not only in off-campus areas but in the ivy halls. A minority of university intellectuals have been known to speak of conditions characterized by physical suffering and political powerlessness in abstract terms that conceal a cold and often sanguinary reality. This includes swinging clubs, damp jails, moldy food, and unusually long prison sentences, as well as a high infant mortality rate and a protein-starved segment of the population. To speak of the oppressed uniformly and continuously organizing effective veto groups and significant dollar-a-year clubs is absurd, as we have learned from the extraordinary but episodic political battles of the 1960s and 1970s.

4. *On political elites and masses recognizing and abiding by the legitimacy of legal authority and associated parliamentary procedures.* Left-democrats hold that governments must win and retain legitimacy by making democracy work for all, especially the oppressed. If and when parliamentary bodies become bound to the interests of "the few," then "the many" have the right to revolution or lesser rebellions.

From a left-democratic perspective, there is nothing sacrosanct about a government or a system. Either it does the job or it can expect to be succeeded. Indications of succession as a possibility can be seen when people circumvent moribund parliamentary bodies and take to the streets to demonstrate and to take other forms of direct action (which generally result in the police or a military body initiating the use of violence to discourage the choice of the demonstration as a political technique). Under these circumstances, the charge that the protestors should use legislative or pressure group channels makes little sense from a left democratic point of view, since in many cases those protesting

have already tried these avenues of redress and found them to be jammed. Furthermore, to argue that crowds induce violence through peaceful however vociferous demonstrations by provoking an easily irked police is pointless. Police are supposed to be trained professionals who can deal with the shouts, the yells and the hoots without inflicting bodily injury on the demonstrators. Again, to argue that these cat-calls and shouts constitute *violent* acts is incorrect, since the definition of violence clearly excludes the voice and includes blood-letting and bone crushing. Left-democrats are loathe to allow conservatives to indulge in the self-serving extension of definition.

Of interest here is the tendency of the left-democrats and the left-radicals to coalesce during prodromal or prodromal-like conditions in order to deal on a day-to-day basis with the minions of power and wealth. The right-democrats form an alliance with power and wealth to maintain the parliamentary system and private property. These extremely unstable alliances are likely to fall apart under many circumstances. For example, during a presidential campaign the left-democrats generally support a presidential candidate of moderate to moderate-left persuasion, thereby eschewing the politics of direct action favored by many left-radicals. Also, during presidential cam-

paings the right-democrats, especially the intellectuals, generally support a political candidate of right-moderate persuasion in a protracted electoral game which drains the body politic of most of its critical energies.

TRANSITIONAL REMARKS

As we indicated earlier, Joseph A. Schumpeter stands as the foremost theorist of right-democratic persuasion. His clearly formulated arguments lend themselves to easy summary, as indicated in our earlier analysis. Yet one can take issue with his assumptions, as we have in this chapter, especially after acquaintance with empirical materials of the kind presented by Herbert E. Alexander in his study of the 1968 election. We have included portions of this sound study in Section Two of this chapter.

Following the Alexander reading, we present an essay on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Curiously, many professional academicians entertain the view that professionals can maintain their autonomy on critical matters when employed within state organizations which are highly influenced by upper-class business interests, schooled in the techniques of skewing the original purposes of federal government bureaus. We will learn otherwise.

Section Two

A Reading on Presidential Elections

The 1968 Election

Herbert E. Alexander

INTRODUCTION

The voting and financing patterns of the 1968 Presidential election were in sharp contrast: In voting it was one of the closest elections in history; in financing the Republicans

■ Taken from Herbert E. Alexander, *Financing the 1968 Election* (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1971), pp. 1-11, 30, by permission.

outspent the Democrats by more than two to one. Unlike 1964, when a Republican financial advantage clearly did not affect President Johnson's reelection campaign, the Democrats in 1968 were seriously handicapped by their relative lack of funds. Overall, politics in 1968 set new records for expenditures, with the Presidential contests leading the increases.

Rising costs have been a feature of the

TABLE 23 Summary of Political Spending at the National Level, 1968 General Election (in millions)

Committees	Gross Disbursements ^a	Lateral Transfers ^b	Total Campaign Costs	Transfers Out ^c	Direct Expenditures ^d
37 Republican	\$28.9	\$.1	\$28.8	\$ 3.4	\$25.4
93 Democratic	19.2 ^e	6.0	13.2	1.6	11.6
37 Labor	7.1	1.0	6.1	4.2	1.9
3 Wallace	7.2	— ^f	7.2	0	7.2
52 Miscellaneous	4.3	.2	4.1	2.1	2.0
222 Total	\$66.7	\$7.3	\$59.4	\$11.3	\$48.1

^aData derived from reports filed with the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives.

^bTransfers between the Committees included in the table.

^cTransfers to Senatorial, Congressional and other candidates, and to state and local committees.

^dIncluding debts, if any.

^eIncludes \$2.8 million (received from contributions and loans) spent by state and local nonreporting committees for obligations incurred by the DNC; called constructive disbursements in financial report of DNC treasurer Robert Short.

^f\$25,000.

American political system, especially since the mid-1950s, and the rate of increase has been accelerating. In 1952, the first Presidential election year for which total political costs were calculated, it was estimated that \$140 million was spent on elective and party politics at all levels of government.¹ Total political costs rose to \$155 million in 1956, \$175 million in 1960, and \$200 million in 1964.² This represents a 43 percent increase in 12 years. For 1968, the total estimated political costs were \$300 million—an extraordinary 50 percent increase in four years.

Only a portion of all political expenditures are covered by federal and state reporting laws, and politicians are usually reluctant about divulging campaign fund information, so that precise data on all spending cannot be ascertained. However, the data which are available and the political conditions in 1968 support the estimate of a very significant increase in costs since 1964. Some of these data and conditions were: The expenditures (total costs) of national level political committees (detailed in Table 23) increased 71 percent; political broadcasting costs reported by the Federal Communications Com-

mission increased 70 percent; there were costly Presidential prenomination contests in both parties, unlike 1960 or 1964 when the competition for nomination was mainly in one party; the ante was raised in both parties by the candidacies of Robert F. Kennedy and Nelson A. Rockefeller, both millionaires, for Presidential nomination; there was protest activity both within and outside the two major parties—in the McCarthy campaign, the Wallace campaign, the New Party efforts, as well as the Black Panthers, Yippies, and others; there were special efforts to gain control of state legislatures in order to control reapportionment after the 1970 census; there was a general price rise of about 12 percent since 1964. There were no known reductions in political expenditures that would offset the increases.

The national-level committees which are covered under Federal reporting laws include the major party national committees as well as labor and some Congressional and other committees which operate in more than one state on behalf of one or more Federal candidates in the general election. The number of such committees has been rising along with expenditures;

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there were 70 in 1960, 107 in 1964, and 222 in 1968. Table 23 details the expenditures of these committees.

The \$59.4 million in total campaign costs of these committees compares with \$34.8 million spent in 1964. Republican committee expenditures increased 68 percent from 1964, while combined Democratic and labor spending³ increased 23 percent. Table 24 shows the relation of Republican and Democratic (and Wallace) committee spending for the last four Presidential election years. (The percentages are based on direct expenditures, as in the last column in Table 23, excluding miscellaneous committee spending.) Excluding spending by Wallace committees, the ratio of major party spending in 1968 was 65 percent for the Republicans and 35 percent on behalf of the Democrats (30 percent by Democratic committees and 5 percent by labor committees). Thus, the Republican financial dominance, customary in recent years, continued.

The costs of campaigning for the Presidency in 1968 were the largest component of the year's political bill, and the 1968 Presidential selection process was the most expensive in American history. The Presidential bill of \$100 million (of which more than 90 percent can be accounted for fairly accurately) was an increase of 67 percent over the 1964 costs of \$60 million, a significantly larger increase than even the 50 percent estimated increase for total political costs.

The Presidential bill for \$100 million, which is one-third of the total political expenditures in 1968, included: \$37 million for national-level costs for Democrats and Republicans in the general election; \$25 million in the Democratic prenomination period; more than \$20 million in the Republican prenomination period; \$9 million for George Wallace's American Independent Party, beginning in 1967. These known costs total \$91 million. State and local spending on behalf of Presidential candidates in both the pre- and postnomination periods would make up a large part of the difference. In addition, one must count in party and delegate expenses related to the national nominating conventions, and spending by activists giving parties, travelling, and telephoning paid out-of-pocket directly by the individuals concerned.

Data on the expenditures of national-level committees primarily concerned with the Presidential general election are available from 1912. The figures in Table 25 exclude spending by labor and miscellaneous committees, which generally do not benefit the Presidential candidates. Although there were some unusual years, the rise in expenditures was gradual from 1912 to 1952. Since 1956, the rise has been even more rapid than the big increases in overall political costs, with 1968 again occupying a unique position.

Calculations of the cost-per-vote for the Presidency since 1912 show a variable pattern for more than 40 years, and then a steady rise

TABLE 24 Ratios of National-Level Direct Spending, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1968
(in percentages)

	1956 ^a	1960	1964	1968
Republican Committees	59	49	63	55
Total on behalf of Democrats	41	51	37	29
Democratic Committees:	37	47	34	25
Labor Committees:	4	4	3	4
Wallace Committees	—	—	—	16
Total	100	100	100	100

^aDerived from Heard, *Costs*, p. 20, and *1956 General Election Campaigns*, Report to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, 85th Congress, 1 Session (1957), Exhibit 4, p. 41. 1956 deficits are listed by this Report as bills unpaid as of Nov. 30, 1956. Heard's figures for Republican and Democrats are for full calendar year 1956, but labor figures are for Jan. 1–Nov. 30, 1956. Heard's ratio for 1956 has been revised to include deficits.

Chapter 11 Center-Democratic: Its Strengths and Weaknesses

Section One *Down the Middle*

CENTER-DEMOCRATIC: ITS BASE AND CONTENT

At the level of the upper classes, center-democratic articulates the judgments of corporate liberals and wealthy sections of ethnic-religious minorities. There are exceptions. Many center-democrats stem from old-line families which have broken with genteel conservatism in order to salvage a badly sagging order. Whatever their background, center-democrats have preferred John Lindsay, John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Eugene McCarthy, and others of center-democratic persuasion. When we examine the industrial and financial backgrounds of center-democrats, we discover that many derive much of their incomes from light industries, the new speculations in real estate, and high finance; they also aid in the management of such enterprises. Not a few belong to the Democratic party.

What is center-democratic? How does it differ from its right and left counterparts? Previously we indicated that center-democratic—whether a party, movement, or government—is committed to the amelioration of social problems faced by the less fortunate. But this is an incomplete description of a political tendency led by the more progressive sections of the upper classes. Under modern circumstances, center-democrats represent an effort to join moderate bureaucratic organizations wedded to mild social change to domestic grass-roots social movements with considerably more in mind. These movements aim for the immediate elimination of problems of unemployment, disease, bad housing, poor health, irresponsible police, and associated concerns common to lower-class life. These adverse material conditions are derived in large part from upper-class decision-

making expressed through political elites who view private corporate welfare as synonymous with the well-being of the nation-state, even at the expense of the poor and the near-poor. Thus sections of the upper class may be allied with the poor against other sections of the upper class and the political power structure. Illustrative would be the coming together of the political and economic power wielded by Robert Kennedy and the California farm workers' movement led by Cesar Chavez against the corporate landed and banking wealth of California's Central Valley.

LEFT- AND CENTER-DEMOCRATIC: A COMPARISON

Left-democratic has little faith in the bureaucratic world of politics, believing that he who links democratic aspirations to bureaucratic organizations must inevitably produce an oligarchy in many ways as noxious as the one used by the establishment and the power structure for purposes of repression. Hence, unlike center-democratic groups, left-democrats shy away from continued reliance on large-scale party organizations, governmental departments, bureaus, and traditional unions. On occasion left-democrats contradict themselves by initially helping to create struggle organizations quite obviously hell-bent to become bureaucratic. In this sense, left-democrats react anxiously to center-democratic efforts to consolidate social movement gains by offering help to fledgling unions and welfare rights groups. Put it this way. Left-democrats supported Robert Kennedy's effort to help the California farm workers. But left-democrats are nonetheless leery of potentially adverse organizational consequences. These include the possible adaptation

of an increasingly successful and hence bureaucratic grass-roots group into the sterile politics practiced by existing unions and political parties. The adaptation could only accelerate the formation of the authoritarian qualities that characterize bureaucratization.

RIGHT- AND CENTER-DEMOCRATIC: A COMPARISON

Center- and right-democratic differ considerably in their relation to grass-roots movements. Whereas center-democrats generally hail the emergence of progressive social movements, work with them, and frequently forego efforts to absorb them—often viewing civil rights movements, student protests, and insurgent labor organizations as essentially positive and vital to the periodic revitalization of the political system—the right-democrats condemn as they eschew grass-roots movements. Right-democrats view insurgent grass-roots groups as potential precursors to a fascist overthrow of the parliamentary system. Hence, wherever they can, the right-democrats attempt to steer protest activities into institutionalized channels, and as soon as possible. Ever since the turbulent 1920s and 1930s when millions were involved in fascist and communist movements, there has existed a politically significant category of right-democrats wary of nonparliamentary politics, especially those involving mass movements. These right-democrats either ignore or condemn a mass movement. They seldom join it. During the 1960s, for example, these upper-class persons and associated intellectuals avoided participating in the civil rights movement, generally condemning both black militants and their white allies, and hewing very closely to a legalistic and cautious strategy advocated by the NAACP. When white civil rights activists went into the antiwar movement, militant antiwar protests were greeted with similar criticism by right-democrats such as Daniel Bell, Lewis Feuer, Nathan Glazer, Sidney Hook, Irving Kristol, Morris Janowitz, and Seymour M. Lipset.

In general, right-democrats differ from center-democrats in yet another way. Although both recognize the "necessity" of organizing society bureaucratically in order to install semi-autonomous elites in positions of formal politi-

cal power both in party and government, these two tendencies differ profoundly on matters of how best to relate to the military high command. Center-democrats have observed and on occasion exposed the propensity of military elites and their civilian partners to engage in covert design of foreign policy decisions in order to accomplish ends that might be very unpopular were they made public. Illustrative were the joint publisher and editorial—staff decisions on the part of *The New York Times* to publish the so-called Pentagon Papers in 1971, and the parallel agreement of the same parties to label the Kennedy—Johnson—Bundy—McNamara—Westmoreland decision on Vietnam as "clandestine."¹ By contrast, the right-democrats will generally support the decision of military civilian elites to deny the public information on matters of foreign policy decision-making. The accompanying rationalization is straightforward: To oppose publicly the right of the military and civilian elites to be secretive on matters of foreign policy plans and to expose the military civilian elites when they do prevaricate is to invite ridicule and hence to weaken their legitimacy. Illustrative would be Nixon's and Agnew's criticisms of *The New York Times* for its publication of the Pentagon Papers.

Clearly, then, these differences among center- and right-democrats indicate real disputes among corporations, government officials, politicians and associated persons on how best to relate to domestic social movements and military elites. Their mutual recriminations have

¹ In the Introduction to *The Pentagon Papers* (New York: Bantam, 1971), Neil Sheehan observed:

Clandestine warfare, as this collection of *New York Times* articles on the Pentagon papers will illustrate, naturally has an important effect on public events. Covert operations also occasionally violate treaties and contradict open policy pronouncements. No matter what vintage, therefore, documents related to clandestine war are, in the bureaucratic phrase, 'excluded from downgrading' under the classification regulations, in order to avoid embarrassing the Executive Branch and the men responsible. (p. xii)

In the same book's Forward, Hedrick Smith noted: The Pentagon account notes that at times the highest Administration officials not only kept information about their real intentions from the press and Congress but also kept secret from the government bureaucracy the real motives for their written recommendations or actions. (p. xxiv)

erupted most recently over the disclosures of the Pentagon Papers, the China recognition overtures, governmental and the devaluation of U.S. currency. These controversies do not mean that right-democrats stand as a confirmed bloc on all issues. Nor is each right-democrat consistent over time. Still, the most important demarcation point is between right and center, especially when it comes to upper-class decision-making on world issues of the kind just mentioned. Right-democrats depict the Communist and insurgent world as proto- or ongoing totalitarian (and the capitalist world as essentially free and democratic, and hence worthy of our protection). Center-democrats, however, generally believe that the best approach to overseas revolutionary movements is to attempt to destroy them through counterinsurgency (i.e., counterrevolutionary) activity *but*, if that strategy fails, to deemphasize the totalitarian label and stress reconciliation between the Communist and capitalist worlds through summit conferences, investment aid, trade agreements, mutual diplomatic recognition, and like devices. These mechanisms are geared to the cooptation of the overseas revolutionary leadership and the integration of such movements into parliamentary politics and international agreements, where revolutionary ideology and left-revolutionary remnants can be more readily managed by oligarchical rulers two or three steps removed from a helpful U.S. political leadership dedicated to the rewarding of right-communists. Once again, we can observe the propensity of center-democrats to work with an insurgent movement in order to defang but not to alienate it.

A NEEDED QUALIFICATION

Here as elsewhere we are not contrasting all-or-nothing qualities but rather speculating on presumed differences between center- and right-democrats in our analysis of political propensities. For example, it may be that many right-democrats favor a bundle of policies virtually indistinguishable from those of center-democrats during a particular phase of development. In the long haul, however, people will generally frequent one camp or the other.

Although center- and right-democrats differ considerably on matters of ideology, both have

come to rely on bureaucratic organizations in order to mobilize and to sustain human energies in a disciplined way. Discipline has been necessary to create predictable behavior coordinated by the few around their goals, which are generally publicized as everyone's goals. In capitalist society, these have most frequently taken one of two forms: (a) private bureaucratic organizations' dedication either to profit-making or to socializing the young in a manner consistent with these purposes, (b) state articulation of policies and programs designed to comfort corporate organizations and their associates. Thus the state need not be governed by the upper class, although often its governors do come from this group. What *is* essential is that the state rule to complement upper-class interests. (See Alan Stone's review-article on Ralph Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society* in Section Two of this chapter.) To do so has demanded increased rationalization within vertically structured large-scale organizations. Viewed historically, the vertical, authoritarian structures were baldly apparent in almost every case until World War II, when there appeared a number of organizations whose lines of authority were obfuscated by human relations techniques. Human relations techniques are forms of human manipulation based on organizational use of persuasion rather than coercion. Built into manipulation through persuasion is the effort to create affectional, near-intimate ties between the manipulator and the manipulated. Illustrative would be a police neighborhood unit in New York City attempting to manipulate neighborhood residents into cooperating with the police by (a) holding informal get-togethers where the police convey a new image of themselves as the people's protectors and at the same time attempt to develop with the residents a first name, chummy relationship, and (b) abandoning the use of police cars where it makes sense for police pairs to walk a beat and so enable the policemen to get to know people on a first-name basis.

THE CENTER PREFERS THE PROFESSIONAL BUREAUCRATIC TO THE STIFF AND STODGY

In Max Weber's time (i.e., sixty to seventy years ago), the relational contours of an organization that was called bureaucratic resembled

and government, these profoundly on matters of the military high command. We observed and on the propensity of military partners to engage in policy decisions in order that might be very unmade public. Illustrative her and editorial—staff of *The New York Times* ed Pentagon Papers in agreement of the same ed Johnson—Bundy—nd decision on Vietnam. contrast, the right- support the decision of to by the public infor- foreign policy decision- nying rationalization is po publicly the right ian elites to be secretive policy plans and to ex- an ites when they do ri cule and hence to y. Illustrative would be criticisms of *The New* ica on of the Pentagon

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those of a rational, military organization such as the German army, civil service, or university.² Nor were the German illustrations unique. The emerging pattern was becoming near-universal, as the small business firm gave way to corporate and governmental organizations. People lodged themselves in large-scale organizations within hierarchies of roles, and the accompanying duties were clearly delineated and sanctioned within organizational subunits having narrowly defined functions. Persons were recruited, promoted, and deposed on the basis of merit. Merit was decided on the basis of personal achievement—grades, degrees, and job performance. Gone were the days of nepotism and informal affectional ties as the basis for obtaining jobs and relating to others at the workplace. Formal relations linked role occupants and departments within a visibly vertical structure—most notably among white-collared salaried employees.

Center-democrats have led in the creation of a new style-bureaucracy—referred to by some as “professional bureaucratic.”³ This model is most popular among those who have worked to create and/or to sustain the human relations school of thought within industrial sociology and large-scale organization.⁴ The thought model’s creation, it might be added, both accompanied and reflected ongoing organizational changes, as the human relations school attempted to redefine the authority structure of large-scale groups such as academic research centers, factory organizations, and university groups. Essentially, the professional bureaucratic organization has united as it has partitioned the *rational, role-specific subunits*, associated with Max Weber, from the *hang-loose, human relations bureaus*, made popular more recently within a larger organization which comes to rely on *both* forms, depending on the task in question. Where the task is predictable,

the organization mobilizes its “rational, role-specific” components. Where the task is generally unpredictable, “the human relations unit(s)” is given the job.⁵

Those of center-democratic persuasion have gravitated toward this modified Weberian model of bureaucracy because they have learned that the prudent and selective application of human relations techniques gives organizational elites greater manipulative control not only over their own expensively acquired personnel but over those whose attachment to the organization is external: most notably, *unpredictable* “clients,” “movements,” “publics,” “students,” and like bodies to which the bureaucratic organizations in question must now relate.

Professional bureaucracy has quite frequently created a pliant, positive, reasonable, democratic (and hence acceptable) “self-image” among potentially hostile clients and even among many of its own members because its leadership works to obscure its truly hierarchical (and hence objectionable) character. Critics have commented that while the ugly authoritarianism may disappear, the vertical structure remains. Still, despite these criticisms, professional bureaucratic leaders continue to engineer this collective perception, in part by promoting fraternal relations among those in contiguous and near-proximate positions as well as those located at quite different levels of the overall, organizational pecking order. Note: The professional bureaucratic organization is in fact organized along hierarchical lines, most visibly in those departments which deal with predictable events (e.g., a university office in charge of recording grades). In the case of a registrar’s office, the predictable flow of grades demands precise role behavior in relation to “clients,” whose behavior is equally predictable. But in many university bureaus such is not the case, especially in those subunits where the tasks are unpredictable yet significant and require professional expertise. For example, consider the problems of the public relations bureau of a State university. University lobbyists working with and through a public relations group must relate positively to State legislative committee chairmen in charge of drawing up budgets for the university in question. Here we can some-

² Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Max Weber, Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 196–264.

³ See Eugene Litwak, “Models of Bureaucracy which Permit Conflict,” *American Journal of Sociology*, 47 (January, 1961), pp. 177–184.

⁴ For an excellent, comparative analysis on the origins of the human relations school, see Reinhard Bendix “The American Experience,” in his *Work and Authority in Industry* (New York: Wiley, 1956), pp. 254–340, especially pp. 287–340.

⁵ See Litwak, *op. cit.*

times observe a subpart of a professional bureaucratic organization employing human relations techniques such as glossy press releases, casual telephone conversations, cocktail parties, luncheon gatherings, golf games, fishing expeditions, and perhaps even mountain climbs to resolve differences between a university and its legislative parent. Of course, the use of human relations techniques by no means guarantees success; but clearly professionals are out on their own, attempting to solve difficult tasks on the basis of schooled ingenuity and not hopelessly useless role specifications. Presumably the less restricted professional will have greater success.

The presence of a "hang-loose" quality, however, should not be confused with the absence of intraorganizational criticisms. Within a professional bureaucratic organization, the chiefs promote criticisms and self-criticisms (relaxed, however harsh) at all levels, much as they engender a sense of community and chumminess among people found at all levels of the group. This sense of community aids organizational allies who depend on well-versed professionals who can be recruited and retained only by drawing heavily on the organization's human and financial resources. Indeed, as we noted, a deliberate effort is made *not* to force brainy professionals to act within a particular role. Rather, people and organizational subunits are given their tasks and are expected to do them on the basis of their professional expertise. Merit remains relevant, although it may be difficult to ascertain individual achievement (since team performance in good measure determines organizational success for persons caught up in informal relations that work against mutual evaluation in terms of objective criteria). Still, the professional bureaucratic approach has proved to be *relatively* successful when dealing with tough problems that have cropped up in community institutions.

PROFESSIONAL BUREAUCRACY, THE CENTER, AND THE GRASS ROOTS

Professional bureaucracy constitutes an intrinsic part of the center-democratic approach to grass-roots social movements on the left. During the 1960s, especially during the Kennedy-Johnson era, it was not unusual in the

United States for representatives of the federal bureaucracy to approach civil rights and peace activists to enlist their support in projects sponsored by federal departments and bureaus. These units of government were professionalized to the degree that they allowed their "outside" people considerable flexibility when negotiating with movement people on the recruitment of those who could help to create anti-poverty programs and legal services for the organized poor. Left-democrats were often given the bureaucratic task of meeting movement "contacts" at university coffee houses and like places to convince radicals of the necessity of merging "novel" federal governmental programs and social movement efforts in order to translate recent leftist victories into significant alterations of ongoing institutions. When center-democrats and radicals established federally sponsored groups like CRLA (the controversial California Rural Legal Assistance program), the new collectivities took on a professional bureaucratic quality—with its admixture of discipline and casualness. For the new service groups had no choice but to invest considerable discretionary authority in the hands of hip but professionally astute organizers, lawyers, and other professionals. These agencies had to work with groups of poor people who often did not trust middleclass professionals when they offered free services.

Another failure became obvious as well: that of the traditional organizations common to elementary and secondary schools in our larger cities. Old-line school principals were no match for the grass-roots people and their new demands.

What was true of schools was also true of overburdened, outdated yet socially involved law offices. They found it difficult to deal with the complex legal needs of individual as well as organized welfare clients, for example. Hence, center-democrats moved to create and sustain groups like CRLA. In this case, the coming together of incipient protest groups and streamlined legal aid programs often proved effective in overcoming short-run obstacles such as injunction-prone judges.

Needless to say, many *right*-democrats often recognized the combination of organizational flexibility and activist professional technique frequently led to minimal success for both the

federal agencies of change and the poor peoples' movements, while the successes of their opponents were quite limited. Despite the small advantages won, however these right-democrats tried to break up this coalition. Illustrative has been the action taken by Governor Reagan of California against CRLA in 1972. It has been successful (1971) in winning court cases on issues hitherto never contested—such as the rights of welfare clients and home ownership prerogatives. These struggles have seldom dented the power of corporate wealth, however, despite the cleverness of the poor plaintiffs' counsels. But because in the past such victories were few and far between, their increased winning incidence has caused alarm among those who view poor peoples' initial success as portending a dire future should the poor be allowed continuous and sprightly legal counsel. Hence, these particular right-democrats often move to eliminate professional bureaucratic organizations. In turn, their staff sometimes abandons their federal salaries and their counter-elitist roles and go so far as to join striking farm workers or tenants' groups. In these few cases, federal organizers have truly joined the people.


CENTER-DEMOCRATIC AND ITS PROBLEMS

Still, center-democrats are hampered by serious contradictions. In the capitalist West, the most persistent problem is the simultaneous commitment of center-democratic organization to the preservation of *both* private property and human justice. Overseas, center-democrats pursue essentially counterrevolutionary policies, despite hypocritical statements on winning the hearts and minds of "the people," not a few of whom have failed to survive center-democratic-sponsored napalm and massacre. (See Eqbal Ahmad's "The Theory and Fallacies of Counterinsurgency or Why We Were Sure to Lose in Vietnam," in Section Two of Chapter 12.) Domestically, the best illustration of persistent inconsistency is the behavior of the "multiversity." (See Section Three of this chapter—a research-essay on the 1964 University of California Sproul Hall Sit-In.)

Outwardly dedicated to the objective pursuit of knowledge but privately bound to the service of the state, and through it, large private corporations, the multiversity has occasionally

failed to use human relations techniques or has used them unsuccessfully. An example is the recurrent tendency of multiversities to fall back on the inflexible "rules" orientation of a traditional bureaucracy when marshalling violent sanctions to deal with students whose anger stems from the abuses of racial minorities, student rights, the unfair treatment of agricultural farm workers by agro-corporate wealth, and, increasingly over the years, the substitution of faculty-administration-student committee work for the realignment of power inside the university. This enduring problem can be phrased in yet another way. Given the "merger" of what Clark Kerr called the "military-industrial complex" and the "university"—we are not surprised to find that university authorities act against protesting students and in behalf of economic and political elites who, at second remove, determine the policy of a multiversity administration through the occupancy of, and immediate access to, governing board positions. In this merger, military and business operations are conducted on a continuous basis on a university campus. Military training programs plus research activities become a permanent part of the university's operations. Business groups, such as agricultural firms, establish research institutes specifically committed to the use of campus facilities, faculty and funds to carry out academic research and teaching geared to the expressed needs of the major growers and banks involved in agricultural production and distribution activities.⁶ A multiversity elite could conceivably create and use organizational structures to attempt to manipulate students through human relations techniques, although students are in many instances alienated by the mere existence of the elite's techniques and their technicians. Even so, the human relations approach appears to be more popular and successful today than it was when university chancellors believed that tamed quiescence could be commanded from students through a short, "reasonable" pitch bellowed through a bullhorn, as at Berkeley's Sproul Hall in 1964. More recently, for example, university administrators have cooperated with others to enlist

⁶ Clark Kerr has expressed this opinion admirably in *The Uses of the University* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 85-126, especially p. 124.



10. From a memo of Burnham's cited in Daniel Bell, "The End of American Exceptionalism," *The Public Interest*, 41 (Fall, 1975), 217.
11. Michel J. Crozier *et al.*, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: New York University Press, 1975).

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The Formation of the American Nation-State

Margit Mayer and Margaret A. Fay*

Introduction

The recent debate among West German Marxists over the nature of the capitalist state has tended to bypass the historical analysis of concrete situations and developments and has taken as its starting-point the abstract categories which Marx developed to reveal and analyze the internal self-contradictory dynamic of the capitalist system. These abstract categories and the inexorable logic of the laws governing the self-expansion of capital have served as the premises for deriving explanations of the functions, institutions, and structures of bourgeois government. The manifold forms of the capitalist state are explained in terms of certain necessary preconditions which must be fulfilled for the accumulation of capital to continue uninterrupted and for the class relations of capitalist production to be perpetuated (e.g., Altvater, Offe).

The problem with these explanations is that their premises and logic collapse when one is confronted with the task of understanding political structures which bear the characteristics of a capitalist state, but which emerge historically in a context where the appropriation of surplus labor has not yet taken the form of surplus value, where capital has not yet developed its own self-expanding dynamic, and where capitalist social relations do not yet exist to be perpetuated. Such is the dilemma of Gerstenberger (1973b), one of the recent serious attempts at an historical analysis of the formation of the bourgeois nation state. She fudges the dilemma by the conceptual ambiguity of the term "bourgeois state." At times she means the political superstructure which the inner structure of bourgeois society must itself bring to birth; at other times she means the preconditions of the actual birth. In other words, the baby becomes, by default of clarification, no different from the events and the conditions of the actual birth, and both are produced by deductions

* This article is the result of our joint reworking of Margit's dissertation, *Zur Genese des Nationalstaats in Amerika* (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt am Main, 1976), where a fuller discussion of the historical data can be found. We are extremely grateful to the Bay Area Kapitalistate collective for their supportive discussions and commentary throughout our work-process, especially to Pat Morgan, Jens Christiansen, Jim O'Connor, and Pat O'Donnell, for their indispensable help in our final task of cutting and editing.

from abstract categories which are then arbitrarily imposed on the historical evidence. Consequently in her empirical work on the historical genesis of the American nation state, Gerstenberger (1973a) uncritically accepts Marx's assertion that "the state [of the North Americans], in contrast to all earlier formations, was from the beginning subordinate to bourgeois society, to its production" (Marx 1973, 884), without undertaking a serious examination of the historical evidence to discover just what this production consisted of. The view that the production-system of the 18th century North American provinces was essentially a unified one is shared by many Marxist historians (e.g., Dowd, Hacker), but is not supported by the historical evidence. The establishment of a centralized political apparatus in 1789 is in itself by no means proof of (in Gerstenberger's terms) "the coinciding conditions of production."

Our own examination of the historical record reveals that what existed on the North American continent in the eighteenth century was not a unified system of production, much less a capitalist system. Instead there was a conglomerate of different nodules of production, none of which can be accurately characterized as capitalist: for example, slave plantations in the South and independent farmers and petty commodity producers in the North. Yet the Constitution of 1787 is still with very minor changes the foundation of the U.S. political system of the 1970's which is accepted by both Marxists and non-Marxists alike as the most advanced capitalist state. Thus the problem arises for Marxist analysis: how did this capitalist superstructure emerge from a non-capitalist material base, from a non-unified, heterogeneous mixture of separate systems of production? In answering this question, we hope to demonstrate that it is possible to start with the concrete detail of history, without abandoning Marx's own conceptual framework.

What unified the conglomerate of diverse modes of production from which the capitalist social formation of the United States of America emerged was not industrial capital, but rather merchant capital,¹ the movement of which served to unify the separate and different regional spheres of production in the North American colonies into an integrated economic unit of trade, a mercantile system. This system can only be understood within the wider context of the world market and of the accelerated worldwide expansion of capitalism in the eighteenth century (cf. Marx 1955, 10). This system developed both an internal dynamic of its own and at the same time was shaped by the external dynamics of the emerging world market. The boundaries and the structure of this system found political expression in the 1787 Constitution of the Union of the independent states of North America.

The first step in our analysis is to locate the origins of the North

American colonies in the seventeenth-century mercantile system and to examine the (eighteenth-century) development of the dominant modes of production, in order to identify the economic bases and interests of the respective dominant political groups. We will then analyze how these groups effected the establishing and centralizing of their own political organs after throwing off British rule; and how each tried to realize its own interests with the aid of their new state. We will discuss the character of the 1787 Constitution of the U.S. and show how its provisions corresponded to, and fulfilled the survival needs, both external and internal, of the young nation state. We conclude our historical analysis with the translation of these principles into the seemingly neutral state apparatus created by the nascent American bourgeoisie under the first Federalist and Republican governments. In our postscript we will briefly outline the implications of our case-study for the later development of the U.S. into an industrial capitalist nation and the active role of the U.S. state in this process.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY AND CLASS STRUCTURE BEFORE 1787

1. *The Origin of the North American Colonies in the Seventeenth-Century Mercantile System*

The colonization of North America and the British West Indies originated from the interests of a merchant class in Great Britain who sought to create a trade network across the Atlantic in order to increase their profits (Hacker, 67 and 93-4). This commercial origin gave its imprint to the economic and political development of the American colonies and accounts for the extent to which the history of the American colonies differed from that of other British colonies, as well as from the experiences of the French and Spanish colonies. Because the most important British colonies were founded in the second half of the seventeenth century, i.e., before the British had organized their mercantile enterprises into a consolidated system, Britain did not succeed in establishing such rigid controls over her dominions as France and Spain. This left space for an indigenous accumulation of capital to develop (J.A. Williamson 1929; cf. Jensen 1968, 24).

The interests of the merchant capitalist class were formulated in the mercantile theory of British political economy, a theory which included the recognition that merchants, when denied the opportunity of outright plunder, could still profit from the colonization of North America by trading. What mattered was not only to secure the greatest possible natural riches, but also to profit from selling them

favorably to other nations (cf. Marx III, 1909, 387). In general, the more varied the products that a nation could offer on the world market, the larger would be the number of potential buyers. Hence it was of advantage to the British mother country in its competition with Holland and France to encourage diversified staple and other extractive production in its mainland colonies where exploitation by plunder was unfeasible. However, in the special case of a region where a unique combination of natural resources provided the conditions for cultivating a product that was in high demand, but could not be supplied elsewhere, the optimum balance of trade could be gained by the *exclusive* cultivation of that product. Such conditions the British discovered in the West Indies. There was a large demand for sugar in the European market, and it could be readily and cheaply supplied on the rich soil of the West Indies whose sugar plantations were developed to become the most profitable enterprise and consequently the focus of the British colonial system as a whole (Newton 1933, 149). Sugar became the *exclusive* product of the West Indies. Contrast this with the colonies north of the Mason-Dixon line which had few staples of any value in the European markets, but a permanent surplus in a variety of food and lumber; and with the colonies from Maryland to Carolina which produced both staples and a less important surplus of certain foods.

This contrasting pattern of production implied an uneven development between the West Indian islands and the mainland colonies: the mainland plantations were small and backward in relation to the sugar estates of the islands where the economies of large-scale production were applied to maximize the productive capacities of the natural resources and of the labor force of the West Indies. Agriculture in the mainland colonies was characterized by a much less one-sided division of labor. During the eighteenth century the mainland colonies concentrated on the production of tobacco, but this was much less profitable than sugar. Specialization did not really take root in the mainland colonies until the cotton boom of the early nineteenth century, when productivity rapidly expanded. Because the West Indies developed a specialized one-product economy in response to the demands of the world market, they became much more dependent (for the satisfaction of their other needs through the exchange of sugar) on the international exchange context that the Empire provided. The West Indies themselves lacked an extensive internal market of diversified products.² On the mainland, however, the diversity of products that were cultivated both for export and for domestic exchange and consumption created an internal market and allowed for the evolution of an American merchant class. The colonies on the North American mainland were able to develop an indigenous class of traders and merchants who later become a power-

ful element in the international mercantile system. But the one-factor economy of the West Indies precluded this possibility.

2. *The Diversity of the Socio-economic Formations in the Eighteenth-Century Colonies*

Before analyzing the historical data on the diverse modes of production which existed in the eighteenth-century colonies of North America, we would like to make four points to clarify our approach. First, the modes of production which we (provisionally) distinguish all bear the imprint of the world market context; in other words, production for commodity sale (at first on the monopolistically controlled, fixed market of the British empire) was the overriding consideration of agricultural activity in the colonies. Thus we shall emphasize that while these different modes of agricultural production cannot be characterized as capitalistic, nevertheless they were created and shaped in response to the requirements of the emerging and expanding world market, that was itself both a consequence and a promoter of the development of the capitalist system. Second, the fact that the products of the North American agriculture assumed the character of exchange values when they entered the sphere of circulation on the world market does not mean that they were already produced as such, that they were already commodities in production (cf. Marx III, 386). The slave plantations of the South, for example, were clearly not a capitalist mode of production—they were not based on wage labor—even though the goal of their production was large-scale export for the world market dominated by European capital. Third, within each of the different reproduction contexts³ different modes of production were dominant (or rather became dominant, since it is almost impossible to treat the structure of production as static in this period.) As a consequence, different dominating classes can be identified corresponding to the dominant modes of production in each reproduction context. Furthermore since the economic interests of the dominant classes do, as a rule, find specific political expression, it should be possible to trace the origins of the different political fractions, which later faced each other in the federated state (and which to some extent influenced its structure), back to the diverse economic interests of the classes who dominated the separate reproduction contexts. Finally, the concrete shape of the central state that eventually arose depended on the forms of production and the class relations that had come to exist on the mainland.

(i) *Commercial Agriculture in the North*

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the vast cheap lands

of the North American colonies offered pioneering individuals the opportunity to obtain uncultivated land with relative ease and to settle down as self-reliant subsistence farmers. However, it has been established that right from the beginning all farms (with the *temporary* exception of the frontier farms) tendentially produced a surplus destined not only for local consumption, but also for sale in other colonies and for overseas export (Bruchey 1968, 27; Bidwell & Falconer). This surplus became the basis on which America developed her ever-expanding commercial agriculture (cf. Marx III, 383-5).

In New England, Great Britain encouraged the diversification of cash crops which were produced by small farmers with ownership rights to the land on which they worked. However, the framework of a market economy subjected the "free, independent, property-owning" farmers to competition with one another (a competition which was mediated and orchestrated by the middleman, the merchant capitalist) and forced them to rely on merchant capital to advance the necessary supply of instruments and stocks of raw materials for their market-oriented production. As petty commodity producers, the farmers had not yet been separated from the ownership of the means of their own labor process, but to the extent that their production took place for the market, they were dependent on "the buyer, the merchant, and ultimately produce[d] only for and through him" (Marx 1973, 510). Since the merchants pocketed the largest share of the surplus value (cf. Marx III, 393-4), the farmers were left with no resources to develop their own mode of production independently of the merchants. The class of independent farmers was, in effect, the creature of merchant capital, a product of a specific stage of the world development of capitalism, necessary for this stage where the conditions did not allow any other way of extracting wealth (cf. Marx 1973, 278).

The development of the land-holding pattern of the agrarian sector of New England is evidence of the increasing penetration of merchant capital. In spite of westward movement, the population grew annually about 1-5 percent. Land prices increased and competition among the farmers became more severe. The number of landless whites grew from 5 percent in 1700 to 12 percent in 1736 (Lemon & Nash, 1-24) and the size of average landholdings decreased from approximately 150 acres per adult male in the early seventeenth century to 43 acres in 1786 (Lockridge, 62-80). Wage-labor and the putting-out system slowly spread within the agrarian subsistence economy (Morris 1946). Thus the agricultural sector which employed 90 percent of the population cannot be interpreted as a static community of "self-reliant, small producers." It was indeed a non-capitalist mode of production, but one that reproduced itself on

the foundation of capital (cf. Marx 1973, 579).

This pattern of landholding and its development can be traced not only in New England, but also in the South and along the frontier. In the middle colonies it differed from the one in New England only insofar as the distribution of land was more unequal (the result of the British Crown's land distribution): there were not only more large farms (manors) but also more landless free whites (Fox). In the case of New York state⁴ agriculture was even more market-oriented than in New England: it was highly diversified, and its exports went primarily to the West Indies.

Independent petty commodity production in North America was able to resist the penetration and eventual domination of the capital/wage-labor relationship for a relatively long time, as is evidenced by the many immigrants who started out as indentured servants or wage laborers, but were able to save enough of their earnings to buy up land and/or their own equipment and transform themselves into self-employed farmers (or craftsmen). However, the mode of independent petty commodity production which these ex-wage-workers entered was itself dependent on capital, and the long period of resistance only served to reinforce this dependence, thereby developing the conditions for the eventual abolition of the petty commodity mode of production (cf. Marx 1973, 574). In another way, too, this system of independent petty production generated within itself its own negation for, by producing a surplus of their own specialties to exchange with one another, the farmers created an internal market that was to develop into a market for new, large-scale capital. Just *because* production was not *totally* oriented towards the world market, as became the case for the sugar colonies, an internal market could develop and the demands which had initially been met by subsistence production were now supplied by the heightened productivity of advancing specialization. With the accelerated expansion of these demands, as more and more immigrants flooded into America, the small independent farmers were superseded by more efficient large-scale farming, where more and more "farm-hands" were employed. This evolving internal market provided the basis not only for the later development of indigenous capitalist and wage-labor classes, but also for the earlier emergence of an indigenous class of merchants.

(ii) *Plantation Slavery and Small Farming in the South*

In the southern colonies, two distinct forms of agriculture interpenetrated one another: large-scale commercial agriculture based on slave plantations (mainly along the coast and the rivers) and small independent farmers (on the hinterlands) who also participated in

the production of rice and tobacco for the world market (Bruchey 1968, 21). The slave plantation economy was dominant, but recent analyses of historical records and documents (e.g. Land 1965; Menard 1973) cast doubt on the traditional literary sources for the pre-revolutionary period, which give the impression that the tenure system of small holdings was not very widespread in the South: it now appears that at least 25 percent (the lowest stratum) of southern agrarian producers worked the land as tenant farmers. Though these two systems of agriculture were not manifestations of the same mode of production, they were vitally interrelated, and both owed their origins and development to merchant capital.

The monoculture of the large plantations had been established for the purpose of delivering large quantities of staples which could easily be transformed into wealth for Great Britain. The plantation workforce initially included large numbers of white indentured servants who immigrated from Europe in the hopes that when their work-contract was over, they would be able to settle down as independent farmers with their own land. Only 6 percent fulfilled this hope (Wertenbaker) and the frustrations of the rest broke out into open violence which disrupted production (e.g. Bacon's Rebellion in 1676 and the tobacco-cutting riots in 1682). Virginia, with its landless freemen, was thus confronted with the same problem she had been helping England to solve. Her own solution was to allow her wealthy magnates to keep their lands and to institutionalize slavery to provide the necessary labor force. The white laborers were liberated from plantation work and allowed to make their living from their own small plots of land. The violent conflict that had erupted between European landholders and landless was transformed into a symbiotic relationship between large and small landholders, but at the cost of depriving blacks of their basic civil rights (Morgan 1972, 24; Bruchey).

This relationship between the transformation of the plantations into a slave economy and the emergence of small landholders can be traced to the desire of British merchants to maximize the profits of trans-Atlantic trade. White labor, which had proved to be an unreliable workforce for the plantations, was replaced by coerced black labor and was now used to expand the production of export staples by bringing into cultivation soil on the hinterlands. The subsequent development of this class of free farmers was also shaped—as was the history of the class of independent farmers in the Northeast—by the dynamic which the production of staples for the world market generated.

The plantation system was never able to free itself from its original dependence on merchant capital (cf. Marx III, 382). By making guaranteed markets available for the plantation products, merchant capital perpetuated the one-sided division of labor based on coercion

and deprived the planters of any incentive to raise productivity by improving their land or means of production.⁵ Consequently the monoculture of the plantation became too dependent on such external factors as successful harvest and the conditions of the export market, and failed to develop an independent, self-developing dynamic of its own. As merchant capital expanded, the slave plantations grew an interdependence which was most dramatically illustrated by the later rise of cotton. In short, the planter-slave-holders of the South remained creatures of merchant capital and as such were subject to the inherent limits of this capital.

The participation of the small farmers in the production of staples for the world market rendered them increasingly dependent on the large plantation owners who took on the role of trade agents and money-lenders. Thus the more efficiently that the free farmers produced their commodities, the more they became dependent on the sale of their produce to repay their creditors for the advance of stocks, etc.; and the more they had to subject themselves to the interests of the creditors themselves (cf. Marx 1973, 853).

The planters who had the resources to develop into land speculators, merchants, money lenders, and manufactures belonged to the wealthiest two percent who owned estates worth more than £1000. They were able to multiply the rent from their land- and slave-ownership by using this income as interest-bearing capital in the sphere of circulation. In this way an indigenous merchant class gradually developed in the South on the basis of simultaneous agrarian and mercantile businesses (cf. Gray I). But as merchants they never replaced (before Independence) the London tobacco factor, which, through an agent resident in the colonies, furnished the planters with capital, sold their products, and shipped English commodities into the colonies (see Nettels 1962, 58). Nor did they ever present, after Independence, a serious challenge to the indigenous merchant class of the northeastern colonies.

Not only did the plantation system inhibit the growth of a class of independent merchants, but it also prevented the emergence of a class of independent artisans. The plantations reproduced themselves in relative autarky, relying on the skilled labor of a few slaves trained in craftwork, and the smaller farms produced what they needed through household manufactures. Until 1830, these household manufactures remained subordinated to the production of use-values (Tryon; Gray I), and sheltered the southern modes of production from penetration by the capital/wage-labor relationship (cf. Marx 1973, 669).

In conclusion, we should note that even though the South provided an exportable surplus similar to that of the West Indies, part of the exports of the South were bought by the indigenous merchant class in the North and exported (together with the northern staples).

to offset the large quantity of manufactured goods imported to the mainland colonies from Britain. In contrast, the surplus produced in the West Indies was entirely under the control of the British. The diversity of the surplus exported by the North American colonies as a whole reflected the diversity of basic staples which were kept at home for internal trading. The combination of these different modes of production made the autonomous development of the North American colonies possible which was the basis of their successful struggle for political independence. The position of the U.S. "in the world depended not only in 1776 but thereafter on slave labor" (Morgan 1972, 6; cf. Jensen 1969, 107-24), but as the opposite course of development experienced by the West Indies, which relied on the exclusive cultivation of a single product by slave labor, shows, it was the coexistence and interrelation of the different modes of production and their diversified surplus that laid the basis for the national economic and political independence of the United States.

(iii) Merchant Capital

Until 1800, the character of American internal trade was quite restricted: it consisted mainly of exchange of local products of farms, plantations, saw mills and fisheries for local manufactures and imported goods (E.A.J. Johnson), but it provided an important foundation, on which an indigenous merchant class could begin to develop. There are several interrelated exogenous factors that facilitated the development of an indigenous merchant class on the mainland: the origin and the structure of the British Empire itself, the special relationship imposed by Britain on its North American colonies, and the financial relationship between Britain and its sugar colonies.

The British colonial system was founded upon successfully implemented trade regulations rather than direct political rule. This was possible because the European settlers themselves deemed their membership in the colonial system profitable. Indeed, the profits that the colonists could make in the (legal) trade with England almost made superfluous the English-imposed legislation restricting their exports to trade with the mother country only (Barrow, 252-5). Thus the colonists' continued voluntary participation in the Empire was based on a recognition of, and a desire to engage in, the profits of mercantile enterprises. The British trading empire fostered a general integrated economic development in the American colonies—despite the regional diversity of the separate modes of production—via bounties for certain colonial products, by military protection and the securing of markets, and by providing a source of finance (Nettels 1932; Bruchey 1968; North 1966). In addition, the special

relationship imposed upon the North American colonies by the mother country forced the colonists to earn, however indirectly, money in England to clear the debts they owed for consumer goods (Pares 1956, 158). While sugar (until 1700), served as ready money all over Europe, none of the agrarian products of the mainland were in a comparatively high demand. New England especially did not have an export staple which it could make the basis of credit arrangements with Great Britain. But since the Navigation Acts⁶ forced the colonies to import their finished goods from Great Britain, there developed a class of people whose exclusive business was to get the needed bills of exchange and foreign currency through trade with the West Indies, through slave (and other) trade with Africa and southern Europe, and by taking on intermediary functions as intercolonial carriers for the tobacco and rice exports of the southern colonies. As a consequence of the economic diversity of North America whose regions required each others' products, a system of exchange developed as a permanent institution and this exchange was mediated mainly by West Indian goods. The West India trade played a crucial role in consolidating the trading partnership between Britain and its American colonies. The British demand for sugar ensured that the colonies would be able to repay their debts to the merchant capitalists in the mother country, and perpetuate the conditions for a continuing flourishing trans-Atlantic trade (Pares 1956, 146). The pattern that had evolved by the eighteenth century (after the colonies which retained some degree of financial dependence had differentiated themselves from those which depended absolutely on the mother country) was that the North Americans sold their produce in the sugar islands, and, if they wanted a remittance to Europe, bought the sugar planters' bills of exchange on their factors (Pares 1956, 151-3).

The American merchants, while building up their trade with Britain, the West Indies, and other nations, also expanded their functions as middlemen within the developing American economy itself, to a large extent on British credit, but nevertheless carried out by Americans (Andrews 1914). Growing foreign and domestic trade established a network of credit relations (Nettels 1962, 304; Hammond 1957, 218) which frequently placed the American merchants at odds with the agricultural interests of local and provincial politics (Sachs 1955, 328). After 1740, when provincial legislators had opened all ports equally to West Indian produce (Pares 1956, 25-8) and therefore also to the simple processing industries for molasses and sugar, the opportunity was created for the accelerated expansion and dispersion of merchant capital throughout all the mainland seaport centers. This dispersion was created by, and in turn reinforced, the intensity of local and regional competition on the main-

land. The competition among merchants in different regions on the mainland became a competition over the possession of an industrial process (the colonial governments protected the products of the distilleries and refineries with duties) and contributed to the accelerated domestic economic development. However, since the trading basis of the British Empire put the colonial merchants in competition with British merchant capital, there was pressure on the North American merchants to deploy their profits in ways that would rapidly expand their mercantile capital; therefore, they could not be so much concerned with potentially damaging provincial competition (Sachs 1955, 326). They developed and maintained a geographically wide network of close business connections and utilized correspondents in other colonies and countries since—to secure bills of exchange at the lowest possible prices became vital for every importer and commission agent struggling to compete successfully—they had to pay close attention to exchange rates in other commercial centers. Out of this competition of local merchants engaged in intercolonial and international commerce, a stratum of rich, resident merchants evolved, most notably in New England (North & Thomas, 98), who employed captains and agents, and who enlarged their capital by investing not only in shipbuilding, but also in private banks and insurance companies.⁷

In summary, the diversity of the existing modes of production in the North American colonies provided the basis for the development of an indigenous merchant class, a development that received impetus from the external conditions of the trading context of the British Empire, and the special role of the West Indies' monocultural economy. Thus it happened that, during the eighteenth century, the indigenous merchants' capital was able to continue to appropriate to itself the overwhelming portion of the surplus product (cf. Marx III, 389). In New England especially, the merchant class exploited the opportunities for accumulation and quickly gained the dominant influential economic position, such that they were soon able to represent their own particular interests as *the* interests of New England. However, the more the merchants intensified their commercial activity across different regions, the more they undermined a major base of their own profits, namely those profits which were derived from the exploitation of the difference in prices of production in the various regions (cf. Marx III, 386-8, 396). Thus the very success of the merchants' capital laid the basis for its ultimate and inevitable transformation into industrial capital, though this process was artificially slowed down by the mechanisms of the British Empire.

(iv) Manufacturing

Throughout the eighteenth century, the main part of American manufacturing was carried out in unincorporated home industries outside the big towns. The geographical dispersion of these "neighbourhood manufactures" (Clark) rendered the transportation costs of their products prohibitive and protected them from competition with one another with the result that production remained based on technologically undeveloped craft instruments (Ellsworth & Hindle; Morris 1944). Manufacturing also occurred in the sea towns, but here too, handicraft production remained dominant, and even the sale of products, which reached no further than the local market, was frequently undertaken by the artisans themselves (Bridenbaugh 1950; Lynd 1964; cf. Marx 1973, 512). The only industries encouraged by the mother country were shipbuilding, which benefitted the British merchants by lowering their freight costs, and the production of goods such as iron, lumber, flour and textiles, which could serve as raw materials for British industry. The few processing industries that were established (sugar refineries, distilleries) worked only intermittently, for example at times when the price of raw sugar was attractive (Pares 1956, 138).

The tendency of merchant capital to prepare the way for capital to take hold of production itself (cf. Marx III, 387-390) was slowed down in North America, not by feudal or guild laws, but by several factors that were inherent in the colonies' status within the mercantile system of the British Empire. The extraordinarily high "profits" that could be made in trade during this period diverted capital from entering the less profitable industrial enterprises; the ready availability of cheap land deprived the manufacturing sector of a free (i.e. lacking its own means of subsistence) labour force; and the cheap import of finished goods rendered domestic production superfluous. American mills and plants failed to produce enough to meet the domestic demand, but as long as it was cheaper to import, domestic production was not encouraged on a large scale by local legislatures. Already in 1650, the settlers had begun to make business a public concern: the colonial representatives took over responsibility for the settlement of certain craftsmen (by tax provision) and the procurement of credit for the erection of production plants, esp. metal and textile (Bailyn 1955, 61 ff.). Corporations were chartered to perform services such as banking, transportation facilities, and a water supply for the benefit of the community, and they included a few manufacturing companies. But the chartering of manufacturing companies on a larger scale had to await the later periods of interrupted trade (J. S. Davis II, 326-9; Handlin & Handlin 1947a, 435) and the war industry, generated by the struggle for independence. The cases of

interrupted foreign trade after 1775 all illustrate the advantages in the utilization of American capital, namely that it was easier to make a surplus in trade than in home production.

Despite the fact that self-employment was still by far the dominant way of working even as late as 1800, there is evidence that a wage-earning class of propertyless producers (which by 1800 had grown to 12%) emerged much earlier than is generally assumed. But in the context of the whole working population of the North American continent in the 1770s and 1780s, the embryonic productive enterprises were practically negligible and still confined to the large towns.

In conclusion, the primitive accumulation of capital on the North American continent before the establishment of the central state may be summarized thus: (1) capital was not yet deployed on industrialization—except in the manufacturing of assets for the deployment of merchant capital; (2) capital was concentrated in the hands of the merchant class and reinvested in their self-expansion; (3) this self-expansion was to eventually bring about the transformation of merchant capital into industrial capital, but this process was still in an embryonic stage in the 1780s, for the peculiar American conditions presented many impediments. Thus it was not the spreading of capitalist social relations, but the integrating force of merchant capital that impinged on all the various regional reproduction contexts. Consequently, the merchants, as the economically dominant class and the one with the most clearly articulated self-interests, gained a most influential position, which was only locally and/or temporarily shaken.

II. POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE 1787 CONSTITUTION

In the previous sections we have emphasized the diversity of the modes of production in the North American mainland during the eighteenth century in order to refute the assumption (ungrounded in historical evidence) that the political unison of the American provinces after Independence can be explained by the 'coinciding conditions of production' (Gerstenberger 1973a, 81). In the following sections we will substantiate our own hypothesis that the political unison of the diverse socio-economic formations existing in America at the end of the eighteenth century was promoted by the interests with which the representatives of the dominant modes of production within each socio-economic formation participated in the world market. In each of the several different regional production contexts the economically dominant groups succeeded in usurping political leadership and in gaining the loyalty and support of

other strata for the realization of their own interests. The internal markets of the North American colonies, which had already been evolving tendentially during the pre-Independence period of British rule provided the foundation on which the formation of a national society, and therefore the development of political unison, could take place. The political unification of this society into one nation state finally became a historical necessity precipitated by the conflict with England and by the consequences of the exclusion of the ex-colonies from the British Empire. The results of this exclusion developed among all the economically dominant groups the awareness that without a strong central authority the internal dynamic of centrifugal forces would rob the newly independent provinces of the chance of competing on the world market and hence jeopardize their newly won independence.

1. Political Structures Before Independence

Two features common to the development of the modern nation-state and the rise of a national bourgeoisie in the countries of Europe were conspicuously absent from the social development and early political structures of North America: a feudal aristocracy and a landless, disenfranchised population of "liberated" ex-serfs (cf. Moore, 140). During the period of British rule, the official government resided in a territorially distant authority in London—the British Crown and Parliament. The functions of government entrusted to the individual provincial governments were from the very beginning limited and remained at a low stage of development. The British State retained the important functions of trade and military policy, including the provision of military defense. Hence the colonial states had no need to establish a standing military organization. Also they did not develop a system of regular taxation since they could cover their non-military expenses from interest-payments and land banks (Ferguson 1961, 5). The administrative apparatus remained not only cheap, but also relatively undeveloped (Andrews IV; Steele).

Within the framework of the British imperial system the American colonies developed and implemented *de facto* political structures of local self-determination. By 1760, the Popular Assemblies (the elected lower Houses of Assembly) had come to exercise the major influence on inner-colonial legislation. The originally intended relationship between the lower Houses and the British-appointed provincial governors, i.e., a "parity of power", receded and the governors were in effect reduced to the secondary status of accessory intermediate agencies (Jensen 1968, 30).

The political influence of the economically dominant groups

manifested itself mainly at the level of provincial government. In the North it was the merchants who controlled the provincial government which was always located in the East. Even when, as a result of westward expansion, the growing population of backcountry farmers secured a majority of seats in the House of Representatives and began to articulate their specific interests in opposition to the politically predominant coastal merchants, the merchants were still able to retain control of the business of the House by excluding the farmers' representatives from committee assignments (Zemsky, 502-520). The opposition between the interests of inland agriculture and the commercial interests of the coastal areas and the domination of the latter interests were thus reproduced at the political level of the provincial government (cf. Hoerder). In the South the great plantation owners were just as firmly established in the southern provincial government as the merchants were in the North. Here, however, westward expansion did not intensify the economic and political differences between coast and inland, because the process of expansion only involved the successive reproduction of the social relations of production in the earlier established eastern plantations. Both on the coast and in the expanding inland areas, the slaveholders/planters were not only the economically dominant group, but also the political ruling class. The fact that the political representatives of the South were recruited from the wealthiest two percent of plantation owners, who were able to deploy their capital in the sphere of circulation as land speculators, money-lenders and trade-agents (Bailey 1971), is further evidence of the influence of merchant capital on the political institutions of the emergent U.S. state.

The relatively autonomous, local self-governments gave political expression to the economic independence of the mass (70-80 percent) of free citizens (see Steeg). These small, self-employed producers had little interest in the provincial legislatures beyond keeping provincial taxes as low as possible (Zuckerman, ch. 1); and they made use of the local political apparatus to implement their own interests. It was at the local level that most of the "economically regulating functions," which ranged from road construction to the levying of taxes, were implemented (Morris 1965, 78; R. J. Taylor, 33-7). As a result, a real fear developed among the wealthy few that local government activity would strengthen the political influence of the lower strata and result in mob rule (Morris 1946, 52). Hence, during the revision procedures of the individual state constitutions, every state (except Pennsylvania, Georgia and Vermont) chose to institutionalize the division of the legislative into two houses, an upper house representing property and a lower one representing the people (Bailey 1965, 186; Ramsay 1789, I, 351). This division was justified on "natural distinctions of rank" which, in turn, rested

on supposed "superior degrees of industry and capacity" ("Ludlow", in *Pa. Journal*, May 28, 1777, Letter II). Thus the diverging, even conflicting, interests within each of the colonies were given explicit recognition by the colonial constitutions themselves.

During the struggle for independence, the immediate tasks of defying the British and coping with the difficulties imposed by the war were the primary determinants in the citizens' decisions over what functions to allocate to state power. With the onset of war, the emergent American bourgeoisie, well anchored in the provincial structures of domination, were able to mobilize and unify the support of the other classes in sustaining their attack on imperial rule. They organized a network of inter-colonial committees and conventions to carry out the necessary co-ordinating functions for national defense. These initial functions quickly mushroomed to transform the *ad hoc* co-ordinating committees into functioning state agencies (Hacker 1940, 173-4).

2. The Impact of the World Market: Polity across State Lines

With the declaration of Independence in 1776, the central authority embodied in the British government disappeared from the American scene and the internal class relations within the now independent provinces found their political crystallization in the separate state governments. The Continental Congress, established in 1775 in response to the crisis conditions of war, was only supposed to provide diplomatic and external representation and ensure the coordination of military maneuvers. Its functions did not extend beyond the implementation of these militarily required measures. However, it soon became clear that more coordination among the individual sovereign states was necessary to ensure that the provinces' newly-won political independence would not fall victim to its economic malintegration. Other mercantile states were able, as centralized nation-states, to promote their own national process of primitive accumulation at the expense of their competitors and to maintain and strengthen their position in the world market, where Britain still reigned supreme. The North American states, lacking any political agency that could guide and promote their common interest vis-à-vis other nations, were especially vulnerable to the threat of economic domination by Britain (Jensen 1963, 241). "So the Americans discovered that with independence they became a relatively backward, underdeveloped, and weak nation" (W. A. Williams 1966, 119).

Consequently, the Continental Congress decreed the Articles of Confederation which became effective in 1781. These soon proved to be inadequate. The Articles did not deprive the individual state

governments of their rights to pass impost acts, navigation laws, and price fixing regulations, all of which varied from state to state according to the balance of forces between merchants, mechanics, planters and farmers. The Confederation itself was powerless to supersede the variegated protective legislation, which had its source in narrow regional economic interests, with a unified policy of national self-protection. It was not only the diversity of economic interests that initially prevented the establishment of a stronger central organ, but also the recent political experience of the colonies under the rule of the British government, which created resistance on the part of the local governments to any loss of their own autonomy. After Independence, the state governments jealously guarded the power which they had come to exercise during the period of remote British rule. In particular, they defended their right to levy taxes and continued to resist the surrender of the substance of power to another remote and uncontrollable government (Wood, 268). The distrust of any "governmental authority set above the people, including their own representatives" (Jensen 1940, 239-240), had grown so strong that the very idea of a new central government with coercive power receded from the public arena of political discussion.

Consequently, the rights and powers granted to the new central government by the Articles of Confederation were severely limited. Congress had no power to tax or to control interstate or foreign trade and it was too weak politically to pursue a consistent economic policy for creating the conditions for the indigenous accumulation of capital which might have rescued the nation from its vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the world market. When Congress was forced to take emergency measures to ward off any immediate threats, the succession of actions was typically extremely disruptive and conflicting. For example, in 1779 Congress lifted all restrictions on interstate trade, but then decided, reacting to the pressure for price controls, that the individual states should each establish their own price committees (Warner, 186). These different regulations presented a major obstacle to the free flow of the market-seeking commodities and, in some cases, as for example when Pennsylvania's Council of Safety prohibited the export of all food stuffs (Warner, 185), brought it to a complete halt. As a result of this disruption, the local price committees themselves soon demanded more centralized measures to regulate prices and duties (Lynd 1964, 92). Thus it became clear that the efforts of the individual states to remedy the ailing economy had such a centrifugal effect that these very remedial measures aggravated the critical problems of repaying the heavy debt incurred during the War of Independence,⁸ of regulating currency and finance and of restricting competition from foreign trade. It was above all the chronic financial calamity that forced the recently

independent American people—though reluctantly—to accept a central political agency with powers of coercion over the national citizen-body and the individual state governments.

During the post-Independence period of political vacuum when Congress still lacked the power to regulate and promote trade and the individual state governments took over no diplomatic responsibilities, it was the merchant class who determined the *de facto* course of the nation's external relations and the merchants' activities were themselves determined by the conditions of the world market. Immediately after the war, Great Britain courted the American merchants with credit offers and other privileges in an effort to recapture American trade; and, despite the recent hostilities between the two nations, most merchants preferred to reestablish trade with Great Britain instead of France and made the utmost use of the British credits (Gray I, 597-600; Ferguson 1961, 83-4). The consequence of this was an extremely unfavorable balance of trade and growing indebtedness to England that reached an unprecedented peak during the years 1783-8 (Nettels 1962, 49). The individual states could not meet the excessive importation of European commodities with adequate returns (Nettels 1962, 49-60). Worse still, the different fragmented efforts of the individual states to stop the drain of specie and to limit imports by duties in practice cancelled one another out. Some states (above all New Jersey) even went so far as to exploit the worsening balance of payments deficit for their own advantage and continued to compete for British ships and goods (cf. Jensen 1950, 298, ff.). A co-ordinated reorganization of commercial relations was urgently needed and the demand for the unified measures was increasingly articulated by groups whose interests began to transcend state boundaries and who expressed unanimous preference for a more powerful central government (Jensen 1950, 344). After 1783, the joint efforts of these "advocates of central authority," to prevent a "recovery [. . .] based on the creation of an unbalanced, quasi-colonial relationship with Great Britain" (W. A. Williams 1966, 138; cf. 164), functioned in lieu of a national party to unify interests across state lines. "A small group of political leaders, . . . with a consciousness of the United States' *international impotence*, provided the matrix for the movement" (Roche, 801, italics ours).

Conflicts between the different regions, such as the dispute between the North and the South over the disposal of western lands (cf. W. A. Williams 1966, 136), receded into the background in face of the urgent need to cope with America's slipping position in the international arena "where each nation was trying to capture gains for itself" (Jefferson, quoted in Lipscomb, III, 273-4; cf. North & Thomas, 152).

In summary, if the Union wanted to continue to exist as an autonomous national power, it needed to create conditions for the enforcement of its own primitive accumulation. The world market was generating pressures which forced an internal development toward a unified political restructuring. These pressures were perceived by the commercially concerned groups throughout the nation as the preconditions for economic survival and the problem of political independence was articulated by them as the urgent need to establish a stronger central authority.

3. Economic Interests in the Establishment of the U.S. Nation-State

Each of the four major economic groups—northern merchant capital, southern agrarian capital, mechanics and industrial capital, and the independent farmers—developed specific interests in the establishment of a strong central state. The political demands of these groups can be traced to the economic functions they performed in their respective reproduction contexts and to the effect of the world market situation on these functions. Hence, though their interests converged on the *founding* of a strong central authority to protect America's slipping position on the world market, there were significant divergences among these groups concerning the precise powers, structures and functions to be assigned to this new political organ. Furthermore, these divergences were the result of the differential impact which America's participation in the world market had on each of the modes of production and on their exchange context.

(i) Northern Merchant Capital

The anarchic conditions, generated by the diverse legislation of the individual states and unchecked by the impotent Articles of Confederation, provoked a demand among the merchants for the centralized control of commerce (cf. Tench Coxe quoted in North & Thomas, 153-4). These demands became especially fervent in the northeastern states which succumbed to pressures from the emergent manufacturing interests and imposed tariffs to protect domestically produced goods (cf. Jensen 1950, 403; W. A. Williams 1966, 151). However, the merchant class as a whole was not hurt until the specific problems under the Confederation such as interstate trade barriers, inflated prices, and exclusion from both the British West Indies and from the French fishing waters began to be felt in every branch of trade. A politically vocal group of Boston shippers began to articulate the interest of the merchant class as a whole, calling for a strong national government, the creation of a national navy, an orderly and uniform tariff system, and naval legislation to challenge British and

French discrimination against American traders (Elkins & McKittrick, 236-7; Jensen 1950, 344). However, efforts to persuade Congress to implement nationwide legislation to stabilize intracontinental commerce and to protect it from foreign traders who benefitted from dealing with each state independently, were continually frustrated by interregional rivalry. The southern tobacco and rice plantation owners, for whom the export of their staples to Europe was vital, stoutly resisted any measures such as uniform tariffs which would have discouraged the competition of foreign shippers and raised the freight costs of the South's exports.

(ii) Southern Agrarian Capital

Despite their opposition to a uniform nationwide tariff system, the southern plantation owners did develop an interest in establishing a strong central authority. This sprang primarily from their additional functions as land speculators, trade agents, and money-lenders (functions performed in the North by the independent merchant class). They recognized that only a strong military power could enforce the measures needed to maintain or enhance the value of their land investments which were continually threatened by problems with Indians and squatters (Robertson 111 ff.) and by the resistance of private debtors. Furthermore, the southern planters had invested their capital not only in land, but also in government loans. These investments were the source of the merchants' and planters' common interest in guaranteeing the continued validity of the public debt (a validity which only a strong government could give) and in securing a stable payment of interest on government bonds. The need for a guaranteed financial and credit stability was the decisive common interest which united southern agrarian capital and northern merchant capital. Too many times creditors had been disappointed by the governments of the individual states which were open to pressure from below and frequently yielded to the demands of indebted farmers and others for the emission of paper money, the creation of land banks, reduction of taxes, etc. Public creditors, both in the North and in the South, emerged as a cohesive and very forceful group which energetically struggled for endowing central authority with its own powers of taxation and coercion (Jensen 1943; Nettels 1962, 149-50).

(iii) Mechanics and Industrial Capital

Under the Confederation government, concessions had been granted to mechanics and manufacturers: they had been freed from taxation, given credits and free land, and protected from cheap

importation by state duties (Bancroft, 138-9; Jensen 1950, 288). While the legislation of the individual states usually served to protect the interests of the mechanics, it increasingly became a fetter on the creation of a nationwide market for indigenous industrial products. The mechanics' awareness of the need for more centralized and uniform governmental activity was heightened by the expansion of manufacturing enterprises created by the war industry. Thus the manufacturers came to share with the trading and shipping groups a common concern to establish a central government that would impose uniform regulations and legislation.⁹

But the mechanics' essential motivation for advocating a strong central government remained different from that of the merchants. The mechanics wanted government protection from British manufactures, while the merchants profited immensely from trade with Britain. Therefore, the alliance between the importing merchants and the mechanics remained precarious and fragile. This fragility was revealed in the repeatedly broken, and subsequently patched-up, political alliances between the two groups (cf. Lynd 1964; Young 1964). The interests of the merchants always dominated the political goals of this coalition because, in the last analysis, the industrial producers, craftsmen, and artisans were all dependent for their profits on the successful marketing of their goods. To the degree that their own interests were promoted by flourishing trade, the mechanics accepted the merchants' interests as representative of all who participated, however indirectly, in the market (Nettels 1962, 126 ff.).

In short, each of these first three groups shared a common interest in establishing a strong central authority, but the tasks that each group anticipated would be undertaken by the strong central authority were narrowly defined in accordance with their desires to protect and facilitate their own economic interests, and as such they conflicted with one another.

(iv) Independent Farmers

Unlike the first three groups, the interests of the mass of small farmers did not suffer from the weakness of the Confederation government. As debtors and as vendors of their own produce, they benefitted from the inflationary conditions of the period because the higher prices that they could get from the sale of their commodities served to pay off their debts which were simultaneously reduced in real terms by the inflation. Second, the massive importation of cheap British finished products, which the small farmers themselves could not provide, was of advantage to them. Third, the system of state and local governments worked to their advantage, for they were able

to exert substantial control over the local centers of self-administration. The success of the small farmers in influencing these governments to protect their own economic interests was evidenced by the passage, in many states, of legislation which guaranteed egalitarian land policies, cancelled or reduced debts, and resulted in the issuing of paper money. Such legislation was, of course, fervently attacked by the public creditors and reinforced their opposition to the power of the state legislatures (Nettels 1962, 91).

The anarchy of individual state regulation of commerce, however, did generate some difficulties for small farmers as interstate trade restrictions. Furthermore, in certain states the funding of the war debt through land and poll taxes placed a severe financial strain on the farmers. Consequently, they too began to support the idea of a central government which not only would assume the individual states' war debts, but also would do away with duties on interstate commerce (Elkins & McKittrick 1969, 237). Furthermore, the Federalists promised that the securities of a new central government would serve to raise the price of the farmers' produce. The expected benefits from larger markets and the promise of the abolition of high land taxes helped to win the farmers over to the idea of a strong central state (Nettels 1962, 93).

In summary, the historical experiences of the four major groups during the Confederation period generated in each a growing awareness of the need for a strong central authority to protect and promote its own interests. This period of post-revolutionary chaos and governmental weakness was an important factor in overcoming the obstacles (posed by the division of the different economic groups into regionally scattered fractions) to the creation of a centralized nation-state and in consolidating widespread support behind the interests of the merchant and finance bourgeoisie. The central organs, which had been established since 1775, failed to ensure the economic viability of the newly independent American provinces vis-a-vis other nations or to reverse their slipping position on the world market. By 1787, there was general agreement on the need to establish a strong central authority which would: 1) guarantee the stability of the nation's credit system, including the public debt incurred during the War of Independence; 2) protect private property; 3) enforce contractual obligations; 4) promote the free circulation of commodities without the internal impediments of state duties; and 5) evolve some mechanism for institutionalizing compromises among the differing and often conflicting demands of the respective dominant groups. All of these functions may be summarized as establishing and promoting the preconditions for the successful primitive accumulation of indigenous American capital.

III. THE FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURES OF THE AMERICAN NATION-STATE

1. The 1787 Constitution and the Primitive Accumulation of American Capital

The Constitution of 1787 conferred upon the new central authority an important extension in powers and functions which had previously been deemed unsafe and inappropriate to assign to any political organ above the individual states.

These new rights and powers were: (i) safeguarding the validity of the state debt; (ii) the protection of private property; and (iii) military and diplomatic representation abroad.

(i) The Validity of the State Debt

The new constitution gave the federal government the right "to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States" (Article I, Section 8, §1). Thus the central state was no longer dependent for its revenues on the voluntary contributions of individual states. The Tariff Act and the Tonnage Act in 1789, the Funding Act of 1790, and the Excise Tax Bill in 1791 translated this constitutional right into effective government revenue-raising activity (cf. Ashley; Taussig) and diversified the sources of government revenues so that the national budget would not just depend, for example, on the tariff system, which would have discouraged mercantile activity, at this time the major source of profits and of the indigenous accumulation of capital.

The Assumption Act of 1790, which transferred the debts incurred by the thirteen individual states during the War of Independence to the central state, and thereby consolidated the public debt into a single national system, also served to guarantee the stability of the whole financial system of the U.S.¹⁰ The Funding Act, also passed in 1790, transformed circulating bills of credit, previously issued by individual state governments, into interest-bearing bonds of the new government and authorized the central government to emit these securities (Nettels 1962, 115; Chambers 1963, 37). This Act provided the impetus not only for the founding of the First National Bank in 1791, but also for the founding of more state banks. The material validity of the public debt was further secured in 1792, when the passing of the Coinage Act translated the federal government's constitutional right to coin money into an institutionalized activity (Nettels 1962, 120-1).

As a result of these measures and arrangements for ensuring the

validity of the nation's public debt, large sums of foreign investment flowed into the United States—an important mechanism for expanding the nation's supply of capital funds (Bruchey, 112). Until 1811, foreign investments pushed up the prices of securities (Hammond, 218) and eased the burden which the central state had assumed in taking over the individual states' debts (Ferguson 1961, 172). Thus the central state established in 1789 not only directly fulfilled the expectations and interest of the security holders (mainly finance and merchant capital), but also laid the preconditions for the development of a capital market (North & Thomas, 156).

(ii) Protection of Private Property

The Constitution gave the federal government the right to protect private property against, for example, the annulment of debts passed by the individual state governments during the Confederation period (Article I, Section 10, §1). The constitutional protection of "different and unequal properties" (Madison) effectively perpetuated the economic inequality and vertical stratification of American society. Private property was rendered secure in two ways: 1) through the federal guarantee of the sanctity of contractual relations among all citizens (Article VI, §1), a sanctity which the individual states were now prohibited from interfering with (Article I, Section 10, §1; cf. Shaw, 107); and 2) through the creation of a national army (Article I, Section 8, §12, 15, 16), which served as a coercive apparatus to back up the sanctity of contractual relations. The central state's guarantee for the protection of private property and the sanctity of contracts reduced, of course, the risks involved in commercial enterprises (North & Thomas, 156) and thus established the basic preconditions for the capitalist mode of production.

(iii) Military and Diplomatic Representation Abroad

Third, and most importantly, the Constitution gave the federal government the authority to represent the nation in the international context both militarily and diplomatically (Article I, Section 8; Article II, Section 2, §1-2). This meant that there was now a superior guarantor of mutual negotiations, treaties, and business transactions at both the national and the international level. No longer was it necessary to rely on personal relations of confidence between two trading houses crediting each other. Since the central state now assumed this guarantee, neither individuals nor individual states could henceforth obstruct the interests of the nation's merchant class.

As a result of the 1787 Constitution, the credit of the United

States rose quickly. The stabilization of the nation's financial and credit arrangements attracted foreign loans and investment, particularly from England (Habakkuk, 71; Jenks, 66; Smith & Cole, 42). At the same time the thoroughly regressive taxation system which served to finance the government's operations discriminated against the buyers of imported goods and thus hindered the flow of capital out of the country. Thus the new authority of the central state generated an orderly nationwide financial system at home and guaranteed the nation's creditworthiness and strength abroad. Both were necessary preconditions for the successful accumulation of American capital, and neither could have occurred on the initiative of private enterprises alone. What the strong central state of 1789 achieved were the preconditions for the *primitive* accumulation of capital, and not the preconditions for the self-expansion of capital (capital accumulation *per se*). The profits made and the capital accumulated were, for the most part, derived from the exchange of products on the world market, and not from the indigenous production process which was still a conglomeration of heterogeneous modes of production. That the American production processes were not themselves the major source of profit is well illustrated by the nation's remarkable economic growth after 1793, when the outbreak of war in Europe enabled American merchants to again earn great profits from their activities as neutral carriers of supplies, even when these supplies had not been produced in America. At the end of the eighteenth century, American capitalism was the activity of merchant capital and the primitive accumulation of indigenous capital. Foreign capital was primarily absorbed by industries related to trade; it was not yet used for industrial capital and capital accumulation *per se*.

Though the individual states were deprived of the opportunity to influence the fiscal policy of the new government and the development of the nation's economic infrastructure, nevertheless they retained some of the functions which they had exercised earlier; and these became a vital part of the national program to accelerate the process of primitive accumulation. The most important state functions were the founding of trade and finance corporations, the chartering of private banks and joint-stock companies, and the encouragement and protection of enterprises which undertook infrastructural projects. None of these functions could be accomplished by private enterprises, but they were not carried out by the central state either, (though without the credit-worthiness of the new central state and its guarantees of the sanctity of contracts backed up by military force, they could not have been fulfilled by the individual states).

Chartered corporations, which had already existed in the colonial

era, directly promoted state activity and intervention in the economy. But the stated purpose of most corporations was, until 1809, the promotion of trade rather than industry. The central state indirectly supported the states' intensified use of the corporations through its economic policy of exclusive support for the most profitable (i.e., mercantile) activity. This policy generated investment at home and attracted the additional funds from abroad needed to finance the activities of the corporations. The corporations, in turn, were largely responsible for the success of the central government's economic policy and an important ingredient in the rapid growth of the new nation's economy.

In brief, the task of directly intervening in the economy fell to the individual state governments:¹¹ they not only promoted the corporations, but also intervened in the domestic economy by regulating, financing, and protecting intrastate activity. The role of the federal government was confined to the creation and maintenance of the general preconditions for economic growth. This division of functions between the individual states and the central state was especially appropriate for the heterogeneous economic substructure of the newly independent nation. In an economy where regional reproduction contexts more or less corresponded to the boundaries of grouped individual states, the federal system of government was well adapted to regional conditions and requirements. At the same time, the structure, policies, and activities of the central government ensured the coordination of the diverse economic activities, carried out by each individual state, into a concentrated national drive for the primitive accumulation of capital.

2. The American Constitution and Internal Political Stability

The historical context of any and all intervention by the American state into the economy was the international competition of the world market. The economic strength of the United States vis-a-vis other nations necessarily presupposed social order and political stability at home because, without this, none of the measures to promote investment would have been either successful or profitable. Hence the two preconditions of American independence, external economic strength and internal political stability were not unrelated, and the structures of the state apparatus which were institutionalized to secure the former also served to secure the latter. In this and the next sections, we will again examine the Constitution and the governing apparatus which was built to implement the constitutional rights and powers assigned to the new central authority in order to understand how the internal stability of the United States was established and safeguarded.

The dynamic of the world market defined the internal conditions of the newly independent American provinces in the following ways: (i) it shaped the material interests of each of the economically dominant groups and their means for achieving them; (ii) it determined the interrelationships among these groups especially the relative power of each vis-a-vis the others, the possibilities for political alliance, despite their diverse and often conflicting economic interests, and the degree to which each group sought to use its power to promote its own interests by influencing the formation and the subsequent functioning of the central state apparatus; and (iii) it determined the shifting constellations of dominant and disadvantaged groups.

The power constellation of interclass relationships, both within the dominant classes and between the dominant and disadvantaged classes structured the political and ideological struggles over the final formulation of the Constitution and over the organizational form of the state apparatus which was to carry into effect the powers and rights granted to the new central authority by the Constitution. These struggles are documented in the recorded debates among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia held from 1785 to 1787 (Gales; Farrand 1937), and in the ratification debates in the conventions held in the individual states from 1787 to 1789. The Federalist Papers, written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, for the debate in New York State provide an excellent contemporary commentary. In particular, Hamilton and Madison exhibit in their political conceptions, theories, and discussions a clear grasp of the relationship between the concrete interests of the different socio-economic groups and the political structures and organizational forms of government.

The final ratification and signing of the Constitution by all thirteen states took place in 1789. The establishment of the United States and its governing apparatus gave the American bourgeoisie the potential to act as a single unit, despite its regional fragmentation and the uneven development of its different economic bases. Thus the structure of the new government reflected on the one hand the consensus of the ruling classes, centered on the security and expansion of private property, and on the other hand the creation and maintenance of a balance of conflicting interests both among the fractions of the bourgeoisie and between the bourgeoisie and the oppressed classes.

The events in the struggle towards this "bundle of compromises" (Morgan 1956, 135) have been extensively described in the historical literature. The vehement four-months long debates have been repeatedly quoted and the frequent concessions from the different sides, resulting in a succession of compromises between the "extreme

positions" (Farrand 1962, 202), reverently praised (e.g., Farrand 1904; McLaughlin 1935; van Doren). But these descriptions of the evolution of the Constitution fail to trace the elements of that bundle of compromises back to their original source, namely the diverse class interests which gave rise to and determined not only the "extreme positions" but also the concessions and compromises by which they were "reconciled." Hence in investigating the material circumstances which shaped the framing of the Constitution, we are calling into question the ideological claims both of the political actors at that time and of later historians. More important, however, than the formation of compromises which created the Constitution of 1787 was the subsequent anchoring of these compromises in the state administrative apparatus so that they were repeatedly activated and confirmed in governmental practice. The focus of our analysis will therefore be the structural principles which shaped the formation of the state apparatus, guided its subsequent development, and determined the way in which any additional functions were implemented and institutionalized, and how they secured the two functions which were absolutely indispensable for securing the internal social stability of the new nation: (i) institutionalizing the peaceful resolution of conflicts of interest among the economically dominant groups and (ii) processing (i.e., deselecting or rendering ineffective) the counter-claims of those excluded from the dominant groups—the oppressed classes. The structural principles which we will discuss are the principles of (1) federalism, (2) representation, and (3) the separation and mutual control of powers.

(i) The Structure of the State Apparatus and the Ruling Classes
(1) Federalism

Federalism is "a system of government in which powers are divided among a central government and several local ones" (Roche, 177) and in which this division of powers and functions is clearly defined so that the limits of each political unit vis-a-vis the others are unambiguous. This principle was already implicit in the Confederation and was a precondition for any unification of the American states, because the individual states were the existing political structures on the North American continent after the rejection of the British central authority and any proposed political structure which implied the removal of their autonomy would have been unacceptable. Only the principle of federalism which guaranteed the individual states at least a limited autonomy could make the union of the thirteen states possible; and it was immediately agreed upon.

The principle of federalism gave each of the individual states the autonomy to formulate and execute economic policies without

having to go through the central state apparatus. One of the most important effects of this principle was to perpetuate the autonomous reproduction of the diverse elements of the national bourgeoisie. They were left relatively free to sustain and develop the regional economic and social conditions for promoting their own interests through their influence on the individual state governments. The central government, on the other hand, was given control over foreign and interstate commerce (Article I, Section 8, §3) and was thus authorized "to institute protective and discriminatory laws in favor of American interests, and to create a wide sweep for free trade throughout the whole American empire" (Beard in Levy 1969, 13; cf. Article I, Section 10, §2-3). In this way a balance of the competing regional interests was created at the level of central state policy, and the diverse economically dominant groups were enabled to act as a unified ruling class.¹²

The debate over the possible abuse of the principle of federalism—the danger asserted by Madison and Hamilton that the individual states would exercise their powers to interfere with the functioning of the central state—developed into a fierce struggle, which resulted in the curtailment of the powers of the individual states (Diamond, 26; W. A. Williams 1966, 159-61). This struggle illuminates the process by which the central state appropriated the monopoly of repressive force, a process determined by criteria other than the formal appropriation of functions and codification of competencies provided by the Constitution (see Article I, Sections 8 and 10) and described in the *Federalist Papers* (23-31, 36, 41-6). The criteria which ultimately determined the concrete functions and powers of the central state vis-a-vis the individual state governments were the nation's needs to consolidate and accelerate its process of primitive accumulation in order to maintain and strengthen its position on the world market. This could not be done if the central state lacked the power to define and execute effectively the measures required for this process, much less if it was threatened by armed rebels whom the state militias were powerless to crush (as had happened in Shay's Rebellion when the rebel-leaders were part of the local militia). Consequently, the nation's economic growth required that the local militia, which were retained by, and under the immediate control of, the individual states (Article I, Section 10, §16), be subordinated to the repressive apparatus of the central state. Once the resort to violence as a means of "solving" class conflicts was excluded, the other principles which structured the governing apparatus of the United States and which were explicitly intended to produce a "system of checks and balances," served to maximize the conditions for reaching and maintaining a peaceful balance of compromise among competing interests.

(2) Representation

The principle of representation meant not only (in Hamilton's words) "the dependency of the servants of the state on the people," but also the representation and protection of property. The franchise was restricted to property-holders only and the legislative branch of the governing apparatus was divided into two parts: the House of Representatives, representing the "people," and the Senate, representing "property."

An early compromise attempted to allay the fears of the small states and the small citizen-bodies of the large southern states in order to win their support for the Union. It laid down two different forms of representation and electoral procedures for the dual legislature. The Representatives were to be elected directly by the citizens of the individual states and their number per state was determined by the size of the state populations (proportional representation); the Senators were to be elected by the legislatures of the individual states and restricted to two per state (equal representation) (Article I, Section 3, §1). However, the southern states still feared that they would be underrepresented and that the northern states would be able to use the central state to promote their own mercantile interests at the expense of the agrarian interests of the southern bourgeoisie. Consequently, a further compromise was necessary, the Great Compromise of 1787, which allowed slaves (the property of the southern bourgeoisie) to be counted as "people"—each slave representing a 3/5 citizen (Article I, Section 1, §3). This fraction was itself determined by no ideological principle but by the pragmatic balancing of the South's own conflicting interests, since the population base was the same for representation in the federal legislature and for the apportionment of taxes levied by the central state on the individual states. If the slave population counted for nothing, the southern states suffered the disadvantage of underrepresentation in the House of Representatives; if it counted as equivalent to the citizen body, then the southern states feared they would be over-taxed.

(3) Separation and Mutual Control of Powers

The separation of powers meant that the authority of the central state to act as a single authority was split into several distinct powers and divided among separate and autonomous agencies (cf. *Federalist* 51). Thus the Constitution placed the sovereignty of the American people in three separate "departments": the Legislative, which was elected by the individual states and was subdivided into the House of Representatives and the Senate; the Executive, i.e., the office of the

President and the agencies under the President; and the Judiciary, whose members were appointed for life by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate.

The separation of powers and the departments' different bases for the recruitment of their members were explicitly introduced to regulate the complex relations between the different interest groups in the nation. The political apparatus of decision-making and administration was intended to produce a dynamic balance of forces at the level of government, in Madison's words, "a fruitful rivalry" among the departments, but a rivalry which would never result in any one of the factions in the electorate seizing control of the whole state apparatus.

The specialized competencies of each agency interlocked with the competencies of the others and therefore each agency exercised a limiting control and influence on the others' spheres of power. Furthermore, the Constitution prescribed additional checks on the departments' exercise of their own specialized competencies by requiring the explicit approval of another department before certain decisions could be carried into effect.

This system of checks and balances served not only as a precaution against the domination of a single interest group ("the power of faction"), but also performed the "positive" function of sifting out the "common good." This public good, in principle, corresponded to the interests of no single class in American society; and the internal structure of the governing apparatus sought to perpetuate and realize in practice the effective representation of a manifold diversity of interests. But, given the world market conditions of those times, the national interest inevitably coincided with, and depended on, the interests of merchant capital. Consequently, as long as the political structures of the U.S. nation-state guaranteed the sifting-out of the public good, the merchants were assured of the state's support and promotion of their interests *without themselves having to participate directly in the government*.¹³ Contrast this with the period before independence,¹⁴ when the only way that any economically dominant group could ensure public protection and support was to exercise direct control over the provincial legislatures by usurping the leading political positions. Later when the conditions for the accumulation of capital changed, the same structures of the U.S. state-apparatus, which in and of themselves had promoted the interests of mercantile capital in the eighteenth century, performed the same function for the development and domination of industrial capital in the second half of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century.

The capacity of the nation's political structures to operate in this way, without the dominant economic group itself exercising direct control over these structures, is what we mean by the relative auto-

nomy of the capitalist state. By analyzing the gradual, historical development of the formal structures of the American state, and its accretion and institutionalization of functions, it is possible to grasp and understand the "autonomization of the capitalist state"—a process which typically appears only as an abstract theoretical category in Marxist debates—as a concrete, historically determined, complex process.

(ii) *The Structure of the State Apparatus and the Oppressed Classes*

In the previous section we examined the structural principles of the American state apparatus by which the Founding Fathers sought to permanently institutionalize a balance of compromises among the dominant economic groups and so to prevent the outbreak of open conflict among the most powerful groups in the society. Here we will reexamine these same principles to see how they functioned as mechanisms for suppressing the claims and interests of the economically least powerful groups.¹⁵ This repressive function of the central state was already implicit in our previous level of analysis since the constitutional attempts to remove dissension from the ranks of the national bourgeoisie and to generate a political consensus diminished the possibility that they would weaken themselves vis-a-vis the oppressed classes by internal disunity.

The repression of the oppressed masses, an essential means of maintaining political stability and social order, was accomplished not by assigning the task of law and order to any specialized agency, but by promoting the nation's primitive accumulation of capital and by the very structure of the governing apparatus as a whole. In other words, the structural principles which guided the state's promotion of, and intervention in, the nation's growing economy and which served to secure a balance of compromise among the ruling fractions, also served to secure and legitimate the domination of the other social groups.

The history of the American colonies, in particular the peculiar colonial relationship to their mother country and their recent struggle for independence, made the legitimation problems of the new central authority especially acute:

The activities of independence had unleashed a destructiveness which the Framers properly recognized could not continue once the republic was established. Thus, the problem of the foundation was not how to preserve the power and the spirit of the towns and voluntary organizations, but, on the contrary, how to defuse them. (Yarborough, 21-2)

The structural principles of the state apparatus were explicitly introduced not only to produce a balance of compromises among

dominant interest groups, but also to check "the turbulence and follies of democracy" (Randolph quoted in Hacker, 187) and "the levelling spirit" (Hamilton in Syrett III, 609); in short, to filter out the interests and counter-claims of the oppressed classes (cf. W. A. Williams 1966, 129; Beard 1913, 58; Hacker 184).

(1) Federalism

The principle of federalism, which applied only to the constitutional division of power between a central government and the governments of the individual states, failed to provide any constitutional guarantees for the lowest level of government, the municipalities. It was at this level, ever since the colonial period, that the political enthusiasm and activity of the American citizens had developed and flourished. The federal structure of the new nation-state reduced town politics to insignificance and few of those who had been previously active had any incentive to continue their participation in municipal affairs now that they only dealt with minor issues. This dampening of the political enthusiasm and activity of the ordinary citizen was not unintentional.

The individual states' retention of certain important powers under the principle of federalism, especially their powers to intervene in the economy, was part of the conscious design to perpetuate the then-existing diverse bases of American pluralistic politics (cf. Goodman, 72) in the anticipation that a proliferation of competing interests would cancel one another out and minimize the disruptive effects of class antagonisms on the political structures. The crystallization of class relations between dominant and oppressed groups was confined within the boundaries of the individual states and the state governments retained the responsibility for regulating and controlling them. The division of functions between the individual states and the central state removed the immediate interests of the oppressed classes from the central state's realm of competence and molded the expectations of the citizen-masses: they counted on the central state to provide general economic protection and the individual state governments to respond to demands for aid, tax relief, and other forms of intervention to protect their immediate interests. In this way the central state apparatus was reserved as an arena for the crystallization and balancing of the interests of the dominant economic groups *only*.

The struggle over the interpretation of the principle of federalism, which resulted in the monopolization of coercive force by the central state, deprived the oppressed classes of their ultimate means of protest against repressive government measures—the resort to violence, which had, on occasion, yielded success in the past. The local

militia, which the individual states retained, were now subject to orders from the central state "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions" (Article I, Section 8, 15); and the superior military force of the central state, over which the disadvantaged classes had no influence, could in turn be used to protect the individual states "against invasion; and [. . .] against domestic violence" (Article IV, Section 4), as indeed it was in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. Hence, in situations where the policies of the individual states failed to contain the discontent of the masses, any local uprising not only would be hindered from spreading beyond state boundaries, but also could be immediately suppressed before it could exercise any disruptive effect on the smooth functioning of the economy as a whole. The repressive apparatus of the new central state ensured the nation's credit-worthiness abroad and at the same time secured the preconditions at home for promoting the interests of the economically dominant groups at the expense of those of the oppressed classes.

(2) Representation

The struggle for independence and freedom, which had succeeded thanks to the active loyalty and participation of most American settlers, meant that the new nation could not deny representation of the masses in their own central governing apparatus. However, every effort was made to conjure up frightening images of the tyranny which would be exercised by a purely plebiscitary legislature and to convince the citizens of the need to defend the newly independent nation against the "turbulence and follies of democracy." The republican principle of representation, as opposed to "pure democracy" which Madison defined as "a society consisting of a small number of citizens who assemble and administer the government in person" (*Federalist* 10, 133-4), seemed to the Founding Fathers to be the best means of preventing "sheer majority rule or democratic despotism" (Dietze, 69). Thus the extension of the republic, based on the principle of representation meant both a concession to the demands for democracy and equality and a restriction on those demands.

The division of the Representative branch of government (the Legislature) into an upper and lower house and the Senate's power of veto over the initiatives of the House of Representatives (Article I, Section 7, § 1) gave the representatives of property equal power with the representatives of the people and ensured that the demands of the propertyless classes would always confront greater disadvantages than the interests of the propertied classes. The indirect election of Senators through the legislatures of the individual states and

their longer period of office—they were elected for six years, in contrast to the Representatives who had to seek reelection after only two years (Article 1, Section 2, § 1 and Section 3, § 1)—were specifically intended as a safeguard against the “illegal usurpation of power” by the people’s representatives (*Federalist* 62; cf. Farrand I (1937), 51, 58). The indirect election of the President through electoral colleges (Article II, § 2) was also intended as an immunizing mechanism against the “emotions of the masses” (*Federalist* 67-77). The House of Representatives was persistently regarded by the Founding Fathers as a potentially dangerous source of “radicalizing” and “levelling” tendencies which, if unleashed, would overthrow the republic.

The much-praised “foresight” of the Founding Fathers in protecting the new-born republic against “radical” and “levelling” tendencies, both then and in the future (see, for example, Madison in Farrand I (1937), 422-42; *Federalist* 10), is evidence not only that they had no intention of removing the sources of economic inequality,¹⁶ but also that they fully anticipated that economic growth and prosperity would aggravate and exacerbate the sources of destabilizing tendencies among the propertyless classes and the disadvantaged groups—namely poverty, economic inequality, social injustice and frustrated expectations (cf. Hamilton in Lodge III, 390).

(5) Separation and Mutual Control of Powers

To the extent that the principle of the separation and mutual control of powers structured the internal differentiation and organization of the central state apparatus, and not the relationship between the individual state governments and the central state (as did the principle of federalism) nor between the individual citizens and their structures of self-governance (as did the principle of representation), it operated at a level where most of the interests and counter-claims of the oppressed groups had already been filtered out. However, if any such demands did succeed in entering the decision-making apparatus of the federal government, they were subjected to the differentiation and specialized competencies of the separate state departments and agencies. Both the Senate and the independent office of the President were conceived of as explicit counterweights to the dreaded rule of the masses and given the specific function of balancing the furies of democracy. All measures passed by the House of Representatives required the concurrence of the Senate and the President’s signature of approval (Article I, Section 7, § 2). These procedures, laid down by the Constitution, were further built-in mechanisms to weaken or overpower the possible influence of the masses, though in practice most of their demands would already have

been accommodated or suppressed at the level of the individual state governments.

In addition, the powers of the third autonomous department of the central state, the judicial branch, were confirmed and extended with the conscious and unambiguous design of rendering the “right to revolution” superfluous (Oppen-Rundstadt, 102; Dietze, 280). The judiciary was the only department of the people’s sovereignty which was not dependent on, nor subject to recall by popular election and whose members were guaranteed their offices for life. Its function was to safeguard the Constitution against all interest groups. By separating off and locating the protection of the rights of every American citizen to liberty, equality, security, and property, in a department independent of, and superior to, the other two elected branches, the Founding Fathers claimed that the Constitution was adequately safeguarded from the abuse of power by an elected government and that this invalidated the citizens’ right to take up arms against an unjust central authority.

In summary, the constitutional structure of the central state apparatus, which was characterized by a manifold splintering of the powers and functions of the people’s sovereign authority and by a system of mutual checks and balances to prevent “the power of faction,” was the necessary precondition for the political stabilization of the class structure of American society, a structure which the Founding Fathers had no intention of uprooting. The vertically and horizontally segmented political system of the new state gave every class access to some part of the state apparatus and an institutionalized channel for promoting its own interests. This apparatus was designed to accommodate the demands of the diverse socio-economic groups in two ways: (i) by facilitating the political expression and articulation of the interests of the dominant economic groups into a balanced consensus of compromises at the level of the federal government, thus encouraging the development of a cohesive national bourgeoisie out of the regionally-based, diverse ruling classes; and (ii) by accommodating the interests of the economically disadvantaged masses at the level of the individual state governments, and thus splintering, repressing, and filtering out the political demands of the nation’s oppressed classes, whose claims on the central state were atomized into the rights of individual citizens. This formally neutral political apparatus, dedicated to the pursuit of the “public interest,” was not the creation nor the instrument of any single class. Once established, it developed a dynamic autonomous institution, which could indeed function in a way which promoted the interests of a single class, but only if the interests of that class coincided with economic needs of the nation as a whole, i.e., sustaining the nation’s economic growth and strengthening its position vis-a-vis other

nations. Our last section will document the historical evidence for the development of this autonomous dynamic.

3. The Influence of the Classes on the Functions and Development of the U.S. Nation-State

(i) The Coalition of the Federalists

The ratification of the Constitution in 1789 gave the Federalist coalition the authority to translate the powers granted to the new central state into an active governing apparatus. This coalition sought to unite the interests of all those who participated in the world market, either directly or indirectly. It was supported by all the dominant economic groups. The merchants, because of their immediate involvement in the world market, occupied the leading position in this coalition. The mechanics and manufacturers, who anticipated that the Federalist program to intensify trade would expand their own basis of reproduction, initially identified the merchants' interests as their own. The mass of small independent farmers were attracted by the promise that the Federalists' economic policies would bring higher prices for their export products. Finally, the strongest agrarian support for the Federalists came from the large planters and slaveholders (Chambers, 120).

Throughout the first Congress (1789-1792), the Federalists consciously sought to accommodate the interests of all the supporters of the Constitution by such compromise measures as the juggling of the tariffs, the bargain with Jefferson insuring the passage of the Assumption Act,¹⁷ and the settlement policies of the West which were designed to allay the South's fears that the new nation-state would interfere with slavery, the economic basis of the southern bourgeoisie. All of these measures reflect not only the conflicts and contradictions in the governing "power-bloc," but also the dominance within that bloc of the merchant class which, because of its direct participation in the world market, succeeded on every occasion in implementing its preferences as representative of the nation's interests. Though the mechanics and the owners of manufacturing enterprises consistently applied pressure on the government to use its powers to redirect the nation's growing prosperity towards expansion of indigenous manufactures, such a policy could not promise the same high profits which were flowing in from trade. The tariff granted to manufacturing in 1789 was subsequently modified in 1792 and again later. Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton refused to tax commerce as a major source of public revenue, rejected the imposition of tariffs aimed at protecting American manufactures against the competition of British imports, and refused to prohibit

selected imports. He justified this economic policy on the grounds that domestic manufactures could best be encouraged by bounties paid by the local and state governments to selected enterprises; but the mechanics themselves were fully aware that such measures failed to provide any effective protection against the flood of low-priced imports. The struggle over the allocation of the government's resources between the demands of merchant capital and the needs of the still weak productive capital was determined by the nation's economic growth which hinged on the exceptional profitability of the activity of its merchant class. The Secretary of the Treasury became the spokesman of merchant capital and the mechanics became disillusioned with the idea that a political alliance with the strong merchant class could be effective in promoting their own interests.

(ii) The Emergence of the Two-Party System

The dependence of the national interest on merchant capital and the succession of national policies favoring the merchant class generated a gradual disintegration of the widespread support initially given to the hegemonial group. The frustrated interests of the other economically dominant groups united them around positions diametrically opposed to the Federalists'. Thus, a few years after the ratification of the Constitution whose provisions made it a "constitution against parties" (Hofstadter), the American electorate split into a "ruling party" and an "opposition party."

The origins of the anti-Federalist movement can be clearly traced to the economic groups who were most hurt by the Federalists' policies. Hamilton's consistent policy of raising state revenues from internal taxation, including the revenues needed to consolidate the public debt, not only alienated the mechanics, but also imposed a massive burden on the backwoods farmers. Ever since Hamilton proposed his new excise tax on distilled liquors, there were repeated protests from rural areas lying along roads to market centers. These agrarian uprisings culminated in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, which was overpowered by the newly-created national force dispatched by Washington (Nettels 1962, 127). Besides such excise taxes, direct land and property taxes contributed to the collapse of the Federalists' popularity in rural areas which had once provided significant support. The nation's freehold farmers became the great bedrock of the new opposition Republican party.

The southern plantation owners also began to affiliate themselves with the Republican Party, even though they did not feel attracted to the "democratic" leanings of Jefferson and his followers. In opposition to the Federalists' principle of "loose construction,"

implied in the government's measures to implement and extend the powers of the central state, the planters had always favored "strict construction"—i.e., no public debt, a frugal government, and the restriction of the activities of the central state to the powers and functions enumerated in the Constitution. The southern bourgeoisie upheld this interpretation of the U.S. government partly because the southern states had already paid off their war debts, partly because they feared federal interference with the institution of slavery, and partly because they themselves had little need for liquid capital and consequently derived little benefit from the federal government's efforts to establish a stable credit system and to attract foreign investment. In 1792-3, the Virginians in Congress formed the anti-Administration Congressional faction and initiated the establishment of "Republican Societies" at the state and local level (Chambers, 57-61).

But the changing world situation in 1793 postponed the collapse of the Federalists' pluralist base. The outbreak of war between England and France undermined the restrictions which had excluded American products from importation into Europe. During the war, the Federalists promoted the international role of the U.S. as a neutral trader and carrier, supplying needed agricultural products to the belligerent countries, whatever side of the conflict they were on (North 1961b, 183-5). Consequently, the U.S. as a whole enjoyed a most prosperous development during the hostilities in Europe; but the nation's expanded capital remained subordinated to mercantile activity.

Though all the classes benefitted indirectly from the expanding economy of the U.S., their relative deprivation vis-a-vis the merchant class caused growing discontent with the consistent use of the nation's administrative apparatus to promote the exclusive interests of merchant and finance capital. When the Federalist government concluded the Jay Treaty in 1794—a treaty which established British trade with the U.S. on a most-favored nation basis (Chambers, 77)—it was immediately attacked as discriminating in favor of merchants, banks, and insurance companies. The Republicans tailored their political program to the economic grievances of all those who did not profit from these trade functions: they insisted on the need to secure markets beyond the British Empire; they committed themselves to tariff protection on behalf of the mechanics (Young 1964); and they condemned the imposition of land taxes, necessitated by the provocation of hostilities between the U.S. and France (Chambers, 134; Goodman, 75). Furthermore, the Republicans exploited the ideological contradiction in the Federalists' foreign policy: the U.S., after achieving its own successful revolution and republican constitution, was now choosing to support their former colonial master, the

British monarchy, against the U.S.'s "natural ally," the new republic of France (W. A. Williams 1966, 167; Goodman, 134).

The Federalists' response to growing public criticism was the passing of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 (Chambers, 135-6; Levy 1960). These laws, which clearly restricted personal liberty and freedom of speech and the press, generated widespread opposition and provoked some of the Constitution's most ardent supporters (including Madison himself) to oppose the Federalists' principle of "loose construction."

By 1800, the Republicans had rallied enough support to win the national elections. Their victory was due not only to the support of the agrarian sector, but also to the less prosperous craftsmen and journeymen of many trades and those manufacturers who were most in need of protection against British imports. By 1801, Hamilton's overly confident claim that

mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions and trades (*Federalist* 35 (ed. Earle), 213)

had been overturned. The Federalist Party could count among its loyal supporters only old-established merchants, wealthier mechanics, craftsmen who were least in need of protection, and poorer tradesmen who depended directly on the merchants.

Not surprisingly, several historians have interpreted the Republican Party as representative of the interests of the still weak productive capital which was being threatened by the Federalist measures to intensify trade during the 1790s (Young 1964). But this interpretation is oversimplified. It fails to take into account the Republican Party's betrayal of their electoral promises, once they took over the government. The Republicans' political victory in 1800 was in fact a result of the very strength of the American merchants on the world market, a strength which had generated the strictly mercantile policies of the Federalists. These policies indirectly resulted in the growth of manufacturing by creating the infrastructure for national commerce and by expanding the markets for American manufactured goods. At the same time they sharpened the opposition between the interests of merchant capital and the interests of manufacturing capital; and they revealed the importance of controlling state policies in order to promote specific class interests. The blatant identity between the politics of the state and the interests of merchant capital (which was possible because of the strong position of American merchant capital on the world market) was the major catalyst that triggered off sufficient political opposition to transform the "bloc in power."

In summary, despite all the safeguards contained in the U.S.

"Constitution against parties" and in the structure of the state-apparatus which was designed to produce a political consensus among fractions of the ruling class, within a decade of the birth of the American nation-state, one interest, that of merchant capital, gained dominant influence in all branches of the central political organ. The political structures themselves, geared as they were to maximizing the economic growth of the nation and the national process of primitive accumulation, sifted out the interests of the highly profitable mercantile activity as the national interest. This historical development, which was counter to the conscious intentions of the Founding Fathers, is strong evidence of the determining influence of the world market in the formation and development of the American nation-state. It was the dynamic of the world market that rapidly established and consolidated the merchants' political supremacy and allowed the public interest to be identified for so long with the interests of a single class. The political opposition which this identification generated was, as we shall see in the next section, unable to change the course of the economic and political development of the United States. Instead, it merely created yet another permanent mechanism—the party system—for the "peaceful and orderly" organization and accommodation of the complex rivalries of different interests.

(iii) The Political Theory of the Republican Opposition (and its Material Contradictions)

In direct opposition to Hamilton's Federalist principles, the Republicans adopted the slogan of Jeffersonian democracy: to promote the interests of the "many" against the "few." But their idealization of a "nation of independent farmers" contradicted their utopia of self-government by the "many."¹⁸ Survival based on independent small farming is a time-consuming activity. So too is the responsible exercise of government. There are only twenty-four hours in the day, not enough time to allow for the fulfillment of all the tasks necessary for both economic survival and political self-determination. In practice, Jeffersonian democracy rested not on a citizenry of self-reliant farmers, but on a leisured class, supported by the labor of others and therefore possessing enough time to participate in and control the government. The material basis for such a class did indeed exist in the United States among the southern plantation-owners who lived off slave labor. The Republicans' principle of frugal government coincided with the southern bourgeoisie's interpretation of the Constitution: the principle of "strict construction."

In his Inaugural Address, Jefferson demanded the curtailment of the state apparatus. There was no need, he argued, in a nation of free

and independent property-owners who had their own interests in preserving law and order, for a complex of agencies to act as "a check against factions," nor for government intervention in the economy. The functions of government should be limited to preserving the codified political and economic rights of the citizens (liberty and property) and to representing the interests of the U.S. abroad.

A minimum of government and a maximum of civil liberties were the twin principles of the Republican political theory. These principles were the electoral slogans which brought them to power. But the Republicans' opposition to excessive centralization and state interventionism failed to manifest itself after they moved into Congress and their candidate, Jefferson, was elected President. The Republicans continued the Federalists' system of regressive taxation, retained the central banking system, and imposed more revenue-raising (rather than protective) tariffs (Chambers, 173 ff., 187). Gallatin's fiscal policies were essentially no different from Hamilton's. The powers of the Executive branch of the central state, far from being curtailed, were extended. Jefferson secretly negotiated with the French to purchase the territory of Louisiana solely on his own initiative without consultation with the other branches of government. This usurpation of American popular sovereignty was confirmed by the Enabling Act, which the Republican Congress passed in 1803, giving the President total civil and military control of the new state of Louisiana, even though such powers of the Executive branch were nowhere specified in the Constitution and hence violated the Republicans' principle of "strict construction." By transforming the office of the President into the embodiment of the national interest, Jefferson expanded the role of the President far beyond either of his predecessors and fortified the power of the Executive branch of the central state apparatus against the prerogatives of the individual state governments (White 1951 (1956), 35, 551; Cunningham 1963, 93; Peterson, 691).¹⁹

Not only were the rights of the states curtailed, but so too was the liberty of private citizens. When Congress passed the Embargo Act in 1807, which forbade any vessel to set out from the United States for any foreign port, the merchants simply ignored it. Faced with this massive non-compliance, the Republicans in the next year passed the Enforcement Act, making full use of the repressive potential of the state apparatus. This act conceded to the central government powers of intervention considerably greater than those contained in the Alien and Sedition Acts passed by the Federalists in 1798.

The Republicans' assumption of political power had implied that significant changes would occur in the state apparatus. But what is remarkable is the failure of the new power-bloc to alter either the structure of the state or the functions it had acquired as a conse-

quence of the Federalists' program. This "incomprehensible betrayal" of Jeffersonianism is much described in American historiography, but little explained.²⁰ Our own analysis, which has systematically recognized the determining influence of the dynamic of the world market in the formation and development of the U.S. nation-state, offers a solution to this riddle.

Conclusion

The U.S. nation-state was established in response to the growing awareness on the part of all the diverse dominant economic groups that the existing decentralized political structures inherited from the British were inadequate to promote their respective economic interests or to protect their country's newly-won political independence. What the Constitution of 1787 represented was the transfer to a strong central organ of powers that were necessary for the effective realization of the interests of the major economic groups which, whatever the source of their wealth, were ultimately dependent on America's position within the world market. The indispensable preconditions for standing one's ground in the international competition for marketing outlets were: (1) a certain amount of privately accumulated merchant capital; and (2) a central authority that was relatively strong financially, or at least had a good credit standing. The Constitution of 1787 provided the basic possibility for the fulfillment of these two preconditions. The policies pursued by the Federalist government under Hamilton, in particular the decision to postpone the development of manufactures, successfully implemented them.

The formally neutral political apparatus, dedicated to the pursuit of the common interest and beyond the control of any single class, once established in 1789, developed a dynamic of its own, so that it attained the status of a relatively autonomous institution. But this dynamic was still in the last analysis shaped by the constellation of economic interests that had initially created the conditions for the birth of the U.S. nation-state, namely the differential participation of the dominant economic groups in the world market. Consequently, the formally neutral political apparatus could be used to promote the interests of a single class, but only if the interests of that class coincided with the interests of the nation as a whole—in particular by strengthening the nation's economic competitiveness vis-a-vis other nations. Neither the class of independent farmers, the bedrock of the Republican Party, nor the southern slave-owning planters, who formulated its policy, could promote their own interests, to the detriment of the merchants, without damaging the nation's economic growth and its position in the world market.

The Republicans came to power on the basis of an electoral program which promised not only to reverse the Federalists' consistent support of the interests of merchant capital, but also to curb the power and activities of the central state in general. Both of these principles of government were in direct contradiction to the indispensable preconditions for the economic independence of America, given the competitive international context of the world market. It is hardly surprising that the Republicans, when faced with the reality of government and of retaining the political and economic independence of their country, were forced to contradict their electoral promises and to succumb to the historically-imposed necessity of sustaining the preconditions for the national accumulation of indigenous capital. Even the most fervent advocates of rural democracy had to submit to the unavoidable crystallization of activities which only the central state could undertake. Far from pruning this runaway monster down to its strict 1787 constitutional size, the Republicans were themselves forced to extend the repressive apparatus of the state and its intervention in the economy.

Hence one of the great riddles of American history—the Republican government's "betrayal" not only of their electoral promises, but also of their political theory—is the most dramatic evidence that confirms our own hypothesis: that the origin, formation, and development of the American nation-state was determined by the dynamic of the world market situation through the participation of the U.S. as a whole and of the separate economically-dominant groups of American producers and traders in the then-existing system of international trade.

Postscript: Implications for the Later Development of U.S. Capitalism

Throughout our analysis of the formation of the American nation-state we have emphasized the role of mercantile capital. This was because the historical conditions during the period which we were examining determined the domination of merchant capital over the economic and political development of the U.S. Since American merchant capital was at this time still operating on the basis of the staple-producing agrarian economy (i.e., the division of labor which had emerged during the colonial system), the privileged promotion of merchant capital (and not of productive manufacturing capital) through the Federalist program, in the final analysis, effected a consolidation of the agrarian property relations. In other words, the comparative advantage in world trade still rested heavily on land-using types of economic activity, and the deliberate program of the Federalists to promote America's competitive position on the world

market presupposed the continued production of these marketable staples and the relations of production in which this took place. Thus the Federalists' own program laid the foundation for a permanent and structural impediment to the capitalist mode of production by consolidating the precapitalist modes of production. The less these had disintegrated (as was particularly the case in the South), the more the governmentally-mediated enforcement of the accumulation process contributed to the petrification of precapitalist class relations. Yet, paradoxically, under these same conditions of government-supported petrification, the successful establishment of the capitalist mode of production depended more than ever on massive interventions of the state.

The process of the effective establishment of the capitalist relations of production in the United States was to last throughout the nineteenth century. One of the most crucial factors in its development was to become the importation of a wage labor force sufficiently "free" to have to sell its labor power. This process does not set in on a massive scale until the 1840s. However, the regressive taxation system implemented by the Federalists in their attempt to shift the burden of raising public revenues from the tariff-system only (detrimental to the interests of the merchant class) served indirectly to accelerate the spread of wage labor. The small self-reliant farmers and petty commodity producers, which at the end of the eighteenth century still possessed their own means of production, when faced with paying the same taxes as the wealthier merchant and planter groups, frequently fell into debt and had to bail themselves out by selling their labor power. Their survival from then on depended on the sale of their labor to whomever would employ them, i.e., to the capitalist owners of the means of production, whose source of profits, unlike the merchants', was the command over the process of production. Thus the revenue-raising system of the first American governments tendentially served to proletarianize the labor force and thereby pave the way for the shift to industrial capitalism (cf. Marx I, 839).

Despite these embryonic developments during the period which we have examined, the dominance of merchant capital and the process of primitive accumulation was to last for more than half a century after the establishment of the central state. Our analysis of the initial phases of the economic and political development of the United States, which laid the historical foundations on which the development of industrial capital was to occur, serves to explain both in what ways this development was already in motion and why it could not progress according to its "natural" course, but required instead the active intervention of the state in providing adequate preconditions.

Footnotes

1. Merchant capital and industrial capital share the common goal of extracting and appropriating a surplus and of maximizing their own profitable returns. But they differ in that merchant capital is deployed in the sphere of circulation for the purposes of transporting products to and from different markets, while industrial capital is deployed in the sphere of production, processing materials and developing the means of production. Accumulation to the industrial capitalist means accumulating direct social control over more producers or employees, enhancing their productivity by reorganizing the production process itself, and thereby generating more surplus value. Accumulation to the merchant means gaining more control over goods already produced. Hence the merchant perceives the source of surplus value from the partial and blindered viewpoint of the sphere of circulation: the surplus presents itself in the form of a favorable balance of trade, i.e., buying where supply is high and hence prices are low, and selling where both demand and prices are high. The more that the merchant can extend his control over a specialized line of commodities, the easier it is for him to set his own sale-price and act as a monopolist, ignoring the market conditions of supply and demand.

2. A further factor in the West Indies' failure to develop an internal market was the elimination of small-scale cane-farming through technological advances. Sugar plantations, requiring large-scale capital outlay, soon destroyed the small producers who might have provided a basis for local exchange.

3. "Reproduction context" is a vague term meaning a geographically limited entity which is governed by certain economic laws. With this category it becomes possible to separate the double connotation inherent in the term "nation" which, in Marx's time, was the reproduction context within which the law of value was realized (and to which the general categories developed by Marx, like "average rate of profit," "tendential fall of the rate of profit," etc., applied.) Since "nation" is both a political and an economic category, it is crucial to distinguish and separate these connotations at the outset of any analysis of the historical formation of a nation-state.

4. In certain parts of New York, the métairie system prevailed. In this system, a transitional stage between the original form of rent and the capitalist form of rent (Marx III, 932-3; cf. 785), the tenant provides, besides his labor, a part of the capital stock, and the landowner provides, besides the land, the other part of the stock, and the product is then shared in certain proportions, typically advantageous to the landowner.

5. The slave-owners as such lacked any incentive to invest in labor-saving devices since their wealth was largely invested in workers whose bodies took the place of machines (cf. Nettels 1962, 191). Also it should be noted that in general incentives to invest in the productive sphere do not emerge until rent and profit have become separate forms of appropriation—or, in other words, not until the process of accumulating capital has become independent of land-ownership.

6. These legislative restraints were introduced in 1661-67, because without them, the Americans would have traded with the Dutch who at that time could pay most, sell cheapest, and carry goods most economically—and who did in fact seek investments in the colonies (Andrews II, 263-4).

7. Very few of the great American shippers tried to take over the enterprise of locally producing the goods they were shipping. But the increasingly specialized nature of their trade led to an identification of the merchant with the shipper and to the investment of mercantile profits in the shipbuilding industries (Pares 1956, 13).

8. The policies by which the national debt (initiated in 1775) was serviced took very different forms in different states, and the measures by which the individual states undertook to combat the problem of rapidly-growing inflation were equally varied. These policies and measures had a decisive influence on the conditions under which finance capital in America developed, but it would be too lengthy to provide an adequate explanation of the various policies and their various effects here. In brief, the series of attempts by the Confederation govern-

ment to meet its need for revenues failed miserably. Already by 1784 the American national government had become unable to pay its interest on foreign and domestic loans. By 1787, it was practically bankrupt. The domestic debt played an important role in that it united the various creditors as strong "centralizing nationalists" (Lynd 1967, 118) and the foreign debt united both the northern and southern capital fractions in the demand for reorganization of the federal system without which the United States could not have kept its foreign credit alive (cf. Ferguson 1961).

9. In addition, some of the larger (and more influential) manufacturers shared the merchants' concern for effective protection on the oceans and for negotiated commercial treaties to guarantee safe transportation for their wares and to secure marketing outlets on the world trading routes.

10. All the southern state governments, except South Carolina, had already absorbed their war costs and were opposed to Hamilton's assumption scheme because it meant that they would now have to share the burden of paying the interest on the unpaid debts of the other states (Bruchey, 115).

11. All case-studies of individual states (e.g., Handlin & Handlin 1947 on Massachusetts; Heath on Georgia; and Hartz 1968 on Pennsylvania) document not only the extent of the states' intervention but also "the fact that respective states held the center of the stage" and that until the Civil War "government intervention was concentrated at the state level" (Bronde, 120; Redford, 7).

12. The whole diversified system of revenue-raising to cover the expenditures of the central state was also an expression of the principle of federalism which demanded that every government agency should be adequate to the functions assigned to it (*Federalist* 30, 34); hence, the central state apparatus could not be dependent for its funding on the individual states.

13. This concept of hegemonial position should be distinguished from that of historians such as Beard whose economic procedures in analyzing the social status of those who participated in forging out the Constitution confine the concept of hegemonial position to those economic groups who directly sought to realize their interests by the creation and manipulation of a central state.

14. During the Confederacy period, there were conscious attempts at both the individual state level and the confederate level to institutionalize the formal separation of the "selected representatives of the people" from those who held economic power and to delegate political power to an "autonomous institution" (Jensen 1950, 366-71). But the formal separation of political and economic power was not effectively established until the founding of the strong central state in 1789 introduced a political structure, superior to those of the individual states and designed to share power among all the dominant economic interests, so that no one economic group (the southern slave-holders or the northern merchants, for example) could directly manipulate the state apparatus and policies in their own interests.

15. These do not include Indians and slaves who, as individuals, were mere "persons" (Article I, Section 2, § 3) and had no citizen rights.

16. They fully recognized that the major source of social antagonisms was economic inequality (*Federalist* 10, 131), but they regarded this inequality as inherent in the human condition (in Madison's words, "the diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate"), which no social reorganization could remove.

17. The southern states, which, with the exception of South Carolina, had already absorbed their war costs, were opposed to Hamilton's assumption scheme because it meant that they would now have to share the burden of paying the interest on the unpaid debts of the other states (Bruchey, 115). This opposition was contained by Hamilton's concession that the U.S. capital and seat of government would be located in the South (Washington, D.C.).

18. A perceptive and detailed analysis of this and other contradictions in Republican political theory (such as that between the perpetuation of independent property-holders and the objective necessity to accelerate the process of primitive accumulation for the sake of ensuring national independence) can be found in Gerstenberger (1973a).

19. After their defeat at the elections, the Federalists used the last days of their administration to strengthen the powers of the Judiciary and to fill the newly-created positions with their own supporters. Jefferson sought to subordinate these strengthened powers of the Judiciary to the office of the President (Mendelson, 20; Warren) and to use it against both the legislative branch of the central state and the individual state legislatures.

20. See, for example, Bruchey, 120-2 and Beard 1915, 445-7. Other interpretations of this shift from Republican theory to Republican practice vary from the reproach that the Jeffersonian elite immorally discarded all its principles to the insight that it never had any in the first place. This line of explanation appears superficially persuasive when the gap between Jeffersonian theory and practice is praised as "practical realism" (cf. Boorstin 1964; Koch).

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Industrial Capitalism and the Rise of Modern American Cities

Patrick O'Donnell

In the past few decades, cities in advanced capitalist countries have been shaken by crisis. Urban problems have proliferated and numerous ad hoc programs have been embarked upon to solve them. But the underlying sources of the urban crisis have not been clearly explained and the eradication of urban ills remains unlikely. In order to understand the crisis that is afflicting metropolitan areas, we need to know a great deal more about modern cities than we presently do. Although we should certainly attempt to gather new information, most of all we need to re-orient our perspective. We must stop looking at cities and their problems in isolation and start locating them in the context of the larger process of capitalist development. We need to understand the origins of modern cities, their role in the overall capitalist system, their basic inner operations and dynamics, their processes of evolution, the major causes of their problems, and so forth. In short, we need a *theory of the city*, a theory that is part of a more general theory of the nature of capitalist societies. Only with the help of such a theory can we hope eventually to understand the nature of the problems that regularly afflict modern cities.

This essay attempts to make a contribution to the emerging Marxist theory of cities. In the United States the work of David Harvey, John Mollenkopf, Ann Markusen, and others has been directed towards developing a new urban theory; in Europe, Manuel Castells, Henri Lefebvre, and their colleagues have made substantial contributions to this end. Like the above work, this essay locates the specific problems of cities within the larger context of capitalist development. But unlike much of the current writing, which concentrates on cities in advanced capitalist societies, this essay focuses on the origins of modern capitalist cities at the time of the industrial revolution.

Specifically, this essay examines the cities that arose in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century. America's mid-nineteenth century cities already contained most of the basic insti-

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Regionalism and the Capitalist State: The Case of the United States*

Ann R. Markusen

The phenomenon we call regionalism—the existence, significance and consciousness of territorial differentiation—accompanies capitalist development in the world system. This paper treats the phenomenon at various levels of abstraction, working from the origins of modern regionalism in the uneven development of capitalism to its contemporary re-emergence within the U.S. as a political and ideological, more than material, construct.

The argument proceeds from a recognition that uneven capitalist expansion with its companion capitalist State,** particularly during the mercantile capitalist era, was responsible for putting in place contemporary political boundaries which now serve as the framework for regionalism. Yet capitalist production relations in their fundamental logic are spaceless. In its historical expansion, capitalism as a set of production relations is most notable for overcoming regional barriers to exploit labor power wherever it resides. Capitalism destroys ethnic and cultural differences that attempt to impede capitalist penetration, differences that simultaneously were the roots of State formation. The spatially differentiated nation-state apparatus dating from the period of emergent mercantilist capitalism has become the inheritor of regional

* I would like to thank members of the Bay Area Kapitalistate Collective—especially Anatol Anton, Jens Christiansen, Les Guliasi, Jim Hawley, Pat Morgan, Brian Murphy, Chuck Noble, Jim O'Connor, Pat O'Donnell, Alan Wolfe, and Lenny Goldberg—and John Mollenkopf for their extensive criticism and help.

** In this paper, the word State refers to the Marxist characterization of the entire political apparatus in a capitalist society, while the word state refers to American subfederal political jurisdictions.

identity, which is better preserved in the political structure, in codifications, and practices of the State than in any other form, including popular practice—at least within the U.S.

The re-emergence of modern U.S. regionalism has accompanied the growth of the state. While the *boundaries* of regions are inherited from past events in the political economy, the *significance* of contemporary regionalism derives more from the evolution of capitalist political structure and power than from the evolution of capitalist production relations *per se*, which are increasingly homogeneous across U.S. regions. State actors and class fractions within a country may find it desirable to selectively engender regional consciousness in order to promote their ends. In the U.S. this is precisely what has occurred in the so-called sunbelt-frostbelt debate. While ubiquitous capitalist economic relations, culture, and ideology homogenize American society, State sector power is employed to preserve and create new regional differentiation.

Capitalist Uneven Spatial Development

That capitalism has produced irregular spatial arrays of economic activity is empirically documentable. However, on a theoretical level, the causal imperative of this pattern is the subject of much debate. And, empirically, Marxist research has not proven *systematic* production of uneven spatial form.

Uneven development was Marx's characterization of the process of capitalist expansion. Marx applied it primarily to the specialization of labor within industries, although his description of the antagonism between the city and the countryside echoes a spatial dimension. Marx's emphasis was dynamic: it was the *process* of capitalist development that he characterized as uneven, not its outcomes. The transportation of this notion to the characterization of outcomes, "spatial unevenness," has been accomplished by younger Marxist social scientists, who unwittingly mimic the tendency within bourgeois social science to assign characteristics to places and things, rather than sticking to the dynamics of a process as the analytical focus. Uneven development remains a feature of the capitalist expansion process, not a quality of particular places.

Three types of uneven development have been most noted in recent Marxist literature: temporal, sectoral and spatial.* Sectoral uneven

* Other forms of capitalist "uneven development" have been studied, including race and gender. There may be many more. It is precisely the descriptive nature of the characterization "uneven" which permits us great elasticity in the various categories which can be included as types of uneven development under capitalism.

development involves the uneven expansion of industries, some faster than others, with consequences for employment, profitability and inter-industry links. Temporal uneven development refers to the short and long run cycles of capitalist expansion, where overproduction crises stunt expansion and create periods of unemployment, low profits and restructuring of the economy. Spatial uneven development refers to the uneven progress of capitalist social relations and sectors across territories. It has been used to characterize the relationship between city and countryside, and the more rapid development of certain regions than others. In all of these cases, the characterization of the process as uneven remains descriptive. In order to understand the causation in each case, Marxists have had to delve deeper into the structure and dynamics of capitalist social relations.

The spatial array of capitalist social relations has never received the attention that the sectoral and temporal dimensions have in Marxist theory, with the exception of still immature theories of imperialism. Many bourgeois and Marxist scholars alike drawing on the apparent correlation of capitalist development with uneven spatial phenomena, have concluded that capitalist development necessarily requires or necessarily produces spatial unevenness. For instance, Walker writes

The kind of development operating throughout the United States today is not chiefly a consequence of barriers to capitalist transformation, development, and convergence, but of capital's own internal logic working itself out in space. (Walker, 1978, pg. 3)

Three positions on the inevitability of uneven regional development seem to emerge from Marxist work to date on uneven regional development.

- 1) Capitalism requires uneven spatial development as a condition of accumulation.
- 2) Capitalism *produces* systematically uneven spatial development, although it may not require it and may even suffer from its consequences.
- 3) Capitalism *may produce*, as well as *may eliminate* uneven regional development.

Resting on an appeal to theoretical plausibility and empirical evidence, I would argue the third of these positions. First of all, there is nothing in the logical capitalist accumulation that requires spatial differentiation. Capital, the motive force in the expansion of production, pursues the extraction and realization of surplus value through the organization of the production and circulation processes. As such, it is always in search of wage labor, the source of surplus value. As many of the accounts of imperialism assure us, pre-capitalist modes of production, including federal agriculture and peasant subsistence farming, have provided impediments to capitalist expansion (Brenner, 1977) by withholding wage labor from the capitalist sector. Such prior modes of production had their own class structure cultures, and state formations, each of

which provided elements of resistance to capitalist incursion. This line of reasoning suggests that it is not capitalism per se, but the environment which capitalism encounters on its expansion path which renders the process of expansion "uneven." Particular capitalists and corporations may be able to exploit conditions existing in any one region at a particular point in the process, but the system as a whole has no stake in ensuring uneven development. This interpretation of uneven development also permits convergence and reversals in the positions of different regions.*

Secondly, the arguments about the necessity of or systematic occurrence of uneven development operate at too aggregate a level. In order to understand *why* uneven development results in a particular region lagging behind others in a particular point in time, we have to know the specifics of the particular region relative to other regions. The recent *Review of Radical Political Economy* special issue on uneven regional development demonstrates that a number of features have retarded or accelerated capitalist expansion across different regions (RRPE, 1978). They include differences in the degree of militance of various classes in pursuing or fighting capitalist incursion, differences in ownership patterns of both land and the means of production, differences in the degree of competitiveness or oligopoly in industrial structure, differences in nature (existent but overplayed in the bourgeois literature), and differences in the adjustment of various sectors to crises in the accumulation process. However, these various features are not peculiar to regional distinctions, since they also characterize neighborhoods, cities, and conflicts or differences *within* regions.

Finally, the empirical evidence on regional experience suggests that different regions' fortunes within capitalism rise and fall with the evolution of capitalist social relations and their expansion across the world. Most recently, the rapid growth of resource rich (especially oil rich) Third World nations belies the conventional wisdom that resource-based economies are necessarily on the losing end of uneven regional development. At the same time, the woes of the British economy and hard times in the European Economic Community suggest that nationally-based capitalist hegemony may not be permanent. And within nations, such as the U.S., the rapid growth of previously laggard regions, such as the South, suggests that once precapitalist and sectoral

* My argument here, and that of Brenner's as well, parallels Schumpeter's argument on imperialism: "Imperialism is thus atavistic in character. It falls into that large group of surviving features from earlier ages that play an important part in every concrete social situation. In other words, it is an element that stems from the living conditions, not of the present, but of the past—or put in terms of the economic interpretation of history, from past rather than present relations of production" (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 65).

barriers to incursion are removed, capitalist production will indeed move to areas where immature capitalist relations of production result in less militance, lower wages, and a less expansive welfare state. Thus generalizations about the systematic nature of uneven regional development are dangerous unless they are disaggregated to specify the precise set of forces operating in each case.

In this disaggregated analysis, the role of the State and political conflict becomes clearer and more significant. While economic specialization does create potential regional differences, it is the establishment and operation of State machinery along regional lines which gives regionalism both its framework and contemporary significance. Political economists grant too little credit to both culture and politics as sources and perpetrators of regional differentiation. While I try to acknowledge the cultural forces at work, the remaining sections of this paper focus on the significance of politics and State structure in the evolution of contemporary regionalism.

The Concept of "Region"

The concept of region has never clearly been granted a precise universal analytic definition. In the U.S. university curriculum it is negatively defined as everything that is complementary to and superceding the "urban." In popular usage, region refers to everything from the metropolitan to the state and multi-state levels, to Third World countries and continents of the world. Castells (1977), Feldman (1978) and others have recently begun to question the usefulness of the notion "urban," correctly pointing out its ideological function—the reification of certain spatial consequences in the sphere of reproduction under capitalist economies and the prescriptive treatment of them separately from capitalist dynamics and social relations. Capital mobility undermines urban viability so that it becomes increasingly clear that urban problems cannot be dealt with in isolation from regional and inter-regional forces. The renewed U.S. controversy at the "regional" as opposed to "urban" scales may be a direct consequence of imperialism and urban crisis coming home to roost.

Abstractly, region is a conceptual category that connotes a physically definable and contiguous geographical area with some political status (not necessarily legal, e.g., Palestine). Membership in a region may be multiple (I am a Minneapolitan, Minnesotan, and American), but it is primarily determined by political status, not by class or cultural circumstance. Regional membership generally extends to all those who reside within the region. It does not distinguish residence from membership, although access to power may be very different across groups within the region and there may be strict controls via immigration on who may

"join." Regions may have multiple cultures and economic activities existent within their boundaries. In a nation state with multiple levels of power, such as federal system, regional groupings may arise from cultural affinity or common economic problems, but remain political aggregates (e.g., the Appalachian Regional Commission or the Western Governor's Policy Office) or political derivatives (Federal Regional Councils).

The essence of State power is the monopoly of force in a territorial unit. Because of the changing nature of the capitalist economy and the existence of resistance to cultural and political oppression, many regional delineations are frequently under attack, through conflict over the political structure or control of the existing State apparatus (Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Northern Michigan, Quebec). Thus, the form and content of regional divisions and groupings change over time as an indirect function of capitalist dynamics and a direct function of class, political and cultural struggles. But the target of such changes is always political structure and power. Therefore, we are justified in identifying the political as the primary determinant of regional divisions, even though at any given moment we may have to seek the roots of political conflict over regional boundaries in the cultural and economic events internally. But no consistent relation between cultural and/or economic status can be found empirically to justify the primacy of either as the definer of region. I argue that a consistent relationship can be found between State boundaries, State power, and the content of regionalism. An operational definition of region therefore uses subdivisions of and aggregates of existing political jurisdictions.

Regional Structure: The Inheritance of Political Boundaries

Regional spatial structure coincides with political boundaries. The history of these political boundaries explains why contemporary nation-states may have serious internal regional problems or threats to their territorial sovereignty from without. Original political boundaries were drawn as a result of conquest, unification, separation, or incorporation. Each region has its own unique history, where its political structure can be traced to the dynamics of the dominant mode of production. This political structure now wields power that may no longer correspond to the underlying economic or cultural dynamics and may therefore be the subject of conflict.

For instance, in the colonial era, mercantilist capitalists enlisted the aid of their own nation-states to break down barriers to capitalist expansion, through military, economic, and ideological means. Imperialism and its predecessor, colonialism, were thus propagated by an inextric-

able mixture of State and private institutions. In fact, the major protagonists were seen to be "Spain," "France," "England," etc., not the primitive accumulators or industrial capitalists behind each. As part of world expansion, these nation-states replicated themselves by imposing nation-state political structure on the Third World. These political divisions remain as the primary regional identifiers today.

U.S. regional structure parts dramatically from the European tradition because its territory was resettled during the era of mercantilist capitalism, not feudalism and its native population was exterminated rather than incorporated as under classical imperialism. Furthermore, its settlers came from many different cultures and political and economic experiences. Of all the advanced capitalist nations, it thus has the most youthful political structure, in the sense that its evolution was less constrained by previous indigenous social relations and cultural traditions than most other nations. Nevertheless, it has a political structure strongly regionally based and has had many regional conflicts, even one, the Civil War, at the scale of insurrection and warfare.

The U.S. political structure from the outset granted regional sharing of power within the nation. Its federal system derived from the different colonial political structure in the original thirteen states, themselves a function of the different franchises and charters granted by European powers, encompassing striking cultural and economic differences within the set. As the new nation expanded across the continent, first to facilitate primitive accumulation, later to aid exploitation of farmland, and still later to engender industrialization, several features determined the boundaries and size of new political units. First of all, "defense" requirements (from other European powers and from Native Americans) made rivers and mountains convenient boundary lines, regardless of the fact that lining the border down a river frequently dissected a natural economic and cultural unit—the water basin. Second, the emerging dominant regional conflict between the slave based cash crop economy in the South and the wage labor manufacturing and commercial economy in the North required additional states to enter as slave/not slave duos, resulting in smaller states than might otherwise have been carved out of existing territories. Third, the boundaries of many states were inherited from the older claims of European colonial states, which devolved in chunks upon the American nation (the Northwest Territory, the Louisiana Purchase, and Texas and California). Finally, the demands of new settlers for protection and control of resources were also granted in some cases, especially if contiguous territory were not already incorporated in another state.

East of the Mississippi, the dominance of the defense motive produced an array of states strongly outlined by rivers. The middle western and plains states were drawn on both river and "equal population" criteria.

California boundaries date from several events. Her northern and southern boundaries were inherited from previous colonial settlements, her mammoth size can be credited to her strongly organized internal politics (although from the start a counter proposal would have made the five southern counties into a separate state), and her eastern boundary was charted by settler greed for the timber on the east slope of the Sierras and control of the lower portion of the Colorado River.

Both economic motives and cultural identities were thus important shapers of the original political units in the United States.* Following the establishment of the fifty states, the political endowment of power in the lower tier of the federal structure began to reorganize regional affinities. During the Western U.S. statehood creation process, strong regional identities emerged on a state by state basis. Settlers, egged on by provincial newspapers, held great pride in their state and in the joint venture that it appeared to be. In the West, regional identifications were dominated from the very beginning, by a series of political events and institutions, not by a common cultural tradition. In the East, large-scale immigration and the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy transcended the older cultural and economic character of the regions. Virtually every state by the mid-19th century had an ethnic mix in its population. Continual immigration and internal mobility prevented the equation of regional identity with cultural identity. The South was the exception: here an antagonistic mode of production and an accompanying culture, both built on slavery, resulted in a regional identity which led to civil war.

Thus political structure in the U.S. derives historically from the dynamics of capitalist expansion confronting a pre-capitalists territory. A sufficient history of U.S. regionalism would inquire after the complex interplay of the economic, ethnic, cultural, and political events surrounding its evolution. In this section, I have traced only the setting place, and maintenance, of political boundaries which are the framework for regional identity. But formation of the specific regional boundaries is not of interest to us unless events within those regions lead to conflict. In the next section, we explore the content of contemporary regionalism, which I will also argue is primarily shaped by the significance of the political realm.

Nevertheless, the importance of political boundaries and membership in a nation-state should not be belittled. The experiences of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, for instance, have been starkly different from other Pacific and West Indian territories primarily due to their incorporation (in different forms) in the U.S. political structure. When ethnic identities or

* A detailed documentation of this political shaping and the subsequent sectionalism that focussed on the federal political structure is presented in Turner, 1932, especially Chapters II, XI, and XII.

common economic ties are bisected by political boundaries, the possibilities for alliances may be impeded and the fortunes of those with common cause may vary dramatically across borders. Sioux Indian members' political strength is diluted by their dispersal over several states; auto workers win better state concessions in Michigan where their numbers are largest; ranchers fighting coal stripping fare better in Montana than in neighboring states because of the different political histories of each state.

Contemporary U.S. Regional Differentiation

Past historians of U.S. sectionalism believed in its vitality. In an essay entitled "Is Sectionalism Dying Away?" written in 1907, Frederick Jackson Turner concluded that distance from markets, sectional distribution of crops and other economic activities, and the sectional distribution of ethnic stocks "will always tend to produce sectional diversities and conflicting interests in the vast area of complex geographical provinces which make up the U.S." (Turner, 1932, p. 312). Similarly, Hesselstine began his 1944 essay on "Regions, Classes, and Sections in American History" by claiming that "the divergent interests of sections have constituted the major problems of America's past and bid fair to be the major issues of the future" (Hesselstine, 1944, p. 35). His analysis emphasized the struggle for control *within* regions as well as the fundamentally different economic interests of each section. While both regional scholars acknowledge the increasing economic integration of U.S. regions and the clear movement toward national planning (Hesselstine, p. 43; Turner, p. 311), each championed the hardiness and desirability of sectionalism.

Over the past hundred years, political structure and political power, rather than economic or cultural stakes, increasingly have become the causes and targets of regionalism. In this section, I argue that increasing cultural and economic homogenization in the United States has broken down the old basis for regional rivalries. Previously, the division of state power between federal and state levels of government resulted in persistent sectional differences based on economic and cultural claims of each section on the national government (Turner, 1932, pp. 327-8). For instance, the agrarian and non-industrial sections (Upper midwest, Plains, and part of the West) would fight in federal forums for concessions from the industrial northeast. But the advance of capitalist industrialization has increasingly eliminated such geographic differences in mode of production or sectoral specialization. New regional rivalries appear to be much more an artifact of pure State power struggles than of true economic or cultural differences. Without charting in detail the 20th century diminution of economic and cultural roots, the following

argument relies on a consideration of the current significance of these features across U.S. regions. By looking at the microdialectics of particular regions and relationships within them, we can decipher the forces which give rise to the consciousness of regionalism and test the contention that political forces dominate.

The Cultural Roots

The reader might protest that cultural and social identifications regionally are quite strong, forming a basis for regional ties. While some cultural pockets thrive, strong forces undermine cultural commonality as a regional phenomenon. First, the settlement patterns in the U.S. referred to above, and the continual high rates of migration by members of all classes and many ethnic groups, tend to break down regional correspondence between culture and place. Some urban neighborhoods may remain culturally intact; thus urban politics may exhibit a strong ethnic or cultural component. But contemporary regional politics demand transcendence of particular ethnic affinities in order to forge alliances, whether we are speaking of corporatist regional policies or western indigenous battles against energy development and federal domination. Regional cultural identity has eroded over the 20th century. While in the 1930s the Communist Party could propose a Black Nation in the cotton belt (Allen, 1976), today the case for the nationalist potential of a people within the U.S. coincident with a particular region would be difficult to make. (The single exception are the claims by some Native Americans to western land. Yet the reality of the moment is that the Cheyenne must join forces with Montana ranchers to protect their adjacent lands from capital incursion.)

Second, the commercialization of culture has preempted people's self-determination of their own culture. In place of an indigenous tradition, plastic images of regional culture are canned in T.V. programs, novels, and the press. David Whisnant (1977) has documented the destruction of Appalachian mountain culture. Economic development funds have been used to encourage craft production, resulting in Taiwan-made replicas of Appalachia arts sold in highway stands to tourists. Likewise, the appropriation of hillbilly music turned Buck Owens' insults the indigenous tradition of Appalachian music. The degradation of their culture through such commercialization has destroyed Appalachian pride in it; many people have stopped making music and art. Similar images of the California beach boy, the Texas cowboy, and the Northern lumberjack pick up on a tiny truth on tradition and smear it on billboards, records, screens, and restaurant menus. People's experience with their culture tends increasingly to come through the media, not through daily contact with similar people in which this culture is

nourished. It is close to being completely synthetic and dangerously manipulable by commercial interests. The overwhelming cultural event of post-World War II America is the nationalization and homogenization of culture through television.

These observations suggest that there is no major cultural content to contemporary U.S. regionalism. While cultural and ethnic ties may be extremely important at the family and neighborhood levels, they have been largely eliminated on the regional level by capitalist mobility and cultural control.

A deep longing for an ethnic or cultural regional identity may remain, and in part be responsible for the popularity of synthetic and commercially-imposed images. The full understanding of this quest for local identity may be blocked in Marxist analysis by the overemphasis on the material relations of *production* at the expense of an analysis of reproduction of labor power under capitalism. The community is the sphere of this reproduction and the assertion of local pride may be a statement by women and children in particular of the importance of reproductive mechanisms, like family, school, and church, in people's lives, and issues of control over them.

The Economic Roots

Much has been made in recent years of the uneven development of capitalism across regions, as students of imperialism brought home their analysis and applied it to Appalachia, the Great Lakes, Native American reservations, the South, and now the Northeast. The clarification and synthesis of this work is only now being undertaken (see URPE, 1978; Simon, 1978; Markusen, 1979). Regions which are differentially occupied by capitalist accumulation are classified as "developed" and "underdeveloped," itself an unsatisfactory delineation, since "underdevelopment" can arise from multiple sources. It can refer to incomplete incorporation into the mode of production of a particular people, the result of resistance by a prior mode or the blocking of full development of free wage labor. On the other hand, it can refer to particular features of capitalist dynamics in a fully integrated region, such as the exhaustion of a resource base, or the persistence of racism that prevents certain groups from freely entering the labor market and encouraging them to migrate. A great deal of bad and incomplete analysis of regional economic development by Marxists has left us a legacy of confusing notions, such as the internal colony, core-periphery, dependency, and backwash effects (Collective, 1978).

As I have argued above, capitalist development is impervious to the needs of people in any particular region and will seek out cheap labor whenever and wherever it is profitable to go. No region's fortunes under

capitalism can be analyzed without an understanding of all other regions, and no historical conclusion of empirical regularities in regional features is warranted. Regions may reverse their position (e.g., the South and the Northeast, cities vs. rural areas) as favored locations for capitalist development. Economic forces are not reducible to regional boundaries or regional qualities.

However, there are two ways in which regional economic differentiation may still feed regionalism. Even though over the long haul each region faces the same capitalist dynamics, at any point in time their experience may be problematic and different from other regions. The significance of the law of uneven development is that it describes the empirical experience of *temporal* (not spatial) aspects of capitalist development. Rapid growth may characterize one region today, after many years of stagnation. Either rapid growth or decline is problematic; each is disruptive of existing regional productive and reproductive structures.

Thus despite ubiquitous incorporation into the industrial and monopoly capitalist mode of production, the *age* of the regional capitalist economy and its rate of change may be a source of continued regional economic differentiation. People in such circumstances may view the different experience of another region as the cause of their plight. For instance, people opposing rapid growth in the West with its myriad boomtown problems might blame the Eastern demand for energy and argue that the Northeast should tighten its belt. People in the Northeast, experiencing the pains of job loss, might blame the South and the West for stealing jobs. These perceptions are not accurate, since the culprit is capital, which knows no home. But upon such regional anxieties, as I argue below, a politically-inspired regionalism is imposed.

The second source of persistent regional economic differentiation is the immobility of certain sectors within regions whose fortunes are tied to that of the region. These may be of two types. First, even though manufacturing, construction, finance, and transportation have decentralized radically, some degree of sectoral specialization may still exist in certain regions. A current example is energy, which places mineral and fuel rich regions in a potentially antagonistic position as suppliers with respect to energy-consuming regions like the Midwest and Northeast. However, energy production makes strange bedfellows, with states like Alaska, Louisiana, and New Jersey suppliers of off shore oil to consumers from California to New England. Thus sectoral specialization as a basis for regionalism is somewhat unpredictable. The second type of local capitalist interest tied to regional futures are those industries whose assets are tied to regional land uses and population centers: banks, real estate, commercial interests, etc.—the constituency of the local Chambers of Commerce. Their stakes in regionalism have not changed perceptibly over the course of U.S. development. Prominent

among these is the local press, which has a monopoly over local regional consciousness and is supported by the Chamber of Commerce coalition, but whose economic asset (its circulation) is not mobile. This single fact may result in the prevalence of a regional consciousness even when the material conditions for regional differentiation have disappeared.

The Political Roots

In the U.S. the entire progress of capitalism has been shaped regionally by the not-so-visible hand of the State. The consolidation of economic power in industrial, monopoly, and multinational corporations has been accompanied by a concomitant growth in national government power and domain. Radical historians have documented the employment of regulation, national government spending and federal land policy in the interests of the capitalist system as a whole, frequently overriding or eliminating small, particular capitalist interests whose behavior stood in the way of the smooth process of capitalist accumulation (Kolko, 1963; Boyer, forthcoming).

Current regional actors know that the State's activity can vastly affect their region's development prospects. Past federal policies and structures which have affected regional differentiation can be conveniently grouped into five categories: regulatory and commercial policy, land policy, infrastructure and public investment, intergovernmental functional allocations, and explicit regional development policies. I have elsewhere rejected the current sunbelt-frostbelt rhetoric that accuses the federal government of some aggregate unfairness, measurable in fiscal flows (Markusen and Fastrup, 1978). The reality is far more complex, sometimes deliberate, sometimes not, not necessarily budgetary, and far more profound than fiscal flows analysis suggests.

Regulatory and commercial policy have affected regional growth rates profoundly, but in ways which are frequently hard to gauge conclusively. The Civil War was largely a regional battle over federal commercial policy toward two competing modes of production. The inability of the auto industry after World War II to secure tariff barriers to imports was a result of regional concentration of production (and therefore lack of Congressional power). The Congressional disinterest helped spur the industry to disperse auto production away from the Michigan axis, while imports made big inroads on U.S. markets, further harming regional growth. Natural gas regulation is purported to have shifted a great deal of industrial production to the South. Regulation of transportation rates (truck, railroad, and air) has shaped regional growth, principally through successive waves of decentralization. Oil quotas for years stimulated the growth of Texas, Oklahoma, and Los Angeles. Such regulatory policies never appear on fiscal flows tallies.

Land policy, including settlement policy, determined basic U.S. settlement and land ownership patterns in the nineteenth century. Particularly significant were the extensive lands given to the railroads, the engendering of petty bourgeois farming by the homesteading arrangements, and the retention of vast amounts of forest and arid lands in the public domain. In more recent years, the disposal of these lands (and offshore shelves) through cheap leasing arrangements to energy companies, timber companies, and ranchers has undoubtedly stimulated the growth of coastal and western interior areas. The recent growth of western coal stripping at the expense of Appalachian expansion may be in large part a result of the advantages of cheap federal land in the west.

Infrastructure and public investment programs, especially the location and construction of military bases, have been incalculably important to regional growth rates. Military installations, especially through porkbarrelling by Southern Congressmen with electoral longevity, favored the South and Southwest. Army Corps of Engineers programs for improving waterways (e.g., Mississippi, St. Lawrence) and building dams for water and power have secured the income of North Dakota wheat farmers and Western Slope irrigators. Likewise, the construction of the interstate freeway system profoundly rearranged access networks in this country, stimulating a continuing decentralization of industrial production.

The intergovernmental allocation of responsibilities and resources, especially in the areas of tax, welfare, and labor policy, have allowed regional differentiation to flourish in ways that are functional for capital. A labor policy that has left questions like right-to-work, workman's compensation, and health and safety issues up to the states has permitted the more conservative dominated states to prevent unionization in the South and to undercut Northern unions by attracting industry away from high wage areas. Similarly tax and welfare policies left to the discretion of the several states have resulted in competition that tends to discourage high tax and welfare levels, with industrial relocation among the states the disciplining force. On the other hand, where competition among states would hurt capital (e.g., trade policy) banking policy functions are centralized at the federal level (Friedland, et. al., 1978). Federal decisions regarding the delegation of state power among levels of government has thus shaped regional growth.

Finally, there have been two sets of explicit regional policies implemented in this century. First, in the 1930s, Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bonneville Power Administration, and sister proposals for other regional power and water development schemes aimed at stimulating regional economies through outright public construction and subsidy of a basic industrial cost. These explicit regional programs were legitimation devices to ward off radical transformation in regions with broad based radical coalitions (e.g., Communists and Black share-

croppers in the South). They succeeded. The TVA was a mainspring of the regional migration of manufacturing activity to the South and capitalist incorporation of wage labor. Bonneville was the key to the aluminum industry's location in the Pacific Northwest (the bauxite was imported), which in turn permitted the development of an aircraft industry.

In the post World War II era, territorially based policies gave way to regional planning which explicitly attempted to force integration of regions into the capitalist mainstream (Friedmann and Weaver, 1978). The postwar policy aimed at destroying isolated communities and existent regional networks by inducing regional migration to "growth poles"—cities organized around wage labor and full integration of the population into capitalist production and consumption structure. The most outstanding example is the Appalachian Regional Commission with its conscious intent to destroy the subsistence economy in the hollows, by encouraging people to migrate to Lexington and Cincinnati, by withdrawing health services and public schools from small locations, by emphasizing education and manpower training, and by encouraging capital to migrate into new growth pole cities (Burlage, 1970). Its major component was a new highway system designed to relocate people and jobs spatially, also a big boon to capital accumulation through the traditional method of stimulating the construction sector. This has succeeded in its task of securing capitalist incorporation, though not in eliminating poverty.

Thus the past records shows tremendous regional consequences from federal and state government policies. I have refrained from offering a comprehensive theory of causation or a definitive accounting because I believe that in large part the regional consequences were not the aim of the policy, but incidental to the more pressing needs of U.S. capitalism: State underwriting of accumulation, State discipline of labor, State championing of petty bourgeois structure in agriculture, State defense policy, and State distribution of favors to particular industries. But the belated recognition of these regional consequences and of their persistence is a prime force in the ideology and reality of contemporary U.S. regionalism.

THE NEW REGIONALISM

I have argued above that culture is not an important basis for contemporary U.S. regional identity, that economic differentiation exists but not consistently or nonreversibly across regions, and that the State has been the primary factor determining regional boundaries and an important force in regional differentiation. In this section I argue that the new regionalism is focused on the capitalist State for good material reasons

and that it is used by regional capitalist interests and sectors in government to obscure the basic class and corporate dynamics of the actual economic situation.

What is the new regionalism? It is the emergence in the early 1970s in the media, in the lobbying world, in regional organizations, and in the State itself (especially Congress) of a strong regional identification and assertion of conflicting interests among such loosely construed regions as the frostbelt, the sunbelt, the South, the Southwest, the Northeast, etc. (Markusen and Fastrup, 1978). While the emergence was concurrent with academic "discoveries" of reversals in central city and regional demographic and economic trends (Sternlieb and Hughes, 1977; Weinstein, 1977), and with state and local government fiscal ills associated with disruption in development paths, the actual popular jargon seems to have begun with several press accounts, namely Kirkpatrick Sale's Yankee/Cowboy hypothesis and the original National Journal article that announced "Federal Spending: The North's Loss is the Sunbelt's Gain" (Sale, 1973; Havemann, et. al., 1976).^{*} Subsequent to the press announcement of the "Second War Between the States" (Business Week, 1976), Congressional caucuses on regional lines were formed and two Governor's groups emerged: the Conference of North Eastern Governors (CONEG) and the Western Governor's Energy Policy Office (WGREPO, now WGPO). Numerous groups launched studies of regional shifts in economic activity and population, and attempts were made to document federal favoritism toward one region or another (Rafuse, 1977, 1978).

The rhetoric, of course, obscured the primary culprit of regional hardship: capital mobility. While always a prompter of regional reorganization, capital mobility was particularly fierce and apparent in the early 1970s because of the conjunction of a recession and the energy crisis. The recession closed down the older industrial plant, located primarily in the more easterly regions, and bared the significance of state sector inducements, such as the interstate freeway system and post-World War II military base locations. The energy crisis, the only stimulus to accumulation during the recessionary period, channelled investment into a sector highly dependent on certain resources, mostly located in the South (the Gulf Coast) and the West (interior gas, oil, coal). Furthermore, the high capital intensiveness of energy production (hugh plants, pipelines) required a labor-intensive construction period, so that lots of short-run jobs mushroomed in these areas. During the recession the typical cyclical repression of labor through unemployment

^{*} Not so ironically, given its charge of sunbelt robbery of the northeast, the latter article uses data from, and seems to have been inspired by Dreyfus Fund (New York all the way) study of fiscal flows. Can we conclude that regional capitalists were the inspiration from the beginning? Nice, but not necessary.

and downward pressure on wage rates, and through cutbacks in social services, hit hardest in the Northeastern region and in central cities around the country. In response to high energy costs and labor militance, jobs continued to migrate out.*

From the point of view of capital as a whole, only the recession itself is a problem. The regional impacts, unless so severe that they affect the availability of other factors of production or regional markets—a possibility, are of no consequence. In fact, neoclassical economists would argue that this is simply the evening out of capitalist development, working toward an interregional equilibrium. The right of capital to pursue cheap labor wherever it exists, i.e., the right to mobility, is guaranteed by the State. (Despite the recommendation to Third World countries that they employ controls of all capital flows, the U.S. has never taken its own advice.)

Current U.S. economic structure produces different regional politics than the 19th century Eastern industry/commerce vs. Southern slave cash crop vs. Western agrarian politics. The hegemony of the capitalist mode of production and the mobility of capital have eliminated the 19th century economic cleavages between regions. The predictions by Turner (1932) and Hesseltine (1944) that U.S. sectionalism would persist were based on an assumption of continued divergent economic interests of major proportions, where the dominant classes in each region were based in entirely different and competing economic bases. Capitalist class interests have now become nationalized, even internationalized, so that the leadership of regional coalitions has devolved upon remaining locally tied economic groups such as the financial sector, and their government counterparts. But local financial capitalists, minus their industrial capital counterparts of an earlier era, are less strong as the core of a continued regional politics, so that they have made greater efforts to build cross-class coalitions.

Above, in the section on economic roots, I contended that two sets of economic factors still matter in regional politics. The first set, arising from capitalist "age" and growth experiences, produce a bewildering array of coalitions: rural vs. urban, Northeast/Midwest vs. South and West, which impede the establishment of contemporary "sections." Only the Northeast appears to be at all unified around this set of experiences, and even here several states have refused to join the common front. The second set, the enterprises with regionally fixed assets, are replicated across regions. They engage in competition for resources and privileges from the federal government and their own

^{*} Not all of these jobs went to the South; in fact many went to Taiwan, the Phillipines, and Korea, and to rural areas within the originating region. But people seeing jobs leaving their yard and grow next door are apt to perceive next door as the locus of the problem.

state and local governments. This competition does not rise from regional differences but from substitutability: each set of bankers and rentiers want development to take place within its domain.

Unlike their multi-national employers, workers are apt to perceive that they have a stake in regional development. While many are mobile (especially professionals, certain classes of workers like construction, transportation, and farmworkers, and very poor people), frequently workers *want* to stay in a particular place for reasons of family, friendship, rearing children, home ownership, and what we might call affection for a particular environment. For workers, the costs of migration are much higher than for capital, so that while they may be forced (that is, "choose") to move, given the options, it is not a pleasant prospect. When workers see neighbors and friends get laid off, default on mortgage payments, or drink heavily, they fear the same consequences themselves, become angry and seek for the cause of their situation and a target for changing it. Similarly, workers and residents in boomtown communities fear the consequences of rapid growth—unless they benefit from it financially (see Markusen, 1978).

Regional leadership, which is generally the press, state and local government, and the Chamber of Commerce steps into this situation with the suggestion that the villain is other regions, that the federal government is in cahoots with those regions, and that regional citizens should join together to fight at the federal level for money to "save our jobs" or to mitigate adverse boomtown effects. The same corporations that are constructing new plants in Taiwan must lobby to "save" their plant and real estate investments locally or smooth the way for their intrusion into new areas. Since they cannot direct their demands to capital because they are part of capital and because they are engaging in precisely the same underlying behavior, they direct their demands at the State. Their hope is that State sector subsidies will dam up local deterioration or ameliorate disruptive boomtown growth so that their particular interests will be secured. The inclusion of labor in regional caucuses (but only big labor, not ethnic or community groups) obscures the responsibility of capital mobility, diverts workers' attention from the plight of workers in other regions, and focuses political energy on the federal government, not on capital locating decisions.

That the new regionalism should direct its demands to the State is not surprising, given the suggestion above of the State's past role in regional differentiation. Regional lobbies are the logical outcome of the growth in State expenditure and power, to the point where hardly any sphere of economic activity is free from State influence.

In addition to the sheer size of the federal government, two other features of U.S. political structure are important for explaining the new regionalism. First, regionalism is facilitated by spatial political representation, an ingenious synthetic device of the bourgeois state in the

U.S. democracy. Unlike the first nation-states under capitalism (England, France), where representation was strictly allotted by class (House of Lords, The French Estates), U.S. political representation is distributed by place. (The initial representation system was also classist, since it required property ownership, but the peculiar exigencies of colonial revolt required a geographical representation system that has become a powerful framework for democratic ideology.) People identify with government primarily on the basis of where they vote, e.g., as a Coloradan from the 7th District. On election night, mediated by the press, people watch how their city, county, and state voted rather than how their class of ethnic group voted. The political identification of citizens is individualist; one is a voter, not a Tory or a Socialist or a Communist. Secondarily, one may also be a Democrat or Republican, an identity that for the most part is mediated entirely by the press and the primary election ballot, not any real organization experience. Vaguely, the Democratic party may have some connotation of class, but its non-class character dominates (Bay Area Kapitalistate Collective, 1977).

Second, in the 1960s, demands on the federal state often originated directly from local ethnic or class groups, such as welfare rights, Blacks, poor people and were responded to by programs like Model Cities and OEO. The Nixon regime replaced these programs with a "new federalism" which strengthened local and state government through revenue sharing, and dismantled class and ethnic programs, ostensibly under the rubric of "decentralization." The new federalism makes more explicit the extent of federal government fiscal control over state and local governments (now as high as 40%) and sets up a formal competition among levels of government and regions for a share of the federal pie.

These notes suggest that the new regionalism is not perhaps all that new, but a more intense and more explicit manifestation of a process that has accompanied the growth of the capitalist State since its inception. It leads us to question the vociferousness of the regional charges and the strength of the claims of "newness" as perhaps ideologically inspired more than anything else. Above we noted that the new regionalism obscures capital's role and undermines worker solidarity across regions. It is this latter feature that is perhaps its greatest strength for capitalism as a whole. In an era when large-scale immigration is not a primary source of capitalist expansion of production, and ethnic and gender divisions are increasingly under attack, capitalism may fasten on regionalism as a means of promoting a new division of the working class, "placism" or more conventionally, "regionalism." To do so, given the remarks above about the virtual disappearance of strong ethnic or experiential differences among working populations in various regions, is certainly a credit to the ingenuity of capital. Could it be that capital is superimposing a new regional image and affinity back on regional members, packaged in a

way that it can easily be discarded by leavers or adopted by newcomers (Colorado is full of eastern-born cowboys whose saddle alternates between a truck and a bar stool). What are the prospects for the new regionalism and the contradictions within it?

THE PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW REGIONALISM.

No social phenomenon of major import is without its contradictions. The new regionalism, which I have presented in its least attractive garb, does speak to people's concerns, even while it diverts attention from the fundamental causes. And, even if a reified conception, the region is where many people feel they can organize and affect change. Therefore, progressive impulses and organizations have also evolved on a regional level, sometimes competing for control of the regional political apparatus, sometimes building alliances across regions to destroy the divisive quality of the new regionalism. I would like to introduce them as part of the dialectic, by describing the logic of the scenario implicit in the above described new regionalism vs. the prospects for the future explicit in people's regional movements.

First, the pessimistic possibility. Suppose that the new regionalism encounters no resistance. Then perhaps twenty years from now we will be able to look back on it as a powerful device for bailing out capitalism yet one more time. It has multiple advantages for capitalism. On the one hand, it rationalizes the spatial structure of capital deployment at a time when its movement is becoming problematic. Whether this takes the form of impact aid for capital at both ends of the migration process (aid to distressed cities and aid to boomtowns) or the form of regulation of capital movement through locational incentives, it will smooth out the worst effects of mobile capital through restraint or subsidy. (The choice of a direction—subsidy vs. regulation—will depend on the relative strength of industries and regions in Congress vs. the constraints on spending by the State). The result will be consistent with the needs of capitalist accumulation and mobility, either by partnership of the federal government in stimulating the economy and investment through more infrastructure, or by further tax rebates and forgivenesses that encourage new investment in older areas. Thus a by-product is the use of regional trauma to guarantee a new wave of capitalist accumulation. And as we noted above, such policies will serve *regional* capital by bolstering the profitability of immobile plants.

Meanwhile, the ideology of regionalism will have served well in disuniting the working class across regions, with workers arguing for aid to cities, national development banks, etc., in the declining regions, and workers arguing for impact aid for infrastructure themselves and their children in booming areas. Each will see the demands of the other

group as antagonistic to their ends, since the regional debate will focus on who gets what rather than how big is the pie for all. Each group of workers will feel compelled to participate with regional capital in lobbying the federal government. They may also begrudgingly participate in disciplining their own ranks, since this will be represented as the only way to attract capital and stem further job outmigration. At the state and local level, they will also be compelled to permit public service cutbacks at the same time business tax rebates are extended, and to join in near scandals like the state of Pennsylvania's \$50 million subsidy to Volkswagon to locate an assembly plant in Pennsylvania.

But this scenario is overdrawn. There is no reason to think that working people would in fact put up with such manipulation. Furthermore, already various manifestations of opposition to the new regionalism have developed. I will list several, certain that there are more that I have not yet learned of. First, there is the commitment of some unions, such as the UAW and the textile workers, to organize those areas of the country currently unorganized and to join with local workers to defeat state right-to-work laws. In the West as well, the United Mine Workers have organized the Navajos and are trying to organize strip miners in the more northerly states. This may herald a reversal in decades-long lack of interest by organized labor in organizing the unorganized.

Second, Western coalitions of ranchers, environmentalists, Native Americans and workers have formed to fight unrestricted energy development. The most sophisticated is the Northern Plains Resources Council in Montana, which is fighting to maintain the Montana severance tax, to protect and extend the state's progressive industrial siting authority, to oppose the proposal in Congress to allow the Bonneville Power Administration to preempt local control, to control strip mining and air pollution. They have stopped construction on the two new units of the Colstrip coal-fired electricity plant. The Council has spawned several sister groups, in Wyoming, North Dakota, and Colorado, and is working closely with the Northern Cheyenne Resource Council. It hopes to unite many groups in the Pacific Northwest to stop or control massive incursions of capital associated with energy extraction, production, and the feared consequent industrialization. It has also contacted groups in Appalachia, including the mine workers, about common interests at the national level regarding coal development and strip mining.

Third, environmental groups concerned with ecological damage, community health, and increasingly, worker's jobs and health, are succeeding in slowing down new capital developments, especially in the energy sphere, and propagating their oppositional techniques across many regions. New groups are appearing, such as the Appalachian Alliance, a new community and union-oriented umbrella organization to raise issues of development in Appalachia, and the National Citizen

Labor Energy Coalition, a national group dedicated to forging a strong alliance across those interests. Local and state level groups concerned with economic development have demanded controls on capital mobility and have designed their own alternative institutions. The Ohio Public Interest Campaign, for instance, calls for charging outmigrating capital the costs of its exit and requiring notice of intent to leave, embodied in a proposed law to the Ohio legislature. Environmental impact statements are a form of control over capital mobility, as are western states' siting authorities. Alternative institutions such as coops, publicly-owned and worker-owned businesses, community development corporations, and state banks exist, succeed, and challenge the inevitability of capitalist economic structure. These constituent organizations are supported by funds and analysis from various small foundations, technical assistance groups, academics, and the Conference on Alternative State and Local Public Policies.

If such groups succeed, the following more optimistic prognosis can be sketched. The new regional capital-dominated coalitions will find themselves thwarted by only partial cooperation from labor and other community groups. Such groups will have stronger ties to their kin in other regions and be unwilling to participate in disciplining their own ranks or going along with capital-inspired schemes such as the national development bank. Instead, interregional labor cooperation will succeed in unionizing across regions, preventing wage rate erosion, and standardizing welfare treatment. Interregional environmental and economic development groups will combine arguments about the physical and economic damage of capital mobility and press for severe controls on mobility. Interregional groups will continue to make inroads on the private sector by using public funds and people's labor power to build public and cooperative institutions that form an alternative and a move in the direction of socialism. As private capital becomes less profitable, because it is held responsible for its regional damage, smaller scale, decentralized and locally controlled production will become increasingly possible. Changes in the economic base will be accompanied by changes in the political base that reintroduce real democracy into the political sphere.

Of course the forces of reaction are strong. The most serious threat to this second scenario is imperialism. Thus a progressive interregional strategy is only a part of an international strategy. In addition, the possibility of repressive deployment of the State in the interests of capital in the face of strong interregional coalitions of workers and community interests is also a possibility. At that point, we would be talking revolution or fascism.

Speculation ends here because the future cannot be predicted. I have laid out the elements of the emerging new regionalism in the U.S., specifying its cultural, economic, and political content. Economic

realities will condition the possibilities, but political struggle will determine the outcome.

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Mexican Immigration and U.S. Immigration Reforms in the 1960's


Robert L. Bach

This paper examines the processes of capital accumulation and various manifestations of class struggle which constitute Mexican immigration to the United States. These processes are examined in relation to the political activity involved in changes in U.S. immigration policy. The period of study is formed by the consolidation of U.S. state intervention in the Mexican labor flow during the Depression and by the substantial change in the sectoral destinations of Mexican workers in the U.S. at the end of the 1960's. Two policy reforms are of particular interest during this period: the extension and then abrupt end to the Bracero Program (Public Law 78) and the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965. The analysis tries to identify the contradictory relations which bring about the immigration reforms, but which simultaneously redefine the subordinate positions of Mexican workers in the United States.

Migration and State Intervention

The limits of state action toward immigrant labor are produced by the intersection of two processes. On the one hand, there are the relations of accumulation which exist in a global form and are imposed upon by the political forces contained in nation-state formation. The capitalist state, formed historically in conjunction with the expansion of capital, maintains its power from continued private accumulation and acts to promote this private success through the protection of property and capitalist social relations in general. Accumulation on a global scale means, then, that the state must facilitate the exchange of commodities,

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taneously disappears.

Despite all his flashy erudition Martin Nicolaus does not in the least comprehend what makes the Soviet rulers capitalist. At the present time this opportunist finds it politically convenient to pose as a great enemy of the Soviet imperialists. But since his analysis is founded on nothing solid, like Sweezy it is not at all unlikely that Nicolaus may one day change his tune. He and his OL sponsors could easily decide—if it serves their political fortune hunting—that since there really is a plan in the Soviet Union, and since planning to them means socialism, well then the Soviet Union must be socialist after all.

Moreover, when applied to the U.S. Nicolaus' line also has very dangerous implications. For if the workers were to accept this "planning equals socialism" garbage, then it would be easy for all kinds of phony "socialists" and imitation progressives to pimp off the working class struggle by putting forward some make-believe capitalist "plans" disguised as "steps toward socialism."

This shows that Nicolaus' line on the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union is not simply incorrect. It is a dangerous line which stems from the same roots as the overall reformist and reactionary line of the October League. The working class must see clearly the face of all its enemies. Here and in the Soviet Union the struggle for socialism is a *class* struggle. There is a real *class* enemy—the bourgeoisie. Nicolaus' line tries to blind us to this fact, to turn our eyes away from the enemy, away from the class struggle which must be waged to defeat this enemy.

Some Preliminary Thoughts on Bourgeois Democracy and the U.S. Working Class

J. WERNER

This year's Bicentennial campaign by the bourgeoisie represents the most concerted action by the capitalists in recent years to shore up faith in their political and economic system. Key to this is their efforts to "remind" the masses of people of the message of their high school civic classes and of countless TV programs, movies, etc.—that this country is ruled by the consent of the governed, that it is a *free* country, that despite whatever weaknesses or flaws may exist, ours is still the "greatest democracy on earth." Now with the '76 election campaign the capitalists have preached a similar message: do your part as a citizen, *get out and vote no matter who you choose to vote for*. They might as well add, it's not who wins or loses, but how the game is played.

Of course the results of the working class' counter-offensive around the Bicentennial, culminating in the historic Philadelphia demonstration, along with the general lack of enthusiasm among the masses for the Bicentennial hoopla, is a sharp reflection of the fact that all is not smooth sailing for the capitalists, that their declarations of "freedom and justice" for all has a hollow ring for millions. Similarly this presidential election has stirred little fervor, in spite of a giant promotion effort including televised debates.

But it is possible, and dangerous, to overstate the extent to which the masses of workers see through the charade of the capitalist political system. Millions of workers will turn out on election day, and among a significant section of the working class, the top "labor leaders" have succeeded in stirring up some motion (if not enthusiasm) for Jimmy Carter. And while the cynicism around the Bicentennial and dropoff in voting reflect a certain embryonic understanding (or more accurately put, *feeling*) that the government does not represent the "will of the people," still the political significance of this cynicism and distrust of bourgeois political system must not be exaggerated; only among a very small section of the working class has opposition to the bourgeoisie reached a conscious political level.

The Bicentennial flurry saw the capitalists reaching into the past to serve their present interests. They both reached back into the past history of the country to glorify the political shell (the Constitution, Bill of Rights, etc.) through which they govern society and appealed to the experience of workers after World War 2 that for a while things were getting better.

In 1912 Lenin wrote:

“The state of affairs in the American labor movement shows us, as it does in Britain, the remarkably clear-cut division between purely trade-unionist and socialist strivings, the split between *bourgeois labor policy* and socialist labor policy. For, strange as it may seem, in capitalist society even the working class can carry on a bourgeois policy, if it forgets about its emancipatory aims, puts up with wage slavery and confines itself to seeking alliances now with one bourgeois party, now with another, for the sake of imaginary ‘improvements’ in its indentured condition.” (“In America,” *Collected Works*, Vol. 36)

It must be said that Lenin’s description of the “bourgeois labor policy” accurately portrays the policy actively promoted by the George Meanys and Leonard Woodcocks and a policy which is spontaneously subscribed to by the bulk of workers in this country. At the same time it must be recognized that there is a section of workers who are breaking with this bourgeois labor policy, abandoning the bourgeois parties and are rediscovering the emancipatory aims of the working class. The significance of this contingent of workers lies not in its size (which still is small) but in the fact that the path these workers are now taking is the future road that the great mass of workers in this country must, and will inevitably, follow.

In order to best be able to lead the masses of workers to break, in the course of struggle, with the bourgeois labor policy, it is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of the historical roots and material basis for the bourgeois illusions and prejudices that exist among U.S. workers; to see how the capitalists try to seize upon (and distort) features of the development of U.S. society in order to strengthen these illusions; and most importantly, to grasp how the very conditions that gave rise to these illusions are being undermined, creating the material basis for the Party and the advanced workers generally to lead the masses forward on the road of proletarian revolution.

This article is an attempt to lay out some initial points on this subject and to initiate further study, discussion and struggle so as to deepen the understanding of the Party and others on this crucial question.

In examining the roots and material basis of bourgeois democratic prejudices in this country, and especially to understand the particularities that these take in this country as opposed to other advanced capitalist countries, it is necessary to examine two distinct but related periods in the development of the U.S.: the era of competitive capitalism, “free enterprise;” and the present era of monopoly capitalism, imperialism, the final and highest stage of capitalism.

DEMOCRACY AND EARLY U.S. HISTORY

The early history of the United States is the history of an extremely rapid and wide-scale growth of capitalism. It is a period which left its mark on the modern U.S. and which created the ideological foundation (or as Stalin put it, one of the criteria of a modern nation, “the common psychological makeup”) upon which the rulers of today try to build.

Some of the most important features of early (pre-monopoly) U.S. society that must be considered are the following: the relative lack (compared to Europe) of remnants of feudalism (either economically or politically); widespread political liberty (free speech, free press, widespread suffrage, etc.); a constantly expanding frontier; a relative shortage of labor and widespread immigration, resulting in a very heterogeneous and fluid working class in this country.

The basic political institutions in this country, the Constitution, Bill of Rights, etc., and the basic political trappings that accompanied them, “freedom and democracy for all,” the “rule of the people” etc., developed because they were the best possible political shell for the development of capitalism; not surprisingly, they took shape particularly in the American Revolution of 1776 and the Civil War which together comprised the *bourgeois democratic revolution* in this country, the political revolution in which the capitalist class established its rule over society.

Both the 1776 Revolution and the Civil War were fought under the name of freedom and democracy, of opposition to injustice and tyranny and of equality under the law. The need of the bourgeoisie to mobilize the masses of farmers and workers to fight first the war with Britain and later—together with freed slaves—to undertake the assault on the slavocracy of the South, required them to grant fairly widespread political rights to the masses—for Black people, of course, they were greatly limited, even after slavery was legally ended.

This did not happen automatically or without struggle. For example, during the 1776 Revolution many democratic rights had to be fought for in the face of vigorous opposition of the

most powerful section of the bourgeoisie at that time, the merchants. But the fact that the nature of the bourgeoisie, as an exploiting class, even in its infancy, kept many of its representatives from perceiving its interests in any but the most narrow and immediate sense, in no way changes the fact that the democratic rights achieved in the Revolution, in fact, were favorable to the development of capitalism—at least insofar as they allowed for the development of a mobile working class, with a certain level of education, etc.

This can also be seen in the fact that the leaders of the masses in fighting for democratic liberties were the farsighted political representatives of the bourgeoisie, like Samuel Adams and Tom Paine. The bourgeoisie always appeals to the masses not openly in its own class interest but as representatives of the nation as a whole; when as a rising and revolutionary class the bourgeoisie is leading battles which are objectively in the interest of the whole society, their political program and ideology will naturally have a broad and deep influence on the masses of people.

In the U.S. the illusion of democracy and the *state* standing above class conflict and representing society as a whole was spelled out very succinctly in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, *deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.*" (emphasis added)

It is no wonder that, to this very day, the Declaration of Independence is required study in the schools, or that the date and place of its signing (July 4, Philadelphia) was the centerpiece of the Bicentennial extravaganza, for in it is contained the basic *deception* of bourgeois democracy—that the capitalist government derives its authority from the consent of the governed and that it is based upon the equality of man.

In commenting on the philosophy of bourgeois revolutionaries in France whose words were strikingly similar to the Declaration of Independence (in fact, men who greatly influenced the thinking of the revolutionary bourgeoisie in America and were in turn influenced by the 1776 Revolution) Engels wrote the following passage:

"...henceforth superstition, injustice, privilege, oppression, were to be superseded by eternal truth, eternal justice, equality grounded in Nature and the inalienable rights of man.

"We know today that this kingdom of reason was nothing

eternal justice found its realization in bourgeois justice; that equality reduced itself to bourgeois equality before the law; that bourgeois property was proclaimed as one of the essential rights of man; and that the government of reason, the Contract Social of Rousseau, came into existence, and could only come into existence, as a bourgeois democratic republic." (*Anti-Duhring*)

The completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the U.S. with Lee's surrender at Appomattox, saw the U.S. emerge as one of the most thoroughly democratic states in the world at that time. The right to vote was guaranteed to every man, hereditary titles were unheard of, and the masses were insured the basic democratic rights of free speech, the press, religion, movement, etc.*

But the presence of widespread democracy in no way prevented the bourgeoisie from increasing its exploitation of the working class tenfold in the period after the Civil War. On the contrary, this period is vivid proof that bourgeois democracy is the *preferred form of rule* of the capitalist class and the best possible political system for the rapid development of capitalism.

This is true for several reasons. By granting personal freedom to the masses, bourgeois democracy hastens the development of a "free proletariat" with no other means to live than to sell its labor to the capitalists and gives each capitalist an "equal opportunity" to employ, and exploit, workers. As Marx and Engels put it in the *Communist Manifesto*:

"The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors,' and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment.' "

By the same token, the bourgeois democratic political system provides the framework for the capitalists to best resolve their conflicting interests. As the *Manifesto* puts it, "The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." Bourgeois democracy enables the capitalists to influence the state more or less proportionally to the amount of capital they control, through the direct bribery

*Approximately 10 years after the Civil War the bourgeoisie found it most profitable to reverse the gains of the bourgeois democratic revolution in the South. Blacks were stripped of all rights and bound, along with a good number of whites, to the semi-

of public officials, through the interlocking of the government bureaucracy with business, and through enabling the capitalists to use their wealth to monopolize the printing presses and news media.

Most importantly, bourgeois democracy is the preferred form of capitalist rule because it allows the capitalists to hide their rule behind the mask of the "will of the people," covering up rather than exposing their dictatorship over the masses and promoting illusions of "harmony" between the oppressors and oppressed.

THE EXPANDING FRONTIER

An important feature of U.S. society in its pre-monopoly stage was the expanding frontier. The original inhabitants, the Indians or Native Americans, were driven further and further back by a brutal policy of robbery and extermination by the relentless expansion of the capitalist system and the slave system.

For many generations new land was available for settling for little or no cost, and millions headed West. This had many profound effects: it created very favorable conditions for a rapid growth of capitalism by providing a vast market for industrial goods and, especially in the decades after the Civil War, gave great impetus to the development of the railways, an important prerequisite to building a modern capitalist nation; it created a vast petty bourgeoisie, unfettered by relics of feudal ownership of land, and it resulted in a significant slowing down of the development of class consciousness in the U.S. by offering some workers the chance to escape wage-slavery and become small farmers and holding out the *illusion* of escape to the workers in their millions.

Engels wrote of the importance of the land question in America:

"Land is the basis of speculation, and the American speculative mania and speculative opportunity are the chief levers that hold the native born worker in bondage to the bourgeoisie. Only when there is a generation of native-born workers that cannot expect *anything* from speculation *any more*, will we have a solid foothold in America." (*Letters to Americans*)

Engels is stressing the point that as long as the opportunity (and the illusion of the opportunity) for large numbers of workers to go into business for themselves, become individual owners (and like all small owners, dream of becoming big ones) the workers could not, in their masses, come to see themselves as a class in *opposition* to the bourgeoisie; for the desire to *speculate*

is itself a capitalist striving.

The particular characteristics of capitalist development in the U.S., especially the rapid settling of an immense expanse of territory, also resulted in a relatively favorable position for the workers to conduct their economic struggle against capital compared to the conditions in Europe.

Unlike the situation in Europe where capitalism created a surplus population by the ruining of the peasantry and the constant displacement of workers by machinery, in the U.S., though machines did continue to displace workers, there was an actual labor shortage for several decades. This left the workers in a better position to wage strike struggles and win concessions from the capitalists. To fill this shortage, and even to have available a surplus of workers, the capitalists enticed millions of immigrants to come to the U.S. from Europe, promising a land of opportunity and political liberty. Even today the ruling class seizes on the great hope for a better life held out to the toiling masses of Europe and many a patriotic movie includes the famous words "Give us your tired and hungry masses yearning to be free" accompanied by sentimental music and stirring pictures of the Statue of Liberty.

But of course the ruling class did not encourage immigration to "free" anybody. Instead they took advantage of successive waves of immigrants, handicapped by speaking a foreign language and for the most part in no position to head off to the frontier, to man the factories and mills in the rapidly growing industrial centers of the East Coast and Midwest. It was among these immigrant workers that revolutionary class consciousness first began to develop, by virtue of their worse economic situation and the fact that many came from countries where the working class movement was far more developed.

Still, horrible as conditions were for the immigrant, they were generally better than conditions that they were fleeing in Europe and, for the most part, the rapid growth of capitalism led to a fairly rapid assimilation into overall American society—though it did not end all discrimination against immigrants, degradation of their cultures, etc. Thus, even among the most downtrodden section of the U.S. working class at that time, the immigrants, there was still some material basis for capitalists to get over with their claim that through hard work and sacrifice their children, at least, might escape the misery of the capitalist profit mills.

The division in the working class between the native-born workers and the immigrant workers was for many years the most significant division within the U.S. working class. Engels wrote in 1892:

"Your great obstacle in America, it seems to me, lies in the exceptional position of the native-born workers. Up to 1848 one could speak of a permanent native-born working class only as an exception. The small beginnings of one in the cities in the East still could always hope to become farmers or bourgeois. Now such a class has developed and has also organized itself on trade-union lines to a great extent. But it still occupies an aristocratic position and wherever possible leaves the ordinary badly paid occupations to the immigrants, only a small portion of whom enter the aristocratic trade unions. But these immigrants are divided into different nationalities, which understand neither one another nor, for the most part, the language of the country. And your bourgeoisie knows much better even than the Austrian government how to play off one nationality against the other: Jews, Italians, Bohemians, etc., against Germans and Irish, and each one against the other, so that differences in workers' standards of living exist, I believe, in New York to an extent unheard of elsewhere." (*Letters to Americans*)

All of these conditions (widespread bourgeois democratic rights, an expanding frontier, relatively high wages and a very heterogeneous working class) combined to hold down the political consciousness of the U.S. working class. At this time workers in the U.S. were beginning to wage some extremely fierce and heroic battles—including the nationwide fight for the eight hour day in 1886. And in fact the U.S. had already entered the race for leading industrial power in the world. Nevertheless, all the conditions discussed above retarded the development of class conscious and independent political action by the U.S. working class, which lagged far behind the workers in Europe in developing political organization and class consciousness.

Even during this early period of the U.S. working class there were workers who were striving for revolution. As early as the Civil War there were some Marxists active in the struggles of U.S. workers, including the fight against slavery, guided by the careful attention paid by Marx and Engels to the development of the struggle in this country. In addition to Marxists, there were other non-scientific revolutionary trends in the U.S., most notably anarcho-syndicalism (the political philosophy of the Haymarket martyrs in the eight hour day struggle among others).*

*Anarcho-syndicalism is a political trend which belittles the importance of the political organization and political struggle of the working class. It holds that the dictatorship of the proletariat is unnecessary and that the working class can somehow abolish capitalism without holding state power. Marx and Engels led a consistent struggle

Nevertheless the ranks of the advanced workers remained small and the conditions for the masses of workers to follow the advanced section of the class were not yet ripe. In the pre-monopoly period revolutionary organizations among the workers, the most significant of which was the anarcho-syndicalist Socialist Labor Party (which quickly degenerated into a sect), were based almost exclusively on newly arrived immigrant workers and remained small in numbers limiting their work mainly to propaganda activities. This is especially significant in light of the fact that at this time Marxism was rapidly gaining ground in Europe, where the parties of the Second International were growing at a fast rate and leading the struggle of literally millions of workers. In fact, even attempts to form a labor party in the U.S. along the lines of the British party (that is without a revolutionary program) did not succeed during this period.

As pointed out earlier, this period of time of the rapid growth of capitalism into its monopoly stage was marked by fierce struggle. The working class was brutally exploited and fought back and was growing rapidly in size. Increasingly the workers saw the power of the government being used to break strikes and in other ways suppress the growing struggle of the workers. "Free enterprise" was rapidly giving birth to monopoly. The whole society was being more and more dominated by smaller and smaller numbers of capitalist robbers. To a growing degree the masses were beginning to see through the hypocrisy of the claims of "equality" and "freedom" as a handful of incredibly wealthy capitalists completely dominated the government from top to bottom.

The growth of monopoly was met with resistance, not only from the workers who were forced to struggle to keep from being driven into the ground as the strength of capital swelled, but from broad sections of the masses—especially from the farmers and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, a great many of whom were being crushed.

A great movement developed among the farmers and which also attracted support from many workers—the Populist movement. The Populist movement, crystallized into the People's Party in 1892, represented an attempt to resist the growth of monopoly—fundamentally it was the strivings of the petty bourgeoisie to hang on to the period of "free enterprise." Its political program was based on opposition to the trusts and a call for going on the silver standard, which was the latest of a series of

against this trend during their lifetimes. Since then, it has developed into an anti-working class, counter-revolutionary tendency. But in the U.S. during the 19th century large numbers of revolutionary workers held anarcho-syndicalist beliefs, not out of opposition to Marxism, but in ignorance of it.

financial panaceas that had been suggested over several decades for curing the plight of the small producer under capitalism.

The populist movement was typical of the petty bourgeoisie, recognizing the domination of society by the bourgeoisie yet trying to eliminate that domination within the framework of the bourgeois system. In fact, William Jennings Bryan, the leader of the People's Party, was to lead that party directly back into the arms of the bourgeoisie when he accepted the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party in 1896.

Bryan, who the bourgeoisie still today casts as the heroic fighter for the "little man," is typical of the demagogues (like George Wallace) the bourgeoisie has made use of in steering the discontent of the petty bourgeoisie into dead-end roads and trying to tie sections of the working class onto the tail of the petty bourgeois movement. Bryan combined his political sophistry (he is known for his "golden tongue") with religious fanaticism. His last public act was prosecuting and whipping up public hysteria against John Scopes for teaching the scientific theory of evolution in Tennessee public schools.

The reactionary role of people like Bryan and the ultimate collapse of the Populist movement reflect the fact that the petty producers are historically a dying strata. Left to themselves their fight is, as noted in the *Communist Manifesto* one "to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class," and is "therefore not revolutionary but conservative," even "reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history." Freeing the working class from the influence of these petty bourgeois strata, and enabling it to fight for its own revolutionary interests has been and remains a crucial question—and, as a matter of fact, is the only way these strata can be mobilized as allies of the proletariat in its struggle against the bourgeoisie.

While the petty bourgeois outlook reflected in the Populist movement is the classic view of the ruined small producer, it did, and continues today, to exert influence within the working class itself. Jimmy Carter has declared himself a "Populist" (and given it as an excuse for his hodge-podge of "liberalism" and "conservatism") and the capitalists themselves, when forced to comment on the divisions in society, try to obscure the class content of those divisions and paint things as simply the "little man" against the powerful and wealthy. Engels addressed the influence of the petty bourgeoisie on American politics when he wrote, "Hence the ups and downs of the movement, depending on whether the mind of the industrial worker or that of the pioneering farmer gains predominance in the average man's head." (*Letters to Americans*)

Such were the main features of the class struggle in the U.S. as the era of "free enterprise" was drawing to a close in an orgy

of capitalist exploitation of millions of workers and the ruining of countless small producers. The proletariat was waging sharp economic struggles and forming its trade unions and a small section of workers were striving for the abolition of the system of wage slavery. The whole country was rebelling against the domination of monopoly. But while these rebellions were powerful and sometimes took a class-conscious form, the working class had not, in its great majority, come to see itself "as a class for itself," was yet to make a radical rupture with the bourgeois political system and begin to wage its political struggle under its own banner, and was yet to build a political party which would be capable of leading the class toward revolution, socialism and communism.

IMPERIALISM

The particularities of the development of capitalism in the U.S. during the "free enterprise" period left its mark on U.S. society, particularly the fact of the low level of political consciousness and political organization of the U.S. working class. Nevertheless, the characteristics of modern U.S. society in general and of the bourgeois democratic prejudices among the workers is not mainly shaped by past history—though this does play a significant role—but by the features and laws of the present era, imperialism, and even more specifically the situation of the U.S. in the world since WW2.

Of course, there is no Great Wall separating pre-monopoly capitalism and imperialism. As was pointed out in this article, many of the particular deceptions of the bourgeoisie that developed out of the conditions of the 19th century have significant influence today among the masses of people. But were it not for the fact that capitalism in its imperialist stage creates new material conditions which establish a new basis for bourgeois prejudices to develop among a section of the workers and for the bourgeoisie to reinforce and build upon the illusions of a previous era, then the "you can make it if you try" mentality of the frontier (for example) would have long disappeared with the frontier itself.

In his analysis of the monopoly stage of capitalism, Lenin analyzed the political effects of imperialism on the working class movement. He described how the bourgeoisie is able to use the superprofits secured from extending the domain of its capitalist robbery to other countries and from its monopoly position to bribe a small handful of leaders from among the proletariat, turning them into "labor lieutenants of capital." Lenin wrote:

"Lucrative and soft jobs in the government or on the war industries committees, in parliament and on diverse commit-

tees, on the editorial staffs of 'respectable,' legally published newspapers or on the management councils of no less respectable and 'bourgeois law abiding' trade unions—this is the bait by which the imperialist bourgeoisie attracts and rewards the representatives and supporters of the 'bourgeois labor parties.'" ("Imperialism and the Split in Socialism," *Collected Works*, Vol. 23)

Lenin also described how imperialism, especially in the "Great Powers," creates a privileged stratum among the workers themselves, sometimes referred to as the "labor aristocracy." In particular this refers to some mental workers and certain sections of skilled workers who through their organization into craft unions are able to maintain a monopoly on their skill and thus extract greater concessions from the capitalists than the mass of unskilled and semi-skilled production workers. The bourgeoisie and its "labor lieutenants" try especially to use these workers as a base for their bourgeois policies of class collaboration.

At the same time he was pointing this out, Lenin stressed, "For the trusts, the financial oligarchy, high prices, etc., while enabling the bribery of a handful in the top layers, are increasingly oppressing, crushing, ruining and torturing the mass of the proletariat and the semi-proletariat." (Ibid.)

This split between the great majority of the working class, for whom the advent of the imperialist era meant greater misery and exploitation, and the handful of traitors who saw their opportunity to sell themselves to the bourgeoisie was common to all of the imperialist countries, only the form varying as this bourgeois trend adopted itself to the political climate in each individual imperialist country.

In the United States the growth of capitalism into imperialism produced a strata of traitors as despicable as any in the world. Their chief representative was Samuel Gompers, head of the AFL and former "socialist."

Gompers and the AFL preached the "neutrality" of the trade unions from politics, but in fact he was a vigorous supporter of the bourgeois political system and constantly fought against working class politics. In fact, in 1912 Gompers published the programs of all three bourgeois parties in the U.S. at that time (Democratic, Republican and the notorious imperialist Theodore Roosevelt's "Progressive" Party) without mentioning the program of the Socialist Party, which by 1912 had become very influential within the working class, gaining, for example, one million votes in 1920 for its Presidential candidate, Eugene Debs, who was in jail for opposing World War 1 as a war between imperialist bandits, including the U.S. ruling class.

The policy of "neutrality" was the political program of the

principal "labor lieutenants of capital" right up until the election of Franklin Roosevelt. Lenin described the "non-party principle" this way:

"Hence, in practice, indifference to the [political] struggle does not at all mean standing aloof from the struggle, abstaining from it, being neutral. Indifference is tacit support of the strong, of those who rule....The non-party principle in bourgeois society is merely a hypocritical, disguised, passive expression of adherence to the party of the well-fed, of the rulers, of the exploiters." ("The Socialist Party and Non-Party Revolutionism," *Collected Works*, Vol. 10)

Despite the treachery of Gompers and his ilk, the advent of imperialism in the U.S. saw the real beginnings, on a mass scale, of the working class breaking loose of the stranglehold of the bourgeois parties and taking a revolutionary political stand. Imperialism greatly intensified the misery of the masses of workers, and the advent of monopoly and the closing of the frontier struck deep at the illusory promise held before the workers, that they would be able to make it out of the working class. The Socialist Party was formed and its left wing and other revolutionary working class organizations like the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) fought for the establishment of socialism (though these forces often lacked a thoroughly scientific understanding of this) and exposed the hypocrisy of the bourgeois political system. When the imperialist system plunged the world into the first world war, and the Russian working class made its successful revolution, the working class in the U.S. made a tremendous historical advance in the forming of its Communist Party which declared war on the capitalist system and led the working class in mass struggle against the ruling class for several decades.

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT

In 1929, after a brief period of stabilization and an orgy of "rationalization" following World War 1, the world capitalist system plunged into its greatest economic crisis to date—the Great Depression. The Depression led to incredible hardship and misery for the masses in the U.S. and led to a tremendous upswing in the struggle of the working class.

Faced with this, the capitalists and their labor lieutenants were forced to give concessions in the face of protracted and heroic struggle. Franklin Roosevelt, who presided over the bourgeois state for most of the Depression, played a skillful demagogic role of trying to make it appear that the fruits of the workers' struggle were the results of the benevolence of

the bourgeois state. He vowed he would "throw the money changers out of the temple" and claimed he would protect the interests of the "little man" against "big business." During the Roosevelt years, the labor lieutenants of capital abandoned their previous policy of "neutrality" and overwhelmingly swore allegiance to the Democratic Party and the "Roosevelt coalition," where they remain today.

Roosevelt's role in many ways was similar to the Social Democratic parties of Europe who had abandoned the revolutionary struggle and become "bourgeois labor parties" and in several countries were in power during the Depression years. But there were significant differences, the principal one being that because of the low level of class consciousness in the U.S. the bourgeoisie did not find it necessary to resort to coloring its bourgeois democracy with a socialist tinge, finding it possible to appeal to the workers as part of the mass of "common people" without making a specific appeal to them as a *class*.

The bourgeoisie's political goal during the Depression years, of preventing the workers from advancing their fierce economic struggle into an overall political struggle aimed at bourgeois rule, was greatly aided by opportunism which emerged within the ranks of the workers' own party, the Communist Party, USA, (CP) even as the Party continued to lead the class forward. Under the influence of the opportunism of Earl Browder, the CP began to preach that "communism is 20th century Americanism," and that socialism was simply the logical extension of "democracy" (meaning bourgeois democracy)!

WORLD WAR 2

The bourgeois democratic prejudices of the Roosevelt era fully flowered during the second World War. That war pitted the U.S. ruling class on the same side as the then-socialist USSR and revolutionary people worldwide (after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany). The *form* that the conflict amongst the imperialist powers took was the bourgeois democratic states on the one side and the fascist powers on the other.

Even after entering into alliance with the Soviet Union and revolutionary movements in a number of countries during the war, the U.S. ruling class of course tried to turn the fight against the fascist Axis to its own imperialist advantage, but it was forced to modify this because of the actual balance of forces in the war. Faced with this necessity the U.S. imperialists tried to turn it to their advantage, posing as champions of those oppressed by the fascist Axis and guardians of "democracy." Their aim in this was to prepare to grab up and plunder shortly what they could not seize and rob right then.

Anytime the bourgeoisie is forced to go to war they must attempt to win the proletariat to its standard. This is especially true in world war which requires the complete mobilization of the resources of the country. And in WW2, after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, despite the fact that the U.S. ruling class had to tone down considerably its anti-communism and allow some of the truth about the advances of the working class in building socialism in the USSR to come through, it was also aided in pushing the notion of collaboration between workers and capitalists by the very alignment of forces in the war—the fact that the Soviet Union was allied with one bloc of imperialist powers and that the working class shared an *objective interest* with these imperialists in defeating the fascist powers which were threatening to wipe out what was then the world's only socialist state.

Millions of American workers fought heroically against the fascist powers and in doing so made a great contribution to the cause of the international working class. But they fought under the banner of "democracy," and "freedom vs. slavery," cast in bourgeois terms—fascism vs. bourgeois democracy. This strengthened the hand of the U.S. imperialists and their agents in furthering bourgeois democratic prejudices in the minds of the working class.

This was even more the case because of the emergence of full-scale revisionism within the CPUSA during the war when its head, Earl Browder, completely submerged the interests of the working class to that of the U.S. imperialists and parroted the very bourgeois-democratic deceptions coming from the bourgeoisie itself. But these deceptions would not have struck as deep roots as they did if the victory of the U.S. in WW2 had not temporarily strengthened the position of the ruling class and enabled it to make certain concessions to the workers' demands for a better life in the years following WW2. (For more on WW2 itself see article, p. 76.)

U.S. IMPERIALISM'S MONOPOLY POSITION AFTER THE WAR

The U.S. imperialists emerged from the Second World War in a stronger position than ever: war production had been a tremendous boost to production; industry was booming full speed and profits were at record highs. The fascist powers were completely defeated and militarily occupied, and the "democratic" imperialists of Europe (Britain, France, etc.) emerged war-torn and greatly in debt to Wall Street.

Very quickly the U.S. established its clear domination of the entire capitalist world. The Marshall Plan was used to bring the countries of Western Europe under U.S. domination, as well as

to head off socialist revolutions in key European countries. The old colonial powers, Britain, France, the Netherlands, emerged from the war unable to hang onto their far-flung empires, and the U.S. was quick to replace them as the leading exploiter of the peoples of Asia and Africa, turning vast areas of those continents into neo-colonies similar to those in Latin America that the U.S. bourgeoisie had long dominated. The capitalists howled that the "20th Century is the American Century."

The monopoly position of U.S. imperialism within the capitalist world for two decades is the material basis and the most important single factor for the relatively low level of class consciousness among workers in this country today.

To understand this point it is helpful to review some of the writings of Engels and Lenin on Britain's period of commercial and industrial monopoly between 1848 and 1868 (which continued, to a certain extent, for some years longer). Engels wrote:

"The truth is this: during the period of England's industrial monopoly the English working class have to a certain extent shared in the benefits of the monopoly. These benefits were very unequally parcelled out amongst them; the privileged minority pocketed most, but even the great mass had at least a temporary share now and then. And that is the reason why since the dying out of Owenism there has been no Socialism in England. With the breakdown of that monopoly the English working class will lose that privileged position; it will find itself generally—the privileged and leading minority not excepted—on a level with its fellow-workers abroad. And that is the reason why there will be socialism again in England." ("England in 1848 and in 1885," from *Articles on Britain*)

In the more than three decades between 1858 and 1892 Marx and especially Engels traced the development of opportunism in Britain showing how it was an outgrowth of England's monopoly position. They pointed to the corruption of leaders of the British labor movement ("it is a pity that the whole pack of leaders did not get into Parliament. This would be the surest way of getting rid of the whole lot," Engels' "Letter to Sorge," 1894); the growth of an "aristocracy among the working class" and of a "privileged minority of workers" (preface to the second edition of *The Condition of the Working Class in England*). At the same time they pointed out that among the masses of workers "the great bulk of them experienced at best but a temporary improvement." (Ibid.)

The point of Marx and Engels' analysis of the partial *bourgeoisification* of the British proletariat was not, as has been the case with certain dogmatists and outright revisionists in this country,

to deny the revolutionary potential of the working class or cast the bulk of the industrial proletariat into the camp of the enemy. On the contrary, Marx and Engels spent many long years in exile in England and devoted much of their time to giving guidance to revolutionary workers in that country, never losing heart when the struggle faced difficulties. Indeed, Engels' joy is unmistakable when he was able to report, "I hold it to be the most important and magnificent in the entire May Day celebration [in Europe and America] that on May 4, 1890, the *English proletariat*, rousing itself from forty years of slumber, *rejoined the movement of its class.*" ("May 4th in London," *Articles on Britain*)

Engels and Marx's analysis of Britain provided much of the basis for Lenin's thesis on the political effects of imperialism on the working class movement in the "Great Powers."

Here are some of Lenin's remarks at some length:

"Between 1848 and 1868, and to a certain extent even later, only England enjoyed a monopoly: *that is why* opportunism could prevail there for decades. *No other countries possessed either very rich colonies or an industrial monopoly.*

"The last third of the nineteenth century saw the transition to the new, imperialist era. Finance capital *not* of one, but of several, though very few, Great Powers enjoys a monopoly...This difference explains why England's monopoly position *could remain unchallenged* for decades. The monopoly of modern finance capital is being frantically challenged; the era of imperialist wars has begun. It was possible in those days to bribe and corrupt the working class of *one* country for decades. This is now improbable, if not impossible. But on the other hand, *every* imperialist 'Great' power can and does bribe *smaller* strata (than in England in 1848-68) of the 'labor aristocracy.' Formerly a '*bourgeois labor party*,' to use Engels' remarkably profound expression, could arise only in one country, because it alone enjoyed a monopoly, but, on the other hand, it could exist for a long time. Now a '*bourgeois labor party*' is *inevitable* and typical in *all* imperialist countries; but in view of the desperate struggle they are waging for the division of spoils, it is improbable that such a party can prevail for long in a number of countries." ("Imperialism and the Split in Socialism," *Collected Works*, Vol. 23)

What Lenin terms "improbable" in the article above—especially the bourgeoisification of a large section of the working class in one country—has, in fact, come about. The U.S., particularly in the years 1948-65, enjoyed a *colonial* monopoly at least equal to Britain's in the period described (mainly in the neo-colonial form) and, if not an industrial monopoly equal to

Britain in 1848-68, certainly industrial strength far outstripping its nearest competitors. To this must be added U.S. imperialism's *financial* monopoly (using this to mean its great investments of finance capital in the other Western-bloc imperialist countries and its domination, during that period, of the world "money market" through the Bretton Woods agreement by which the dollar replaced gold as the international standard).

What were the effects of monopoly position of the U.S. imperialists in the post-war period on the class struggle in this country? To answer this question we must look at: the expansion of the outright bribery and corruption of "leaders" of the working class; the growth in the size and political influence of the labor aristocracy; and the effects on the *masses* of the proletariat.

Prior to the Second World War, the bourgeoisie had concentrated on purchasing the top leadership of the AFL, which was composed mostly of craft unions. With their bankrolls swelled following the war, the imperialists were able to extend this policy greatly. One after another, the industrial unions of the CIO, which were built through great sacrifice and struggle by the masses of production workers in basic industry, were captured from within by a whole new battalion of "labor lieutenants of capital." The bribery and corruption of the trade union officials was extended beyond the top strata (many of whom became actual capitalists controlling and investing vast union funds) down to the majority of full-time union officials, including most business agents, for example. This was accompanied by an all out assault on communists and other revolutionary workers who were hounded by the reactionaries and forbidden by law from holding union office. As noted earlier, the line of the CP during WW2, and to a significant degree after it, of tailing after bourgeois democratic prejudices, left the working class less conscious and more vulnerable to these attacks. It also made it easier for the bourgeoisie to isolate and attack the CP and class conscious workers generally.

The monopoly position of the U.S. did not and could not eliminate the basic contradiction of capitalism or the crises that inevitably result from it. In fact, in the period after WW2, even during the heyday of U.S. imperialism there were a number of economic "recessions." But for many years the U.S. imperialists were able to stave off a deep and prolonged crisis through their monopoly position in the world, forcing lesser imperialist powers and developing countries to bear much of the burden of the U.S. economic "recessions."

All this enabled the U.S. capitalists to broaden the ranks of the "privileged minority of workers" or labor aristocracy. In the construction industry for example, the majority of skilled workers enjoyed a relatively comfortable position during this period. This

was only partly due to the monopoly of skilled workmen by the building trades unions for while, to this day, these unions continue to try to restrict membership through lengthy apprenticeship programs and other means, the introduction of new machinery has rapidly reduced the level of skill required. More to the point was the massive growth of the construction industry due in large part to the tremendous underwriting of that industry through the GI Bill, guaranteeing savings and loan corporations, and other forms of government spending which represented a subsidy by the capitalist class as a whole.

The policy of subsidizing the construction industry not only enabled construction workers to maintain a relatively favorable position for a time, it also enabled a large section of workers to own, or look forward to owning, their own home for the first time in U.S. history.

Similarly, the trucking industry in another example of where the capitalist class as a whole was in a position to subsidize an entire industry and to make possible increases in the standard of living of the workers. By building the massive highway system at public expense, the capitalist class as a whole, while pursuing its general interests, was also basically providing the main capital expenditure for the trucking companies, meaning the companies were forced to invest little more than the cost of trucks and the wages of the workers. In the long haul trucking industry also, workers were able to win through struggle a considerably higher standard of living than the majority of the proletariat.

In both the trucking industry and construction the position of U.S. imperialism not only allowed a section of the workers a higher standard of living, it also allowed significant numbers of workers to become small owners, to become independent truck drivers or open a small construction outfit. Such phenomena, which of course were not restricted to these two industries, helped to resurrect the hope of escaping the working class far beyond the real possibility.

In addition, the growth of certain new branches of industry brought into being new sections of "better off" workers and new sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The needs of the aerospace industry, to take one example, required a large number of highly trained technical personnel. The needs of administering a government bureaucracy growing by leaps and bounds gave rise to other new sections of the petty bourgeoisie, for example, social workers whose ranks now number in the hundreds of thousands.

During this period there was a massive upswing in higher education, spurred on by new needs of production and financed through U.S. imperialism's global empire. This fact also led to increased hopes on the part of the masses of workers that at least it might be possible for their children to escape the factory.

For the masses of production workers in basic industry (auto, steel, rubber, etc.) the "benefits" of U.S. imperialism's monopoly were (to quote Engels' words on the mass of British proletarians during that country's period of monopoly) "a temporary share now and then." True, living standards rose somewhat, especially compared with the Depression years, but for the great majority it was still a matter of getting by from one paycheck to the next and for most becoming entangled in a net of consumer debt (another mechanism used by the imperialists to temporarily expand their market). For the masses of workers the rate of exploitation increased during this time, that is the percentage of the value of their labor going to the capitalists grew greater.

Any advances that were made in the standard of living came only as a result of sharp struggle and during this whole period of time workers continued to battle the capitalists over the terms of sale of their labor power. This is shown very dramatically in the cases where workers were in a weak position to wage the economic battle. In the electrical industry, for example, where the capitalists succeeded in crushing the industrial union and dividing the workers up into many different organizations, wages fell way behind those of workers in other basic industries.

Hand-in-hand with the ruling class' efforts to establish an "American Century" came an all-out political offensive within this country, especially in the form of a protracted anti-communist crusade. Their goals were several fold: to rob the working class of its vanguard, its communist party; to prepare public opinion for its interference in other countries and wars of aggression aimed at maintaining its global dominance and turning back the tide of revolution sweeping the world; and generally to mobilize the masses of people around its political "pole."

In the course of this holy war on communism the capitalists reached deep into their political arsenal of myth and deception for weapons, old and new, with which to attack the working class. The bourgeoisie tried to twist and pervert the experience of the Second World War, picturing it as a battle of democracy vs. dictatorship, and portraying communists as the equivalent of fascists. Especially in opposition to socialism and working class rule, the bourgeois electoral system was held up as if it was the highest achievement of man. All of these arguments of the bourgeoisie about the superiority of its political system were very much tied in with a barrage of propaganda about the superiority of its economic system—that "free enterprise" really "delivered the goods"—the implied threat being that the worker had to choose between putting up with capitalist exploitation or giving up his few personal possessions.

Naturally the tendency toward the bourgeoisification of the U.S. working class during this period created a strong basis for

the capitalists to make some headway with their political attack. Nevertheless the extent to which they succeeded was by no means inevitable and there was political resistance from communists and advanced workers, even at the height of the anti-communist frenzy during the Korean War.

A successful political counter-offensive which could have minimized losses would have required correct leadership from the workers' own political party. Yet the Communist Party, itself under sharp attack and many of its leaders jailed or driven underground, had never thoroughly eradicated the revisionist line, even though Browder and some of his more hideous revisionist theses were driven from the Party. During the period in which it was under attack the CP more and more fell into apologizing for its revolutionary aims and trying to hide behind, and appeal to, the "democracy" of the American political system.

Under such circumstances it was necessary to expose the contradiction between the self-proclaimed democracy of the bourgeoisie and its denial of political rights to the political representatives of the working class and also necessary to fight to hang on to democratic rights which could be used by the masses as weapons in the struggle against the capitalists. Lenin wrote:

"Even in the most democratic bourgeois state the oppressed people at every step encounter the crying contradiction between the *formal* equality proclaimed by the 'democracy' of the capitalists and the thousands of *real* limitations and subterfuges which turn the proletarians into *wage-slaves*. It is precisely this contradiction that is opening the eyes of the people to the rottenness, mendacity and hypocrisy of capitalism. It is this contradiction that the agitators and propagandists of Socialism are constantly exposing to the people, *in order to prepare them for revolution!*" (*Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*)

But the CP limited its criticism of the U.S. political system to the lack of consistent (bourgeois) democracy (including constantly howling that fascism was around the corner) and not focusing on the main point: that even the most thorough bourgeois democracy remains an illusion and a deception since it masks the rule of an exploiting handful over the great majority of people. Instead of exposing this contradiction the CP basically portrayed itself as the "true defenders" of democracy, in the tradition of Roosevelt and Jefferson, fighting its "betrayers" like McCarthy and Truman.

In the late '50s, following the capture of the USSR by revisionists led by Khrushchev, the CP completely abandoned revolution and the working class and became the traitor party that it remains today. This degeneration of the CP was a most serious

loss to the working class. It left the working class without a vanguard and thus politically disarmed, leaving the bourgeoisie a clear field to push their political poison. But it could not eliminate the basic contradictions of capitalism, the exploitation and oppression of the masses of people under this system—or their resistance, which was shown especially in the Black people's struggle and also the movement against the war in Vietnam, as well as continuous strikes, often very militant, of the working class itself during the period after WW2.

GROWING CRISIS

As far back as 1848 in the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels, in discussing the recurring crises of capitalism, pointed out:

“And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by the enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.”

This statement certainly applies to the developments in the U.S. since World War 2: the very measures that enabled the bourgeoisie to get out of the depths of the Great Depression, and to minimize the effects of the several post-war “recessions,” paved the way for the steadily deepening crisis of today and has greatly reduced the ability of the capitalists to further postpone the inevitable further deepening of that crisis.

The vast U.S. economic and military presence in the homeland of its rivals has, to a large extent, turned into its opposite; these very countries now challenge the U.S. monopolists, even in the home market of U.S. imperialism itself, and the large presence of U.S. dollars in those countries has greatly contributed to the collapse of the “dollar standard” and to successive devaluation of U.S. currency.

The empire of the U.S. imperialists has suffered under the telling blows of revolutionary struggle. First China freed itself from the clutches of imperialism and its faithful servant Chiang Kai-shek, then the masses of Korean people backed by their comrades-in-arms of the People's Republic of China beat back the U.S.-led invasion of north Korea and held the powerful U.S. to a standstill. Then, during the 1960s, came the heroic armed struggle of the Vietnamese and other Indochinese people which greatly weakened the U.S. capitalist class.

And of tremendous significance has been the emergence of the USSR as a capitalist superpower capable of challenging the U.S. on a global scale.

All of these things, coupled with the even further saturation of U.S. imperialism's home market and the greatly increased capitalization of the South, the principal region in the country where the bourgeoisie found it profitable to invest massive amounts of new capital, has created the basis for the present crisis.

Already the economic and political effects on U.S. society have been great. Real wages for the working class have declined since the mid-'60s. Sections of the working class which enjoyed a “better off” position in the past, such as construction workers, have come under fierce attack so today over 40% of all commercial construction is non-union. Unemployment generally has reached the highest rate since the Great Depression and inflation continues to climb higher. Where previously many working class families lived on one income, now the paycheck of both husband and wife is necessary for most to get by.

The moribund nature of the imperialists, hid for many years under a glittering facade of “prosperity,” stands out in stark relief as whole cities fall into greater and greater decay, the capitalists lack the necessary capital to re-tool their industrial plants, even the railroad tracks stand in disrepair and ruin, and all of the social evils that accompany the decay of the economic system soar.

The ability of the capitalists to further postpone the even further decline of their system is increasingly reduced; in fact, while the bourgeoisie is not utterly without freedom and there will be some ups and downs in the development of the crisis, there is no way short of world war and a new favorable redivision of the world which might result from winning such a war, that the capitalists of this country could return to a respite from crisis even remotely resembling the post World War 2 period.

Whereas the decades following World War 2 saw material conditions favorable to the growth of bourgeois prejudices among the working class, for the strengthening of old illusions and the creation of new ones, the present period of deepening crisis is undercutting the basis of these very illusions. For the “bottom line” of bourgeois democratic illusions among the workers is the myth that capitalism can provide a tolerable life for the working class and that wage slavery is not an intolerable or inescapable condition which must be forcibly *overthrown*.

The capitalist crisis also weakens the ability of the bourgeoisie to join ranks and put up a common political front against the working class. Marx noted:

"So long as things go well, competition effects an operating fraternity of the capitalist class...so that each shares in the common loot in proportion to the size of his respective investment. But as it no longer is a question of sharing profits but of sharing losses, everyone tried to reduce his own share to a minimum and to shove it off upon another...The antagonism between each individual capitalist's interests and those of the capitalist class as a whole, then comes to the surface, just as previously the identity of these interests operated in practice through competition." (*Capital*, Vol. 3)

This is the economic basis of the "dirty politics" that has grown so prevalent today. In recent years scandal after scandal has rocked the political arena. Individual capitalists and their political representatives, out of their narrow and immediate interests, expose each other and, unwittingly, expose the very political mask of democracy that they all share in common. And while the current Ford/Carter election has been mainly an attempt to restore some credibility to the increasingly tattered political system, there can be no doubt it won't be long before new exposures of corruption in high places and of "abuse of power" (as the capitalists call their extra-legal wiretappings, assassinations, etc.) will come to light.

None of this is meant to imply that objective conditions alone—the deepening crisis, the increasing misery of the masses and the disarray of the bourgeoisie—will by itself wipe out bourgeois democratic illusions. What it does mean is that life under capitalism will become increasingly intolerable for the masses of people, that the domination of the society by the bourgeoisie will stand out all the more sharply and the broad masses will search for a solution, a way out, of their exploitation and oppression.

At the same time, the intensification of the contradictions of capitalism and the rise of the mass struggle will *intensify* the ideological struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie will find its rule more dependent than ever on deceiving the masses about the possibility of peaceful change through its political framework and hiding the irreconcilable antagonism between the workers and the capitalists. This will be true even as the capitalists are increasingly forced to use their state apparatus to suppress the struggles of the people and even as they restrict the bourgeois democratic rights of the workers and others.

The objective basis for the accelerating expansion of the ranks of the politically class conscious workers, who have radically broken with the politics and ideology of the bourgeoisie and fight for the "emancipatory aims" of the working class lies precisely in the fact that all of the evils and miseries of capitalism will in-

crease—it cannot be otherwise. But the experience of the masses of workers is uneven and contradictory and counter currents to the general decline of U.S. imperialism continue to exist.

While the world situation is qualitatively different than it was during the heyday of U.S. imperialism in the '50s and early '60s it would be wrong to think that its monopoly position has been completely eroded—it remains, after all, one of only two super-powers in the world and still dominates a vast, if shaky, empire. It would be ridiculous to say that *no* workers are able to escape into the petty bourgeoisie or that *no* workers are able to maintain a relatively comfortable and "better off" position even though the general direction of development is the ruining of the petty bourgeoisie and the driving down of "better off" workers to the level of the mass of the proletariat.

In December, 1975 an article appeared in *Revolution* entitled "Mass Line Is Key to Lead the Masses in Making Revolution" which pointed out:

"But the experience of the masses, in their struggle to produce, in the class struggle and in scientific experimentation, does not take place in a vacuum, of course. And in capitalist society, along with their monopoly of ownership of the means of production, the capitalists control the media of mass communication, the educational system, etc.

"They constantly try to 'sum up' the experience of the masses according to their own upside-down world view."

This is certainly true when it comes to summing up the experience of the masses with the bourgeois-democratic political system. A few examples should help clarify this point.

The Black people's struggle was the cutting edge of revolutionary struggle in the U.S. beginning with the early civil rights movement of the mid '50s through the high tide of the Black liberation struggle of the late '60s.

What gave that struggle its revolutionary thrust, and will again, is that the oppression of Black people is rooted in the capitalist system of exploitation and that the liberation of Black people can only come through working class revolution. Indeed, the most significant contribution of the Black liberation struggle of the '60s was rekindling revolutionary spirit among masses of working people of all nationalities and increasingly aiming its blow at the rule of the bourgeoisie.

But the bourgeoisie, through its political representatives within and outside that movement, tried to turn reality on its head and portray many of the gains won by the Black people's struggle (like civil rights legislation, for example) as proof of the "vitality of the democratic system" or, in a slicker variety of the

same line, that the goal of the struggle was to *perfect* the bourgeois democratic system.*

Similarly, when powerful sections of the U.S. ruling class saw their inevitable defeat in Indochina some of their political representatives rushed to try to head off the massive movement of the American people against that war. Trying desperately to hide the fundamental character of that conflict, that it was an imperialist war waged for the sole benefit of the monopoly capitalist class, these politicians tried to tell the people that the Vietnam war was a departure from "traditional democratic values" and that the big mistake was supporting a "dictator" in south Vietnam.

More recently the example of Watergate comes to mind, which exposed the "extra legal" side of the bourgeoisie's infighting and their dog-eat-dog nature. Yet once again the capitalists tried to turn this around, declaring that the near impeachment of Nixon and his forced resignation was living proof of the "health" of the constitutional process.

There are countless other examples of attempts by the bourgeoisie to reenforce the bourgeois democratic deception even as it is being battered by reality. This just further underscores the point made in the "Mass Line" article cited earlier, "At each point in the development of the struggle the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will contend not only in the practical battlefield, but also in the sphere of ideology."

This battle "in the sphere of ideology," to which the fight against the bourgeois democratic deception belongs, is crucial to the success of the revolutionary struggle. In this battle the Party and advanced workers play the decisive role. Without the painstaking work of communists, without repeated political exposures of the rule of the bourgeoisie, the masses of workers will not be able to free themselves of the shackles of bourgeois democratic illusions no matter how deep the crisis becomes.

This exposure must pierce beneath the surface—the talk about democracy—and get down to the real class relations that lie at the bottom of this and all political phenomena. As Mao Tse-tung wrote:

“...freedom and democracy do not exist in the abstract, only in the concrete. In a society rent by class struggle, if there is freedom for the exploiting classes to exploit the

*In doing this the capitalists tried to take advantage of the fact that there is a bourgeois-democratic aspect to the struggle of Black people. This was especially true in its earlier civil rights phase when the struggle was aimed at winning basic democratic rights, such as the right to vote and so forth, but remains true now.

working people, there is no freedom for the working people not to be exploited, and if there is democracy for the bourgeoisie, there is no democracy for the proletariat and other working people. The legal existence of the Communist Party is tolerated in some capitalist countries, but only to the extent that it does not endanger the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie; it is not tolerated beyond that. Those who demand freedom and democracy in the abstract regard democracy as an end and not a means. Democracy sometimes seems to be an end, but it is in fact only a means." ("On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," *Selected Readings*)

The real question is the class question—which class rules society. The revolutionary goal—though it involves far greater democracy for the masses of people than in any past society—cannot be seen as some kind of straight line extension or expansion of existing democracy. Only on the basis of establishing the rule of the working class by overthrowing the capitalist system and its bourgeois democracy (or other forms of rule) can the working class exercise dictatorship over the overthrown class of exploiters, practice its own democracy and end all forms of oppression.

Bringing out these class relations is an important task of communists. As the crisis of the imperialist system deepens, conditions are ripening for this socialist agitation and propaganda, conducted in the course of leading the struggles of the working class forward, to achieve more and more favorable results.

In 1892 Engels wrote about the United States, "In such a country continually renewed waves of advance, followed by equally certain setbacks, are inevitable. Only the advances always become more powerful, the setbacks less paralyzing, and on the whole the cause does move forward." And, Engels concluded, the very rapid and powerful development of capitalism in the U.S. has laid the basis for a revolutionary struggle of the working class that "will one day bring about a change that will astound the world." (*Letters to Americans*)

ON MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM, 1913: An Analysis of Problems and Strategies

Carl D. Thompson
Manager Information Department
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Dear Comrade:-

It is a privilege to reply to your letter. You have opened a discussion which neither of us is in any position to conclude. For it leads to the center of those difficulties which perplex every Socialist who has survived his first period of omniscience. One thing your letter makes perfectly clear, that however inevitable the road to Socialism may be in our theoretical text-books, there is nothing inevitable about the tactics of today and tomorrow. You have to meet these problems in your official position, and you are puzzled. The comrades who write to you for help are puzzled. The immense discussion in our press shows that the movement as a whole is puzzled. If all of us could admit this frankly we should have made the first great step toward a solution, for that is the only atmosphere in which complicated problems are ever solved. With that in mind I have held back my reply to your letter until after the November elections. There is no use trying to precipitate an open discussion at a time when everybody has to pretend that he is entirely wise and absolutely certain. A man standing on a scap-

*The following letter from the Socialist Party Collection at Duke University is printed with Lippmann's spelling, punctuation, and paragraphing unchanged. Ironically, after writing this letter, Lippmann left the Socialist Party to become a Progressive.

box has to be cocksure. But about the tactics of a revolutionary movement only a fool is convinced that his is the last word. For we might as well make up our minds to the fact that the debate over tactics will last as long as the movement. For every year the situation changes, new factors arise, and a living party has to readjust itself to meet them. That is why hostility to "new" theories is such a discouraging business. These criticisms of Socialism which are coming from the younger men may be "half-baked" and blundering; they are at least attempts to face a condition of affairs that did not exist when the veterans were learning what they know.

Let me reply first of all to your question: What is the basis of attack on the Schenectady administration? Its basis is the knowledge I gained as Executive Secretary to the Mayor and member of the administration caucus. I was present at the making of the first budget and the laying down of the year's policy. The main outlines of my objections to the kind of politics represented by Schenectady were published in the Call of June 9, 1912, under the title of "Schenectady the Unripe." The points of that article have, I believe, been thoroughly confirmed by later events. I do not propose here to rehearse all that, for our business is not with the criticism of what is being done but with the discussion of something more effective. I have met no informed Socialist who did not confess, at least privately, that the Schenectady administration presented immense problems. You admit it, of course, and you add to that statement the wider one that the problems are typical. You have seen Milwaukee at first hand; it is very significant that after studying Schenectady you should feel that the Socialists there "encounter the same kind of difficulties that every Socialist administration has encountered and the same kind of difficulties that for many years every Socialist administration will encounter."

That difficulty can be stated quite simply on one very important issue: The economic policy of the administration. It is this,—the budget in Schenectady was made on the principle that taxes must not be increased, because high taxes would alienate the property-holders whose votes decided the election. In other words, the Schenectady Socialists know that they owe their election to voters who would not stand for an increase of taxation. They know that they could not be re-elected if taxes were higher than under the Democrats. The first principle of their economic policy was to keep the tax rate where it was, or to reduce it if possible. This truth about Schenectady has never been denied. The administration has boasted of it. Now I say that this is a clean-cut issue between Socialism and anti-Socialism, for it is quite clearly the business of a Socialist administration to cut into the returns of property, take as much of them as possible to be spent for social purposes. Any reformer would agree in a minute that the "constructive" work of the Schenectady Socialists was admirable, no graft,

efficiency, parks, schools, medical attention, etc. But the ordinary reformer wishes these reforms without cutting into the returns on property. That is why "low taxes" is the watchword of all good government activity.

Now the Schenectady administration chose deliberately to follow the policy of the reformer. It couldn't help itself. It had been elected by people who believed in reform, and it represents its constituency admirably. But on the only economic issue which it faced, the administration is not a Socialist Administration. It is a pure and simple product of reform, using some of the phrases of Socialism, but acting on the identical policy that would inspire an administration conducted by John Purroy Mitchel or Norman Hapgood. When I call it a reform government I am speaking as accurately as I can. It isn't the fact that Schenectady interested itself in dental clinics and playgrounds. I am not with those who despise these things as unworthy of a "revolutionist." I say simply that when the amount of playgrounds and the whole work of reform is made to depend on keeping taxes where the Democrats left them, then the point of view is literally non-Socialist. On the crucial question of whether the administration would cut deeper into the returns on privilege, Schenectady said no.

And because of that, political action in Schenectady must be ineffective. It refuses to take the first step on which everything else hangs: it refuses to attack privilege.

Now if we are to arrive at an understanding of how to rejuvenate political action, we must find out why on this clean issue of policy, the Schenectady administration faltered. Such an analysis will lead us, I think, to the source of their difficulties. From that there should emerge a clearer sense of how to strengthen Socialist politics. I do not agree with you that every administration must encounter the same difficulties. I do agree that every administration will encounter them if it doesn't correct the underlying errors of Schenectady.

The main analysis is quite simple. The administration was elected by non-Socialists. It represents them.

You can translate that very simple statement into a number of practical questions which must be answered before political action can have any sound basis. Let me try to suggest a few of them.

1. Is it good policy to nominate a candidate for mayor who will poll a personal vote large enough to decide the election?
2. Should Socialist campaigns be fought on issues like police corruption or paving graft?
3. What bid should be made for the progressive vote, disgusted with the old parties and ignorant of Socialism?
4. If an administration is elected by non-Socialist votes, does it owe any allegiance to the wishes of its non-Socialist supporters? Can the local

claim the right to control the action of officials, when the local represents a small minority of the voters?

5. What is the attitude of Socialist mayors towards disorderly strikes and strike-breakers?

6. What is the Socialist policy in taxation: What should it do in regard to its non-Socialist middle class supporters?

7. What is the Socialist policy towards vice?

8. What is the policy on school-boards? Is it "non-partisan" as reformers desire?

I mention these questions almost at random. They are, I think, all aspects of the same question, the most fundamental one that American Socialists in politics have had to face: where is the allegiance of Socialists elected by non-Socialists? If we can keep that issue before us it may be possible to save this discussion from running out into futile bickering. I should like to suggest that before anyone enters the argument he should face this question, and come to a clear understanding of what he really believes. I venture to predict that all the disagreements have their source right here: you will find that those who incline to some form of syndicalism have in the back of their minds the notion that an overwhelming political majority for Socialism is too slow a method of progress; you will find many Socialists who think they are very "practical" because they insist that we must play the political game and take any votes we can get; some of the greatest difficulties of the party turn on this point, such as our attitude toward the negro, towards the small farmer, and the little shop-keeper. But all this would take us too far afield, and I have no desire to wander all over the face of the globe. We are discussing political action especially in cities.

I do not know, of course, how you would answer the eight questions or the one question of which they are parts. I should say:

1. That votes cast for a candidate alone represent no strength for the movement.
2. That elections won on issues like graft, anti-Tammany, etc., etc., are mandates from the voters to clean out graft, not to strike at respectable privilege.
3. That the disgusted progressive vote represents no strength because it does not intend to stay with us on any essential issue.
4. That Socialists ought not, even if they could, go beyond the actual will of the constituency; *that administrations elected by non-Socialists do owe allegiance to non-Socialist voters.*
5. That a disorderly strike is an absolutely baffling problem, *unless the great majority of the community are convinced Socialists.*
6. That it is the business of Socialists to throw an increasing burden

of taxation on unearned incomes, and to spend the money socially.

7. That the policy of fighting vice with the police is a reformers' policy, not a Socialist's.

8. That non-partisan school-board appointments are an absurdity for Socialists who have a new philosophy of society, *and yet* partisan appointments are a form of tyranny unless they are made with the consent of the great mass of the citizens.

It is fairly clear, I think, that the keystone of our principal difficulties is that large and decisive group of progressive voters which holds the balance of power in America today. These progressives are hard to describe. They are more numerous than the Bull Moose; their national leaders include Roosevelt, Wilson, Bryan, La Follette; they are single-taxers and prohibitionists, anti-trust people, anti-Tammany, efficiency enthusiasts like John Purroy Mitchel, unclassifiable men like Brand Whitlock, Lindsey or Steffens; they are Collier's Weekly and the Saturday Evening Post, they are the muck-raking magazines, the social workers, the conservationists, white slave crusaders and woman suffragists; they are the most widely-spread element in public life. They hold their party ties lightly; they are today in a liquid condition, and under certain circumstances they will flow towards us. They are not afraid of Socialism, not of the name anyway. They like Socialism a great deal better than they do the Socialists.

The temper of these progressives is to use any political machine that will serve them. They have captured the Democratic Party in national politics; men like La Follette, Borah, Hadley still hope to control the Republican machine; there is, of course, the Bull Moose; they are powerful organizations like some of the granges, the People's Power League in Oregon, the Voters' League in Chicago—all of them instruments of this widespread progressive feeling. But that isn't the end. In a city like Schenectady, both old parties are utterly hopeless, the Bull Moose is weak, and the Progressives are quite ready to turn temporarily to the Socialists if they feel they can trust them. The path is smoothed for them if the candidate of the Socialists is a man who moved from progressivism to Socialism a year or so before, a popular man whom everybody knows. He becomes the link of an alliance between Socialism and the reformers. But note what happens: the reformers are harder to hold on to than the Socialists. They are free people who have signed no pledge and they are not tied to a ticket. They come when they please and go when they please. The whole campaign turns on keeping them in line. Everything is done to attract them, and the real Socialists stand around like a serious husband who has married a flirt.

It is this mass of progressives who create the puzzles of our political tactics. That, I think, is very clear for America.

It is essential then to understand the relation of the Socialists to the

progressives.

The general attitude of the party press is that all reformers are either fools, crooks, or hypocrites. You will find Socialists arguing, as one of them did recently, that Mitchel must be all sorts of a knave because Hearst supported him, and McAneny a scoundrel because Hearst said he was. The rough assumption of all our political thinking is that the world is divided into Socialists and rascals. The assumption is false. In our less ugly moods we assume that society is divided into Socialists and conservatives. That assumption is false. Our politics assume that we alone represent every step in progress from personal honesty to the Cooperative Commonwealth. That is not true. We are not the whole of honest, nor the whole of progress, nor the whole of radicalism. It is the meanest kind of arrogance when our press or our speakers make a great fuss about Milwaukee's milk stations or Schenectady's grocery shop as if to say that if you want these undeniably good things you will have to vote for us. In the region of what we call our "immediate demands" it is sheer nonsense to pretend that we alone are capable or willing to carry them into effect. There is probably not an item in all the immediate demands of the Erfurt program that progressivism is incapable of accepting. And as for the execution of these reforms, well, you know as I do that the competent administrators have not yet swarmed into the Socialist Party.

But our assumption that we alone are to be trusted has got us into a very difficult position. We try to do the things that reformers can do at least as well as we, and we try to represent at the same time a profoundly revolutionary movement. Supermen might do it. We can't. The moment we go into competition with the reformers on their own ground, we are too busy for much else. It is quite an absorbing job to run even a dental clinic. The police force will keep any man busy. And the administration that is breaking its head off the daily problems of the police in a city is not going out of its way to encourage strikes or anything else that is likely to make new difficulties. And then, there is always before its eyes the great fact that supporters would leave in a minute if anything was done that they didn't like. There arises then the feeling that re-election is supremely important to prove to the world "that the Socialists have made good." And so in a thousand human complications the net is spun, and the Socialists are in the grip of the progressives. Then we wonder that political action is denounced.

If Socialists are to make anything of political action they have got to keep themselves clearly distinguished from the progressives. By clearly distinguished I do not mean a state of violent hatred towards Roosevelt and all his works. I do not mean a hallelujah chorus if Milwaukee installs the cost unit system and a cheap sneer if Philadelphia does it. To distinguish

clearly means for us to concentrate on that which is ours alone, to leave to the progressives what is theirs.

How is that to be done? I have been asked fifty times whether we can really reject votes that come to us. "Are you going into a campaign shouting 'Don't vote for us?'" It is perhaps hardly necessary to say to you that such argument is merely quibble. When a Socialist says that he wishes only Socialist votes, he doesn't mean that on election day he proposes to prevent anyone from voting his ticket. It is really quite easy to make it extremely improbable that the great mass of progressives will swing to us.

All it means is a really honest campaign. That is not pleasant, for we all like to see "results," and a big jump in the vote puts heart into the party. And yet I am convinced that political action will simply prove itself another of the age-long deceptions, unless it is conducted on the central principle that no fictitious size is any real strength. Those Socialists who talk as if we were going to measure our success by the standards of other parties have failed to grasp imaginatively what we are here for. We have nothing to gain by empty victories; every time we gain something which we do not really deserve, a new despair is born. If we cannot learn to play politics with a long vision and an ability to distinguish between Socialist power and the external clap-trap of victory, then we haven't learned the first steps in revolution, and our magnificent pictures of the future are the idle dreams of incompetent men.

The officials we elect are as powerful as the group they represent, no more so. The label Socialist will not make Socialists out of officials elected by progressives. If you keep that in mind, it becomes perfectly clear that the success of political action is determined before the officials are elected. The whole question which you ask me centers, then, in the campaign. You will understand, of course, that a Socialist campaign is not confined to six weeks of feverish electioneering before the vote is counted.

It includes the quality of propaganda, the kind of nominations, the nature of the platform, and the issues that are raised. You can readily see that everywhere here there is a choice, — a choice between the effort to build up a real Socialist constituency and the sham effort to pile up a vote. It is easiest perhaps to illustrate this with the platform.

The most interesting part of the platform in many ways is the section of "Immediate Demands." It represents the opening wedge of Socialist activity, a statement of where we would begin. Now so far as I can discover, the notion seems to be that our immediate demands should include desirable reforms capable of immediate realization. It's a list of good things worth having now. It's a sort of storehouse from which reformers are supposed to steal.

Whether they do or not is an academic question. The fact is that

they do come around to endorsing most of our immediate demands. What do we do then? You know what we do: First, we shout "Thief"; then, we shout "hypocrite,— if you really want these reforms you must let us carry them out . . . we had them first." This has been our position ever since the Progressive Party caught us napping.

Now the least we could have expected of the party was that it should set to work at once to map out a set of immediate demands far more radical than anything the Progressives had accepted. If reformers could go that far, it was clearly our business to move ahead. We did not need to attack the old reforms we had endorsed. They were just as valuable when the Progressives had accepted them. But it was our business to work out reforms that went beyond them.

On what principle? Fortunately an example exists, which I should like to call to your serious attention. Last spring in New York City a small group of us who had realized this predicament set about writing a municipal platform which should recognize the great political fact of the present time — that the progressives have become a conscious group in the community. We felt that the old platform was made before the progressives had appeared, and it was built on the assumption that the Socialists and the conservatives were the only two divisions of the voters. We knew this assumption was false. We knew that the Progressives represented a large body of earnest reform, and we recognized that this fact had changed the outlook of political action. We saw that it was folly for the Socialists to duplicate the work of the Progressives, and to attack them stupidly was worthy of the dog in the manger.

So we made an innovation in the structure of the platform. We divided the immediate demands into "Reforms endorsed by Socialists" and "Socialist Policies." This division has been very much attacked because no hair-line distinction is possible. That is true. But for the rough work of politics it is, I believe, a useful distinction. Under "Reforms Endorsed" we were able to place all those projects which are obviously desirable. You know that there are a hundred things of great value about which there is no class division because they involve no attack on profit. We desire those reforms in common with a great mass of people who are not Socialists at all. But there is nothing peculiar to us about them.

Now while we approve of them cordially, we cannot as a party afford to give much time to them. We have to concentrate on what is original in our message. But this does not mean that we are to talk the Cooperative Commonwealth, and despise immediate action. What we have to do is to devise a practical program for the next few years that would really affect the balance of power, that would really cut into profit, that would really put Socialists ahead in their essential work. Such a program is difficult to

formulate. But it has to be done. And it is on such a program of immediate demands that our campaigns must center.

One illustration may make this clear. Take the municipal ownership and operation of subways. That in itself is an immediate reform which will find no great opposition among the Progressives. We believe in it, and we should welcome its achievement. But we do not stop there. We say municipal ownership is worth having, but it is an installment of Socialism only when it is conducted on Socialist principles. The moment municipal trading becomes an immediate issue it is our business to draw the distinction between the reformer's policy and ours. The distinction is roughly this: that reformers propose to use the profits to reduce taxes; that Socialists propose to spend the profits socially. The difference is enormous. Municipal ownership under Socialists would pay for things that the people need; under reformers it would lighten the burden on property-owners. That is such a big difference that a great many "revolutionary" comrades won't see it at all.

For note what it means. The profits on a socialistically conducted subway would be a direct transfer from private dividends to the people; the profits on a reformist subway would be a transfer from stockholders to tax-payers. Landlords have everything to gain by a reformist enterprise, and the people very little; the Socialist method would be real socialization of capital. Now obviously, our campaigns must make this issue very clear: Municipal ownership is a reform we endorse; socialist municipal ownership is what we demand.

How profoundly this would change the quality of our campaigns you can see. There is no bait to the progressives in it. A whole pack of arguments are thrown overboard and the revolutionary issue is brought to the front. That is the way to keep the progressives from voting our ticket. Go to them with this statement: "We stand for municipal enterprise. We propose to operate public utilities for the public. We do not propose to take one cent of the profits to reduce the burdens on the tax-payers. We propose to spend it on raising wages, on reducing fares, improving service, and on reforms that would seem a luxury to you progressives. Out of the profits we propose to create new social opportunities, in schools, in city life, — opportunities which you will not endorse because they would cost too much."

What I have suggested here about municipal ownership can be extended, I think, to all the interests that politics touches. The Socialist policy on schools is yet to be worked out: there is contained in it a whole trunk full of revolutionary demands that are immediate and practical. There is a health program to be devised which will carry the party beyond anything the reformers are likely to accept. Taxation is a way of socializing wealth

that we have hardly explored.

If we really concentrate on immediate demands of this sort our progress will represent actual strength. There will be no mushroom victories, and the essential work of the movement will not be neglected. By an everlasting insistence on the specifically socialist position we shall save ourselves from the embraces of fickle friends.

Of course this means that we shall win less elections, and come into power more slowly. We shall have to stand by and let the Progressives look like the saviors of humanity. For those who find that too great a strain on their ambitions there is only one thing to do and that is to join the Progressives. If "doing something" means being in office or carrying through reforms, then the Socialist movement is the wrong place for them. We can part without bitterness. The progressives will be all the better for the addition of men who have had contact with Socialism, and Socialism will have lost nothing. For it cannot be repeated too often that the only strength of Socialism is its real strength.

The first objection that will occur to all this is that I am advocating mere talk. That is not true. I am advocating the assumption of political responsibility only when the constituency is ripe for it. The great danger, as in Schenectady, is to have the externals of power and none of its substance.

A second objection, certain to be raised, is that we must have political experience, and that we can't get that in our locals or in propaganda. That is true. No one who has watched the American movement can very well deny its deep need of experience. An evening at almost any local will convince an observer that whatever other virtues we may have, administrative efficiency is not one of them. I have watched a local of two hundred Socialists trying to audit fifty-cent bills by majority vote. The so-called practical wing of the party is composed largely of people who have a vivid sense of what a gigantic administrative problem Socialism will be, coupled with a vivid sense of what administrative dubs we are. And they feel that direct responsibility as in Schenectady is the only way there is of making the party prepare itself for practical affairs. There is, I believe, an enormous amount of truth in their position. We do need sorely to develop the capacity of dealing with actual problems. The debates which enliven the Call are often theoretical and verbal to an extreme: our criticisms of Congress or the mayor betray constantly the fact that the writer has never had to face the actual work of drawing up a bill or administering a department. It makes us arrogant, self-righteous, sectarian, and unjust. We blame officials for things absolutely beyond their control; we curse them often because we do not understand them. We announced on general principles that the subway contracts were a graft, but what the graft was we never

took the trouble to state. If there is any party member who has made an analytical study of those contracts with the substitute proposal along Socialist lines, I have not heard of him. The first comment I read in the Call on John Purroy Mitchel's nomination announced that he was a pinhead. Now on the subject of municipal government Mitchel is undoubtedly not a pinhead. One could draw up a tremendous indictment against Mitchel, but on the question of his competence, administrative skill, and integrity no Socialist I know has the right to open his mouth. We become positive hypocrites, for if Mitchel were in Schenectady or Milwaukee, he would be doing just about what he has been doing and we should be hailing him as an example of the extraordinary capacity which the Socialist movement produces.

I do not wish then to underestimate the importance of the practical experience which so many comrades insist upon. But it does not follow that we must buy that experience by abandoning almost everything else that we believe. It is not necessary to crawl into office, and create political despair, just in order to remedy our incompetence. We can have experience without destroying the value of political action. Office is not the whole of politics.

We can if we have the energy, take an active part in every important controversy. The party could be represented at every hearing, could organize demonstrations: if the subway issue arises, the party ought to put forward its solution, and fight for it. It ought to make itself heard before every budget committee, every legislative inquiry on labor laws, conservation, schools. There should be trained representatives at every session of a government body, sent there not to write satirical articles, but to report to the party and keep it alert to new developments. There should be standing committees of experts on various phases of politics, and there should be machinery for presenting the issues to the party, and enabling it to take its stand. It would be an excellent beginning of the National Office appoint a committee to draw up suggestions as to how to carry on political action before the election of officials. Such a national inquiry could be supplemented with local committees that worked out the special details for particular communities.

Political action of this sort would be a blessing in all directions: it would give us all the habit of dealing constructively with immediate issues; it would be an unequalled form of propaganda; it would lay excellent foundations for any administration that we elected: it would ventilate the stuffy theoretical atmosphere of our discussion.

However, it is not the only way of gaining the experience we need. The unions themselves are miniature democracies, and active participation in their affairs by those who are eligible is not only absolutely essential

from the deeper aspects of Socialism: it is a real training for law-making and administration. But there is another field of activity that for business experience outweighs either politics or work in the unions. That is the cooperative. It is hard to realize sometimes how much we suffer in America from the lack of a strong cooperative movement. The time will come when we shall have to set about remedying that defect, for a working class with unions and no cooperatives is a one-legged man. The practice of cooperation is important in all sorts of ways: it is integral to any genuine revolution, it is the solution of many difficulties in capitalism, and from the point of view which we are discussing here, it is the only way I know of by which the working-class can have business experience combined with democracy. Cooperatives would supply us with capable administrators who had not been commercialized.

You see then that I do not advocate mere talk, and that I do not shirk the fact that practical experience is one of our greatest needs. I differ from the defenders of Schenectady in this, — that I think it is possible to get better training in a better way than by playing the political game of the old parties. The combination of extra-official politics, the unions and the cooperatives is a very ample field for training in administration.

Votes as an index of converts; campaigns without bait; political action year in year out without the immediate desire for office. That is, I think, the central policy that we must pursue.

But even that will be a delusion if we allow it to absorb our main interest. The work we are engaged in lies a great deal deeper than politics can ever go. Politics is very near the surface of life; it expresses rather clumsily forces that are much more important. For the currents that move the world do not start in legislatures; occasionally they reach the legislature. Revolutions are not made by statute, or Socialist congresses. All that politics can do is to clarify and put a sort of concluding stamp on revolutions that have worked themselves out in the life of the people. I need hardly say to you that we are concerned with the revolution, and interested in politics only because it can aid it.

Our great task to which politics is entirely subordinate is the organization of labor so that it understands its position, realizes its possibilities, and learns how to apply the power it possesses. Winning elections or fighting the subway issue are utterly trivial compared to the creation of this power among the working classes. Politics is only one small factor in this much more comprehensive work. Politics will be useful to labor only when labor has trained itself to self-government, has built its unions into centers of power, and saturated its daily life with a concrete and imaginative vision. That is the first work of the Socialist movement. If it is well done, our political action will reflect it. If it is neglected, no amount of fuss over the size of our vote will cover it up.

This then is the rough answer to your question: Political action in order to be effective must represent a power in the community behind it. That power is built out of economic forces made intelligent by conviction.

WALTER LIPPMANN

Votes must represent the size of that power: all other votes are a menace. Platforms must be written for the purpose of keeping the campaign to the essential issues. Propaganda and political action can be united by taking part in public affairs without the responsibility of office. Elections are the last goal of political action, and not the first. They should come only when the social forces are organized and ready.

This letter is very long, yet it is far too short for the subject. I have had to compress so much that many statements will appear unsupported by argument or evidence. I do not know how to avoid that. I hope you will read not to confute but to understand. I hope that in any discussion which may ensue no one will try to be smart and score debating points. They will only confuse what is already very confusing.

Fraternally yours,

Walter Lippmann

October 29, 1913

46 East 80th Street
New York City.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

The manuscript collection that was of greatest general use to the essays in this volume is the Socialist Party of America Papers at Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina. Since these papers contain a large amount of material relating to Socialist locals, they are especially pertinent to the needs of any study dealing with municipal socialism. Other manuscript collections will be mentioned in the following discussion of the cities analyzed by the essays herein. A most useful guide to library and archival holdings is Bernard K. Johnpoll, "Manuscript Sources in American Radicalism," *Labor History* 14 (Winter 1973), 92-97. Another source valuable to all essays in this book is the U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of the United States*, for the decennial periods from 1890 through the present.

Of the four cities analyzed that elected Socialist administrations, Milwaukee has received the most previous attention by scholars. The following collections should be consulted for research materials on the history of Milwaukee socialism: the Daniel W. Hoan, Victor L. Berger, Emil Seidel, and Frederic F. Heath papers in the archives of the Milwaukee County Historical Society, as well as the papers of the Social Democratic party (Socialist party) of Milwaukee. The Society also has copies of county campaign manuals and proceedings of various conventions of the Wisconsin Social Democratic party. The Milwaukee Public Library houses relevant collections and the archives of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin contains related material, such as the papers of Morris Hillquit, Algie M. and May Wood Simons, and John M. Work. Party newspapers which are available include the daily, the *Milwaukee Leader*, 1911 to 1938, the weekly, the *Social-Democratic Herald*, 1900-1913, and the *Voice of the People*,

INTRODUCTION

"Lockheed Gets Loan Guarantees," "President Says, 'No Vietnam Dividend,'" "New \$50 Million BART Issue," "Medicare Spending Up 20%," "30% City Budget Increase," "Teachers' Strike Begins Third Week," "Violence Mars Welfare Rights Demonstration"—these were some of the typical headlines of the 1960s and early 1970s. Each is a variation on the same theme: Corporations want government to build more freeways; bankers and investors want government to underwrite more loans and investments; small businessmen and farmers want more subsidies; organized labor wants more social insurance; welfare rights groups want higher income allowances, more housing, and better public health services; government employees want higher wages and salaries; and government agencies want more appropriations.

Other familiar headlines—"School Bond Issue Voted Down," "Gallup Poll: Tax Relief Top Worry," "Unified School District Referendum Defeated," "Commuter Tax Declared Unconstitutional," "Homeowners Vote to Shift Tax to Downtown Business," "Reagan Supports State Withholding Tax"—tell a similar story. Large corporations and wealthy investors want working people and small businessmen to foot the bill for airport modernization, freeway expansion, rapid transit, water investment projects, and pollution control. Small businessmen and homeowners want property tax relief. Middle-income wage and salary earners want income tax relief. Poor people want tax relief, period. Suburbanites don't want to pay taxes in the central city where they work, and they don't want central-city residents to get any of the taxes that they pay in the suburbs.

Every economic and social class and group wants government to spend more and more money on more and more things. But no one wants to pay new taxes or higher rates on old taxes. Indeed, nearly everyone wants lower taxes, and many groups have agitated successfully for tax relief. Society's demands on local and state budgets seemingly are unlimited, but people's willingness and capacity to pay for these demands appear to be narrowly limited. And at the federal level expenditures have increased significantly faster than the growth of total production. In the words of the head of the Federal Reserve System,

We stand at a crossroads in our fiscal arrangements. Many of our citizens are alarmed by the increasing share of their incomes that is taken away by Federal, State, and local taxes. . . . The propensity to spend more than we are prepared to finance through taxes is becoming deep-seated and ominous. An early end to Federal deficits is not now in sight. Numerous Federal programs have a huge growth of expenditures built into them, and there are proposals presently before the Congress that would raise expenditures by vast amounts in coming years.¹

We have termed this tendency for government expenditures to outrace revenues the "fiscal crisis of the state." There is no iron law that expenditures must always rise more rapidly than revenues, but it is a fact that growing needs which only the state can meet create ever greater claims on the state budget. Several factors, singly or in combination, may offset the crisis. People who need government-provided services may be ignored and their needs neglected, as happened in New York's welfare cutback during the 1970-1971 recession. Corporations that want loans and subsidies from the government may not get them, as happened in the Congressional defeat of proposed subsidies for the development of the SST. Government-employee income may fall behind private sector income or below the cost of living, but this does not mean that these workers get automatic pay increases. In fact, the government may even freeze wages and salaries in an attempt to ameliorate the fiscal crisis. Furthermore, people can be forced to pay higher taxes. Should they be unwilling to pay taxes directly because large numbers oppose particular spending programs, the government can force them to pay taxes indirectly by financing increased expenditures via inflation or credit expansion—as the Johnson Administration did during the peak years of American aggression in Southeast Asia.

A combination of some of these countertendencies resulted in budgetary surpluses in many state and local governments in 1972. According to one "optimistic" estimate, state and local governments will be able to meet their normal needs through 1975 by increasing tax rates by not more than 5 percent.²

The volume and composition of government expenditures and the distribution of the tax burden are not determined by the laws of the market but rather reflect and are structurally determined by social and economic conflicts between classes and groups. The English Prime Minister Gladstone once said that "budgets are not merely matters of arithmetic, but in a thousand ways go to the root of prosperity of individuals, and relations of classes, and the strength of Kingdoms." The "relations of classes" were then expressed

in many ways that today are of only historical interest. In modern America individual well-being, class relationships, and national wealth and power are bound up in the agony of the cities, poverty and racism, profits of big and small business, inflation, unemployment, the balance-of-payments problem, imperialism and war, and other crises that seem a permanent part of daily life. No one is exempt from the fiscal crisis and the underlying social crises which it aggravates. We need a way to think about and ultimately act on this fiscal crisis that clarifies the contradictory processes which find both their reflection and cause in the government budget. We need a theory of government budget and a method for discovering the meaning for the political economy and society as a whole.

Perhaps then we will be able to answer such questions as: Who will pay for rising government expenditures? Will some kinds of spending rise while others are cut back? Can the government deliver more services for less taxes? Why don't Americans want to pay for services that presumably benefit the "people"? Can the fiscal system survive in its present form? Political-economic analysis is needed to answer these and dozens of other equally important related questions.

THE THEORETICAL BANKRUPTCY OF TRADITIONAL ECONOMICS

The theory of government budget put forth in this work is based on the study of fiscal politics, an investigation of the sociological foundations of government or state finances.³ The main concerns of fiscal politics are to discover the principles governing the volume and allocation of state finances and expenditures and the distribution of the tax burden among various economic classes. The major work of the German Marxist Rudolph Goldscheid, founder of the contemporary science of fiscal politics, appeared in the second decade of this century.⁴ A few years thereafter Joseph Schumpeter wrote glowingly of the promise of fiscal politics:

The public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially though not exclusively of its political life. The full fruitfulness of this approach is seen particularly at those turning points, or better epochs, during which existing forms begin to die off and to change into something new. This is true both of the causal significance of fiscal policy (insofar as fiscal events are an important element in the causation of all change) and of the symptomatic significance (insofar

as everything that happens has its fiscal reflection). Notwithstanding all the qualifications which always have to be made . . . we may surely speak of . . . a special field: fiscal sociology, of which much may be expected.⁵

Schumpeter's optimism proved to be premature. The budget remains, in his words, a "collection of hard, naked facts" not yet "drawn into the realm of sociology." "Unfortunately," one scholar confesses, "there exists no integrated theory of the economics and politics of public finance which would serve as a framework for analyzing [state] finance."⁶ No blunter admission of theoretical bankruptcy can be found than the declaration that within the mainstream of Western economic thought,

public finance, traditionally, has neither contained a theory of demand nor one of supply. . . . The scholar from outer space, coming to earth in the post-Marshallian era, might have concluded on perusing the English-language literature that governments exist wholly apart from their citizens, that these units impose taxes on individuals and firms primarily to nourish the state; and he might have thought that positive public finance consists in predicting the effects of these taxes.⁷

The "scholar from outer space" would have been only partly right. Orthodox public finance theorists are concerned not only with the economic effects of taxation (and expenditures), but also with the problem of what the government should take away in taxes (and provide in expenditures). For example, in his study of state enterprise Ralph Turvey writes that "because it is public, what interests us about public enterprise is how it ought to behave. . . . [W]e are not so much concerned with understanding its behavior and making predictions as with criticizing and making recommendations."⁸ Turvey's interest lies in how the behavior of state enterprise can be made to conform to a preconceived notion of economic optimum. This is the focus of the best known treatise on public finance, Richard Musgrave's *The Theory of Public Finance*. Musgrave tries to synthesize the entire modern literature on government finance and, in particular, "to state the rules and principles that make for an efficient conduct of the public economy." Musgrave devises an "optimal budget plan on the basis of initially defined conditions" and then tries to "see how it can be achieved." He calls it "a normative or optimal theory of the public household."⁹

The effect of this emphasis on normative theory has been to ignore the application of the theory of economic growth. The

absence of an "integrated theory of the economics and politics of public finance" (or "a theory of demand and supply of public goods and services") has compelled economists to adopt an almost metaphysical attitude toward government spending. For example, the Keynesian Evsey Domar theorized that government expenditures can be dealt with (1) by assuming that they are exogenous, or determined by forces outside the economic system; (2) by merging them with consumption expenditures; or (3) by assuming them away altogether. The last alternative is obviously completely unsatisfactory, and to assume that government spending is determined by undefinable outside forces is to beg the question. And merging all government spending with private consumption is merely a convenient fiction. Methods of analysis such as this have led two public finance specialists to write that "growth models in their present form cannot be treated as anything more than exercises in a technique of arrangement."¹⁰

As government expenditures come to constitute a larger and larger share of total spending in advanced capitalist countries, economic theorists who ignore the impact of the state budget do so at their own (and capitalism's) peril. Currently, economists do not consider actual determinants in their theoretical models but rather restrict themselves to estimates of the volume of state spending necessary to effect desired changes such as high employment or more rapid accumulation and growth. Their premise is that the government budget should and can be increased or lowered to compensate for reduced or increased private spending. Many orthodox economists believe that the volume of federal spending (if not its composition) is determined by and inversely related to the volume of private spending.

As will be seen in the course of this study, the orthodox approach is at best simplistic. Although changes in tax rates and the tax structure have been increasingly used to regulate private economic activity, the growth of federal spending over the past two or three decades has not resulted from the government's adopting compensatory fiscal policies, "except perhaps to a very limited degree."¹¹ Particular expenditures and programs and the budget as a whole are explicable only in terms of power relationships within the private economy.

SUMMATION OF THE THEORY OF THE FISCAL CRISIS

To avoid "exercises in a technique of arrangement," we have attempted to develop a theory of economic growth that is rooted in the basic economic and political facts of late capitalist society. We

hope to elucidate the relationship between the private and state sectors and between private and state spending. Although we believe that many of the ideas presented can be adapted to the experience of other advanced capitalist countries, the focus is on the post-World War II United States. Basically an interpretation of the period's economic development and crisis tendencies, this study does not offer a comprehensive analysis of state budgetary planning and policy or a comprehensive guide to state finance. Many of the data presented have been chosen more to illustrate a line of theoretical argument than to verify a set of hypotheses.

The categories that make up this theoretical framework are drawn from Marxist economics and adapted to the problem of budgetary analysis. Our first premise is that the capitalistic state must try to fulfill two basic and often mutually contradictory functions—*accumulation* and *legitimization*. (See Chapter 3.) This means that the state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state also must try to maintain or create the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support. But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's surplus production capacity and the taxes drawn from this surplus (and other forms of capital). This contradiction explains why President Nixon calls a legislated increase in profit rates a "job development credit," why the government announces that new fiscal policies are aimed at "stability and growth" when in fact their purpose is to keep profits high and growing, why the tax system is nominally progressive and theoretically based on "ability to pay" when in fact the system is regressive. The state must involve itself in the accumulation process, but it must either mystify its policies by calling them something that they are not, or it must try to conceal them (e.g., by making them into administrative, not political, issues).

Our second premise is that the fiscal crisis can be understood only in terms of the basic Marxist economic categories (adapted to the problems taken up here). State expenditures have a twofold character corresponding to the capitalist state's two basic functions: social capital and social expenses. *Social capital* is expenditures required for profitable private accumulation; it is indirectly productive (in Marxist terms, social capital indirectly expands surplus value). There are two kinds of social capital: social investment and social consumption (in Marxist terms, social constant capital and social

variable capital). (See Chapters 4 and 5.) *Social investment* consists of projects and services that increase the productivity of a given amount of laborpower and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit. A good example is state-financed industrial-development parks. *Social consumption* consists of projects and services that lower the reproduction costs of labor and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit. An example of this is social insurance, which expands the reproductive powers of the work force while simultaneously lowering labor costs. The second category, *social expenses*, consists of projects and services which are required to maintain social harmony—to fulfill the state's "legitimization" function. They are not even indirectly productive. (See Chapter 6.) The best example is the welfare system, which is designed chiefly to keep social peace among unemployed workers. (The costs of politically repressed populations in revolt would also constitute a part of social expenses.)

Because of the dual and contradictory character of the capitalist state, nearly every state agency is involved in the accumulation and legitimization functions, and nearly every state expenditure has this twofold character. For example, some education spending constitutes social capital (e.g., teachers and equipment needed to reproduce and expand work-force technical and skill levels), whereas other outlays constitute social expenses (e.g., salaries of campus policemen). To take another example, the main purpose of some transfer payments (e.g., social insurance) is to reproduce the work force, whereas the purpose of others (e.g., income subsidies to the poor) is to pacify and control the surplus population. The national income accounts lump the various categories of state spending together. (The state does not analyze its budget in class terms.) Clearly, the different categories cannot be separated if each budget item is not examined.

Furthermore, precisely because of the social character of social capital and social expenses, nearly every state expenditure serves these two (or more) purposes simultaneously, so that few state outlays can be classified unambiguously. For example, freeways move workers to and from work and are therefore items of social consumption, but they also transport commercial freight and are therefore a form of social investment. And, when used for either purpose, they may be considered forms of social capital. However, the Pentagon also needs freeways; therefore they in part constitute social expenses. Despite this complex social character of state outlays we can determine the political-economic forces served by any budgetary decision, and thus the main purpose (or purposes) of each budgetary item. (See Chapters 4 through 6.)

The first basic thesis presented here is that the growth of

the state sector and state spending is functioning increasingly as the basis for the growth of the monopoly sector and total production. Conversely, it is argued that the growth of state spending and state programs is the result of the growth of the monopoly industries. In other words, the growth of the state is both a cause and effect of the expansion of monopoly capital. (See Chapter 1.)

More specifically, the socialization of the costs of social investment and social consumption capital increases over time and increasingly is needed for profitable accumulation by monopoly capital. The general reason is that the increase in the social character of production (specialization, division of labor, interdependency, the growth of new social forms of capital such as education, etc.) either prohibits or renders unprofitable the private accumulation of constant and variable capital. The growth of the monopoly sector is irrational in the sense that it is accompanied by unemployment, poverty, economic stagnation, and so on. To insure mass loyalty and maintain its legitimacy, the state must meet various demands of those who suffer the "costs" of economic growth. (See Chapter 1.)

It might help to compare our approach with traditional economic theory. Bourgeois economists have shown that increases in private consumption beget increases in private investment via the accelerator effect. In turn, increases in private investment beget increases in private consumption via the multiplier effect. Similarly, we argue that greater social investment and social consumption spending generate greater private investment and private consumption spending, which in turn generate surplus capital (surplus productive capacity and a surplus population) and a larger volume of social expenses. Briefly, the supply of social capital creates the demand for social expenses. In effect, we work with a model of expanded reproduction (or a model of the economy as a whole) which is generalized to take into account the socialization of constant and variable capital costs and the costs of social expenses.¹² The impact of the budget depends on the volume and indirect productivity of social capital and the volume of social expenses. On the one hand, social capital outlays indirectly increase productive capacity and simultaneously increase aggregate demand. On the other hand, social expense outlays do not increase productive capacity, although they do expand aggregate demand. Whether the growth of productive capacity runs ahead or behind the growth of demand thus depends on the composition of the state budget. In this way, we can see that the theory of economic growth depends on class and political analyses of the determinants of the budget.

This view contrasts sharply with modern conservative

thought, which asserts that the state sector grows at the expense of private industry. We argue that the growth of the state sector is indispensable to the expansion of private industry, particularly monopoly industries. Our thesis also contrasts sharply with a basic tenet of modern liberal thought—that the expansion of monopoly industries inhibits the growth of the state sector.¹³ The fact of the matter is that the growth of monopoly capital generates increased expansion of social expenses. In sum, the greater the growth of social capital, the greater the growth of the monopoly sector. And the greater the growth of the monopoly sector, the greater the state's expenditures on social expenses of production.

The second basic thesis in this study is that the accumulation of social capital and social expenses is a contradictory process which creates tendencies toward economic, social, and political crises. (See Chapter 2.) Two separate but related lines of analysis are explored.

First, we argue that although the state has socialized more and more capital costs, the social surplus (including profits) continues to be appropriated privately. (See Chapters 7 and 8.) The socialization of costs and the private appropriation of profits creates a fiscal crisis, or "structural gap," between state expenditures and state revenues. The result is a tendency for state expenditures to increase more rapidly than the means of financing them.¹⁴ While the accumulation of social capital indirectly increases total production and society's surplus and thus in principle appears to underwrite the expansion of social expenses, large monopoly-sector corporations and unions strongly resist the appropriation of this surplus for new social capital or social expense outlays. (See Chapter 1.)

Second, we argue that the fiscal crisis is exacerbated by the private appropriation of state power for particularistic ends. A host of "special interests"—corporations, industries, regional and other business interests—make claims on the budget for various kinds of social investment. (See Chapter 3.) (These claims are politically processed in ways that must either be legitimated or obscured from public view.) Organized labor and workers generally make various claims for different kinds of social consumption, and the unemployed and poor (together with businessmen in financial trouble) stake their claims for expanded social expenses. Few if any claims are coordinated by the market. Most are processed by the political system and are won or lost as a result of political struggle. Precisely because the accumulation of social capital and social expenses occurs within a political framework, there is a great deal of waste, duplication, and overlapping of state projects and services. Some claims conflict and

cancel one another out. Others are mutually contradictory in a variety of ways. The accumulation of social capital and social expenses is a highly irrational process from the standpoint of administrative coherence, fiscal stability, and potentially profitable private capital accumulation. In Chapter 9, we discuss the ways in which struggles around the control of the budget have developed in recent years and the ways in which these struggles impair the fiscal capacity of the system and potentially threaten the capacity of the system to produce surplus.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Arthur F. Burns, statement to the Joint Economic Committee, July 26, 1972, *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, August 1972, p. 699. Burns concludes that "the fundamental problem . . . is how to regain control over Federal expenditures." As this study will attempt to show, the lack of control of federal expenditures is merely a symptom of a much more deep-rooted problem.

2. Richard Musgrave and A. Mitchell Polinsky: cited by Edward C. Banfield, "Revenue Sharing in Theory and Practice," *The Public Interest*, 33 (Spring 1971), 35.

3. The conventional phrase "public finance" reveals the ideological content of orthodox economic thought by prejudging the question of the real purposes of the budget. The phrase "state finance" is preferable to "public finance" (and "state sector" to "public sector," etc.) precisely because it remains to be investigated how "public" are the real and financial transactions that take place in the state sector. For example, many so-called public investments are merely special forms of private investments.

4. Rudolf Goldscheid, "A Sociological Approach to the Problem of Public Finance," reprinted in translation in Richard Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock, eds., *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance* (New York: 1958); *Staats-socialismus oder Staatskapitalismus* (Wien-Leipzig, 1917); *Socialisierung der Wirtschaft oder Staatsbankrott* (Leipzig-Wien, 1919).

5. Joseph Schumpeter, "The Crisis of the Tax State," reprinted in *International Economic Papers*, No. 4 (1954), p. 7. Schumpeter was expecting much of the mainstream of economic thought (the orthodox or bourgeois economists). Fiscal sociology has always been central to the Marxist tradition. Marx himself wrote extensively on the subject. For example, compare Marx's conclusion that "tax struggle is the oldest form of class struggle" with the contemporary English Marxist John Eaton's statement that "state expenditure is . . . unceasingly the battleground of class interests."

6. Glenn W. Fisher, *Taxes and Politics, A Study of Illinois Public Finance* (Urbana, Ill.: 1969), p. 3.

7. James M. Buchanan, *The Demand and Supply of Public Goods*

(Chicago: 1968), p. v. Political scientists also have tended to take the state and political order for granted in their analyses of politics and administration as natural phenomena. See Theodore Lowi, "Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for Technocracy," *Public Administration Review*, 30:3 (May/June 1970).

8. Ralph Turvey, *Public Enterprise* (Baltimore: 1968).

9. Richard A. Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York: 1959), p. 4. Musgrave's treatise is a perfect example of what Paul Baran was talking about years ago when he wrote that "in our time . . . faith in the manipulative omnipotence of the State has all but displaced analysis of its social structure and understanding of its political and economic functions." Paul A. Baran, *The Longer View* (New York: 1969), p. 262.

10. Evsey Domar, *Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth* (New York: 1957), p. 6; Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, *The Growth of Public Expenditures in the United Kingdom* (Princeton, N.J.: 1961), p. 10.

11. Herbert Stein, *The Fiscal Revolution in America* (Chicago: 1969), p. 69. Stein is an establishment economist who participated in many crucial corporate and government decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. He was associated for a long time with the corporate-dominated Committee for Economic Development and was chief economic advisor to President Nixon in 1971-1972. "[A] very limited degree" means that Congress is more receptive to new spending bills during periods of recession. Three other exceptions to the general rule should be noted: (1) In 1958, the federal government began extending unemployment insurance programs to give workers additional purchasing power and thus offset expected declines in private spending (the policy has been applied fitfully since 1958). (2) Federal highway expenditures have been adjusted to smooth out fluctuations in the economy. However, fiscal policy probably has affected the timing of government outlays much more than the total volume of highway spending. (3) The President has tried to regulate spending by impounding funds (impounded funds rose from about 3.5 percent of total appropriations in 1964 to roughly 5.5 percent in 1971).

12. We have not presented a theory of the relationship between private investment and private consumption in either the short run or long run. Nor have we worked out in detail the dialectical movements between the different kinds of state expenditures. Consider, briefly, education expenditures. Education spending does double-duty as both constant and variable capital. The education system also temporarily takes surplus population off the labor market. In other words, the growth of education simultaneously absorbs surplus labor and expands productivity (and thus creates more surplus labor). In short, education spending creates and eliminates surplus capital simultaneously. Any detailed study of the education system would have to take this basic contradiction into account. A further complication arises to the degree that the growth of the education establishment and the growth of militarism are inseparable processes (as they seem to have been in the United States). It is probably true that one of the reasons that state-financed higher education in Europe is relatively undeveloped is that military and related spending is comparatively small.

Finally, it might be added that both Marx's notion of realization crises and Keynesian notions of crises of effective demand require emendation. The reason is that "supply creates its own demand" in ways that neoclassical economics never dreamed of.

13. The standard conservative work is Milton Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: 1962). The standard liberal work is John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* (Boston: 1958).

14. The socialization of profits consists of the redistribution of productive wealth from capital to labor, or the confiscation of the owning classes by the working class. Although wealth and profits as a whole have not been socialized, a portion of surplus value is appropriated by the state and used to finance expanded social capital and social expense outlays. Instead of private capital "plowing back" a portion of surplus value into expanded reproduction (net capital formation) in a particular corporation or industry, the state "plows back" that part of the pool of surplus value that it appropriated into expanded social reproduction (new social capital formation) in industry as a whole. However, the state also appropriates part of constant and variable capital. Because capital's and labor's claims on budgetary resources are processed by the political mechanism, there is rarely a one-to-one correspondence between sources of financing and the uses of tax monies. On the one hand, taxes must appear to conform to bourgeois democratic norms of "equity" and "ability to pay." On the other hand, the mixed character of social capital and social expense outlays makes it difficult to develop clearly defined criteria for identifying state expenditures empirically. Perhaps the closest correspondence between private and social forms of capital is the tax on payrolls (levied on private variable capital or wages) which is used to finance social insurance (a form of social variable capital).

CHAPTER I AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN STATE CAPITALISM

INTRODUCTION

Economic activities in modern American society may be classified into two broad groups: industries organized by private capital and those organized by the state.¹ Production and distribution in the private sector fall into two subgroups: competitive industries organized by small business and monopolistic industries organized by large-scale capital. The three groups of industries overlap considerably, and each sector depends on the others in various ways. Nevertheless, each has its own distinguishing features.

THE COMPETITIVE SECTOR

In the competitive sector the physical capital-to-labor ratio and output per worker, or productivity, are low, and growth of production depends less on physical capital investment and technical progress than on growth of employment. Production is typically small scale, and markets are normally local or regional in scope. Familiar examples include restaurants, drug and grocery stores, service stations, and other branches of trade; garages, appliance repair shops, and other services; clothing and accessories, commercial displays, and other manufacturing industries. Competitive industries employ roughly one-third of the U.S. labor force, with the largest proportion in services and distribution.

What is the significance of low ratios of capital to labor and low productivity? First, competitive sector wages are relatively low, and second, there is a tendency toward overcrowding because it is relatively easy to set up business. Further, many competitive industries produce for (or sell in) markets that are seasonal, subject to sudden change in fashion or style, or otherwise irregular or unstable. Small businessmen whose product markets are irregular have little opportunity to stabilize production and employment. Nor is there much incentive to do so even when the opportunity arises:

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The author spent several weeks in Poland in the fall of 1980 interviewing principal figures in SOLIDARITY (the new union) and in KOR (the organization of intellectuals). He was born in Poland, and was exiled along with his parents. He was educated in London, Geneva and Paris, and for eighteen years he was Paris correspondent for *The Economist*, (London) specializing in Eastern European affairs.

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The Fiscal Crisis of the State Revisited: A Look at Economic Crisis and Reagan's Budget Policy

James O'Connor

The purpose of this article is to offer a prognosis of the Reagan government's economic policies with most attention given to the Administration's budgetary policies. What is Reagan trying to do and what will he be able to do on the budgetary front? A clear answer requires an evaluation of the fiscal crisis of the state and its current relationship to the general economic crisis of capitalism. Reagan's policy is based on the theory that the economic crisis in general and inflation in particular are caused by fiscal overloads, such as Federal budget deficits, government regulation, and welfarism, rooted in excessive government intervention in the economy.¹ Traditional Marxism offers exactly the opposite theory. The claim is that fiscal overload and fiscal crisis tendencies have arisen because of the general economic crisis, which is explained in terms of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and which has the effect of reducing taxes relative to social and economic needs. My analysis is that the general crisis originates in the class struggle, including the struggle to expand and widen the social budget (in this sense Reagan is right), and that the crisis places increasing burdens on the state budget, particularly at the levels of local governments and Federal entitlement programs (in this sense, traditional Marxism is right).

However, the approach adopted in this article differs from traditional Marxism in two respects. First, in my view, the falling rate of profit is not rooted in overproduction of capital (as traditional Marxism maintains) but rather underproduction of capital. The underproduction

of capital emerges when the combined demands of both organized and unorganized sectors of the working classes results in a dramatic growth in the "average individual consumption basket" (or the average amount of wage goods workers can acquire with their real wages); an excessive growth of the "value content" of these goods; a concurrent growth in the social consumption costs organized by and through the state; and, finally, when the value content of these social costs rise dramatically. "Underproduction of capital" results when these factors combine during a period when labor power is immobile and inflexible, and when capital has a relative difficulty in mobilizing variable capital (or surplus value producing capital). Second, in my opinion, the fiscal crisis is not strictly derivative of the general crisis of capitalism, but rather develops also in accordance with its own logic, which is reciprocally and dialectically related to the general economic crisis.

These positions—that the general crisis of capital is due to underproduction of capital and that the fiscal crisis is relatively autonomous—requires some theoretical defense. This article, however, is not the place for an adequate defense of the former thesis (developed at length in a work-in-progress called *Accumulation Crisis*); instead my focus in these pages is on the connection between fiscal crisis and budgetary policy. For this reason it is essential to defend the second thesis.

The best way to conduct this defense is to take a backward glance at my book *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* and deal with certain criticisms which both orthodox and neo-Marxism have made of its theses. Consequently, the purpose of the second section of this article is meant to counter-attack orthodox Marxist and functionalist arguments. In the third section, I take up the substantive relationship between the fiscal crisis and general economic crisis during the 1970s. As mentioned above, this is not the place for a full treatment of these themes, so I offer only a sketch of the reciprocal relationship between general economic conditions and the state budget today, with some reference to the likely effects of Reagan's economic and budget policies. This lays the basis for the fourth and final section which more fully evaluates Reagan's budget in terms of what he is trying to do and also in terms of whether he is likely to get his way indefinitely. The budget issue as well as the general economic issue are seen as nothing more or less than capital's problem of reestablishing its social and political domination over labor.

The Fiscal Crisis of the State was intended to be a practical and theoretical intervention into the debates and social struggles raging in

the U.S. in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Practically, *Fiscal Crisis* was meant to help shift the American left's focus from industrial workers to the radical possibilities of state worker and state client organizations and actions. The book's claim was that the material conditions of state workers and clients are direct political issues insofar as these conditions are determined through a political process of negotiation in which arguments must be about public finances, the levels and purposes of taxation, and (potentially) the content of public policy. The material conditions of state workers and clients are also directly political in the more immediate sense that they are frequently the objects of ideological attacks (or mobilizations) by different factions of the ruling class seeking political power. This influences state worker and client interests as well as the political representation of those interests.² Due to these considerations, I argued that these factions of the working class might assume a leadership role in defining class issues politically. I also argued that state workers are the *only* fraction of the working class with a powerful material interest in uniting the other two great fractions of the proletariat (productive workers/reserve army; monopoly sector/competitive sector workers; working class taxpayers employed by private capital/state clients). In this sense, state workers are a political vanguard in that they are the class fraction enforcing Marx's basic condition for working class unity, i.e., "regular cooperation between the employed and unemployed."

The focus on state workers and clients was not an unusual position in the 1960s because of the black rebellions, student revolts, and organizing drives within state employees, though it opposed those theorists of the 1970s who returned to orthodox Marxism. Other new left fractions held to the original premises pertaining to the displacement of the class struggle into the state, and combined with older social democratic/new deal forces within the state bureaucracy (especially in education and the health and social agencies). As a result, this state bureaucracy is more progressive today than it was ten or fifteen years ago.

Theoretically, *Fiscal Crisis* lined up against orthodox Marxism's view that the capitalist state functions from the standpoint of capital as a whole solely to insure the conditions of capitalist accumulation, including the reproduction of labor power as a form of capital,³ and also the related view that the function of labor unions and social democratic parties is to contain and integrate the working class into the capitalist social order. *Fiscal Crisis* lined up in favor of the position that the modern state is "an object of class struggle . . . (and thus) social policy (is) the contradictory result of the compromise between capital and a powerful labor movement."⁴ This position, which unalterably opposes Marxist "capital logic" and functionalist methods, has won increasing

acceptance in the U.S., Italy, Spain, France (as evidenced by Nicos Poulantzas, 1978), some Third World countries, and also, to a significantly lesser degree, in England and Germany, where "capital logic" seems to be staging a last ditch defense.⁵

Fiscal Crisis was based on two major theoretical departures from orthodox Marxism's treatment of the state budget. The first was the treatment of certain state expenditures and material activities as social capital, or social investment/social consumption, or social constant capital/social variable capital. This concept of social capital permitted me to study both the quantitative and qualitative meanings of certain kinds of state interventionism. Quantitatively, social capital *ceteris paribus* raises the rate of exploitation, hence the average rates of profit and capital accumulation. Qualitatively, however, social capital "pollutes" capitalist production relationships insofar as transport, education, health services, and so on are organized by the state and hence are not based exclusively on exchange value criteria. In sum, the first theoretical departure was to treat certain state expenditures as social forms of capital advanced, or capital costs, not as revenues or drains on surplus value.

The second departure from orthodox Marxism was the treatment of other state expenditures as "social expenses." The concept of social expenses is perfectly consistent with orthodoxy in the sense that both "state revenues" and "social expenses" are deductions from surplus value and thus form a barrier to capital production in proportion that they help solve the problem of capital realization. I departed from traditional Marxism in the sense that I claimed that social expenses are the price that the state must pay for political consensus and legitimation.

Orthodox critics have pointed out that the concept of legitimation has no status in traditional Marxist thought. It is claimed that social expenses are really transitory forms which are turned on and off in accordance with levels of popular unrest, rather than in accordance with social needs, hence that they exemplify social control by the state, not legitimation of the state, representative democracy, and/or capitalism itself. Yet orthodox Marxists are not always consistent in their views on this issue. For example, Bullock and Yaffe write that "the contradictions of the capitalist state are heightened precisely in a period of growing crisis. While trying to restore the rate of profit for private capital it still *needs to guarantee* a 'politically' acceptable level of employment."⁵ In *Fiscal Crisis*, I agreed in effect with Habermas that an increased need for legitimation is created by state intervention in economic and social life. If required legitimations are missing because of various kinds of "motivation deficits," the resulting legitimation shortages must be offset by material rewards.⁶ My view also

was (and remains) that in modern capitalism the dominated classes are potentially the dominant classes, and that the state must underwrite the economic and social costs of accumulation, or those in political power risk losing their capacity to secure political and ideological consensus.

Writers in the "critical theory" tradition have attacked the way I used the concept of legitimation on the grounds that I played down or ignored these "functional equivalents." As John Keane suggests, *Fiscal Crisis* does not make a clear distinction between system integration/system rationality and social integration/social rationality. The reason is that I wrote *Fiscal Crisis* primarily as a political economist, rather than as a "political economic sociologist." The result was that I failed to appreciate the fact that social integration may be possible on the basis of new social and political symbols, or the manipulation of old symbols by cultural leaders, politicians, etc. Claus Offe, for example, argued in the early 1970s that "no-cost" claims on the state potentially increases social integration at little or no material expense, hence without reinforcing fiscal or economic system crisis tendencies.⁷ Put another way, consensus and legitimation are question of social integration which may or may not be vulnerable to economic system disruption or system crisis.

The answer to this criticism is not to deny its methodological validity but rather to question its applicability particularly during the 1960s and early 1970s.

In one sense, legitimation can be defined as the reasons which the state gives to the public to cover up the real purposes of state programs and policies. In the U.S.A. today under Reagan, for example, "deregulation of business and increasing competition" means hurrying up crisis-induced capital restructuring, including capital concentration and centralization, and also increasing labor mobility. "Tax incentives for business" means increasing profits on new capital in the south and west at the expense of old capital (and the traditional working class) in the east and mid-west. "Supply-side economics" is a cover for a program which seeks to reduce the size and value content of both the private and collective consumption basket with the purpose of sharply increasing the rate of exploitation. In this sense of the concept "legitimation," economic success presupposes ideological success. Expanded profits and accumulation presuppose successful legitimation or hegemony which, assuming state ideological policies are internally coherent, promotes social integration. This is simply a way of saying that to work effectively the economic system needs to be secured against social dysfunctions.

But there is another more important definition of legitimation. Social integration requires not only certain belief systems and

normative actions but also material resources. Symbols may legitimate profits or accumulation policies but material resources are needed to legitimate the accumulation process (i.e., capitalist accumulation through crisis) to class fractions which do not participate in, or which suffer from, economic growth and development. This is especially true during periods of crisis and capital restructuring when demands to maintain and increase social consumption and social expenses to offset declines in private consumption are made. This growth in "entitlement" has real material consequences. The most important is the redistribution of material resources from the so-called middle class to the so-called lower class, with the result that capitalist motivations and incentives within both fractions of the working class are weakened. Incentives within the "middle class" are impaired because it "doesn't receive enough." Incentives within the "lower class" are weakened because it "receives too much." In other words, social integration policies in a society which tends to reduce everything to the lowest common denominator, money, are not cheap, and also result in bad fits between individual motivations and system functions.⁸ This explains Reagan's general income distribution policy which can be summarized as the carrot for the capitalists and better-paid workers and salariat on the one side and the stick for lower-paid workers and unemployed on the other. This redistribution policy, which is legitimated by his hair-brained supply-side economic theory, functions to divide the working class.⁹

When these two theoretical breaks with Marxist orthodoxy—the concepts of social capital and legitimation/social expenses—are combined into a general theory of the state budget, it becomes easy to answer the question: why does the state grow? Some traditional answers have stressed the effects of war and their aftermath, the growth of the absolute size of capital, the need to control the working class, and struggles for the universal entitlement. Without denying the validity of any of these ideas, the answer which the reader will find in *Fiscal Crisis* is that social capital underwrites private capitalist accumulation which in turn increases demands for social expenses to prevent or remedy the "social costs" of accumulation. In this dialectical and reciprocal process, "the state grows because it grows." This simple theory highlights one of the most profound contradictions of late capitalist society and of public finances.

The question immediately arises, however, does the U.S. state always or necessarily grow because it grows? If this was true in the 1960s and early 1970s, has it been true in the late 1970s and will it be true in the 1980s? It might be plausibly argued that the 1960s and early 1970s were special periods, in the twofold sense that the economy was expanding while the Vietnam war, the proletarianization of blacks

and women, and the industrialization of higher education, were weakening time-honored American legitimating symbols of growth and opportunity. Hence that these were years in which social integration both *could be and had to be* purchased in hard, albeit inflated, cash. Along similar lines, it might be argued that the Democratic party today has not recovered from its failure to develop an austerity strategy (including austerity ideologies), which could minimally protect the Party's traditional working class, urban black, and low income constituencies from more economic hardship during the general economic crisis.

These kinds of arguments which root social and economic theory in particular *historical conjunctures* throw doubt on some of the unfortunate "functionalist" formulations of the basic thesis of *Fiscal Crisis*.¹⁰ The unproblematic nature of these formulations of the problem of the relationship between state, economy, and society is exposed not only by speculations on American experiences such as those above, but also by historical developments in some European countries. In Italy, for example, Marino Regini cannot find any clear "logic of action of the State" whether it be "capital logic" or "accumulation/legitimation logic." The reason seems to be that state action in Italy is the result of a "spoils allotment system" of client relations, conflicts and compromises in which private actors distribute resources. Hence, state policies may be "allotments without any consistency" and not necessarily conducive to either accumulation or consensus.¹¹ I believe that this kind of analysis may be applicable to the U.S. as well, with the major difference that the spoils allotment system works through the vehicles of well-established state agencies, Congressional committees, and the legal system, rather than by more direct encounters between representatives of capital, labor, farmers, small business, etc., and their various factions. This fruitful approach (which is not altogether absent in *Fiscal Crisis*), helps further to lift the whole discussion of state, economy, and society out of an abstract and functionalist framework and put it into the context of concrete social, economic, and political struggles in which different class fractions, bureaucratic interests, and so on, deploy their respective social weaponry. Furthermore, if the historical and conjunctural aspects of the whole problem are stressed, we can evolve a more powerful model of theory and action. For example, the functionalist elements in *Fiscal Crisis* were too rigid to grasp the real course of European development in the 1960s and early 1970s, when there existed a negative correlation between capitalist accumulation and social spending. Highest growth rates and lowest expenditures on medical and health facilities and services, low-cost housing, and mass transportation were to be found in France and Italy. The standard explanation is that high

inflation associated with rapid growth of capital forced European governments to keep a lid on social spending.¹² However, the governments of France and Italy were active in the provision of social capital, which underwrote economic growth in the private capital sector. This led to increased social needs and demands for social spending, which in turn were politically frustrated. This in turn contributed to the big strikes at the end of the decade and in the beginning of the 1970s, which finally had the effect of multiplying the number of various social "safety nets" in those countries and their scope of action.

3

The main factor undermining functionalist methods in Marxist theory has been the general crisis of capitalism itself. "Crises" are historical turning points or times of hard decisions when institutions and individuals are severely tested; they are periods when it is not possible to accept traditional "logical" relationships between state, economy, and society in matter-of-fact-ways. Political capitalism, the social factory, and the political factory develop new and highly problematic functional relationships which can be understood as such typically only well after the fact. It is during "crises" that new definitions of both systems and social functions emerge. This is true at the levels of both theory and practice. For example, the current level of aggregate demand is considered by the Reagan economists to be sufficient, or more than sufficient. System integration functions, however, can be satisfied only if social integration functions are restructured: hence current practical redefinitions of social integration, (e.g., the "return to the family"), attack on government expertise, etc. Crises may be defined as social struggles with highly uncertain outcomes in which functional theoretical methods themselves "function" as a kind of social control.¹³

The orthodox Marxist theory of the current economic crisis of capitalism is in this sense functionalist. Different writers emphasize different "variables" but nearly all orthodox Marxists agree that the present crisis is a classical "system crisis" of overproduction or over-accumulation of capital. Mandel, Frank, Sweezy, and others have written that the politics of the present crisis consists in the need for the working class to resist attempts by big capital and the state to restructure economic life at the expense of current standards of living and working conditions. By contrast, neo-Marxist, "workerist," and other tendencies (e.g., M. Castells, H. Cleaver, myself), insist that the current crisis is the result in whole or in part of a class struggle about which the working class may be itself deeply confused. The real need

is not to restore laborpower to the status of a relatively well-paid commodity but to deepen the struggle to unify factory workers, housewives, oppressed minorities, students, etc. along class lines, to re-integrate social relationships within the working class with the purpose of destroying the status of laborpower as a commodity.

More specifically, orthodox Marxism's theory of the fiscal crisis is that overproduction of capital has resulted in relative declines in state revenues which in turn produce bigger budget deficits. Inexorable political pressures organized by capital to reduce the social budget build up. These pressures are thought to be even greater than those during the 1930s because of current high inflation and the likely effects of budget deficits on future inflation. The tendencies toward fiscal crisis which I analyzed in my book (the internal development of the contradictions between state expenditures and state revenues), are downplayed or ignored. This tactic seems to me to be eccentric precisely because the modern fiscal crisis emerged well before the current general economic crisis.

As I suggested above, my view is that the current general economic crisis in the U.S. is not a crisis of capital overproduction but of capital underproduction. The post World War II solutions to classical overproduction crises (consumer credit, mortgage debt, welfare and the social wage, and other trends and policies developed to underwrite capitalist product competition and the commodification of needs), have stretched U.S. capitalism to the point of capital underproduction. Specifically, thanks to the growth of private consumption and social consumption, from the standpoint of both the size and value content of the consumption basket, there is insufficient production of inflation-free surplus value. And because of the growth of social expenses, including military and law-and-order expenditures, there is a larger unproductive drain on the surplus value that *is* produced. In short, in my view, the general economic crisis must be itself explained partly in terms of the social forces and political struggles leading to the fiscal crisis of the 1960s and 1970s.

I wish to pursue this theme by sketching some of the connections between the general crisis and the fiscal crisis. From the early 1960s on, the growth of social capital and social expenses (together with the partial collapse of social expenses into social consumption which has occurred because of the growth of "entitlement") increased state spending in relation to total spending. This had the unintended but not undesirable effect of stabilizing the capitalist cycle and strengthening long term economic growth trends. The result was to maintain inefficient capitalist enterprises; strengthen the unions; create cultural and social resistance to labor mobility, thus increasing structural crisis tendencies in the economy as a whole. Moreover, the growth of state

spending in relation to total spending was financed in part by inflationary means (i.e. budget deficits at the Federal level financed by the government borrowing from itself). The result has been to reinforce the relative decline in capital formation in the U.S. and the absolute decline in the older U.S. industrial zones. Inflation has had the effect of discouraging capital from committing itself to long-term investments. In many localities, especially in the midwest, there exists what is for all practical purposes an industrial capital strike, which of course has the consequence of worsening fiscal crisis trends at the level of local government.

Furthermore, inflation, and cost of living adjustments for workers in big industry, provides incentives for big capital to farm out more subcontracting work to small-scale capital and sweatshop home work, where wages are low, fringe benefits non-existent, and laborpower more variable. In England, small subcontracting firms are structurally created out of big capital's need to maintain the competitive sector and reserve army of labor.¹⁴ In Italy, the result, in Enzo Mingione's words, is that the "eco-dualistically organized society tends to incur high costs for social assistance to the underpaid or those whose income is below the subsistence level." The problem is made more severe by the fact that workers in these marginal sectors cannot defend themselves against inflation. In effect, big capital "solves" its crisis by displacing it; the general crisis reinforces traditional big capitals' practices, namely, to compel the state to socialize the costs of its variable capital while expanding needs and demands for social expenses.

Another way in which the general crisis and fiscal crisis combine is through the process of internationalization and interregionalization of capital. Capital is increasingly repelled from the older industrial and commercial zones by high wages and taxes, union rules and welfare, social disorder, etc. Industrial capital is increasingly attracted to new accumulation centers by new social capital outlays by States in the south, southwest, and west for education, water projects, space projects, transport facilities, industrial parks, and also by low wages and welfare, anti-union local and State governments, and so on.¹⁵ The result seems to be a kind of new social and geographical division of labor which concentrates "mind work" in finance, administration, research and development, in the older capitalist cities in the north (among other regions) and "manual work" in the rural areas and new industrial accumulation centers in the south and west. This process of repulsion/attraction and structural change in the social division of labor, which is caused by and exacerbates both the general and fiscal crisis, results in the need for greater outlays on social expenses in the older capitalist zones *precisely because* of increased outlays on social capital in the newer zones. Combined and uneven

regional development generates combined and uneven social conflicts.¹⁶ All this means that Reagan's plan to expand industrialization in the south and west by cutting taxes on capital (and also by trying, via changes in the unemployment system, to force workers to move from the north to the south in greater numbers), will have the effect of worsening conditions in the north and midwest, thus potentially increasing the demand for more social spending and social services. In this way, the Reagan government's short-term recovery plan profoundly conflicts with its long-term wish to undercut or eliminate entitlement.

In short, the vehicle of capital restructuring in the U.S. today is the wrecking machine of inflation rather than the class depression and deflation of capital values. However, the Reagan government must at some point choose between depression and state planning because inflation-induced capital restructuring makes both the general economic crisis and the fiscal crisis worse. Since a major depression is unthinkable for the U.S. ruling class, from the point of view of both internal and external social and political order, the state's role will have to change from "supportive" to "directive,"¹⁷ especially in relation to consumer and mortgage credit, incomes policy, and energy, raw material, agricultural, transportation, and health planning. This is not to say that *increases* in Federal social capital spending can be expected. The Reagan budget for FY 1981 actually shelves many significant social capital projects, especially in the areas of synfuels, highways, and mass transit, but also in education and science.¹⁸ The general crisis calls first and foremost for capital restructuring, which requires little if any new social constant capital, especially since economic expansion is mainly in areas such as retail trade, business services, and personal services.¹⁹ It is to say that significant changes in Reagan's free market ideologies, which had electoral appeal because of widespread anti-government sentiment created by the failure of the state and democratic institutions to deal effectively with "problem overloads," not only can be expected but appear to be inevitable.

The question arises, is it also inevitable that the changes I have been describing will actually result in higher levels of social consumption and social expenses? Put another way, what is the capacity of the state, especially the Federal government, not only to resist new claims which will be made on the budget, but also to reduce current claims? Superficially, the answer seems to be that the Federal government has a mandate to slash the budget, especially the social budget, which it is

determined to fulfill. A closer look reveals that Regan's attack is less against social consumption expenditures than social expenses, and less against income redistribution than against programs which undermine the commodity form and wage form. Thus, the Social Security program which costs \$140 billion and benefits 32 million retired workers will apparently remain substantially untouched. But so will Medicare (\$5.4 billion, 28.6 million recipients), Supplementary Security Income (\$7.9 billion, 4.2 million blind, disabled, and elderly recipients), Veteran Administration services (\$12.7 billion, 3.2 million people), and (if the Senate gets its way), parts of the programs designed to assist low-income families with their fuel bill, and to provide black lung benefits, legal aid to the poor, and aid to the handicapped. On the other hand, food stamps, which are consistent with the commodity form of need satisfaction but not necessarily the wage form, are under heavy attack. And CETA (The Comprehensive Employment Training Program) which subverts both the commodity and wage forms, is likely to be significantly reduced or eliminated altogether.²⁰

The situation is actually more complicated than this because, as I suggested above, social expenses and social consumption are variable. There always exists some kind of trade-off between acceptable symbols of well-being and hard cash at rates of exchange which themselves fluctuate in accordance with the social and political climate. However, as already noted, the Federal government cannot buy legitimation by granting political access to *both* urban-liberal-blck-feminist-labor forces and the "new right," pro-life-sunbelt forces simultaneously. At best, it might be able to neutralize the former by policies of "benign neglect" and repression while mobilizing the latter with new bursts of patriotism and Cold Warfare. In this sense, Haig's foreign policy pronouncements are an indispensable part of Reagan's budget and economic policy. However, the real problem for the Reagan government is not a shortage of "marketable" no-cost claims and symbols. In the 1930s and 1960s the problem was to keep the working classes from winning the social budget. In the 1980s Reagan's problem is to undermine the social budget which the working class has already won, or at least to keep old entitlements from growing and new entitlements from becoming established. But any attack on the social budget has the result of destroying capital, "human" capital to be sure, but capital nonetheless. This is true insofar as the social budget consists of social consumption, or insofar as an attack on social expenses in the epoch of "universal entitlement" is also a threat to social consumption. The effects of a successful attack on social consumption, because of the adverse effects on motivations and discipline within the working class, would be to lower, not to raise, the rate of exploitation, hence making underproduction of capital even more severe.²¹

In any case, from a political point of view, for U.S. capital to return to its ancient position of undisputed authority in contemporary capitalism here where the working class constitutes the vast majority of the citizenry, and where the welfare state and social budget, environmental and consumer protection, etc. are established, is practically impossible outside of the establishment of a variety of fascism.²² However, despite the new and successful political organization of the capitalist class, which has entered local and national election campaigns in full battle gear, the Reagan administration so far appears to wish to stay within the rules of the liberal democratic game.

In the absence of any sharp political turn to the far right, it is necessary to agree that "public finance may be more precarious in the 1980s than at any time since the Great Depression."²³ This means in effect that state spending on social consumption and social expenses will continue to grow. The reasons why this is so can be collected under four major headings: the rise of military spending; the growth of entitlements; the growing failure of the tax revolt; and the ineffectiveness of reprivatization strategies to reduce the costs of government services.

First, the U.S. ruling class perceives that the national and social struggles of the peoples of the Third World, not those of the domestic population, are the main threats to world capitalism and U.S. power today. Moreover, a more aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union seems to be required, along other reasons, to legitimate economic austerity at home.²⁴ (Hence, Carter's FY 1981 budget increased military spending and Reagan aims to expand arms spending and the military forces even more significantly.)

Second, there has been and probably will continue to be an uncontrollable rise in entitlement spending of all kinds at the Federal level. This is especially true of interest payments on the Federal debt which grew 156 percent (\$29.3 billion to \$74.9 billion) between 1974 and 1980. About 20 percent of the expected \$604 billion Federal budget for FY 1981 will be paid out in interest payments.²⁵ This is also true for Social Security and Medicare, which increase more than \$25 billion every year (amounting to a total of \$178 billion, or about 25 percent of the total Federal budget). The expansion of social "uncontrollables" reflects their incredible popularity among the working classes,²⁶ and also the absence of effective control by big capital over the Federal budget or bureaucracy. In fact, with the rise of the working class in the Depression and after World War II, especially with the political organization of blacks and reserve army of labor in the 1960s, capital was forced into a series of negotiated compromises which permitted labor unions, State and local governments, state employees, state client organizations, private capital with state contracts, students, etc. to

determine the social budget, albeit in highly mediated and contradictory ways. The "social democracy" built into the budget and Federal bureaucratic structure is perhaps the main domestic problem facing big capital. For example, establishing and tightening eligibility standards in entitlement programs, an alternative preached by some Democratic party politicians, requires significant changes in bureaucratic personnel and rules. Nixon spent four years winning political legitimacy and support on the basis of initiatives in foreign policy with the partial purpose of using his second term to purge the social democrats from the Federal bureaucracy. He tripped over Watergate and the social democratic presence within the state, the media and educational establishment—a presence which, in the form of environmentalist ideologies and practices, is if anything stronger now than ever. Carter was unwilling and unable to do anything about this "problem"; nor will Reagan be able to try what Nixon intended during his second term without building up much more credibility than he has at present. Otherwise, Reagan advisor Martin Anderson's line, that the welfare state is complete since the promises American society has made to its citizens are either already fulfilled or obsolete, will remain mere ideological rhetoric. At best, Reagan may be able to reduce Democratic Party control of the House in 1982 by scapegoating House Democrats for resisting spending cuts, thus constituting themselves as a barrier to economic recovery. But it is unlikely that the Democrats will fall for this obvious ploy, and also it is a long way from this (possibly future) "victory" to any large-scale purge of social democrats, laborists, minorities, feminists, etc. from the state itself.

A third reason why public expenditures will expand and public finances will remain "precarious" is that the local tax revolt and "welfare backlash," in which employed workers and salariat have tried to protect their real wages and salaries against the ravages of inflation,²⁷ show some signs of weakening. State client groups, some unions, students, and above all the state employee unions and associations have been fighting property tax and other tax reductions on the grounds that these reductions threaten needed public expenditures and social services. This social and economic struggle is absolutely crucial both economically and politically. Economically, because big reductions in the welfare state will recreate more open competition between productive work forces and the reserve armies of labor. Politically, because Reagan's electoral support depends precisely on this basic antagonism within the working class between, on the one hand, hard-pressed employed workers and salariat who have supported tax cuts and irrationally viewed social programs with hostility, and, on the other, the reserve armies of labor and the state workers who both depend on the social budget.

It appears that despite significant blue collar support for cuts in programs serving the "undeserving poor," all the struggles to prevent the re-creation of 19th century labor market conditions have not been altogether in vain. First, as I have already mentioned, there is no large political support for cutting social programs from the Federal budget (food stamps excepted). Most people apparently would prefer to fight inflation by balancing the budget than by cutting taxes.²⁸ Second, the proposed cutbacks in the social budget have immediately inspired new coalitions of labor unions, women's organizations, black organizations, environmentalists, and others, which will doubtless spearhead a drive for Ted Kennedy in 1984. Third, in the 1980 elections, California's Proposition 13 mania did not sweep the country. While property taxes were sharply cut in Massachusetts, tax cut ballot measures lost in half a dozen other States. Fourth, local and State governments have passed new tax laws, and, because the Congress is not likely to go along completely with supply-side economic theory, the promised large reductions in personal income taxes may not be readily forthcoming.

The underlying reason for the relative weakening of the tax revolt, and also the reluctance to support specific social cuts in the budget, appears to be the deep contradiction facing the employed working class and salariat. They have won entitlements at the Federal level through decades of social action and political pressure, which have added inflationary pressures. The struggle against reductions in real wages and salaries (that is, the struggle against inflation) in the form of local tax revolts means that employed workers are in effect fighting against themselves, at least to the degree that local, State, and Federal tax cuts threaten entitlement and the social budget as a whole. In effect, there are signs that more people are paying attention to the "vanguard" of state worker organizations and acting in their own objective interests, which consists in a refusal to let capital turn the clock back and restore the full range of fractional divisions within the working class, which historical struggles of labor unions, blacks, state workers, clients, women, etc. have to a degree successfully overcome. In short, to the degree that the working class as a whole acts in its own objective interests on the economic front, it will be much harder for capital to reestablish its social and political domination of labor. The missing ingredients in the "implicit" working class program are the demand to restore detente with the Soviet Union (hence creating conditions for reducing the military budget), and the demand for vastly expanded collective consumption and community services organized by the people themselves (which would directly attack the commodity form of need satisfaction and the wage form).

Finally, State spending is likely to continue to increase because the major attempt to control costs of state services has failed. "Reprivati-

zation" of social services, or "contracting out," has not provided the fiscal relief that was at one time thought to be possible and practical.²⁹ It is interesting and ironic that Reagan's own Navy Secretary denounced the military contractors building nuclear submarines as incompetent, and threatened to bring the Federal government into the sub-building business. The failure of "reprivatization" to overcome the fiscal crisis, has meant that city, county and State government payrolls have expanded by 108 percent between 1970 and 1978 (a little less than the rise in private sector wages); structural fiscal crisis tendencies are greater than ever. The corporate liberal establishment, at least, recognizes the structural power of state workers, to protect their wages and salaries, working conditions, and their employment in most cases, except these "basket cases" like New York City, where divisions within the working class are unbelievably deep.³⁰ While layoffs of government personnel and cutbacks in social services at the local level have caused much hardship during the past half decade or so, there are signs that the unity moving within the working class, feminist organizations, community groups, etc. has a real change of meeting the challenges posed by the Reagan government in the 1980s. The main reason will be the economic failure of the administration. Assuming he gets his big tax cuts through Congress, the effect will be to expand consumption spending and speculative investments. The reason is that productive investments are sluggish not because of insufficient personal savings but because of insufficient profit rates. Further, assuming Reagan can in fact cut \$30-45 billion from the Federal budget, the effects on inflation in an economy in which the GNP is \$3 trillion will be slight. In my view, Reagan's economic policies will fail badly, partly because of bad economic advice, partly because of popular resistance to his policies, (especially budgetary policies, which will increase in the proportion that his policies flounder), and partly because the general and fiscal crises are intractable except in the context of vast bottom-up changes in the conditions of material reproduction of daily life. The real danger is that Reagan might be tempted to start a war to keep the Republicans in office in 1982 and himself President in 1984.

In conclusion, the persistence of fiscal and social stresses and strains throughout the 1970s, which are in part causes and in part effects of the general economic crisis, has forced the state to use various devious or roundabout tactics to reduce the budget and threaten new deal/liberal/new left forces within the State bureaucracy. But all of these tactics have already failed, or will later backfire. First, there is the attempt to centralize the budget determination procedure at the Federal level. In Carter's proposed FY 1981 budget struggle, he sought a "reconciliation" bill which would set overall limits on Federal

spending. The aim was to neutralize special interest seeking exemptions from expenditure cuts, and was opposed by Congressional committees trying to protect these special interests and their own turf. Reagan has suggested escalating this tactic by a referendum-type approach to budget determination in the form of a single bill which would cut expenditures across the board. The "danger" is that any attempt to steamroll "special interests" and normal pluralistic budget determination will backfire and transform particularistic budget struggles into open class struggles.

Second, there is the attempt to relieve the fiscal crisis by making Federal block grants to States and cities a cover for reducing revenue-sharing and diluting national standards in welfare and other fields. The Reagan government wants to consolidate nearly 100 categorical grants into a few block grants for education, health, and social services. This would give State and local governments more flexibility in their use of Federal monies, and is thus supported by the National Governors Association (which however wants the Federal government to keep paying welfare and Medicaid). The "danger" is that increased local control of budget decisions will open up new arenas of struggle for local progressive forces. Third, there is the partly successful attempt to cut social services outright, legitimated by "extraordinary conditions," or local government "bankruptcy." When this has occurred it has often been accompanied by a bottom-up radicalization of social programs and/or local government personnel. Fourth, Sun Belt State and local governments have developed new and devious forms of "contracting out" with the purpose of preventing state worker unions from establishing themselves. But these seem to have opposite counterparts in the north and midwest where fresh attempts to establish more popular control of local budgets and social programs keep being tried. Reagan's CETA cuts, which may force some local governments to buy services from "social-industrial" capital, appear to be a Federal counterattack against progressive local programs.

In short, despite the present crisis, the new left strategy of the "long march through the institutions" is by no means moribund. The democratization of local governments and states, the radicalization of state personnel, the development of state worker-community relationships and new anti-cutback coalitions, suggest that the dream of the triumph of society over capital and the state is still alive, although admittedly not in the most robust health.

NOTES

1. A much fuller critique of Reagan's policies in general and supply-side economics in particular may be found in: James O'Connor, "Accumulation Crisis: The Problem and Its Setting," *Contemporary Crises*, 1981. It should be mentioned at the outset however that there were fewer Federal employees in 1980 than in 1968, and that Federal spending in relation to GNP was practically the same in 1980 as it was in 1968 (22.1 percent compared with 21.5 percent).

2. Thanks to Carlo and Lela Carboni for help in formulating this issue.

3. For example, John A. Fry refers to the "bourgeois class character of the state . . . and its overall function of maintaining and expanding conditions favorable for an economy based on a capital/wage labour relationship" (*Limits of the Welfare State: Critical Views on Post-War Sweden*, Franborough (England), 1979, 2).

I should add that *Fiscal Crisis* was also written as a critique of the barren bourgeois theory of public finance based on the concept of "individual choice." Jared Epstein has pointed out that it is a little strange to listen to bourgeois sociologists and economists today using or reintroducing the concept of the "individual" in a period when the attack by capital on the working class as such is so severe. But, of course, ideologies of individualism are required to make an attack on the working class actually work.

4. John D. Stephens, "Review," *Limits of the Welfare State*, op. cit., *Contemporary Sociology*, 10, 1, January, 1981, 112, citing Korpi's *The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism*. For a defense of the *Fiscal Crisis* against orthodox Marxism, see my "Some Reflective Criticisms on Mosley's 'Critical Reflections on *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*,'" *Review of Radical Political Economics*, LL, 3, Fall, 1979.

5. Paul Bullock and David Yaffe, "Inflation, the Crisis and the Post-War Boom," *Revolutionary Communist*, 3/4, November, 1975, 35 (italics added). The "capital logic" school has been further undermined by arguments that claim that the state is the "institutionalization" of anarchy because the aims of the capitalist class (however it is decided politically what these aims are), are subverted by individual capital fractions acting in their own special interests.

6. Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, Boston, 1975, Chapters Six-Seven.

7. No-cost claims and new symbols pertaining to pro-abortion, pro-easy divorce, pro-reverse discrimination, pro-sexual freedom etc. forces have of course been confronted politically by new "pro-life" forces, new forms of racism, etc. which have polarized U.S. society, raised the political ante, and render "no-cost" claims increasingly ineffectual. In effect, the price of using no-cost claims to ameliorate fiscal crisis was to worsen social crisis tendencies.

8. There are many other aspects of the problem of legitimation which cannot be dealt with here. As Regini, for example, shows, the involvement of unions in state policy may help to integrate workers into the social order, not because the unions themselves are necessarily sources of social control, but rather because the mere presence of unions in the state apparatus increases capitalist legitimacy, hence social integration.

9. The extreme version of this so-called theory can be found in George Gilder's *Wealth and Poverty* (New York, 1980), which claims that the state has ruined the U.S. economy by taxing the capitalists too much while granting too much social welfare to the poor.

10. For example, "the greater the growth of social capital, the greater the growth of the monopoly sector. And the greater the growth of the monopoly sector, the greater the state's expenditure on social expenses of production" (*Fiscal Crisis*, op. cit., 9). This formulation is incomplete even as a statement of functional relationships, i.e., it leaves undetermined the growth of social capital, which as we will see must be (problematically) related to whether private capital is in a boom or crisis. As I mentioned above, it also leaves undetermined the effects of an expansion of social expenses on surplus value available for accumulation.

11. As the Carbonis have pointed out to me, this approach ignores the whole dimension of "capital as a whole" hence possibilities of showing that social contradictions are class contradictions. That is, in the pure "spoils allotment system" model, conflicts appear as merely specific conflicts without any relation to social and class struggles.

12. For example, Richard B. DuBoff, "Economic Ideology and Environment," in Hans G. T. Raay and Ariel E. Lugo, *Man and the Environment, LTD*, Rotterdam (Holland), 1974, 215-216, citing the work of EEC economist Michel Albert.

13. The definition of crisis as class struggle, and the critique of traditional mechanistic, functionalist, and radical Durkheimian crisis theory can be found in: James O'Connor, "The Meaning of Crisis," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 1981.

14. Friedman sets another *Fiscal Crisis* thesis right by showing that it is the capital/labor struggle within big capital, not lack of demand, that leads to the recreation of small capital and the reserve army (Andrew Friedman, *Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Capitalism*, Atlantic Highlands, (N.J.), 1978).

15. The 1980 census revealed that the most rapidly growing metropolitan areas in terms of population are (in order of rates of growth): Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood, Fla.; Phoenix; Houston; Tampa-St. Petersburg; San Diego; Orange County, Cal.; Salt Lake City-Ogden; Denver-Boulder; Sacramento, Cal.; Dallas-Fort Worth. In the midwest, east and west, population growth in rural areas is significantly greater than in metropolitan areas. In the south, the reverse was true.

16. Dwayne Ward was the first to point this out to me.

17. J. Winkler, "Corporatism," *Archives Europeene de Sociologie*, XVII/1, 1976.

18. The significant exception seems to be state investments in future "human capital." Head Start, which provides \$950 million in educational services for 374,000 preschool children, and the school breakfast and lunch program (costing \$2.1 billion for meals to 9.5 million school children) remained untouched in the original Reagan budget proposal. It remains to be seen whether the NEA, AFT, science establishment, etc. can save the education and science budgets from large planned reductions.

19. *Fiscal Crisis* was written as an interpretation of crisis tendencies in the 1960s and early 1970s, hence downplayed the variable nature of social capital outlays during general economic crises. However, social capital outlays have to be explained in terms of political struggles as well as "functional economic requirements." Thus a mass united front of northern/midwestern interests might be able to force the Federal government (in the form of a Kennedy) presidential candidacy in 1984?) to lay out the social capital needed to "reindustrialize" these regions.

20. The inconsistencies in Reagan's program are underlined by the fact that the Summer Youth Jobs Program (\$870 million for 665,000 urban youth) is likely to stay the same.

21. Liberal commentators have confused the issue by accusing Reagan of cutting back the poor more than the "middle class" hence using political not economic criteria to determine the distribution of budget cutbacks. This is a good example of how liberal thought sees only the distribution of values, not the production of values. The fact is that a cutback of "middle class" social consumption would impair capitalist production relationships hence value production. The same is not true of a cutback of social expenses.

22. Eight years ago I described the many segments of U.S. society which depend on the budget—bureaucrats and poverty workers; businesses and workers in construction and other industries which live off government contracts; local Democratic party politicians who need the budget to build up client constituencies; state clients and workers; etc. I concluded that a "true monopoly class domestic policy and budget will hinge on the consolidation of monopoly capital's political rule, which is an academic way of saying, the introduction of American fascism" ("Nixon's Other Watergate: The Federal Budget for FY 1974," *Kapitalistate*, 2/1973, 11).

23. Wayne Anderson, Executive Director of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, quoted in "The Pinch on Public Employees," *Business Week*, June 23, 1980, 71.

24. James O'Connor, *Accumulation Crisis: The Problem and Its Setting*, op. cit.

25. This compares with a 121 percent growth rate between 1974 and 1980 for education, health, and human services spending, and a 71 percent growth rate for military spending (Steven Seiden, "Interest is Eating Up the Budget," *Business Week*, February 9, 1981).

26. According to the New York Times/CBS poll in February, 1980. The only really unpopular program among those polled was food stamps (*New York Times*, February 2, 1981). According to the Census Bureau, Federal benefit programs reach about one-third of American families (*New York Times*, March 13, 1981).

27. As Robert Kuttner shows (*Revolt of the Haves*, New York, 1980), the revolt against high property taxation is basically a "middle class" social movement in that it consists of workers and salaried personnel in large-scale capital, professionals, and small businessmen. The revolt is *against* redistribution within the working class and salariat in favor of workers in small capital, unemployed, underemployed, etc. It is not a right-wing plot, although the right-wing has received a large ideological windfall.

28. Steven Roberts, "Reagan's Budget Battle," *The New York Times*, February 11, 1981, 10, citing *The Times/CBS* poll.

29. A full discussion of "reprivatization" is not possible here. Suffice it to say that this process assumes many forms. First, contracting out, mentioned in the text above. Second, money transfers which will permit people to buy services on the open market (e.g., educational vouchers). Third, shifting state services back on to the family in general and women in particular (the hoped-for outcome by the new right). Fourth, self-organization of needs on a collective basis by people involved directly in the delivery and use of services (the optimal outcome from the standpoint of the working class).

30. "The power of public employees to cause irritation or inconvenience to the public need not be totally curbed. To do so would be excessively costly, even if it were possible. Such action might also unnecessarily deprive employees of a measure of power that it may be desirable for them to have in order to protect their own interests and dissuade them from seeking power through other routes" (Committee for Economic Development, *Improving Management of the Public Work Force*, November, 1978, 89).

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NEW YORK CITY: PROTOTYPE OF THE URBAN CRISIS

Introduction

We are pleased to publish the following extensive article on the fiscal crisis in New York City, and its impact on black people and the nation as a whole. New York is the information processing center of the international finance capitalism, overseeing and regulating the flow of capital throughout the nation and, indeed, the world. This function is made possible by the characteristics of the city's labor force, especially superexploited black and third world workers. The city government provides the infrastructure for the private sector, and it must also meet heavy social needs which are not provided by the banks and corporations. Taxation, hitting the black and third world communities hardest, does not cover the city's expenses, and the result has been greater reliance on borrowing resulting in a growing debt and the looming possibility of default. Default, however, would threaten the big banks that have grown rich on the interest from New York's bonds. The entire national economy would feel the repercussions of default. Four supra-electoral bodies, tied closely to the banks, were established to restore the city's liquidity by cutting back on social and educational services, and undermining the livelihood of the city's workers. But these regressive measures have failed to resolve the crisis, forcing the city government to appeal for aid to the state and federal governments. The crisis has had disastrous impact on the city's black and third world communities as cutbacks in employment, housing, health, education and welfare programs have taken effect. Moreover, racism has been intensified as blacks have been used as scapegoats for the city's crisis. Unless there is a general awakening to the meaning of this crisis, the outgrowth could be the rise of state capitalism and fascism in the United States.

—The Editor

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by WILLIAM W. SALES, JR.

THE MUNICIPAL government of New York City is now faced with an unprecedented fiscal crisis. Since June of this year it has been dangerously close to defaulting on the payment of principal and interest on its short and long term debt. Due to erosion of investor confidence in the city's liquidity, refinancing of the outstanding debt has been increasingly difficult. Current taxation alone cannot bridge the gap between revenues and fiscal obligations payable. Consequently, the city's political leadership has been forced to seek the aid of the banking community, the State and the Federal governments.

Through a series of extra-ordinary measures and a special session of the state legislature, fiscal responsibility for New York has been removed from local elected officials and placed in special committees of bankers, corporate directors and state officials. In New York City the mechanisms of public policy are now beyond the effective control of the electorate. Imposed upon the working people of the electorate are: massive layoffs and firings; the contraction of job opportunities; the freezing of the wages of municipal workers; a moratorium on public construction; the curtailment and elimination of essential public services; and the increase in real estate, sales, and service taxes. Political disenfranchisement has been accompanied by a decrease in the standard of living and material well-being of the majority of New Yorkers. For the city's black and Third World communities, deepening economic exploitation presages the intensification of political op-

pression. The crisis itself recreates, at a higher stage of development, the objective conditions for interracial working class unity, but the ideologies of the capitalist class work overtime to sow the seed of racial antagonism in the white working and petty bourgeois classes. Thus the objective and the subjective conditions for fascism have emerged as a consequence of the city's crisis.

This article will describe and analyze in their interrelationships each of the crisis components mentioned above. Premising this article is the assumption that the current fiscal crisis emerged out of the antagonistic contradictions associated with a New York City government functioning within the context of a capitalist, national economy. The article will also examine to what extent the city's fiscal crisis is part of the larger crisis facing the imperialist system of monopoly finance capitalism. Lastly, our concerns will identify the implications of the city's crisis on the future development of the socio-economic system of the United States.

NEW YORK CITY IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Economic activity in New York City is primarily directed toward producing and processing the information necessary for the ruling class to exercise control over the productive activity of the national economy. The service oriented economy of the city represents the epitome of the bureaucratic organization of labor in the United States. This

bureaucracy exists solely to facilitate the realization of surplus value. Of the 500 largest industrial corporations in the United States, 126 are headquartered in the New York region, as are four of the top ten utilities, five of the seven largest banks and three of the four largest insurance companies.¹

NEW YORK'S economy can perform this function only because of the quality, variety and flexibility of its labor force. The city's service sector can exist because of the continuous supply of a relative surplus of low-waged labor thrown out of the older manufacturing processing and agricultural sectors by technological unemployment. These cast-offs are absorbed into the headquarters bureaucracy, a sector somewhat more resistant to labor-saving technology. Complementing and expanding this relative surplus of low-waged labor are the swelling numbers of legal and illegal aliens entering the city's labor market. Especially in the tropical areas of the Third World, imperialism's "development of underdevelopment" is forcing these aliens out of subsistence agriculture and into the economic life of the metropolises like New York.² This mass of low-waged labor is but one aspect of contradictory relationships whose other aspect is the tremendous rate of profit realized from headquarters activity in New York.

New York City is the corporate headquarters of international finance capital because corporate investment has flowed into the city as a natural consequence of the rate of profit realized there. Other service industries like advertising facilitate the central task of the corporate headquarters while wholesale and retail activities as well as manifold small manufacturing industries meet the consumption needs of the city's work force. Many of these small manufacturing firms are marginal producers, prolonging their existence in the face of more technologically advanced competitors by using extremely low-waged "sweat shop" labor. This labor force is disproportionately composed of black and Third World people. Thirty percent of New York's labor force is nonwhite, a majority of whom are confined to these lowest wage sectors of the

work force. In a sample of seven New York City ghettos, the percentage of individuals working fulltime and not making a living wage, discouraged job seekers, those working part-time involuntarily, and the officially unemployed, range from 39.9% to 66.6% of the ghetto labor force.³ The superexploitation of the city's black and Third World population to subsistence levels is but the edifice upon which rose the New York City that we know as the corporate and financial capital of the world.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NEW YORK CITY ECONOMY

The government of New York City is responsible for providing the infra-structure necessary to support profitable economic activities within its borders. It must meet many of the needs of its working population which are crucial for the regeneration of labor power but are not met in the private sector for lack of profitability. If social peace and stability so necessary to business activity are to be maintained, the city government must provide regardless of profitability a minimal standard of living to the most oppressed and unproductive segments of the working population. These public responsibilities require the municipal government to raise revenues. The city's expense budget includes expenditures for social welfare, education, police, fire and environmental protection, debt servicing and miscellaneous categories. A separate capital budget outlines construction expenses, and revenues for this purpose are raised almost exclusively through borrowing.

The fiscal 1976 budget, a spartan one, is approximately 12.6 million dollars larger than the gross national product of many countries. Revenues to meet this budget come from several sources. Considerable revenues come into the city from the Federal and State governments. Three and one half billion dollars of Federal monies met 25% of New York City's expenses this year: 2 billion in Medicaid, Public Assistance and Food Stamps; 263 million in revenue sharing; 203 million for transportation and 400 million for education and manpower programs. On the other hand, New Yorkers paid out in person-

al and corporate taxes approximately 15.5 billion dollars.⁴ Among other taxes, the State turns over to the city its receipts from two special taxes: the stock transfer tax and the mortgage tax. Most of the revenue raised by the city itself comes from real estate taxes, representing about 60% of total tax receipts, the remainder composed of taxes on sales, businesses and individual incomes.

THE LIMITS OF TAXATION AS A SOURCE OF REVENUE

One bourgeois social scientist feels that raising revenue is fraught with "endless problems because what is involved in the fiscal management of government is a complex balancing of unequals. Revenues are pitted against community needs: neither are rigid quantities, both are politically rooted. Among the problems encountered are how to spread costs fairly for such services as public transportation, or how to introduce efficiency and trim budgets where patronage and expenditure are in some quarters a measure of success."⁵ This analysis is quite wide of the mark. Municipal fiscal managers are not primarily concerned with an equitable distribution of the tax burden nor are municipal bureaucracies supposed to be efficient. Rather municipal financing can be reduced essentially to finding the proper mix between taxation and borrowing. This proper mix can simply be defined as that ration of taxation to borrowing which maximizes the growth in the rate of profit of the corporate firms which dominate the city's economy.

REGARDLESS OF legal stipulations, all taxes in the capitalist economy are regressive; that is, a disproportionate amount of income in taxes is yielded by lower income groups. This is a result of theoretical and practical considerations. Taxation has traditionally been viewed as a disincentive to corporate investment. Capitalist consumption and investment come out of the surplus extracted from the labor of workers. Increasing taxes reduces the amount available for investment and consumption. In addition by holding out the

spectre of reduced future consumption to the capitalist, increased taxation becomes an incentive toward increased capitalist saving or, what is the other side of the same coin, reduced capitalist investment. Since the rate of profit is positively correlated with the rate of investment, municipalities try to minimize the impact of taxes on corporate investment so as to maximize the growth of the urban economy.

From a practical standpoint, also, we see that increased corporate and real estate taxes are in fact fully or partly passed onto the backs of the working classes of the city in the form of higher rents and commodity prices. When this inflationary motion outstrips the growth in real income of the working classes the general level of economic activity is curtailed and the total level of tax revenues received may actually be less than might be the case with a lower rate of taxation. Equality in taxation to meet necessary social costs would undermine the process of capitalist accumulation. The major burden of taxation thus falls upon the backs of those who work. Their limited incomes collectively cannot support necessary current and capital expenditures. Herein lies the source of the contradiction haunting public fiscal policy: the necessity of limiting taxation so as to maximize the rate of capital accumulation but at the same time providing an infra-structure for business activity whose costs thus far outstrip the tax base. The city overcomes this contradiction by borrowing.

There has been a secular trend in New York City to avoid balanced budgets so as not to curtail the general expansion of economic activity indicated in the foregoing. The gap between revenues and expenditures has been met through long and short term borrowing, primarily from the big banks and corporations at marketable interest rates. Today the city has an accumulated debt of some 13 billion dollars while the servicing of that debt in the fiscal year 1976 will amount to some 3 billion dollars. Socially necessary but unprofitable projects are financed by making them lucrative to the capitalist investor. Municipal deficit financing by making the capitalist investor a creditor of the city,

repaid out of tax revenues exacted from working people, converts unprofitable social responsibility into profitable, private investment.

THE CAUSES OF NEW YORK CITY'S FISCAL CRISIS

The unequal imposition of taxation and debt already described could be rationalized if it stimulated business activity in such a way as to allow a growth in real income of working people which could outstrip the increases in taxation. In periods of increasing prosperity it may appear that this is what happens. But all justification for this strategy vanishes in the present period of depression, a period characterized by rampant inflation coupled with high unemployment; in a word, stagflation. The rising level of prices calls forth justifiable demands from municipal workers for increases in real wages and benefits. Inflation also affects the costs of goods and services purchased by the municipality. On the other hand revenues are restricted because inflation and unemployment reduce the taxability of the working population. The problem is compounded by bureaucratic inefficiency and political corruption in the tax collection process. Private realty corporations in New York City owe some 500 million in back taxes. It took a tax discount of 8% on taxes estimated to get these very same interests to make a prepayment on this year's taxes. The city itself claims that there is little it can do to quickly collect delinquent corporate taxes, arguing that it takes several years to foreclose on defaulted properties. New York is thus faced with a liquidity problem, a problem of cash flow.

TRADITIONALLY New York has bridged the gap between cash on hand and current obligations by issuing short term, revenue anticipation notes. These notes were redeemed as revenues came in. Long term borrowing in bonds, formerly was limited to large-scale capital undertakings. Recently the cash flow problem has been accentuated, so much so

TABLE 1

Loans and Deposits: Commercial Banks LARGE COMMERCIAL BANKS(a)

End of year	Loans	Deposits	Loans as percent of deposits
Billions of Dollars			
1950	\$ 31.6	\$ 87.8	36.0%
1955	48.4	105.3	46.0
1960	71.6	127.2	56.3
1965	120.3	181.8	66.2
1970	188.8	266.8	70.8
LARGE NEW YORK CITY BANKS			
1950	9.9	25.1	39.4%
1955	14.2	27.9	50.9
1960	18.6	31.0	60.0
1965	31.8	45.7	69.6
1970	45.5	63.2	72.0
1974	78.9	93.5	84.4

a. Banks that had total deposits of \$100 million or more on Dec. 31, 1965.

Source: Data prior to 1974 are from various issues of the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*. Data for 1974 are from *Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.3* for the last week in 1974.

that the maturing short term debt itself could not be redeemed in cash. This situation was tolerable as long as the banks would accept the city's higher yielding but longer term bonds as redemption of the short term debt. In the present period of depression, however, investor confidence in the ability of the city to service its huge and growing debt has been eroded.

This summer Moody's, a leading investor rating service, withdrew its rating of New York City bond anticipation notes and revenue anticipation notes. Moody's action came hard on the heels of Standard and Poor's suspension of its A rating on New York City general obligation bonds. "New York City's deteriorating ability to raise money in the capital market places unusual strains on its cash position. . . . The possible inability or unwillingness of the major underwriting banks to continue to purchase the city's notes

and bonds was a primary contributing reason for the suspension."⁶ The market for New York bonds and securities had all but disappeared by this summer. Without investor confidence, the city is forced to meet both payrolls and debt servicing with cash. The possibility of default becomes a reality.

NEW YORK'S FISCAL CRISIS IS A CRISIS FOR THE "BIG" BANKS

Default represents catastrophe not only for New York City's municipal government but its "ripple" effects represent an accentuation of the crisis in which the American economy is now enmeshed. The banking system and especially the New York City big banks are the transmission lines of this shock to the nation's economic structure. In an article in the February 1975 issue of *Monthly Review* the editors of that publication described and analyzed the true liquidity posture of the U.S. banking system. What they reported

was that the tremendous economic expansion of the early 70's was built upon a mountain of corporate and bank debt which progressively decreased the reserves available to meet depositor demand. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate respectively the loan structure supporting the upsurge in economic activity and the liquidity posture complimentary to this expansion.⁷

The bank reserves indicated in Table 2 include cash short-term U.S. treasury bills and notes whose market price will not fluctuate very much. In addition the banks maintain a portfolio in long-term bonds of the U.S. Treasury and other government bodies including municipal obligations. The advantage of long-term borrowing is the higher interest rate paid on bonds as compared to short term notes but their price fluctuates in the market and therefore their sale is not always profitable. These reserves must be available to meet depositor demand but as we see from Table 2, at present Federal

TABLE 2
Liquidity of Large Commercial Banks

End of year	Cash Reserves(a)	U.S. Treasury Bonds(b)	Short-term U.S. Treasury Notes(c)	Cash + All Treasuries as a percent of total deposits(d)	Cash + Short-term Treasuries as a percent of total deposits(d)
	Billions of dollars				
1950	\$13.7	\$33.7	n.a.	54.0%	n.a.
1955	14.9	30.1	n.a.	42.7	n.a.
1960	14.0	30.2	8.2	34.7	17.5%
1965	16.3	24.3	8.6	22.3	13.7
1970	20.2	28.1	10.3	18.3	11.4
1974	29.5	23.4	7.9	13.6	9.6

n.a. Not available

a. Cash in vault plus reserves with Federal Reserve banks, as required by the Federal Reserve Board.

b. Bonds here include bills, certificates, notes, as well as bonds.

c. All treasury securities that mature in less than one year.

d. The data on deposits used as the denominator are those given in Table 1.

Source: Same as Table 1.

securities and cash amount to only 13.6% of the "Big" banks demand deposits. If federal reserve requirements are taken into account the adjusted figure is 9.6%. Municipal bonds and the banks' own borrowing are the major means by which this poor liquidity position is propped up against the possibility of a surge in withdrawals and loan defaults. Thus municipal debt servicing is an important component of the banks' ability to meet depositor demand as well as the servicing of the banks' own debt.

Specifically, over 50% of the portfolio holdings of 100 major U.S. banks are in New York City bonds and notes. The top New York City banks (5 of the nation's 7 largest) hold between 20-50% of their portfolios in New York securities and bonds.⁸ Clearly, a major part of the banking systems reserves are held in New York City notes and bonds. A municipal default would cause a multiple contraction of available credit, causing interest rates to rise, resulting in a further downturn in economic activity. Loss of investor confidence already apparent in the price decline in bank stocks, might result in a "run" on the U.S. banking system as investors themselves struggle to improve their liquidity posture. A city default could torpedo the supposed "recovery" of the national economy from its deepest post-war "recession." Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System and the board chairmen and presidents of the "Big Three" New York Banks, have acknowledged the pronounced depressionary impact of a New York City default. Chancellor Walter Scheel of West Germany warned President Ford of the international repercussions of such a default.⁹ New York's fiscal crisis is rapidly becoming a major aspect of the more general crisis of the capitalist system.

THE COST OF FISCAL REDEMPTION: LOSS OF DEMOCRACY AND BANK RULE

By the summer of 1975, the City administration produced an honest projection of its deficit for the fiscal 1976 year. The gap was then seen as approximately 800 million dollars with projections for it to increase astro-

nomically to three billion dollars before the conclusion of the fiscal year. Given the setbacks in bond rating already described the "full faith and credit" of the City was not enough to elicit significant purchases of short term notes and long term bonds.

The hands-off attitude of the "big banks" was based on several assumptions. Municipal politics in New York were characterized as corrupt. City fiscal policies were seen as nothing more than sleight of hand. Justifiable wage increases were viewed as irresponsible and inflationary concessions to a union oligopoly representing an inefficient and wasteful public bureaucracy. Blame was placed squarely on the political lieutenants of the capitalist class and all remedies subsequently proposed included a progressively broadening and dominant direct presence of the financial and corporate directorate of the nation. Profligate spending was seen as the demon to be exorcised from the fiscal life of the City. The banks have insisted that the City balance its budget as a condition of refinancing its debt servicing.

By the end of the summer the tentative gropings of the City and the Big New York banks had engulfed the State government and a cornucopia of bank-dominated structures emerged to restore the City's liquidity. These structures were to restore investor confidence by imposing draconian economies upon the working people of New York. Four supra-electoral structures were created: they are in order of importance: the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB); the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC); the Management Advisory Board; and the Temporary Commission on Finances. Charts 1 and 2 illustrate their membership, tasks, costs and their interrelationship.¹⁰

The forty panel members on these boards are executives of multi-national firms. Seventeen of them are bankers or directors of savings institutions or investment houses. In the tradition of the capitalist class, the four boards have interlocking directorates. William Ellinghaus, President of New York Telephone and director of two banks, is the only EFCB member to sit on a second board. Ellinghaus and Special Deputy Mayor Axel-

CHART 1				
	Emergency Financial Control Board	Municipal Assistance Corporation	Management Advisory Board	Temporary Commission on Finances
Membership	The Governor, State Controller, Mayor and City Controller are designated as members by law. Three others are named by the Governor.	Five members named by the Governor and four by the Mayor.	Eleven members, appointed by Mayor Beame.	Twenty-three members appointed by Mayor Beame.
Responsible to	The Legislature.	Gov. Carey and the Legislature.	Mayor Beame.	Mayor Beame.
Assigned Task	Control city's budget, funneling all available city money into a special account and approving all spending and contracts. Force the city to come up with a revamped budget by Oct. 20, stripped of gimmicks, and develop a plan to wipe out \$3.3 billion deficit.	Sell \$5 billion in long-term bonds, guaranteed by \$1 billion a year in city sales and stock transfer tax revenues, to pay off the city's short-term notes and obligations.	Streamline city management systems and install expenditure controls in city agencies, focusing first on problems such as pensions, Medicaid billings, hospitals and sanitation. Serve as consultants with Dep. Mayor Axelson on steps for revising budget for EFCB.	Conduct in-depth study of city's fiscal prospects and make long-range recommendations on revenues, tax base and federal-state funding. Draft legislation for state takeover of prisons and courts, federal control of welfare.
Cost	Undetermined. Expected to include salary for deputy state controller for New York, approximately \$45,000 a year. Board members not paid.	Debt service on bonds approximately \$385 million. Operating expenses authorized to \$3 million. Staff and office space costs total \$730,000 a year at present. Legal fees will be substantial, with estimates of as much as \$1.5 million. Board members paid \$100 per diem.	No appropriation to date, but a key member said \$400,000 may be sought to cover salary for an executive director, some staff, and outside consultants. Members are not paid.	City Council reviewing \$400,000 appropriation, including \$275,000 for staff and operating expenses, \$125,000 for outside consultants. Members are not paid.

son both sit on the board of J.C. Penney. Martha Wallace of the Luce Foundation and Dr. Edward Mortola of Pace University are board members of Ellinghaus' New York Telephone Company. Richard R. Shinn, President of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and a board member of Chase Manhattan Bank is linked to Robert C. Weaver also a board member of Metropolitan. George Champion, a former chairman

of Chase Manhattan, serves on the Temporary Commission while Alton Marshall, a former aide of Vice President Rockefeller is now head of Rockefeller Center.¹¹ The few blacks and Puerto Ricans on these boards are firmly tied to the corporate elite.

These four interlocking and corporate dominated boards have jurisdictions and goals which conflict with the responsibilities of elected officials and City agencies. The

CHART 2




Chart shows relationship of the four new panels overseeing the city finances. Asterisks (*) denote persons serving on more than one panel. The Deputy Controller has not yet been named.

costs of these supraelectoral boards ironically could become a major source of deficit themselves, although their employment of Wall Street Law firms like Paul Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison and ivy league researchers does not seem to draw scrutiny from the capitalist overlords. Out of this small but important kernel come the directives aimed at reshaping the municipal gov-

ernment in the image of sound business practice; what does not pay for itself has no rationale for being. All of this was accomplished by executive order and rump legislatures sitting in extraordinary sessions, and not a single referendum or endorsement was solicited from the electorate. Certainly bank rule is upon us.

THE BANKERS' PROGRAM

On August 1, 1975, Mayor Abraham D. Beame and the Municipal Assistance Corporation separately announced the bankers' program for fiscal sanity in New York City. As of September 1, the wages of all municipal workers were frozen. The 6% salary increase of July 1 was rescinded while managerial employees' salaries were being rolled back to 1973 levels. Thirty two million dollars was deleted from the City University budget. Subway fares were increased from 35 to 50 cents to be further augmented to 60 cents in January of 1976. Capital spending was cut by a projected 375 million to come mostly from halts in school, library, and park construction. Four public hospitals are slated for closing and the cuts in essential services threatened to reduce garbage collection by a third and the available police protection by 25%. These draconian measures came on the heels of 14,000 layoffs and the loss of 21,000 city jobs through attrition. Affiliated agencies like the Board of Education and the Health and Hospitals Corporation have released additional thousands.

WITH THE appearance of the EFCB, additional layoffs and cutbacks to reduce the city's payroll by 10% have been imposed. A three year extension of the wage freeze is also in the offering. A three year ceiling on the budget and taxes is to be enforced by the EFCB while the Temporary Commission and the Management Advisory Board eliminate Budgetary gimmicks, inefficiency and increase productivity. While this is going on the major tax receipts of the city go into a fund controlled by Big MAC which disburses them in such a way that note and bond holders are paid first, then the remainder is released to meet other City obligations.¹² As one careful observer noted, the municipal workers forsake a 6% gain while the bond holders earn 9% interest on New York's crisis.¹³ What better illustration is there of the true intent of the bankers program to transcend their crisis by seizing the levers of

government and squeezing more and more surplus value from New York's working population?

THE BANKERS' PROGRAM AND NEW YORK STATE

New York State resources were mustered by the banks to come to the rescue of the City. The political leadership of the State was reluctant to become involved in the City's fiscal crisis as it might tend to engulf the State in the onus being directed towards Gotham. A City default on the other hand would adversely effect investors' confidence in the State's fiscal stability. Caught between this scylla and charybdis, the State has attempted to shore up New York City's fiscal position by selling its own paper and raising the proceeds to buy City bonds. In addition the State has attempted to raid public pension funds and use their receipts to buy up the City's debt.

Rather than rescuing the City from default, the State has found itself under close scrutiny from investors and its shaky financial posture has been exposed for all to see. State Budget Director, Peter C. Goldmark has asserted that within 30 days of a New York City default the state would follow suit.¹⁴ Moody's has withdrawn its rating from four issues of New York State agency notes issued on October 15. This was the first time Moody's had ever refused to rate a New York State issue. The ratings of the notes of the New York State Housing Finance Agency and the Medical Care Facilities Finance Agency were withdrawn because Moody's didn't feel these agencies could come up with revenues from bond sales to meet the redemption schedules of the notes.¹⁵ Standard and Poor's warned the State that additional State aid to the City would imperil the State's fiscal integrity.¹⁶ More and more attention was thus being focused on the State's own 10.3 billion budget, her 12 billion indebtedness and the current 611 million budget deficit. As with the City, New York State's bonds were no longer marketable. Already the bankers program had begun to unravel.

THE BANKERS' PROGRAM AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

As the crisis has outstripped the resources of the City, State and the supra-electoral, quasi-bank boards, the bankers of New York City have gone to Washington for Federal Assistance. Recently President Ford met with David Rockefeller (Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank), Walter Wriston (Chairman, First National City Bank) and Ellmore C. Paterson (Chairman, Morgan Guarantee Trust) to receive their warning of the "extremely serious economic repercussions to the nation, government bond markets including Federal bonds and business generally," if the New York fiscal crisis continued.¹⁷ In a letter from a Chase Manhattan executive, the New York banks presented their program for Federal resolution of the City's fiscal crisis.

It can safely be assumed that any failure by either New York State or City to meet maturing obligations will further erode the national market for municipal securities and cause vital government programs at the state, county and local level to go unfunded throughout the nation. . . . What we believe to be the only viable alternative is a temporary substitution of Federal credit for the City's, in order to insure the marketability of City debt until investor confidence is restored by a year or two of demonstrated performance in meeting the targets which have been set forth. . . . Federal Assistance can be tied to the achievement of savings resulting from these steps so that improvement will be assured.¹⁸

This aspect of the bankers' program has elicited a lukewarm response from the Ford administration. In general, Federal fiscal decision makers are irresolute in the face of the obvious bankruptcy of Keynesian solutions in the present depression. In the face of such a predicament they are hesitant to increase the government's obligations for a number of reasons:

1—The past two Republican administrations have increased the Federal debt by 200 billion, and therefore the Ford administration looking to the 1976 election wants to avoid any unnecessary expansion of that debt.

2—The disappearance of a municipal bond market nationally means that the Federal salvage operation could be potentially unlimited and could not morally or rationally be restricted to New York.

3—The Federal debt itself is of such proportions that establishing a Federal guarantee would fan the fires of inflation since it would have to go into the money market as a borrower for this specific purpose. Already huge Federal borrowing in the note and bond market has diverted funds away from municipal bonds while driving up the interest rates necessary to market these issues.

4—Most important however, the Ford administration, by minimizing the possible impact of a New York City default is trying to forestall the development of the kind of investor panic which would drive the Federal government into an active role when it has no solution to the problem which is politically acceptable to it. Outside of the executive branch, the City's fiscal crisis has become a political football of presidential hopefuls generating much hot air but little concrete motion.

The banks have not yet been able to involve the Federal government in their program for fiscal survival in New York City but Chairman Burns of the Federal Reserve has conceded the Federal Reserve's assistance to any banks which default due to the City's insolvency. Burns's position is unrealistic in light of the very real possibility of a City default threatening the solvency of 100 banks. Without Federal pump priming and guarantees, the banker's program resolves itself into a scheme for extracting increasing levels of surplus value from New York's laboring masses, the foundation of which is the black and Third World community.

THE FISCAL CRISIS AND THE BLACK AND THIRD WORLD COMMUNITIES

The City's fiscal crisis affects all of New York's working people but it is particularly severe in its impact on black and Third World communities. In addition this crisis impacts in unique ways upon the City's colored population.

(Continued on page 35.)

(Continued from page 30.)

EMPLOYMENT:

The employment situation of the black and Third World communities has worsened as a result of the present fiscal crisis. In the public sector, the structure of the labor force is such that a disproportionate number of blacks occupy those jobs with the least amount of civil service and union protection. These "provisional" positions were created for political reasons to expand the number of jobs which could be rapidly made available without at the same time running afoul of the traditional civil service regulations. In addition they represented an elastic factor in budget calculations which allowed the city to expand and contract its work force as demand dictated without creating a liability in long-run fiscal obligations. The CETA, federally sponsored, public service job program for the hardcore unemployed has rechanneled its funds in the City to maintain the employment of more tenured members of the civil service. These CETA jobs represented a significant employment source for blacks and Third World unemployed workers.

The Board of Education reacted to the fiscal crisis by paring its work force to the bone. Per diem and substitute teachers, the positions held by the majority of blacks in the system, were laid off in droves, while 5000 regulars lost their jobs. Fifteen thousand para-professionals, many of them black mothers also felt the fiscal axe. In the sphere of alternative education, largely black and Third World staffed programs, like the Urban League's Street Academies, lost their Board of Education financing and closed up shop. In education, therefore, the employment gains by black and Third World people has suffered a serious setback.

THese two public sector examples are indicative of trends in other sectors of the municipal labor force. Public sector employment of blacks and Third World peoples, a traditional device for maintaining social peace, has been pruned of its "black" jobs.

The municipal unions which have protected the bulk of their more established and largely white members by conceding to wage freezes, longer working hours and the like, have sacrificed the security of the "provisionals" and para-professionals without a sound of protest. Ironically, unions like the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) took much of the steam out of the "community control" movement of the '60's by organizing the largely black protesters and giving them jobs as unionized para-professionals. These people were the first to be sacrificed on the altar of union-ruling class collaboration.

Employment in the private sector recedes steadily as the draconian measures of the banks cut into government spending and torpedo those business interests directly or indirectly dependent on municipal spending. The City's layoffs and firings also cut into the work force's purchasing power which also manifests itself in private sector layoffs as objective demand recedes. Unfortunately black people find themselves over-represented in those New York jobs with the most elastic demand for labor. Part of the least monopolized segment of the American economy, these marginal "sweat shop" industries represent the further decay of competitive labor, intensive capitalist production. From 40% to 70% of the black and Third World work force find themselves trapped in this "secondary" labor market¹⁹ earning low salaries with little or no fringe benefits, little training and no career ladders. In this setting employment experience or any one job is short and non-transferable except to equally unrewarding and dead-end jobs. As New York City's fiscal crisis accelerates the demise of these firms, the long term employment picture for our people steadily worsens. An economic upturn will find these firms replaced by more capital, intensive competitors who will not be able to reabsorb the large numbers of unemployed cast off by marginal "sweat shop" industries. In the past year New York City has attained an unemployment rate of 11.9% while losing 39,000 jobs.²⁰ None of the policies aimed at resolving the fiscal crisis will reverse this employment profile, rather they will accentuate it.

HOUSING:

Mayor Beame has moved to suspend plans to finance the construction and rehabilitation of virtually all public supported housing on the drawing boards. This move involves suspension of plans and work on 50,000 new apartments and 20,000 apartment rehabilitations. Low and moderate income families in subsidized housing would definitely be affected. The housing market is already severely depressed with the rate of construction in New York City, only half of what it was in 1973. Applications for new housing construction have fallen by 6% as interest rates on mortgages continue to climb. Even before the onset of the fiscal crisis only 32% of public moneys earmarked for housing were committed to the construction of low income units.²¹ Public policy was much more interested in middle and high income developments as they were considered to be more justifiable because their rental incomes would support both the amortization and interest payments as well as a larger city real estate tax base. The urgent housing needs of black and Third World people will remain unmet since the municipal and state construction agencies can find no market for their notes and bonds.

HEALTH:

In the field of public health, the fiscal crisis has given added impetus to those who want to sell the municipal hospitals totally to private, medical interests. Four municipal hospitals are slated for closing, at least two of which are unequivocally in ghetto areas. Neighborhood, public health centers have been closing and essential services are being absorbed by private hospitals and doctors who return exorbitant fees for poor medical care. The public hospitals in New York, whatever their shortcomings, have provided blacks and Third World people in the City a level of health care unattainable for this class in private medicine. The dissolution of this system of public health care would have disastrous consequences for the well-being of our communities.

EDUCATION:

The moratorium on school construction has a disproportionate impact on the black community. School construction has generally been designed to facilitate integration which means in fact that very few schools were being built in the ghetto. There still is no public high school in Central Harlem and may never be one since 315 million in construction projects have been iced.

Ghetto schools have been hardest hit by the teacher layoffs since a disproportionate number of their faculties were untenured and substitute teachers. The shortening of the school day and the increase in class size has had a disproportionate impact on ghetto schools since it is not accompanied by a program of teacher transfers to make up for inequitable staffing practices. Without the para-professionals, ghetto students will lose that presence in the classroom which was materially and morally concerned with their welfare. If unchallenged the present economies introduced into the educational system will reinforce the predominance of the most bureaucratized non-teaching hacks, those who had established their seniority behind a curtain of Jim Crow practices.

In higher education the fiscal crisis manifests itself in a veiled attempt to foreclose on the tenuous presence of blacks and Puerto Ricans in the City University. Sixty four million dollars in cutbacks has endangered the open-admissions policy and severely cutback SEEK programs, both of which subsidized the integration of CUNY's student body and faculty. A recently instituted lawsuit has revealed that college administrators have been secretly redirecting SEEK funds to finance the regular programs of their campuses. At the same time plans are afoot to drop those in academic trouble before they have had a chance to redeem themselves. Worst of all, the policy of free tuition has been endangered, and despite facts to the contrary free tuition is being portrayed as a subsidy to the poor at the expense of the lower middle classes.²² Educational advance in black and Third World communities is being reversed

as the fiscal crisis undermines the financial bases of hard-won advances.

WELFARE:

Welfare payments have been reduced in response to the City's fiscal crisis. As part of a program producing 800 million in savings, the allotment for rent has been reduced by 20 dollars. Needy black and Third World people not now on welfare find it almost impossible to get on the City's welfare roles. In response to the intensification of the fiscal crisis, welfare clients are paid bounties to report the infractions of other clients. Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve, let the cat out of the bag when he indicated that the Ford administration was considering a public service jobs program at below the minimum wage level to be coupled with reduced welfare and unemployment benefits.²³ It would be interesting to see if welfare policy in this period of stagflation evolves as a mechanism for increasing the amount of extremely low wage labor. If this trend materializes then welfare will become less and less of a tool for combatting the social dislocation attendant to the City's fiscal crisis.

The black population of New York City is paying dearly for a crisis it did not create. Quantitatively the fiscal crisis impacts more severely upon the black community than the white. Qualitatively, blacks are losing not only jobs but the tenuous foothold they had acquired in the economic life of New York City. The public edifice of social agencies which provided at least minimal services to satisfy black and Third World needs is crumbling. Permanent unemployment threatens half the work force in the black community. In the present municipal fiscal crisis the City's watchword for its ghetto communities is neglect, but certainly not of a benign sort.

BLACKS AND THE POOR: THE LIGHTNING ROD OF THE CRISIS

The fiscal crisis facing New York City exposes for all to see the exploitative relationship that exists between finance capital and the public till. To obfuscate this relationship,

the ruling class has again attempted to stigmatize the black poor as being lazy, unproductive and a rapidly procreating mass representing an ever increasing drain on the City's treasury. New York City has been portrayed as a haven for the black and poor of all states who have been supported increasingly by the tax dollars of the white middle classes. The social welfare programs of the City have been portrayed as overly remunerative handouts which, as the largest single budget item, has been responsible for the City's lack of cash. It is implied that the deprivations and insecurity of the white middle class would end if massive public welfare programs would cease. Robert Moses, one of New York's "empire builders" sees it this way:

We are in a fiscal mess. We invited with Federal and state acquiescence and support too many blacks and Puerto Ricans when we manifestly had neither room nor jobs for them. The effects were not merely regional but nationwide. We induced cheap labor to come here to glut a full-up market. We created a high relief program only part of which should on any reasonable theory fall on New York.²⁴

In a similar vein another commentator reports that:

In the past thirty years New York has wooed the poor and imported them from everywhere with higher benefits for welfare, special housing privileges, etc. Economically this policy was once sound as a needed source of unskilled labor. The small factories and businesses that employed them have mostly disappeared due to high rents, laws on working conditions, unionization and modernization requiring skilled labor. The poor became more and more simply a burden on New York City, but the desire to import even more continues.²⁵

From these commentators one would assume that most people on welfare are black or Third World living materially at a middle class level of existence and sending the tab to the white middle class. None of these assertions can be borne out by the facts. Moreover they leave as much unsaid as they purport to say. Why was the black and Puerto Rican

reservoir of cheap labor unable to benefit from the economic expansion it created? Why does the City's economy develop in such a way that blacks and Third World workers find the traditional avenues to middle class material welfare closed to them? These are some of many questions left unasked, let alone unanswered. However, that is beside the point. What we see in fact is the more general process by which the ideologies of the ruling class appeal to white middle class fears by telling them the cause of all of their problems are black people. Black people in league with "liberal" whites are seen as the source of all public corruption and waste. Black people are offered up as scapegoats upon the altar of white middle class fear and insecurity as the ruling class very quietly subverts democratic institutions and establishes bank rule. An intensification of racism and racial antagonism becomes then a real and logical outgrowth of the City's fiscal crisis.

CONCLUSION

New York City's fiscal crisis is a particular instance of the more general crisis facing the imperialist system of monopoly finance capital. Default is a consequence of the general decline in business activity attendant to this most recent and severe post-war depression. The significant feature of the City's crisis is the domino effect that it will have on the American economy through the accentuation of the liquidity crisis facing the American banking system. Already it has undermined not only the market for New York notes and bonds, but has destroyed the municipal bond market generally. New York's fiscal crisis is rapidly generalizing to all of urban America.

The bankers program is clearly unworkable without Federal guarantees. Republican resistance at the national level to such Federal guarantees is not simply partisan politics but reflects a more fundamental realization that a crucial debate has emerged within the ruling class around the efficacy of moving American society toward state capitalism as a solution to its ills.

What we see emerging, out of New York's

crisis, is a clear cut experimentation with state capitalism. Felix Rohatyn, chairman of the Municipal Assistance Program, is a leading, ruling class theoretician in this area. His ideas have been summarized as suggesting, "that the capitalist class, acting through its state, should create a permanent institution capable of fulfilling the dual function of arresting the present potentially disastrous slide of the economy and subsidizing directly or indirectly, investment in and production of goods and services which private monopolies consider too unprofitable and or too risky to get into. If by chance some of these investments should turn out to be attractively profitable, they could and should be turned over to private hands: the state's job under capitalism is not to appropriate profits but to socialize losses and see that the system functions smoothly."²⁶

Samir Amin also deals with this schema in one of two variants he calls "1984". He recognized that:

... if capitalism is to be perpetuated, it will reach an unprecedented level of centralization and abstraction. The capitalist state would tend to replace fragmented and competing units of capital.

This centralization of capital would certainly change capitalism profoundly. . . . This change would mean a reversal of the relations between the economic base and the ideological superstructure. . . . The extraction of surplus value in the capitalist mode is hidden by competition and the market, in which labor power itself is sold as a commodity. For this reason the dominant factor in capitalism has not been ideological but economic, as opposed to the situation in the precapitalist modes and the Soviet mode. 1984, with the centralization of capital, is similar to the Soviet mode. The extraction of surplus value by the dominant state class again becomes transparent, and the ideological factor thereby acquires a dominant role in reproduction.²⁷

The resurgence of racism which rationalizes the loss of bourgeois democratic rights to the working classes and human rights to the black and Third World communities is but a companion to a developing state capitalism. This combination has been seen before in NAZI Germany. It is fascism pure and simple that is evolving out of New York's fiscal crisis.

FOR BLACK people the trend toward fascism means that the liberation struggle will have to go forth in the face of growing opposition not only from the ruling class but also from large segments of the white working classes panicked into a misplaced hatred of blacks. The liberation struggle will have to go forward in the face of a state dominated by business interests who see bourgeoisie rights as an extravagance they can ill afford. The capitalist class has realized that it's much later than it thought. Its recent actions around the New York City fiscal crisis indicate a lack of clarity, resolution and confidence which indicate that bourgeois class rule is in an advanced state of decay.

This state, however, is most dangerous in that naked force and coercion increasingly replace ideological illusion and cooptation as the basic levers of capitalist control. For a time the black community will have to face up to the concerted onslaught of white society and all of its class components. If we successfully weather this trial by fire our reward will be the radicalization of the larger segments of the American population generally. Nothing short of the steadfast and tireless resistance to racial oppression will tear the white working classes loose from their ideological dependence on white ruling class leadership. The radicalization of American society is in the hands of black working people. We are the catalyst for change in America. New York City's fiscal crisis is both the end of something old and, hopefully, the beginning of a new stage in the social transformation of the United States.

FOOTNOTES

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5. First National City Bank, Economics Department, *Profile of a City* (New York, 1972) p. 221.

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7. *Monthly Review*, February 1975, pp. 11-12.
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14. *New York Times*, Sept. 26, 1975, p. 1.
15. *Op cit*, Sept. 27, 1975, p. 1.
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22. *New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1975, Sept. 28, 1975.
23. *Op. cit.*, Sept. 26, 1975.
24. *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1975.
25. *Op cit.*, Sept. 23, 1975.
26. P. Sweezy & H. Magdoff, "The Economic Crisis in Historical Perspective - Part II" *Monthly Review* vol. 26 no. 11, April, 1975, p. 7.
27. Samir Amin, "Toward a Structural Crisis of World Capitalism" *Socialist Revolution* no. 23, p. 23.

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cause of accelerating money growth. The amount of government debt held by the Federal Reserve System has risen at a much faster rate since the early 1960s than debt outstanding. As a result, the System's holdings of government debt rose from 11% of the total outstanding in 1961 to 23% in 1973. These rapidly growing purchases of government securities provided much of the basis for the accelerating growth of money.³⁸

But it is also clear that the money supply is a function of the general debt of the economy and the impact that debt has on Federal Reserve Board policies. *Thus, the statistical relationship between the amount of money and inflation is the expression of the gap between the production of value and the required artificial expansion of demand.*

The relationship between the debt economy and the acceleration of inflation is a dialectical one. If inflation accelerates very fast, it can wipe out a significant portion of the debt through devaluation. This is a nice automatic mechanism for an eventual self-regulation of the system. But it so happens that we are not dealing with a cybernetic system, but with a historical society dominated by financial capital with its center of economic power within the financial institutions. What this means is that the major economic interests are going to do everything possible to recover the real interest rates they expected when they invested their capital. The financial corporations react to inflation by raising the interest rates in order to prevent devaluation. However, when it becomes clear that inflation is a structural trend that threatens the whole system, the financial corporations ask for a global economic policy that has two major targets: to wipe out part of the debt in some sectors where monopoly capital has little interest, such as mutual savings and public debt (witness, in particular, the case of New York City municipal bonds); and, more important, to provide the structural requirements for financial capital to fight inflation, that is, to reduce it, to control it, to channel it before its geometrical progression is able to devastate the very foundations of the financial markets. This is the reason why the fight against inflation has top priority for financial capi-

tal. Thus, we are on the threshold of a new economic policy necessitated by the new contradictions that have been generated by the attempt to create demand for capital and capital for demand without a corresponding creation of value. *The debt economy is the structural background of our age of inflation.*

2.2.3. *The American State in a State Capitalist Economy*

The most important transformation characterizing advanced capitalism is the decisive role taken by the state in the functioning of the economy. To the traditional functions of social control, repression, legitimation, and political leadership, the state has now added new economic functions that have steadily grown in size and importance since the Great Depression. One crucial problem, which we can hardly consider here, has been the interaction between the classical political-ideological functions and the new economic ones.

The economic intervention of the state developed after it became clear that the spontaneous rules of the market could provoke major catastrophes that would undermine the self-reproduction of capitalist social relationships. Functions of regulation and programming, from data collection to coordination of individual economic units, became the usual practice of the state in capitalism after World War II, with different institutional expression according to the particular historical situation. However, it was clear from the beginning that systematic state intervention in the economy would be necessary to overcome the trends toward stagnation, sustain investments, provide employment, and create demand. The New Deal was the first attempt to translate such a program into government initiatives, and Keynesianism became, particularly in 1960 with the Kennedy administration, the orthodoxy underlying economic policies.³⁹

Because of these new trends, total government spending in the United States jumped from less than 8 percent of the GNP in 1890 to almost 30 percent of the GNP in 1960. This increase was particularly important in nonmilitary expenditures. Military expenditures, even though they increased greatly in absolute terms, remained fairly stable or declined in relation to the GNP.

Since World War II total expenditures by all levels of government have risen from an average of 12.8 percent of the GNP in 1945-1950 to an average of 22.4 percent of the GNP in 1966-1970. State and local government spending rose from 5.9 percent of the GNP in 1946-1950 to 11.5 percent in 1966-1970. This steady accelerated expansion of public expenditures between 1950 and 1972 is shown in absolute terms in Table 13 for the federal government and in Table 14 for state and local governments.

Why this accelerated growth of public expenditures? James O'Connor has developed an insightful analysis that provides some of the most important elements for our answer to this question in terms of social dynamics.⁴⁰

Capitalism, in order to expand, has to perform the two major functions of accumulating capital and legitimizing social order that makes this accumulation possible. The expansion of public spending and state intervention develop in two closely interacting ways. Spending for social capital provides a stimulus to accumulation, and spending for social expenses serves the purpose of legitimization. Social expenses include the maintenance of channels of integration (social welfare, income maintenance, social security, etc.) and the development of institutions for repression (police, army, justice, etc.). Expenditures on social capital take two different and complementary forms. Expenditures to sustain the formation of constant capital (what O'Connor calls social investment) are concentrated on physical capital (industrial infrastructure, fixed capital, technological improvements, transportation, etc.) and human capital (research, education, etc.). Expenditures for the improvement of variable capital—that is, expenses in social consumption—are directed to the reproduction of labor power, lowering its cost for private capital in housing, schools, health services, etc.

As O'Connor shows, the requirements of all these expenditures by the state come from several articulated trends in the evolution of advanced capitalism:

1. Production increases in complexity and interdependence, especially because of the progress in technology and the rapid adolescence of capital equipment.
2. Human capital assumes a greater role in the growth of productivity.

3. The multifaceted long-term impact of indivisible physical social investments means that private capital seeks control of all collective equipment shaping economic factors and social life. The state has then to intervene in order to coordinate and to socialize for the whole capitalist class requirements that are necessarily collective. This is a contradictory process since it will express at the same time the state's tendency to appropriate some fractions of capital and its required intervention on behalf of the ruling class.

4. The cost of such huge infrastructural projects is too large to be assumed by one single corporation or even by a group of them.

5. Some investments in social consumption and social capital are absolutely necessary for capital but hardly profitable in the short term. Therefore, the state assumes the initial expense and transfers the function to the private sector once it has become profitable. An example of this kind of function would be basic research and development. Many other services required for the reproduction of labor power that would be unprofitable to capital are also assumed by the state.

6. Pressure from the grassroots increasingly forces the state to provide services that are not supplied by private investment. As social needs grow and consumption becomes ever more socialized, the state has to increase social consumption expenditures and social expenses in order to reproduce power and social relationships.⁴¹

The intervention of the state is required by capital (in its process of accumulation and legitimization) and forced by labor (which demands a larger share of the product through forced socialized consumption). This raises the profits for capital by transferring public resources to it, lowers the cost of labor power, and creates a social environment suitable for exploitation.

Public expenditures play a major role in the right to expand employment and create new markets for the realization of capitalist commodities. Military expenditures have been important in both these respects.⁴² Public expenditures have also accounted for an increase in civilian employment in the United States, especially at state and local levels. *Approximately one-sixth of the U.S. labor force is employed by the state.* If we were to consider all employment that is dependent on public expenditures, includ-

TABLE 13. STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, SELECTED YEARS 1955-1972 AND PROJECTED FOR 1980 AND 1985

Category	1955	1958	1959	1963	1965	1968	1970	1971	1972	Projected	
										1980	1985
<i>Billions of current dollars</i>											
Revenues	31.4	41.6	46.0	63.4	75.5	107.1	135.0	152.3	177.2	349.8	505.8
Personal tax and nontax receipts	4.1	5.6	6.3	9.4	11.8	18.3	24.4	27.7	34.3	73.5	108.0
Corporate profits taxes	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.7	2.1	3.2	3.8	4.1	4.9	9.1	14.6
Indirect business tax and nontax receipts	21.4	27.0	28.9	39.4	45.9	60.6	74.1	82.0	89.6	156.4	213.9
Contributions for social insurance	1.8	2.5	2.7	3.8	4.5	6.4	8.3	9.4	10.7	20.7	31.8
Federal grants-in-aid	3.1	5.6	6.8	9.1	11.1	18.7	24.4	29.1	37.7	90.2	137.5
Expenditures	32.7	44.0	46.8	62.2	74.5	107.5	133.2	*148.3	*164.0	353.0	514.7
Purchases of goods and services	30.1	40.6	43.3	58.2	70.2	100.8	123.3	136.2	150.5	326.0	480.8
Transfer payments to persons	3.7	4.6	4.8	6.0	6.9	10.0	14.1	16.6	18.2	31.0	38.2
Net interest paid	.5	.6	.7	.8	.5	^b	-.4	-.2	-.4	.5	.7
Less current surplus of government enterprises	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.8	3.0	3.4	3.8	4.1	4.4	4.5	4.9
Surplus or deficit (-)	-1.3	-2.3	-.8	1.2	1.0	-.3	1.8	4.0	13.1	-3.2	-8.9
<i>Percent distribution</i>											
Revenues	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Personal tax and nontax receipts	13.1	13.4	13.7	14.8	15.7	17.1	18.1	18.2	19.4	21.0	21.4
Corporate profits taxes	3.1	2.4	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.9
Indirect business tax and nontax receipts	68.1	64.7	62.9	62.1	60.9	56.6	54.9	53.8	50.6	44.7	42.3
Contributions for social insurance	5.8	6.0	5.9	6.0	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.0	5.9	6.3
Federal grants-in-aid	9.9	13.5	14.8	14.4	14.7	17.4	18.1	19.1	21.3	25.8	27.2
Expenditures	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Purchases of goods and services	92.2	92.2	92.6	93.6	94.2	93.8	92.6	91.9	91.8	92.4	93.4
Transfer payments to persons	11.2	10.4	10.3	9.7	9.2	9.3	10.6	11.2	11.1	8.8	7.4
Net interest paid	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.2	.7	—	-.3	-.1	-.3	.1	.1
Less current surplus of government enterprises	4.8	4.0	4.3	4.6	4.0	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.7	1.3	1.0
<i>Average annual rates of change^c</i>											
	1955-68		1965-72		1972-80		1968-85		1968-80		1980-85
Revenues	9.90		12.97		8.88		9.56		10.36		7.65
Personal tax and nontax receipts	12.17		16.40		10.00		11.02		12.30		8.00
Corporate profits taxes	9.50		13.09		8.16		9.44		9.24		9.92
Indirect business tax and nontax receipts	8.34		10.02		7.21		7.70		8.22		6.46
Contributions for social insurance	10.23		13.23		8.59		9.87		10.25		8.97
Federal grants-in-aid	14.76		19.04		11.53		12.46		14.02		8.80
Expenditures	9.59		11.92		10.05		9.65		10.42		7.83
Purchases of goods and services	9.74		11.52		10.14		9.63		10.28		8.08
Transfer payments to persons	8.07		14.89		6.88		8.19		9.87		4.27
Net interest paid	17.41		^d		^d		18.51		23.69		6.96
Less current surplus of government enterprises	6.12		5.62		.22		2.20		2.40		1.72

^a Detail does not include wage accruals less disbursements.

^b Less than \$50 million.

^c Compound interest rates between terminal years.

^d Not calculated.

Source: Historical data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; projections by Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE 14. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, SELECTED YEARS 1955-1972 AND PROJECTED FOR 1980 AND 1985 (NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS BASIS)

Category	1955	1958	1959	1963	1965	1968	1970	1971	1972	Projected	
										1980	1985
<i>Billions of current dollars</i>											
Revenues	72.1	78.7	89.7	114.5	124.7	175.0	192.0	198.9	228.7	421.0	570.0
Personal tax and nontax receipts	31.4	36.8	39.9	51.6	53.8	79.7	92.2	89.9	107.9	195.8	289.0
Corporate profits taxes	20.6	18.0	22.5	24.6	29.3	36.7	31.0	33.3	37.8	86.5	112.1
Indirect business tax and nontax receipts	10.7	11.5	12.5	15.3	16.5	18.0	19.3	20.4	19.9	30.2	36.5
Contributions for social insurance	9.3	12.4	14.8	23.1	25.1	40.7	49.5	55.2	63.0	108.6	132.3
Expenditures	68.1	88.9	91.0	113.9	123.5	181.5	203.9	221.0	244.6	431.7	574.5
Purchases of goods and services	44.1	53.6	53.7	64.2	66.9	98.8	96.2	98.1	104.4	166.6	218.5
Transfer payments to persons	14.5	21.3	21.9	29.1	32.5	48.2	63.2	74.9	82.9	149.7	191.9
Grants-in-aid to state and local governments	3.1	5.6	6.8	9.1	11.1	18.7	24.4	29.1	37.7	90.2	137.5
Net interest paid	4.9	5.6	6.4	7.7	8.7	11.7	14.6	13.6	13.5	18.1	18.7
Other ^a	1.5	2.7	2.1	3.6	4.3	4.1	5.5	5.4	6.1	7.0	8.0
Federal surplus or deficit (-)	4.0	-10.2	-1.2	.7	1.2	-6.5	-11.9	-22.2	-15.9	-10.6	-4.5
<i>Percent distribution</i>											
Revenues	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Personal tax and nontax receipts	43.6	46.8	44.5	45.0	43.1	45.5	48.0	45.2	47.2	46.5	50.7
Corporate profits taxes	28.6	22.9	25.1	21.5	23.5	21.0	16.1	16.7	16.5	20.5	19.7
Indirect business tax and nontax receipts	14.8	14.6	13.9	13.4	13.2	10.3	10.1	10.3	8.7	7.2	6.4
Contributions for social insurance	12.9	15.8	16.5	20.2	20.1	23.3	25.8	27.8	27.5	25.8	23.2
Expenditures	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Purchases of goods and services	64.8	60.3	59.0	56.4	54.2	54.4	47.2	44.4	42.7	38.6	33.0
Transfer payments to persons	21.3	24.0	24.1	25.5	26.3	26.6	31.0	33.9	33.9	34.7	33.4
Grants-in-aid to state and local governments	4.6	6.3	7.5	8.0	9.0	10.3	12.0	13.2	15.4	20.9	23.9
Net interest paid	7.2	6.3	7.0	6.8	7.0	6.4	7.2	6.2	5.5	4.2	3.3
Other ^a	2.2	3.0	2.3	3.2	3.5	2.3	2.7	2.4	2.5	1.6	6.4
<i>Average annual rates of change^b</i>											
<i>Projected</i>											
	1955-68	1965-72	1972-80	1968-85	1968-80	1980-85					
Revenues	7.1	9.1	7.9	7.2	7.6	6.3					
Personal tax and nontax receipts	7.4	10.5	7.7	7.9	7.8	8.1					
Corporate profits taxes	4.5	3.7	10.9	6.8	7.4	5.3					
Indirect business tax and nontax receipts	4.1	2.7	5.4	4.3	4.4	3.9					
Contributions for social insurance	12.0	14.1	7.0	7.2	8.5	4.0					
Expenditures	7.8	10.3	7.4	7.0	7.5	5.9					
Purchases of goods and services	6.4	6.6	6.1	4.8	4.5	5.6					
Transfer payments	9.7	14.3	7.7	8.5	9.9	5.1					
Grants-in-aid to state and local governments	14.8	19.1	11.5	12.5	14.0	8.3					
Net interest paid	6.9	6.5	3.7	2.8	3.7	.6					
Other ^a	8.0	5.1	1.7	4.0	4.6	2.7					

^a Includes subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises plus a small amount of wage accruals less disbursements in 1971 and 1972.

^b Compound interest rates between terminal years.

Source: Historical data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; projections by Bureau of Labor Statistics.

ing the production of military supplies, we would find that *almost one-third of the labor force is dependent on the economic activity of the state.*

The state thus plays a decisive role in the U.S. economy, sustaining capital accumulation, providing services, creating markets, and absorbing surplus population into public employment. In fact, the different economic functions of the social and political mechanisms are interrelated in a complementary way. They form a structural set of relationships that O'Connor aptly describes as the "warfare-welfare state."

The complexity of these relationships can be summarized in one simple sentence. *The state has become the center of the process of accumulation and realization in advanced capitalism.* Without the state the process could be neither expanded nor reproduced. Are we then in a different mode of production? Not at all. The intervention of the state takes place within the structural rules of capitalism for the purpose of overcoming the historical contradictions that arise during the latter stages of its development. The crucial mechanism that reveals the capitalist logic of public policies is the fact that we can observe *a systematic trend toward the socialization of costs and the privatization of profits.* This is the most profitable pattern of state intervention for corporate capital. But it is also the basis for increasing contradictions that support the trends toward a new type of economic crisis.

One of the major contradictions is that as the state increases its intervention in the economy with a corresponding expansion in its outlays, it reduces its base of revenue. This happens not only because most of the profitable operations are transferred to corporate capital but also because the state's absorption of surplus population forces the state into less productive activities. The monopoly sector produces more and more value but distributes less and less income. What happens in the public sector is just the opposite. The state employs more and more people and distributes more and more revenue, but does not take over productive activities that would increase the productivity of the public services.

To pay for its massive expenditures in the absence of a large sector of public enterprises, the state must raise revenue from sources other than itself. It does this in two ways: through taxa-

tion on capital and people (appropriating a share of the value); and through debt and increases in the money supply (without respecting the necessary relationship to the value created).


Taxation has obvious limits. To collect taxes on profits defeats the purpose of increasing the rate of profit in order to make the capitalist economy more dynamic. Collecting taxes on personal income reduces demand and can provoke social unrest.

Despite the increase in taxes, the gap between state resources and state expenditures expanded at an accelerated rate for the period 1960-1972, as shown by Figure 15. (There was an exception in 1969-1970, when budgetary restrictions were used by Nixon to engineer a short recession.) Total spending rose at an annual rate of 5 percent from 1952 to 1960, 7 percent from 1960 to 1968, and 8 percent from 1968 to 1975.⁴³

To fill the gap, *the U.S. government has created public debt and increased the money supply without a corresponding in-*

Figure 15

Federal Budget Receipts and Outlays: 1960-1976



^a Estimate

Source: Chart prepared by U.S. Bureau of the Census. Data from U.S. Office of Management and Budget. *Statistical Abstract Yearbook, 1976.*


crease in the actual levels of production. Figure 16 shows the size of the federal debt, and Tables 15 and 16 show the increasing rate of growth in money supply and in debt per capita. The situation is even more unfavorable for local governments, which have been required to bear increasing costs for social consumption expenditures, especially in education. *The structural gap between the socialization of costs and the privatization of profits has led to the fiscal crisis of the state.*

In order to pay for the expenditures required by the warfare-welfare state, the U.S. government has used the only tool possible within the limits of the system—the expansion of the debt and the money supply—which has spurred inflation. Why does the expansion of public debt and the money supply lead to inflation? There are several reasons. First, their rate of growth exceeds the rate of growth of the GNP. Thus, for a given amount of commodities (goods and services), there is an increasing proportion of means-of-payment units: the same value will be represented by a higher nominal price. Second, the increased borrowing of the state in the financial markets (particularly in the form of municipal debt) will raise the rate of interest for capital, further increasing the cost of money, which we have seen to be one of the primary sources of inflation. Third, most state expenditures (nurtured through debt) do not correspond to the production of goods and services but to the expansion of unproductive services and to increased employment in the public sector. Therefore, by paying its employees the state introduces more and more money into the market without increasing the existing quantity of commodities. Thus, in addition to the direct effect of increasing the money supply and the debt (the first factor), there is also an indirect effect caused by the way these increases are used—demand is stimulated through unproductive activities.

Nevertheless, it would be theoretically possible to balance production and the money supply in the long run. The state would stimulate the economy just to pump it and withdraw when equilibrium was established. Actually, this is impossible in the current pattern of U.S. capitalist accumulation for two reasons:

1. There is an imbalance of growth between Department I and Department II of the economy, requiring a *preexisting solvent demand* for capital to invest in Department I at a level high

Figure 16



^aExcludes holdings of Federal Reserve, U.S. trust funds, and federal agencies.

Data: Solomon Bros.

TABLE 15. GROWTH OF THE U.S. MONEY SUPPLY

Year	Billions of dollars	Percentage increase
1965	463	—
1966	485	4.8
1967	533	9.9
1968	577	8.3
1969	594	3.0
1970	641	7.9
1971	727	13.4
1972	822	13.1
1973	893	8.6

Source: *The Economic Report of the President*, Feb. 1974, p. 310.

enough to ensure a profitable return on the increasing quantity of fixed capital. Therefore, state-stimulated demand always has to be ahead of the general rate of growth in the economy, and the gap between the quantity of commodities and the means of payment will never be closed.

2. As it develops, corporate capital increasingly relies on the

TABLE 16. PUBLIC DEBT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1900-1975

Year	Total billions of dollars ^a	Gross Debt Percent annual change ^b	Per capita dollars ^c
1900	1.3	2.9	17
1905	1.1	-2.2	14
1910	1.1	0.3	12
1915	1.2	0.8	12
1920	24.3	80.0	228
1925	20.5	-3.3	177
1930	16.2	-4.6	132
1935	28.7	12.1	226
1940	43.0	8.4	325
1945	258.7	43.0	1,849
1950	256.1	-0.1	1,688
1955	272.8	1.3	1,651
1960	284.1	0.9	1,572
1961	286.4	0.9	1,559
1962	295.4	3.1	1,582
1963	302.7	2.5	1,598
1964	308.1	1.8	1,604
1965	313.8	1.9	1,613
1966	316.1	0.7	1,605
1967	322.9	2.2	1,622
1968	345.4	7.0	1,717
1969	352.9	2.2	1,737
1970	370.1	4.9	1,807
1971	397.3	7.4	1,919
1972	426.4	7.3	2,042
1973	457.3	7.2	2,174
1974	474.2	3.7	2,238
1975	533.2	12.4	2,496

Note: As of June 30. See also *Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970*, series Y, pp. 461, 493, and 494.

^a Adjusted to include nonmarketable issues to the International Monetary Fund and other international institutions for each year as follows (in billions of dollars): 1950, 0.9; 1955, 1.6; 1960, 2.2; 1962, 2.8; 1963, 3.2; 1964, 3.6; 1965, 3.5; 1966, 3.8; 1967, 3.3; 1968, 2.2; and from 1969 through 1976, 0.8.

^b Change from previous year; e.g., 1900 from 1899; 1905 from 1904, etc. Minus sign (-) denotes decrease.

^c Based on estimated July 1 population; prior to 1960, excludes Alaska and Hawaii.

Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, *Statistical Appendix to the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the State of the Finances and Final Monthly Treasury Statement of Receipts and Outlays of the U.S. Government*, taken from *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 1977, p. 266.

state to support technological innovations and to assume the cost of capital devaluation. Since this is a self-accelerating process that also has to be ahead of the rate of accumulation, the state needs to mobilize over and over again a quantity of resources larger than the value it can appropriate.

Therefore, the "monetary school" is not wrong when it claims its statistical findings establishing the correlation between inflation and the expansion of the debt and the money supply are valid. But such a "discovery" is a blind observation as long as it is not put into the broader context of the dynamics of accumulation in advanced capitalism. In fact, the state has tried from time to time to stop this movement by applying a more restrictive budgetary policy. By doing so, however, it threatened the whole equilibrium of the system whose expansion was based on the ability of the state to provide jobs and demand to counteract the tendencies toward stagnation. For instance, the restrictions in 1969 drastically reduced the government's addition to consuming power (\$11 billion less in consumer demand), provoking a reduction in investment and a rise in unemployment. Inflation and recession have become the two benchmarks between which the capitalist state must follow an increasingly adventurous path.


THE CAPITALIST mode of production is an expanding contradictory system. Capitalist societies are shaped by the particular way these contradictions develop through the conflicts and interactions defined *on* the social classes and *by* their political expression. The major structural problems created by the process of capitalist accumulation in the United States were determined by the upheavals caused by new economic policies and the transformation of the system on the basis of a new relationship between the state and the large corporations. The internationalization of capital, the creation of the debt economy, and the decisive role of the state in the process of accumulation and realization of profit were major structural trends that allowed for sustained capitalist growth during almost three decades. But the introduction of these countertendencies to fight stagnation triggered new contradictions that were increasingly expressed through the monetary crisis and the sprawl of structural inflation. In this particular situation, dominated by the defeat of imperialism in

Indochina, increasing intercapitalist competition, and the development of social unrest within advanced capitalist societies, the new structural contradictions came together in certain conjunctural factors that, in return, made them more acute and precipitated the latest crisis. The worldwide interdependency of the American economy permitted the crisis to expand through the whole system. Figure 17 gives a schematic summary of the process.

In this analysis we have oversimplified some trends by reducing them to their effect on the process of production and circulation of capital and commodities. Nevertheless, in order to understand the dynamics of U.S. society we must now consider the specific American class structure and the reciprocal relationship between its transformation and the major trends of the economic crisis.

Figure 17

Mechanisms of the Production of the Crisis in the U.S. Economy, 1965-1975



in the United States is the direct expression of the functioning of the system of social stratification under the conditions of uneven development.⁸⁵ Twelve percent of Americans lived in poverty in 1975, and prospects are that the percentage will increase as a consequence of the evolution of unemployment and underemployment and of discrimination by race and sex in a fragmented labor market that is self-reproducing under the pattern of accumulation we have described. The description of the "urban poor" in 1968 in an accurate study by Anthony Downs gives empirical evidence supporting our interpretation.⁸⁶

The increasing contradiction between growth and poverty becomes most evident in the crisis of the inner cities, in the progressive collapse of social services, and in the fiscal crisis of local governments. The limits to the absorption of surplus population combined with the deepening of the structural causes of poverty are transforming the largest U.S. inner cities into what has become the most direct expression of American social decay: the urban crisis.

8. THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN CITIES⁸⁷

The economic crisis is the expression of some fundamental structural contradictions embodied in the pattern of capitalist accumulation in the United States. Therefore, it concerns not only the relationships of production and distribution but also the collective conditions of organization of everyday life. The crisis of public services and urban infrastructure in American cities is perhaps one of the most spectacular manifestations of the larger economic crisis. It reveals in a particularly striking manner the problems resulting from the tendency toward the socialization of costs and the privatization of profits. It expresses also the crisis of the service sector and the state's growing difficulties in supporting capital accumulation and absorbing surplus population while maintaining the current basis of social interests. At the same time, the politicization of collective consumption as a consequence of state intervention in urban services leads to an increase in the protest movements and political dissent that have grown out of the urban crisis.

The urban crisis is the crisis of a particular form of urban

structure that plays a major role in the U.S. process of capitalist accumulation, in the organization of socialized consumption, and in the reproduction of the social order. This model of urban structure can be characterized by three major trends: metropolitanization, suburbanization, and institutional fragmentation. The process of *metropolitanization*,⁸⁸ namely, the concentration of population and activities in some major areas at an accelerated rate, follows from the process of uneven development and from the concentration (economic, organizational, and spatial) of capital, means of production, labor, means of consumption, and institutions.

The process of *suburbanization*,⁸⁹ which is the process of selective decentralization and spatial sprawl of population and activities within metropolitan areas, started on a large scale after World War II. The basic trend is for suburbs to expand through massive construction of single-family dwellings for private ownership. This pattern of suburban growth was made possible by federal housing policy. On the one hand, tax deductions and loans were available to families buying a home *in the suburbs*. On the other hand, a federally backed secondary mortgage market was created, which removed the risk for private capital lending money to all home buyers. Another element in this suburban expansion was the general spread of automobiles as the major means of transportation. Here also the state was decisive in launching the highway program which built the intrametropolitan highway system using up to 90 percent public funds. The urban sprawl that followed led to the decentralization of many industrial plants and businesses. A large portion of the middle-class and skilled workers moved as well. Middle-income groups found better housing conditions in the suburbs and abandoned older buildings in the center cities. These buildings were subdivided into small apartments that were crowded with low-income families, among them black immigrants from the South who had been displaced by labor-saving investments in agriculture. There followed a process of urban dilapidation in these central-city neighborhoods. This could not be stopped by public policies because of the growing gap between fiscal resources, depleted by the outflow of business and well-to-do dwellers, and social needs, aggravated by the unemployment endemic among

many inner-city inhabitants. At the same time, the maintenance of highly expensive office concentrations in downtown areas necessitated an increasingly sophisticated urban infrastructure. Preserving the central functions of the large metropolitan areas required the overwhelming part of public resources devoted to urban services.

The *fragmentation of local governments*⁹⁰ has allowed suburban communities to avoid any social redistribution of fiscal resources. A relatively high level of collective services is maintained in those neighborhoods already in a better position to obtain goods and services in the private market. Thus, local autonomy becomes a mechanism for perpetuating social segregation and developing income inequality. Since the school system is also organized along the lines of residential segregation,⁹¹ the reproduction of economic and cultural inequality continues across generations.

The wage-earning population is split so that each social position is crystallized in physical and social space, in consumption of services, in organizational networks, and in local government institutions. Future conflicts are channeled toward intracity competition among equally exploited residents for a structurally limited pie. The suburban local governments enforce this situation through all kinds of discriminatory land-use regulations: large-lot zoning, minimum house-size requirements, exclusion of multiple dwellings, obstacles to nonreliable building permits, etc.

At the same time, the suburban model of consumption has had a very clear impact on the reproduction of the dominant social relationships. Because the (legally owned) domestic household was in fact purchased with borrowed money, it could only be kept on the assumption of a stable permanent job. Any major deviation or failure threatened (job-dependent) financial reliability. Mass consumption also meant mass dependence on the economic and cultural rules of the financial institutions. Social relationships in the suburban neighborhood expressed the values of individualism, conformism, and social integration, reducing the world to the nuclear family and social desires to the maximization of individual consumption.

Thus, class-based metropolitan inequality is derived from uneven capitalist development. Expressed in the unequal social

composition of the urban structure, it is ultimately preserved and reinforced by the state through the institutional arrangement of local governments and the class-determined fragmentation of the metropolitan areas.

The U.S. pattern of urban development individualizes and commodifies profitable consumption while simultaneously deteriorating nonprofitable socialized consumption. At the same time, the institutional mechanisms for the preservation of the social order are structurally provided.

Nevertheless, this model of urban structure depends on some basic structural contradictions: the contradiction between the growing need for public services in a system of socialized consumption and the increasing privatization of profits; the contradiction between the need to maintain some central functions and the urban sprawl of metropolitan areas; the contradiction between the growth of local governments' responsibilities and their inability to deal with the problems, either financially or institutionally; the contradiction between the spatial concentration of surplus population and oppressed ethnic minorities in the ghettos and the lack of mechanisms of integration in the central city. Deepened by economic crisis and expressed by movements of revolt, these contradictions are threatening the very basis of the existing pattern of urban development. Since the mid-fifties, the urban crisis has developed rapidly along three lines: the crisis in the production, distribution, and management of the means of collective consumption; the crisis of social order; and the crisis of local governments.

At the level of the means of collective consumption, the crisis of the postwar pattern of urban development reflects an increasing inability to keep the segregated delivery of urban services functioning smoothly. The most significant examples include housing, transportation, and education.⁹²

The crisis of the housing market, particularly acute in the central cities of large metropolitan areas, is revealed in a total failure of the "filtering down" theory, the relative deterioration in the resources of the poor, the rising level of property tax and maintenance costs, and the depreciation of the housing stock caused by the overall decay of the city, overcrowding, and lack of maintenance.

Many landlords faced declining purchasing power and profitability.⁹³ The incomes of a large portion of central-city families were insufficient to provide landlords with rents that would cover maintenance costs and still leave acceptable profit margins. Thus, many families overcrowded small dwellings, accelerating the rate of deterioration, abandoned housing units in the quest for cheaper housing, or launched rent strikes, in which case either the families were evicted or the landlord abandoned the house to force urban renewal and to obtain a revaluation of his property by public funds.

Many central-city landlords facing increasing costs and property taxes could not obtain higher rents because of the low income of tenants and could not sell because of tenants' resistance and lack of buyers. Therefore, they stopped making repairs and maintaining their buildings. Later on, they stopped paying property taxes, obtaining superprofits during the two or more years before the city could legally take over the house. Since the cost of demolition was high and without profitable purpose, the empty houses were quickly occupied by squatters, often drug addicts or inner-city gangs. Violence, prejudice, actual assaults, and widespread fear contributed to the abandonment of the entire sector by the neighbors, creating a process of contagion that literally produced no man's lands in large parts of the cities. This trend is developing very fast in the United States. Some official figures for 1973 estimated ("conservatively") that 100,000 units were abandoned in New York City, 30,000 in Philadelphia, 12,000 in Baltimore, 10,000 in St. Louis, etc. Abandonment was going on in New York between 1968 and 1975 at a rate of 50,000 housing units each year, which (with corrections for demolition and adding previously abandoned stock) gives an estimate of between 400,000 and 450,000 abandoned apartments in 1975.⁹⁴

The crisis in central-city housing stock is paralleled by a crisis in the mechanisms of production and distribution of suburban housing, reflected in creeping inflation and the instability of financial markets. Financial intermediaries are decisive in the family's ability to purchase a home. The major contradiction is manifested in increasing individual, corporate, and state debt in general, and residential debt in particular. Residential debt as a percentage of total debt rose from 9.5 in 1947 to 23.7 in 1972.

More and more resources have to be devoted to paying the past debt. With the skyrocketing of interest rates and the stagnation of real income, the cost of new suburban housing threatens a financial collapse that could start an explosive chain reaction.⁹⁵

Housing investments are becoming more and more risky, and therefore the leading financial institutions are retreating from the mortgage-holding markets. In the process the federal government has assumed an increasing share of the debt, avoiding a mass of foreclosures in the suburbs and in the central cities. Increasing government debt and thus inflation were crucial for maintaining the demand for housing between 1968 and 1972.

But there are major unresolved contradictions linked to this process. Either interest rates grow faster than inflation and families will be increasingly unable to pay them, or inflation speeds up and financial institutions will refuse to make unprofitable investments. The federal government intervenes but is increasingly unable to stop inflationary expenditures and simultaneously meet other priorities.

The pattern of transportation in the dual model of urban-suburban structure produced several contradictions during the sixties.⁹⁶ The most important was the differential speed of residential sprawl and decentralization of activities in the central business district. The undersupported public transportation network became increasingly overcrowded and run down, and the new urban highways were not sufficient to accommodate peak-hour traffic. An increasing amount of central land was devoted to parking lots, and downtown streets were more and more submerged by traffic. Federally backed use of the automobile created a permanent financial crisis in public transit and reinforced the downgrading of the service, thus expanding a vicious circle.⁹⁷

Urban crises have been generated by the contradictions inherent in a situation where downtown-redevelopment interests require renewed public support for mass transit to make the facilities they are building more accessible and inner-city residents have problems driving in the city and are disadvantaged in their travels to suburban work places. As a response, the federal government started a new program funding 80 percent of city projects proposing mass-transit development.⁹⁸ The most important initiative under this new provision was the BART system in the

San Francisco Bay area. But as several analysts have shown, this experience, as well as the general trend in other current mass-transit programs, has favored middle-class suburban residents commuting to work in the central business district rather than the increasingly isolated city residents or the mass of workers commuting from the working-class suburbs.

But the model came under attack from the suburbs as well. Car maintenance costs increase, and a significant portion of the suburban population cannot drive. Also, measures to protect the environment against pollution have emphasized the damage done by the automobile, mobilizing one dimension of the suburban model (living "within nature") against another (traveling by car).

Ultimately, the oil crisis is producing a major breakdown in the perspectives of unlimited car-based transportation. With the 55 mph speed limit on the highways, commuting time increases substantially, and the absurdity of extra large powerful cars running slowly in twelve-lane express highways is starting to strike many North American minds.

Another key mechanism in the class model of urban structure that is crumbling is the school system. We will not refer here to the whole complex set of contradictions concerning education, but exclusively to its role in the reproduction of the system of urban segregation through the "separate and unequal" rule. The autonomy of the school districts over the functioning of their schools has come under attack from the grassroots and the institutions at the same time. Neighborhood movements, particularly in the minority sectors of the city, have campaigned for community control over the schools, trying to mobilize the parents in order to improve the quality of the service and to break down the differential class logic of the educational bureaucracies in the inner-city schools. Without challenging segregation, this movement opposes the effects of segregation on services, calling into question the structural inequality in the distribution of public resources.⁹⁹

On the other hand, the impact of mass protests and liberal pressure on the institutional system has led to a potentially explosive trend: the busing of school children between different school districts to achieve a racial balance and avoid segrega-

tion.¹⁰⁰ Busing is one way to bypass the vicious circle between the social status determined by the quality of education and the quality of education determined, through residential segregation, by social status. In some cities courts have ordered two-way busing to improve integration in the schools. While the upper and middle classes do not care too much, being "protected" in the suburbs or able to send their children to private schools, the white working-class neighborhoods have reacted strongly (rioting and demonstrating in Boston and Louisville, for example) against what they consider a threat to the social chances of their children or even their physical security.

The system of supplying "educational vouchers" to families who can use them in the school of their choice, each school receiving funding proportionate to the demand, is an attempt to make the schools work through market mechanisms. Experiences in California do not seem very encouraging, either in terms of efficiency or equality, since the mechanisms of reciprocal selection by schools and parents work to keep in general the same social recruitment.

What this process of contradiction and conflict over school segregation makes clear is that the U.S. urban model is being shaken not only in its daily functioning but also in its mechanisms of self-reproduction. Similar problems appear in other basic public services, such as health, garbage collection, and welfare. Analysis of these service areas would provide additional evidence about the general breakdown of the organization of the means of collective consumption settled during the expanding period that followed World War II.

The most striking effects of these trends are undoubtedly the growing abandonment and physical destruction of large sectors of the central cities, particularly in the ghettos. Baltimore's Pennsylvania Avenue, Boston's Columbia Point, and St. Louis's Pruitt-Igoe are symbols of the massive destruction that could occur if the current pattern is not reversed. The most famous example is the South Bronx in New York City, where 600,000 people live. The process of abandonment, the deterioration of real estate values, and the loss of control by the system have induced the landlords to encourage the setting of fires in order to get money from their insurance companies. In other cases fires are

started just to obtain plumbing and building materials. Landlords pay children three to ten dollars apiece to start the fires. There were 12,300 fires in the South Bronx in 1974, with more than one-third proved intentional—ten every night! And this is not a unique district: Brownsville in Brooklyn, Bushwick, and others are also burning. Zones of New York appear as if they had been bombed.

But the most direct and most disruptive expression of the urban crisis was a series of different phenomena that suddenly and radically disrupted the reproduction of the social order. The breakdown, which had its roots in the central-city social order, occurred in the social structure of exploitation and the political and ideological experiences of oppression. Since the central city was, on the one hand, a material apparatus for the managerial functions of the economy and of the society and, on the other hand, a form of organization of the labor power in the stagnant economic sector, the revolt of the overexploited against the symbols and practice of the rulers was expressed through the material base and organizational supports of the inner city's everyday life.

This major disruption of the dominant social order took several different forms, but they all expressed the rejection of a given situation and produced a similar impact on the functioning and structure of the central city. The most important forms of breakdowns of social control were the following:

There was a rapid increase of so-called crime and particularly of "crime in the streets," which was clearly linked to an individual reaction against structural oppression in the absence of a stable mass-based political alternative.¹⁰¹ "Crime" is not explained by "deprivation" alone. For example, in the depression of the 1930s, crime rates actually went down and only went up again in the late fifties and early sixties. In the current depression crime rates are higher still (up 20 percent in 1975 over what they were in 1974). This comparison implies that the collective movement that during the thirties forced the government to launch the New Deal was viewed by many urban dwellers as an adequate response and a hopeful trend. Today the structurally unemployed are concentrated in the inner cities and lack an effective channel for collective action. But we also observe that the most rapid in-

crease in the crime rate occurred during the sixties, when in fact, until 1966, the economic situation was improving on the average. It seems, therefore, that the major factor has been the collapse of the system of social control by the family, the school, or the southern communities from which many inner-city dwellers came. Not only was urban crime a challenge to the social order, but it became a way of life, economically and culturally, for a large sector of inner-ghetto youth who had no chance outside the irregular economy to which some forms of crime are structurally connected.

Another source of challenge to the established social and spatial division of labor and consumption was the development of community organizations and urban protest movements that defied the logic of the functioning and delivery of specific services as well as the legitimacy of traditional local authorities.¹⁰² The most widespread urban movements were mobilizations against urban renewal to protect a neighborhood from demolition or obtain adequate help and money for relocating. Given urban renewal's direct threat, it was relatively easy to mobilize neighborhoods, but these movements were defensive and limited in scope. After several years of experience, however, the movements progressively shifted toward demands for comprehensive neighborhood planning forcing a new approach to urban redevelopment.

Rent strikes, particularly in New York, St. Louis, Philadelphia, and Chicago, ushered in a new period, in which the "filtering down" process was blocked by insistence on adequate repairs and by demands that rents be controlled according to some public standards instead of at the landlord's will.¹⁰³ All social services (health and education in particular) as well as social welfare were subject to assault by central-city residents. Frances Piven and Richard Cloward have shown how, in fact, the spectacular increase in the welfare rolls during the sixties was not due to increasing needs (these already existed) but to increasing demands.¹⁰⁴ Thus, urban protest was not the effect of urbanization, but the grassroots attempt to overcome the segregated model of collective consumption, an expression of the loss of social control caused by the combined impact of the internal contradictions of urban services and generalized unrest in American society.

The poor and black mobilizations were paralleled by Alinsky-type community organizations trying to develop middle-class citizens' participation and control over local governments and social services. Robert Bailey has shown how this very moderate populist approach developed mostly where middle-class groups found "poor people types of problems," that is, where the inner-city crisis struck the remaining middle-class dwellers.¹⁰⁵ Thus, in spite of their ideological conservatism and pragmatic approach, the Alinsky-type movements were a real threat to the social order (contrary to what Bailey thinks), since they were channeling toward protests groups that were generally supportive of local institutions. Certainly, their localism and economicism kept them within the mainstream of the consumer movement, but their growing influence was a factor pushing in the direction of a multiclass movement that could have been developed on a more conflictual base in a different political context. In summary, while limited, localistic and strictly economic, the urban movements during the sixties clearly limited the overexploitation implicit in the pattern of urban development that had until then been predominant.

The most significant factor in the breakdown of the social order in the cities during the sixties was the riots, which took place mostly in the black ghettos. After the explosions of Harlem (1964) and Watts (1965) they were generalized in the famous hot summer of 1967 and as a mass response to the murder of Martin Luther King in 1968. There followed, in 1969, 1970, and 1971, an important number of less publicized riots.¹⁰⁶ Certainly, the riots were not "urban movements" in the sense that they were not exclusively linked to a protest related to the living conditions in the inner city. They were a form of general protest and struggle of the black people against the general conditions of their oppression. There had been much debate and empirical research on the riots, but the best systematic statistical analysis, carried out by Seymour Spilerman, shows that the only variables significantly correlated with the occurrence and intensity of riots were the size of the black population in the city (the larger the black population, the more riots) and the region (the northern cities are more likely to have riots).¹⁰⁷ Statistically speaking, the riots were strongly linked to the large inner-city ghettos of the

largest metropolitan areas. This fact can be interpreted either in organizational terms (the largest possible base for sustained mass organization) or in terms of the specific effects of the segregated organization of work, services, and everyday life, as expressed in the largest ghettos. The hypotheses are complementary. The riots were mass protests against the racist society, including one of its dimensions, the specific pattern of racial segregation in the ghetto and its effects on the delivery of services and jobs.¹⁰⁸

If the black movement, in its different expressions, could not overcome its isolation and if its vast radical component was destroyed by repression, the struggles of the sixties at least forced the state at the federal and local level to a major reexamination of the use of central cities as a reservation for ethnic minorities. Blacks increasingly gained access to local governments and state agencies, more and better services were distributed (at least for a period), and more public jobs were made available for inner-city residents. Often this amelioration was part of a process of cooptation of the community leaders intended to disorganize the grassroots, but nevertheless the overall effects produced a decisive breach in the social logic dominating the urban services and local governments. Thus, the protest from the grassroots obtained tangible social benefits, challenged the structural logic, and eventually precipitated the urban fiscal crisis.

The crisis of urban services and the breakdown of the social order at the individual and at the collective level had a major impact on the management of the urban system itself, striking deeply the state apparatus and its internal operations: this is what emerged openly as the urban crisis of the seventies.

The most visible effect of the impact of the urban contradictions and conflict on the state apparatus is the fiscal crisis of the central cities.¹⁰⁹ This is the direct expression of the articulation of the different processes I have described. The fiscal crisis of the central cities is a particularly acute expression of the fiscal crisis of the state: the increasing gap between expenditures and revenues brought on by the socialization of costs and privatization of profits. The crisis is even more acute in the local governments of large central cities because they express the contradictory expansion of the "service sector."¹¹⁰

On the one hand, corporate capital must build managerial function centers which require a concentration of service workers and public facilities. On the other hand, in order to maintain the social order, the state must absorb the surplus population and provide welfare and public services to the large fraction of structurally exploited population, mostly concentrated in the inner cities. During the fifties, accumulation requirements had top priority, and local finance started to recover. During the sixties the mass protests in the inner cities forced some redistribution through social expenditures as well as through the provision of jobs.

The increase in the number of municipal workers triggered a process of escalating demands and economic struggles that were favored by the absence of established bargaining patterns in the public sector. Teachers, municipal service workers, public health workers, sanitation workers, fireman, and policemen have been among the most militant strikers and union-organizing sectors of American labor. They have improved their position substantially even if their wages are still below those in the private monopoly sector. The entire set of labor relationships has been disrupted in the local public sector, creating inflationary trends in the cost of labor-intensive services. The city did not react by levying new taxes on the corporations, which were the most expensive municipal-service consumers, but by raising taxes on central-city residents and trying to oppose between them taxpayers, the welfare-consuming poor, and municipal workers. In spite of renewed fiscal effort and higher public service charges, the city had to increase public debt and count on expected future revenues in order to balance the budget. This is what happened to New York City in 1975-1976, provoking a world famous fiscal crisis.

During the 1950s the New York City budget expanded at an annual rate of approximately 6 percent. Since 1965, the year pressure from communities and workers started, the budget has increased at an annual rate of 15 percent. One-eighth of New Yorkers are on welfare. New York maintains the largest system of public hospitals, subsidized mass transit, welfare payments, tuition-free universities, and cultural facilities in the United States. Nevertheless, the "bankruptcy" of New York City is not a

consequence of the distribution of "excessive" services and jobs, as the elite circles have tried to argue. It is the combined result of corporate rejection of increased taxes that could pay for the social services and, even more important, the decision of the financial community to impose discipline on New York City's social-welfare policy.

The case of New York City is perhaps the most extreme example of the tendencies implicit in the whole evolution of urban contradictions, but most central cities face similar problems. In 1975, in Cleveland, the city's debt service represented 17.9 percent of its current budget expenditures, even higher than New York. In Milwaukee, this figure (indicator of potential imbalance) was 15.2 percent in spite of very high local taxes. Detroit also had a structural deficit and laid off 15 percent of its municipal workers in 1975. Buffalo had a debt-service-to-operating-budget ratio of \$17 million to \$229 million. Boston reduced its municipal work force by 10 percent in 1975, particularly in the health sector. San Francisco in September 1975 faced a strike of firemen and policemen that forced the mayor to keep their jobs and raise their salaries, provoking the indignation of the financial community and subjecting the mayor to embittered accusations that he was on the path to a very serious fiscal crisis.

The potential consequences of the urban fiscal crisis are very serious because they could threaten the already unstable political legitimacy of local governments. Let us explain this important point.

The municipal reformers of the thirties replaced the pork-barrel and patronage policies of the political machines with the urban-development schemes of the city managers. They risked the loss of the person-to-person ties that had founded machine control of inner-city neighborhoods. The pressures from the grassroots during the sixties forced local bureaucracies open to the poor and the ethnic minorities. If "all-out business" policies predominate, the local governments of the largest cities are going to be increasingly isolated from the different conflicting social interests and are going to lose all their past sources of legitimacy, whether in terms of clientele, in terms of management, or in terms of specific interests being served. First line in the revision of the social policies of the sixties, the cities are actually caught

in the crossfire of the business interests calling for restraint and the workers and consumers refusing to carry the burden of a crisis that is not theirs. Thus, the status apparatus in the central cities, besides supporting increasing contradictions at the level of fiscal policies and being shaken by demands for services, jobs, and wages, is also losing political control over the social conflicts growing out of urban issues.

The postwar pattern of urban development itself is now at stake. The converging trends of the social conflicts, the crisis of services, and the economic and political breakdown of local governments have put into question the urban-suburban structure that emerged as a powerful factor in the process of capitalist accumulation and segregated commodity consumption. Actually, even the trend of metropolitanization is now being reversed. For the first time in U.S. urban history, between 1970 and 1973 five of the eight major metropolitan areas decreased instead of increased in size. The New York metropolitan area had a net decrease of 305,000 inhabitants. The decrease in Chicago was 124,000; in Philadelphia 75,000; in Detroit 114,000. Los Angeles in 1972-1973 showed a net outmigration of 119,000. Boston (up 0.4 percent) and San Francisco (up 0.5 percent) remained stable after having grown during the sixties. Only Washington grew, by 1 percent, largely because of federal government employment.

A new and major contradiction arises. If the flight of activities and residences toward the nonmetropolitan areas continues (these areas gained 4.2 percent population between 1970 and 1973), the deterioration of the large cities will accelerate. But the large metropolitan areas remain organizational forms for major economic and political interests of the ruling class, as well as the dwelling place for a large portion of the American people. The new urban form arising from the current crisis will be largely a function of urban social movements and political conflicts. A similar argument could be used for other dimensions of the economic crisis as well as for its impact on American society.

Thus, the social order emerging from the transformations triggered by the economic crisis will be shaped primarily by the policies implemented to overcome the crisis. And these policies will be the result of class conflicts and political strategies within the framework of constraints and tendencies of the American social structure, as presented in this chapter.

4

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Class Interests, Policies for the Crisis, and the Political Process

WE HAVE SEEN that the "economic crisis" is, in fact, a social process. Therefore, its treatment will also be a social process. Each month economists look at "leading indicators" as if they were meteorologists trying to predict the weather for the weekend or a natural storm of uncontrollable origin. In fact, the evolution of the crisis and its impact on the social structure and the dynamics of U.S. society will depend on the interaction between the structural social contradictions it reveals and the policies used to counteract the effects of the crisis. By policies we mean a series of articulated decisions made by the two major centers of economic and social power—the large corporations and the state. These policies are obviously not neutral or scientific. They are embedded in particular social interests; other interests will be opposed and, if necessary, sacrificed.

Their orientation, plausibility, and final effects of these policies will be mostly a function of the social conflicts expressed at both the grassroots level and the level of the political process related to the state. Thus, to understand the economic crisis, we must systematize and define the major orientations of the state policies used in the United States over the past fifteen years to try to control the increasing contradictions of the process of accumulation. In fact, the current crisis is also a political crisis in the sense that the political system has been seriously shaken by the failure of economic policies and by the triggering of new political contradictions generated by those policies. Today it has become indispensable at all levels (economic, political, ideological) to organize a new departure for the system as a whole, in the United States as well as in the rest of the world. To outline the set of interactions between the current crisis and the political implications on the different policies

particularly among organized municipal workers. O'Dwyer, an ex-cop, had strong friends in the police department, the fire department, the Transport Workers Union and other municipal employees' groups. Perhaps most crucial, the ALP had been sharply divided in the phoney war period. ILGWU President David Dubinsky and Alex Rose, heads of the state organization, had always been restive about the influence of the Left-led rank and file in the ALP and the fact that they had to work with Communist trade union leaders. Battles for control of the county ALP organization and the state ALP developed, some of them near-brawls.

Much of this, if not forgotten, at least was muted after June 22. City Council President Newbold Morris got the message fast. Shortly after the Nazi invasion of the USSR he told intimates that he had breathed a sigh of relief. "Now we're gonna win," he said. It was perhaps a piece of parochial cynicism but it reflected the feeling of many political professionals that the emerging anti-Fascist unity would help re-create the anti-Tammany coalition that had been so successful in 1937.

Pete was up to his neck in work, continuing to battle on the economic issues of the day while stepping up his speaking schedule to reorient the Brooklyn Party organization, the people on the Left and literally all within sound of his voice. However, nature and the doctors intervened. One day in July, 1941 after a thorough medical examination, he was called to a meeting with several members of the Party's National Committee and solemnly told that the doctors had decreed that he had to cease all political activities forthwith. It was his heart, the doctors had said. And the National Committee supported the doctors' orders.

A desperately unhappy Pete left the national offices at Manhattan's East 12th Street for home. He was fated to watch the next stages of what he felt in his bones was a victorious councilmanic campaign from a hospital or his sick bed at home.

Back in Brooklyn Pete's comrades were momentarily dismayed. But they rallied swiftly. The collective took over. They couldn't replace Pete but they could work in his style. They and hundreds of non-Communist supporters fanned out across the huge borough, canvassing at homes, holding street meetings and rallies at shopping centers, speaking on the floor of unions and circulating nominating petitions in shops. Pete followed the campaign through reports of his manager and his wife, Dorothy, who divided her time between home, her infant son and some doorbell ringing and personal contact with voters close by.

The war in Europe was raging and it was evident that sooner or later the

United States would be directly involved. Pete's over-all slogan in his campaign literature was "Unity Against Hitler" and it struck a ready response. The Greater New York CIO Council endorsed Pete, as did a number of progressive AFL unions. The first stage of the campaign wound up with 30,000 signatures of Brooklyn voters on Cacchione nominating petitions.

Undoubtedly the strict regimen ordered by his doctors did Pete a world of good. But a greater tonic than the enforced rest and the prescribed medication, according to Dorothy and his campaign committee, was the favorable reports coming in from the field. Impatient as he was at being sidelined, he grew visibly stronger. Ten days before the election he was able to visit campaign headquarters for a few minutes at a time. In the climactic last two days he made two speeches.

PETE and his managers strode into the familiar armory on the morning of Election Day, 1941, in a mood of mingled confidence and wariness. They had every reason to feel optimistic, but the memory of the near-miss—or steal, as some of the old pros would hint privately—was ever present.

The current was running Pete's way. LaGuardia and the ALP-endorsed city-wide slate had won, even though Fiorello's margin was substantially lower than in 1937. The Communist Party had again given qualified endorsement to the LaGuardia ticket, urging its supporters to vote ALP for the major office and to give the Communist Party councilmanic nominees first-choice votes.

Most candidates supported the anti-Fascist war, but they hesitated to make it an issue in the campaign. "We're running in the city," they would argue. "We can't affect national policy." The Communists on the other hand stressed the war as the overriding question of the day. Pete's

demand for "Unity Against Hitler" struck fire as he and his campaigners linked municipal problems with the supreme issue of defeating nazism. It was the Party's policy of coalition *and* independence again, but under new conditions.

Even the atmosphere in the armory was palpably different than in 1939. Reporters and old party politicians alike sensed that Pete was a winner this time. Many went out of their way to shake his hand, to exchange a few words with him, to see and be seen with him. These were seasoned old politicians who could spot a sure bet: Pete's remarkable 1939 write-in vote had not been forgotten.

The old pros' shrewd guesses were soon vindicated. A murmur went up as the first-choice count was completed, showing Pete with 34,748 No. 1 ballots, an increase of 15 percent over his 1937 first-choice vote. He was now in the top nine and unless the 1937 hanky-panky was repeated he couldn't be stopped. Pete's watchers were all over the place as the canvassers went into the next stage of eliminating the bottom candidates and distributing their second choices. Pete himself, still under strict doctor's orders, made few visits to the armory, but his committee people—who by this time had picked up some discreet allies among the canvassers—kept the vigil. The second choices continued to pile up for Pete.

By the late afternoon of November 11, radio station WCNW conceded Pete's election and called him to its armory microphone. But Pete wasn't claiming victory yet. He remembered too well what had happened in the last hours of the 1937 count. He contented himself with a brief "appreciation to the voters who cast ballots for me," his "thanks to the workers who are counting the votes here in the armory," and a strong boost for the "PR system of voting."

He was officially declared elected at 2:20 P.M. the next afternoon, November 12, by Charles Prokorny, the Republican co-director of the count in Brooklyn. "Announcement of the election was singularly undramatic," the *Daily Worker* reported the next day, "having been anticipated by election workers and observers at the huge armory."

The figures told the story: Pete had started off with nearly 35,000 solid first-choice votes and picked up 13,881 second choices to win election with a total of 48,629. He had gained all along the line: he had received over 4,500 more first-choice votes in 1941 than in 1937 (34,728 as against 30,237) and about 2,500 more second-choice votes (13,881 as

against 11,327). There were nine councilmen to be elected in Brooklyn, and Pete had come in ninth. No monkey business this time.

Pete took his victory without any display of excitement. Asked by reporters for an off-the-cuff statement, he quipped gently: "This *has* been an interesting year for Brooklyn. First, the Dodgers win the pennant. Next year the Dodgers are going to win the World Series. Then . . ."

Later that day he issued a formal statement which expressed in a few succinct paragraphs his political outlook and that of the Communist Party. Pete noted and hailed—he was the only Brooklyn councilman to do so—the fact that voters of neighboring Manhattan had elected a Black man for the first time to the City Council, the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell. It was a statement that foreshadowed Pete's next two years in the Council:

My election is a mandate from the people of Brooklyn—and so I consider it—a mandate to continue and intensify my efforts in behalf of the unity of all peoples and forces working for the defense of America through the military defeat and destruction of Hitler and all he stands for. It is in this spirit that I shall endeavor to cooperate with all members of the City Council, whether they be Democrats, Republicans, Laborites or Fusionists, who support the foreign policy of the Roosevelt Administration, who stand for progressive legislation, civic improvements and clean government.

I shall devote my time and energies toward bringing about an improvement in the living conditions of the people of Brooklyn as well as those of New York City as a whole—fighting for better housing, lower taxes for low income groups, control of prices, a curb on excess profits and an end to all practices of discrimination whether directed against the Negro people, the Italian people, the Jewish people or the foreign-born. . . .

Only the unity of ALL patriotic Americans, regardless of race, color, creed, political belief or social position, can guarantee the defense of America and the defeat of the butcher and enemy of all mankind—Adolph Hitler.

Pete's statement was no conventional thank-you filled with the platitudes of a victorious candidate. It was a policy declaration. It zeroed in on the central question of the day—the struggle against Hitlerism—while continuing his focus on the fight for the needs of the people and the battle against racism at home. Significantly, Pete emphasized that his mandate had come from "the people of Brooklyn," his way of saying that he had been backed by many who did not necessarily subscribe to his political philosophy. Always a fast man with figures, Pete, who knew the

actual strength of the Communist Party in Brooklyn, promptly did some calculating. Analyzing his 35,000 first-choice votes, he reckoned that for every first-choice vote he had received from a Communist Party member, he had gotten six from non-Communists. When the second-choice votes and third-choice votes were added, it was clear that he had received ten votes from non-Communists to each one from a Party member.

This was the thinking behind his phrase about "a mandate from the people of Brooklyn." It represented his—and the Party's—sober judgment that Pete had a constituency far wider than the Party, one that had been built up in the course of leadership of broad united front struggles. It was a constituency that was to be widened in subsequent campaigns.

Who were these non-Communists who were the overwhelming majority of Cacchione voters? Pete and his immediate aides followed the armory count minutely and observed as far as possible the areas where he got the heaviest votes. They concluded that the hard core of his vote came from left-wingers, that is, people who were sympathizers of the Communist Party and readers of the *Daily Worker* and progressive foreign language newspapers. Many votes, they reasoned, were cast by militant trade unionists attracted by Pete's unwavering pro-labor activities and the endorsement of the CIO council. Others, undoubtedly, were from old Bonus March buddies and fellow fighters in the struggles of the unemployed. Some came from liberal intellectuals impressed by Pete's general program and his obvious integrity, in shining contrast to the run-of-the-mill old party politicians. (He ran well in Brooklyn Heights, the borough's counterpart of Manhattan's Greenwich Village, where many writers, artists and other professional people made their home.)

Of all independent white candidates Pete ran strongest in the Black communities. His unflinching fight against racism down the years and the firm, principled Communist position in the struggle was reflected in Pete's substantial vote in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area. True, candidates of the dominant Democratic machine frequently received preelection "endorsements" from some Black leaders. But Pete's support from the Black community had a different quality, based as it was on his record of day-to-day work in common struggle with the Black people. His steadfastness in the fight for Black-white united struggle broke down the generally justifiable suspicion of white "politicians" in the Black community. This was reflected in the armory count where it was evident that he got a good first-choice vote from Black voters. Where it wasn't a first-choice vote, it was frequently a second or third choice. In any event,

it was clear that Pete was one of the few white candidates with substantial support among Black voters.

Harder to measure was the so-called neighborhood vote, but it was considerable. Pete had been involved in battles around scores of civic community issues, from getting a traffic light installed at a busy crossing used by school kids to forcing removal of an obnoxious coal pile that blew black dust into neighborhood homes. How close he was to his community is indicated by the Rockwell Kent episode. Pete's attention was drawn to a young Italian-American artist who lived on Bay Parkway in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn near Pete. Pete wouldn't rest until he persuaded Kent to come out to Bensonhurst to evaluate the young man's paintings and advise him how best to develop his talent! (Naturally, he ran well in his home district, so strongly, in fact, that in one campaign he led the field in his own election district, beating even the incumbent Democrat who also lived there.)

Did he get a big "ethnic" vote because of his Italian name, as charged by his opponents? Pete did in fact run well in Italian neighborhoods, surprisingly strong for a Communist, his foes remarked bitterly. As a practical matter, however, his "ethnic" Italian vote was no greater and in fact less than that of some Italian-American machine candidates. Actually a higher proportion of his vote came from Jewish districts rather than Italian areas. What bothered the major party machines was that Pete showed *any* strength in Italian districts. Pete had clearly tapped a reservoir of strength among Italian workers, particularly garment workers and longshoremen, who appreciated an honest working-class candidate who was also "one of their own" but of a different stripe than the conventional Italian-American politico with whom they were all too familiar.

But few Brooklynites engaged in these long thoughts on the night of November 12 after it was officially announced that Pete had been elected as the ninth of nine council members from Brooklyn.

For days, when it appeared almost certain that Pete would win, a stream of well-wishers rang the bell of Pete's tiny attic apartment at 91 Bay 31st Street in the Bath Beach section. His wife, Dorothy, worn from campaigning and attending Pete during his convalescence, and infant son Bernard, bustled between the front door and the jangling telephone. At one point there were so many people in the house, Dorothy relates, that Pete rose from his couch to deliver a brief speech, refusing to claim victory but simply contenting himself with stating that if nine were to be elected, he would be one of the nine.

When the news finally came through, Pete insisted over Dorothy's objections, that he had to leave the house to thank his campaigners. Pete wanted to go to downtown Brooklyn, to the central headquarters, but Dorothy was adamant. They compromised, and Pete was driven to a nearby branch campaign headquarters in Coney Island where Pete spoke for three minutes to a cheering audience that jammed the little hall.

Meanwhile, the main headquarters was a joyous bedlam. Campaign workers poured in from outlying sections. Telephones rang incessantly and regular relays of messengers appeared with telegrams, some from Pete's Bonus March pals. Later, his mother came in from Sayre to join in her son's triumph. But Pete's father was missing. He had died just two months before Pete was elected. Pete's mother brought with her the *Sayre Evening News* with the headline: SAYREITE FIRST U.S. COMMUNIST TO WIN MAJOR ELECTIVE POST.

23

Why Pete Won: Reflections

PETE had a lot to do between the day he was declared elected and his first meeting of the newly-elected City Council in January. Meanwhile there was some time for reflection on the results by Pete and his comrades. How did it come about that Pete was the first person to be elected on a Communist ticket in a great metropolis?

Pete was a unique human being, but he would be the last to say that his victory was a one-man feat. True, he and his Brooklyn comrades and sympathizers had worked diligently and self-sacrificingly in the bread-and-butter struggles of their fellow workers and neighbors. They had led or supported union organizing drives, relief demonstrations, rent strikes and scores of other day-to-day struggles. Pete had always been available to his neighbors, whether to walk a picket line, greet them on a joyous occasion or demand immediate cash relief for a needy family. And on the larger questions of the day: the struggle against Franco in Spain and the

menace of Hitlerism and Mussolini fascism, Pete and the Party had spoken up, even when it was not popular to do so.

Pete and his comrades understood that his election arose out of a complex of historic circumstances. Without the great mass movements, particularly the unemployment struggles, the surge of unionization typified by the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the battles of the Black people, the exposure of the scandal-ridden Tammany machines and the growth of political independence, Pete's victory would have been impossible.

Even these factors were not the complete answer, however. After all, there were other periods of great upheaval and enormous activity by Communists without Communist electoral triumphs. What was decisive in 1941 was the Communist Party and its policy of the united front. The application of the united front policy to the electoral scene, with its strong currents of independence from the two old parties—and the democratic advance of proportional representation—made the difference.

Communists had long stressed the need for unity, particularly among the workers. In the twenties, the Communists and especially William Z. Foster, who came out of the trade union movement, called for amalgamation of existing craft unions, for industrial unionism and for independent political action through a labor party or a farmer-labor party. It carried on an unceasing criticism of the reward-your-friends-and-punish-your-enemies political philosophy of AF of L President Samuel Gompers and his successors, a policy which wound up with support of the two old parties.

What had been largely ignored in the so-called prosperity twenties had a new ring in the depression thirties, especially when one looked at Europe where Adolph Hitler, backed by heavy industry, had come to power in Germany at the head of a jack-booted horde. While Britain and France stood by mute—some circles in both countries even applauded—Hitler shrieked imprecations against the Soviet Union, communists, Marxism, the Jews and "degenerate democracy." Communists, Socialists, trade unionists, Jews, liberal Catholics and pacifist Protestants were hounded, imprisoned, tortured and killed. The holocaust was on, and over the land of Goethe and Schiller the swastika fluttered, and schoolchildren greeted teachers each morning with "Heil Hitler!"

It was in this lowering political landscape that the Communist Party's fight for the united front took on new meaning and vitality. Georgi

Dimitrov's historic report on the united front to the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935 was read widely in the United States by Communists and many other anti-Fascists. The words of the heroic Bulgarian, who had defied his Nazi captors at the Reichstag Fire trial in 1933, had enormous impact. An integral element of the Communist outlook, the policy of the united front became an urgent question far beyond the ranks of the Communists. Ancient political foes on the Left cast nervous glances at Hitler Germany and, at the urging of the Communists, took thoughtful second looks at their differences. Under pressure of the rank and file in scores of organizations, they began to see that the area of agreement in struggle was more important than their disagreements. It was in that period that the Communist-led Unemployment Councils united with Left Socialists in the same field to form the Workers Alliance and on the broader arena of anti-Hitler struggle the League Against War and Fascism was born.

It was in the trade union field that the new stirrings led to the massive movement to organize the unorganized industries—steel, auto, chemical and others—that came to be known as the CIO. It was a movement that spurned the fragmented AF of L craft union structure and moved along industrial union lines, so long urged by Foster and the Communists.

Communists promptly threw their vigor, talent and experience into the CIO drive. Veterans of rank-and-file struggles, many were appointed as organizers in a variety of industries notwithstanding ideological differences with top leaders of the CIO. Gus Hall, later to become general secretary of the Communist Party, was named to an important post in the Youngstown, Ohio steel region. Wyndham Mortimer, another Communist, became one of the leaders of the auto workers in their great sit-down strikes. In New York State, organizing drives were under way on the waterfront, in the transport, electrical and distributive industries, as well as among newspaper workers, retail clerks and office employees.

Politically, matters were somewhat more complex. In Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt was in the saddle. Pressed by the economic crisis, wide bank failures, mounting unemployment and surging mass movements, the Congress churned out a mass of Roosevelt-initiated legislation, much of it designed to shore up what was apparently a tottering capitalist system and some of it obviously aimed at meeting mass demands. With one eye cocked on Hitler and his Nazis, and reflecting some alarmed currents in ruling circles, Roosevelt moved swiftly to end the sixteen-year-old policy of Soviet nonrecognition. On November 7, 1933,

FDR and Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov signed a recognition treaty which would in a decade prove to be one of the most fateful acts of the administration.

New York City, ever a faithful barometer of great national and international changes, had in one way or another reflected all these vast changes. New popular movements arose, new problems were posed and new answers were required.

The Communists had come up not only with specific programs but with carefully thought out answers for united struggle of the people. The united front was the centerpiece of the Communist outlook and the united front of struggle was the fundamental explanation of Pete's election in that time and in that place and under those circumstances.

24

The Eagle Screams

PREDICTABLY, the reactionaries set up a howl on the news of election of Pete, the "avowed Communist." But it was more than Pete that reaction was after. The men in the Wall Street board rooms and their friends among the big publishers and the two old parties were unhappy about the whole City Council elected under PR in 1941. Along with Pete, the new Council would have four Laborites, two independents and its first Black councilman. This democratic method of election was too much. No telling where it could lead.

It was the *Brooklyn Eagle*, which long ago had buried the tradition of Walt Whitman, its editor of another era, that set up the loudest scream. Within twenty-four hours after Pete's election was officially announced, the November 13 *Eagle* was on the stands with an editorial headlined:

ELECTION OF RED TO COUNCIL
IS NEW BLOW TO P.R. SYSTEM

The *Eagle*, a sworn foe of PR and the LaGuardia Administration, was

widely regarded as an organ of the borough's banks, big real-estate interests, department stores, dominant political machines and reactionary clerics. It never forgave the Newspaper Guild for its strike of 1937 and Pete for walking the picket line with the strikers. Its racism was hardly concealed. Back in 1919, after an eruption in Washington, D.C., the *Eagle* carried the headline: RACE WAR IN WASHINGTON SHOWS BLACK AND WHITE EQUALITY NOT PRACTICAL.

A friendly biographer of the *Eagle*, Raymond A. Schroth, S.J., (*The Eagle and Brooklyn*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1974), wrote: "The *Eagle* blamed the riot on the full employment, high wages, and increasing independence that Washington Negroes had won from the war." One of the *Eagle* publishers visited Nazi Germany in 1936 and returned to the United States singing the praises of Hitler, according to *The Eagle Eye*, a monthly newspaper published by Communist workers at the *Brooklyn Eagle*. The charge was never rebutted.

Hearst's *Journal-American* and the *Daily News* followed the *Eagle's* lead. The *New York Post* quavered a bit yet did not join the fury. But the lordly *New York Times*, the nation's most influential paper, weaseled. It was a harbinger of its 1947 reversal when it threw itself violently into the campaign to abolish PR.

It was the usual *Times* technique, soothing the reader with an on-the-one-hand-and-on-the-other "balanced" approach before plunging the knife. "In the election of the new City Council," the editorial began calmly enough, "proportional representation did not achieve a brilliant success. Tammany and its allied organizations in this city have several times tried . . . to get rid of it; but they have nevertheless learned to use it for their purposes far better than have their opponents."

So far so good, an unwary reader might think. But Tammany wasn't the real target. That came in the next paragraph:

Nor was it an accident that a Communist was elected to the Council by P.R., or that it was from Brooklyn that P.R. elected him. For a Communist to win he needed only one-ninth of the total vote, or even slightly less. . . .

Here one might interrupt to ask, if Pete needed only one-ninth of the total wasn't the same thing true of the Democrats and others elected in Brooklyn? The editorial conceded that PR is "representative," but then went into reverse, charging that PR is "divisive in its effect; it emphasizes and aggravates differences and groups instead of helping to reconcile them. It elects Communists, Fascists and other extremists who

would otherwise not get into power, and these extremists thereupon proceed to make parliamentary government unworkable. The history of Europe has given much sad testimony to this. . . .

"After three elections P.R. in New York City must be considered to be still on trial." (*The New York Times*, November 14, 1941.)

It might be noted that the august *New York Times* had no such reservations about PR after the 1937 election when Pete was narrowly defeated (if that's the word for the shenanigans in the armory). Nor in 1939 when Pete was knocked off the ballot on a technicality and had to wage a write-in campaign. No, indeed. Doubts about PR assailed the *Times* only after Pete was fairly elected. If the *Times* was simply storing up arguments for a later switch of its position on PR, the once-liberal *World-Telegram*, a part of the Scripps-Howard chain, followed another tack. It wanted the courts to bar Cacchione.

"He is an avowed member of the Communist Party," the *World-Telegram* thundered editorially three days after Pete's election. "He is in fact that party's Brooklyn chairman. No haze or disguise."

The editorial demanded a court test to "get down to the basic questions." What was "basic" to the *World-Telegram* was "whether or not the Communist Party does advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence." Its own attitude to representative elections was revealed a bit later in an editorial: "Electorate or not, it seems grotesque to bar Communists by state law from civil service jobs but to let an active Communist into the City Council. . . ." (*The New York World-Telegram*, November 14, 1941.)

It was not all one way, however. The *Daily Worker* swung back sharply at the enemies of PR, pointing out that what they feared was not simply the lone Communist in the City Council but the whole concept of democratic elections in which the voters could express their independence of the two major parties. Marshall Field's afternoon tabloid, *PM*, then edited by Ralph Ingersoll, also backed PR vigorously.

Of the major circulation papers, only the *Herald-Tribune*, reflecting the views of the liberal Republican and good government groups, argued against the witch hunters. It cautioned editorially against efforts to bar Pete, apparently referring to the proposed resolution of the ultrareactionary Councilman Hugh Quinn, a Queens Democrat, to refuse to seat Pete when the new Council convened.

Recalling the national scandal when the Republican-controlled State Assembly expelled five Socialist assemblymen in 1920, the staid Repub-

lican organ called on Cacchione's foes to watch their step. "He (Cacchione) polled 48,229 votes, which is about 43,000 more than the estimated strength of the Communist Party in Kings" (Brooklyn), the *Herald-Tribune* editorialized:

As the candidate affirms his allegiance, and as there seems no doubt he pulled enough votes to elect him, representing the wishes of a large number of persons, it may be well to go somewhat slowly with the excommunication rites. . . . Proceedings of this sort are seldom satisfactory. Those who think of engaging in them should remember the cases of the five Socialist Assemblymen who were expelled in the New York State Assembly. (*New York Herald-Tribune*, November 15, 1941.)

Pete made note of all this, quietly warning his comrades that PR was in for trouble. Meanwhile, he began his preparations for taking office in January.

His devoted Dorothy had read him all the news and editorials during the campaign—his eyesight had been steadily deteriorating for at least a year—but now he wanted to learn the Council rules. This had to be done at leisure, so he suggested to this writer, then the legislative director of the New York State Communist Party, that we leave town for a week to "study the Council rules so I know them backward and forward." Thus it was that visitors at the modest Hotel Allaben in Lakewood, N.J. were treated to the spectacle of two men poring over a book of rules. I read them aloud; we discussed each one. At the end, Pete had virtually memorized the rules. He was, I thought, probably better prepared than most of the veteran Tammany hacks.

Returning to New York, Pete had one more suggestion. He wanted an aisle seat in the council chamber, so that when he had to leave the floor he would not stumble over his neighbors. City Council President Newbold Morris quickly agreed when I relayed Pete's request.

But if Morris was agreeable, Quinn was still making big noises. Despite the tub-thumping by the reactionary press, it was clear that his resolution to exclude Pete was going nowhere. It would be resisted strenuously by the non-Tammany minority, varied though their views and affiliations; it was also opposed by canny leaders of Tammany who remembered the State Assembly scandal of the 1920s. Finally, the new atmosphere after Pearl Harbor (Dec. 7) made it virtually impossible to exclude a man with Pete's anti-Fascist record.

Quinn, who felt he was getting political mileage with some of his

right-wing forces, kept up his fight until the very last day. He was intent on becoming the idol of the anti-Communists. (He was already something of a favorite of the anti-Semites by his coarse mockery of the Russian Jewish accent of Laborite Councilman B. Charney Vladeck when the latter was minority leader in the 1938-1939 council session.)

Quinn knew his resolution would get nowhere, but he still wasn't through. Came the last meeting of the outgoing Council on December 30 and Pete and two other newly elected members visited City Hall. Two of them were accorded "the courtesy of the floor" on the motion of incumbents. This is, of course, pure ritual, formally requiring unanimous consent while according the person so honored no particular right. It is traditionally carried without objection.

But not this time. When Councilman Harry Laidler, a Brooklyn Socialist defeated for reelection, moved "to extend the courtesy of the floor" to Pete, it was Quinn who roared objection. Pete remained seated a few minutes among the visitors and later quietly left the chamber. Reporters followed him into the corridor. Did Pete have any comment on Quinn's calculated insult?

The wishhaws had their pencils poised. Here was something that would make copy out of this otherwise dull last session. Maybe Pete would oblige. He did, but not as some thought he would. Pete smiled sweetly. "My mother and father taught me to be a gentleman," he said, "and I hope I'll never forget that until the day I die."

IF PETE was ill at ease at his first council session in January, 1942, there was no outward sign of it. Immaculate and smiling, he greeted his council colleagues warmly, recognizing them mostly by voice since his vision was already badly dimmed. The man whose first night in New York was spent in a municipal flophouse was now an elected official of the great

city and, in fact, something of a celebrity, the first to win city office as "an avowed Communist," to use the *New York Times'* arch phrase.

There was an undercurrent of tension in the ancient oak-paneled chamber as news photographers snapped pictures endlessly and reporters waited hopefully for some explosive copy. Quinn's threat to bar Pete had fizzled out—the cagey Democratic council leaders had effectively throttled the Queens loudmouth—but would there be some fireworks anyway? Pete waited calmly; and back in the visitors' seats, Dorothy, a new corsage on her dress and surrounded by a delegation of Pete's supporters, beamed.

There was one incident and that one almost unnoticed. It occurred after Council President Newbold Morris called the session to order with a sharp crack of the gavel and introduced the Rev. John P. Boland, chairman of the State Labor Relations Board and pastor of the St. Columbia's Church in Manhattan, to deliver the invocation.

Pete rose with the rest, his head bowed. As Father Boland concluded his call for divine guidance for the Council "in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost," Councilman Quinn peeked over his shoulder to see whether the Communist councilman would cross himself. (Pete didn't.) Quinn looked away hurriedly and few in the chamber caught the stealthy glance.

The incident should have taught Quinn something. Pete had a deep respect for the religious beliefs of his parents, friends and neighbors, but for himself, he always said, he was no hypocrite. Told later of Quinn's sneaky peek, Pete was mildly amused. Brought up in the Catholic faith, he explained, he was no longer a believer and would not pretend otherwise, even if it might be politically expedient to do so. He was a Marxist; his whole world outlook was based on scientific materialism, and while he would defend every person's right to worship as he or she pleased, he would not masquerade as a churchgoer. He and Dorothy, who was of Jewish descent, had been married in a civil ceremony.

But none of this was on Pete's mind as he followed every procedural detail at that first session. He absorbed it all and began to think of what was primary to him: how would he relate the business of the Council to the working people of Brooklyn?

He had already rented an office and anteroom at 26 Court Street in downtown Brooklyn, a location easily accessible from all parts of the borough. Office workers and a legislative assistant, Don Schoolman,

were chosen, the latter a young man who could drive Pete to meetings as well as help on bills, resolutions and research.

"And now," said Pete as the cheerful group returned to his Brooklyn office after the council session, "we thank everybody who helped. We'll send out thank-you letters to the 30,000 people who signed my nominating petitions and invite them and their neighbors to come to the office with any problems." It was done, a host of volunteers sitting up nights addressing envelopes. Peculiar, some people thought. One newspaper reported it as a "singular" action. And further, Pete insisted, he was going to account regularly to his constituents. He would increase the frequency of his *Daily Worker* column and make a weekly radio report. WHOM, a commercial radio station with a large ethnic listening audience, particularly among Italian-Americans, was selected.

Only after these matters were cleared away did Pete begin to concentrate on his legislative activity. His priorities were clear: first, strengthen his links with the people and then, and only then, would his parliamentary activities have meaning. He was not of that school of politicians who do things *for* the people; he did things *with* the people. He never swerved from his conviction that his chief job as an elected official was to help organize the people in struggle. There was no Chinese wall between Pete's resolutions in the City Council and his activity in the street. They were one.

Pete was hardly naive about his committee assignments or, in fact, the political weight of the Council. He knew that within the city government, the Mayor and the Board of Estimate were dominant (and that behind them was the "permanent government," the bankers, insurance trusts, real-estate sharks and other huge corporate interests who effectively controlled the city) and that the City Council had very little real clout. He knew that on the basic question of the power of the purse, the Council was virtually impotent, since the Mayor drew up the budget and the Council had only the power to cut. The council members were in fact fiscal eunuchs.

Nonetheless, Pete, with his superb head for figures, would have liked to be on the Council Finance Committee where he could at least have a crack at the all-important city budget. He understood that the huge eight-pound city budget, virtually incomprehensible to most New Yorkers, was in fact a class document indicating the actual direction of city policy. He knew, for instance, that a hefty percentage of the budget

annually went to pay interest and principal to the bankers to whom the city had been in hock for lo! these many years. As Pete anticipated, the Council bosses kept him far from the Finance Committee and instead put him on Buildings, Codification and Parks and Playgrounds, relatively innocuous committees which met rarely and performed only a few perfunctory chores. In his second and third terms he was on Buildings & Housing, Civil Employees, Veterans and Parks committees into which he introduced some important resolutions.

Assigned to toothless committees, Pete quickly saw that to advance issues of importance to working people he would have to put forward his own legislation. At the same time he was determined to work together with those in the Council, particularly the Laborites, Councilman Powell and the independents, with whom it was possible to find common ground.

But what about his very first proposals, his maiden resolutions? These should dramatize his central campaign slogan, "Unity Against Hitler," particularly now that the United States was directly involved in the anti-Axis war. (The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor took place exactly a month before Pete's first council session.) At the same time, Pete reasoned, his first legislative measures could not be just rhetoric but had to deal with the real needs of real people. Further, he insisted, they should be modest. He did not want to start off on a flamboyant note.

And so it was. At the Council's third session the clerk read aloud: "By Mr. Cacchione, a resolution. . . ." The members perked up. What was the Communist going to propose?

It turned out to be a resolution to petition the State Legislature to adopt Assemblyman Stephen Jarema's bill for free transportation on municipal facilities for soldiers, sailors and marines in uniform. Cacchione resolution No. 2 was a companion measure calling on the Mayor "to use his good offices to request all privately owned transit facilities under franchise of the City of New York to provide free transportation of soldiers, sailors and marines in uniform."

Immediate consideration? Hell, no. Council vice-chairman Joseph Sharkey, leader of the Democratic majority and thus the boss of the Council, promptly objected, and the Cacchione resolutions were referred to committee, there to gather dust. But some of the Democrats were uncomfortable. Why hadn't the flag-waving Tammany crowd thought of this simple courtesy to low-paid servicemen? Army privates were then getting \$30 a month; free fares while on leave in the Big Apple would

have been helpful. The usually voluble Quinn was silent. Pete had stolen a march on the ultrapatriots with his modest resolution.

Later, Pete confounded his foes in the Council by displaying an intimate knowledge of city finances. He didn't just "leave it to the experts." Unlike most of the council members, Pete dug through the complicated budget messages and the maze of figures. He spotted Albany's usual robbery of the city and introduced a resolution calling on the state to pass legislation granting New York City a larger share of state tax receipts and increasing the city's power to tax utilities and financial institutions. After Governor Thomas E. Dewey announced an anticipated \$70 million state surplus, Pete organized a vigorous fight for a special session of the State Legislature.

Significantly, a bitter floor fight took place on the issue, with the Democratic machine members coming to the aid of Republican Gov. Dewey and the minority—Laborites, Independents, and two out of three Republicans—voting with Pete.

Fighting Fascism and Anti-Semitism

PETE had no illusions about the fate of his legislation. He knew that his measures would either be pigeonholed or stolen from him. Both happened, of course.

If the Democratic majority leaders didn't like Pete's bills or resolutions—which was practically all the time—they consigned them to committee where they were bottled up. If he wanted to get a bill out of committee, he would have to move on the floor to discharge the committee from further consideration of the measure. He did that on some selected occasions, forcing debates which at least ventilated the issue, and then was roundly defeated by a machine vote.

Occasionally, however, the Democratic majority realized that Pete had hit a vital nerve. Unable to ignore a Cacchione measure, they rewrote it slightly, gave it to one of their henchmen to introduce and, presto, it became law. Pete would chuckle at this hocus-pocus and would vote for the "revised" bill. He had no pride of authorship; "a good bill is a good bill no matter who sponsors it."

One such measure, introduced by Pete, was a bill to wipe out what he called "hate ads," those venomous little want ads that specified "white Christian only," "white Protestant only," etc. It would punish newspapers carrying such ads by barring them from getting any city and state advertising, a lucrative source of income. With a large Jewish and Black electorate—and a war against nazism going on—the Democrats couldn't afford to suppress it. They promptly "rewrote" Pete's bill, gave it to Councilman Walter R. Hart, a Brooklyn wheelhorse, and passed it, with Pete, of course, voting for it.

Pete was not content to play parliamentary games. He insisted, of course, on learning all the intricacies of legislation and used to the full the research of his legislative aide, Don Schoolman, and his erudite legal counsel, David M. Freedman, as well as various specialists. But above all, he understood that his fight had to be carried to the people. He knew that the fate of a specific piece of his legislation, whether it became law in his or someone else's name, depended on mass public action. And this he consistently organized.

This was basic to Pete's work in the Council and was particularly clear in his everlasting fight against racial and religious discrimination. A working man's son born into a small-town Italian Catholic family, Pete knew religious bias at first hand. He recalled vividly the rampant bigotry of the campaign against Al Smith, a Catholic, the 1928 Democratic presidential candidate. Those were the days of lurid tales of Popish plots when Ku Klux Klan crosses burned not only in Georgia but also on the hills of Pennsylvania and even in Suffolk County, New York, an hour away from Brooklyn. Pete, whose family had generally voted Republican, worked for Al Smith that year and, Pete, in fact, was vice-president of a Smith-for-President club in Sayre, Pa., carrying his ward for Smith.

The experience with the poison of anti-Catholicism never left him. Later, in the period of his activity with the Unemployment Councils and through his education within the Communist Party, he learned of the national oppression of the Black people and the virus of anti-Semitism and how all were used to keep the working people divided. It was through

his contact with the Communist movement that Pete learned the full meaning of the Marxist call: "Workers of the world unite!" For Pete that meant *all* workers, white, Black, brown, red and yellow, Protestant, Catholic, Moslem or nonbelievers.

Thus, Pete brought to this question a richness of feeling and personal experience and creativity of forms of struggle. He went far beyond simply introducing legislation to ban discrimination. When the New York State Civil Rights Law was passed, Pete sponsored a council bill requiring the posting of the provisions of the law in all public places (hotels, restaurants, taverns, etc.) to acquaint people with their rights and point out the penalties for violation of the law. He filed charges with License Commissioner Paul Moss against employment agencies which continued to discriminate and the commissioner forced the agencies to change their practices. That was typical of Pete. He not only wanted a good law on the books but he wanted to see it enforced and would personally fight for its enforcement.

For Pete this was a many-sided fight to be pressed at all times, not least of all during World War II. He sensed that there was a far wider public receptiveness to the struggle against racism during the war against Hitlerism with its theory of racial superiority, a theory under which six million Jews and millions of Slavic peoples—Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles—were slaughtered by the Nazis. As one memorial to this struggle against racism, Pete proposed in January, 1943 that Morningside Park, adjacent to Columbia University, be renamed Franz Boas Park after the famed anthropologist who had taught at Columbia and had died in December, 1942. Of Boas, Pete wrote to Parks Commissioner Robert Moses:

Dr. Boas, a German by birth, an American by choice, has made lasting contributions in the field of American and world science. . . . Perhaps the most significant of Dr. Boas' contributions was his complete refutation of the myth of racial superiority. Long before Hitler came on the scene with his infamous theory of racial superiority, Dr. Boas had completely disproved all claims to racial superiority.

It was a thoughtful idea but was promptly vetoed by Moses, the poohbah who controlled the city's greenery as well as vast public projects with their gravy trains of lush financing, building contracts, insurance premiums and legal fees. Moses said Pete's proposal was "confusing." Boas' name and accomplishments went unmarked by any monument.

If Pete's efforts to honor a distinguished scholar were quietly strangled, his fight against an anti-Semitic cop, Patrolman James LeRoy Drew, won wide public attention. Drew was suspended from the police force in May, 1943 after it became known that he had engaged in pro-Nazi activities and was in possession of quantities of scurrilous anti-Semitic literature. A departmental trial followed in the course of which Drew's attorney, former Judge Alfred Talley, defended his client by arguing: "It hasn't yet become a crime for a policeman or a civilian to have in his possession anti-Jewish literature. . . . We haven't come to that yet."

Among the literature Drew kept at his Brooklyn home, it was revealed at the trial, were copies of *The Talmud Unmasked*, by Edgar Sanctuary, a Fascist who had been indicted by a federal grand jury; 29 copies of a pamphlet entitled *Who Wants War*, and 2,700 copies of a Jew-baiting leaflet about the Talmud, apparently a translation of one widely distributed in Nazi Germany.

After receiving the report on July 16, Police Commissioner Lewis J. Valentine reinstated Drew the following day while refusing to make public the trial record. On August 3, two weeks after Drew's restoration to active service, Pete introduced a resolution in the Council calling on Mayor LaGuardia and Commissioner Valentine to remove Drew from the police force. The Cacchione resolution was referred to the Council Rules Committee where it rested until the end of the year and the expiration of the Council.

Pete wasn't through. Reelected overwhelmingly in November—and about that, more later—Pete reintroduced his resolution. Council boss Sharkey, sensing the dynamite in the issue and also an opportunity to score points against Mayor LaGuardia, introduced his own resolution, not asking for Drew's removal but calling on the Mayor to make a statement on the facts in the Drew case. The Sharkey resolution was passed, but now the minority, including Pete and Ben Davis and minority leader Stanley Isaacs, was demanding the full record of both reports, the one originally made by Investigations Commissioner William Herlands as well as that of the department trial.

By this time the Drew case was a city-wide issue. Pete had held meetings, called for resolutions by trade unions and civic organizations and encouraged mass delegations. He also wrote a pamphlet, "Is Drew Guilty?" analyzing the case. Addressing himself to many liberals who

saw anti-Semitic outrages as merely aberrations of hoodlums and hooligans, Pete warned:

The hoodlums and hooligans of the 1920s in Germany became the storm troopers of the 1930s. The hoodlums and hooligans of New York City and America who commit these outrages today can become the storm troopers of tomorrow in a fascist America.

And in what was plainly a thrust at LaGuardia, who wavered—he frequently vacillated when his opposition contained substantial elements of the Catholic community—Pete wrote:

One can never compromise on the question of anti-Semitism or discrimination against the Negro people, and the question of race hatred in general. When one compromises on the most elementary principles of democracy, then everything is lost. Therefore, there can be no compromise on the Drew case.

Pete had made his point. Even though Drew kept his job, he never got very far in the police department and was retired quietly. The Communist councilman, by his fight inside and outside the City Council, had helped check a brazen pro-Nazi current inside the police force and, perhaps even more important, had helped create an atmosphere for a wide movement against racism and for strong laws against it.

Later, Pete called on the Council to set up an investigating committee to ferret out all groups and individuals spreading race hatred and anti-Black, anti-Jewish and Christian Front propaganda. The latter referred to a group of followers of Father Charles E. Coughlin, a Detroit priest who specialized in broadcasting thinly veiled pro-Nazi, anti-Roosevelt themes larded with populism. Like most of Pete's legislation, this resolution was not palatable to the council majority, which felt itself on the spot, particularly since the nation was in the midst of a war against Hitler. Pete's resolution was bottled up in committee.

Pete finally moved to discharge the committee from further consideration, thus compelling a debate. The opposition couldn't meet the issues; all they could do was shout that it was an "election maneuver." Pete's motion was of course defeated but it was supported by the sole Black member, the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, minority leader Stanley M. Isaacs, two Laborites and one Republican.

Pete didn't confine himself to legislative measures, important as these were and useful as were the debates around them. He used these and his new standing in the community as a councilman to lead public actions.

Thus, for example, he hammered away at job discrimination against black workers. This was crucial on two counts—the pressing concern for jobs in the Black community and the great reservoir of Black labor power so vitally needed in the war effort. Pete impaled his opposition on both counts: they were not only racists but they were also hampering the war effort by refusing to hire Blacks.

Deeds were more important than words in the Council. So Pete led delegations to factories in Brooklyn to demand that Blacks be hired. The Black community remembered particularly Pete's leadership of a delegation to the Metropolitan Engineering Company at Atlantic and Nostrand Avenues in Brooklyn. Jobs and regular paychecks were gotten by Black men and women because one councilman took direct action—the only white politician who did so. The other councilman who also went in for direct action was Adam Clayton Powell, a Black leader who was later to go far in Congress.

But crucial as was the fight for jobs, Pete is perhaps recalled best as one of the leaders in another battle, the battle to banish Jim Crow from big league baseball.

27

Battling Baseball's Jim Crow

The late Jackie Robinson, one of baseball's immortals, probably never knew that Pete Cacchione helped bring him to the Brooklyn Dodgers as the first Black player in big league ball.

Pete may not have been in the stands that day in 1947 when Robinson made his first appearance at Ebbets Field, but the Communist councilman had a lot to do with the historic occasion. The movement to break down the color line in organized baseball was, of course, not new when Pete got on the political scene. But the record shows that it was Pete and the Communists, particularly the Communist youth, who took an aggressive initiative, and virtually forced the issue.

For Pete this was no perfunctory matter. It took on the aspects of a crusade and, like virtually everything else Pete did, it had to be organized in campaign fashion. And finally, it had to be linked with the all-out war effort. To Pete the fight to break down Jim Crow barriers in big league baseball was part of the fight to unite the people in the struggle against Hitlerism.

Thus it came to pass, as the old book says, that 1942 and the spring of 1943 saw thousands of leaflets passed out at Ebbets Field calling for an end to discrimination in baseball. Members of the Young Communist League circulated petitions among the fans calling on the Dodger management to recruit Black players. Meanwhile, Pete saw to it that resolutions calling for all the big league teams to join in breaking down Jim Crow were advanced in unions and civic organizations and forwarded to the high moguls of organized baseball. In a relatively short time, the Greater New York CIO Industrial Union Council, the National Maritime Union, the United Auto Workers, the United Electrical and Machine Workers, the International Workers Order and dozens of other organizations went on record backing the fight. The *Daily Worker* sports page, led by Lester Rodney and Nat Low, kept up a drumfire on the issue, with an able assist from Pete's column and the paper's editorial page.

Pete didn't only stress the moral question or the issue of wartime unity. An avid reader of the sports pages and a rabid Dodger fan himself—and who in Brooklyn wasn't—Pete knew that the borough wanted the pennant in the wrong way, but the Dodgers had been hard hit by the military draft. A few Black stars could make the difference.

By the spring of 1943 Pete sensed that the grassroots movement had taken hold and the moment was ripe for a direct confrontation with the Dodger management. He wrote Dodger President Branch Rickey requesting that he meet a delegation on the question. Rickey, who was no slouch at counting bleacher attendance figures and was privately delighted at evidence of public support for breaking the color line, promptly agreed.

The meeting was set for June 11 at the Dodger offices at 215 Montague Street in downtown Brooklyn, just a few hundred yards from Pete's office. Pete, who knew a lot about baseball but did not trust his own knowledge, brought with him Nat Low of the *Daily Worker* sports page, as well as two leaders of the Young Communist League. And to make sure that the public—and more particularly baseball-mad Brooklynites would know the underlying issue, Pete was careful to issue an

advance statement on the purpose of the visit. In a few neat sentences it deftly linked the fight against Jim Crow with the war on Hitlerism:

We citizens of Brooklyn are proud of the Dodgers and will support them in the future as we have in the past, but in order to make the Dodgers a stronger team than they are, and in order to bring the pennant back to Brooklyn, we will urge Mr. Rickey to sign . . . Negro stars. . . . The Dodgers can win the pennant with these players—but what is more important, the signing of Negro stars would give the war effort in Brooklyn a tremendous boost. In this war for the very life of our country it is inconceivable that the Hitler-like ban on Negro players still exists when Negro soldiers, sailors and merchant seamen are laying down their lives by the thousands in defense of our country. . . .

The point was restated by Pete and the delegation to Rickey's personal representative, Edward Staples, to whom they gave their petitions with 10,000 signatures in the course of a 90-minute meeting. Staples listened carefully and sympathetically. Pete, on leaving the session, added: "I urge fans, trade union and church leaders and people of all walks of life to visit the Dodgers as we did today. Such visits will undoubtedly bring to an end this season, the ban on Negro stars."

The rest, as they say, is history. While the ban was not lifted as quickly as Pete hoped, he lived to see the day that Jackie Robinson was cheered to the echo as he walked out on the Ebbets Field greensward. Recruiting of Robinson by the Dodgers, did not, of course, end the curse of racism in the big leagues. There were expressions of bigotry by a handful of players as well as a host of Jim Crow restrictions in the Southern training camps, particularly in hotels and restaurants. It took some years of struggle for these to be wiped out. Today the major league rosters are filled with Black and Hispanic players, some estimates going as high as 40 or 50 percent.

Pete and his supporters would not claim sole credit for smashing racist barriers in organized baseball. He and his associates understood that a conjuncture of factors made for this development, not least of which was the atmosphere of the anti-Axis war. It must be noted, however, that most chroniclers of the period who bothered to discuss the question, including sports historians, have shamefully ignored Pete's role and that of the *Daily Worker*, which hammered at the issue in season and out.

The record, however, is clear. Pete was the only public official who personally organized a campaign, circulated petitions and led a delegation to the Dodger owners when it mattered most. It was Pete who on

Nov. 30, 1945 introduced into the City Council, Resolution No. 339 calling on Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis and all National and American League club owners "to end exclusion of Negroes from organized baseball." It was the kind of action that led not only to Jackie Robinson's appearance at Ebbets Field in 1947 but to the appointment of Frank Robinson—no relation of Jackie's—as manager of the Cleveland Indians 28 years later. (But Pete would undoubtedly have demanded much more than a token appointment of one Black manager. He would have pointed out—as do many fans today—that there are at least a dozen Black players qualified for managerial posts who are barred on essentially racist grounds.)

Some political figures may have felt that the issue was beneath them. Not Pete. To Pete there was no contradiction in the issue of racism generally and the fight for Black ballplayers in particular. He sensed the possibility not only of a winning fight against baseball's Jim Crow but also a unique way of bringing home to white people the evils of racism and how it harmed unity against fascism.

In a word, the fight for Black players was not only valid in and of itself; it was at that time and place another way in which Pete expressed in practice his campaign slogan, "Unity Against Hitler."

FEW PEOPLE knew it then, but even in his first term Communist Councilman Cacchione had something on his mind beyond the issues of the day. He was dissatisfied with the style of work of the Left, and he wanted to do something about it.

Long before the pundits gave birth to the theory that the medium is the message, Pete was arguing the question of style with his comrades and fellow workers. Out of years of fighting for his viewpoint in the mar-

ketplace grew Pete's conviction that two things were crucial to the men and women—and particularly Communists—who sought to persuade their countrymen: *what* they said, and *how* they said it. Indeed, Pete fought not only for the right to speak but for the duty to speak well.

Methodical in all things, Pete was a demon for preparation for public speaking. He regarded stumping as an ancient, honorable and democratic art, a tradition carried on from the New England town meeting through the village green, the candidate's front porch, down to the chromed microphone. He saw it as an art at once as old as the handclasp of friendship and as modern as stainless steel.

Because Pete respected people and, above all, the plain people, the working people, the so-called little people, he was death on slovenliness, both in appearance and speech. He prepared as meticulously for a kaffee klatch in a neighbor's living room as for a speech before a municipal body. No split between form and content for Pete. He spoke with the same zeal and care from a ladder platform at a factory gate as in the staid City Council chamber.

Busy as he was in the City Council in his first term, he insisted on conveying to the movement his thoughts on reaching people. Somehow he found the time to write a pamphlet on the subject. A collector's item now, the little booklet may be considered artless or dated by modern sophisticates, but a thoughtful reader perusing its thirty-two pages, brilliantly illustrated by some anonymous cartoonist, will draw a different conclusion. It was widely popular in its time and is no period piece even today. (See *Public Speaking, A Speaker's Guidebook* by Peter V. Cacchione, Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1942.)

"Speaking," Pete wrote, "is nothing more than conversation—only on a larger scale. Instead of conversing with one person, you are conversing with a group."

This may be hardly novel, but the tone is significant. Pete was addressing himself to thousands of "little people," men and women in local unions, shop and community gatherings who had something to say and frequently were fearful of their ability to say it. His was the advice of a plain man who had mastered the art form and sought to encourage others to do likewise. "Public speaking," he wrote, "is an art acquired through experience, like the art of playing music, singing, or painting. Good speakers are not born. Every public speaker has to start at the same level. A public speaker always strives to improve himself or herself."

Three decades later, Pete's gentle warnings still bring a shock of guilty recognition even to well-intentioned people on the Left. He warns against "the bombastic declamatory method of speech" and "the speaker who never pauses between his sentences." He was death on lengthy speeches (the illustration in this section shows a weary auditor snoring soundly as the speaker discourses at length). He was especially sensitive to the occasion for which a gathering was called. "Never try to give a political speech at an affair held in a home or at a social gathering, when the affair is one of gaiety," he writes. "Simply greet the people who come and hope they will have a good time." Here, of course, Pete was referring to the neighborhood social event to which he was invited to "drop in" rather than to those meetings organized in homes for the specific purpose of addressing a group.

Pete's advice is detailed. Perhaps his note on "appearance" may draw a snicker from latter day readers as downright old-fashioned, but his feeling for audience impression is sensitive. "A speaker should be neat, shoes shined, hair clipped and smooth-shaven, if the speaker is a man; hair well-groomed, if a woman." Some of the advice may seem almost archaic to the modern youth: "One should never speak at any type of meeting in a sport shirt or a sweater. A man should never speak at an open air meeting with his hat on, regardless of how cold the weather."

But if time has modified some of Pete's thoughts on speakers' apparel, most of his other practical suggestions still stand up as sound, from his thoughts on placing the chairs in the hall ("at least four inches apart") to the collection ("should be short and snappy" and "the silver collection should never be brought to the front of the hall").

On the curse of verbose chairmen, Pete waxes wrath. "The chairman of the meeting must *be the chairman* and nothing else," Pete snaps. (Emphasis in the original.) Pete apparently had experience with another kind of chairperson. "Too many times," he writes, a note of bitterness creeping into his otherwise calm prose, "the chairman takes twenty-five minutes in opening the meeting, makes a long speech and practically covers everything that the following speakers are going to say." *Touche!*

Pete was like a good football coach who constantly drills his squad in fundamentals. Basic, he insisted, "is that the speaker know his subject. Never speak on a subject with which you are not thoroughly acquainted." And facts, facts, facts.

"Your facts," he wrote, "must be absolutely correct; never misquote;

if you wish to mention figures as, for instance, an appropriation of \$200,000,000 in Congress, do not say hundreds of millions of dollars, but state the exact figure.

“Avoid using the unqualified superlative. Better to say ‘one of the greatest,’ ‘one of the finest,’ or ‘one of the best.’”

A public speaker, Pete went on, “must be an avid reader” and “by all means, a Communist public speaker must read the *Daily Worker* and the Communist press regularly.” (Undoubtedly, he would have said the *Daily World* today.) And, he added, “One who speaks constantly must read the publications of our opponents, or, at least be aware of what they are saying about us.” And, “a good speaker keeps a file system . . . the daily press should be clipped and filed.”

Perhaps the key to Pete’s intimacy with community matters is indicated by another firm admonition. “Local speakers must have a knowledge of their neighborhood.” (Note the use of “must.”) “They should be familiar with the reports put out by local civic and welfare agencies. They should have a knowledge of the composition of the population, the number of unemployed, the housing conditions of the people in the territory, the youth problems, a knowledge of the cost of living and, above all, an understanding of the local political machine.”

But if Pete demanded that the speaker know the subject and particularly his or her own locality, he was equally strong on using the King’s English correctly. “Do not use any word that you are not sure you can correctly pronounce,” was his injunction, “and be sure that you pronounce every word correctly.”

Content, pronunciation, delivery, gestures, all were crucial elements in public speaking, as Pete saw it, but hardly anything was more vital than simplicity of language. He broke down Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, noting that “one of the finest orations of all times uses 194 one-syllable words, 53 two-syllable words, 13 three-syllable words and 7 four-syllable words. Of the four-syllable words, the word ‘dedicated’, was used several times.” And with a dig at some left-wing writers, Pete added: “The principle of using simple language also holds for those who write in publications for the working class.”

Why did Pete write this pamphlet? Why did he laboriously distill the experience of a lifetime of public agitation—yes, he freely termed himself an agitator—for the young and inexperienced? Because he wanted a message to be conveyed to the masses of his fellow Americans, the

Communist message, and in the most effective possible way. He said it all in his final paragraph:

In conclusion, remember that we can convince the people on the validity of our program only if *we tell* them about it. That means more mass meetings—open-air rallies, forums, broadcasts, debates—in short, go to the people. (Emphasis in original.)

Prophetic Resolutions

LOOKING back at Pete’s first council term, 1942-43, it is apparent that the struggle against discrimination was a central aspect of his work. The fight for jobs for Black workers and his struggle against Nazi influence in the Police Department, as evidenced in the Drew case, and his fight against Jim Crow in big league baseball were dramatic elements of his first two years as a Communist city councilman.

But that was by no means the total picture. As a worker himself, Pete showed a many-sided sensitivity to the needs of the ordinary people in everyday life. He knew better than his councilmanic colleagues all that made up a worker’s life in New York. He understood, for example, how much the morning and evening rush-hour subway trips took out of a worker, particularly when labor was straining every effort to produce for the war. In his characteristically meticulous way, he made a personal investigation of transit conditions and the overcrowding of subway lines, particularly at peak hours. He thereupon drafted a careful plan for staggering working hours to meet the problem of traffic congestion. Typical of Pete’s passion for facts, he wrote to various cities around the country where such plans were in effect to obtain reports on the operation of their systems. He even discussed the matter with the War Manpower Commission representatives in New York and got their approval of the basic idea.

Thus armed with the facts, Pete introduced a council resolution calling for formation of a committee to work out a city-wide plan for staggering working hours. He insisted upon and got a public hearing on his resolution. Although Pete's proposal was backed by representatives of organized labor and numerous civic groups, it was killed by the committee which apparently preferred overcrowded conditions rather than adopt a Cacchione plan.

Thirty-four years later, as this is written, Mayor Abraham Beame and the Metropolitan Transit Authority are pleading with employers to institute staggered working hours. Had the city's powers heeded Pete in 1942, staggered working hours would have long ago become the normal pattern of New York life and some relief would have been obtained from the beastly daily crush in the city's subways.

Pete came into office pledged to fight the high cost of living. He got his first chance shortly after he was sworn in when a drive was under way to boost the 5-cent subway fare. (Yes, Virginia, there once was a 5-cent fare!)

First, he got to the people. He wrote a pamphlet backing the bill introduced in the State Legislature by State Senator Charles Muzzicato, Republican-ALP of East Harlem, the effect of which was to freeze the fare at 5 cents. He explained the issue in hundreds of letters to organizations and helped send a large delegation to Albany. He went along with the delegation and spoke eloquently in favor of the Muzzicato Bill. The measure was passed and signed by the Governor, saving the 5-cent fare for the time.

Rent, housing and prices, the nightmare of most low-income workers, bulked large in Pete's thinking. He not only backed every effort of the wartime Office of Price Administration (OPA) to keep prices down but pressed it to put a freeze on rents, introducing a resolution to that effect. Again, this was no formal for-the-record gesture on Pete's part. Characteristically, he sought to enlist mass support and participation in the fight, sending out a letter early in July, 1943 urging organizations to send representatives to a hearing on the resolution. He went further. Early in September—and this, it should be recalled, was long before there were in existence mass tenants' organizations such as the Metropolitan Council on Housing—he called for the formation of neighborhood committees to combat rent rises.

As on rents and fares, so did Pete act on similar questions, introducing measures to keep milk and bread prices down and to back the OPA in a

program designed to help farmers produce more milk and other foodstuffs while keeping prices down to the consumer. But Pete did more than introduce bills and resolutions in the City Council. He went to the people with the issues. He wrote to trade union and civic organizations and addressed countless open-air meetings. He organized delegations, mass meetings, petitions and every other conceivable form of pressure to rollback prices.

As the author wrote of him at the time:

High prices to Pete aren't some cold figures in thick reports. They mean that extra bottle of milk for the kids, that sunlit apartment, that extra shirt. (*Pete Cacchione—His Record* by S. W. Gerson, Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1943.)

On war-related activities Pete was a veritable gadfly to the business-as-usual politicians in the City Council. While formally polite to his council adversaries, he had a vast contempt for the way most of the Tammanyites and their allies carried on. At one point, he expressed his views publicly. In a letter to the *Brooklyn Eagle* Pete wrote:

The majority of the Council has played nothing but politics as usual on practically every important issue that has come up. Its conduct of the Council meetings, its hooliganism and horseplay would make it difficult for anyone to know that a war is going on. (*Brooklyn Eagle*, October 23, 1943.)

Pete had good reason to be bitter. He had sponsored a score of measures designed to strengthen the war effort and virtually all were either buried or stolen from him and passed in watered down form. When the *S.S. Normandie*, a French luxury liner which was scheduled to be used as a troopship, mysteriously burned down at a New York dock, Pete, who knew intimately conditions on the waterfront, called for an investigation to eliminate the possibility of sabotage. Despite support of the National Maritime Union and rank-and-file longshoremen, this measure, too, was killed in committee.

A similar fate met his resolutions urging increased allotments to wives of soldiers and a coordinated program of nurseries and after-school care so that children of drafted fathers could be tended while their mothers took jobs in war industry.

If the council majority members ignored or buried most of Pete's proposals, they were stung to a fury by a Cacchione resolution—which had the support of U.S. Treasury Department representatives—for the

regular deduction of 10 percent from each council member's salary for the purchase of war bonds. A nationwide war bond drive was under way and here was a splendid opportunity for elected officials of the nation's largest city to set an example. But this was too much for the Democratic majority. Patriotism was okay but this was carrying things too far. Pete's resolution was defeated in a wave of red-baiting invective.

That, however, didn't stop Pete's bond-selling activities. He hawked bonds at outdoor rallies and at his own office until by October, 1943, he personally had sold more than \$300,000 worth, mainly in small denominations. This figure rose to \$600,000 by 1945.

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Defender of Italian-Americans

PETE'S win-the-war activities were manifold, inside and outside the City Council. But there was one field in which he felt a sense of special responsibility—the Italian-American community.

Pete sensed a certain unease there; the pro-Mussolini poison had left its mark, particularly on the foreign-born Italian-American. Pete knew that many were conflicted by the fact that Mussolini Italy had ranged itself on Hitler's side. And he also knew that some Americans thoughtlessly lumped all Italian-Americans together as pro-Fascist.

Pete knew better. He knew the real feelings of Brooklyn's Italian-Americans. He knew many of them had been misled in the heyday of *Il Duce*, but he never had despaired of them. He was proud of the Italian-American heritage and never ceased to extol the contributions of his people to the United States: the explorers, from Columbus on; the men who laid the tracks of the New York Central and a dozen other railroads; the dockers and ditchdiggers, the granite cutters and garment workers; the scientists and savants.

Unlike conventional Italian-American politicians, Pete had refused to yield an inch to the wave of chauvinism that swept over the Italian-American population when Mussolini was riding high and had conquered

Ethiopia. He was associated firmly with the anti-Fascist section of the Italian-American community and constantly appealed to the progressive tradition of Garibaldi among older Italian-Americans.

At the same time, he was keenly aware that to the native-born Italian-Americans that tradition was vague. With them he sought common ground on economic questions and on the basic issues of the anti-Axis war, constantly pointing out that a victory for fascism would mean death to their democratic rights, limited though they were, and their hard-won living standards.

With red-baiters and Soviet-haters in the Italian-American community Pete was blunt: they were following Hitler-like policies and disrupting the war effort. He did not hesitate to take on the toughest of them, including the powerful Luigi Antonini, a vice-president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, whose anti-Fascist posture was far weaker than his vociferous anticommunism.

In a letter to an Italian language newspaper published in New York, Pete wrote:

Anyone who red-baits is helping to spread disunity and weaken our war effort.

History has demonstrated that the main weapon used by Hitler to divide the German people and come to power was his use of the bogey fear of Communism.

And, in turn, this weapon was used to divide one nation from another so that each could be conquered separately . . .

If all the democratic forces must be united, anyone who works to prevent these democratic forces from getting together is doing a disservice to the cause of unity and the war effort.

And Mr. Antonini certainly falls in this category. Does he not continually attack the Communists? And the Soviet Union, one of the main bulwarks of the United Nations?

Does his policy help to unify all Italians in the United States to help the people of Italy rid themselves of fascism? (as quoted in the *Daily Worker*, May 31, 1943.)

Pete's frank position won him wide respect in the Italian-American community. He was one of the scheduled speakers at a huge Madison Square Garden rally of the United Americans of Italian Descent on September 9, 1943, one day after Italy's unconditional surrender to the Allied forces.

Pete's speeches and writings on the subject of Italy are worthy of a

detailed essay far beyond the confines of this work. Suffice it to say that they were prophetic. He early saw the possibility of a new democratic Italy arising out of the armed defeat of Mussolini, a nation making rapid and sharp social advances. He also foresaw postwar intervention by Washington in Italy's internal affairs, a view amply justified by subsequent events. Pete sensed long before many other Americans that imperial Washington was fearful of the role played by Italian Communists in the resistance movement that helped overthrow *Il Duce* and defeat Hitler's forces. He realized that Washington would move heaven and earth to abort a popular democratic movement in which the Italian Communists would play a leading part. Pete followed the dispatches closely as U.S. Ambassador James Dunn strode up and down the Italian peninsula in a lavishly financed crusade against the Left which finally forced Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti out of Italy's first postwar Cabinet.

In 1942 Pete wrote a foreword to a pamphlet on Mussolini Italy written by "M. Ercoli," the underground name of Togliatti. The pamphlet, transmitted to the United States by radio and distributed widely in the Italian-American community, Pete wrote, ". . . presents a revealing picture of what is going on inside of Italy, and clearly indicates how Mussolini has betrayed the Italian nation. The Italian fascist government of Italy is today only a puppet government. Hitler and his fascist bandits are the real masters of Italy. They dictate the policies and give the orders to the Italian nation."

Addressing himself to the deep feelings of Italian-Americans about the country of their forebears, Pete warned that only "the defeat of the Axis powers . . . will bring about the liberation of our people in Italy . . . (and) can guarantee that the Italian people will be free and will once again become the masters of their own destiny."

Familiar with Italian history, Pete knew the thinking of many Italian-Americans and astutely addressed himself to their doubts. He wrote:

Many Italians, remembering the Versailles peace, are skeptical about the kind of peace that will be established when the war is over. But the great labor movement of the democratic countries of the world, the great power of the colonial peoples, the strength of the people in the occupied countries, and that great tower of strength, the Soviet Union, will be a guarantee that a just peace will be achieved.

The task of Italian-Americans is clear. As good, loyal Americans, and true to the great traditions of Garibaldi, we will rally ever more strongly in support

of our country's war efforts, participating in all activities that contribute to the national unity of all the American people, increasing production to ever greater heights, and relentlessly exposing the fascist agents in our midst. This is the road to our salvation in America and to the salvation of our kin in Italy. (*Inside Italy* by M. Ercoli, with an introduction by Peter V. Cacchione, Workers Library Publishers, New York, 1942.)

Rereading the pamphlet thirty-four years later, one is struck by Pete's sensitivity to the feelings of his Italian-American neighbors. Note the phrase, "good, loyal Americans." This is an obvious reply to those who suspected all Italian-Americans of being pro-Mussolini agents, and his appeal to "the great traditions of Garibaldi" was clearly designed to evoke the deepest and purest national feelings in the Italian-American population.

Pete didn't live to see the day when U.S. Ambassador Clare Booth Luce pulled a hundred strings in Italy's 1948 election, including a massive campaign among Italian-Americans to write relatives back home urging that they vote for the Christian Democrats, the party heavily supported by Washington. He could not have known then, of course, what was later revealed in congressional hearings—that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had funnelled more than \$90 million to the Christian Democrats and others in order to defeat the Left. But Pete pretty much had called the shots. And he had made a contribution to rallying the Italian-American people for the war effort that few others could match.

By the fall of 1943 Pete was an established figure, a Communist who had held office for a full term. He now had a record in office. He had introduced six bills and twenty-six resolutions in the Council, had spoken countless times, led delegations, carried on a myriad of activities on behalf of individual constituents and groups and had worked himself to the bone in win-the-war activities. And, above all, he had spoken to the needs of the working people, the Black and Puerto Rican people, the Jewish and Italian people, and always within the framework of his 1941 campaign slogan, "Unity Against Hitler."

What would be the verdict of the voters on the Cacchione record?

Widening Support

BY THE late summer and early fall of 1943 it was clear that there was no cause for nervousness. Pete's record was getting amazing response. Barring untoward accident or wholesale larceny, the city's first "avowed Communist" councilman would be reelected.

A powerful labor committee for Pete came into existence quickly, with forty unions represented, both AFL and CIO. Early in October the Political Action Committee of the CIO Industrial Union Council of Greater New York announced it was backing Pete on the basis of his record. From Joseph Curran, the CIO council president, and Saul Mills, its secretary, came a warm letter to Pete:

Your endorsement was unanimously voted by the CIO Council delegates because of your outstanding record in the present City Council. Your fight for such measures as bills to prevent waterfront sabotage, outlawing discrimination and to alleviate the financial crisis of New York City has won the support of all workers in the Borough of Brooklyn. You can be assured of the support of all CIO members in Brooklyn.

(This was, of course, in Joe Curran's salad days. He later became one of the highest paid bureaucrats in the trade union movement, taking a salary of about \$100,000 a year, surrounding himself with sycophants and suppressing democratic opposition. Before he retired in the early seventies he acquired an estate in upstate New York and wangled a near-million dollar pension from the National Maritime Union. But in the thirties and early forties Curran was still part of the powerful left-wing bloc in organized labor.)

Pete clearly had strength among seamen, longshoremen, transport workers, furriers, furniture workers and painters. He had a big following among the thousands of members of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union who lived in Brooklyn, particularly the shorefront area of Coney Island and Brighton Beach where they had fled from the

tubercular-infested tenements of Manhattan's Lower East Side. But he was the devil incarnate to people like ILGWU President David Dubinsky and Vice-President Luigi Antonini. Nevertheless, some of the middle level ILGWU leaders were a bit torn on the subject of Pete. This was reflected in a wistful note Pete's labor committee received from an ILGWU affiliate, the Joint Board of the Cloak, Suit, Skirt and Reefer Makers Union. Morris J. Ashles, one of its officers, wrote regretfully "that the Joint Board was unable to endorse Cacchione because such candidates must first be endorsed by President David Dubinsky of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union." Such expressions didn't bother Pete. He knew his strength among the dues-paying ILGWUers in the Brighton Beach and Coney Island area.

From the Black community came strong endorsements. With Pete standing at his side in the pulpit, the Rev. Thomas S. Harten of the Holy Trinity Church of Brooklyn, told 2,500 members of his congregation that "he (Pete) is a Communist and I'm going to vote for him." The Rev. Boise Dent followed suit and then Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. made it public in a big way.

Powell, the first Black to be elected to the City Council, had declined renomination, announcing that he would run for Congress from Harlem the following year. A brilliant, handsome figure and magnificent orator, Powell was a veteran of scores of civil rights battles. He and Pete had frequently teamed up in council sessions on many issues. Nominally a Democrat, he was fiercely independent, and his endorsement carried punch. Nor was his letter to Pete pro forma:

I wish to publicly thank you for the courageous fight you made in the City Council in support of my bills and resolutions. The city sure needs men of your calibre in the Council, and I am sure the good people of Brooklyn will return you to office. . . . My only regret is that I can't be in Brooklyn to cast my vote for you. Yet, I have friends, and Joe Ford (Powell's secretary—SWG) assures me that they will vote for you on November 2nd.

In the same letter Powell advised Pete that he had given Ford "instructions to work for your re-election and for the election of Norman B. Johnson." The latter was a Black Republican candidate from Brooklyn whose candidacy was warmly backed by Pete.

Pete's basic strength was already clear—it was among the workers, the Jewish, Italian and Black people. But his base was in fact broader. It included hundreds of professional people, doctors, dentists, lawyers,

writers, and small middle-class storekeepers, particularly the desperately struggling owners of mom-and-pop stores.

His sensitivity to this section of the population was vividly illustrated by a speech Pete delivered about two weeks before Election Day to a meeting of the Boro-Wide Food Dealers Association, an organization of more than 700 small grocers, fruit and produce store owners in Brooklyn:

You little fellows in the food dispensing business are in this fight up to your necks along with the consumer who buys your goods. You work long hours and work hard for dwindling incomes.

He understood, he said, that "you catch first class hell from the consumer who comes into your store because of your high prices," and added:

The small merchant today is the victim of a gigantic squeeze—he's caught in a powerful vise between an indignant public and the wealthy food monopolies and chain stores. . . . When the retailers and the consumers really get together and demand of Congress real effective price controls, then we'll be getting somewhere. . . .

Pete lunged on, tackling the delicate issue of meat and the black market in the precious stuff. He knew well the hundred daily hassles and intrigues that went on around the neighborhood butcher shops and the virtual state of war between consumers and meat market proprietors. But he had an answer:

It's only logical that when you want to correct an evil, you have to go directly to the bottom of the problem. Simply slapping a ceiling on retail butchers' prices is not the answer. If we want to control meat prices and do away with the vicious black market in meat, we have to go right out to the cattle ranges and slap a price ceiling on the price of beef on the hoof.

Pete spelled it all out: price controls for the wealthy cattlemen, for the big meat processors and then at the retail store level. The Communist councilman was applauded warmly and a resolution endorsing him was adopted overwhelmingly. Many storekeepers took Cacchione posters to put in their windows.

If Pete struck a responsive chord among Brooklyn's little storekeepers, the same could not be said of the Citizens Union, a grouping of middle-class and upper-class professionals of the good government stripe. The C.U., which admitted that Pete had "a good voting record," nevertheless could not screw up the courage to endorse him. The interchange

between the C.U. and Pete's supporters is worth recording for the light it sheds on the hesitation of certain well-intentioned groups when faced squarely with the issues of communism. This is how the C.U. described Pete in its 1943 preelection survey:

Peter V. Cacchione (Communist). A conscientious Councilman with a very good voting record. He frequently introduced measures outside the province of the City Council in order to advertise the Communist Party program, but showed a helpful attitude on issues which were properly the Council's concern.

Pete and his campaign committee understood of course what lay behind the weaseling language. They knew that there were some in the Citizens Union who felt that Pete deserved their endorsement but feared the displeasure of upper-class sponsors and contributors. Pete and his campaigners also knew that the Citizens Union endorsement meant little in Brooklyn's working-class neighborhoods, but it was the attitude and precedent that stuck in their craws. They could not legally challenge the C.U.'s refusal to endorse Pete but they could discuss publicly the C.U.'s timidity.

After all, the Citizens Union, despite its general anti-machine stance, had okayed Democratic Majority Leader Joseph T. Sharkey of Brooklyn and Councilman Anthony DiGiovanna, another Brooklyn Democratic hack. But it had turned down Pete, who, it admitted, was "a conscientious Councilman with a very good voting record."

An open letter to the Citizens Union was promptly drafted on behalf of the Citizens Committee for the Re-Election of Peter V. Cacchione and submitted to Pete for his approval. Its substance and language ring true today, more than thirty years later, as a classic dissection of the position of many middle class liberals.

Turning first to the C.U. argument that Pete had "frequently introduced measures outside the province of the City Council," the committee shot back:

Is not the memorializing of the State Legislature (necessitated frequently by statute) generally in the time-honored American tradition?

. . . Curiously enough, the Citizens Union did not use the same standards when judging candidates like Mr. Sharkey and Mr. DiGiovanna, who have also introduced resolutions at various times on various issues. Is there a double standard in operation here? Are certain things permissible to Democrats but impermissible to Communists?

That is the larger implication that gives us serious concern. Implicit in the Citizens Union attitude is an unwritten taboo on certain nominees because of their political affiliations. The Citizens Union, for example, negates its own characterization of Mr. Cacchione's conscientiousness and splendid voting record by its refusal either to endorse or qualify him.

Unless we are seriously mistaken, we believe there is an underlying theory to all this: to wit, that a Communist, no matter what his ability or record, cannot be endorsed or qualified by the Citizens Union solely because of his political affiliation. By extension, the same attitude is apparently applied to left wing Laborite candidates.

The letter pointed out that the C.U. in the past had defended individuals belonging to minority parties and had always sought clean and democratic government. It went on:

Now it has apparently fallen prey to the very policies which it has in the past so vigorously repudiated. The fact that it does so in urbane fashion in nowise mitigates the crime. In short, the Citizens Union seemingly has adopted its own genteel form of discrimination, based on narrow class and political prejudice. . . . If the Citizens Union in the quiet of its own sanctum follows a policy of discreet discrimination, it cannot in good faith oppose reactionaries who seek to write such discrimination in our statute books. Such a policy weakens our civic unity and is, in fact, a pale reflection of the type of red-baiting demanded on a national and international scale by the Hearst-McCormick-Patterson press. . . . Objectively, therefore, such a policy defeats the very aim and purpose of the Citizens Union.

Having thus publicly criticized the Citizens Union, Pete and the committee nevertheless were careful to keep the door open for future cooperation with the good government group. The letter concluded:

This is not written in any carping or partisan spirit; We write this simply because we regard the issue as so important as to merit wide discussion, and we hope that at some future time—after Election Day, perhaps—we can appear before your board to discuss the matter further in a friendly and constructive way.

No comment came from the Citizens Union. But some sensitive souls at the C.U. offices must have winced as they read the letter, Pete guessed.

The campaign committee, it might be noted, tactfully refrained from reminding the Citizens Union that it had twice endorsed Thomas M. Farley when the latter was an alderman, despite an arrest and indictment for extortion during his first campaign. This was the same grafting Farley who was removed as Sheriff of New York County by Governor Franklin

D. Roosevelt in 1932 after he had admitted to ownership of that "wonderful tin box."

While it was important to make the reply to the Citizens Union, no one in the Cacchione campaign, least of all Pete, sat around and brooded. A dozen campaign headquarters in various sections of the borough teemed with activity. Pete was all over, at rallies, street corner meetings, kaffee klatches and radio stations. And always, he found time to meet with a stream of constituents, handling the varied problems that they brought him and giving such assistance as he could.

He was by no means the conventional politician but he was aware of the picture of the old-line alderman as described by one student of the subject:

The poor looked to him for jobs as watchmen, laborers and chauffeurs, for permits to sell newspapers, black boots, roast peanuts or keep chickens; for assistance in gaining admission to hospitals, for intercession with the landlord when the rent was overdue, for passing the hat to save the destitute from Potter's Field, or for intervention in the courts when a youth had run afoul of the law. (*The History of The New York City Legislature* by Frederick Shaw, Columbia University Press, New York, 1954.)

Pete didn't hesitate to use his political clout when he could right a wrong. He would, for example, write or telephone or visit the city's Building Department to have a violation corrected and would help tenants in rent fights or intervene to correct a blatant injustice. But he never used "influence" in the improper sense, always demanding only what was properly a constituent's right. And, above all, he sought to organize his constituents for struggle and showed them how to organize to win their demand.

And, whatever his preoccupation at home, he never forgot the men and women in uniform. He kept up a steady correspondence with Brooklyn G.I.s in the service, often writing personal letters and sometimes even sending a mimeographed newsletter to keep them informed of things back home, from politics to the all-important status of the Dodgers.

MEANWHILE, across the river in Manhattan something new and explosive was shaping up: the possibility of electing another Communist, a Black leader, Benjamin J. Davis. Pete kept a close eye on Manhattan and lent a hand.

Manhattan Names Ben Davis

ACROSS the river the joint was jumping, politically speaking. Adam Powell, still the council's only Black member, had declined to run for reelection. He planned to run for Congress the next year in the new Harlem district carved out by the State Legislature in belated response to the growing demand for Black representation. Who would fill the shoes of the magnetic Adam Powell?

Pete was up to his neck in his own campaign but rationed his own precious time in order to huddle in Manhattan with Ben Davis, Harlem leader of the Communist Party, state secretary Gil Green and others. To complete its ticket the Communist Party had nominated Carl Brodsky, a well-known Party leader with special strength in the Lower East Side Jewish community, but obviously that didn't meet the problem of another Black representative, one who could have a powerful base in the Harlem electorate and yet poll enough votes in white communities to win a borough-wide seat.

Ben Davis took the initiative. He visited Powell to urge him to reconsider his decision. Nothing doing. To make the council race in 1943 and the congressional race in 1944 was too much. Would he help establish unity around a progressive Black councilmanic candidate? Powell preferred, as Davis recalled later, "a hands-off policy." (Davis, *op. cit.*, all quotations from Davis in this chapter are from his autobiography.)

Ben then visited Dr. Channing Tobias, a YMCA leader, not a militant but highly regarded in the Black community and with considerable contacts among the Roosevelt forces. "He was a typical liberal," wrote Davis, "but I was not looking for a Communist candidate but one around whom the broadest unity of the Negro people and labor could be achieved in this specific situation." Dr. Tobias respectfully declined as did Dr. George Cannon, a prominent Black surgeon who was also approached by Davis.

The situation was critical. The Democrats had not nominated a Black candidate and it appeared that the gain for Black representation made in Powell's election would be lost. The Communist Party, with Pete concurring, thereupon made a bold decision—Ben Davis was to run. It was no far-out move nor based on any narrow partisan outlook, but was rooted in the needs of the Black people. As Davis wrote of the decision in his autobiography: "At least, I was an integral part of the people's coalition in Harlem, had shared in their struggles and activities, and had been accepted as one of their recognized spokesmen."

It was a decision not arrived at easily. Electing a Black representative had been a great breakthrough and had been accomplished through the personality of Harlem's leading figure, the Rev. Adam Clayton Powell Jr., who had behind him an active bloc of 15,000 parishioners of his Abyssinian Baptist Church, a hallowed institution once headed by his father.

But electing a Black Communist? Tammany and the Republicans scoffed and most of the press ignored Davis. Some of the skepticism even seeped into the Communist Party, and there were those who even feared that the Davis race would weaken the Cacchione campaign. But the Party forged on and even the doubters quickly subordinated their misgivings. Then one of those things happened that electrified people on the Left and even moved others—the withdrawal of Carl Brodsky in favor of Ben Davis.

Normally, a switch in candidates is hardly noticed. Most parties do a certain amount of candidate juggling between the time of filing nominating petitions and the last date to make changes. But this was different. Here a Jewish candidate withdrew specifically to help elect a Black candidate. In what was described later by Communist leader Elizabeth Gurley Flynn in her *Daily Worker* column (October 24, 1943) as "a deeply moving document," Brodsky wrote:

As a citizen of Jewish descent, a member of a persecuted minority people, I can particularly appreciate what it would mean to have a Negro in our City Council. I suggested Mr. Davis in the firm belief that around him can be rallied not only the voters of Harlem but progressive citizens of the entire borough.

Mr. Davis will fight not only to wipe out the blot of Jim Crowism upon our city. In fighting against Jim Crowism, he will be fighting anti-Semitism, against Catholic-baiting, against the racial theories of Hitler.

The Davis campaign swiftly moved into high gear. A wide nonpartisan committee for Davis' election, headed by Dr. George Cannon, quickly swelled from 50 to approximately 2,000. It was a cross-section of the Manhattan population, including unionists, ministers, lawyers, social workers, youth and artists, men and women, with especially heavy representation from Harlem. Some of the city's best progressive advertising and layout workers enlisted in the Davis drive, producing striking campaign literature that was the envy of the old-line politicians.

Ben Davis needed no coaching from Pete. He had observed the successful 1941 campaign closely, and indeed had come to Brooklyn to make some speeches for Pete, and had patterned his own campaign after Pete's. Above all, as Ben wrote later, the dominant note of his campaign was:

... its people's character. By this I mean that my platform which was based on the major issues of the electorate was shaped in such a manner as to facilitate the coming together of the largest sector of the people in defense and extension of their all-around welfare. Republican and Democratic voters rallied to my support no less than independents.

It was the difference between a narrow partisan campaign designed to reach primarily those who agreed with my Marxist socialist views, and a people's nonpartisan campaign designed to reach those who could unite on immediate issues such as housing, equality, police violence and civil liberties, irrespective of their party affiliation or long-range political perspective.

With that type of Davis campaign well under way in Manhattan, Pete could turn with relative calm to the closing days of his reelection fight. After all, his votes had to come from Brooklyn, and Brooklyn only.

Tackling The Eagle and O'Dwyer

PETE felt the strong groundswell of labor and community support as he entered the final weeks of his 1943 campaign. It was a winning fight this time, he sensed, even as he warned against overconfidence, particularly

because his old foe, the *Brooklyn Eagle* was gunning for him in a new way.

About two weeks before Election Day the *Eagle* opened up on Pete because he was supporting a Black Republican, Norman B. Johnson, in the latter's fight for a council seat from Brooklyn. On the surface, it would appear that the *Eagle* was seeking to ridicule Pete as an unprincipled politician because he, a Communist, was backing a Republican. Pete, as was his wont and policy, would come before Johnson supporters and others to lend his strength to the fight for Black representation. On his part, he simply asked that Johnson backers cast their No. 2 votes next to the name of Cacchione on the PR ballot.

Actually, as Pete knew, the *Eagle* was not particularly interested in Pete's support of Johnson. The *Eagle* was seeking to whip up something of a white backlash against him, he believed, because of his consistent fight against racism. Pete was furious. He dashed off a reply to the *Eagle* which he made public in his column, "It Happened at City Hall." It was pure, plain, indignant Pete talking:

If there is one thing I am proud of concerning my work in the City Council, it is my fight against discrimination and race hatred. . . .

If there is one individual in America that does not enjoy the same rights I do, that is a threat against my rights. As long as there is one group in America that does not enjoy its full democratic rights under the Constitution, that is a threat to all people. It is a dagger at the very vitals of democracy.

My fight against discrimination is guided by these principles. I will never compromise on this question. If there is one inch of compromise to the enemies of democracy, we are lost. On this line I stand and on this line I fight! (*Daily Worker*, October 24, 1943.)

This off his chest, one other thing continued to nag Pete. Would the old party machines try any hanky panky at the ballot count à la 1941? Should he start to warn people publicly? Or should he make discreet inquiries and tell the politicians not to try any funny business or else he would make it an issue well in advance of the count? Pete knew that in the war atmosphere, with so much talk about democratic rights the question of a fair count in an election was a sensitive issue all the way to Washington. He determined on a bold but quiet move—he would personally see the District Attorney of Kings County (Brooklyn) and put the matter squarely.

Thus it was that Pete, accompanied by this writer, on a sparkling fall afternoon, visited the hideaway penthouse of District Attorney William O'Dwyer at the Hotel Bossert in the Brooklyn Heights section of Brook-

of the working class, realizing that under conditions of modern monopoly capitalism this class can achieve the equality and freedom of the Negro people.

Communists are not opposed to reforms. On the contrary, they work constantly for the slightest improvements that can be won within the framework of capitalism. They are willing to unite and cooperate with all forces for the betterment of the people's conditions, in any and all fields of endeavor. At the same time, Communists believe that the struggle for reform should be carried on in such a way as to weaken and expose capitalism and to build up the forces that can bring about the replacement of capitalism by socialism. Communists are aware that reform victories tend to strengthen mass illusions about monopoly capitalism and therefore seek always to carry the struggle further and always to keep before the mass movement the socialist perspective.

The five-year sentence that I am now serving in Terre Haute federal prison only confirms many times over the correctness of my Communist convictions—first attained during the Herndon case—and only proves the cynical brutality of the ruling class and government toward the Negro people and toward those of their spokesmen who really fight for Negro liberation, who really challenge the fundamental economic and political causes of Negro oppression, and who seek to replace the barbarism of white supremacy with the noble virtues of human equality.

THE "IMPOSSIBLE" CANDIDATE

When, in 1943, my candidacy for the New York City Council on the Communist ticket was announced, the press was unanimous in declaring my election impossible. For entirely different reasons, some of my friends joined them. The difficulties were considered insurmountable.

Shortly after I was designated as a candidate by the Manhattan County Committee of the Communist Party, I telephoned my father in Atlanta to inform him of my nomination. I had run for office before on the Communist ticket; consequently my father was not inclined to attach any special importance to this particular instance. But I assured him that this was different—this time I was going to win. An old hand in politics, too worldly-wise to be moved by youthful enthusiasm, he replied:

"Son, this election is going to be like all the rest. Remember the time you ran for District Attorney or something on the Communist ticket? Well, you didn't get elected then; and you won't be elected this time. You Communists are always running for offices, but you never catch them. The day of your party hasn't come yet."

But the impossible happened. I was elected. The opposition and its two-party machine were shocked and dismayed. They had already had to swallow the bitter pill of the election of Peter V. Cacchione, Brooklyn Communist leader, in 1941, and they had hoped to get rid of him in 1943. Instead, they were now faced with two Communists in the city council.

My friends and supporters were jubilant. My election was another high-water mark in the achievement of the labor-Negro people's progressive coalition. Independent political action had scored a signal victory. And the Negro people of Harlem, demonstrating tremendous political maturity, had fired a shot that

was heard not only in the sharecropper's cabin in Mississippi, but in the trenches in Europe and the Far East. It was, above all, a victory for unity behind our country's patriotic, national war to defeat the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis.

The combination of circumstances and relationships which had led to this triumph had thrust upon me the honor of being the first Negro Communist elected to office in the history of the United States. While I regarded it as a great distinction and an unprecedented opportunity, uppermost in my mind was the feeling of responsibility. My task was not only to advance the movement which alone could improve the jim-crow conditions imposed upon my community in Harlem, but also to make the whole of New York City a better place for the people. There was no contradiction, but rather a dynamic unity, between the two.

A part of the campaign against me was that I would never get elected because I had two strikes against me. I was a Negro and a Communist. An amusing incident as to this "deadly" combination occurred when I called my father the night I was elected. He thought it was a gag and wouldn't believe me. I finally gave up—I knew how stubborn father could be, especially when he had predicted another outcome.

The next morning I got a call from him. Excited and happy, he exclaimed: "Son, I guess you were right. I see there's a headline in the paper here which says 'Black Red elected in New York. White Yankees vote for him.'"

My father represented a link between the period of the struggle for Negro rights in which he had lived and fought and another stage of this struggle in which I was living and fighting. He still was inclined to think his period would last forever, and still believed pretty much, as did Frederick Douglass, that "the Republican Party was the ship, and all else was the sea." He found it difficult to acknowledge the beginning of another era. Before he died, however, he had become somewhat reconciled to the inevitable; he even went so far as to completely forgive my abandonment 28 years earlier of the comfortable and lucrative bourgeois career he had arranged for me.

The reaction of the Atlanta paper was a small measure of the

shock sustained by the bourgeoisie. The New York *Herald Tribune* sought to explain my election on the basis of my "personal following." Other papers and bourgeois experts on elections said it was a political accident.

Often in my campaign I would share with the audience the episodes involving my father. They never failed to get a big laugh, especially when there were many Southern-born Negroes among the listeners. For they were intimately acquainted with the utterly absurd—as well as murderous—forms that white supremacy could take in the deep South. Sometimes I would use the description of me as a "Black Red" to answer the favorite argument of A. Philip Randolph, the Social-Democratic Negro labor leader: "Why should the Negro add to the handicap of being Black, the handicap of being Red?"

Far from considering it a handicap to be a Negro and a Communist simultaneously, I considered it a double weapon against the ruling class. An American Negro has a background of 300 years of oppression in this country, and great indeed is the Negro's anger. When that same Negro is a Communist, he is equipped with a science—Marxism-Leninism—which alone can help realize his 300-year aspiration for freedom and equality.

In 1913, the only Negro member of the city council was Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., who had been elected as the first Negro member in 1941. He had been elected pretty much as an independent, securing designations from the City Fusion Party, the American Labor Party and the Democratic Party. He was the symbol of the progressive people's coalition in the city. This was the dramatic start of Powell's political power as an independent, when he first proclaimed his motto: "I will wear no man's collar." He was swept into office in 1941 on the crest of a wave of demands by the Negro people and their supporters for representation in the city legislature. His election was made possible technically by Proportional Representation, which had become the law of the city under the new Charter adopted in 1936.

Powell was a powerful orator, dramatic and colorful, and capable of manipulating the emotions of his audience. A shrewd politician, he had the gift of sensing the popular yearnings and

trends of the masses, which he voiced as their leader. His church, the Abyssinian Baptist, built by his father, was famous as the largest in the United States, numbering 15,000 members. A wealthy institution, its members were very politically and nationally alert, and constituted a formidable election machine.

As the chief executive functionary of the Harlem Communist Party, I had a deep concern in having the community retain the seat held in trust, as it were, by Councilman Powell. I had heard that he did not intend to run for re-election but, putting no stock in rumors, I decided to have a personal talk with him. We had a long discussion, a friendly one, but not successful, on the question of the city council. He said, in effect, that he had already announced his candidacy for congress in 1942. The new congressional district which made it possible to elect a Negro representative from Harlem had been carved out in 1941, and Powell was determined to be the first Negro congressman from that district.

I placed the issues squarely before him, giving the point of view of my party, namely, that it was incumbent upon the progressive forces of the community to do everything possible to guarantee the retention by a Negro of the seat he now held and, if at all possible, to elect an additional Negro. I emphasized that we were faced with the prospect of losing the one place in the council, and that would amount to a setback of such proportions as to damage the united struggles of the Negro people. I asked him to reconsider his decision not to run and, failing that, to assist in establishing unity around a progressive Negro candidate of independence and integrity who would be worthy of support.

Powell declined on both scores. He stated that to run for re-election to the city council in 1943 and then to make the race for congress in 1944 was more than he could bear either physically or financially, and that he considered it best to relinquish his position in the council in order to prepare for the congressional race in 1944. On the second point, he preferred a hands-off policy.

This was late spring of 1943 and time was passing rapidly. It

would be no easy or simple matter to achieve Harlem unity around a candidate who could win and there was not much time left. I had heard that Dr. Channing Tobias was considering the race and made an appointment with him at his offices in the YMCA headquarters on Madison Avenue. He was, of course, neither as militant nor as close to the man on the street as Powell, although he was pro-labor and had associated himself on various occasions with the progressive coalition. He would have made a good candidate at that time; he was part of the Roosevelt coalition among the Negro people in a vague sort of way. He was a typical liberal, but I was not looking for a Communist candidate but one around whom the broadest unity of the Negro people and labor could be achieved in this specific situation.

When I placed the question before him, he respectfully declined, on the ground that he wanted to remain independent politically and had no desire for public office.

I finally went to Dr. George Cannon, who later became the chairman of the non-partisan committee for my election. Although he declined to run, he helped in every way, calling conferences, having personal chats with friends, trying to convince representative Negroes to run.

George Cannon was an able physician and surgeon who had not lost any of his youthful passion against jim-crow. He would not sacrifice his militant views to further his medical career, and although he was a Roosevelt Democrat, he did not quail at my Communist convictions, but rather believed that if a cause was worthy, people should not permit political or other differences to prevent them from supporting it.

Nevertheless, the problem had not been solved. The nominations for the city council by all parties had been made, but no representative Negro from Harlem had been nominated. The Democrats had not nominated a Negro. Even the Negro Tammany leaders in the community were up in arms. They felt they had been put in a very bad position before the Negro people, upon whom they depended in the election district for the Dem-

ocratic vote. Many of them protested and showed their disapproval but without going so far as breaking with the Tammany machine.

Our Harlem Communist Party surveyed the situation, consulted with Negro and labor leaders. My own conversations with various Negro spokesmen demonstrated that all felt that the place in the council must not be lost. They felt that the failure of the two major parties to designate a candidate of the community's choice should be exposed during the campaign. Our party had nominated a candidate, Carl Brodsky, well known in labor and progressive circles. He offered to withdraw in my favor and to permit the party to substitute my name for his as candidate on the Communist ticket. After due consideration, the county committee made the switch and my name was substituted for Brodsky's within the time permitted by the law. This decision was based upon the record of our Harlem party among the Negro people, their response to its program, and on the basis of our contact with the community. At least, I was an integral part of the people's coalition in Harlem, had shared in their struggles and activities, and had been accepted as one of their recognized spokesmen. Moreover, as my election proved, our party had correctly judged the desires and sentiment of the Negro people and their white supporters as well.

The honor of my designation as the Communist candidate belonged rightfully not to me but to the people from whom I sprang. Whatever spark of determination I possessed in the struggle was instilled in me by the hardihood of my people in resisting oppression in America, Africa, the West Indies and wherever black men fight to live. I had seen that same flame burn in my father; a little of it burns in every Negro, if he does not permit it to be extinguished by violence or intimidation, or if he does not deny it for a mess of pottage.

Carl Brodsky was truly a representative of the Jewish people. In withdrawing in my favor, under circumstances in which the Jewish people needed a representative in the City Council, he demonstrated the close bonds of cooperation that could exist between the Jewish and Negro people. His action was a warm,

human and generous symbol of recognition on the part of progressive Jewish workers of their own profound stake in the cause of Negro liberation.

It was not only I who was deeply impressed; this dramatic and genuine demonstration of solidarity was not lost among the people of Harlem. Although Brodsky spent most of his time during the campaign trying to win the lower East Side Jewish workers to my support, he would occasionally come to Harlem, often speaking on the same platform with me. He would receive a rousing ovation from the people.

The tremendous vote I received from the Jewish community was one of the highlights of my election. I was told by experienced election campaigners that my name had become as familiar as one of their own, and that never before had a Negro candidate received such a high percentage of votes in a white neighborhood.

The metropolitan newspapers merely noted the fact that I had been substituted for Carl Brodsky. I was listed along with the candidates of the other parties. After this, there ensued a conspiracy of silence in these papers; the bourgeois election experts and commentators paid me no mind. I didn't have a chance, according to them, so why waste printer's ink? Tammany paid no serious attention to my candidacy; nor did the Republicans. This attitude even affected the people in my own ranks. Many friends said, "Yes, you'll make a good campaign, a very fine one indeed; but you won't be elected—too many odds against you. Besides, the two party machines are too strong; if you look as though you might become a serious threat, they'll pour in thousands of dollars to defeat you," and so on, ad infinitum.

These friends and supports were not the only ones with serious doubts. Some of my own comrades were skeptical. They were only a small minority among the party membership, still their views deserved serious consideration. They doubted that the estimate of a possible victory was correct, although during the campaign they worked with great skill and energy; I would have liked to have had more "skeptics" like them. Such differences illustrate a cardinal distinction of our party—a working class organization operating on the principle of democratic centralism.

Once a decision was made it was binding and carried out by all members alike. Some of these skeptics pointed out that a Communist councilmanic candidate in Manhattan had never received more than 13,000 votes, and in Harlem no more than 5,000 votes. They estimated that I would have to receive almost twice the number of votes in the trade union and progressive white areas that a Communist candidate had ever received in the whole of Manhattan under the best circumstances. Furthermore, the campaign was late and I had only a bare six weeks. Other arguments were that any attempt to shoot for victory would tax our organization too heavily and run the danger of not securing the re-election of Councilman Cacchione in Brooklyn. Still others held that I should aim to secure enough second-choice votes to elect the ALP candidate, which would be a big advance since Manhattan had never had a labor councilman.

These arguments could not be brushed aside willy-nilly. They proved to be very valuable in pitching and focusing the campaign and in touching up weak points. Besides, these exchanges of opinion were part of the thorough way in which our party considered all angles of a problem and then charted its course. It was this same Marxist consideration of many-sided factors that led to the election victory and rallied and strengthened our ranks.

All the doubts expressed by the skeptics failed to dent my enthusiasm. My campaign staff and I prepared to involve all these friends, not in a "very fine" campaign, but in a winning one. I was buoyed up by the fact of Pete Cacchione's election in 1941. What was basically new in the situation was the tremendous upsurge among the Negro masses and the unprecedented support they were receiving from white workers—particularly from the CIO, but also from the AFL—as well as from white intellectuals, artists, progressives, liberals. The Negro people, wholeheartedly supporting the war against fascist-racism abroad, were demanding more and more earnest of eventual victory at home. Their democratic aspirations were released under the impetus of the anti-fascist war. The war, under Roosevelt's leadership, brought forward the most democratic and progressive traditions of our country. What was apparent here was the possibility of a qualitative leap forward for the Negro people and for indepen-

dent political action. It had to be grasped then or it would be lost.

The circumstances that had dictated my nomination also shaped my campaign, which was pitched upon the theme of winning the war and demonstrating against Hitler racism by advancing the cause of Negro representation at home. In the local and city program were: the banning of jim-crow in Stuyvesant Town, the appointment of a Negro on the Board of Education, a public market for Harlem, the end of police brutality, rent and price controls, slum clearance, the enforcement and expansion of the multiple dwelling laws, and the outlawing of all forms of racial discrimination, anti-Semitism, jim-crow and segregation.

But I was also running on the Communist ticket. It was my duty and responsibility, as well as my privilege, to explain to the voters why I was running on that ticket, what the Communist Party stood for and why I was a member. If I couldn't trust the people, why should they trust me? I did not believe in hiding "the light of Marxism-Leninism" under a bushel. It was necessary to point out that though I had backers of other parties in my corner, I nevertheless was a Communist whose program went much farther than the present election campaign; that I believe in socialism and would ever strive for its triumph at home.

My campaign spread like wildfire. Overnight the nonpartisan committee for my election leaped from about 50 to approximately 2,000—a real cross-section of ministers, doctors, lawyers, businessmen, trade unionists, social leaders, women, youth, foreign-born, native-born, workers, artists—indeed, people from every conceivable stratum of life. The committee became so large and unwieldy that it had to divide up into smaller committees. The major power in these committees and among the campaign workers were the Negro masses and the trade unionists. The accomplishments of our party, which numbered less than 2,000, were nothing short of miraculous. Only hard work, devotion and skill—climbing six and seven flights of stairs, tramping the streets in the roughest weather, seeing ministers, arranging conferences, holding street meetings, distributing literature, and so on—could achieve such "miracles."

Resolutions of endorsement and support soon began to pour

in from unions, churches, groups of almost every description. Friends in the deep South, especially from Atlanta, sent long public statements of good wishes, accompanied by donations. Soldiers in the trenches sent best wishes. The campaign took on an international aspect. The two Harlem Negro weeklies reflected in as much space as they dared to give the snowballing character of the campaign.

A group of artists and layout experts produced excellent campaign literature. An enterprising chap even got hold of an old Amherst yearbook of my class (1925)—from an unsuspecting Wall Street classmate—and reproduced my entire college career in pictures. My campaign literature was of "printer's excellence"; even experienced Democrats and Republicans wanted to know whether they could borrow my layout staff—"for a price," of course. They were amazed to find that not everyone was for sale. Many of the people of Harlem wanted certain campaign pieces as ornaments for their walls.

We held street rallies at the liveliest corners in Harlem, in the garment workers' district, before union and people's organizations in the course of their regular meetings. It was impressive to see the revolutionary tradition of the Negro church assert itself during the campaign. They became bulwarks of support to my campaign. Ministers invited me to speak "for a few minutes" at their 11 o'clock Sunday morning religious services.

The campaign was becoming irresistible; the smell of victory was in the air. Councilman Powell was now ready to take his stand. He issued a statement declaring that I was the "worthy successor" to his seat in the city council, and called upon his supporters and friends to vote for me. Accurately gauging the enthusiasm of the campaign, the Non-Partisan Committee decided on a rally in Golden Gate Ballroom—a mammoth auditorium in the center of Harlem, holding about 5,000 people.

A top price of \$2.75 was placed on reserved seats and 50¢ on general admission. "Who ever heard of charging for admission to an election rally?" the doubting Thomases said. "Most candidates are only too glad to get a full house, with free admission." But the committee wouldn't be daunted.

There was scarcely a name band or a popular entertainer who did not volunteer their services. The Golden Gate was sold out ten days before the rally. On the day of the event, the fire department closed the hall two hours before the performance. When I appeared on the scene, it was all I could do to get in. One of the more prominent artists had to intercede with the police and fire department in my behalf.

Finally another 5,000 people had gathered outside the Golden Gate. We decided to rent an additional hall about six blocks away. We then routed the artists to this hall after their Golden Gate performance.

There were no speeches. Paul Robeson introduced me at both halls. I told the audience that I was but a part in a cause much bigger than any one of us and that we would struggle jointly until our country and the world were rid of Hitler racism and all humankind could live in dignity and walk in freedom.

This type of campaign rally was new, and we continued with it. At our street corner rallies we featured outstanding Negro and white artists. They performed with dignity, and they gave their talent because of their convictions.

In Harlem, support came from all sorts of quarters and for all sorts of reasons. A score or more old-timers who were Georgia-born supported me because they knew and admired my father. Some of them would slap me on the back and say: "Davis, your father was a Lincoln Republican. You must be a Lincoln Communist. I'm going to vote for you."

The large vote I received from the Porto Rican community was indispensable to my victory. During the campaign two things struck me with great force: First, that the Porto Rican community in lower Harlem, victimized by discrimination, had no representation whatever at any level of government*; second,

* The so-called racial pattern of the United States must appear quite bewildering to the Porto Rican people. In New York they are jimmied and treated like Negroes. But here in Terre Haute federal penitentiary they are integrated with the white inmates, while the Negro is segregated. It shows the utter insanity of racism and discrimination.

that I could not speak Spanish. I resolved to do something to help correct both these conditions.

In the course of the five-week whirlwind campaign, the Communist Party had built a smooth and powerful people's election machine that cut across all party lines. It was based on the crusading spirit of the advanced trade unionists—the leaders of the working class. They had ties with thousands of families, churches and people's organization in Harlem and throughout the city. When they moved in their full strength, the whole community moved. Naturally, our heaviest concentration was in Harlem, for without a large base vote in Harlem, it was not possible to win.

When election day came, the trade unionists took over all our poll-watching assignments—most outstanding were the organized seamen, the furriers (CIO) and the food workers (AFL). Church women prepared hot coffee and sandwiches at various assembly spots on election day. Many elderly Negroes voted for the first time in their lives. As a candidate, I had the right to visit the polls—and I did. Whenever I walked in, there were cheers and assurances of victory.

The heaviest voting in New York City is done in the last two hours—between 5 and 7 PM, the period when the workers are returning from their jobs. At about 4:30 PM the worst downpour of the season started. It lasted until about 8 PM, an hour beyond the closing of the polls. All we could do was hope. I continued to visit the polls even during the downpour and was surprised to see that the polling places were crowded. We took heart from this.

When the polls closed, our task had just begun. The count began next morning and was to last about eight days. These days seemed like years. To watch the count is a bewildering, nerve-racking experience. One had to be on his toes against vote stealing, chicanery, every conceivable brand of trickery—as well as some honest errors. The Democrats and Republicans held all the official positions as counters, tellers, etc., and they did not want me to win. And it later appeared that they planned to count me out.

From the first day of the count, I was leading the field. Radio commentators blasted out that this was the upset of the election. Actually, they were counting those districts which included Harlem. But after the first two or three days, my vote began to level off as the count reached other parts of the city. I remained among the first three, however, and five were to be elected. It seemed that my election was assured. But then the stealing began in earnest. The votes for me began to disappear from my table, and the closest Tammany candidates began to congregate around my table, seeking to create an incident. We appealed to Mayor La Guardia, to the Honest Ballot Association, to every clean-government group. Statements were issued informing the public of the conspiracy to count me out.

On the fourth day Pete Cacchione, his own election in Brooklyn now assured, brought his entire staff over to the Manhattan court to assist me. Soon after he arrived, I discovered that some of my Harlem districts were missing and hadn't been counted. One of the ablest of our party election workers demanded a halt to the count, and demanded the right to search for the missing votes. He dug through the huge pile, district by district and found not only the missing votes we knew of but also some unknown ones. In all, 1,500 votes has been stacked away, stolen right before our eyes. How perilous this was could be seen in the fact that I won by a little over 2,000 votes. It was a dramatic moment.

When, at the end of the long, gruelling count, my election was announced, every Negro in the Armory jumped up and yelled. They were to maintain their representation in the city council and white supremacy had taken a licking. The machine had been beaten. The wrath of an aroused electorate outweighed the fraud, deceit, corruption and vote-stealing of the party bosses. The unity of Negro and white had done the "impossible." History had been made.

Major party lines had been badly shattered. In the whole of Manhattan in 1943, there were not more than 6,000 Communists. My vote was more than 43,000. My election represented a qualitative leap forward for the Negro people, for the Negro-labor

alliance and for our party. It was the result of years of conscientious and consistent work of the party in Harlem in the battles of the Negro people. And it went far beyond the state lines of New York, reflecting the leading role that Harlem plays in the political thinking of the Negro, nationally. From all over the country came messages of congratulations, greetings, best wishes. And I felt a sense of responsibility to the Negro people, nationally, and to fighters for Negro and colonial liberation all over the globe.

In this campaign for the City council, as well as in my subsequent campaigns in 1945 and 1947, the dominant note was its people's character. By this I mean that my platform which was based upon the major issues facing the electorate was shaped in such a manner as to facilitate the coming together of the largest sector of the people in defense and extension of their all-round welfare. Republican and Democratic voters rallied to my support no less than independents. It was the difference between a narrow partisan campaign designed to reach primarily those who agreed with my Marxist socialist views, and a people's nonpartisan campaign designed to reach those who could unite on immediate issues such as housing, equality, police violence and civil liberties, irrespective of their party affiliation or long-range political perspective. The latter was especially adapted to Harlem, characterized by the all-people's character of the movement against the jim-crow ghetto system.

However, there was no contradiction between my being a Communist candidate and at the same time a people's candidate. The two supplemented each other. Moreover, only such an approach could guarantee Negro representation on the city council. Besides, living Marxism is itself the broadest approach to the mass of people, encompassing all who work by hand and brain. Since my party was part of the people's movement in its electoral coalition form, I could pledge the support of the Communists to this broad people's platform. Some of my well-meaning supporters who were either Democrats or Republicans hoped I would stop there and go no further, fearing that an espousal of my views

would frighten away voters. I rejected this view. Some agreed, others tried to reconcile themselves with my position; but none bolted. My campaigns were an excellent example of the united or people's front in which many forces work together on a common platform, even though they disagree on many other important questions.

At the same time, the foundation of my victorious campaign was the alliance of the Negro people and important sections of the labor movement. Upon this foundation was erected the structure of mass support among all sections of the population. The solid vote of Harlem was not enough to elect me; I needed the trade union and white progressive vote. That was shown clearly after the ALP candidate was counted out, when I received enough second-choice votes from him to assure my election by a comfortable margin.

It was significantly shown in the elections that among the Negro people there was a tremendous trend toward independent political action, toward breaking with the two-party system. They also showed great solidarity and a high degree of political maturity. Cacchione's vote was scattered widely over the Borough of Brooklyn, while my base vote was largely in a single community, which rebuffed solidly any red-baiting during the campaign.

Although our party received such a fine reception in Harlem it failed to become a mass party in that community. The basic requisites were present, except for one: the will to do so. As the leader of the party in Harlem, I was making one of the biggest mistakes in my political life. For I had become, no less than many other party leaders, deeply influenced by the revisionism of Browder, which led to the liquidation of the party as an independent working class force. Our party began to merge with the masses of militants and progressives, losing its own identity. True, the party had played a significant role by drawing together and leading the combination of forces that achieved my election and made possible continued Negro representation on the city council at a crucial moment when all other parties failed to meet the test. All the more pity that we failed to build a strong, mass party in Harlem.

Our campaign did make clear certain important characteristics of our party. My candidacy did not result from a careerist desire to run for office, as is generally the case with other parties. It was a response to the needs of the given situation—to guarantee that the Negro people should not lose their place on the city council. My nomination came only after the party had offered its full support to other candidates, none of whom were Communists but who merited the support of the Negro people and had a good chance of winning. In fact, it had not occurred to me that I might be the candidate.

The campaign also showed that only a progressive Negro candidate could serve as the symbol of unity. A conservative Negro spokesman identified with either of the major parties could not have united the Negro people. Such a candidate would have led to disunity, to certain defeat and to the loss of the council seat. The ruling class can unite only on a reactionary program, the working class only on a progressive one.

Thus, now the so-called unity of the CIO and AFL behind the pro-imperialist policies of the top labor leadership is a false facade. Badly confused and temporarily hogtied by the collaborationist policies of the officialdom, predominant sections of the labor movement are following the line of least resistance behind their treacherous leadership, although a significant section opposes these policies. On the other hand, a positive policy, clearly put before the rank and file and courageously fought for, together with further experiences in struggle, can eventually turn the tide. So much the better for America. Let us hope that this will happen in time—in time to avert the third world war and the catastrophe into which the ruling class, abetted by the top labor officialdom, is pushing the nation.

My electoral victory rested upon years of conscientious and consistent work of the Communist Party in Harlem in the struggles of the Negro people. Many gave their lives or served in prison, victims of police brutality, frame-ups or what have you. Progress seems slow and then, all at once, when conditions are ready, it takes a big leap forward. Communist open-air speakers were pelted with cabbages and tomatoes by Garveyites back in

1929, but a dozen years later even the neo-Garveyites joined in my campaign. It is always toward the qualitative leap forward that the Communist works, for it is only in this way that socialism can be established. There is no such thing as capitalism gradually growing into socialism. But the Communist also works, even at the risk of his life, to prevent a qualitative step backward. For this can mean only one thing—fascism, which in our country might well be worse than Hitlerism.

IN THE CITY COUNCIL

The die-hards had predicted dire consequences for the city of New York following upon my entry into the municipal government—even though I was only one of 25 members of the city council. There was, of course, Peter Cacchione, and now here was another who was not only red but black. It was too much for them.

When, however, I took office on January 4, 1944, the earth remained unshaken by hurricanes, earthquakes or other "acts of God" to mark my satanic accession to power. City Hall did not fall down. And there were only a few threats to refuse me my seat. These came in the form of the perennial and anonymous "taxpayers' suit." This paper tiger had been routed by the people two years earlier when Pete Cacchione took his seat. But, on the whole, they decided not to turn the spigot on as I took office this time.

Late in November, I was about to arrange the details of taking my oath of office—a simple pledge to uphold the Constitution of the United States and of the state of New York—when I received word from Mayor La Guardia to come to his office. I did not have the slightest idea what it was all about.

When I walked into his office at City Hall, he greeted me in his own inimitable way. "Hello, councilman-elect. Congratulations." He was smiling.

"Hello, Mr. Mayor. Why did you send for me?"

He went on in a jesting tone. "Well, you're only a councilman-elect. If you want to be a councilman, you'd better get sworn in."

I relaxed. "Oh," I said. "I'm arranging for that in the next few days."

"Just what I thought. You have only a few more days. I'm

going to swear you in right now and get it over with. After all, under the Charter, I'm the chief magistrate of the city."

Before I could take this in, he had buzzed his secretary, cussed a few times when the buzzer didn't work, gotten hold of a Bible and a blank form of a councilman's oath, and I was sworn in.

"Now you're a councilman," he said, "and even if the Democrats try to pull a fast one on the first day of the council, you'll be ready. Best of luck to you. We'll get together during the council sessions and have a talk."

The solicitude and initiative Mayor La Guardia had shown in getting me sworn in gave rise to a thought or two in my mind. But no more than that; it was fairly obvious, even to a neophyte, that La Guardia was a practical politician, and that he had acted in accordance with his political position. He was a Roosevelt independent or New Dealer and expressed it formally by registering with the American Labor Party. His interest in me was undoubtedly based on strengthening his minority position in the city council against the Tammany majority. After all, I had a vote: Perhaps the occasion would arise when it would be decisive. At all times, indeed, it would be preferable to have my good will. A second consideration was that I was the only Negro in the council. In a certain sense his relations with me would symbolize his relations with the large population of Negro Americans in Harlem. I do not say that these were the specific reasons that motivated La Guardia—there probably were others. But he did not swear me in for personal reasons—I did not know him; indeed, I had never met him. On the contrary, I had led many a delegation to see him at City Hall in protests against police brutality, relief discrimination, Stuyvesant Town discrimination, jim-crow—and on many other issues. I had denounced his actions on Stuyvesant Town, and our party had waged a relentless campaign against the shortcomings of his administration—not the least of which was his arrogant attitude toward the Transport Workers Union and the Public Workers Union. So there was absolutely no basis for any special personal regard for me. . . .

Prior to the first session in January, the minority of the council had a meeting for organizational purposes. It was a

heterogeneous minority, since every council member who was not in the Tammany majority was automatically a member of the minority; it made no difference whether he was in agreement with the Tammany side of the chamber. Obviously the physical division of the chamber into majority and minority had little or no relation to political principles.

Alfred Phillips, who sat on the minority side, was even more of a straitlaced reactionary than anyone on the Tammany side. His favorite comment was: "This is the American way." He uttered these words as if they were a magic incantation. Once, on the council floor, I spoke of the way Pepsi-Cola signs were defacing the scenery of the city—particularly in Queens. Phillips clambered to his feet to announce that the Communist member of the council was attacking business. "These signs are the American way." And then he sat down as though he had uttered mankind's final and eternal wisdom. Pete and I nicknamed him "the American way," and privately we shuddered for America.

One of the most important things I learned at the preliminary minority session was that it was utterly impossible to whip that group into an organized, politically unified body, even on a minimum progressive program. How, for example, could Pete and I agree with the outlook of a man like "American way" Phillips? About the only things we agreed upon were: the election of a leader, the seating arrangement of the minority on the council floor, and the issuance of a statement setting forth in broad outline the policy we would pursue. Political expediency prevailed in all three actions. The statement carefully skirted the fundamental convictions of all of us.

Councilmen belonging to the same party sat together. Pete and I sat side by side from the first session of the council until the day he died. His near-blindness made this imperative anyway. I had known Pete and his record in the party and in the veterans' and unemployed movements for many years, but I had not worked with him personally. Our first day in the council was the beginning of a close association and of an enduring friendship. . . .

The first session of the council took place the first Wednesday after January 1, in accordance with the City Charter. It was purely a formal session and did not do any legislating. Pete had warned me not to be too impressed with the opposition—I had no difficulty whatsoever in not being impressed. Pete explained how the decisions, particularly those made by the Tammany majority, were not arrived at in debate on the floor but in the caucus rooms of Tammany Hall. I soon learned this for myself. For though the Tammany majority leader would go through the motions of defending a particular position, it was a mere formality. They had the votes and they played "power politics" in the council. Often some of us on the minority side would pick their arguments to pieces in debate, but it was like arguing with the Sphinx. Arguments, reason, common sense—no such "Communist propaganda" availed against Tammany. Only the superior power of great mass pressure could alter their position on any given issue.

The highlight of the first session was a brief address of welcome to new members by Newbold Morris. He made an innocuous liberal speech, of which I remember one portion: "The New York City Council is the most representative legislative body in the country, having among its members not alone Republicans and Democrats but saboteurs and Communists, women and men, Negro and white." This, he said, "was a demonstration of the kind of unity among the American people that was needed to win the war against Hitler." That impressed me because it was the nearest thing to an expression of the formal inclusion of Communists in national unity to win the war that I had ever heard from a white bourgeois politician—before or since.

The only other time I heard anything approaching such recognition was when the then Secretary of the Interior, the late Harold Ickes, campaigning for Roosevelt's fourth term, spoke in the Golden Gate Ballroom in Harlem to a packed audience of Negroes. He quoted liberally from a speech I had made attacking Dewey, mentioning me as author. Ickes, of course, did not intend to formalize recognition of the Communists. He was seeking a

broad channel into the Negro community in the interest of the re-election of Roosevelt.*

Soon after my election I met with the leading committees of our party in Harlem and on the state level, and with National Committee members, to work out my responsibilities. The fundamental strength of such meetings was the collective thinking of groups like these. Of course, the experience and advice of Councilman Cacchione was of enormous value. Our party committee was only concerned with how I could best serve the people of New York as a member of the city council. It was decided that my main work was to be a councilman, which meant relinquishing some of my party responsibilities; secondly, that my council plan of work was to be divided into four parts—legislation, coordinating my work in the council with the demands and needs of the people, servicing the public and, finally, giving special attention to the problems of the Negro people, the Harlem community, and labor. Councilman Cacchione and I were the links between the parliamentary arena, on the one hand, and our party and the working people, on the other.

On the floor of the council or in council committees, Pete and I made our own decisions in what we believed to be the interests of the working class and our Communist outlook. That's what we were elected to do, and that's what we tried to do to the best of our ability. A pertinent and amusing angle on the question of our individual voting was that whenever one of the Tammany hacks on the other side of the aisle was backed against the wall in an argument, he would shout at the top of his voice that Cacchione and I were voting on "orders from Moscow"; or, when that seemed too farfetched, "on orders from 12th Street" (Communist headquarters). This they could do, mind you, without

* Seven years later, in 1951, Ickes wrote a column in the *New Republic*, lumping together Paul Robeson and myself as "bright in school" and "intelligent men," and wondering what caused us to become "agents of a foreign power." Again, this red-baiting shows that expediency, not principle, is the refuge of the bourgeois liberal in times of crisis. Moreover, he did the gifted Paul Robeson a grave disservice by lumping him with me.

blinking an eye over the fact that they had just left Tammany headquarters, where corruption, graft and reaction called their tune.

Every week, Pete and I reviewed the legislation before the council and prepared whatever bills, resolutions or other measures we planned to introduce. We went over all the other bills, irrespective of their sponsors, analyzed their worth and acted on our convictions. Too much credit cannot be given to our secretarial assistants, to the legislative bureau of our party, to numerous trade unions and peoples' organizations, who gave us invaluable assistance. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the Negro people's organizations of Harlem and to many individual citizens, without whose counsel and aid I could not have functioned.

Altogether, during my first term, Pete and I introduced about 175 pieces of legislation. Only about 15 were passed, but nearly all of them had a salutary effect on the actions of the council. The substance of a bill was often taken from us and then passed as a Tammany measure. But Pete and I were happy to see it enacted, and considered our "pride of authorship" secondary. Neither Pete nor I ever denied that our legislation had propaganda purposes and content. I remember once saying on the council floor that a bill I had introduced for a municipal FEPC with teeth in it was not only a good bill, but it was good propaganda:

"Any propaganda that upholds the constitutional right of the Negro and minorities to equality of employment; any propaganda that upholds the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments and the Declaration of Independence is good propaganda—to that kind of propaganda, I plead guilty," I said in debate.

Pete and I never failed to support any measure of any councilman which to any degree reflected the needs of the people of New York. The voters had crossed party lines in electing us, and we crossed party lines in upholding their best interests. But neither of us had illusions that we would break any records in obtaining the passage of legislation. We realized that the greatest value of our presence was that "we were tribunes of the

labor-Negro-progressive movement."* On Pete's splendid initiative, he and I worked persistently to voice the demands of the people for local rent control legislation—a step which the Democrats, in obedience to the big realty interests, had long fought off.

In order to be as responsive as possible to the community, I worked with a group of citizens comprising all parties, reporting constantly to them and securing from them proposals for measures, views on pending legislation and suggestions for improving my work. I established an office in Harlem; Pete had a similar headquarters in Brooklyn. I know of no other councilmen who offered such facilities to the public.

"Servicing" the public meant that my office was open to all citizens in connection with their individual problems. During my six years in the council, I must have personally interviewed or handled the problems of some 10 to 15 thousand persons. They had serious problems, generally involving the basic necessities of food, shelter and clothing—with jim-crow aggravating the family misery. Almost invariably they were pathetic or tragic. Sometimes I could do nothing more than permit a mother whose son had been a victim of unjust police action to unburden her troubled soul. Very often young couples would come to be married. I would have to inform them, regretfully, that a city councilman did not have the power to perform a marriage ceremony.

Of the individual problems, perhaps the largest was discrimination in employment and housing. Many apartments were found for possibly one in ten homeless citizens, but jobs were more difficult. Some Negro and white workers were placed through the trade unions, which were happy to cooperate with my office.

Once a Negro mother came to my office in tears. Her son was an American soldier who had spent a year-and-a-half overseas. He had been returned to Illinois under court-martial and dishonorably discharged from the army. We investigated the case and found that his offense was that he had protested a partic-

*Evidently, this was a "crime"—and it was one of the prime reasons for the defeat of Proportional Representation in 1947, and for the three-party gang-up against me in the 1949 campaign.

ularly brutal instance of jim-crow mistreatment. We carried on several weeks of correspondence with the army authorities, finally cutting through several miles of red tape. We were agreeably surprised when, several months later, we were notified that his case had been reconsidered and that he had been given an honorable discharge. We were as happy as his mother.

Once I was able to intercede with the Board of Health to have a vaccine station permit issued to a white neighborhood druggist. Though Harlem was the most congested area of the city, it had fewer such stations, or hospital and other health facilities, than any other section of the city. Harlem Hospital, the sole city institution catering to the general public, had 400 beds—for a population of 600,000! The hospital was known in Harlem as the "butcher shop"—no reflection on the doctors and nurses who, overworked and in second-grade facilities, were trying to keep up with a staggering burden of cases. The countless unnecessary deaths that took place in that medical factory might well be charged to the city of New York, since it could find no money for providing adequate hospital facilities for the people of Harlem.

To be sure, there were other hospitals in Harlem—in the midst of the Negro sections. But they did not accept Negro patients—no matter how grave their illness. One of the most shocking instances of this brutal discrimination was the case of W. C. Handy's wife, who died a few minutes after she had been refused admittance to a lily-white hospital in the center of Negro Harlem.

As I began my first term in the council, I had one regret—I would have less time to devote to the functioning of the party and to organizational tasks among the workers. I had to miss many important meetings of party committees, although my comrades did everything possible to accommodate the time of meetings to the council obligations of Pete and myself. As a result, my council work suffered, and so did my party work—not to mention my own Marxist education. Just as I could not have been elected without the party, I could not adequately fulfill my official obligations without it. I confess I preferred party work to any public office. That was why I had given up the practice of

law 11 years earlier. But knowing the needs and demands of the movement as a whole, I laid aside my personal preference.

The associations one forms, by necessity, in public office are sometimes revolting, seldom rewarding and nearly always politically unsanitary and unwholesome. One has to be careful not to absorb these associations even by osmosis and it is most interesting that the arrogant bourgeois politicians think we should be tickled to rub shoulders with them. The capitalists pay us a big compliment when they assume that one Communist in an organization of tens of thousands can influence the entire body, but that the same thousands can never influence one real Communist. It is a compliment that we Communists—being human—do not always deserve, and of course it is not meant as a tribute but as a slander. Actually, the slander is more against the thousands in the organization, who are treated as incapable of thinking for themselves, than it is of the Communists. We do not possess any such supernatural powers. When we are persuasive it is because of the truth and correctness of our contentions. If they are not true—then why jail us and persecute us?—the American people will see their untruth, as they have been able through the years to ultimately puncture falsehood.

One of the bills I introduced proposed the outlawing of jim-crow in the infamous Stuyvesant Town housing project. The measure provided for the withdrawal of the tax-exemption privilege from any landlord or realty owner who discriminated in the selection of tenants. One of the targets of the measure was the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, whose president had declared publicly that no Negro tenant would be allowed to dwell in the project. The state legislature had passed a housing redevelopment law (under which Stuyvesant Town was built) which left a loophole big enough to permit the whole confederate army to pass through. The bill I introduced was designed to plug this loophole. Actually, it was introduced jointly by Councilman Stanley M. Isaacs, a Republican, and myself. His efforts in its behalf were able and conscientious, and I was happy to be co-sponsor with him.

The Mayor had a sensitivity on this issue which virtually drove him into a tantrum at the very mention of Stuyvesant Town. It was as though he realized he had made a political mistake, but couldn't turn back for fear of losing face. It was his whip that had jammed the discriminatory contract through the Board of Estimate. He deserved his share of the blame, but neither Governor Dewey nor the Tammany Democrats did one thing to prevent the city's ratification of the contract, nor aided one bit in the campaign to pass the Isaacs-Davis bill.

This bill was the most important one I introduced in my first term. For the measure would have seriously dented a powerful unwritten landlord rule in New York City—that white apartment houses, residential areas and neighborhoods must be barred to Negro Americans.

Pete and I introduced other legislation—Pete granting me joint sponsorship on many of the measures he had ably worked out and introduced in the first term. As a matter of fact, some 14 measures I had sponsored were passed by the council—a record that compared favorably with that of any other councilman.

Notwithstanding the overwhelming support for the Isaacs-Davis Bill, the Tammany majority stalled, hemmed and hawed. For a solid year they conducted a silent filibuster. They continually raised the smokescreen alibi that the measure was unconstitutional. They were all for it, but the courts "would not uphold it." Of course, the chief opponent of the bill was the Metropolitan, one of the biggest landowners in the United States, with vast plantation and farm holdings in the deep South, as well as immense realty holdings in New York. Its assets (according to the *New York Times* of February 21, 1952) made it the second largest corporation in the world—second only to AT&T. It was an empire, not a corporation. This was the prime colossus we had to contend with in attempting to pass the Isaacs-Davis bill. Add to this the real estate lobby—a powerful combination which aimed to maintain intact the rigid segregation of Negroes and Porto Ricans—and it is easy to see what we were up against.

After Tammany's majority had been raising its bogus arguments of unconstitutionality until early 1945, the public pressure

forced them to execute a maneuver. They did not enact the Isaacs-Davis bill. Instead, the majority leader, Sharkey, took our bill and wrote another just like it—in all but one particular. The bill he wrote, which was later enacted, actually left jim-crow in Stuyvesant Town untouched. It penalized jim-crow in future tax-exempt private projects, that is, from 1945 on (Stuyvesant Town had been authorized in 1943). We had won an important skirmish, but we had lost the battle. The billion-dollar Metropolitan was bigger than the elected legislative body of eight million New York citizens.

The struggle brought forth many by-products. Not the least of these was the attempt of the Metropolitan to buy off the Negroes' opposition to discrimination in Stuyvesant Town. It announced, and subsequently built, another project under the Housing Redevelopment Law, with tax exemption, called River-ton. This was in Harlem. But the maneuver failed, because Negroes, fully conscious of the law that had been foisted on them, insisted that white tenants be integrated into the house. They were integrated, and at the same time the struggle against Stuyvesant Town went on unabated. Soon the tenants took it up. One of them subleased an apartment to a Negro family, robbing the Metropolitan completely of the argument that none of the white tenants wanted Negroes in the project with them. The Metropolitan sought to oust every white tenant who opposed jim-crow in the project. Professor Lee Lorch, formerly of City College, was driven from his faculty posts in New York, Philadelphia and finally from Fisk University. It wasn't until redoubled public pressure made itself felt that the Metropolitan was compelled (in 1952) to withdraw its eviction proceedings against the handful of tenants who had dared to defy its imperial sway.

Actually, the first bill passed under my own sponsorship turned out to be the designation of Negro History Week as an official annual observance of the city. It was proclaimed each year by the Mayor and the city council for six years—the duration of my membership in that body. Negro History Week had been inaugurated 35 years before by the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, under the leadership of Carter G. Wood-

son, a brilliant, self-made scholar. It was to acclaim and revive the great contributions of the Negro people to the building of democracy—contributions buried in the pages of prejudiced American history textbooks. If this is true in New York, one can scarcely imagine the extent of the malignant falsifications of history in such states as Mississippi, South Carolina and Georgia. From my earliest recollection in the schools of Dawson and Atlanta, I was always keenly conscious of the Ku Klux versions of Negro history shoved under my nose. The least I could do as a member of the city council was to strike a blow against these slanders of my people.

The significance of the city council's action was greater than the formal observance. The resolution itself was a simple document recalling in broad terms the important contributions of the Negro in the fields of science, art, culture, industry and statesmanship—connecting these contributions with current history and calling upon the city and all its departments to collaborate with the Association in appropriately observing Negro History Week.*

Thus the city was officially on record for this observance—but only in form. I worked out and submitted appropriate activities

*The idea of the resolution had been worked out in close coordination with the local Harlem branch of the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History. The latter gave an annual breakfast at which, as a regular item, I was called upon to make a few remarks and to read the council resolution and the Mayor's proclamation. Twice I read the proclamations of Mayor La Guardia and three times of Mayor O'Dwyer. The sixth time, which fell in February 1949, in the midst of my Smith Act trial, I was not invited to participate in the annual breakfast. The interesting thing about this is that the city council had felt compelled to pass the annual resolution, although I was in the midst of a trial for "conspiracy to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force and violence." I remember vividly the day the resolution was passed in 1949. The federal court was just across the street from the council chamber in City Hall. At about 4 PM Judge Medina and Prosecutor McGohey called me and my co-defendants "menaces to society." At 5 PM I walked across the street to City Hall where the council straightaway passed the resolution on Negro History Week, sponsored and introduced by a "menace to society."

for the schools, the various city departments and officials. I conducted a year-round campaign against prejudiced textbooks in the schools. Some of these were so crass that they were removed after I had quoted merely a few passages from them in a letter to the department of education. And I called these to the attention of the Mayor and Superintendent of Schools during Negro History Week. But it was of little use. They were not really interested in the warping of children's minds by racist history books.

But the city of New York now had an official tradition of observing Negro History Week, and the observation was picked up later by the state government. It is something the people of New York can be proud of—even though they have never been encouraged to make full use of it by the municipal administration. Such tributes as are deserved in connection with the event should be paid to the Negro people, to several progressive organizations, and to many advanced CIO and AFL trade unions.

Another of the struggles we waged was around discrimination in the Fire Department. It had been brought to my attention that Negro members of the various fire companies were assigned to special beds in the fire houses. White firemen, in between calls, could occupy any beds in the building, but Negro firemen were relegated to "Negro beds." They were also denied certain kinds of promotions. One Negro in the department had risen to batallion chief and was pointed to as an answer to all complaints of discrimination.

The city council refused to pass my resolution condemning such practices, but only agreed to enact a resolution to investigate the complaint through a special hearing. I conferred with the Negro firemen and we decided to accept the change from "condemnation" to "investigation"—confident that the facts exposed would force an improvement in conditions. The city council majority preferred an investigation because they anticipated hopefully that none of the Negro firemen would show up to testify—for fear of losing their jobs. Hints of reprisal against those who did appear filled the air.

But the Negro firemen, a militant and intelligent group,

showed up with bells on. They were solid as rock, and they burned with the kind of fire—the fire of the struggle for justice and dignity—that couldn't be put out. They jeopardized their jobs, their seniority and tenure rather than be intimidated. They made a powerful and impressive appearance—surprising the Tammany majority on the committee. There were about 40 of them—the committee room was jammed; the reporters from City Hall press room, hearing there was to be a big show, hung from the rafters.

Actually the Tammany majority had openly and shamelessly sabotaged the hearing but it had not turned out as they expected. They had asked the head of the Fire Department to appear to refute the charges, hoping to whitewash the department in the absence of the firemen themselves. The chief came, along with other high-placed officials, but the Negro firemen were there, too, in force.

When the hearing began, a question from me drew a promise from the Fire Chief that there would be no reprisals against the firemen who testified. It was the custom of the city council to permit the mover of a resolution to conduct the hearings. But the majority would scarcely permit me to get a word in edgewise. They tried the pettiest of tricks to bar my participation, even to the point of claiming I wasn't impartial. Few people were fooled—least of all the Negro firemen. They took the stand one after another, revealing the details of the humiliating discrimination existing in the department.

The hearing was a success, even though the council subsequently smothered my resolution. The facts of discrimination got to the people—partly through the press—and a short while later the jim-crow bed system was abolished and other reforms were instituted. And there were no reprisals. The system of jim-crow did not come to an end, although it received a few good whacks through our action.

The Fire Department entered my life again later when I started my own investigation of the reason for so many fires in Harlem—more fires than in any other residential area. Then I found that there were fewer fire houses per population than in

any other area of the city. This accounted for the devastation wreaked by the fires—the sparsely distributed apparatus was too far away to get to the scene in time. I found that the engines took a longer time to arrive at fires in Harlem than they did in any other part of the city.

My investigation also showed that the business section and the exclusive residential areas, in addition to having a higher percentage of well-placed fire-fighting equipment, also had a system of double water outlets, whereas even single systems were scarce in Harlem. The council did not attempt to refute the facts, which were undeniable. Their answer revealed the most cynical disregard for human life I had ever heard. It hit me with such force that I shall never forget it—revealing how cheap the Negro's life was in their eyes. . . .

It was inevitable that a sense of frustration—of being fenced in—should occasionally arise in one who took seriously his membership in the council. The council was powerless to legislate on matters pertaining to the school system and to other areas of vital importance to the welfare of the people. Consequently, it was necessary to resort frequently to resolutions—which might cover subject-matter from a local parade to the biggest question of foreign policy. When Pete and I introduced such resolutions, they were dubbed “Communist propaganda”; when the Tammany councilmen introduced them, it was “American statesmanship.” Ours were usually defeated; theirs were almost invariably passed.

Nevertheless, after many bitter debates, four of my resolutions were passed during the latter part of my first term. There were two on FEPC, one urging the adoption of a national FEPC and the other urging adoption of a state FEPC. Another placed the city of New York on record as urging congress to pass a national anti-poll tax bill—a measure designed to enfranchise six million whites and four million Negroes in seven poll-tax states.

A fourth was passed early in 1945, at the height of the struggle to break down the iron curtain against Negroes in big league baseball. This movement had reached tremendous proportions in New York and, to a certain extent, throughout the country.

The trade union movement took it up in a big way and so did millions of white baseball fans and progressives. Many big league baseball players expressed support, thereby depriving the baseball magnates of the bogus contention that white players would not play on the same team with Negro players. This movement resulted in a nonpartisan citizens' committee, ranging all the way from La Guardia and O'Dwyer to myself.

We found that the baseball magnates were holding their annual meeting in New York at the Vanderbilt Hotel, and we greeted them with a big demonstration in front of the hotel, while an elected delegation went upstairs to wait on the magnates. I was one of the delegation of six, and Paul Robeson was another—voted by all of us to be our spokesman. No one had a better right to speak for American sports than he—he had been chosen on Walter Camp's All-American football team repeatedly; he had been a four-letter man at Rutgers; a semi-pro baseball, football and basketball star. Paul had fulfilled the aspirations of every American boy—white, as well as Negro.

Paul gave the baseball tycoons a lesson in American sportsmanship. They knew Paul spoke for a whole people and for millions of white baseball fans. But they were too shrewd to admit their own responsibility for the ban against Negro players. They hemmed and hawed about it being “difficult to find qualified Negro players,” and about “not pressing the issue too fast—it must be done gradually.” They used all the well-known clichés.

Paul easily demolished their arguments. His antagonists were conscious of the significance of the occasion. Baseball, the “great American pastime,” was on the spot. They finally told us they had no objection in principle and they would hire the first qualified Negro. Their concession was filled with ifs, ands and buts, and it did not quiet the protest. In the midst of the struggle, my resolution was introduced and, after some watering down to save the faces of the Yankee, Giant and Dodger owners, it passed.

Subsequently, the Dodgers purchased Jackie Robinson from a Negro ball club. A small reception was given for him in New York—attended by about 25 trade union, Negro, progressive and

Communist leaders. Paul and I were present. He commended Robeson for his contributions to the struggle and said a few kind words to me on the city council resolution which, he said, he had learned about on the West Coast. We were happy because we felt he was aware of the long struggle put up by his own people and by the labor and progressive movement to achieve this symbolic triumph. Alas, when the political atmosphere changed, so did Jackie Robinson. He soon forgot that it was the struggles of the people—his own, in the first place—that put him where he was.

Early in 1944, I was the recipient of several citations. One came to me on the national Negro History Week radio broadcast in January—as the first Negro Communist to become a member of an elected legislative body in the United States. A similar citation came from the *Pittsburgh Courier*. And later a citation at a *New Masses* banquet, where Charles Drew, the distinguished Negro scientist and surgeon, was also cited for his contributions to the development of the American blood bank during World War II—during which, incidentally, the blood of Negroes was segregated. I remember this occasion vividly, for it was the last time I saw or talked with Drew prior to his accidental death in 1951. We had been personal friends and had a strong respect for each other since our school days at Amherst, when we played side by side on the football team. His death was a tragic loss to science and society, and it affected me deeply.*

The years 1944-45 proved to be a fateful period for me in particular and for the American Communist movement in general. In the city council, Cacchione and I continued to press for progressive legislation and reforms of a democratic character. But soon the incorrect direction in which the party was moving cast its shadow over our council endeavors. Mistakes were made, some of them serious.

Nevertheless, it was a mixed period, in which certain reforms

*Efforts to obtain special permission to attend his funeral in Washington, D.C., were unavailing. The Federal District Court in New York would not temporarily relax my bail restrictions even for this purely personal feeling of sorrow over the death of a life-long friend.

were achieved and in which mistakes did not reveal themselves too glaringly. One of the most important of these reforms was the successful struggle for a New York State FEPC. The federal FEPC, established by President Roosevelt under pressure, had been so belabored, attacked and starved for funds that its effectiveness had been seriously hampered. As a result, there arose in dozens of states and localities demands for state FEPC's to supplement the national organization. Nowhere was this demand more insistent than in New York. Governor Dewey tried as long as he could to ignore it, but he was compelled to change his direction in midstream. He set up a commission of prominent citizens to investigate. The whole world knew that New York was riddled with discrimination, and this was obviously an empty gesture on Dewey's part. Set up in the latter part of 1943, the commission was to report to the state legislature in 1944. But the wily governor would not permit the commission to report in 1944, and the chance of passing the law was lost.

A storm of protest fell upon the governor's head. Members of the commission resigned publicly in disgust. It was no mystery why Dewey was temporizing with the FEPC issue. He was running for president, and at that moment he had his emissaries in the deep South lining up Southern Republican convention delegates. . . . Dewey went down to a smashing defeat. I doubt if he carried a Negro precinct in the whole North. The Negro voters of Harlem helped to bury him.

Nothing is more effective with a reactionary than a good beating at the hands of the people. Still running for president, Dewey changed his tactics. He maneuvered to make partisan capital out of the movement instead of bucking it. He contrived to take the play away from the Democrats, making his side-kick, Republican State Senator Irving Ives, the sponsor of the proposed FEPC law—known as the Ives-Quinn bill.

The hearing on this measure was conducted so that Dewey's friends were given first opportunity to speak. This was in order to give them the best press and also to keep to the end the most militant speakers—those who were most responsible for the measure. They hoped by then the crowd would be gone and that the

morning editions of the press would have gone to bed. But virtually the whole crowd stayed; trade-union, Negro and other militant forces demanded the right to be heard. The hearing lasted until late at night; it had begun at 10 AM that morning—it was a magnificent victory, after a struggle that lasted a year and a half.

While I spoke at the hearing, my main job had been to help others gather and organize the New York contingent. My councilmanic office was turned into an organizing center for the delegation. It was well disciplined and well prepared.

The incorrect policies that underlay certain aspects of my work in the city council were not so easily discernible in the waging of the FEPC struggle and other reforms for which we pressed in the city council. But in other instances it was not at all difficult to recognize.

There is no such thing as a politician without a line. It is either the people's line or the bosses' line. I, as a Communist, considered public office as an instrumentality for helping to effect the will of the working class—whose ultimate destination is the socialist transformation of society. My membership in the Communist Party and my Marxist convictions were not incidental to, but were the source of, my usefulness to the people who elected me. To discard them as bourgeois politicians shake off their campaign promises would be like cutting off my hand. When, therefore, I failed to adhere to my Marxist principles, I made many mistakes—of omission as well as commission. Of these, two were outstanding: the first, when I voted to support a sales tax levy—a tax always heaviest upon the working people; the second, when I voted to extend the term of city councilman from two to four years. A third mistake—not as fundamental as the first two—was my vote for the anti-discrimination housing law, in spite of the fact that it did not ban discrimination in Stuyvesant Town—which had been the main object of the Isaacs-Davis bill.

Opposition to sales taxes is a matter of principle for the working class—to a worker it constitutes a wage-cut. Mayor La Guardia had proposed the sales tax levy in 1944. The tax had

first been imposed during the depression, and proceeds were to be earmarked for relief purposes. Like most taxes on the poor, it had remained, even though it had been supposed to last only as long as the depression-relief emergency. Still other reasons were given for continuing the tax—the subway operating deficit, hospitals, schools, etc. The arguments were indeed persuasive, especially since the tug-o'-war between the city and the state on financial questions invariably left New York the short end of the stick.

As a matter of fact, when the vote came in the city council, Pete and I refused to vote for it. Whereupon, the majority refused to put the question to a vote, and a debate ensued. The majority leader declared that unless the minority—including the Communist members—took responsibility for the sales tax also, it would not be passed and the city would be left without adequate revenues. Cacchione and I refused to budge—Sharkey's bellowing was patently fraudulent. The council took a recess for an hour or more. Pete and I conferred together. Meanwhile, we were deluged with almost tearful pleas from the Mayor's spokesmen. It was an extraordinary procedure—none like it before and none since. Finally, Pete and I reasoned that since we were part of a broad coalition of forces, including the La Guardia administration, we should go along with the sales tax, even though we were opposed to it in principle. The council was recalled into session. We then voted "aye."

We thought we had been wrong, and were very anxious to discuss the matter with other party leaders. But, much to our surprise, they thought we had been wrong in delaying our vote so long. It later developed that the agreement of these comrades only signified that they, too, were injected with the same un-Marxist virus as we were. The truth is we were right the first time, and should never have changed our votes even if hell froze over.

Neither Pete nor I ever learned to like what we had done, but we consoled ourselves with the explanation that it fitted in with the "new line of the party." Little did we know at that time that it was precisely the new line of the party that was off the beam.

And this was the case with regard to the proposal to lengthen the term of city councilmen from two to four years. It was argued that the short term did not provide enough time to achieve substantial legislative programs. These contentions did not influence Cacchione and me. Yet we went along with the proposal. We had to find reasons of our own. We had no difficulty finding them in the "new line of the party." The reasoning was that we were now a part of a broad anti-fascist progressive coalition, whose political leader was Franklin D. Roosevelt and whose political instrument was the Democratic Party. If this was true on a national scale, why not on a municipal scale? The new line projected a long term of working-class collaboration and alliance with the Democratic Party. What better than dovetailing our own party's electoral activities with those of the local Democrats—thus eliminating the councilmanic fight against Tammany midway in the mayoralty term, and going along with them every four years, at the end of each mayoralty term.

The reasons for the four-year term proposal and the enthusiasm of the Democrats were scarcely to be found in the innocent arguments for it. It may be that La Guardia did intend to save campaign money by a joint ticket every four years, but the total sum was hardly worth mentioning. A four-year term meant two years more of gravy and graft; extending the term made the municipal government less responsive to the people. A weakness of the Charter was that it gave the council power to perpetuate itself in office without the people's having a say. The extension of a term could be accomplished by a simple majority vote of the councilmen.

My third lapse—with respect to the Isaacs-Davis bill—affected its main objective, the end of discrimination in Stuyvesant Town. If this had been accomplished, automatically it would have barred discrimination in all future housing. To be sure, the Democrats stole our bill and in doing so they left out its guts. That fact alone was sufficient for me to have refrained from supporting it—or, at the least, I should have refrained from voting. Again the influence of the new line reared its head. The measure—even without outlawing discrimination in Stuyvesant Town—

was progressive. And since the Democrats in the city council were the local voice of the political party with which we contemplated a long-term alliance, it followed that we should second the progressive measures they recommended. But this was form without content. It was not a vote for continued struggle—although the struggle did continue, including my own participation in it. It was primarily a vote of collaboration—if what was right couldn't be gotten, then go along with what could be gotten. This did not reflect a correct role for the independent party of the working class.

It goes almost without saying that none of these mistakes appeared as such at the time they were made. I had no intention of departing from the scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism. As a matter of fact, I thought I was upholding them. Further, a Communist does not oppose reforms obtained in the framework of capitalism. But in voting for the sales tax and the other measures, I had voted against the economic and democratic interests of the working class. This was objectively true—whatever my intentions and even though these votes conformed to the line of the party.

A word about the new line of the party, which had crystallized and congealed as the official line at the National Convention in May 1944. It was called the Teheran policy and was based upon a book by Earl Browder, presenting postwar domestic and international perspectives. Stripped of its pseudo-Marxist verbiage, the book was based upon a diplomatic document signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Teheran. From that meeting, it drew the erroneous conclusion that capitalism had overcome its inherent cyclical crises, that monopoly capitalism would grow gradually into socialism, that the trusts and monopolies of the United States would lead this country and the world into a warless, secure and prosperous life—without exploitation and oppression. Hence, a Communist Party was not necessary and was liquidated into an amorphous Communist Political Association. Its members were to join political parties; they would find their place preferably in the Democratic Party.

All this was, of course, total subservience to the capitalist class,

complete subordination to its bourgeois liberal wing, then under the leadership of F.D.R. Fortunately, our party was able to arrest this debacle before it reached its logical conclusion. Only Browder and a half-dozen others ended up in the swamp.

My individual responsibility could not be dismissed. I was not only a member of the council; I was also a party leader, and the Teheran line and perspective had been formulated with my participation. When at the May 1944 National Convention of the party, this policy was officially adopted, I not only voted for the policy but accepted full responsibility for carrying it out.

When Communists make mistakes, however, they disclose them, analyze them, seek their source, try to correct them and then establish guarantees against their recurrence. All of this is done publicly. This is the hallmark of a serious Marxist party and has no counterpart in any other political organization. Thus, the erroneous policy was exposed and discussed, and corrective guarantees were adopted in a special emergency party convention in July 1945. A fuller account of this period can be found in the documentary history contained in publications of the party and made available at the time. I will not dwell on it further in these pages, except to say that the struggle against the Teheran line was stubbornly and courageously conducted by William Z. Foster, and that, on the basis of Foster's polemic against Browder's book *Teheran*, Jacques Duclos, a French Communist leader wrote an article in the official organ of the French Communist Party demolishing the Browder line.

The false character of the Teheran line is implicit today, as American monopoly capitalism leads the world toward catastrophic war, keeping its productive machine from cyclical collapse by prodigious war expenditures—with the blood of Americans and Asians. . . .

My first term in the council ended December 31, 1945. The election for the next term, however, took place a month earlier. The Negro Labor Victory Committee in Harlem, which had played a decisive rôle in unifying the Negro masses in support of the war against Hitlerism, was the core of the Negro-labor-

progressive coalition. Backing my candidacy, it sent an open letter to the Democratic and Republican parties demanding that they both give me the councilmanic designation as the overwhelming choice of the community. Soon afterwards I received word from Tammany Hall that it was considering naming me as the Democratic Party candidate from Harlem. I knew of the request of the Negro Labor Committee and its wide influence among the Negro people but, for a thousand-and-one reasons, I did not consider that a Democratic nomination was possible for me.

Nevertheless, at a subsequent conference with several Democratic County leaders, I realized that the proposed designation was serious. It was agreed that I would register as a Democrat, that I would retain my Marxist convictions and affiliations, and that I would receive the Democratic designation. I confess I felt a bit strange at first, even though this was in line with the Teheran perspective of the party. Since I was at that time a member of the Communist Political Association, which was non-partisan and not a political party, I not only could join another political party, it was my duty to do so—especially since the Democratic Party was the main political instrument of the Roosevelt coalition. I registered Democratic.

At a rally at the Golden Gate, where my candidacy was projected, the Democratic Party County Committee announced that it had accorded me its designation and I made a few remarks of acceptance. It was the worst speech I had ever made. It was obvious to me—if not to the filled auditorium—that I was not ideologically adjusted to the change. The applause of the audience was desultory. It was as if my neighbors and co-workers in Harlem did not know whether to laugh or to cry, to be happy or to mourn. Actually it was a time to weep—not over me, but over the fact that the Communists were lowering their colors.

This ceremony occurred on a Sunday; the next morning scare headlines appeared in the papers. The majority, led by the *Heart* and *Scripps-Howard* publications, screamed, "Democratic nomination to Red." For ten days the radio commentators and the press screamed as if the revolution had come. The

Democratic majority in the city council was stunned. One could hear the taunts from the Republicans and other minority members: "So now Davis, the Communist, is a member of the majority. When is he moving over to your side?" The Democrats said nothing. I, in the middle, enjoyed their short-lived discomfiture. For a brief interlude they were on the receiving end of red-baiting.

Soon the press and the die-hard political leaders were joined in their hysteria by "50th Street"—the headquarters of the Catholic hierarchy. What was the godly Democratic Party coming to, they screamed, giving its hallowed designation to a godless, Moscow-serving Communist? The reporters were chasing me around, insisting on statements of one sort or another. I escaped them and blandly ignored the press. When the time came to speak, I would do so in no uncertain terms.

Finally, the issue, which began to overshadow all others in the pre-election jockeying, could no longer be sidestepped by William O'Dwyer—whose lifelong ambition it was to become mayor. He was about to be the unanimous choice of the Democratic machines in the five boroughs, when along came this Communist issue. The worst part of it was that he wasn't in a clash with me or the Communists—he was in a head-on tussle with the Manhattan Tammany section of his own party, which had designated me. That he didn't like. And I wouldn't oblige him, or pull his chestnuts out of the fire by entering the fray. I played it cool. Let the Democrats fight it out among themselves. In a sense, Tammany had made one decent nomination in its modern history; unaccustomed to this, it was about to wreck the party and Mr. O'Dwyer's ambitions.

About nine days, the papers began to hint of special conferences between O'Dwyer and Spellman at 50th Street. Two days later the papers carried the story that O'Dwyer was under terrific pressure. On the one hand, he needed the left-wing, trade union and Negro sectors of the coalition and did not want to offend them by denouncing my nomination. On the other hand, he did not wish to offend the old-line clerical-fascist wing of the Democratic Party—the Jim Farleys, Spellmans, and Hearst-Roy

Howard papers. What to do? O'Dwyer must have had some sleepless nights communing with the infinite.

Finally he came out of it. The power of 50th Street, of the monopoly press, of the ultra-reactionaries who dominated the Tammany machine was too much for him. He capitulated. The papers published the story: O'Dwyer had laid down an ultimatum to Tammany Hall; either it withdrew my nomination or he wouldn't run. It didn't take Tammany long to decide what to do—with the whole pro-fascist pack on its heels; it withdrew my nomination.

But this, too, had to be done skillfully or else Tammany would run pell-mell into a resentful Harlem, into a disillusioned Negro population throughout the city. Now it had to figure out a way of withdrawing the nomination from the "overwhelming choice" of only a few days ago. It declared that since I had reaffirmed my Communist convictions publicly after receiving the nomination, the Democratic designation had been withdrawn. The tempest in a teapot was over.

The howlers for blood, however, did not stop there. Once the Democratic designation was withdrawn from me, they demanded that Tammany put another Negro in the race to defeat me. Otherwise, they said the Democrats would be assumed to be secretly supporting me. And Tammany complied. Thus, in the space of two weeks I had run the gauntlet from the "overwhelming choice" to one who must be defeated at all costs. To accomplish this task, the Tammany committee designated Ruth Whitehead Whaley, a Negro woman whose sole qualification was that she had won some elocution prizes many years before. Actually, she was still in a deep sleep, politically speaking. Needless to say, Mrs. Whaley was snowed under.

This whole episode had occurred early in the corrective and self-critical process taking place in the party. I was so occupied in this all-decisive process that all of my political activities became somewhat disoriented. However, it did not take me and other party leaders long to recognize that I had been off the beam. The brief flirtation with Tammany was, and will forever remain, a nightmare. This underestimation of the influence and

strength of monopoly capital is the biggest and most serious I had ever committed. It is not altogether surprising that this kind of error happens. It grows out of the tendency to revert to the fallacious theory of "American exceptionalism"—that American capitalism is different, stronger, above the laws of social development.

My second term in the City Council was to be a stormy one. Mayor LaGuardia said as much when he swore me in for the second time. "Davis," he said, after administering the oath of office, "you're going to have tough sledding this time."

"Communists prepare for all eventualities," I answered. He smiled. It is quite possible that we had entirely different things in our minds. I had in mind the correction of our party's policy at the Emergency National Convention in July, six months before I was sworn in. I knew that with the re-constitution of the party as the independent political party of the working class on sound Marxist-Leninist principles under William Z. Foster's leadership there was no ground for unrealistic expectations. And I was prepared. I had learned from the personal experience I had had with the Tammany Democrats. In this sense, Pete and I were prepared for the worst, though never ceasing to work for the best.

Incidentally, Mayor La Guardia, who kept abreast of the Communist Party's policy on current issues, called me to his office one day to give him the "low-down" on the meaning of our Emergency Party Convention. I started to explain, but there were so many interruptions that we didn't finish. He never got around to it again before he left office.

I could have told him that our organization had been re-established as the independent political party of the working class. It was this historic step which enabled the Communists and those who respected them to stand for peace and democracy against the howling storms of war incitement and reaction which struck the country in the dark years that followed. In the process, I had learned a qualitatively new approach to Marxist theory and activity—which would improve my ability to serve the people as a member of the city council of New York.

DEATH OF MY FATHER

Late in October 1945, two weeks before election day, my father died. It was a blow such as I had not sustained since the death of my mother in 1932. My grief was only partially cushioned by my absorption in the election campaign.

My father died in Harlem Hospital, of cancer complicated by a severe heart ailment. He was close to 75 and the suffering he endured carried him away because his weak heart could not stand the debilitating process of the other dread disease.

I had seen him only a few hours before he died, thinking there was a chance he could live a while longer. He had said: "Son, I hope I can stay alive until you're re-elected, but it's going to be hard to do it." These were his last words to me.

I had never seen my father in such a weakened state—his voice was scarcely audible. I had known him only as a strong personality with an iron constitution, and a powerful voice.


His funeral took place in Atlanta, in Friendship Baptist Church, where he was a deacon and where 14 years earlier my mother was a member of the choir. He was buried beside my mother in Southview Cemetery in the family plot. My sister and I attended the funeral. I dropped everything and left the campaign to the party.

After his first heart attack in 1944, my sister and I tried to get him to live in New York with us, but he would have none of it. He would not move his home because Atlanta was the scene of the most fruitful part of his life—and some of the most stinging, bitter defeats. He lived alone with his memories, in sight of many of the monuments which he had helped to erect. There were a few old friends, the intangible ties with the past that bound him to a social and political setting that was rapidly disappearing. The changes that had taken place during the

On Organizing the Masses n 1

ELECTORAL POLITICS: ITS PROBLEMS & PROSPECTS

by Bill Epton



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On Organizing The Masses, #1

ELECTORAL POLITICS: ITS PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

—Bill Epton—

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Good Morning, Revolution

Good morning, revolution:

You're the very best friend
I ever had.

We gonna pal around together from now on.

Say, listen, Revolution:

You know, the boss where I used to work,
The guy that gimme the air to cut down expenses,
He wrote a long letter to the papers about you:
Said you was a trouble maker, a alien-enemy,
In other words a son-of-a-bitch.
He called up the police
And told 'em to watch out for a guy
Named Revolution.

You see,

The boss knows you're my friend.
He sees us hangin' out together.
He knows we're hungry, and ragged,
And ain't got a damn thing in this world—
And are gonna do something about it.

The boss's got all he needs, certainly,
Eats swell,
Owns a lotta houses,
Goes vacationin',
Breaks strikes,
Runs politics, bribes police,
Pays off congress,
And struts all over the earth—

But me, I ain't never had enough to eat.
Me, I ain't never been warm in winter.
Me, I ain't never known security—
All my life, been livin' hand to mouth,
Hand to mouth.

Listen, Revolution,

We're buddies, see—

Together,

We can take everything:

Factories, arsenals, houses, ships,

Railroads, forests, fields, orchards,

Bus lines, telegraphs, radios,

(Jesus! Raise hell with radios!)

Steel mills, coal mines, oil wells, gas,

All the tools of production,

(Great day in the morning!)

Everything—

And turn 'em over to the people who work.

Rule and run 'em for us people who work.

Boy! Them radios—

Broadcasting that very first morning to USSR:

Another member the International Soviet's done come

Greetings to the Socialist Soviet Republics

Hey you rising workers everywhere greetings

And we'll sign it: Germany

Sign it: China

Sign it: Africa

Sign it: Poland

Sign it: Italy

Sign it: America

Sign it with my one name: Worker

On that day when no one will be hungry, cold, oppressed,

Anywhere in the world again.

That's our job!

I been starvin' too long,

Ain't you?

Let's go, Revolution!

Langston Hughes (1932)

TOWARDS CLARITY AROUND ELECTORAL ACTION

The massive struggle to register voters in Philadelphia and the eventual electoral defeat of Frank Rizzo by those hundreds of thousands of people (primarily black) who did register and then voted against his attempt to amend the city charter to allow himself to run for a third term has once again raised the question of what position does the black radical movement take towards electoral politics. But even more pointedly, in New York a significant campaign was mounted to recall Ed Koch, the openly racist and anti-working class Mayor. Conversely, the drive to register voters to support Judge Bruce Wright for the Civil Court of N.Y. (Judge Bruce Wright won national fame as "cut 'em loose Bruce" because he refused to use bail as a punitive weapon against poor defendants. Because of his stance he has been under constant attack by New York's fascist police department and by Mayor Koch) was successful in that he was elected.

The question then arises: do we tell the victimized black and white working class population of Philadelphia, "Don't Vote-Organize", when, in fact, the registering and voting process was an organizing tool? And, in New York, do we tell the union movement, the black and hispanic workers and the white workers that they are "dupes" of the ruling class if they organize and mobilize their ranks to defeat Koch as the representative of the ruling class? Again, do we lecture the black people of New York not to support Judge Bruce Wright at this level of struggle?

Has the radical movement committed a sin if they register to vote and urge others to cast their ballot against a Rizzo and a Koch and for Bruce Wright? Should the electoral process be condemned and boycotted when the working class and its allies have an opportunity to raise a campaign and present issues while organizing and struggling to gain positions and influence on school boards, P.T.A.'s, shop committees, union positions, etc.? Has the working class been betrayed? Has any fundamental principle been violated? Let's examine the question.

Lenin, in a "Speech on Parliamentarism" has succinctly laid the theoretical framework on how Marxists should view doing electoral work. In this polemic against an Italian Marxist who was opposed to parliamentary action Lenin stated:

There are backward elements of the working class in all capitalist countries, and these elements are convinced that parliament is the true representative of the people; they do not see that dishonest methods are used in it. It is said that parliament is an instrument with which the bourgeoisie deceives the masses. This argument should be turned against you, and it is turned against your theses. How will you reveal

to the backward masses who are deceived by the bourgeoisie the real character of parliament? How will you expose any particular party, if you are not in parliament, if you remain outside of parliament? If you are Marxists you must admit that there is a close connection between the relations of classes in capitalist society and the relations of parties. I repeat: How will you prove all this if you are not members of parliament, if you repudiate parliamentary action? The history of the Russian revolution has proved that the broad masses of the working class, of the peasantry, and the minor office employees, cannot be convinced by arguments if they are not convinced by their own experience.

(V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. X, p. 245. "SPEECH ON PARLIAMENTARISM", Delivered at the Second Congress of the Communist International, August 2, 1920)

Here, Lenin was speaking of a situation where most of the class and interest groups elected and had representatives in Parliament including the Communists during the bourgeois democratic stage of the Russian revolution. In the U.S. the ruling class fights in every way to guarantee that only *one* class and interest group is represented in its various legislative bodies even though it has hoodwinked the working class into believing the Democratic Party *is its Party*.

Because the ruling class has created this deception and established these rules does not mean that we are bound by them. If we do not believe the Democratic party is the party of the black, hispanic and other workers then let's not only say it but let's prove it by demonstrating in action with the masses and in the various legislative bodies. It is this fear of exposure that moves the ruling class to stop at nothing to prevent progressives and radicals from participating in their legislative bodies and it is the radicals' immaturity on this question that makes it easy for them to do this.

Evidently the question of electoral action is not "new". It may only be "new" to some "infantile leftists" who have not done their theoretical homework and who glorify in being isolated from the struggles of the masses. Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin have given clear examples of how this tactical form of struggle can be used and it is only those that "...argue like doctrinaire revolutionaries who have never taken part in a real revolution, or have never deeply pondered over the history of revolutions, or naively mistake the subjective 'rejection' of a certain reactionary institution for its actual destruction by the united forces of a whole series of objective factors" who hold back this form of mass struggle and who are "confused". (Lenin Vol. X, p. 103, "Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder").



RULING CLASS NOT ALWAYS UNITED


Can we tell the working class, in general, and the black section, in particular, that it is not in their fundamental interest to organize to defeat a Rizzo or a Koch? And what do we say about Proposition 13-type legislation? Is our response that electoral politics is a fraud, that it diverts the attention of the working class away from the main struggle; that what difference does it make anyway whether you vote or not, the ruling class ultimately retains all of the power in its hands? We offer that none of these responses is a clear scientific explanation of how and why this process is operating. In fact, it is a cop-out for not seriously studying this question.

What would have happened in California if a well organized and unified left launched a massive campaign to educate and politicize the people about the class content of Proposition 13; the role of the real estate interest; the opportunism of Jerry Brown; the necessity to mobilize the working class to defeat it and even more—to put forth its own proposition on the ballot that would speak to its own class interest? In addition, because of our theoretical and organizational weakness, the ruling class is able at every turn to exploit the differences in the ranks of progressive forces and adopt an endless array of reactionary legislative measures in its interest and against the working class. And because we are removed from this important arena of struggle we are not able to draw the proper lessons from these struggles to educate and to further advance the consciousness of the working class. So, the working class by default is left to be manipulated by the ruling class. On the other hand, our theoretical and organizational weaknesses also express themselves in our inability to exploit the differences among various sections of the ruling class. It is obvious that not all sections of the ruling class were united in support of Rizzo or Proposition 13. There were major breaks in their ranks and it appears that the Black United Front in Philadelphia and its allies took advantage of it. The same would apply in New York around Koch and other local politicians.

There are probably some sections of the ruling class that find Koch an embarrassment. They view his open brand of racism and anti-union activities rapidly reducing their options for dealing with the black community and the unions. They are dissatisfied because he is bringing together forces in the black community who could have easily been kept disunited. He is exposing the ruling class much the same way that Nixon and Rizzo did. Well, how do we exploit these differences? How do we unite the Black, Hispanic, trade union, poor white and the liberal and progressive communities in a campaign against Koch and his policies and also educate, politicize and advance their consciousness? How do we demonstrate to them clearly that he and the policies that he is pursuing are against their most fundamental interests? The campaign to oust Koch also gives us the opportunity to once again point out the class question in its most basic form because even the most rabid nationalist will find it

difficult to justify the role that Herman Badillo and Haskell Ward played. The left can clearly point out the class nature of the struggle and that it transcends race and nationality, even though both are used by the ruling class in a divisive way. Presently there are thousands of black, Hispanic and white workers involved in this struggle and the question for us is whether we join the struggle and concretely demonstrate our anti-racist positions or do we remain outside of the struggle, isolated from the people, perched on the rooftop yelling down to them, "Don't Vote—Organize"?

These campaigns are conducted not only by registering voters but also by putting out literature that explains the class nature of the struggle, what are short term and long term solutions, that there will be small and large mobilizations of the masses into demonstrations and rallies, that there will be various levels of confrontations with the ruling class, that the working class will be constantly educated and agitated to understand that the ruling class is limited in the level of concessions it can make, that as we press them they will increasingly resort to more and more violence against us and that we must respond in kind. We can make these electoral struggles another classroom in educating and preparing the people for the seizure of power. The arena of struggle should be viewed as another front that the working class opens up in our war against the U.S. capitalist system. *Why should we allow them to be the sole occupants of this battlefield and we do not come out to challenge them?*



APATHY AMONG THE PEOPLE


One may advance the argument, why are we proposing engaging in electoral struggles at this time when the people are "rejecting" it; when a little better than 50 percent of the eligible voters are casting their ballots—the lowest in all of the bourgeois democracies. In fact, the average turnout for elections in this country is about 40 percent and in Washington, D.C., with a 75 percent black population only 11 percent of the eligible voters cast their ballots in the 1976 Democratic primary election.

This same steady decline in voter participation and activity can be witnessed in the Trade unions.

Increasingly it is almost impossible for unions to garner a quorum to conduct their business and it is rare indeed when 50 percent of the membership turns out to vote in their internal elections or to vote on contracts. For example, the New York State Civil Service Employees Association, with an eligible voting membership of 185,000, just completed elections for officers. Only 39,108 members saw fit to cast their ballots—less than 25 percent! The reactionary union leadership, who are extremely satisfied with this state of affairs (an apathetic and unaroused membership offer no threat to them), stated that "the low voter participation was more or less a traditional indicator that the membership was satisfied with the current union leadership." What bull!

And all indications point to the fact that unless the ruling class makes some major adjustments or the working class fully assaults this structure the percentage voting will continue to decline. (The ruling class did make one adjustment to overcome the crisis and apathy among the voters by reducing the voting age to 18 from 21 but even this adjustment has not significantly halted the steady decline in the percentage of people voting. The apathy is not necessarily a good thing without an active and militant left because, as has already happened, the right-wing has been able to mobilize their forces and some sections of the masses to press for "adjustments" in the system to "make it work", i.e. further moves to the right.) There's no mystery to this. The right-wing in this country read and analysed these statistics and they understand that if they mobilize their forces in certain areas they can have a significant impact on who gets elected. But it is not only the *who* but what are the *issues* they get elected on. The radicals can do the same kind of mobilizing and concentrating of its forces at the weak points in the bourgeois system and crack it. It is at this point if the radical movement is successful that the ruling class will change the rules to prevent the left from running or winning. Witness the elections campaigns of Ben Davis, a black Communist Party leader of the 1940's-1950's.

In the mid-1940's he ran and won a seat on the New York City Council. In order for the ruling class to defeat him in the 1950 elections they changed the entire electoral system in New York from proportional representation (this gives minority parties representation in proportion to their popular vote) to the current system and ran a black candidate against him who ran on the Republican, Democratic and Liberal ticket. This would have been an excellent opportunity for the "C" PUSA ("Communist" Party) at that time to fully expose the ruling class, to educate and further politicize the masses and explain to them that to prevent this kind of fraudulent behavior, the organized people must overthrow this system and set up a people's government. But, of course, this did not happen because the "C" PUSA then, like now, was essentially reformist and viewed this as just a "flaw" in the bourgeois-democratic system. Similarly when I ran for State Senator in the 31st Senatorial District as the candidate for the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) in Harlem in 1965 the ruling class admittedly sabotaged the voting machines in those districts where they knew I would draw a large vote. The PLP was not politically mature enough for us to take advantage of this chink in the ruling classes' armor and expose them to the people and help the working class in Harlem—and the city in general—to draw the proper lessons from this charade of democracy. There are numerous other examples where the radical movement was on the threshold of conducting significant electoral struggles in this country only to let them slip away by not knowing how to capitalize on the situation.



Unable to develop its ideological foundation and sustain itself in the midst of racism and repression, in 1966 the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was not in a position to help Alabama Blacks put progressive candidates into office.

SOME PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS IN THE PAST

Radicals and progressives have conducted election campaigns around particular issues and, at times, have met with limited success but we have always disbanded after the campaign and did not consolidate our gains or the constituencies that were developed. We almost never continued our unrelenting pursuit of and attacks on the programs and policies of our opposition beyond the campaign so if we decided to pursue an electoral policy the next year or some other time afterwards we had to start from scratch. One of the recent examples of this policy was the "Peace and Freedom Party" electoral campaign in California during 1968 where the basically white anti-war movement and the Black Panther Party united to run candidates. Even though they were not tremendously successful in terms of the percentage of votes cast for them they did put the war and the Black Liberation struggle on the top of the agenda. And it must be said that this campaign played a significant role in bringing these two particular questions to the forefront of the minds of many Californians, and others around the country who followed those events. So the percentage of the votes in no way was a clear indication of the overall effect this campaign had.

One can speculate as to what would have happened if the progressive forces in California were mature enough to maintain and build that unity (in the face of the attacks by the ruling class on the Panthers in order to break that unity, which they eventually did) over the last decade and had the theoretical and organizational capabilities to take on Proposition 13? But the "Peace and Freedom Party" for all intent and purpose collapsed once the electoral campaign was over, although some efforts were made to hold it together. In a similar fashion in New York, under the leadership of the then "progressive" PLP a petition campaign was launched to include a referendum on the New York City ballot to prevent any draftee from New York city from going to Vietnam. Nearly 300,000 signatures were gathered on those petitions and the Corporation Council for the City of New York ruled that it could not be put on the ballot because it was not a "referendable" item.

The issue here is that aside from its propaganda and agitational value if the referendum were placed on the ballot the left would have to organize and mobilize the people to vote for it. Not *only* to vote for it but to *actively* register the people so they would be able to cast their ballot for the referendum. This demonstrated, without a doubt, a tactical method where the working class could take advantage of the bourgeois electoral process. The lessons to be learned from this experience are that the PLP and the forces who were united with it around this campaign did not make serious attempts to follow-up and pursue this issue beyond the courts. This did not

speaking to the failure of the electoral process as a tactical weapon but it speaks to the ideological immaturity of the PLP in particular and the left in general. There are numerous other examples that occurred all over the country during the 60's primarily around the anti-war and black liberation struggles.



THE QUESTION OF THE SLOGAN "DON'T VOTE—ORGANIZE!"


The left has neither demonstrated nor proven to the masses that electoral politics has not served their interests and, therefore, this form of struggle should be boycotted. On the contrary it has been the inability of the ruling class to maintain this charade in its present form and to hold the interest of the masses that accounts for the decline in the participation of the people in the electoral process. (We must keep in mind that a 50% turnout is approximately 90 million people!) Thus, the masses have not learned a revolutionary lesson by this "failure" of the electoral process. They do not challenge the "electoral system" as a method to achieve some degree of achievement. They attribute the "failure" of the electoral system to the lack of "good honest men" in leadership. Their most common statement is that they will withhold their vote until "there is someone worth voting for". There is no question that if the ruling class carefully nurtures a "popular" candidate in a given election that the working class would probably turn out in large numbers to vote for and support that person. Why not? Has the left given the working class a clear alternative political line, candidate or program other than the worn out, empty, non-analytical and un-dialectical slogan, "Don't Vote—Organize"?

"Don't Vote" for whom or what? Don't vote against Rizzo? Don't vote against Koch? Don't vote against Proposition 13? Don't vote for Bruce Wright? Don't vote for progressive candidates on PTA and school boards? Don't vote for radical shop stewards, delegates or union officials? Who's to "organize"? "Organize" for what? "Organize" against whom? And it goes on and on.

The entire electoral process has been in the hands of the ruling class and it's because of their arrogance and contempt for the people (can it be any other way?) and the crisis in the capitalist system that this process is in crisis. The crisis did not come about because the left was involved in the process and exposed it from within to the masses as a fraud. The crisis did not occur because the political consciousness of the masses was raised to the level where they understood that the two-party system was no more than a clever ruse to give them the illusion that two distinct parties existed that had different ideologies. The masses have not learned political lessons from this crisis. In fact, because of the low level of political consciousness of the people, withdrawing from the electoral process can also be taken as another step backwards for them politically.

But one will surely hear the argument that the crisis itself is a lesson and since this crisis has been developing since World War Two, the working class is clear in what it is doing. Of course this is just another case of "infantile" reasoning, of not doing proper

political analysis and work among the masses. This argument presupposes that this spontaneous behavior among the people with very little input from progressive and radical forces and without an alternative solution will have a lasting and deep rooted effect. Just like the ruling class has been able to manipulate the masses and sink into this crisis with very little interference from the left so will it be able to solve its current crisis and continue to manipulate the masses. The only guarantee that this will not continue to happen is for the left to enter this arena of struggle, open up this festering sore for all to see and smell, attack it and, more important, also learn to manipulate the process in order to further expose it. This is the *only* way the masses can continually engage in an on-going learning process, internalize the lessons they will learn and become more politicized as to the nature and limits of bourgeois democracy. This is how we work with and educate the masses—not by encouraging them to boycott the very institutions that exercise a major influence and control over their lives, i.e., trade unions, local community organizations, school boards, various elected positions, etc.



THE ROLE OF RADICALS IN ELECTORAL STRUGGLE

In a recent publication of a respected Marxist-Leninist organization that is involved in on-going mass work we find the following analysis:

Badillo and other associates, in carrying out campaigns in the Puerto Rican communities in favor of voter registration for bourgeois political parties distract and divert the attention of this community from the fundamental problems that effect them daily and from their solutions. They distract and divert their attention, creating the false illusion that the elections will solve the serious problems of health, housing, unemployment, and education that confront the workers and those of oppressed minorities in particular. If the solution were what the 'political lords' propose, then why does Mayor Koch threaten municipal hospital closings in the black and Hispanic communities? How do we explain that, while 40% of our young people are unemployed, Koch and President Carter reduce employment programs for youth by 80%. It is clear that Puerto Ricans and other minorities can expect nothing from the bourgeois parties nor from politicians that serve their interests.

So right! The Puerto Ricans, other minorities and the working class in general can expect nothing but lies and deception from the bourgeois parties and from bourgeois politicians that serve the interest of the ruling class. And yes, Herman Badillo *is supposed* to try to mobilize the Puerto Rican communities to support the bourgeois parties—he would not be a bourgeois politician if he did not attempt to “distract and divert the attention of this community from the fundamental problems that affect them daily and from their solutions”. But what about the role of the radical movement?

Is there any role within that process for it to champion the cause of the masses and rivet their attention on the problems and offer solutions? And if a call is made to “. . .struggle to defend democratic rights in the areas of health, housing, education, and employment. . .” then what prevents us from using the bourgeois democratic electoral process to “defend” these democratic rights? What we are addressing here is the fact that many left groups are engaged in daily struggles in many areas for the democratic rights of the people using every conceivable bourgeois democratic weapon that they can find—and many times coming up with clever methods to manipulate the “system”. And yet, when some of them are approached with the concept of electoral struggle they look incredulously and say that that is a “sellout position”, “it diverts the attention of the working class”, “it creates false illusions”, “that’s a waste, we should organize”, and “haven’t you read the papers, the lower voter turnout proves that the working class is boycotting the elections”, etc. In dealing with this question Lenin, in his time, made the following observation in reply to some German “Lefts” who stated that “. . .parliamentary forms of struggle. . . have become historically and politically obsolete. . .”:

PARLIAMENTARIANISM

Parliamentarianism has become “historically obsolete”. This is true as regards propaganda. But everyone knows that it is still very far from the *practical* overcoming of parliamentarianism. Capitalism could have been rightly declared to be “historically obsolete” many decades ago, but this does not in the least remove the need for a very long and very persistent struggle *on the soil* of capitalism. Parliamentarianism is “historically obsolete” from the standpoint of *world history*, that is to say, the *epoch* of bourgeois parliamentarianism has come to an end and the *epoch* of proletarian dictatorship has *begun*. This is incontestable. But in dealing with world *history* one counts in decades. Ten or twenty years sooner or later makes no difference when measured by the scale of world history; from the point of view of world history it is a trifle that cannot be calculated even approximately. But this is precisely why it is a crying theoretical mistake to measure questions of practical politics with the scale of world history.

“Is parliamentarianism ‘politically obsolete’? This is quite another matter.” “Clearly, the “Lefts” in Germany have mistaken *their desire*, their ideological-political attitude, for objective reality. This is the most dangerous mistake revolutionaries can make. In Russia—where the extremely fierce and savage yoke of tsarism, for a particularly long period, and in particularly varied forms, produced revolutionaries of diverse shades, revolutionaries who displayed astonishing devotion, enthusiasm, heroism and will power—we watched this mistake of the revolutionaries particularly familiar with it, and hence, we can see it with particular clearness in others. For the Communists in Germany parliamentarianism is, of course, “politically obsolete”; but—and this is the whole point—we must *not* regard what is obsolete *for us* as being obsolete for the class, as being obsolete *for the masses*. It is precisely here that we see that the “Lefts” do not know how to reason, do not know how to conduct themselves as a party of the *class*, as a party of the *masses*. You must not sink to the level of the masses, to the level of the backward strata of the class. This is incontestable. You must tell them the bitter truth. You must call their bourgeois-democratic and parliamentary prejudices—prejudices. But, at the same time, you must *soberly* observe the *actual* state of class consciousness and preparedness of the whole class (not only of the Communist vanguard), of all the toiling masses (not only of its advanced elements).

(Lenin, Vol. X, P. 97, 99) (emphasis in original)

We quote Lenin at length here because many would-be “left” groups have over the years mis-quoted and taken out of context Marx and Lenin on this question. They often quote Marx as stating that the right to vote for Parliament is the right to choose once every several years which member of the ruling class will misrepresent the people and Lenin as stating that the struggle between contending bourgeois parties is a struggle for the “spoils of office.” After taking these quotes out of context they then conclude that the masses should abandon parliamentary struggle. What is the truth of the matter?

First of all, Marx, Lenin and Stalin *never* described bourgeois

parliaments as institutions where the working class and the masses of the people could ultimately resolve their contradictions with the reactionary ruling class. But what they all did say, which our "Lefts" of today try in every way to obscure, and is embodied in this statement by Lenin is that "to express one's 'revolutionariness' solely by hurling abuse at parliamentary opportunism, solely by repudiating participation in parliaments, is very easy; but, just because it is too easy, it is not the solution for a difficult, a very difficult, problem." (Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. X, p. 105) And further, in discussing some of the ways good leadership can be developed and tested he singles out the "parliamentary arena" as an important one. He then suggests that "criticism—the sharpest, most ruthless, uncompromising criticism—must be directed, not against parliamentarianism or parliamentary action, but against those leaders who are unable—and still more against those who are *unwilling*—to utilize parliamentary elections and the parliamentary tribune in a revolutionary manner, in a communist manner." (Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. X, p. 106)


Furthermore, is there any bourgeois institution that affects the lives and well being of the masses and in which the masses are involved that we will not penetrate, undermine and exploit the contradictions within it? And, why should *all* radical political candidates declare that they are "radical"? Did those people who went into the armed service during the Vietnam war openly declare to the ruling class that they were going in to disrupt and to organize against U.S. imperialism in one of its most hallowed institutions?

In the U.S. today there are many areas where successful electoral actions can be taken by progressives and radicals ("successful" can be taken to mean raising the political consciousness of the masses up to and including "winning" elections). The key questions in these actions is to run our own candidates around a working class program that clearly spells out to the working class how we view the issues and how we will fight around these issues in their class interest. This does not mean that we operate in the opportunist manner of the "C" PUSA, the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and various and sundry other opportunist sects who run candidates on programs that are barely distinguishable from those of the two bourgeois parties or who many times support the "lesser of two evils" candidates. No radical group has the right to initiate or join electoral struggles without first making a concrete analysis of the class forces at work around the issues; determining objectively who are the friends and the enemies of the people; analysing every aspect of the local situation; putting the electoral action in its proper context within the general framework of the group's program; having a general perspective of what the group's overall goals are and realistically assessing one's own strengths and weaknesses. Only after this analysis has been made can a radical group consider entering into electoral action!


There has been a history, due to the lack of this analysis, of the

left jumping into electoral campaigns and coalitions with all kinds of renegades, opportunists, right-wingers and anti-working class elements—in many cases just to have something to do! They jump from one struggle to the next—wherever the masses rise up spontaneously; from one politician to the next whenever they utter a progressive statement. They have no concept of long range building and digging in among the masses for the long haul. This right opportunism under all kinds of left covers has a history of running rampant among the left in this country. Usually it's the groups that have the "hardest" line on the concept of electoral struggle that have the most right opportunist line in their practice.

We have to assess where we can best mobilize our forces to launch concentrated attacks where the bourgeoisie is weak and where they can be defeated in one or two (or three or more) election campaigns. In fact, it would be a crime against the people if we had popular radical leaders who had broad support among the masses that we could enter into electoral action and we did not. But we should be careful that those people who we run for various posts should have a proven record of consistently fighting for the people's interest and are not "fly-by-night" militants or radicals who suddenly appear on the scene and tomorrow they're gone. We saw thousands of them who were swept into the mass struggles of the 1960's and disappeared when that particular struggle went into an "ebb".



We view electoral action as being just one tactical part, not the primary part, of an overall revolutionary strategy of confronting, challenging and defeating the ruling class. It is part and parcel of the ongoing political education and ideological advancement of the working class and the general masses. We stand opposed to the working class or the radical movement forming electoral parties solely for the purpose of electing people to various offices. Likewise we view with skepticism the concept of radical candidates engaging in electoral actions around single issues.




Single issues have historically attracted and sparked actions among the petty-bourgeois, i.e., "Ban the Bomb", "U.S. Out of Vietnam", (as opposed to linking that struggle to the liberation of the U.S. working class), "No Nukes", etc. It is our duty to show the working class how all of the problems it confronts daily are all connected and can be traced to one source, and it is only when the source of its problems is eliminated and, in the process of elimination, the power of the working class will grow and mature until it achieves its liberation. It is quite simple for the petty bourgeois to raise the slogan "No Nukes" and completely ignore the racism of U.S. imperialism, its attacks on the working class, its world-wide imperialist adventures, etc. But this is not the case for the working class.

As important as the anti-nuclear struggle is, the working class is completely enmeshed in the daily battle to ward off all kinds of present and real attacks being leveled against it by the ruling class. Thus the working class cannot isolate a particular issue—correctly so—and we have to understand their consciousness on this question and develop our electoral actions accordingly.

The people must also build into their party or organization an ideological, political and organizational structure where they can effectively recall their candidates if the candidates break with the platform or political line of the party or organization. The candidate must be completely subordinated to the control and direction of the party or organization. All radical political candidates for whatever office run for and occupy an "organizational seat." It belongs to the Party and not the individual. We do not create "career politicians". The Black Liberation Movement is still suffering from the errors that were made in the 1960's when we raised demands for more blacks in this or that agency, in the news media, on various boards, etc., and because we had no political or organizational structure to put forth the people we wanted or a *definitive program* to advance, the ruling class chose which black they wanted and these people have been a force in suppressing us ever since.

In the course of these electoral actions we will maintain the masses at a high level of constant mobilization where they will daily fight in their interest and the electoral actions will be viewed as just one more mobilization and forum for the left to educate the masses. We will learn to understand the tactical differences in conducting local small electoral actions and city-wide, statewide and national actions. There are different contradictions that require different sets of strategies and tactics. We must learn to explain to the working class that we are participating in these electoral actions as a tactic and using it as a platform to champion their cause. We will make it clear that we are not and will not rely on legislative bodies alone to solve the problems of the working class. We will spell out to them at every turn that the only source of political power for the working class is revolution and the establishment of a socialist society in the U.S. We will present a clear alternative to the ruling class' candidates—whether they are Democrats, Republicans or some of the "loyal opposition" so-called "third party", like the "Citizen's Party" which is presently organizing itself.

Seven Days magazine in its July 20, 1979 issues says "the Party's organizers include a triumvirate of wealthy, liberal philanthropists: Archibald Gillies, president of the John Hay Whitney Foundation and David Hunter, executive director of the Stern Fund, who have collectively financed many of the groups they hope will support them; and Stanley Weill, a businessman who funds the Nuclear Information and Resource Service in Washington, D.C. who first pulled the third-party idea out of the hat. Don Rose, who ran Chicago mayor Jane Byrne's successful campaign, community organizer Don Leahy, and environmentalist Barry Commoner, soon came on board. . . ." Obviously these kinds of "third party" formations that will raise the issues of "inflation, the gas crisis, unemployment, and for decisions on the more 'emotional issues' of anti-discrimination legislation, abortion, and women's rights" may be springing up all over the place because the liberals and the



apologists for the ruling class are becoming increasingly fearful that the bourgeois democratic system is slipping away and the right-wing pro-fascist elements are organizing and waiting in the wings to seize power. They are also trying to resurrect the system from its crisis to short-cut the left from capturing the minds of the masses on these same issues. But these groups *are not* and *will not* deal with the basic and most fundamental question—and that is the question of state power and which class *must* have that power—the working class! These groups also act as a smokescreen and put forth the proposition that all that's needed to solve the problems in America is a nice liberal president that will listen to the people!

A REVOLUTIONARY ELECTORAL PROGRAM

A revolutionary electoral program will deal foremost with the question of state power. It will show the U.S. working class that its main enemy is not a foreign power but a small handful of rich powerful men *right here in the U.S.*, constituting less than 2% of the entire population. The program will explain in clear terms that only a socialist revolution offers a solution to the issues mentioned above. It will show the interconnection between capitalism and racism. It will explain the political economy of racism. It will educate the white workers to understand that it is in their interests and the interests of the entire working class to fight racism and support the Black Liberation struggle. A revolutionary electoral program must also deal with the class nature of the oppression of women and not confuse the issue with petty-bourgeois feminism.

It will show how the military-industrial complex has consistently lied to the people and robbed the public treasury. The platform will describe the real nature of U.S. imperialism and its relationship to the suppression of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. But most of all we must be skillful enough to offer solutions to some of these complicated questions and show the connection to local situations and issues and local campaigns. And we must also learn to apply the science of Marxism-Leninism to local issues and work out solutions with the masses. We will be very explicit in explaining and educating the working class why we give conditional support to some progressive candidates and why we run our own independent candidates. We will first study this question and come to understand the limitations of supporting certain progressive candidates. They are not under the discipline of a radical political organization and they have faith in the bourgeois democratic process yet they have a progressive side that we should encourage and strengthen. At the same time we must be ever so vigilant not to allow these petty-bourgeois progressive politicians to lead the struggles of the masses!

In this process radicals find themselves in coalitions, that are involved in mass struggles, with petty-bourgeois politicians and the like. Radicals must work to organize and mobilize the masses to struggle around the issues—but not to create platforms for the politicians. Too often radicals in this kind of situation work the longest, hardest and devotedly among the people to only find the fruits of their labor drop into the outstretched hands of some local politician, who in most cases is not even “progressive”. This stems from the fact that we have not yet mastered the art of working in and among broad based groups and coalitions, laying out our conditions for participating in them or spelling out our terms for including others, winning over the masses and either equally sharing the platform to clearly set forth our line or dominating the platform. But one of the main reasons why many left groups have not been able to assume this posture is because of their general isolation

and lack of respect among the masses. So the left does not come to these coalitions from a position of strength with the masses familiar with their work and respecting them, even though once this mass work begins we often find that there is a tremendous leadership vacuum. The left consequently finds itself trying to ride on the coattails of the politicians or labor leaders and maybe pick up a few crumbs. Obviously this is and has always been a losing position! So, if there is no constant political, agitational and organizational work among the masses by the left it cannot participate in these coalitions in a principled manner. *Hard work is not enough without troops!*



None of this implies that we are diverting the masses' attention away from the issues that affect their daily lives or that we are creating illusions about electoral struggles. It does suggest that we are attempting to apply a Marxist-Leninist analysis and action program to a situation that affects the lives and existence of the working people in this country. It does not mean that a worker who is a registered voter is a traitor to his class or will no longer actively function in the militant or black caucus in the union, or that parents who are registered voters will stop fighting in the PTA's, or local community struggles will be curtailed because members are either registered voters or participate in electoral actions. The question logically arises, can a fragmented left that's organized into hundreds, if not thousands, of small collectives, study groups, "pre-party formations", various "Marxist-Leninist" and "communist" "Parties" hammer out an electoral action program? And, is an electoral strategy possible without a Marxist-Leninist Party? We think it is on a certain level.

If these various formations are fully integrating their study with concrete practical work among the masses then electoral tactics can fall very well into the concrete application of uniting theory with practice. Of course, if some of these formations have elevated theory or the study of theory to a level of "book worship" or to a fetish, they may find it extremely difficult to engage in this kind of struggle, or for that matter, any struggle that is not on a purely theoretical level.

What we are saying is that most of these small formations are located in or near small and large cities or industrial centers or close to or on college campuses. Wherever they are, the people are engaged in some form of electoral struggle, and invariably, they are the kinds of struggles that directly impact on the lives of the people. Some of these left formations are capable of doing the kinds of analysis mentioned earlier: developing an electoral strategy, presenting a working class electoral program, fielding a candidate and doing the organizing work among the masses. Others are so mired in their sectarianism and anti-working class attitudes that if they did attempt to do this kind of work it would probably take the form of an all-out assault on the working class! We will leave the discussion of these anti-working class forces on the "left" for a more developed analysis later. But for the purpose of this article we must recognize that there are forces who call themselves "left" who may engage in electoral struggle but will wind up only confusing the masses.

Many of these left formations are engaged in varied forms and levels of struggle. They have not said that "we don't have a Marxist-Leninist Party so we cannot engage in struggle among the masses." Quite the contrary! Those that are seriously developing have taken the position that as part of their growth, gaining experience, widening their circle of influence, testing theory and enmeshing themselves among the masses, they must take on the ruling class in as many arenas as they are capable. They understand that a Marxist-Leninist Party is not created in an ivory tower or in a library or in a backroom. It is created out of the concrete practice of revolutionaries among the masses in struggle—the unity of theory and practice! It is within this concrete practice that we educate and agitate among the masses the need for a Marxist-Leninist Party!

We said "on a certain level." Naturally, since most of these left formations are localized, their electoral actions can only be localized. This is one of the major weaknesses of conducting electoral actions without a national unified Marxist-Leninist Party. We are not able to coordinate programs in many different areas of the country and to a degree each electoral action by each group can be just that—a local action isolated from others. On the other hand this problem can be partially overcome by those formations who are working in approximate cities, districts, unions, PTA's, etc. working together to carve out a common program and working col-

lectively to accomplish it. This too becomes a concrete step towards party building!



In conclusion. The left has a lot of homework to do on the question of electoral actions and their approach to it. We have a history of either "ultra-leftism" (boycott all elections) or right-opportunism (support "lesser of two evils" or run "independent" candidates with reformist platforms) and have not mastered the strategy of combining all forms of struggle and looking at their interrelatedness—viewing electoral actions as a dialectical process. Hopefully this pamphlet will help us to examine this process and to master it.

The author welcomes comments, criticisms and suggestions on how this debate can be expanded and deepened. Send all comments to BLP.

A BRIEF SUMMATION OF ELECTORAL ACTION AND THE PHILADELPHIA BLACK UNITED FRONT

Two significant events occurred during the November 6, 1979, elections of which we should take note. One was the election struggle waged by Black people throughout the South; and the other was the election campaign of Lucien Blackwell, running as an Independent for the office of Mayor of Philadelphia.

The people who raise the slogan, "Don't Vote—Organize!", would find themselves totally isolated from the Black population in the southern parts of this country. One only has to count the thousands of people who lost their lives and who were maimed, threatened, intimidated, fired, run off the land, and harassed in order to win the right to vote over the last seventeen years or so, to understand what an advance this right is under the present conditions in the South.

Not since the Reconstruction period following the Civil War (1865–75) have so many Blacks been elected to public office throughout the Black Belt states (Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas). Blacks have been elected as mayors of such large cities as Birmingham, Alabama, New Orleans, Louisiana, and Atlanta, Georgia, as well as in several small towns and rural hamlets. One has to understand that in the particular situation in the South, these kinds of election victories offer some relief for Black people from the oppressive racism exercised against them by the ruling class and its lieutenants.

A case in point is Mississippi. The New York Times described it as the "most racially polarized state in the Deep South, a state in which many residents remain stuck in poverty, malnutrition and illiteracy—a state viewed almost as the last frontier by developers and industrialists who have rushed to the Sun Belt Region in the past two decades" (Nov. 8, 1979). Not only did the Democratic Governor of Mississippi owe his victory to Black voters' support, but their victory includes the election of 17 Black legislators in 1979 who in turn will sit on every House committee. These victories have to be understood in the context of a Black electorate sophisticated enough to vote out Charles Evers (active in the Civil Rights movement during the 1960's) because "he had too often aligned himself with anti-Black politicians, some thought" (New York Times, Nov. 8, 1979).

Despite these electoral gains, we should not be deceived. In the country as a whole, Blacks hold only 81 or 1.9 percent more elected positions in 1979 than in 1978. This figure represents "only 18 Black elected officials for every 100,000 people" (New York Times, Nov. 4, 1979). We can see how the ruling class maintains and manipulates

racism by setting the "rules" of the game. Black elected officials represent only Blacks, while white elected officials represent "everyone".

The following is a political critique of the growth and development of the Philadelphia Black United front and the Black Political Convention (BPC). At this time, their critique is important if we are to understand how to build the necessary revolutionary consciousness and organizational forms among the masses on a day-to-day basis.

The Development of the Philadelphia Black United Front

"Elections," as Engels noted, "are a barometer of the political maturity of the working class." The rise of the Black United Front in Philadelphia cannot be isolated from the history which preceded it and the mass movement which produced it. In November, 1977, 457,851 people went to the polls in Philadelphia and defeated Mayor Frank Rizzo! Their massive "no" vote could not have been won so overwhelmingly without the movement that grew up around the issues that Rizzo made into headlines: "Racism, Redbaiting, and Violence."

Several groups have staked claims on Rizzo's defeat. One was the Charter Defense Committee (CDC), under the leadership of the Head of the Chamber of Commerce, Thatcher Longstretch. Their opposition to Rizzo was extremely narrow. They deliberately avoided discussion of his policies, and never felt the need to take a position on Rizzo's rule of racism, repression, and reaction. Instead, they hoped to confine the charter change issues solely to the merits of the two-term limit. Their struggle consisted of raising money for billboards and spot advertisements airing a very limited theme. One couldn't expect these forces—headed by the Chamber of Commerce—to raise the issue in any other way.

Then there was the Committee to Protect the Charter (CPC). They were based primarily in the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) reform wing of the Democratic Party, and included a well-known Republican and the Consumer Party. They organized canvassing and poll-watching, but limited their efforts to "wards" in the white sections of Philadelphia. The CPC underestimated the rising fervor of the Black community and ignored the potential groundswell of new voter registration efforts. They remained silent during the MOVE* crisis.

Out of these activities the Stop Rizzo Coalition (SRC) was formed which in turn produced a coalition of progressive whites, and alliance of Hispanics and the Black United Front. They were the products of a

*MOVE is a back-to-nature, anarchistic "commune" which is predominantly Black. In the 1970's they defended their house and property against a racist landlord, racist neighbors, Drexel University encroachment, police harassment and brutality. When in August of 1978 the police brutally evicted MOVE men, women and children and razed their home there was a massive organized outcry against the racist neighbors, police and the man who gave the orders to brutalize the MOVE people . . . Frank Rizzo.

developing unity among anti-racist whites, the Black community, and much of the Hispanic community. The near annihilation of the MOVE organization sparked a "political crusade" in the Black community, and a repulsion of Rizzo among the anti-racist whites. Together, the 3 coalitions represented the most progressive sectors of the Black, progressive, and white working class sectors of the city: those tired of Rizzo's gestapo-like administration, overt encouragement of increasing police brutality, and defense of "white rights" (i.e., racism). Comprising over 30 organizations of Black, white, and Hispanic individuals, trade unionists, tenants, professionals, and a wide range of left political organizations, the *STOP Rizzo Coalition* carried out its mandate.

The role of one left political organization is worth noting. For example, the Philadelphia Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC) was quite active in the STOP Rizzo Coalition, and some of its members participated in the Black United Front. In addition to the canvassing, petition gathering, leafletting and building the coalitions in the black, white and Hispanic communities there was some agitating in trade union caucuses and on the shop floors. Particularly active were Locals 813 and 92 of the United Auto Workers who passed resolutions attacking Rizzo and racism; the Hospital Workers Union 1199C and the Retail Clerks. When attempts were made to move this struggle to the city-wide Central Labor Council the reactionary forces in the council prevailed and the move was defeated. Even without the support of the entrenched reactionary leadership of the Philadelphia Central Labor Council the SRC was able to register nearly 50,000 voters in Black, white and Hispanic working class districts of Philadelphia.

Another group which participated in the SRC was the Consumer Party. By securing enough signatures to secure it a place on the ballot for the gubernatorial race, the Consumer Party became entitled to poll watchers certificates which it provided to the anti-Rizzo forces. The Consumer Party later provided the tactical strategy which enabled Lucien Blackwell to run on their ballot, representing the Human Rights slate.

Finally, the Black United Front (BUF) included many broad-based organizations which grew out of the charter change struggle. Many of these understood that only a systematic, organized movement could sustain the momentum of their victory, and that this would have to be developed. At that time, they felt that independent political action in Philadelphia was the correct course for them to take.

The development of the SRC and the three coalitions was basically a temporary alliance around a single issue among groups that did not have a long history of doing political work among the masses in Philadelphia. It represented a spontaneous reaction on the part of the masses and progressive forces to Rizzo's reactionary policies. It was held together on a day-to-day basis by the progressive forces who attempted to broaden the issues beyond Rizzo and to expose and attack the long list of problems that faced the people. It was this desire that subsequently produced the HRA.

History and thousands upon thousands of struggles have demonstrated

that spontaneous actions are *spontaneous* and long term mass movements cannot be built based on them even though it is essential for progressives and radical forces to intervene and raise the political issues and strive to raise the consciousness of the masses. Once the masses have expressed themselves on the issues their spontaneous heightened political consciousness loses its sharp edge. The action of the masses will no longer be spontaneous when the progressive and radical forces have built political bases among them through many years of consistent struggle around the key issues in the communities, the factories, among the women; the white, Black and Hispanic workers. It is at the point when the progressive and radical forces are one with the masses and have sufficiently politicized them that the initiative will shift into the hands of the people and they will call the shots. Under conditions of spontaneity it would be difficult to hold these coalitions together for a long period of time and as the masses begin to drift away the door is then opened to political opportunist, narrow Black nationalist elements, etc.

Convention I

In December, 1978, the Black United Front organized and sponsored a citywide Black Political Convention, with workshops and plenary sessions which drew as many as 1,500 people over the holiday season. On hand were the same forces which had worked from community to community and contributed to the charter change victory: Black working people, the unemployed, welfare recipients, and sectors of the lumpen-proletariat. Other active participants included progressive elected officials, revolutionary Nationalists, and a small number of Black Marxist-Leninists.

The convention was called with several interrelated aims. The first was to adopt a platform, later to be known as the "Human Rights Agenda" (HRA). The HRA became the standard for evaluating and challenging the political candidates who would later seek the convention's endorsement. It raised demands and addressed issues and concerns which would define focal points for struggle in future years regardless of who would win an election seat. The Convention also addressed and attempted to determine the future of the BUF.

A resolution was adopted which called for the BUF to work for the formation of an independent Black Political Party. Sharp struggle ensued in many of the convention workshops, and was followed onto the floor for debate. For example, the economic development workshop attempted to tie the convention to a Black capitalist program with an almost exclusive emphasis on building Black-owned businesses and financial institutions. This perspective was soundly defeated, but the convention remained deadlocked over the question of desegregation versus community control of schools. In both its platform and its ongoing work, the BUF showed weaknesses related to the under-representation of Black trade unionists as an organized force.

Some 20 candidates for local offices came before the convention delegates seeking endorsements. In order to be recognized by the con-

vention, each candidate had to sign a pledge promising to uphold the aspirations of the Black community if elected and to submit to its scrutiny. In the past, the Rizzo-circle politicians had often boycotted the Black community or approached it through their flunkies. These same politicians now clamored for a place at the convention; in particular, the more opportunist and liberal elements who had previously supported Rizzo now tried to dissociate themselves from him. Al Gaudiosa (Rizzo's stand-in) and Bill Green (now Mayor) were both on hand.

The candidate most in tune with the convention was Charlie Bowser. He had run against Rizzo in 1975 as a Black candidate on the Philadelphia Party ticket financed by John Bunting, the city's biggest banker. He was a popular front runner among Black voters in 1979. However, Bowser fell short when questioned on specifics of the HRA. His supporters attempted to stampede the Convention into endorsing him, but it was not willing to be anyone's caddy and no candidate was endorsed. However, the planned March 1979 Black Political Convention, Part II, appeared to be an exciting challenge to traditional political party charades.

Convention II

It was during the planning of the second Convention that clear political lines began to emerge. Among the different "active" political forces, the range of differences did not fully materialize in practice until after the November, 1979, election. This would be the culminating phase of independent political action in Philadelphia.

Phase II of the Convention convened over the weekend of March 9, 1979, when convention delegates met to consider the endorsement of a Mayorality race candidate and the city row offices. The major struggle on the Convention floor centered on Charles Bowser's Mayoral candidacy. Bowser had expected his mere appearance to ensure smooth sailing, but this time, "political convention politics" wasn't on the corrupt terrain of the bourgeois parties. Instead, Phase II of the Convention structure was based on a democratic process for people and candidate participation.

Bowser showed little respect for democratic procedures. The Convention's Candidate Evaluation Committee had prepared a detailed questionnaire based on the Human Rights Agenda by which to determine each candidate's stand on the issues. The Credentials Committee was highly organized, and each candidate seeking endorsement had to complete the questionnaire and be rated accordingly.

Bowser failed to answer the questionnaire or to meet the Convention's deadline. He reluctantly did so only when told that he would not be allowed to address the Convention or be considered for endorsement. When the Candidate Evaluation Committee disclosed the poor results (557 out of a possible 861 rating) to the delegates, all hell broke loose on the Convention floor. Bowser's supporters manoeuvred to prevent full disclosure of Bowser's views, and led an attack on the Convention's rating system. In essence, they attacked the Convention process.

Bowser was backed by the Housing Activists, led by Milton Street (now State Representative). (At the time, some people felt that Street

didn't realize that Bowser did not support many of the basic HRA demands, but in Phase III, Street again backed a reactionary position on the endorsement of Lucien Blackwell as the HRA Mayorality candidate.) An intense fight on the Convention floor followed. Although Bowser opposed cuts in military spending; opposed the Public Housing Tenants' demand that they be empowered to elect the Director of the Housing Authority; opposed the demand for a civilian police review board; and openly declared that he could not support the HRA because parts of it were "against the law," he was given the Convention's endorsement. The vote was 59 to 6, with 8 abstaining.

The reasoning which finally prevailed was that it's better to be "Black" than politically sound. Bowser's supporters would have had difficulty in selling him to the Black community as the only Black candidate in a city which had never elected a Black mayor if the full extent of his response to the HRA had been known and if the opportunist forces had not successfully interceded on his behalf at the Convention.

In November, the BPC Mayoral candidate, Lucien Blackwell, and his running mates for various offices lost to the liberal Democratic candidate, William Green. Ironically, the former Rizzo supporter who first came to the BUF Convention seeking an endorsement, who was rejected in favor of then front-running Charles Bowser and later endorsed by the First Convention, defeated the HRA candidate by only one-sixth of the city vote.

This Black voter expression exemplifies that the process of selecting political candidates on the basis of party affiliation (i.e., Democratic and Republican) can truly be challenged if the independent political forces take an independent line. This requires cutting the ties *ideologically* with *Big Business and Finance Capital*. That was the ideological perspective argued within the BUF and the Convention, and it must be pushed forward within the movement. Throughout the country, a trend called the "Black United Front Movement" is growing out of the Black Liberation Movement. We must take a lesson from our Philadelphia brothers and sisters who had to struggle against opportunism, ultraleftism, Nationalism, and both the reactionary and petty bourgeoisies. The Black Liberation Movement has yet to sustain a truly independent Black Political Convention or a Black United Front for the reasons stated earlier.

As demonstrated in Philadelphia, the progressive Left and the Black Marxist-Leninists played important roles in defending the political integrity of each Convention. The Conventions became an open platform for debating revisionists, opportunists, the ideologies of the Black petty bourgeoisie, and even some of the dogmatic sects. However, the Left forces' ability to mobilize for the Convention was limited, as they concentrated on organizing for it and meeting among themselves to discuss objectives. In essence, the Left devoted a lot of time to developing a defense against those forces which would attempt to turn the convention into nothing more than an electoral "only" arena.

After each convention, the Black United Front took on a more independent character. At that time there were many day-to-day struggles in the city, which the BUF endorsed and was actively involved in. The

actual organizing for each convention was done by individuals who worked in the BUF, as well as by individuals who were primarily interested in organizing and doing the hard, often tedious work of the convention. In other words, one did not have to be a member of the BUF in order to work on the convention.

Within BUF meetings, there were often political struggles. In particular, these concerned the BUF's development beyond each convention process. These struggles were often defused by some of the leadership for the sake of "unity".

Some of the Left forces attempted to convene the Left organizations. The purpose would have been to assess political differences and to approach the concept of "United Front" strategy within the BUF. For many reasons, this idea never developed, and there was therefore no consolidated, advanced, "left-ML" leadership within the Front. However, Black progressives often met together as individuals.

Convention III

After the May primary in which Charles Bowser lost the nomination, the Black community suffered set-backs and divisions emerged within the city's established Black leadership. Many of the activists and those who had been recently drawn into the electoral process were demoralized.

Bowser had lost to Bill Green. Charges of poll rigging by Green's forces were valid in many precincts—particularly in Black precincts where voting was heavy. Bowser then made a deal to support Green, but when the heat was applied, he abruptly "resigned from Public Life." In retrospect, if the Left had been more united and clear on the entire process, the Convention in which Bowser's folks had deemed his rating unfair could have served to educate the Black community as to who Charlie Bowser was really committed to. It wasn't the Black community or the white community he also claimed to represent. From Bowser's behavior, he was clearly just another Black politician tied to big business and liberal politics.

The BUF attempted to be another voice of the Black community. In the heat of this political chaos, it reconvened Phase III of the Black Political Convention. From July 13 through July 15, over 2-3,000 people attended the convention. And all of the hacks were there, a-politicking all around. Brother Mike Simmons, who was active in the BUF and a member of the Evaluation Committee, said in an interview with the *Organizer* in August 1979 that State Representative Richardson's opening remarks calling for accountability on the part of so-called Black leaders

set the stage for the major struggle at the convention: who to endorse as mayor. It was clear throughout the convention that participants were not enthusiastic about the choice between Bill Green and David Marston. By a 71-8 vote, with 15 abstentions, the delegates drafted councilman Lucien Blackwell as mayor. The debate around Blackwell's draft was centered on whether independent politics was a viable option. One delegate at the convention summed up the feelings of many delegates when he said, 'We lose whether the Republicans or Democrats win. It is time for us to *really* win.'

This statement was verified earlier in the day when candidates came before the convention. When Green was barred from speaking by his continual refusal to sign the BPC pledge, Marston felt he could capitalize on the hostility toward Green. However, Marston's presentation was limited to vague statements on recycling jobs and education. During questioning by the delegates, Marston refused to speak to the Republican party's support of Rizzo during Rizzo's administration or to disavow his support of Ronald Reagan during the 1976 Republican convention and generally failed to offer any clear program to aid the Black community.

The seriousness of the delegates at the convention was highlighted by the treatment of Augusta Clark, Democratic candidate for Council-at-Large. Clark, though she did not receive the endorsement at the Phase II of the BPC, was clearly a favorite of many convention delegates. Her victory in the primaries almost assured her endorsement at Phase III. However, during the question and answer session, Clark was asked if she would support Rizzocrat James Tayoun for President of City Council. Clark's response of, 'If there were not a qualified Black candidate I would support Tayoun,' was met with a rain of boos. Many felt that this political pragmatism lost Clark the expected endorsement.

Gray, along with C. Delores Tucker, Bowser's campaign manager, were called to task by the convention for their endorsement of Bill Green before the convention process. Delegates reminded Tucker that less than two months ago she was telling the Black community that a vote for Bill Green was a vote for Rizzo. The attempts of Gray and Tucker to defend their actions were rejected with boos by the convention, which led to Gray's premature departure from the convention.

Another indication of the thrust toward independent politics was the vote received by Consumer Party candidates. At Phase II of the BPC no Consumer Party candidate got more than 10 votes. However, in Phase III, three Consumer Party candidates, Lee Frissel (Comptroller), Max Weiner and Ralph Wynder (both for Council-at-Large) got majority votes. Had the 2/3 majority rule been suspended, as in Phase II, they would have made the Human Rights slate. Nevertheless, their vote total was a clear indication that independent politics is on the agenda for the Black Community.

After the Convention, the first task was to develop a campaign structure for the endorsed candidates. The BUF continued to be the organizing and follow-up structure for the Convention's mandate. The campaign was not an easy one. An entire campaign structure was developed from monies raised through discos, raffles, house parties, and barbecues. The attempt to popularize the Human Rights Agenda was not always easy. However, some of the Charter Change momentum was still alive. Many of the Black politicians who had used the BUF as well as the Conventions were now seen courting Republican candidates, falling to the side, and badmouthing the BUF. These types were the real losers. They had no faith that the progressive forces and Black community could break from ruling class party politics and *win*. It was their distrust and lack of faith in the masses that gave the election to Bill Green, the Democrat. They did not unite with the Black United Front because it represented something which was not in *their* class interests.

The Blackwell-for-Mayor campaign was also a difficult one. The attempt to popularize the Human Rights Agenda within a short period of time wasn't always done consistently. Many of the HRA candidates

failed to use it as a basis for campaign issues. As the recognized President of the International Longshoremen's Association—Local 1332, Lucien Blackwell often found it more important to put union interest before the interest of the human rights agenda.* However, in spite of inadequate planning due to lack of organized leadership, the momentum and spirit of the struggle against Rizzo and the struggle to form a Black United Front enabled Blackwell to pull more than 15 percent of the total votes in the Mayoral race. He even got a significant number of votes in white working class districts in Philadelphia. In Black districts, he pulled more than 85 percent of the votes.

Although Blackwell ran on a reformist platform, it was progressive in the sense that, within the limits of the bourgeois State, it addressed the aspirations of the poor, working class, Black and Hispanic communities of Philadelphia. The campaign and all that it represented grew out of independent political action: initiated, organized, and run by the people. The Human Rights Slate broke the grip of the two parties in Philadelphia. Sister Valerie Lane—one of the first organizers of the conventions—received enough signed petitions to have her name placed on the ballot representing the HUMAN RIGHTS PARTY TICKET! Yes, that was a real choice the voter had.

After the Election

At this point, very little is known of the Black United Front's summation of the experience. Many of the progressive and Left elements have either left the BUF or now find it somewhat difficult to work in. There are various reasons why many of the progressive forces are no longer within the Black United Front. For instance, some of the progressive organizations took up other tasks and issues such as national human rights work, anti-Klan activities or deepening the struggles around and in the workplace. In addition, some progressive forces left Philadelphia and a few others became discouraged. The few who have remained active in the Front are isolated and/or overworked and therefore do not have as great of an impact on the ideological developments as well as the day-to-day workings of the Black United Front.

Hence, there is a renewed thrust in the BUF by some of the petty bourgeois Nationalist forces who had attempted to push it into taking up single issues which they considered priorities, as opposed to the BUF developing independent political action. Clearly, this sort of leadership can potentially kill Black United Fronts in other cities. New leadership has been elected and membership is now limited to those groups/organ-

*Lucien Blackwell was also backed by the International. In fact, he was at the annual ILA convention at the time the Black United Front endorsed him. Thus, he not only received immediate support from his local, but also received the go ahead from the rank and file of the ILA. But as his campaign pressed on, it appeared that the ILA national and Local 1332 were pressuring Blackwell to place more emphasis on union matters than the struggle for mayor.

zations which are Black; those Third World groups and organizations whose Black members had participated in the BUF can no longer do so as members. This had been a strength of the early Fronts, where Third World groups did much of the work, secured resources, linked together the various movements in the city which opposed Frank Rizzo, and saw the need for independent political action.

The most simplistic forms of Nationalism are reflected in the Front to a greater degree now than during the Conventions. The entire multiracial working class has an objective interest in winning the kind of platform articulated by the convention. While there was recognition of the need for tactical alliances with whites, the necessity of a strategic alliance between the movements of the oppressed racial minorities and nationalities and the multiracial working class is not the viewpoint of the majority within the Philadelphia Black United Front, the national Black United Front Movement or even the U.S. Marxist-Leninist forces.

In the final analysis, the development and struggles of the Philadelphia Black United Front reveal the need to be tactically flexible within the electoral political arena—on a day by day basis. Its experience also highlights the reality that the political terrain in the U.S. is not the same everywhere. There are no set formulas that apply to Philadelphia as well as to Jackson, Mississippi, or St. Louis, or Seattle. However, the study of each struggle can indicate whether progressive forces have developed a long-term strategy suited to the struggle for independent political action by the working class. If anything, the electoral action led by the BUF and the progressive white community in Philadelphia has the potential of laying the groundwork for establishment of a progressive political platform built on the strength of the masses. The independent political action developed in Philadelphia also highlights the real possibility of forming progressive electoral political action within the white working class through the organized efforts of progressive predominantly white organizations at the workplace and on the neighborhood level. This platform, organized by and coming from the masses, would be the basis of ongoing, day-to-day challenges to the Philadelphia ruling class.

EDITOR'S NOTE:

BLP recently received this press release from the Peoples Energy Committee in Detroit. We feel that this kind of political action among the masses can serve as a vehicle to educate, agitate and arouse the peoples consciousness. At the same time we must be careful not to raise illusions or false hopes that U.S. imperialism will voluntarily turn the energy industry over to the people. It is obvious that this kind of action can be applied to numerous issues and should be studied and implemented where possible.

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News

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact: Jerry Goldberg

DETROIT FIRST IN COUNTRY TO VOTE ON PEOPLE'S TAKE-OVER OF OIL INDUSTRY QUESTION TO BE DECIDED IN AUGUST 5th PRIMARY

March 26, 1980—Action by Detroit's City Council made it official today: the people of Detroit will be the first in the nation to vote on a people's takeover of the oil industry, in the August 5th primary elections here. The Council voted five to three to place the following advisory question on the ballot: "We call for the oil industry to be owned and operated by the people and not by private industry."

Their action culminated a petition drive by the People's Energy Committee (PEC) which gathered 11,300 signatures of registered voters over the last four months.

Jerry Goldberg, a laid-off auto worker and spokesperson for the PEC, said today, "For the first time in this country people will be able to express their feelings against the oil monopolies in a popular vote. Detroiters are leading this movement because they are fed up with the massive layoffs in auto and skyrocketing gasoline and energy prices which have resulted directly from the phony shortages, profiteering, and illegal price gouging by the oil monopolies. Many of the petition signatures collected by the People's Energy Committee were obtained at Detroit's packed unemployment centers. Throughout the city, at supermarkets and shopping centers, in churches and union halls, the response to the petition drive has been electric: at the mention of action against the big oil companies, people grabbed the petition boards out of the cam-

paigmers' hands."

The nationwide campaign for a referendum on a people's takeover of oil was launched last October 17th at the National Day of Protest Against Big Oil actions across the country. In Detroit, the People's Energy Committee, a grass-roots community organization, was formed to get the question on the ballot here. The PECX campaign has been endorsed by Operation PUSH, the P.E.O.P.L.E. Committee of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (Region 1, Council 25), Nellie Cuellar of the National Caucus on Black Aging and the Grey Panthers, and many union, community, and political leaders from the Detroit area.

The proposal for a people's takeover of the oil industry demands that Congress divest the oil companies of all ownership and invest ownership instead in the people of the United States. The oil, gas, and energy industry should be run by popular committees, composed of direct representatives of all interested parties—trade unions, community groups, the elderly, minorities, women, the disabled, etc.

While the oil monopolies are very rich and will spend a great deal of money to defeat this ballot initiative, the People's Energy Committee pledges to continue to rally community support behind its proposal. The Committee is planning to reach out to block clubs, churches, unions, and on the streets to mobilize the people of Detroit for a "Yes" vote for a people's takeover of the oil industry.

Goldberg also stated, "This vote in Detroit should serve as a spur to working and poor people across the country to organize to actually takeover the oil industry. We must operate our basic energy resources on the basis of people's needs, not for the profits of a handful of oil billionaires. That is the people's answer to the energy crisis."



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Socialists were not paid and the financial honor of the I.W.W. was saved. The amendment was adopted unanimously.

A TAMMANY ELECTION

It is an old story that Tammany Hall in New York City, similarly to corrupt political machines in scores of other American cities and states, has falsified innumerable elections by wholesale buying of votes, stuffing of ballot boxes, failing to tally opposition ballots and by various other crooked devices. The following episode points its own moral.

A Socialist speaker, a prominent figure locally in the New York S.P., was delivering a speech at a street corner on the lower East Side, during the 1912 elections. At that time most of the garment workers still lived in this congested slum area, and the Socialist Party had a strong following among them. There was a large crowd, and the speaker made an effective speech. On the edge of the gathering stood the Tammany Hall precinct leader, much interested.

When the speaker had concluded and climbed down from his portable platform, the Tammany heeler sidled over to him and said:

"That was a fine speech you made, me boy. I think you'll poll sixteen votes for it on election day."

This made the Socialist a bit wroth and he replied:

"What do you mean, sixteen votes? This precinct is one of our Party's strongholds. We'll get many times that; we'll carry the precinct."

By now the Tammany man was also hot under the collar and he shouted:

"I told you sixteen votes, didn't I? Well, that settles it. Not a single one more will you get!"

Now, indeed, the Socialist speaker was angry. He reported the matter to the local committee and it was decided to make an extra effort to carry this particular precinct. Accordingly, additional speakers were sent in, many meetings were held and special house-to-house work

was done. The workers responded well and as the election took place the Party local leaders were positive they had won the precinct.

But when the detailed election returns were made public, there, sure enough, the Party in the precinct was credited with the famous sixteen votes. And so the thing stood. Nor could all the Party's protests and demands for a recount change matters.

A PERPETUAL VACATION

One of many manifestations of the conservative A.F. of L. bureaucracy is the so-called chair-warmer type of organizer. Such organizers draw big wages and do nothing constructive. About the only time they can be galvanized into action is when it is a case of fighting back some progressive movement struggling to improve the unions, on which occasions they display an amazing vigor and activity.

Chair-warmer organizers have long been targets of attack by progressives and revolutionaries in the labor movement. But I never knew a criticism more effective than one made off-hand by Samuel Gompers, himself the king of labor chair-warmers, to a typical A.F. of L. conservative, do-nothing organizer in Pittsburgh.

Gompers happened to be in Pittsburgh, and in the course of his conferences, the organizer, an old veteran, requested that he be granted a month's vacation. Gompers, with a drink or two under his belt, listened to his request and then inquired:

"Now, let's see, Tom, how long have you been on our payroll?"

"It'll be twenty-five years next November," replied the organizer.

"Well," said Gompers with a sly grin, "don't you think that's vacation enough?"

AMALGAMATION FROM THE BOTTOM

During the World War and for some years afterward, under pressure of the high cost of living and profiteering by the trusts, the

tember 8th. Even then, I thought a short rest would set me on my feet again. But "the pitcher had gone once too often to the well."

It was a heart attack—angina pectoris, the doctors called it—and for the next several weeks I was knocking sharply on death's door. I spent five long months in bed, suffering indescribable torture. When I finally got on my feet again there came many months of barely crawling about, sick to the core and such a nervous wreck that I was almost as helpless as a child. It was nineteen months after my crash before I could even put foot in my office, and three years before I could make even a ten minute public speech.

I have never ceased to wonder how the human body could possibly heal itself again after being so badly wrecked. Nor could I ever have pulled out of the terrible crisis I was in had it not been for the intelligent, tireless and loving care of my devoted wife, the loyal assistance given me by the Party, and my own determination not to die or to become a hopeless wreck but to live on and fight in the workers' struggle for emancipation.

ELECTION CAMPAIGNING

My three Presidential campaigns were not all hard work, however. They were also literally packed with human interest. Especially the tragic days of 1932. All over the country the terrible industrial crisis was rampant. On all sides factories and mills were closed; great bread-lines of unemployed wound their way to their goal of miserable handouts; filthy flophouses were overflowing with the homeless, freezing unemployed; along the railroads myriads of hobo workers traveled and camped; in every city there were the monstrous "Hoovervilles" of tin can shacks on the city dumps or along the railroad tracks, filled with utterly destitute workers; in many Western towns there were tent colonies of dispossessed farmers. And the brutal Hoover government was doing nothing to relieve this mass misery caused by the breakdown of the obsolete capitalist system.

One night I was riding a South Side elevated train in Chicago

when a Negro youth just in front of me collapsed. Starvation. Next day a small note in the paper stated that he had died. In Philadelphia an elderly immigrant couple told me that just a week previously they had lost their home by foreclosure; their whole life's savings were gone at one blow, and the old husband was sick and unemployed. In Pittsburg, Kansas, a miner insisted that I stay at his home while I was in town. But in my room I picked up a book to read and found in it, as a marker, an unpaid grocery bill for ninety-six dollars. I learned later he had not done a day's work for two years. And so on, I met with endless manifestations of the terrible mass destitution of 1932.

But my campaigns also produced many humorous incidents, and I could appreciate them as a relief from the hard work and mass pauperization. In the 1924 campaign there was, for example, the case of Poniatowsky's baby. Stanislaus Poniatowsky was a miner in the anthracite district of eastern Pennsylvania. He had a big family and, being a confirmed rebel, concluded it was very fitting to call his children after outstanding revolutionaries. In this sense, he distributed upon his first three offspring the names of the great international leaders, Marx, Engels and Lenin. Then he began to use names of American militants, including Debs and Ruthenberg, upon other newly-arrived children.

Eventually, Stanislaus' wife presented him with still another baby, a bouncing boy. What should this one be called? The miner was sorely troubled. He had two names urgently in mind; but he was afraid to use either, as he had reason to believe this would be his last child, and then he could not use the other name. It was indeed a difficult situation. But Stanislaus boldly cut the Gordian knot with one sweeping stroke. He decided to give both names to the youngster. So, a week before I saw the kid in 1924, he called him William Z. Foster Alexander Howatt Poniatowsky, and let the matter go at that.

During the 1928 election campaign I made a speaking trip through the South. I had just concluded a meeting the night before in Atlanta, Ga., and was on my way to make another in Richmond, Va. As the train pulled into Raleigh, N.C., the station was full of a noisy throng.

A band played, flags waved, the crowd yelled and a committee of a dozen "distinguished citizens" stood in front and looked important. Then a general invasion of our train took place. The committee, plus a score or so more, filled the car I was in, while the band and the *loi polloi* jammed into the other coaches. I was not long in learning that it was a campaign reception committee going up the road an hour or two's ride to meet the train bearing the Democratic Presidential candidate, Al Smith, who was speaking that night in Raleigh. The delegation was headed by the pompous Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy under Wilson. Nobody recognized me, but Daniels, politician like, bade me a formal "How-do-you-do?" I wondered what he would have thought had he known I was the candidate of the hated "Communist" Party.

The committee was in a hilarious mood, and evidently the moonshine "coln likkah" that passed freely from hand to hand had a key part in livening things up. The delegates laughed and sang and joked. They outdid each other in making wisecracks at the expense of Calvin Coolidge, who was Al Smith's opponent and, incidentally, mine also. The best of these cracks was made by a preacher in the group, who, quite jolly and not a bit shocked at the open violation of his revered Prohibition amendment, delivered himself of the following.

"Do you know," said he, "Coolidge is such a musty conservative that every time he opens his mouth a moth flies out?"

The crowd laughed uproariously, and I, too. It was doubly funny to me, because of its coming from such Bourbons, tools of the cotton mill child labor exploiters, Jim Crowes of Negroes, hypocritical bible-pounders and Prohibitionists—even then on their way to welcome Al Smith, as reactionary a man as Coolidge ever dared to be. It was the pot calling the kettle black.

PAUL SINGER'S FUNERAL

During 1910-11, I spent a year in France and Germany studying the labor movement. When I pulled into Berlin from Paris in the dead


of winter, 1911, I did not know a single word of German. I had secured a pretty good grasp of French in my previous six months in France, but German was all "Greck" to me. Therefore, I had the devil's own time on that first Saturday, my arrival day, in getting located in a cheap lodging house; for I had only twenty dollars in my pocket and could not afford to go to the high-priced places where they spoke English.

The morning of my second day in Berlin, Sunday, was bright and clear, but what the French picturesquely call *froid de loup* (wolf-cold). I decided I would take a walk about the city. I had not gone far when I noticed many little groups of men, most of them with high hats, all hurrying along in one general direction. I could not make out what was up, and of course I was unable to ask anyone. At first I thought all these people were going to church, but I soon saw this was not the case.

Moved by curiosity, I decided to follow a group and learn what was afoot. So I "tailed" one and it led me towards the center of the city. The farther we went the larger the number of high-hatted groups and the bigger the crowds. Finally we came to where a great demonstration was taking shape. The streets were jammed in all directions.

From the banners I made out that it was a Socialist turnout, but I did not know what it was all about. Soon, however, I saw a newsboy selling copies of *Vorwärts*, the Socialist daily paper, which had a full front page picture of Paul Singer, noted Social Democratic leader, surrounded by a heavy black border. So that was it: Paul Singer was dead and the Socialist Party was burying him. And what a mighty demonstration—the claim was made that a million people took part and that it was the biggest funeral in the history of Germany.

At the time I was a syndicalist, and as such had no confidence whatever in the revolutionary pretensions of the German Social Democracy. And this first view of the organization itself in action only intensified my unfavorable opinion. For one thing, coming from six months' contact with the militantly revolutionary French trade unions, I was struck by the absence of red flags in the demonstration. There were



between community planning and interest groups is discussed with the help of a scheme showing different levels of authority organization.

Conclusions centre around the low level of participation and the obstacles that prevent the exercise of influence on the planning and decision-making processes. Against these, the conditions and opportunities for increased influence on the part of those affected are discussed.

T. Maunsbach is now involved in a joint interdisciplinary project concerning industrial change and alternative employment in the declining steel-making regions.

724 MILLER, T., BURELL, U. (1978), *Kunskap och inflytande: Utvärdering av planeringssamråd i Hedemora 1975-1977* (Citizen participation in Swedish municipal planning), Bygghörsningen Report 82.

725 MILLER, T. (1979), 'The emergence of participatory policies for community development: Anglo-American experiences and their influence on Sweden', *Acta Sociologica*, 22 (2) (in English).

726 MILLER, T. (1979), 'The emergence and impact of participatory ideas on Swedish planning and local government', *Nordplan*, paper given at the Nordic Sociology Congress, Abo, 21-23 August (in English). Citizen participation does not appear as an effective strategy for increasing political activity and influence among low-resource groups. If its goals are considered important, it is necessary to analyze the phenomenon critically, defining it clearly, stating its inherent contradictions, and explaining its origins. This paper is based on empirical evaluations of participation exercises in Sweden and abroad, and against the background of more general studies of societal change and policy development.

727 THERBORN, G. et al. (1978), 'Sweden before and after social democracy: a first overview', *Acta Sociologica*, supplement on the Nordic welfare state (in English). The work examines the effects of an unusually long Social Democratic parliamentary reign on the 'welfare state', arguing that such a causal analysis has to begin with an historical study, correlational methods having little value. Sweden is thus compared with other Western societies before and at the end of the Social Democratic era in order to assess the degrees to

which and ways in which it is different.

Two alternative theses are proposed: (a) the parliamentary hypothesis, according to which societal development is determined by parliamentary politics and therefore one can expect an increasing differentiation between Sweden and other countries; (b) the class hypothesis, according to which societal development is determined by extra-parliamentary forces and reproduced, rather than represented, by the latter — unless rupture occurs in political institutions. As no such rupture occurred in Sweden in 1932 or thereafter, it can be expected that the development of Swedish society has not differed appreciably from that of other Western countries. This is evaluated against aspects of social conditions, labour relations, social and tax policies. No definite conclusions are reached, but the evidence casts reasonable doubts on the parliamentary hypothesis and indicates the use of the class hypothesis for further work.

UNITED STATES

compiled by Elizabeth Lebas with
the assistance of Francine Miller

- 728 ACTHENBERG, E., STONE, M.E. (1974), 'Tenants first: a research and organizing guide to the FHA'. Cambridge, Mass., Urban Planning Aid.
- 729 AGNEW, J.A. (1976), 'Public policy and the spatial form of the city: the case of public housing location', PhD dissertation, Ohio State University. (Also in 753.)
- 730 AIKENS, M., CASTELLS, M. (1977), 'New trends in urban studies', *Comparative Urban Research*, IV (2 & 3), pp. 7-10. This brief position paper emphasizes the need for multiple research strategies and the importance of cross-national research. The works of Hill, Mingione and Szelenyi are also discussed.
- 731 ALCALY, R.E., MERMELSTEIN, D. (eds) (1977). *The fiscal crisis of American cities. Essay on the political economy of urban America with special reference to New York*, New York, Random House. The premise of this influential book is that the American urban fiscal crisis must be understood firstly in terms of capital accumulation and

the pursuit of profits. The first section presents various interpretations of the causes of this crisis in New York. R. Zevin reviews its recent municipal economic history, R.E. Alcaly and H. Bodian stress its cyclic dimension in terms of the specific role of the banking system and municipal bond market and J. Epstein examines the profitability of urban renewal for the construction industry. The second section examines the issue more widely, in terms of its relation to patterns of urbanization, the recent growth of Southern cities, the social effects of urban decline and Federal-municipal relations, and includes among others, articles by D. Gordon, J.H. Mollenkopf, G. Sterneib and J.W. Hughes, F. Fox Piven. The last section proposes a more focused historical and political analysis of the New York situation by contributors such as R. Caro, M. Edel, R. Freedman, W.K. Tabb and D. Mermelstein.

732 ALPERT, I., MARKUSEN, A.R. (1977), 'The professional production of policy ideology and plans: an examination of Brookings and resources for the future', University of California, Santa Cruz and Berkeley (mimeo), 45pp. In this rare and historical examination of two public policy institutions, the authors adopt the position that these 'perform a brokerage function between private capital and the state'. This function, perceived as a form of production of ideology and plans, is assumed by policy professionals who translate private entrepreneurial values and state objectives into seemingly independent policy plans and rationales. The authors claim to overcome the problems of both instrumentalist and structuralist perspectives. Participant observation was the method employed.

733 ANGOTTI, T. (1977), 'The housing question and after', *Monthly Review*, 28 (5), October, pp. 39-51.

734 *Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography* (1975), 7 (1), February. The issue features a debate between G. Ives of Britain and R. Walker of Berkeley about a Marxist approach to the analysis of rent. It follows a previous essay by Walker in *Antipode*, 6 (1) (1974) in which rent is discussed as a market phenomenon linked to the role of circulation and realization in the American city. Here Ives criticizes Walker on the grounds that he does not have a proper conceptualization of social class and also does not come to

terms with the labour theory of value which he sees as crucial to the theory of rent. In turn, Walker replies in terms of a close and critical examination of Marx's value and rent theory, focusing on the relations between production and circulation, the transformation problem and conceptions of absolute and differential rent.

- 735 *Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography* (1975), 'Accumulation, housing, cultural evolution', 7 (2), special issue.
- 736 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PLANNERS (Jan. 78/79). Includes a review of Italian books in English on Italian community movements.
- 737 BIRCH, E.L. (1978), 'Women-made America. The case of early public housing policy', *American Institute of Planners Journal*, April, pp. 130-44.
- 738 BLUESTONE, B., HARRISON, B. (1980), 'Capital mobility and economic dislocation' (mimeo). Although then not for quotation, this draft adds to American radical research on inter-regional mobility of capital. With a rather simple theoretical perspective of capital, the authors successfully question both academic assessments and empirical evidence of the mechanisms and extent of firms' dislocation and relocation, providing empirical data of their economics. They also outline the social consequences of capital mobility, criticize existing policies and programmes, and propose an alternative model of capital mobility 'in a truly democratic socialist society'. B. Bluestone is at Boston College and B. Harrison is at MIT.
- 739 BLUESTONE, B., HARRISON, B. (1980), *Capital and communities — the causes and consequences of private disinvestment*, Washington DC, The Progressive Alliance.
- 739a BOOKCHIN, M. (1973), *The limits of the city*, New York, Harper and Row. Now a classic text on the relations between urban growth and organization and everyday life.
- 740 BOWLY, D. (1978), *The poorhouse: subsidized housing in Chicago, 1895-1976*, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press.
- 741 BANFIELD, E.C. (1973), *The unheavenly city*, Boston, Little Brown. A key reference text, precursor to later 'materialist' approaches.
- 742 BRETTE, B., D'ARCY, F. (1976), 'On recent urban

- research in France: The Marxist view: 1974-1975', *Comparative Urban Research*, 3 (4-6), pp. 22-8. Short critical reviews of work by M. Castells, J. Lojkin and S. Biarez et al. are presented. There is no bibliography.
- 743 BURNETT, P. (1973), 'Social change, the status of women and models of city form and development', *Antipode*, 5 (3), pp. 57-62. This is an early attempt to grapple with existing models of urban development in terms of their neglect of any analysis of sexual divisions. It is followed by a succinct critical commentary by Irene Breugel.
- 744 CORNOY, J., WEISS, M. (1973), *A house divided: radical perspectives on social problems*, Boston, Little and Brown.
- 745 CARO, R. (1974), *The power broker; Moses and the fall of New York*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
- 746 CHECKOWAY, B. (1980), 'Large builders, federal housing programmes, and postwar suburbanisation', *IJURR*, 4 (1), pp. 21-45. Contrasting images of American post-war suburban development with the few studies existent which analyze suburbanization as a process of institutional (both private and public) decision-making, the author proposes to fill this gap with a documented historical account of the institutions that 'built the suburbs' for the postwar decade.
- 747 CLAVEL, P., FORESTER, J., GOLDSMITH, W. (eds) (1980), *Urban and regional planning in the age of austerity*, New York, Pergamon Press. This collection includes articles by M.A. Weiss on 'The origins and legacy of urban renewal', A.R. Markusen on regionalism, C. Hartman and M. Stone on a socialist housing strategy, R. Appelbaum and P. Dreir on rent control, R. Burlage and L. Kennedy on health planning; in addition to contributions by Clavel, Forester, Goldsmith, R. Beauregard, H. Baum, H. Goldstein, J.L. Sarbib, J. Kussy, M. Regan and Joel Freidman.
- 748 CLOWARD, R., FOX PIVEN, F. (1975), *The politics of turmoil*, New York, Vintage Books. Essential for understanding the nature of American urban politics and grass-roots movements.
- 749 CLOWARD, R.A., FOX PIVEN, F. (1977), *Poor people's movements: studies from the contemporary United States*, New York, Pantheon.
- 750 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, The Graduate School of Ar-

- chitecture and Planning, 410 Avery Hall, New York, NY 10027. The continuing *Papers in Planning* (PIP) series contains working-papers and reprints, and includes pieces on the politics of urban planning by C. Boyce, the political sociology of housing tenure by P. Marcuse, the position of women in urban professions by J. Leavitt, and health planning by R. Burlage among others. See in particular PIP no. 20, 'Public crises for private profits: on the usefulness of the urban fiscal crisis' (98pp) and PIP 20a, 'The targeted crisis: on the ideology of the urban fiscal crisis and its uses' (36pp), both by P. Marcuse, 1980 and 1981. The latter forthcoming in *IJURR*, 5 (3), 1981.
- 751 *Comparative Urban Research* (1978), 5 (2-3). This issue is devoted to a discussion of the impact of Marxist approaches on existing American urban sociology. It includes a critical article by C.S. Fisher and a reply by D. Harvey, an outline of the uses of Marxist theory as a foundation for urban sociology by J. Bensman, which is critical of the structuralist perspective; a review of the neglected use of the ethnographic method by M.E. Brown as well as articles by T. Clark and I. Szeleny, and finally an overview of new research directions and tasks by the Research Planning Group on Urban Social Services. Altogether this periodical is of interest not only for its contents, but also for its receptivity to European developments. For example, previous issues have contained a bibliography on urban anthropology (1978), and a special number on 'Urban proletariat politics', 3 (3), 1975/6.
- 752 COX, K.R., REYNOLDS, D.R., ROKKAN, S. (eds) (1974), *Locational approaches to power and conflict*, New York, Sage-Halstead.
- 753 COX, K.R. (ed.) (1978), *Urbanisation and conflict in market societies*, London and New York, Methuen and Co. Two objectives underlie this collection; a theoretical and descriptive examination of the conditions under which conflict exists in capitalist cities, and an attempt to move away from both liberal and instrumental interpretations of urban conflict. The text is divided into three sections; the first being a theoretical examination of the conditions of conflict, the second a description of cases of locational conflicts and

- the third a number of analyses of locational outcomes with a focus on an historical interpretation of urban growth. The text includes among others, articles by D. Harvey, S.T. Roweis and A.J. Scott, M.J. Dean and J. Long, R.A. Walker, K. Young and J. Kramer.
- 754 COX, K.R., NARTOWICZ, F.Z. (1980), 'Jurisdictional fragmentation in the American metropolis: Alternative perspectives', *IJURR*, 4 (2), pp. 196-211.
- 755 CRISIS READER EDITORIAL COLLECTIVE (1978), *US capitalism in crisis*, New York, Economics Education Project, The Union of Radical Political Economists (URPE). This large paperback written in an accessible style, is of interest not only for its various interpretations of the American economic and social crisis of the 1970s, but also for its emerging outline of a theory of disaccumulation. Section A, part II, on 'Workers and Jobs' includes articles by B. Heil and the Santa Cruz Collective on global and 'Sunbelt' labour migration, while Section C, 'Communities in Crisis' includes relevant articles on urban government, housing, health services and the family by among others, K. Fox, M.E. Stone and E. Zaretsky, while Parts III and IV are devoted to theoretical analyses and political proposals. The text also contains besides a number of empirical tables, a full statistical appendix covering employment and fiscal data for the period 1951-1976.
- 756 CUIILLER, J. (1978), 'Mobility and Social Organization of space in the United States, 1760-1820', *IJURR*, 2 (2), pp. 270-68. Class conflict in the north-eastern cities between 1760 and 1820 surrounded the appearance of commodity labour in the USA during this period. This transformation must be understood in terms of a 'primitive mobility' which preceded the 'primitive accumulation' of capital. The relation between town and country also lays the bases not only for the economic policies of the early nineteenth century, but also for popular resistance whose origins can be traced to an earlier rival and communitarian ideology which was not shown by new European immigrants.
- 757 DINER, H.R. (1979), *Women and urban society. A guide to information guide series*, Detroit, Gale Research Co.
- 758 DI TOMASO, N. (1978), 'Public employee unions and the urban fiscal crisis', *The Insurgent Sociologist*, special issue

- 'Essays on the social relations of work and labour', 8 (2-3), Fall, pp. 191-205. In her examination of a neglected area of study, the author proposes a documented explanation of the rise and relative decline of unionization among municipal employees during the 1960s and 1970s. Sectorial comparisons are made, these being related to other unions, employers and clients: the text also includes a brief overview of wage gains, negotiations and levels of militancy for the period 1967-75.
- 759 DORFMAN, D. (1975), 'Greenlining Chicago', *Working Papers for a New Society*, Summer, pp. 32-6.
- 760 EDEL, M., SCLAR, E. (eds) (1974), *Working papers, Boston studies in urban political economy*, Queens College, CUNY (mimeo). These working papers still in progress at the time of compilation, are to be published in 1981-82. They centre around the theme of Boston's suburban growth since the 1870s, focusing on the relations between city government and the property market.
- 761 EDEL, M., SCLAR, E., LURIA, D. (forthcoming), *Shaky palaces*. This book in preparation which is due for publication in 1981-82 is based on the authors' long-term research on the land economic history of Boston's urbanization.
- 762 EDEL, M. (1976), 'Not blaming the victim in studies of suburban growth', paper delivered at the 23rd North American Meeting of the Regional Science Association, 12-14 November. In this paper based on an extensive study of the suburbanization of Boston, the author contests the notion that suburbanization can be envisaged in terms of a general social progress which has been accompanied by an equalization of wealth and an increase in social and spatial mobility. Drawing from a wide range of historical, political and academic sources (in particular Engels' writings), the discussion focuses on interpretations which have been put forward on the meaning and problems of home-ownership for the US working-class, comparing them in the last section to interpretations on the value and drawbacks of tenancy.
- 763 EDEL, M., SCLAR, E. (1975), 'The distribution of real estate value changes: metropolitan Boston, 1870-1970', *Journal of Urban Economics*, Fall.
- 764 EDEL, M. (1977), 'Rent theory and working class strategy: Marx, George and the urban crisis', *The Review of Radical*

- Political Economics*, 9 (4), pp. 1-13. Against a critical discussion of the implications of analyses of land rent for urban struggles, the author introduces and juxtaposes three nineteenth-century theories of rent (classical, populist and Marxist), illustrating both their shortcomings and relevance for local housing strategies.
- 765 EWEN, L.A. (1978), *Corporate power and urban crisis in Detroit*, Princeton, Princeton University Press. While instrumentalist in its perspective, this text offers a case study on the historical and political relations between the rise, dominance and present crisis of a major industry, municipal government and interest groups. It also provides some empirically based insights on the local political management of unemployment and marginalization.
- 766 FAINSTEIN, N.I., FAINSTEIN, S.S. (1974), *Urban political movements*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.
- 767 FESHBACK, D., SHIPHUCK, L. (1973), 'Corporate regionalism in the United States', *Kapitalist State* 1 (1).
- 768 FRIEDEN, B.J., KAPLAN, M. (1975), *The politics of neglect: urban aid from model cities to revenue sharing*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
- 769 FRIEDLAND, R., PIVEN, F.F., ALFORD, R.R. (1977), 'Political conflict, urban structure and the fiscal crisis', *IJURR*, 1 (3), pp. 447-71. Also in: D. Ashford (ed.) (1978), *Comparing public policies*, Sage Yearbooks in Politics and Public Policy, vol. 4, pp. 197-225. Informed by the works of O'Connor and Huntington among others, the authors suggest a theoretical perspective on the role of the state in capital accumulation and political integration in terms of their consequent spatial effects. They argue that over time urban governments become structured in ways that allow them to support economic growth and regulate political participation so as to mediate potential conflict arising from contradictions between the two functions. They propose that variations between countries and cities in the degree of centralization/decentralization of government functions and the degree to which economic and political functions are segregated within urban governments may help account for differences in their ability to cope with political conflict. At the same time, the subsequent growth of governmental services, the diversion of struggles at the point of production

into struggles over the allocation of resources leads to cumulative fiscal strain in place of class conflict.

- 770 FRIEDLAND, R. (ed.) (1979), 'Social services and the state: class conflict and accumulation', special issue, *International Journal of Health Services*.
- 771 FRIEDLAND, R. (forthcoming), *Power and crisis in the central city*, London, Macmillan.
- 772 FRIEDMAN, J., WEAVER, C. (1979), *Territory and function. The Evolution of Regional Planning Doctrine*, London, Edward Arnold. This text provides on the one hand an insightful historical overview of the institutional origins and evolution of dominant American planning 'doctrines' and on the other, puts forward an interpretation of the social, political, and ideological significance of two fundamental distinctions in planning ideology and practice: territorial and functional planning. These distinctions are firstly related to changes in the evolution of American capitalism and then articulated to an analysis of their consequences for planning in the Third World, the authors arguing the case for territorial forms of planning.
- 773 FUSFIELD, D. (1973), *The basic economics of the urban racial crisis*, New York, Holt, Rhinehart and Winston.
- 774 GELFUND, M. (1975), *A nation of cities: the federal government and urban America, 1933-1975*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- 775 GEORGAKAS, D., SURKIN, M. (1975), *Detroit: I do mind dying*, New York, St Martin's Press. The text revolves around two detailed accounts of class struggles in Detroit — against city government and against General Motors — and provides much information on working and living conditions in the motor industry, the relation of the latter to the UAW union and the local judicial system.
- 776 GOLDSTEIN, H.A., ROSENBERRY, S.A. (eds) (1978), *The structural crisis of the 1970's and beyond: the need for a new planning theory*, Blackburg, College of Architecture and Urban Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Proceedings of the Blackburg Conference on Planning Theory (mimeo), 227pp. The theme of this conference was to relate in a critical manner three dimensions of planning: the social reality of the professional planner, theoretical issues, and planning practice. The proceedings

- contain lively discussions and papers by among others, Painstein, Bayer, Noyelle, Beauregard, Applebaum, Clavel, etc. and also contains useful references.
- 777 GOODMAN, R. (1979), *The last entrepreneurs: America's regional wars for jobs and dollars*, New York, Simon and Schuster.
- 778 HARTMAN, C. (1974), *Yerba Buena. Land grab and community resistance in San Francisco*, San Francisco, Glide Publications. This closely documented study focuses on two decades (1953-73) of the politics of urban renewal in an inner-city district, placing them in the context of the rise (and recent breakdown) of pro-growth coalitions in large American cities and highlighting the use of government funds and role of urban professionals in subsidizing property speculation. In turn, it also examines specifically American forms of resistance to displacement and redevelopment, and also touches on the little-researched phenomenon of the urban impact of big-business sports.
- 779 HARVEY, D. (1973), *Social justice and the city*, London, Edward Arnold. With the work of O'Connor, perhaps the most influential text of this period for Anglo-Saxon developments in Marxist approaches to urban rent, urban and regional development in advanced capitalist countries. (Only a selection of Harvey's works are here listed.)
- 780 HARVEY, D. (1974), 'Class-monopoly rent, finance capital and the urban revolution', *Regional Studies*, 8, pp. 239-55.
- 781 HARVEY, D. (1976), 'Labour, capital and class struggle around the built environment in advanced capitalist societies', *Politics and Society*, 6 (3), pp. 65-295. In this article Harvey attempts to articulate a conception of the built environment (as a 'mass of humanly constructed physical resources') to a specifically capitalist setting, outlining the areas of class struggle to its production and use and pointing out the dual evolution of the socialization of labour and rationalization of consumption.
- 782 HARVEY, D. (1977), 'The geography of capitalist accumulation: a reconstruction of Marxian theory', *Antipode*, 7 (2), pp. 9-12. This article contributed to the foundation of a specifically American social historical approach to the geography of uneven capital accumulation and dis-accumulation over the American territory.

- 783 HARVEY, D. (1978), 'The urban process under capitalism: a framework for analysis', *IJURR*, 2 (1), pp. 101-31. In this essay which both resumes and extends his problematic, Harvey analyzes the role of investments in the built environment in relation to the structure and contradictions of the accumulation process. Within this perspective, long-term investment cycles and their geographic effects are examined, as is, in turn, the way the built environment itself expresses and exacerbates capitalist crises. The last section of the essay considers the way the class struggle influences the directions and forms of investments in the built environment, and how this process has the tendency of both to relate and displace struggles away from the workplace to the home as places of reproduction of labour power.
- 784 HAYDEN, D. (1976), *Seven American utopias: the architecture of communitarian socialism 1790-1975*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.
- 785 HAYDN, D., WRIGHT, G. (1976), 'Architecture and urban planning', *Signs Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, Spring, pp. 923-33. Remains a very useful review essay on the state of the literature on and by women in these urban professions.
- 786 HAYDN, D. (1980), *A grand domestic revolution: American visions of household liberation*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. Biographical discussions of feminists in late nineteenth-century America provide a major insight into the struggles and ideologies surrounding the privatization of domestic life and labour in its relations to urban and housing design.
- 787 HERSHORN, L. (1979), 'The theory of social services and disaccumulationist capitalism', *International Journal of Health Services*, 9 (2), pp. 295-311. This article, among other texts by the same author, has relevance for contemplating theoretically the issue of the provision of social services and infrastructures in a situation whereby the labour market itself is decaying and a process of delegitimation of social provision has emerged, thus questioning theses which examine public provision in terms of accumulation and the reproduction of labour power. In this essay Hershorn outlines the intellectual history of the dis-accumulation thesis and puts forward ten descriptive/

- 788 theoretical propositions on the nature of 'dis-accumulation'. HOCH, C., FRIEDMAN, J. (1979), *Radical urban political economy: a bibliographical introduction*, Iowa State University, mimeo 45. Although not annotated, this bibliography forwarded by a short introduction, provides a rapid overview of Marxist and critical texts, focusing on American and British research.

*Institute for Policy Studies —
Conference on Alternative State and Local Policy,
Washington, DC (miscellaneous entries):*

- 789 SHEARER, D., WEBB, L. (eds) (1976), *Second annual public policy reader*, Conference proceedings Austin, Texas, 10-13 June (mimeo), 654pp. The purpose of these readers is to make available knowledge about the most innovative bills, ordinances and programmes in state and local government and also to stimulate their critical discussion. This particular example includes information and papers around the themes of neighbourhood government, criminal justice, government reform, education, women's legislation, food, land and growth, health, corporations control, energy, economic development, tax reform, political organization and long-term programmes. It provides a useful profile of social policy trends and alternative forms of organizations and policy proposals and includes papers by academics and activists.
- 790 MARSCHALL, D. (ed.) (1979), *The battle for Cleveland*.
- 791 RIDGEWAY, J. (1979), *Energy-efficient community planning*.
- 792 WEBB, L. (ed.) (1979), *Public policies for the 1980's*.
- 793 *Kapitalistate* (1976), 'The urban crisis and the Kapitalistate', special issue, nos. 4-5. This issue which reflects both French and German theoretical influences was perhaps the first and also most coherent statement of Marxist perspectives in American urban and regional studies of the period. It includes M. Castells' 'Wild city', R. Child Hill on the urban

- fiscal crisis, A. Markusen on the fiscal and political relations between suburbs and central city, as well as articles by S. Clarke and Ginsburg, M. Edel, S. Sandie-Biermann and an article by A. Evers on 'State structure and state interventionism'. This periodical also occasionally contains essays relevant to the field of urban and regional studies.
- 794 KRAUSHAAR, R. (1979), 'Pragmatic radicalism', *IJURR*, 3 (1), pp. 62-80. Within the evolution over the past decade of analyses of community struggles from pluralist to class perspectives, the author examines current ideologies and strategies in British community action and arrives at its analytical description in terms of its 'pragmatic radicalism'. Its nature is defined as the day-to-day alliances and negotiating strategies of industrial and community groups who lack real political power and as a consequence experience difficulties in developing a coherent and long-term political objective. Three levels of action are analyzed and illustrated: industrial, community and local government.
- 795 LURIA, D. (1976), 'Wealth, capital and power: the social meaning of homeownership', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Fall.
- 796 MARCUSE, P. (1972), 'Homeownership for low income families', *Hard Economics*, May.
- 797 MARCUSE, P. (1975), 'Residential alienation: home ownership and the limits of shelter policy', *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare*, 3 (2).
- 798 MARCUSE, P. (1978), 'Housing policy and the myth of the benevolent state', *Social Policy*, Jan-Feb. (Also in 312.) This article offers an historical overview beginning with the inter-war period in America of national housing policies and their class effects and struggles. It examines in particular the relations between the private rented sector and homeownership and dwells also on their implications for urban development and planning.
- 799 MARKUSEN, A.R. (1979), 'Regionalism and the capitalist state: the case of the United States', *Kapitalistate*, 7. This article argues that regional delineations are increasingly politically determined and focused on growth of the state sector and that conflicts over regional deployment of state subsidies and regulation have become a major feature of ad-

v. led capitalist development. Unlike capitalist economic activity, the state has an explicit territorial basis which provokes political activity on territorial lines which are not necessarily congruent with the spatial expressions of economic activity.

- 800 MARKUSEN, A.R. (1980), 'Regions and regionalism: a Marxist view', Institute of Urban and Regional Development, working paper no. 326, University of California, Berkeley (mimeo). Regionalism is not a generalizable concept because as a physical entity it does not refer as such to social relations. Instead regions can be understood as territorial arenas of capitalist relations from which political claims are made on the state. It is important not to fetishize regions in a way which interprets the social relations of one place as exploiting another, for this type of analysis fuses the role of the state with social relations found within and across territories. An understanding of regional patterning of capitalist development and political struggles must incorporate a theory of the state and specific empirical analyses.
- 801 McGUIGAN, P., SCHAEFFER, R. (eds) (1979), *Developing the public economy: models from Massachusetts*, Cambridge, Mass., Policy Training Centre.
- 802 MILLER, S.M. (1978), 'The recapitalization of capitalism', *IJURR*, 2 (2), pp. 202-12.
- 803 MOLLENKOPF, J., PYNOOS, J. (1972), 'Property politics and local housing policy', *Politics and Society*, Summer.
- 804 MOLLENKOPF, John H. (1979), 'Paths toward the post-industrial service city: the northeast and the southwest', paper prepared for a conference on Municipal Fiscal Stress — Problems and Potentials — co-sponsored by the Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy Research and the Office of Policy Development and Research, US Department of Housing and Urban Development, held 8-9 March 1979, at Miami Beach, Florida (mimeo), 40pp.
- 805 MOLLENKOPF, J. (forthcoming), *Growth defined: community organisation and political conflict over urban development in America*.
- 806 MOLOTCH, H. (1976), 'The city as growth machine', *American Journal of Sociology*, 82 (2).
- 807 MOLOTCH, J. (1978), 'Capital and neighbourhoods in the United States', *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 14 (3).

- 808 MORVIES, D., HESS, K. (1975), *Neighbourhood power: the new localism*, Boston, Beacon Press.
- 809 NOYELLE, T. (ed.) (1976), *1976 Symposium on Planning Theory*, papers in Planning no. 2, University of Pennsylvania, Department of City Planning, December (mimeo). Of particular interest is the paper by H. Goldstein and T. Noyelle entitled, 'Planning and social practice: a theory of capitalist planning in the U.S.'.
- 810 O'CONNOR, J. (1973), *The fiscal crisis of the state*, New York, St Martin's Press. Beginning with the proposition that the state must fulfill the contradictory functions of accumulation and legitimation, O'Connor puts forward two major theses on the fiscal crisis of the state, namely, that (a) the growth of the state sector is functioning increasingly as the basis of growth for monopoly capital and total production, and that (b) the fiscal crisis is exacerbated by the private appropriation of state power for particular ends. These theses hinge around a two-fold characterization of state expenditure which as social capital correspond to the state's two essential functions and which is distinguished as social investment and social consumption capitals. The text is devoted to a critical development and illustration of these theoretical premises. Chapter 5 focuses on issues of particular importance for urban fiscal analysis, namely the organization of social consumption outlays in terms of the administrative and territorial contradictions of urban governments. This is illustrated by the exploitative role of the suburbs vis-à-vis the inner city. This text has been influential not only in opening up debates and research on the fiscal crisis of American cities, but also in Europe where in particular, it has influenced the work of Mingione and Folin.
- 811 O'DONNELL, P. (1977), 'Industrial capitalism and the rise of modern American cities', *Kapitalstate*, 6, Fall, pp. 91-128. Sharing with others the viewpoint that a theory of the city can only be understood in relation to a general theory of the nature of capitalist society, O'Donnell proposes a historical focus which examines the emergence of industrial American cities in the mid-nineteenth century in terms of what he considers their transformation from a colonial and essentially household economy to one of sectorial

- specialization related to the organization of industrial production. Having identified the industrial American city in terms of four major sectors of transformation — production, social reproduction, infrastructural development and state/political intervention, O'Donnell outlines major urban changes of the period, providing some useful insights in the 'reconstruction' of the urban family, the rise of mass education and cultural activities and communications.
- 812 O'DONNELL, P. (1978), 'The beginnings of the modern home in the 1920's', *Childhood and Government Project*, working paper no. 19, University of California, Berkeley, 38pp. Articulating the relations between economic and urban changes in America in the 1920s, the author places into perspective developments in the previous era and also suggests analogies useful for current urban analysis. The change of emphasis from production to consumption, the increasing differentiation of the labour force and the appearance of mass unemployment gave rise to new political and economic advantages, to new values about the home and the individual, to new architectural forms (e.g. the 'small house') and also to present patterns of residential and ethnic segregation and suburbanization. The author focuses on three essential aspects (the family, the cities, housing).
- 813 O'DONNELL, P. (1978), 'Capitalism and cities: a critical examination of the rise of industrial cities and the making of the first modern cities in America', PhD dissertation, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
- 814 PEET, R. (ed.) (1977), *Radical geography: alternative points of view on contemporary social issues*, London, Methuen and Co. This important collection of essays which includes articles by Peet, Stone, Massey, Harvey, Lefebvre, Galois and Slater, illustrates both the initiatives which social geography has taken in developing radical and Marxist analyses to urban and regional issues and the interdisciplinary approaches necessary to introduce them.
- 815 PERLMAN, J. (1976), 'Grassrooting the system', *Social Policy*, 7 (2), Sept.-Oct. An article which has been influential in Britain and the USA in redirecting research on community action.
- 816 PERRY, D.C., WATKINS, A.J. (eds) (1978), *The rise of the sunbelt cities*, Beverly Hills, Sage. This collection has

- been influential both in developing the historical study of the spatial evolution of capital accumulation and more precisely, in introducing research and debates around the relationships between the decline of industrial cities in the north and north-east of the USA and the accompanying growth of Southern cities and regions.
- 817 PHILPOTT, T. (1978), *The slum and the ghetto*, New York, Oxford University Press. Adopting an historical perspective as a means of countering conventional ecological approaches to the study of neighbourhoods, the author examines the formations of uni-ethnic ghettos and their political and social relations with the city.
- 818 PIVEN, F.F., CLOWARD, R.A. (1972), *Regulating the poor: the function of public welfare*, London, Tavistock. Focusing on the evolution of public welfare policies in the USA from the Great Depression to the Great Society programmes of the 1960s, the authors examine their relations to economic cycles, their role in containing civil disorders and regulating local labour markets, and the implications they have for local government fiscal and political management.
- 819 *Planners' Network*, Box 4671 Sather Gate Station, Berkeley, California 94704. This newsletter, which reports regularly on current research, forthcoming and past conferences, employment opportunities, courses, recently published texts and opinions in the fields of planning and urban studies, is invaluable as a means of keeping in touch with American developments. Until recently edited single-handedly by Chester Hartman, it now has a nation-wide collective editorship.
- 820 RABINOVITZ, F. (1974-75), 'The study of urban politics and the politics of urban study', *Comparative Urban Research*, 2 (6), pp. 5-16. This review article traces the evolution from the early 1960s of the study of urban politics, pointing out the changing relationships between research and policy responses, and purposes an agenda for future work. In the same issue Alvin Magid comments.
- 821 *Review of Radical Political Economics* (1978), special issue, 'Uneven regional development', 10 (3). Backed by an introduction which clearly summarizes the various approaches to the study of uneven regional development and their analytical problems, the essays which focus geographically

on Canada, Europe and the USA, provide altogether a succinct statement of the situation of research in this field in the late 1970s. It contains among others, significant articles by R.A. Walker, D. Massey, J. Overton, A.R. Markusen, as well as a review essay of Castell's *Urban question* by M. Feldman.

- 822 RIFKIN, J., BARBER, R. (1978), *The north will rise again: pensions, politics and power in the 1980s*, Peoples Business Commission, Boston, Mass., Beacon Press, 279pp. The book looks at the competing claims of unions the north-eastern industrial states and local governments, and the corporate/banking community for control of pension fund capital in the US. Section I examines the internal policies and external pressures leading to the decline of organized labour and of these so-called 'Graybelt' states, and the loosening of their ties with the private sector. Section II examines the historical development of pension fund capital, the ways it is presently being used, and the claims and counterclaims by unions, states and local governments and the financial community for control over it. A final section focuses on the potential for using pension fund capital as an opening wedge in developing basic economic alternatives in the US.
- 823 ROLY, P. (ed.) (1974), *The poverty establishment*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall. This collection of essays, which contains articles by H.M. Watchel and L. Sauers, D. Willman, B. Bluestone and F.F. Piven, discusses various aspects of government welfare spending, incomes distribution, manpower training and urban labour markets.
- 824 *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (1980), 'Women in the American city', special issue, 5 (3). Contains multidisciplinary theoretical, historical prescriptive contributions to the analysis of the position of women in American cities. There is a useful section on ongoing research and a review article by G. Werkevele. Reviewed in *IJURR*, 5 (3), 1981.
- 825 SIMON, R.M. (1980), 'The labour process and uneven development: the Appalachian coalfields 1880-1930', *IJURR*, 4 (1), pp. 46-71. Having critically reviewed current approaches to the study of uneven regional development, the author develops a framework for analysis based on the

- labour process. More precisely, he argues in the case of West Virginia that for the period considered that class conflict in the coalfields led to the reinforcement of the domination over labour rather than its freeing, and that moreover, this domination was qualitatively different from pre-capitalist forms — this having effects on the present renewal of economic growth in this region.
- 826 SMITH, M.P. (1980), *The city and social theory*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. In offering a close and critical reappraisal of the writings of five theorists of urban culture and personality — Wirth, Freud, Simmels, Roszak and Sennett — the author unveils specific aspects of the ideological connotations of 'urbanism' and proposes an alternative viewpoint based on a consideration of the role of planning in advanced capitalism and the extent to which neighbourhood political structures can counter the power of corporate centralization.
- 827 SOJA, E.W. (1978), 'Topian Marxism and spatial praxis: a reconsideration of the political economy of space', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, 9-12 April. Beginning from a critique of the work of Harvey, Lefebvre and Castells, this paper proposes to elaborate further a conceptualization of what is termed the socio-spatial dialectic whereby space is neither considered as a separate structure, nor as the simple expression of class relations, but as a 'dialectically defined component of the general socio-spatial relations of production'.
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WALTER LIPPMANN

Votes must represent the size of that power: all other votes are a menace. Platforms must be written for the purpose of keeping the campaign to the essential issues. Propaganda and political action can be united by taking part in public affairs without the responsibility of office. Elections are the last goal of political action, and not the first. They should come only when the social forces are organized and ready.

This letter is very long, yet it is far too short for the subject. I have had to compress so much that many statements will appear unsupported by argument or evidence. I do not know how to avoid that. I hope you will read not to confute but to understand. I hope that in any discussion which may ensue no one will try to be smart and score debating points. They will only confuse what is already very confusing.

Fraternally yours,

Walter Lippmann

October 29, 1913

46 East 80th Street
New York City.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

The manuscript collection that was of greatest general use to the essays in this volume is the Socialist Party of America Papers at Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina. Since these papers contain a large amount of material relating to Socialist locals, they are especially pertinent to the needs of any study dealing with municipal socialism. Other manuscript collections will be mentioned in the following discussion of the cities analyzed by the essays herein. A most useful guide to library and archival holdings is Bernard K. Johnpoll, "Manuscript Sources in American Radicalism," *Labor History* 14 (Winter 1973), 92-97. Another source valuable to all essays in this book is the U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of the United States*, for the decennial periods from 1890 through the present.

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The most useful manuscript collection for the study of Reading is

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No prior scholarly monograph or article has been written exclusively pertaining to the Bridgeport Socialist experience. Manuscript collections which were most valuable to study socialism in that city are: The McLevy and Schwarzkopf Collections at the University of Bridgeport; the Records of the W.P.A., Connecticut, 1935-1944, in the Connecticut State Library, Hartford; the Harry Hopkins Papers and the Official Files 300 in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., both of which contain detailed comments about localities throughout the United States, especially the latter which includes reports to James Farley about "Elections and Forecasts, Analyses and Results"; the collection at the Tamiment Institute Library, New York City; and the H-9500 file in Record Group 196 referring to public housing, National Archives, Suitland, Maryland. The scrapbook of former Bridgeport Socialist officeholder, Jack Bergen, assisted in the writing of the Bridgeport essay as did an oral history project conducted by the author; the oral history project is on file at the University of Bridgeport. The *New Leader* provided excellent coverage of the early years of the McLevy administration and the *Bridgeport Post* and *Telegram* offer daily reports of the city's municipal socialism. Two helpful official publications are the *City of Bridgeport, Manual* (the 1936 edition was used) and the *Municipal Register*; the latter provides voting returns for the year preceding the one in which the volume is published. Copies of the *Registers* and other useful material can be found in the Bishop Room of the Bridgeport Public Library. Aside from the U.S. Census, information about Bridgeport population and

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